The time lag argument for idealism
First, it is basic principle of rational inquiry that appearances enjoy default justification. That is, if something appears to be the case, then we are default justified in believing it to be the case. To put it another way, if something appears to be the case, then we have reason to believe it is the case, other things being equal.
Don't deny that principle. If you do, you won't be able to argue for anything. And that's dumb. It'd just be another way of inanely responding 'but how does anyone know anything?' So don't. You will. But don't.
Anyway, there appear to be events occuring now. That is, there appears to be a present in which events are occurring. There are events that appear to have present-ness, then.
The default is that they are indeed occurring now. That is, that which appears to be happening now, really is happening now.
If a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false.
Imagine my theory is that everything is made of Edam cheese. Well, very little appears to be made of Edam cheese. That's good default evidence that my theory is false. If I insisted that the appearances are all faulty because they conflict with my theory, then I'm just a dogmatist who is more convinced that everything is made of Edam than I am that following evidence is a way to find out what's true.
So, if a theory about reality implies that all our impressions of presentness are false, then that's a big black mark against that theory. It is default evidence that the theory is false. The job of theories about reality is to respect the appearances, not ignore them. (Having said that, it is not reasonable to think that 'all' appearances are accurate - it is reasonable to expect that some will be false. But if a theory implies that most or all appearances of a certain sort are false, then that's a black mark).
Now, bearing all this in mind, if materialism is true, then given what we know about how our brain responds to the world it inhabits, all our impressions of presentness are going to be false. For on the materialist view our sensations are caused by an external material world interacting with our brains. But although simultaneous causation is surely possible, the simple fact is that the events in the brain seem to lag behind the events they are responses to. So it takes time for an impression to be created in our minds. And surely that means that no impression of presentness is going to be accurate, for by the time it has been created the events it is representing to be occurring are no longer present. Thus if materialism is true then the evidence shows that our sensations are of a past state of the world. Yet they represent the state to be present, not past. So the presentness they represent the events to have is not there. We are, it seems, prey to a systematic hallucination of presentness if materialism is true.
A lot of people are so wed to the idea that materialism is true they can't help but simply conclude that this is indeed the case: that everything we perceive to be happening now, in fact happened a split second ago. But they're just dogmatists. They're always with us and in the past they would have been religious bigots. Now they're materialism bigots. Different worldview, same characters.
But it is default evidence that materialism is false. And pretty powerful evidence too.
Note, the same problem does not afflict immaterialism. For by hypothesis our sensations of presentness are not created in us by some material process. And so there is no problem supposing that things are as they seem, temporally speaking. That is, immaterialism does not imply that our sensations of presentness are false, for it does not imply that they are the product of a process that takes time to occur.
Don't deny that principle. If you do, you won't be able to argue for anything. And that's dumb. It'd just be another way of inanely responding 'but how does anyone know anything?' So don't. You will. But don't.
Anyway, there appear to be events occuring now. That is, there appears to be a present in which events are occurring. There are events that appear to have present-ness, then.
The default is that they are indeed occurring now. That is, that which appears to be happening now, really is happening now.
If a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false.
Imagine my theory is that everything is made of Edam cheese. Well, very little appears to be made of Edam cheese. That's good default evidence that my theory is false. If I insisted that the appearances are all faulty because they conflict with my theory, then I'm just a dogmatist who is more convinced that everything is made of Edam than I am that following evidence is a way to find out what's true.
So, if a theory about reality implies that all our impressions of presentness are false, then that's a big black mark against that theory. It is default evidence that the theory is false. The job of theories about reality is to respect the appearances, not ignore them. (Having said that, it is not reasonable to think that 'all' appearances are accurate - it is reasonable to expect that some will be false. But if a theory implies that most or all appearances of a certain sort are false, then that's a black mark).
