Intuition, evolution and God
Ever since evolution by natural selection was conceived of, there have been worries that an evolutionary account of our intuitions will undermine the credibility of those intuitions. (The early worries were about moral intuitions, but the worry generalizes to all intuitions)
For example, take the intuition that we have reason to think our sense-impressions resemble an external world.
Well, if there actually is an external world that resembles the content of some sense-impressions, then clearly a reproductive advantage would be enjoyed by those whose sense-impressions did resemble the world and whose intuition told them that they have reason to believe this.
But we do not need to posit reasons to believe anything in order for this explanation to work (or so the worry goes). We need to posit an external world and sensory faculties that generate sense-impressions whose content resembles the world. And that, combined with evolution by natural selection, will generate creatures like us: creatures who have intuitions that tell them to believe their sense-impressions are 'of' a world.
Well, if we do not need to posit any reasons to believe things, then Ockham's razor tells us not to do so.
The problem, however, is that this now means we have no reason to believe that there's an external world or that the theory of evolution by natural selection is true and no reason to believe anything I just argued.
Any argument - any case - that ends by concluding that we do not have any reason to believe anything is self-undermining. For arguments are just attempts to show us what we have reason to believe.
We can safely dismiss such arguments, then. They are, in effect, arguments against arguments. Only a fool or a scoundrel makes an argument against arguments.
But now we have a puzzle. We cannot - without being a fool or a scoundrel - deny the reality of reasons to believe things. And so we have to admit that our intuition - which is the means by which we are aware of reasons to believe things - tells us about something real. Yet a purely evolutionary story about how we developed a faculty of intuition tells us that what they are telling us about - reasons to believe things - are not real at all, but just things it was adaptive for our ancestors to believe in.
Does this mean we must conclude that evolution by natural selection is false? No, it just means it cannot be all encompassing. Again: any case for thinking it is all encompassing is actually a case against cases, and thus is the case of a fool. For again: if you think it is all encompassing, then it turns out that there are no reasons to believe anything, which means there's no reason to believe evolution by natural selection is true!
But in what way does the account need supplementing? Well, the case for evolution by natural selection presupposes that there are reasons to believe things. And reasons to believe things require God. Sorry, but they do. So the case for evolution by natural selection presupposes that God exists. And it is this that shows how it could come to pass that we have a faculty of intuition that tells us about reasons to believe things. For the world that evolution by natural selection posits is a place that is deadly dangerous. It quickly kills those who fail to navigate it well. Well, wouldn't a good person try and warn people about those dangers? Wouldn't they equip those they know are living there - or destined to live there - with a faculty of intuition that would tell them how best to make use of their sensible faculties so as to be able to navigate the world more safely? I think so. Seems reasonable. And of course, those who are equipped with such a faculty will, if it is reliable and they trust it, be selected for as the world won't kill them as quickly as it does others.
In this way, I think, we can explain why we can trust - or at least, default trust - our intuitions. Evolution by natural selection presupposes that there is an external world in which such forces of selection are operating and that we are, in some sense, 'in' it. But it also presupposes that there are reasons to believe things and thus presupposes God. And it is with those presuppositions that it gets the job done. But if you try and do without God, then the theory undermines itself as it undermines the epistemic status of all our intuitions, including those that the case for evolution by natural selection appeals to.
For example, take the intuition that we have reason to think our sense-impressions resemble an external world.
Well, if there actually is an external world that resembles the content of some sense-impressions, then clearly a reproductive advantage would be enjoyed by those whose sense-impressions did resemble the world and whose intuition told them that they have reason to believe this.
But we do not need to posit reasons to believe anything in order for this explanation to work (or so the worry goes). We need to posit an external world and sensory faculties that generate sense-impressions whose content resembles the world. And that, combined with evolution by natural selection, will generate creatures like us: creatures who have intuitions that tell them to believe their sense-impressions are 'of' a world.
Well, if we do not need to posit any reasons to believe things, then Ockham's razor tells us not to do so.
The problem, however, is that this now means we have no reason to believe that there's an external world or that the theory of evolution by natural selection is true and no reason to believe anything I just argued.
Any argument - any case - that ends by concluding that we do not have any reason to believe anything is self-undermining. For arguments are just attempts to show us what we have reason to believe.
We can safely dismiss such arguments, then. They are, in effect, arguments against arguments. Only a fool or a scoundrel makes an argument against arguments.
But now we have a puzzle. We cannot - without being a fool or a scoundrel - deny the reality of reasons to believe things. And so we have to admit that our intuition - which is the means by which we are aware of reasons to believe things - tells us about something real. Yet a purely evolutionary story about how we developed a faculty of intuition tells us that what they are telling us about - reasons to believe things - are not real at all, but just things it was adaptive for our ancestors to believe in.
Does this mean we must conclude that evolution by natural selection is false? No, it just means it cannot be all encompassing. Again: any case for thinking it is all encompassing is actually a case against cases, and thus is the case of a fool. For again: if you think it is all encompassing, then it turns out that there are no reasons to believe anything, which means there's no reason to believe evolution by natural selection is true!
But in what way does the account need supplementing? Well, the case for evolution by natural selection presupposes that there are reasons to believe things. And reasons to believe things require God. Sorry, but they do. So the case for evolution by natural selection presupposes that God exists. And it is this that shows how it could come to pass that we have a faculty of intuition that tells us about reasons to believe things. For the world that evolution by natural selection posits is a place that is deadly dangerous. It quickly kills those who fail to navigate it well. Well, wouldn't a good person try and warn people about those dangers? Wouldn't they equip those they know are living there - or destined to live there - with a faculty of intuition that would tell them how best to make use of their sensible faculties so as to be able to navigate the world more safely? I think so. Seems reasonable. And of course, those who are equipped with such a faculty will, if it is reliable and they trust it, be selected for as the world won't kill them as quickly as it does others.
In this way, I think, we can explain why we can trust - or at least, default trust - our intuitions. Evolution by natural selection presupposes that there is an external world in which such forces of selection are operating and that we are, in some sense, 'in' it. But it also presupposes that there are reasons to believe things and thus presupposes God. And it is with those presuppositions that it gets the job done. But if you try and do without God, then the theory undermines itself as it undermines the epistemic status of all our intuitions, including those that the case for evolution by natural selection appeals to.
Comments (256)
Some people (I'm not super familiar with their argument) argue that theism also suffers from an issue of circularity and regress. I'm not sure I follow their argument, so I can't comment on that side.
A forum member here made a good argument that naturalism assumes a metaphysic, so it isn't a full metaphysical stance; I'll see if I can find it.
My argument is different. My point is that any case for evolution by natural selection presupposes that there are reasons to believe things. And those, in turn, presuppose God. And it is the combination of God and a dangerous world that explains why we have developed fairly reliable faculties of rational intuition.
No. Evolution is just a description of a process. No need to believe anything.
You have the knowledge of an average college freshman. Show some modesty and do philosophy.
Show me how by addressing the argument in the OP. Dad.
I am not your father.
I did. Clearly you cannot respond.
You made the inane observation that the theory of evolution is just a description of a processs.
That didn't address anything I'd argued in my OP, and so in a vain attempt to get you to engage with the argument I asked you whether you thought there was any reason to think it true.
You then insulted me. And I then insulted you back much better. It's the way of things.
It is true. It is standard.
Read the OP again. Engage with the argument I made.
Goodnight, sweet troll.
What are the reasons to believe "all reasons to believe things require God"?
And then there's the indirect argument provided by my argument in the OP. It can't reasonably be denied that our faculty of reason tells us about something real (see the OP for details). Yet unless we posit God - or at least a person who is concerned, at least to some extent, about our welfare in this dangerous world - who has provided us a faculty of intuition to inform us of what we have reason to do and believe, we will be forced to conclude that our faculty of intuition tells us about nothing real. But that's a self-undermining conclusion and thus we have to suppose our faculty of intuition has been implanted in us by a person, rather than developed by blind forces of evolution alone.
I suggest you now post a crying with laughter emoticon.
Like, lmao. This is trash.
Hahaha
People are supposed to take this seriously.
???
Sorry, but they don't.
Woah, did you see the powerful argument that I put forth?
And as someone has already noted above, there's a similar argument to mine that's very well known, made by Alvin Plantinga. No doubt you've read it.
The case in question:
Quoting Bartricks
Trash.
See how this argument works?
This is the only line worth anything in the OP, and it is worth nothing.
Note, you have yet to do this. You simply told me your 'intuitions' about certain matters. I then asked you in what way that was relevant to the OP. You then asked me whether I trust your intuitions. Well, no of course I don't - why would I trust the intuitions of a person whose reason is so poor they can't understand the OP? I mean, did I at any point assert in the OP that our faculties of intuition are infallible or that yours in particular is?
There is nothing to address in the OP because the entirity of its substance is a bald assertion which does not follow from the waffle that precedes it.
But you're not very good at arguing or at understanding what another person has argued. I mean, you somehow thought that I had argued that your faculty of intuition is infallible, yes? But that's not in the OP. So you just have really poor comprehension skills.
"Reasons" =/= "directives" as you point out below with "directives OF reason", so your premise is false and invalidates your "argument".
Oops. :snicker:
Do you understand what a self-undermining case is?
It really doesn't matter because God in the OP has nothing to do with it other than a rabbit which you pull put of a hat as a literal deus ex machina. I don't need to follow your argument because there isn't one.
Read what I say carefully. Reasons-to-believe things are directives. Directives need a director. The director needs to be a person.
The word 'reason' is ambiguous (that means it has several distinct meanings). Sometimes we use it to denote reasons-to-believe things.
Sometimes it is used to denote the faculty of intuition that gives us some awareness of the reasons-to-believe things.
And sometimes it is used to denote the 'source' of the directives.
Reasons-to-believe things are directives.
They need a director.
The director needs to be a person.
That person will be 'Reason' because - do you remember from above? - that's one of the uses of the word 'reason'.
That person will be God.
That's called an argument.
Note too that it is not essential to my case. Everyone must admit that reasons-to-believe things exist. The job of work is to reconcile their existence with an evolutionary account of our development. That, I am arguing, cannot be done without God.