Now, bearing all this in mind, if materialism is true, then given what we know about how our brain responds to the world it inhabits, all our impressions of presentness are going to be false. For on the materialist view our sensations are caused by an external material world interacting with our brains. But although simultaneous causation is surely possible, the simple fact is that the events in the brain seem to lag behind the events they are responses to. So it takes time for an impression to be created in our minds. And surely that means that no impression of presentness is going to be accurate, for by the time it has been created the events it is representing to be occurring are no longer present. Thus if materialism is true then the evidence shows that our sensations are of a past state of the world. Yet they represent the state to be present, not past. So the presentness they represent the events to have is not there. We are, it seems, prey to a systematic hallucination of presentness if materialism is true.
A lot of people are so wed to the idea that materialism is true they can't help but simply conclude that this is indeed the case: that everything we perceive to be happening now, in fact happened a split second ago. But they're just dogmatists. They're always with us and in the past they would have been religious bigots. Now they're materialism bigots. Different worldview, same characters.
But it is default evidence that materialism is false. And pretty powerful evidence too.
Note, the same problem does not afflict immaterialism. For by hypothesis our sensations of presentness are not created in us by some material process. And so there is no problem supposing that things are as they seem, temporally speaking. That is, immaterialism does not imply that our sensations of presentness are false, for it does not imply that they are the product of a process that takes time to occur.
Comments (133)
I don't consider it to be an issue of materialism vs idealism, but an issue of how to define the present moment. Is the present moment defined as the time at which - as you say - we respond to events? Or, is the present moment the earliest time at which those events we respond to can be measured/recorded?
I believe that one can be a materialist and still define the present moment as the time at which we respond to events; the time at/of which we find ourselves conscious.
Have you heard that seeing stars (or starlight) is looking back in time? So when you look at the stars you might be seeing light that was reflected from a star millions or billions of years ago. Does that situate the (i.e. our) present moment at millions or billions of years ago? I don't think so.
I don't think you're saying anything different to what I am. I acknowledge that an event can occur at t1 and that the earliest we can be aware of it is at t2. But you have ignored or misunderstood my point that we need not define the present moment as being at t1. It can also be defined as being at t2 - even by a materialist.
If you say that presentness is when the sensation of presentness occurs, then it is not 'of' presentness but is the presentness.
To determine that your sensation falsely represents the event p as being in the present (at t2) presupposes that t1 is the present, not t2. My point is: don't presuppose this, since either t1 or t2 could be defined as the present. If t2 is defined as the present instead, then your sensation truly represents the event p to "have presentness".
Quoting Bartricks
If t2 is the present, then you could (possibly) say that your sensation is the present, or you could say that your sensations represent event p to be in the present. I would say it's the latter.
If event p occurs at t1, then it is present at t1, not t2. Otherwise it would not be correct to say it occurs at t1.
If I have a sensation that represents even p to be present, then in order for that sensation to be accurate p would need to be present.
But if event p occurred at t1 and my sensation of its presentness occurs at t2, then my sensation is inaccurate. For at the time of the occurrence of my sensation the event it represents to be present does not have presentness but pastness.
So, we do not decide in advance when the present moment is. We look to our appearances to tell us, for that is how we're aware of it. But if materialism is true, then they tell us it is where it isn't.
Only if you define presentness, or the present, in that way.
I am not denying that an event occurs at t1 and that we are aware of it at a later time t2. I am only denying that we must situate the present at t1 instead of t2.
So you think that present determines the past?
What I mean is, if the event of p occurs at t1, would you admit that it is present at t1? It seems to me that you want to say that despite p occuring at time 1, it is present at a later time.....that, to my mind, makes no sense.
So, if I sense that p is present, that is default evidence that p is present.
But if won't be present if materialism is true. It'll be past.
You, if I have understood you correctly, want to say that this is not true for the materialist can simply insist that an event can be present at a time later than that at which it occurs. Which I think is incoherent.
That's what I'm saying, too.
Quoting Bartricks
I assume we have been using t1 and t2 as follows:
t1 = the time that an event occurs
t2 = the time that we become aware of, sense, or respond to that event.
You've just said in the first quote above that the present moment is the time that we are aware of - "when our sensations tell us it is" - which means the present moment is at t2. However, you are also saying in the second quote here that situating the present moment anywhere but t1 makes no sense to you?
Good, so we agree that in order for my sensation that p is present to be accurate, p needs actually to have presentness.
Quoting Luke
Yes.
Quoting Luke
No, I said that in order for an impression of presentness to be accurate, the event it represents to be present would have actually to be present.
So, if at t2 I get the impression that event p - an event that occurred at t1 - is present, then that impression will be inaccurate.
I'm not a materialist. I'm trying to refute it. So we both agree that my sensation that p is present is accurate. I think that's incompatible with materialism though. Or at least, incompatible with our best materialist explanation of how the world interacts with our brains. FOr if an event occurs at t1 then it is present at t1.
An event can't occur earlier than it is present, can it?
I would call it immediacy. But we mostly relate to the other in the realm of recognition and recollection (mediation).
No, that's not that same as what you said here:
Quoting Bartricks
If the present moment is "when our sensations tell us it is", then p is present when our sensations tell us it is, not whenever p actually occurred.
Quoting Bartricks
And I'm saying it doesn't have to be. A materialist can also agree that the present moment is when our sensations tell us it is, and not when event p actually occurs. It's just about defining when to situate the present moment.
Someone yells across the canyon. You can hear the voice echoing off the walls. Do you think the experience of the echoes convinces you the sound was produces immediately?
Or, you see the lightning, then hear the thunder several seconds later?
The moment you recognize the sound as originating from an external source, the immediacy is lost.
(Edit). Simply recognizing the experience as sound destroys the immediacy.
But I also said that I am not a materialist. I think materialism is false partly because I think the present moment is where our sensations represent it to be. WHich is not where it would be if materialism were true. So:
1. If materialism is true, the present moment is not where our sensations say it is.
2. The present moment is where our sensations say it is
3. Therefore materialism is true
So you need to argue that if materialism is true, the present moment is where our sensations say it is.
But it isn't.
SO far as I can tell, what you're doing is insisting that the materialist can say that event p is present if our sensations say it is, even if it occurred earlier. That doesn't make any sense, does it?
If event p occurred at t1, then it was present at t1, not t2.
Why not?
Quoting Bartricks
Why?
Because my sensation that event p is present will occur at t2, yet event p occurred at t1.
Quoting Luke
Because if an event occurs at time t1, then it is present at t1, not t2.
That doesn't answer why t1 must be the present moment. Why must the present time be equated with the occurrence of event p instead of when I am aware of it or sense it?
Quoting Bartricks
Present to who?
Well it does, because if the present is that which can render the impression of the present accurate, and the impression of the present occurs at t1, then that which can render that impression must occur at t1 as well.
Note, I have never ever identified the present moment with our sensation of it. Our sensations represent something to be the case - in this case the presentness of p is what they are representing to be the case.
What could render that impression accurate? A past event? No. For it is an impression of presentness, not pastness.
So only a present event can render an impression of presentness accurate.
Hence why p needs to occur when the sensation of p's presentness occurs if the sensation of p's presentness is to be accurate.
Can you explain to me how your view - that an event can occur at t1 yet be present later than it occurs - makes any sense at all?
Does it make sense to wonder "hmm, well, I accept that p occurred at 3 o clock - but when was it present?'
That obviously happens in many situations, so it would seem to be a problem for idealism, not materialism. The materialist would just say our sensations are delayed because it takes time for an event to reach our senses and register in our brains as a sensation.
What is the idealist explanation for various time lags? We know these lags exist. We can measure them!
Your conception of accuracy is entirely based on the presupposition that the present time is equated with the occurrence of the event at t1.