[Bald assertion]
"Sorry but it's true"
"Take me seriously!!!"
Lol no.
Once more, address the OP. Start by trying to understand the puzzle I was raising. Like I say, there's no doubt an SEP page on it. I know you people love fancy labels as you think it makes you sound clever, so what I am doing above is raising what's known as the 'ontological' version of the evolutionary debunking argument.
Once more, there is nothing of substance to address in the OP because it resolves into a bald assertion which deserves exactly no engagement other than to point it out and laugh.
Quoting Bartricks
So your premise is vague. Fallacy of ambiguity. :clap:
No one agrees with you.
Source: "I made it up / It came to me in a dream".
Do you actually understand the OP? Do you understand how an unassisted evolutionary account of our development presents a problem?
It was very easy to understand.
I understand you are saying it. I see you presenting no evidence.
It's incredible that you think this is a positive and not the glaring hilarity that it is.
"I didn't mention God one single time in the entirity of my argument. This is how I came to the conclusion that God is necessary for evolution. This is how arguments work. I am very smart".
But you don't even understand the puzzle. So we're really not off to a good start, are we? You just saw the word God and thought "God is bad. I no like God. I no understand argument. But I no like God. I will say my thoughts"
I couldn't care less about the setting-up of the puzzle because it's clear that neither do you. The "solution" has exactly nothing to do with the set up. This is something you admitted as a point of pride!
For example, how familiar are you with the literature on evolutionary debunking arguments?
And it isn't irrelevant. It's what this thread is about. The thread you're happily derailing.
Do you understand what a self-refuting argument is?
Quoting Bartricks
Do you understand why this bit is true?
Yes, I do.
Our brains look like they've adapted to something and that something is an external world. Ergo, there is an external world. Why would our brains have to calibrate themselves to their own creation? They could've simply modded it to suit their own nature, idiosyncracies and all. In other words why is there dukkha (dissatisfaction) if it isn't the case that there is an external world independent of our brains/minds?
:snicker:
Intuitions are more harmful than helpful when it comes to truths but the converse is true when it comes to survival (re cognitive biases). My hunch is that certain patterns in our thinking gave some of us an edge over the others and these subroutines were automated, occuring subconsciously rather than consciously, in order to enhance its benefits (to our wellbeing).
Paradoxically, irrational folks should live longer, healthier, and happier lives than rational peeps. If not then the mad and the foolish should have thrilling albeit shorter and unhealthier lives. It's a tradeoff you see. :grin:
I'm off-topic aren't I? Oh well!
Yes. What I am doing is raising a well-known puzzle and then suggesting how to solve it.
What's the puzzle? The puzzle is that an evolutionary explanation of our rational intuitions seems to debunk them. Why? Because we seem able to provide an explanation of why we are disposed to get such intuitions without having to suppose that what they're intuitions 'of' actually exist.
Compare this to sight. Does an evolutionary explanation of the development of our faculties of sight debunk that faculty? No, because our evolutionary explanation will mention what our sight gives us apparent awareness of. Humans who saw the lions in the field would not picnic in that field. Thus those humans would be the ones more likely to survive long enough to procreate. We actually have to posit what the sight gives us an awareness of in order to explain its adaptive value. So, that's a vindicatory explanation. The evolutionary explanation of how sight developed does not give us grounds to think it is not telling us about anything real. On the contrary, it provides us with reason to think it does tell us about something real.
Compare sight to a disposition to believe in gods and afterlives. Well, a plausible evolutionary explanation can be provided of such a disposition. Those who believe in gods and afterlives are likely to be happier than those who do not and are better motivated to behave morally, which in turn will increase their likelihood of creating trusting relationships and so on, all of which is likely to enhance one's chances of successfully reproducing people who will in turn successfully reproduce.
Is that a vindicatory explanation of the disposition to believe in gods and afterlives? No, for we have not had to posit any actual gods or afterlives. Thus the disposition's adaptive value does not turn crucially on the existence of what it is a disposition to believe in. And this means that the evolutionary explanation debunks the beliefs that were formed in this way. We can explain why humans are disposed to believe in gods and afterlives without having to suppose there are actually any gods or afterlives.
Those are just standard examples of vindicatory evolutionary explanations and debunking evolutionary explanations. When it comes to the development of faculties of awareness or faculties of belief formation, a 'vindicatory' explanation is one where we need to posit what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of (or belief in) in order to explain its development. A 'debunking' explanation is one where we do not have to posit what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of (or belief in) in order to explain its development.
Now for the puzzle: when it comes to our faculty of reason the evolutionary explanation seems to be a debunking one, not a vindicatory one. We seem able to explain why we developed a faculty that produces in us the belief that we have reason to believe things without having to suppose that there are actually any reasons to believe things in reality. So we can explain the development of the faculty without having to suppose the reality of what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of.
Yet that now means that we've undermined our own case, as any case for anything depends on there being actual reasons to believe things (not the mere belief in such things).
I hadn't ever thought of an evolutionary debunking argument against reason itself, but I think you present a good case for it. I posted here a while back about the metaphysics of reason/logic (what "reasons" do we have to trust reason?), which got me thinking about this, albeit in a tangential way. I do think the theist has a strong answer to this question that the naturalist does not, which is that we were born into a universe that is rationally intelligible, and through our use of reason we can understand it. In fact, while typing this, I found this quote from the IEP:
My guess is Kant had something similar to say about reason.
I think maybe this is where foundationalism comes in with saying we need to have properly basic beliefs to avoid infinite regress, with perhaps a trust in the process of reason being one of those.
Quoting Bartricks
But such intuitions are rooted in sensory faculties which tell about something external. A sensory faculty, by definition, senses something outside itself; they tell us of the external world. An intuition is about something sensed and therefore about an external world.
Quoting Bartricks
There is a reason to believe things, and it is that sensory faculties tell us exclusively about something external to the sensory faculty. No matter the nature of the external, the sensory faculty necessarily tells us about something external.
But their points seem fundamentally different to mine. I hope so anyway, for I think their cases are undermined by evolutionary accounts. There seems no problem in explaining how a faculty that reliably generated accurate - or fairly accurate - beliefs about any external reality there may be would be selected for. There does not need to be a designer, evolution by natural selection alone will explain what needs to be explained on that front. I think their cases are quite weak, then.
My case is quite different. My focus is on reasons themselves, rather than the reliability of the faculty that tells us about them. The evolutionary account of the development of our faculty leaves us with no need to posit any actual reasons corresponding to the intuitions that the faculty generates. Thus, an evolutionary account of our faculty of reason - even if it succeeds in explaining how such a faculty would generate accurate beliefs about the material world - would leave us not having to posit any actual reasons. And thus we should not posit them. Which then means that we have a self-refuting case. We can't really explain why such a faculty would be selected for if we end up having to conclude that there's no reason to believe anything.
What this tells us, I think, is that evolutionary accounts presuppose not just an external world, but also presuppose the reality of reasons. And thus an evolutionary account must not challenge the reality of what it presupposes, else it will be incoherent.
It's not actually clear to me what a naturalist analysis of reasons would amount to (to the discredit of the naturalist, of course). If the naturalist is someone who believes that among the natural features of the world are reasons, then their account will certainly fall foul of the evolutionary explanation, for there would be no need to posit such strange things. The naturalist will therefore find themselves with an incoherent position.
The same would apply to the non-naturalist about reasons. Again, there would be no need to posit such things.
The only exception is my kind of divine command theory of reasons. For if reasons are the attitudes of God, then we have independent reason to think that God would provide us with a faculty of reason that would tell us fairly reliably about the superficial nature of the world we are living in.
First, our senses are impotent to 'tell' us anything about anything. It is our reason that tells us to suppose our sensations are 'of' things. That is, the 'representing' is done by our reason. It is our reason that tells us to suppose that colour sensations are of something out there that is coloured and shaped, and so on.
Second, our faculty of reason or intuition represents us to have reasons to do and believe things. And it is those - those reasons - that I am talking about. One must not confuse an intuition with what it is an intuition of. One can give purely evolutionary accounts of the development of the intuitions. The problem is that one can do so without having to posit any reasons themselves. And thus the explanation will debunk those intuitions.
The result: one will have to conclude that there are no reasons to do or believe anything in reality. There are just impressions of such things. But the things themselves - the reasons - do not exist.
And that's incoherent. For concluding something is to do as one thinks Reason bids. Someone who thinks they have reason to believe there are no reasons seems confused.
Quoting Daniel
You are confusing the basis upon which we have a reason to believe something with the reason itself.
We do indeed have reason to believe what our senses are telling us (though note, they tell us nothing in themselves, it is our reason that tells us what to make of them). I have not denied this. My point is that if one gives a purely evolutionary account of how we have come to believe we have reason to believe things one will not have to posit any actual reasons.
I gave an example: if you can explain why people are disposed to believe in God without having to posit God, then that explanation debunks those beliefs, doesn't it? (it doesn't debunk belief in God, just beliefs in God formed by that disposition). It doesn't vindicate them. It gives one reason to think there's no God, for we can explain the belief in God without having to posit God.
Now, the same applies to reasons to believe things - indeed, all reasons to do and believe things - if one gives a purely evolutionary explanation of why we are disposed to believe there are reasons to do and believe things.
Oh! So, you mean to say that just because we have the
faculty of reason it doesn't necessarily follow that there are any real reasons (to believe anything). An intriguing statement based on the example you gave, which drives the point home viz. our proclivity to believe in god(s) doesn't imply the actual existence of god(s).
Your thesis, if it is yours, jibes with what Brian Greene says in an interview (paraphrasing): The brain evolved for survival, but truth and survival are different things. Hence also my view that so-called cognitive biases & fallacies (thinkos) have a purpose viz. to keep us alive (only) long enough to reproduce & care for our progeny till they too attain puberty-adulthood; post that these flaws in reasoning tend to be a liability. Mind you, this is my opinion; I don't have anything to back it up.
Yes. That you have the impression or belief that there is a reason to do something does not entail that there is. The reason and the impression of the reason are distinct, just as an impression of a tree and a tree are different.