Quoting Bartricks
If you'd stop presupposing that the present moment coincides with the occurrence of the event, and entertain the possibility that the present moment coincides with our awareness of the event, then the present moment can be later than the occurrence of the event.
Why does the present havta be true present?
You are welcome to materialism if that's something you think is coherent. It's not - it's mental.
When did it occur? T1
But when was it present? T2
Mental.
There's as much evidence that all of this is real, as there is that it is an illusion.
I have said that the present moment needn't coincide with the occurrence of an event, but could instead coincide with our awareness of the event. If the event precedes our awareness of it, and our awareness of the event coincides with the present moment, then the event would be in our past at the present moment. That's not the same as saying "it can be present later". In fact, on your conception of time where the present moment coincides with an event, it would mean "it can be present earlier" - that is, the event would be "present" before we were aware of it. That's what the so-called time lag means, right?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/717206 .
Who's to say?
it's a concept.
What about eastern ideas?
Now, go away and let the serious discussion continue.
Yes, and what about eastern ideas? They're good.
I take it to be a conceptual truth that if event d occurs at time t1 then it is present at t1. If you think an event d can occur at t1, yet not be present until later, then I just think that's a contradiction. When an event occurs is when it is present and when it is present is when it occurs. "It's occuring now, but is it present?" makes no sense.
So, the event d occurs - and so is present at - time t1. That is, d is 'now' at t1. Not after, not before. But at t1. It has presentness at t1. These are just different ways of saying the same thing.
If my sensation of d's presentness does not occur until time t2, then d appears present when it is not. That is, my sensation of d's presentness is false. If materialism is true, then all my impressions of presentness are false. Nothing that I sense to be present is actually present. The event of my sensation of d's presentness will occur after d is present, not simultaneous with it. And that's true of all of my sensations of presentness if materialism is true. So they're all false if materialism is true. Which is why it isn't.
If I understand you correctly - and I am not at all sure I do - then all you are saying is that my sensation of the presentness of d will be present when it, the sensation, is present. Which is true, but beside the point. For the sensation of d's presentness is of d's presentness, not the sensation of d's presentness. And d is not present, it is past.
Quoting Bartricks
Are they? How does anyone know anything?
There is a sensation of presentness such that when it attends other sensations we get the impression that what those other sensations are representing to be the case is the case presently.
If materialism is true that sensation of presentness occurs after the events that the other sensations are representing to be the case. Thus the sensations of presentness is systematically false if materialism is true.
That something appears to be the case is default evidence that it is the case. As such if a theory about reality has as an implication that a whole range of our impressions are systematically false, then that's default evidence the theory is false.
Thus, the falsity of all of our sensations of presentness if materialism is true is default evidence that materialism is false.
2. The perceived present should be the true present.
Ergo,
3. Idealism is true. (1, 2 MP)
Refutation: Premise 2 is begging for a supporting argument. Why should the perceived present be the true present i.e. what's the issue with perceptual time lag?
No, I gave up because you refused to acknowledge what I was saying. I'll try once more.
Quoting Bartricks
I realise that is what you are presupposing. But is there a reason why the present (or "now") must coincide with the occurrence of an event? Can you provide a non-circular reason without merely presupposing that it does?
Quoting Bartricks
In what way do you sense it to be present at t2?
What makes the occurrence of the event "actually" present at t1? (And what event are we even talking about here?)
Quoting Bartricks
If the above indicates that your sensations "are all false", wouldn't that make it an argument against idealism? "If materialism is true..." I thought you arguing for idealism being true?
According to Wikipedia, idealism is the view "that reality is indistinguishable and inseparable from human perception and understanding; that reality is a mental construct closely connected to ideas".
If all of our sensations are false, then that spells trouble for idealism.
Quoting Bartricks
If "materialism is true" implies that the present moment coincides with the occurrence of events, and that there is a time lag between the occurrence of an event and our sensation of that event, then that's what you have been arguing for. Therefore, you are arguing for the truth of materialism (according to the views on materialism you have presented here, at least).