Quoting Agent Smith
That's not what I said. I said that if we can provide an explanation of the development of a disposition to believe in God without having to posit God himself, then that explanation debunks the belief. That is, it gives us grounds for thinking that the belief is false, or at least that we have no reason to think it true.
Another example: I jab a pencil in my ear and I start hearing a ringing sound. Now, what's the best explanation of why I am hearing a ringing sound? That something is ringing out there in the world? No. The best explanation is that I am hearing a ringing sound because I jabbed a pencil in my ear. That explanation makes no mention of any actual ringing out there in the world. And thus it debunks the impression. I am getting the auditory impression that there's a loud ringing in the room I am in, but because this impression is a product of me pushing a pencil into my ear I now have grounds to think the impression is false: there is no ringing in the room, there is just a pencil in ear.
Now, does that mean that I am saying that if one gets an auditory impression of a ringing sound that this does not imply that there is any ringing going on?
No. On the contrary, if one gets the auditory impression of a ringing sound the default is that this is excellent evidence that there is some ringing going on.
And likewise, if one finds that one has an intuition that God exists, that is default excellent evidence that God exists.
But if - if - we can provide an evolutionary account of that intuition that makes no mention of God himself, then we would have debunked the credibility of the intuition.
So, you get a ringing impression. That gives you default reason to believe that there is some ringing going on out there in the world. You then remember that you just jabbed a pencil in your ear. That information provides you with reason to believe that there is no actual ringing going on corresponding to your impression, but that your impression is false as it is the product of a pencil stabbing and not the product of any sound 'out there'.
The puzzle arises becasue we can give an evolutionary account of the development of our faculty of reason without having to posit any actual reasons. And thus such an account debunks our impressions and beliefs that we have reasons to do and believe things. Yet we have to presuppose that there really are reasons to believe things. So the atheist who believes they have reason to believe in evolution by natural selection has an incoherent set of beliefs. They believe there is reason to believe in evolution by natural selection, yet if evolution by natural selection alone (unassisted by God, that is) is true, then there are no reasons to believe anything.
Can you give an example of one of these reasons you talk about. The most simple you can think of. To be honest after reading and re-reading many of your posts, I just don't understand what your point is.
Consider these two statements: a) there are trees; b) there is reason to believe there are trees.
Those aren't equivalent, are they? One is about trees, the other is about what I am talking about: reasons to believe things.
Note, the entire of philosophy is concerned with them. Philosophy is the enterprise of trying to figure out what we have reason to believe (including what we have reason to believe about reasons to believe things)
A reason to believe something is not under evolutionary constraint directly, I think. If I understand correctly, these reasons you mention are complex traits, meaning they are the result of many things working together. A reason is not a single entity, but a collection of things. The fear of fire is your experience of the shape of fire, your experience of the colour of fire, your experience of heat, your experience of pain cause by hot stuff, etc. Fear of fire is not shaped by evolution. The molecular machinery that allows you to see, feel, smell fire is.
Give me a reason you believe you are alive. Don't reply to my previous post.
You are confusing intuitions and beliefs with what they're intuitions of and/or beliefs about.
What we can provide an evolutionary explanation of are the intuitions and beliefs.
An evolutionary explanation of the intuition that we have reason to believe things is not an explanation of why we have reason to believe things.
That would be akin to thinking that an evolutionary explanation of why people believe in God is an explanation of God.
Give me a reason you believe you are alive.
What are your thoughts on my view that though, at times, it might be to our advantage to believe falsehoods (e.g. belief in god), evolutionary success (passing down one's genes) is best achieved by being in touch with reality (truths), which is precisely what reason evolved for?
So, I have the rational impression - or intuition, if one prefers - that I have reason to believe there is a thinker if there are thoughts. And I have the introspective impression that there are thoughts. I conclude that I exist.
None of that was an example of a reason to believe something. it was an example of impressions of reasons to believe things.
A reason to believe something is the 'accuracy' condition of an impression of a reason to believe something (or - and this will be the same - the 'truth condition' of a belief that one has a reason to believe something).
I don't know why you added "e.g. belief in God". That belief is TRUE. It's called begging the question: your question assumes the very issue under debate.
THe only solution to the problem I am raising involves positing God.
But anyway, ignoring the question begging bit in the brackets: is it sometimes to our advantage to believe falsehoods? Yes, of course. And it is sometimes moral to believe falsehoods too. I don't see the relevance to the point I am making.
Quoting Agent Smith
But I just explained why that's not true. Some true beliefs will be selected for, and some false ones will be selected for.
Again: if one gives a purely evolutionary account of our development, then approximately accurate beliefs about the lay of the land will be selected for (for those with systematically false beliefs about the lay of the land will get eaten by lions or wander into lakes, which isn't good for one's reproductive chances). But completely false beliefs about reasons to believe things and reasons to do things - such as that there are, in fact, reasons to believe things and reasons to do things - will also get selected for.
Note too that you do not understand what I mean by a purely evolutionary process is you think such a process is 'for' anything. It isn't. It's blind.
Quoting Bartricks
Give me an example of a reason itself. I am asking because I truly do not understand what you mean by a reason.
yes
What is a reason here?
A reason to do something - such as get yourself some food - is an example of a reason to do something. And a reason to believe something is a reason to do something, namely believe something.
This is us:
Daniel: can you provide me with an example of a donut
Me: yes, you see this plump quoit of sugared dough - that's a donut.
Daniel: but where's the donut?
Me: er, I have just shown you a donut. The donut is the plump quoit of sugared dough I just placed in front of you. Let's try again, shall we? Have you ever had a donut?
Daniel: yes
Me: well, that's what a donut is. A donut is one of those things you had when you had a donut
Daniel: but I just want an example of a donut
Me: are you mental?
So, you're saying an evolutionary explanation for rationality is of the debunking kind i.e. that we're rational doesn't mean there are reasons (for believing/disbelieving things).
I like where you're going with this, but what's your argument? You don't offer one.
No. I am arguing - not saying, arguing - that a purely evolutionary account of our development will debunk our impressions and beliefs in reasons to do and believe things. (Note I do not know what you mean by rationality and I did not mention it; I take 'rationality' to involve a disposition to recognize and respond to reasons. If that's correct, then someone can be rational even if there are no reasons, for it is sufficient to be rational that one 'would' have recognized and responding to any reasons that there were).
And I argued this by showing how we can explain how creatures who got the impression of such things would be selected for by a process of evolution by natural selection without having to posit any actual reasons to do or believe anything.
If you explain why a person believes something without positing the object of the belief, then the explanation debunks the belief.
I gave you examples of this. If we can explain why a person believes in God without positing God himself, then the belief is debunked if that explanation is correct.
So if you want the argument laid out more formally, here it is:
1. If the correct explanation of why a person believes x does not involve positing x, then that person's belief in x is debunked.
2. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our development is true, then the correct explanation of why any person believes there are reasons to believe things does not involve positing any reasons to believe things.
3. Therefore, if a purely evolutionary explanation of our development is true, then a person's belief in reasons to believe things is debunked.
If I don't eat, the cells that make me will lack the nutrients required for the normal functioning of the molecular processes that maintain such cells alive - that is, I will die. By the way, the reason we eat is not to feel full or feel some kind of pleasure, we eat to give our cells what they require for their normal functioning. Same reason we drink water. We feel hunger because our cells have developed a mechanism to alert us that we need to provide our cells with nutrients, or we die! (a mechanism that evolved many thousand years ago - bacteria eat and they have molecular mechanisms that alert them to eat).
That need to go and grab something to eat, like that delicious donut, that need that makes you get up from your chair and down the stairs, that need that makes you think of that marvellous, fluffy, juicy donut, that need is part of a molecular process (there is no denying that). The molecular process that makes you feel hungry has evolved because (among other reasons) without the nutrients you acquire through eating, you would not be able to maintain those functions that allow you to reproduce. Those thoughts you call a reason to eat are a consequence of your body communicating to your brain that you need to eat.
Yours is an argument by example which, if memory serves, is a fallacy.
Nevertheless, your thesis is an intriguing one to say the least.
It, however, is self-refuting if you notice, as it undermines all reason and hence, even your own and out the window goes your theistic conclusion.
This, to your credit, is a new take on an idea as old as the mountains viz. skepticism.
Did you read the thread Banno started about 6 moons ago on logical nihilism. There's a recorded lecture in which the speaker, a lady, says of skepticism of the Agrippa kind that there's something seriously flawed about a system of reasoning that self-destructs in the sense we can formulate an argument within it that exposes the system's Achilles' heel so to speak.
This is nonsense.
You asked for an example of a reason to do something - I provided it.
An unassisted evolutionary story about how we have come to be, will not make any mention of any actual reasons to do anything. The disposition to believe in them, yes. Their actual existence, no.
Thus, an evolutionary story undermines itself. It needs assistance if it is not to do that.
What fallacy? I'm illustrating a point. That's not to commit a fallacy.
If the explanation of why you hold a particular belief does not make any appeal to the actual existence of the object of that belief (so, what the belief is 'about'), then the belief is debunked by the explanation.
I then provided examples of this to illustrate the point. For example, if the explanation of why people believe in gods is that a disposition to believe in such things made them more reproductively successful, then those beliefs are debunked, for the explanation of why people are forming them makes no mention of any gods.
So, once again: if an explanation of a belief does not appeal to the reality of what the belief is about, then the belief is debunked.
Another example, this time of a vindicatory explanation. The explanation of why I believe there's a cat in my garden is that there's a cat in my garden. That explanation makes mention of the object of my beilef. Thus the belief is not discredited by the explanation, but vindicated.
If the explanation of why I believe there's a cat in my garden is that I have just been hypnotized into believing it, then the explanation makes no mention of a cat in my garden and thus in this case the belief would be debunked.
Quoting Agent Smith
No, what I am doing is showing that an exclusive evolutionary explanation of our situation is self-undermining.
Are you saying the reason one gets hungry is not a lack of nutrients but instead an idea given by god to those organisms that feel a need to eat?
Sometimes the word reason can operate as a synonym for 'cause'.
But that's not what it means when we use to denote a reason to do something.
A reason to do something is called a normative reason. The normativity is the 'to do-ness'. It's sometimes expressed by saying that normative reasons direct. That is, to have a reason to do something is to be in some sense 'directed' to do it.
Note, these statements do not mean the same thing; "I have a reason to get myself some food" and "I am being caused to get myself some food".
An evolutionary explanation of how we have come to be will make no mention of any normative reasons. And thus it is self-undermining. But it will make mention of causes. So I am not arguing that an evolutionary explanation debunks the idea that there are causes of things. I am arguing that an evolutionary explanation debunks the idea that there are reasons to do things.
The molecular machinery that keeps cells alive gets worn with time. It does not last forever and needs to be replaced. New molecules are made of nutrients obtained from the external world (or recycled nutrients). How do you know that the molecules needed to keep your cells alive are getting old and that you need to replace them? how do you know if you have enough nutrients to replace those old molecules? how do you know if you need to acquire nutrients from the external world? How do you think you get that sensation of hunger?
The kinds of reasons you talk about are being caused. They are outcomes. That which you call a reason to do something is an outcome of a process and not what initiates a process. They are ends.
In other words, I think I am alive not because there are reasons to be alive but because by being alive I have come up with reasons to believe I am.
Irrelevant. I refer you to my earlier reply.
Irrelevant.
You're just not getting this.
This is not about causes. It's about reasons-to-do things. You are just going to continue talking about causes, yes? You're attacking a straw man. I am not arguing that evolutionary explanations force us to conclude that there are no causes.
Ok. Forgive me. I mean well. The thing is that I just cannot understand what you mean by reasons-to-do things. It seems to me that in your mind you picture these reasons-to-do things as...... what? Are they pleasures, needs, wants, or what? Could you explain in other words what you mean by reasons-to-do. Describe them to me as if I was an alien from a far far away world threatening to end life on Earth and its destiny depends on how well I understand your term.
Also, what is a reason to go a get some food.
But to me they are rooted in natural processes. A reason to do anything is an invention of a mind.
Like I say, this exchange is like this:
You: what's a chair?
Me: well, what are you sat on?
You: a chair
Me: right, so one of those
You: I just don't know what you mean by a chair though. Can you give me an example of a chair?
Me: I just did. You are sat on a chair, are you not?
You: yes.
Me: so that's a char
You: so do you mean a lamp?
Me: no.
You: I don't know what you mean then. Do you mean a cat?
Me: no. I mean a chair. Do you know what a chair is?
You: yes.
Me: so one of those.
You: but what's a chair?
And on and on and on.
Look, are you auditioning for the mad hatter's tea party or something? Don't ask me what a reason to do something is when you can't be bothered to read the reply.
You are saying that a reason to do something is not a cause to do something, but a directive. What's the difference?
Yes, I believe there are reasons to do things.
So why the f-ing hell do you keep asking me what one is and to provide you with a bloody example of one? Again: are you mental?
You: what's a chair?
Me: do you believe in chairs?
You: yes
Me: well one of those then you.....
That which is asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.
Reasons to do things are dependent on evolution (a mind like yours must come up with them, and a mind is the result of an evolutionary process). Evolution is not dependent on reasons to do things.
It's impossible to understand. Your examples are very complex. No one can read your mind, and if you do not try to actually give simple examples is gonna be impossible to actually even know what you are trying to say. In addition, you are oversimplifying evolution (natural selection is not the only process that leads to evolution); furthermore, you are oversimplifying complex things like the faculty to believe. When you put an idea forward and several people do not understand it, it is not the people's fault.
You said yes.
So you know what a reason to do something is, for you believe in them yourself.
They are not causes. When you believe - as you do - that there are reasons to do things, you are not believing that things are being caused to occur, for clearly we can have reason to do something that we do not and never will do.
So you - you - know what a reason to do something is. For you believe in them. And they are not equivalent to causes of things.
When you say "the reason he died was flu" the word 'reason' is operating as a synonym for 'cause'. You are not saying that he had a reason to die. You are talking about the 'cause' of his death.
This is everso slightly complicated due to the ambiguity of the word 'reason'. This happens with words over time. They tend to become ambiguous. The word 'reason' is ambiguous. Lots and lots and lots of words are ambiguous. Indeed, the word 'lots' is ambiguous, isn't it? It can mean 'a large number' or it can mean 'items in an auction'. See? Lots and lots and lots and lots of words are ambiguous.
The word 'reason' is one of them. It can be used to denote a faculty - our faculty of reason. It can be used to denote a reason-to-do something (that's called a 'normative reason'). It can be used to denote a cause of something. That's called a causal reason. It can be used to denote the explanation of something - they're called 'explanatory reasons' (and some would argue that causal reasons and explanatory reasons are the same). And it can be used to denote where reasons-to-do things are coming from. And no doubt there are other meanings to the word too that I can't think of.
Same word, different meanings.
A 'reason to do something' - which, remember, you believe exist - is a directive to do something. That's a more substantial definition. But you already know what they are, for you believe in them.
And if we give a purely evolutionary story about how we have come to be, we won't have to make any mention of them at all.
And that's a problem.
If I am mental, you are fucked.
There are reasons to do things. YOu believe in them. I believe in them. Everyone who's sensible believes in them. Indeed, everyone who possesses reason believes in them, for to possess reason is to recognize that there are reasons to do things.
So, they exist.
But - and here is the problem - an evolutionary account of our development implies they do not exist.
That's a problem, yes? They do exist. There can be no doubt about it. Yet an evolutionary account of our development implies they do not.
I explained why.
For example, it used to be the case that the appearance of design was thought to be good evidence that the world and its contents were indeed designed and thus that there was a designer of them.
But the theory of evolution by natural selection can explain why the world appears designed without having to posit a designer.
That raises a problem for those who believe the world is designed by a god or God, yes?
We can explain the appearance of design in a parsimonious way - that is, we can explain it without having to posit a designer.
Thus, the theory of evolution by natural selection would appear to undercut the so-called 'design' argument for a god.
I use this example because most of you here are atheists and you will be more able to understand a point when it leads to a conclusion you endorse.
Exactly the same point applies to reasons-to-do things. An evolutionary account of our development can explain why we believe in such things without having to posit any.
But that's a huge problem. Because they do exist.
No, that doesn't follow.
First off all, you provided us with an instance of a debunking kind, which oddly is (belief in) god, the very thing you say in your conclusion is necessary. Isn't that self-refuting?
Coming to the fallacy of argument by example you commited, it's like this: If I say some Americans are presidents, I could prove it with n number of examples e.g. Washington, Roosevelt, etc. However, this doesn't imply that some Americans are not presidents.
Likewise, yes, there are beliefs of the debunking kind (god :chin: ) but that doesn't mean the belief that there are reasons to believe is also one. You need a different argument for this.
The other problem with your argument is that if there are no reasons to believe anything, why on earth are you trying to offer reasons to believe you?
No.
That was to illustrate the point. Sheesh.
Here's the principle I am appealing to: if the explanation of a belief that p does not have to posit p, then the belief is debunked.
Now, it does not matter what 'p' stands for. Most of you lot are atheists and incredibly poor reasoners and you can only recognize a good argument when it leads to a conclusion you endorse. So, I take it that most of you can recognize the truth of the above principle if we make the belief in question a belief in God. For then it will be clear, even to you lot, that the principle is true: if the explanation of a person's belief in God makes no mention of God himself - so, the explanation just mentions the adaptive properties of the belief via the psychological benefits that accrue from it - then the belief is discredited.
It might still be true. But the mere fact a person is disposed to believe it does not, in itself, constitute any kind of evidence for its truth, given that we can explain why the person believes it without having to suppose that God himself exists.
Now, we can provide an evolutionary explanation of our disposition to believe that there are reasons to do things.
SO the same applies. We do not have to posit any actual reasons to believe things in order to explain, in a parsimonious manner, why people believe there are reasons to do things. Thus, the belief that there are reasons to do things is discredited if, that is, the evolutionary explanation is true.
It's called an 'evolutionary debunking argument'. If one can provide an evolutionary explanation of a belief or intuition, then - other things being equal - that explanation debunks the belief in question.
Why? Because we do not have to posit the object of the belief in order to explain the belief. And thus there is no reason to think the belief is true. For if one does not have to posit the object of the belief in order to explain why the belief is occurring, then it violates Ockham's razor to posit it.
Quoting Agent Smith
What? No, don't just describe a fallacy. Where did I commit a fallacy? If I use an example to illustrate a point, that's not a fallacy. A fallacy is an error in reasoning. Outline my argument and show where the fallacy occurs. If you can't do that, then you don't know what you're talking about. You're just randomly throwing mud in the hope that some of it sticks.
Quoting Agent Smith
It is how the belief is acquired that debunks it. And stop begging the question by insisting God does not exist! He does. Christ, you go on about fallacies entirely oblivious to all those you are committing. The fact that some beliefs that P are debunked by explanations of how they were acquired does not - not - imply that all beliefs that P are false!! That some As are Bs does not imply that all As are Bs!
Now, I am going to give an example to illustrate my point. Try and understand the point. Imagine I have been hypnotized into believing there's a cat in my garden. Now, don't ask me about my garden or about hypnotism. It's not about that. It's just an example, Okay? So, again, imagine that I have been hypnotized into believing there's a cat in my garden. That's the whole story about why I have that belief. I have the belief that there is a cat in my garden solely because I was hypnotized into it.
That explanation of my belief discredits it. Can you see that? There's absolutely no reason to think there's actually a cat in my garden. Why? Because the entire explanation of why I believe there's a cat in my garden makes no mention of any actual cat (or any actual garden).
Does that mean that all beliefs in cats in garden are debunked? No. I would have thought that was blindingly obvious. It means that that particular belief - the one the hypnotist implanted - is discredited. It does not imply that any belief in a cat in a garden, no matter how it was acquired, is debunked. Yet you think it does. Or at least, you think it does when it is a belief in God that we're talking about.
Some beliefs are discredited by how they were acquired. It doesn't matter what the belief is about, what matters - what does the discrediting - is how it was acquired. If the belief was acquired in a manner that did not involve the object of the belief, then the belief is discredited, no matter what the belief is about. It's the fact the object of the belief does not turn up in the explanation of how it was acquired that discredits it.
Now, an evolutionary explanation of how we have acquired our belief in reasons to do things will discredit those beliefs.
Quoting Agent Smith
OMG. I think there ARE reasons to do things. I could not have been clearer. I said only an idiot or a scoundrel thinks they do not exist.
They exist.
The PROBLEM - for you, not me - is that an evolutionary explanation of how we have acquired our belief in them will discredit them.
So guess what? That means that an exclusive evolutionary explanation is FALSE. It does not mean that evolution by natural selection is false. It means that it can't be the whole story.
Don't get me wrong - I like the argument you're proposing, I'm a skeptic you see and nothing gets me stoked as much as an attack on reason, the be all and end all of epistemology.
To reiterate your point, there are no reasons to believe there are reasons to believe. Call this claim B. The reason you offer for this is an example of a belief, that of in god, evolutionarily useful (survival), but not entailing the reality/existence of god. Call this reason R.
Your argument:
1. R [math]\to[/math] B
2. R
Ergo,
3. B (1, 2 MP)
My issue is that an example supports but doesn't prove until and unless you want to reduce the scope of your argument to some beliefs are of the debunking kind rather than the vindicatory kind.
The task now is to prove that B is a debunking belief; R is inadequate for that purpose.
I'm not attacking Reason. I think there are reasons to do things. You can't make a case against them without presupposing them. So if you don't believe in reasons, you're stuck. You can't defend your disbelief, for the instant you do that you'll be appealing to the very things you think do not exist. And so all you can do is assert: all you can do is declare that you disbelieve in things that appear to exist both to you and everyone else who possesses a faculty of reason.
Quoting Agent Smith
Where is that my point?
My point is that a purely evolutionary explanation of us will discredit our belief that there are reasons to do things, for we do not have to posit any to explain why we believe in them.
Note, I think reasons to do things exist. I am not arguing that they do not exist. I think they exist. I think a purely evolutionary explanation of us is demonstrably false. Demonstrably, because if true it implies there are no reasons to do things. But there are, so it is false.
Quoting Agent Smith
What? English please.
Quoting Agent Smith
What? You don't know what you're talking about, yes? I can't understand what you've just said. Some beliefs are discredited by how they were acquired. WHen that happens it's called a 'debunking explanation'. Some beliefs are vindicated by the explanation of how they were acquired. Those are called vindicatory explanations. Now, if I give an illustration of the former, how the f is that to commit a fallacy?? To give illustrations of beliefs that are debunked by their explanations and illustrations of beliefs that are not debunked by their explanations is not to commit a fallacy, for it is not to argue anything. Illustrations are not arguments. A fallacy is an error in reasoning. When I illustrate a point with an example I am not arguing. I am trying to help you understand.
Do you agree that if the correct explanation of a belief does not mention the actual existence of the belief's object, then that belief is discredited?
One example (theism) of a debunking belief is sufficient to prove the claim that the belief there are reasons to believe is a debunking belief.
However, I think you shoot yourself in the foot in that your example of a debunking belief is theism and, further down the line, you go on to say atheists are wrong about there being no God.
I have no idea what you mean - I have said nothing remotely like that.
Do you agree that if the correct explanation of a belief does not mention the actual existence of the belief's object, then that belief is discredited?
No. It is how the belief was acquired that does the debunking. It doesn't matter what the belief is.
My belief that there is a cat in the garden is debunked if I acquired it through hypnotic suggestion.
That doesn't mean that beliefs in cats have been debunked! It means THAT belief - my one - was debunked.
Again: it is how the belief was acquired that debunks it. Any belief - any belief - that has been acquired in a way that did not involve its object, is debunked.
Do bear with me, I'm slow. This [math]\uparrow[/math] is the right place to start. I concur with it (somewhat).
True, if the explanation for a belief x doesn't require the reality/existence of x then, [s]that belief is debunked[/s] x is unnecessary.
[quote=Pierre-Simon Laplace]Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là (I had no need of that hypothesis).[/quote]
1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p.
And to that we add this premise:
2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things
From which it follows that:
3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things.
Note, that conclusion does not assert that there are no reasons to do and believe things or that our belief in such things has actually been debunked. It says 'if'.
This premise is also true:
4. There are reasons to do and believe things and the correct explanation of our belief in reasons to do and believe things does invoke the actual existence of such things.
From which it follows:
5. Therefore, a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is incorrect.
That's the word I was looking for! I'm sold on your idea!
Their reality - and the fact our belief in such things is not of a sort that can be debunked - tells us something. It tells us that a purely evolutionary account of our development is false.
Well, if an unassisted evolutionary story about our development implies that there are no reasons to do or believe anything in reality, then that story is wrong, isn't it?
There are reasons to do things. One can't make a case against their existence without assuming them. It is hard to see how something's existence can be more certain than that.
What does this tell us? It tells us that some form of 'assisted' evolution by natural selection is true. Why? Because:
1. If unassisted evolution by natural selection is true, then there are no reasons to do things
2. There are reasons to do things
3. Therefore unassisted evolution by natural selection is false
And assuming that this premise is true:
4. Evolution by natural selection is true
And that this is also true:
5. Evolution by natural selection is either assisted or unassisted
Then this follows
6. Therefore assisted evolution by natural selection is true
Well, what would assist it? We know that reasons to do things exist, for their existence is as certain as can be. What we need, then, is a theory about what reasons are, that would actually predict that we would have a faculty of intuition that would tell us that we have reason to do what we seem, intuitively, to have reason to do.
Why? Because that's how you get a vindicatory explanation. For then our explanation of why we believe we have reason to do this and reason to do that will make mention of our actually having reason to do this or reason to do that.
An unassisted evolutionary account of how we have acquired our beliefs in reasons to do things makes no mention of any actual reasons to do things, and thus debunks all of those beliefs.
So, what we need is an account of how we have acquired our beliefs in reasons to do things that 'vindicates' those beliefs (at least approximately).
True that if it can be shown the belief that there are reasons to believe x is independent of actual reasons to believe x then the belief is debunked for the simple reason that x's existence/reality is immaterial to the belief itself.
There are such beliefs e.g. theism (the existence of an actual god is unnecessary because belief in god has another reason that has nothing to do with a real god).
Take note of the underlined words above.
You keep mentioning the belief in God - I don't know why. Again, you seem to think that I am saying that belief in God is debunked. NO!!
It is belief in reasons that is debunked by an exclusively evolutionary explanation of those beliefs.
I have outlined the argument above. There's really no way of making it clearer.
So, what you're sayin' is that it's true that there is a reason to believe that the belief that there are reasons to believe is false.
Isn't that self-contradictory? You're providing a reason that there are no reasons. Isn't that like saying here's a dog and therefore there are no dogs?
I need to take a breather! Will get back to you later. G'day.
[quote="Bartricks;d13161"we can explain why we can trust - or at least, default trust - our intuitions[/quote]
You are talking a lot about intiution(s) but I din't see the words "knowldge" and "consciousness" mentioned at least once. How can you speak about external world, evolution, God, etc. without these two very important elements?
It sounds like the only thing human beings have is intuition, i.e knowing something instinctively, without the need for conscious reasoning ...
Maybe because you don't know what "knowldge" and/or "consciousness" are ... If you did, you would certainly get my point.
1) Express yourself better so you do not constantly find yourself telling others they are not addressing the OP when they have and found little to nothing of content.
2) Be constantly ignored and ridiculed due to the inability to react to how people respond to your posts where the blame is put 100% at their doorstep.
If someone reads what you wrote and replies to it then it might help to either point out the misunderstanding (without insulting them) and/or trying to express what you meant more precisely, or just try another approach.
Im done with you for a month. Bye
If you don't quote my text, and respond a week later, it is impossible to know what you are referring to.
Good advice, you should practice it.
Very interesting and insightful.
I say this just to clarify that though believing something on the basis of an intuition is not 'reasoning', it is - or can be - to believe it on a rational basis.
So for example, I know by intuition that 1 x 2 = 2. But I know by reasoning that 3 x 16 = 58. And both are rational.
This is one of your better arguments if I'm understanding it right. However:
Quoting Bartricks
seems to miss. We have reason to believe things because we are capable of perceiving things and then adapting ourselves or changing the world based on those perceptions, thus generating meaning in the process in our suitably developed brains. You continually interact with this forum because you derive meaning from doing so, and thus have good reason to believe that, according to Ockham's Razor, your interactions with said forum are worthwhile.
So even if we don't need to posit reasons to believe things, I think we are justified in doing so merely because we, as humans, can create meaning in ways that are not totally governed by mere intuition. I think you and I just disagree about what the source of that is.
I mean, do you really think that early humans actually operated purely based off of intuition? I think human nature has a strong analytical aspect, and probably always has, and that it can be explained in terms of evolution minus any hocus pocus about God guiding us with divine subtlety.
It's just I don't understand your point. You seem to agree that a pure evolutionary story about our development would not require us to posit any actual reasons to do things. But then you said some stuff about human psychology which seemed irrelevant. And then you question beggingly characterized belief in God as hocus pocus. It didn't hang together as a criticism.
No. Just because one does not make mention of P actually existing in expressing why they think P is true does not mean we shouldn't posit P.
You make the argument yourself that God need not be invoked directly as responsible for our intuitions - that they may be derived from natural selection - but nonetheless posit that God is the only way to understand why we have reasons - specifically reasons to believe that we have reasons to believe things, such as that our intuitions actually are guided by truthful sensory perception and reflect an external reality.
This is not the same as what you just proposed to me.
If that is indeed what you were trying to do there, that is.
That's why it's false. False. Not true. But false.
Now, when I explain why such an explanation does not have to posit any actual reasons, you do realize I am not endorsing the view in question? You do understand, do you, that I think a purely evolutionary story is false?
So it is false because we do have reasons, at least according to you?
And yes, I understand that just because you accept it needs no reasons does not mean that you believe it is true.
I think this premise is true:
If a purely evolutionary story of our development is true, then there are no reasons to do and believe things.
That doesn't mean I think a purely evolutionary story is true.
It doesn't mean I think reasons don't exist.
Can you see that?
So when I defend the truth of that premise, I am not defending those two claims.
I said only a fool or a scoundrel thinks there are no such things.
When someone says that, they're not saying they themselves are a fool or a scoundrel.
When someone says they believe there are reasons to do things, that does not mean the exact opposite.
My argument:
1. If p, then q
2. Not q
3. Therefore not p.
You: so, you think p is true
Me: no,I think it is false.
You: but do you not think p is not true?
Me: no,I think p is false
You: but you think that if p then q
Me: yes
You: so you think p
Me: no. I think not p.
Me: if I'm going to the shop, I'll buy you some toffees
You: you're in a shop?
Me: no.
You: you've bought me some toffees?
Me: no
You: I get that you haven't bought me any toffees. But you're in a shop, yes?
Me: no.
Now, pay attention: 'if a wholly evolutionary story about our development is true, then there are no reasons to do or believe anything'.
That has the same form as 'if I go to the shop, I will buy you some toffees'.
It doesn't mean "An evolutionary story about our development is true". That's like thinking I am in the shop. And it doesn't mean "there are no reasons to do or believe anything". That's like thinking I have bought you some toffees.
Again: 'if' does not mean 'is the case'.
Would you agree that reasons to do things are founded upon knowledge about the outcome of an action. For example, let's say a person would not like the way they would look if they lost their teeth. Such person knows flossing and brushing their teeth would prevent their fall; so, such person flosses and brushes their teeth to prevent them from falling, and at the same time the person avoids an appearance they would not like. In this example, the person's reason to floss and brush their teeth (either not liking the way they would look if they had no teeth or mere precaution or any other reasons - i.e. they want to keep their teeth so they are able to eat or they want to avoid the physical pain of loosing your teeth, I dunno) is founded upon the knowledge that flossing and brushing your teeth prevents their loss.
Now, let's say a person believes in god. Following the logic presented in the previous example, such person's reason(s) to believe in god must be founded on knowledge about the outcome of believing in god. Be it personal satisfaction, or social acceptance, or psychological well-being, no matter the outcome, the person's reason to believe in god can only be a reason-to-do if the person knows about the outcome of carrying the action (believing in god).
Let's imagine now that there is a person who harbours in their mind the idea that there is a god but has no reasons to believe this; a completely possible scenario, I think. In this case, a reason for such person to believe in god would manifest only when the person knows about the outcome of carrying such action.
In all this examples, the person must be able to gather and store knowledge to be able to have reasons-to-do things. If a person did not have the faculties of gathering and storing knowledge, then the person would not be able to know about the outcome of actions, and therefore would be unable to form reasons-to-do things, in my opinion.
Following this logic, a question arises which is: is natural selection acting at the level of reasons-to-do things, or at the level of the faculties to gather and store knowledge, or at both, or are there any other levels we should consider first?
I think I mentioned in some previous post that you were oversimplifying things, and I hope you understand what I mean with these examples. It might be the case that natural selection acts only at the level of organs in a given organism - i.e. it affects the eye, but not the faculty of vision as a whole (at least not directly) -, or maybe natural selection affects only independent structures - i.e. the cornea, the iris, eyelashes, the retina - and emergent features resulting from the collective functioning of these structures are not truly under the effect of natural selection. It might even be the case, that some features of an organism do not affect its fitness and can be passed over generations until one day such features might affect the fitness of the organism that has them. It might be that the faculty to form reasons-to-do things, which is dependent on the faculty to gather and store knowledge, is evolving not under the effect of natural selection, but some other force(s) (bottleneck events, genetic drift, artificial selection, etc).
All this might be out of topic, but again I just want to hopefully show you how complex is the topic you are trying to discuss, and how lightly you are arriving to your conclusion. So, I think that a better place to start is to demonstrate that natural selection and reasons-to-do things can actually be discussed together because it might be the case that there is no relationship at all between the two.
No, for knowledge itself involves reasons. That is, to 'know' something is to have reason to believe it (among other things).
There is that which gives rise to us having a reason to do something or believe it. That, I would say, is the basis or ground of the reason. And then there is the reason itself.
It is important not to conflate the ground of a reason with the reason itself. Quoting Daniel
You are describing the ground or basis upon which a person may have a reason to do something. But although everyday speech allows us to refer to the grounds of reasons as 'reasons', a reason is distinct from that which gives rise to it.
You have said that this topic is complex. I assume, then, that you can appreciate this complexity and will not make the mistake of conflating the ground of a reason with the reason itself?
My hunger gives me a reason to get myself a sandwich. That does not mean my hunger and the reason are the same. The hunger is the basis of the reason - the explanation of why I have the reason - but the reason itself is not the hunger.
Now, a wholly evolutionary story about our development will mention these grounds. And they will mention our belief that such grounds give us reasons to do things and believe things. But what such an evolutionary story will not have to posit is any actual reasons themselves.
It seems to me that it is you who is not appreciating this point. There are two mistakes people commonly make here. The first is to confuse the belief that p with p itself. So, believing that we have reason to do x is not the same as there actually being reason to do x. The second is doing what you're doing - which is to confuse the basis or ground of a reason with a reason itself.
There is no problem providing an evolutionary explanation of the grounds of the reasons that there appear to be, or providing an explanation of the appearances and beliefs in reasons to do and believe things. The problem is that these are not themselves reasons.
I have this feeling you're conflating debunking with unnecessary.
True that as per evolution, there needn't be actual reasons (to believe/do) [unnecessary] even when we believe there are but from this it doesn't follow that there really are no reasons (to do believe) [actuality]. You can't go from possibility to actuality like that, no sir, you can't!
That doesn't mean it is false.
If I believe there is a lion in my kitchen and that belief is wholly due to my having taken a hallucinogen earlier, then I have no reason to think that belief is true. That doesn't mean there isn't a lion in my kitchen. There might, by pure coincidence, be one in there.
The evolutionary explanation of our belief in reasons is analogous: the explanation of our belief makes no mention of any actual reasons (just as the explanation of why I believe there's a lion in my kitchen makes no mention of any lion in my kitchen).
Thus, there is no reason whatsoever to think the beliefs are true. And given we do not have to posit any reasons to believe things, we shouldn't. There could still be some and they could even be arranged in the way we believe them to be. But that would be a pure coincidence and not a reasonable belief. Furthermore, just as my hallucinogen induced belief that there is a lion in my kitchen would not qualify as knowledge even if there is a lion in my kitchen, so too we would not know there were any reasons to do or believe things if our belief in them has been induced by evolutionary forces, even if there are reasons to do and believe things arranged exactly as we believe them to be
Self-referential paradox results. You're offering us a reason why there are no reasons. You just killed yourself!
Even so, most intriguing
And I think I agree with him.
I think there is a problem with the claim that our positions were arrived at only via reason. (I don't mean in the sense that that would be bragging, that we are fallible, but rather that they can't be reached by reason (alone).
A common reaction to this is to argue that intuition is fallible or that this is anti-science or all beliefs would then be the same. But that's arguing consequences. I also think the last two are not entailed. Based on intuition and experience, I don't believe them.
I am arguing that reasons exist.
Are you a goldfish?
Ok, so you are...with a little help from God.
Explain how God [math]\to[/math] Reason.
No, I'm not a goldfish! :snicker:
If you have anything against reason, you're not allowed to use reason. Simple. :snicker:
1. An evolutionary account for the belief that there are reasons (to believe/do x) doesn't require there be actual reasons (to believe/do x).
Ergo,
2. The belief that there are reasons (to believe/do x) is debunked in the sense there needn't be real reasons (to believe/do x).
Ergo,
3. the belief that there are reasons (to believe/do x) needs a different basis/foundation and that basis/foundation is god.
Critique.
True that evolution is all about survival and towards that end everything is/will be sacrificed including but not limited to truth and the belief that there are real reasons (to believe/do something) is one such "truth" If life were given the option survive OR form true beliefs, it would choose the former without batting an eyelid and in a flash.
However what are the justifications for grounding beliefs in god? This question is left unanswered by the OP.
Truth is intuition maybe an alternative pathway to truth - it's a feeling rather than a thought - and, guessing hereon, some intuitions of great minds have been vindicated later on by reason. With phenomena like these, we're led to psychological concepts like Freud's unconscious although I prefer to call it subconscious (my intuition :snicker: ).
Given what I said above, intuition isn't exactly non-reason; it's leaving out all the steps in proof and simply presenting the conclusion to someone. The task then is to reconstruct the argument.9
That out of the way, there's the notion of verisimilitude - there are "reasons" other than reasons in the traditional sense (logic) that we can and probably rely on to demonstrate truth e.g. some say that mathematical truths are beautiful and elegant and so are, physicists say, the equations of physical laws. You're aware of course of the so-called argument from beauty (visit Wikipedia for a fairly good exposition of this idea).
Anyway, coming to the OP, I actually like Bartricks' argument because it uses reason to attack/kill reason i.e logical seppuku (I think deep down I'm quite suicidal :snicker: ). Nuff said!
Yes you are! No matter how many times I tell you that I think reasons exist, 10 minutes later you're telling me I'm arguing that reasons do not exist.
I'm not. I said - many, many times now (and in the OP!!!!) that reasons exist and that only a scoundrel or a fool denies this.
That's as clear as crystal, yes? Yet in 10 minutes time, you'll attribute to me the opposite view.
I am now going to quote me telling you time and time and time again that I am arguing that reasons exist, not that they don't.
Here's the OP:
Quoting Bartricks
Now here's me explaining it to you for the first time:
Quoting Bartricks
See?
Now here's me saying it againQuoting Bartricks
And then again, moments later:
Quoting Bartricks
Note what the conclusion of that argument is. It isn't what you think it is. It isn't 'there are no reasons to believe things' is it?
And then, a tiny time later I have to do it all over again, here:
Quoting Bartricks
And then, about 10 minutes later, I do have to do it AGAIN:
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
And then again:
Quoting Bartricks
And AGAIN in a reply about 3 minutes later!!!!:
Quoting Bartricks
And then AGAIN after you once more attribute to me the view that there are no reasons (I am, you'll note, by this time losing my temper with you):
Quoting Bartricks
And that's where we are now.
Do you see how unbelievably patient I am with you?
Now, do you understand that I think reasons do exist? And that this means I think they do exist, not that they don't? Or are you on a sponsored thickathon?
If a purely evolutionary story of our development is true, then there are no actual reasons to do anything.
That means that any faculty of reason we have developed is not capable of detecting any actual reasons - for there are none - and will instead be a faculty that generates the hallucination of reasons.
One can still exercise that faculty. But exercising it would simply be to generate hallucinations in oneself, rather than any actual awareness of reasons.
These things should not be conflated (but are, by almost everyone).
Our faculty of reason.
Reasons to do things
The belief or impression that there is a reason to do something.
What an evolutionary account does is explain how we have come to be 'without' having to posit any reasons to do things.
So an evolutionary account will explain how we have acquired a faculty of reason, without having to posit any actual reasons.
And consequently it will explain why we subsequently get the impression of reasons to do things without having to posit any actual reasons (the impressions are generated by the faculty).
Ok, ok.
Let me summmarize, as best as I can, your argument.
Evolutionarily speaking, there doesn't havta be real reasons for believing/doing something even though you believe there are.
What follows?
You claim that the belief that there are real reasons to believe or do something is debunked. It's, to put it bluntly, just convenient/useful/healthy to believe that there are real reasons to believe or do something even though there are none.
If so, any argument you make, which quite naturally requires you to furnish reasons (duh!), is going to fall flat on its face owing to the fact that according to you there are no real reasons. How can you say there are no real reasons to believe anything and with the same breath provide reasons to believe you? You're drinking from the very well you just poisoned! I'll call 911! :snicker:
Nothing follows from that.
Now, I laid out an argument for you, didn't I?
Here it is: Quoting Bartricks
And then you say this AGAIN:
Quoting Agent Smith
No, fishy, I didn't. Again and again and again. I do not claim that. I claim that 'if' a purely evolutionary account of our development is true, THEN the belief is debunked.
This isn't hard. 'If' doesn't mean 'is the case'. "If we were in a victorian school and I was your teacher, you would now have an extremely sore bottom" I have not just said that we are in a victorian school and you have a sore bottom, have I? We've been over this again and again and again and again and again.
Quoting Agent Smith
Christ. I give up. If we were in a victorian school I would now be in big trouble for having spanked a pupil to death.
Ok, ok. You win, but not because you're right but because you're bullheaded!
When you say reasons, do you mean motivations? (here that is). Quoting BartricksOK, right. I don't think I conflate them.
From there in your post to me I am not sure what you are getting at. Could you use motivation or another word of your choice for reasons to do things. That might help me sort out the point you are making here.
Reasons to do things are known as normative reasons (or justifying reasons). They are what shoulds or oughts are made of.
Clearly an evolutionary story of our development does not challenge the idea that we have motivations. Such an account will mention them. What it challenges - because it will not mention them - is the idea that there is anything we should do or should believe.
Can you give me a couple of other examples. If someone is motivated to torture John, it seems to me he has a reason. It may not be what most people call a good reason (when looked at in total) but there would be a reason. He is mad at John and wants John to feel bad. OK, perhaps you grant that but point to the psychopath. He just does it for the hell of it. But then the psychopath gets pleasure from torturing John. John is a human and the psychopath gets pleasure out of torturing humans. That is a reason. We just don't like that reason.
Or maybe I am missing something still, so pardon my slowness. And I almost grasp the OP, at least at times I think so, but then other times, not.
Clearly not. So what we ought to do and what we are motivated to do are not equivalent.
"I am motivated to do it, but I wonder if I have reason to do it" is a coherent thought, but would be incoherent if the two were equivalent.
Any confusion here is simply due to the fact the word 'reason' is ambiguous. It can be used as a synonym for motivation and many other things besides.(So I am not saying you are incorrect to say that I have reason to torture john, I am just saying that the word reason does not operate as a synonym for a normative reason in that context).
So, a reason-to-do something is not a motivation, for we can have reason to do that which we are not motivated to do and we can have a motivation to do that which we have no reason to do.
Quoting BartricksI took this as reasoning, as in reaching conclusions via logic and probably verbal thought. The second seemed to be 'the why we do things.'
But now it seems like the second is really about morals.
Should I do something, should I not.Quoting BartricksWe are not motivated enough to do it perhaps. But if we have reasoned that we should do X, but don't do X other motivations are stronger. I mean, if we believe we should do X (either version of should, the moral or the practical) then we have some motivation to do it.
Yes, we can have a reason. IOW it is obvious to others, but we don't seem to notice. But if I have (reached the conclusion that I have) a reason to do something but don't do it, I still have motivation but other things are getting in way, other motivations, laziness, fear,...)
But let me take a break. I literally have a conceptual dyslexia. I suspect that I still have issues with what you are saying here, but it could also be my cognitive, hm, oddity so I don't want to waste out time. I'll read your responses to others.
I took the OP as in part a defense of intuition. That we cannot reason our way to all rational conclusions. There was more I thought was in there of course, but I am reevaluating.
So, philosophers call 'reasons to do things' 'normative reasons', so they are not confused with other uses to which the word 'reason'can be put.
There are different sorts of normative reason. They are all reasons to do things, but they have different bases.
For example, we often have reason to do something due to it being in our interests to do it. The fact doing x is in my interests is the basis upon which I have a reason to do it. That kind of normative reason is called an instrumental reason.
Sometimes we have a reason to do something because it is in someone else's interests that we do it, or because it will give someone else what they deserve, or because it would manifest a good character trait, or because it would respect another. When a normative reason has that kind of base it is called a moral reason.
And sometimes we have a normative reason to believe something because the belief is true. When that is the basis of the normative reason it is known as an epistemic reason.
These are all different kinds of normative reason and they can sometimes come into conflict. But morality, note, is partly made of normative reasons. Morality is essentially normative. But the domain of the normative is larger than morality. It includes morality - at least the normative part of it - but includes much else besides. So it is a mistake to think that I am just talking about morality. I am talking about all justifications - all reasons to do things (so, moral reasons, instrumental reasons and epistemic reasons).
I am not talking about anything else that the word 'reason' might be used to denote. So I am not talking about our faculty of reason. Nor am I talking about motivations. Nor am I talking about the causes of things. I am talking about normative reasons.
That doing certain things is adaptively advantageous is in keeping with an evolutionary account, and provides a practical reason for doing those things. This is also in keeping with the understanding that there cannot be any 'pure' as opposed to practical reason for doing anything. Any reason to do anything is only as good as the purpose it is intended to fulfill.
You're the very soul of clarity! Please, please, don't let me interrupt you. Carry on!
:lol: I never understood time. Can't answer your question.
Quoting Bartricks
Firstly, 3 does not follow from 2. If you think it does then you need to explain how it would. Secondly, 3 itself is not merely a conclusion but an argument: "then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things": you haven't explained why our reasons to do things is debunked on account of our not having to 'posit actual reasons' or what that even means, when it is obvious that we do posit reasons for doing things (despite your claim that we don't "have to"; {again whatever that could actually mean})and that those reasons motivate us, regardless of their truth value.
:snicker:
:snicker: We all have our little problems!
By the way I love the consistency of your God. He is reason so he, being omni-benevolent, would never deceive us. But he has given us, according to that very reason (according to you, of course), a life not worth living on account of the fact that it involves some suffering, and the ultimate hurt: death, a degree of suffering such as to warrant our reason (god) to tell us that it is immoral to procreate. And yet God created the world with us and our ability to procreate as part of it. Now that's some real fine consistency right there, boy! You're doing just fine boy, don't let your detractors, those who disagree with your reasoning, undermine your perfect God/reason-warranted confidence in your own ability to reason better than anyone else. :rofl:
And you're very much a Hugh.
Quoting Janus
Yeah, Hugh, you need to stop trying to think - it isn't working. It's not 'my' God, it's 'God'. And it does not follow from his being omnibenevolent that he would never deceive us. But you haven't the first idea what does or does not follow from another thing, do you? It's just whatever you think next.
1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q
Hugh: 3 doesn't follow from 1 and 2, so far as I can see, because you're Bartricks and you know nothing. If P, then squirrel. But squirrels like nuts. So therefore nuts. If P, nuts. Bartthick.
1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q
Hugh: no, so far as I can see, 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. How do we know anything? Do we just have to accept what you say, Bumtrick? I think that what follows from 1 and 2 is "I'm off to the shops".
1. If P, then Q
2. If Q, then R
3. Therefore if P, then R
Hugh, no, so far as I can see, 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. What follows from 1 is 34, or maybe yellow. Bumthick.
Tedious.
When you've managed to collect above 100 IQ points, get someone to read this to you:
1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p. (that has the form "If p, then q")
2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things (that asserts p)
3. Therefore, if a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things (therefore q).
Soundness is a property of arguments, not premises. You mean 'false', not unsound.
Now you're saying that 2 is false. But you offer no argument, you just say things. Read the OP and address the case I made or go away and be a Hugh elsewhere.
And what you said - after insisting my valid argument was invalid - is this. You said 'promise 2 is infalse becorn doobidoobidoo'. And that, around these parts, is good filosophymizing.
A: Your argumentation is invalidity because it is doobidoobidoo. Hegel. Everything is subjective and how do we know anything anyway?
B: I agree that his urgemont is unfactisound,but it isn't doobidoobidoo. It is wahdiwahdiwaa. Noumenal. Everything is subjective and God's a dick and how do we know anything anyway?"
C: Have you read unqualified Hack's work on why everything is subjective and how do we know anything anyway? It's really good as he explains the dumbdidumbdidumb of everything and makes a great point when he says 'and how anything know do we?'
:rofl:
To posters engaged in discussion with Bartricks, look up gennaion pseudos (noble lie) and pious fiction.
It is telling that you would rather pedantically address the technical error than address the obvious point of what I was saying.
The reason the car exploded was the bomb.
I have reason to blow up the car.
The word reason means something quite different in the first sentence to the second. In the first it means cause. In the second it means normative reason.
The reason we believe in normative reasons (not causes,but normative reasons) if an evolutionary explanation is correct is that belief in them was adaptive. That does not mean we have to posit any. We posit causes, not normative reasons.
Belief in normative reasons to do things is adaptive because generally those norms are designed to facilitate social harmony. For a social animal getting along with others is important to well-being. So my point is that there is no substantive distinction between normative reasons and adaptively advantageous reasons.
And you have said above 'I understand the distinction between p and q, but doobidoobidoo I think ps are qs." So you don't understand it at all, do you?
The word reason is ambiguous. What does that mean? (Pssst, it doesn't mean that it can write with either hand)
There is no such substantive, as opposed to a merely conceptual distinction. For example, when we do something we desire to do, does that mean we are caused to do it by the desire? If you say 'yes' then what grounds would you have to claim that if we do something for a normative reason, that we are not caused to do it by our belief in the normative reason?
Try addressing what I'm saying and not succumbing to your attention deficit or bad faith-driven desire to characterize it as "doobidoobidoo".
You claim that reason does not deceive us and that God is reason. It follows that you believe God does not deceive us. If this is not on account of omni-benevolence then what is it on account of?
I'll just tell you - it means it has more than one distinct meaning.
I then said that the word 'reason' can be used to denote normative reasons (which are what the OP is about) and also to denote 'causes'.
So, once more - and do take the bloody trouble to read what I am saying you giant Hugh - 'the reason the car exploded is the bomb'. The word 'reason' there denotes a cause.
I have reason to blow up the car. The word 'reason' there denotes a normative reason. Not a cause. A normative reason.
Now, if we haven't already far exceeded your ability to understand, we're definitely going to now. Normative reasons can sometimes cause things to happen. Oooo. So normative reasons can also sometimes be causal reasons as well.
But - and hold to the sides of your Hugh - causes are not necessarily normative reasons.
For example, the bomb didn't have a reason to blow up the car. It did. It caused that to happen. But it didn't 'have a reason to' do so.
Now, an evolutionary explanation of us will mention causes. It won't mention any actual normative reasons
This now sounds like this to you - doobidoobidoobidoo - yes?
What have you done, Hugh? All you've done is insist that normative reasons and causes are one and the same. No argument for that. Just an insistence.
Argue something!!!! Engage with the bloody OP. Take the bloody time to understand it. Then argue against something it says. DOn't nay say. Argue.
I conclude that God is Reason. I don't claim it. I conclude it.
Quoting Janus
Er, no it doesn't. You explain why you think it does. It doesn't.
Quoting Janus
Reason - who is a person - will be omnibenevolent. That doesn't mean 'won't ever lie'. How many words do you actually know the correct meaning of? Is it 8 or 9?
Hugh: yeah, but you believes that God are Reason and that means you is thinking that is onionbenvolent, which means you think Reason likes onions.
I'll put it another way: normative reasons are effective only if we believe them. Adaptive advantage gives us good reason to believe in them; namely that following them is generally adaptively advantageous.
Quoting Bartricks
So you conclude it, but don't claim it to be true? Real consistent!
Quoting Bartricks
I've already explained why I think it follows: if reason doesn't deceive us, and God is reason then God doesn't deceive us. Try reading. Now explain why you think it doesn't follow.
Quoting Bartricks
So, you think sometimes it is in our best interest to be deceived and that reason sometimes deceives us?
I don't know what you mean by that (and nor do you). It's doobidoobidoo talk. Stop it. When I make a distinction, resist the temptation to articulate it in your own words. You don't know what most words mean, yes? So stop it. Stop trying to change the meaning of what I say into something stupid that you understand and then attributing it to me. NOw, why the F, when I said 'causes' did you start talking gibberish about 'conceptual distinctions'? Eh? Why? Do you think it makes you sound clever?
THe OP is about normative reasons. Normative reasons are reasons to do things.
The word 'reason' can be used as a synonym for cause. But that does not mean that a normative reason and a cause are synonymous.
There are causes of things. Some of them are normative reasons and some are not.
No discussion with you goes anywhere. I'm using you.
Quoting Janus
Address the OP. You haven't done that. If there are normative reasons, then we have reason to believe in them. But if an evolutionary account of our development is true, then there aren't any. See? So you need to show how there will be some if an evolutionary account is true. It's called 'begging the question'. You do it. Always.
It means that it is a distinction without a real difference. But you won't attempt to answer the questions I posed which will show that.
Quoting Bartricks
And what reason would that be?
So, you think normative reasons are causes and causes are normative reasons?
Or did you not know what you were saying (clue: it's that one).
Quoting Janus
It would be an epistemic reason. There - that's a big word for you. You can misuse that one now. Have fun with it.
Answer the question: do normative reasons cause us to do things or not?
Quoting Bartricks
What do you claim we know when we have a normative reason to do something? Why should we follow what seems, normatively speaking, the right thing to do? As the word 'normative' suggests, when we follow normative reasons we are following norms; where do these norms come from and how are they established if not from social convention? I know you'll say they come from reason, but according to you it's not the case that reason "won't ever lie". So why should we follow normative reasons (even assuming that we know just what they are in all circumstances) if they might be based on lies?
Yes, they 'can' do (as I said and you didn't bother to read). Now answer my questions:
do you think that causes and normative reasons are one and the same or were you just putting big words together that you didn't really understanding and hoping I'd think you were clever and not a Hugh?
Now, stop asking me questions and actually engage with the argument in the OP. ("But how do we know anything? And everything is subjective. And how do we know anything? Is it true just because Bartfuck says so? How know everything do we? Subjective. Conceptual. Noumenal. Hegel." Yes?).
There are different kinds of causes for actions and normative reasons are one of them. Desires are another, and instincts are another. So that all reasons are causes does not entail that all causes are reasons, since there are other kinds of natural causes that do not pertain to human action and are thus not reasons for human action ( although they might be)..
I asked you if you think that causes and normative reason are one and the same.
Your answer, so far as I can discern it in that muddle, is 'no'.
That's correct.
Normative reasons can be the causes of things. They're not always. For example, you have reason to think I know what I am talking about. You don't though. So that reason is not being causally effective.
But they 'can' be.
So, that something has been caused to occur does not mean that a normative reason is present.
Do you see how that follows?
If not all causes of things are normative reasons, then if something has been caused to occur you can't conclude that a noramtive reason exists.
Do you see?
Now, the word 'reason' can sometimes be used as a synonym for 'cause'
When it occurs in evolutionary explanations, that's what it means. It denotes a cause.
And that's not equivalent to it denoting a normative reason. Do you see?
And so though an evolutionary explanation of our development will cite causes, it will not cite normative reasons.
It will cite beliefs in them. It will not cite the objects of the beliefs. And I explained in the OP why, when that happens, we do not need to posit the object.
Now, if you think my argument is dumb - which you do - then you need to do the following. You need - without conflating normative reasons and causes - to show how an evolutionary explanation of our development needs to posit actual noramtive reasons. Not causes and not the belief in normative reasons. Actual normative reasons.
Do that.
If I thought you knew what you were talking about then that would condition my behavior, I would behave differently if I didn't think you knew what you were talking about. so either way it is causal.
Quoting Bartricks
All evolutionarily established reasons for behavior of social animals are in some sense, however attenuated, normative. This is because the social animal is constrained to behave in ways acceptable to the group or suffer the consequences. For the social animal to be exiled from the group is a disaster.
Normative reasons can cause things. But not all causes are normative reasons. So, that an evolutionary story appeals to causes does not establish that normative reasons have to be posited. Stop hoping that big words like 'attenuated' will make up for a lack of point
@Bartricks
And I think you must show if our belief in normative reasons is actually evolving or not. If it is evolving, you need to show if it is evolving under the constraint of natural selection or some other force or none other than by random chance - again, there is no point in discussing a relationship between natural selection and normative reasons if our believe in normative reasons is not evolving under the constraint of natural selection. If our belief in normative reasons is not evolving, you must show that it is not evolving. I also think you must provide evidence in favor of your claim that the theory of evolution by natural selection does indeed not take into account normative reasons in its explanation of our development - it is not enough that you state such claim. Please do not refer me to your OP since as I said before I do not think it clearly addresses what I am asking you to demonstrate.
Why? That makes no sense given I am arguing against such an account! Why would I need to defend the account I am attacking?
Quoting Daniel
Do pay attention - I am arguing that if a wholly evolutionary story about us is true, then there aren't any reasons to do or believe things. Yet there are reasons to do and believe things.....thus it is false.
This is the argument Daniel - read it:
Quoting Bartricks
Which premise do you think is false and why?
I am not convinced by what you bluntly and carelessly state in proposition number 2. I cannot say 2 is false or true simply because I am not able to find on the literature any evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things or even a decent attempt to address the problem in question. So, I am asking you to provide an article or some other source of reliable information in which the topic is analyzed and in which it is demonstrated that in fact a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not take into the account normative reasons. I am not satisfied with you simply stating that a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not take into account normative reasons. Also, since you maintain that our belief in normative reasons is not evolving, I would like you to show that it is in fact not evolving.
Now, since you are the owner of this thread, I think it is your duty to at least from time to time seriously address the questions put forward by those of us who decide to maintain a conversation with you not by referring us to the op nor by repeating the same thing over and over but by offering evidence that backs up and clarifies the claims that you make. So, I would like you to present an evolutionary explanation of our belief to do things which does not posit any normative reasons, or at least direct me to one.
I've already acknowledged that not all causes, for example merely physical causes, are normative reasons. I'm saying that causes of human and some "higher" social animals' behavior are, in the sense that behavior is constrained by what is acceptable to the group, normative.
Yes, but in about 2 minutes time you'll say something that implies you think all causes are normative reasons.
Quoting Janus
Well anyone can say stuff. Argue.
Duck! Blimey - that was close. You almost got taken out by a normative reason.
Don't picnic there - there's a pride of normative reasons over there. THey eat humans!
He's dead I'm afraid Mrs Jenkins. A ton of normative reasons fell on him.
I would procreate with him, but he's covered in normative reasons.