I am not sure how you got to materialism is false. I get that there is an illusion of presentness. But that doesn't make materialism false. It would mean that there is an illusion about part of experience. Materialism could still be correct in the main. And in fact could simply contain this as one of the facets of materialism.
I'm not a materialist by the way, so I'm happy if you can break that old beast in a new way.
You call this presentness illusion a big black mark against the theory. But I don't see it that way. I see it as a consequence of the theory. That's it. Materialism entails that what we think of as happening exactly now is not. Some might put it differently that while the experience is happening right now, what it is representing came a tiny bit earlier.
Some materialists may find this vexing, but i don't see how it means that their ontology - the world is made of matter and so on - needs to be tossed out.
As a side note: it seems to me not being a materialist might lead to different ideas about natalism/anti-natalism. Has it? You can link me if you've already gone into this somewhere.
That's a bold statement, even on a philosophical forum. But, I think I see how you equate Materialism and Temporalism as subjective beliefs. For example, Einstein's Relativity (block time) posited that there is no knowable objective time. Hence my T1 and your T1 may not be simultaneous. Our intuitive sense of time, and its passage, is inherently subjective. For an astronaut on Mars, and a scientist on Earth, there is a significant time-delay, even at the light-speed of radio transmissions.
But idealistic humans have built conventional & technological means to synchronize our cultural Time -- measured ever more minutely -- allowing us to pretend (as-if) it is objective. Yet that factual Time assumption is similar to the factual Matter presumption of classical physics. Both were called into question by 20th century Relativity and Quantum fuzziness. Atoms of time, and atoms of matter are now viewed by woke scientists as conventional beliefs, instead of physical facts.
Wheeler's Delayed Choice thought experiment, and various Illusion of Choice experiments, seem [subject to alternative interpretations] to indicate that our sense of control over time and matter are retrospective, not causal. But, the point here is that Subjective Reality is actually Ideality (i.e. mental, not physical). As Kant pointed-out, we only know phenomena as interpreted into mental ideas (noumena).
So, it seems that Plato's postulated perfect "Ideality" may be closer to truth, than our conventional "Reality" of absolute objective Truth and physical Facts. A truly Objective Ideal observer would necessarily be viewing from an omniscient perch outside our system of Space & Time. Those of us players in the Real World game, view the environment from a mobile perspective, in both space (matter) & time (change). From our self-centered viewpoint, Time & Space are synchronized to the beat of our own heart. :cool:
Delayed-choice experiment :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wheeler%27s_delayed-choice_experiment
Look, if you just take materialism for granted and then interpret data in light of it, then you are not doing philosophy. That's no different from taking christianity for granted and interpreting the data in light of it.
Philosophy is about following reason, not using reason to rationalize your prejudices.
Now, if something appears to be the case, that is default evidence that it IS the case. It's in the OP.
The event appears to be present. That is default evidence that it is present.
If a certain worldview - materialism- implies it is not present, then it follows that the evidence implies materialism is false.
All you are doing is rejecting the evidence on the grounds that it conflicts with materialism.
You think that if an event occurs at time t1, then this leaves open when it is present.
No it doesn't. It means it is present at t1. Christ almighty!! A bloody 5 year old can understand that.
If you have to say, utterly nonsensically, that event t1 can occur at t1 yet be present later, then you've been refuted.
And the explanation is that there is no way of making sense of what 'occurs at t1' means if it does not mean 'present at t1'.
You - you - try and explain otherwise. Explain what 'occurs at t1' means without recourse to temporal terms such as now or present. Go on.
If an event occurs at t1, then it is present at t1. If you think otherwise, explain.
If an event is present at t1 - so, it is 'now' at t1 - then that's when it is occurring. If you think otherwise, explain.
And it's NOT an argument for materialism. If materialism is true, then none of our iimpressions of the presentness of events are accurate. That means they're evidence that materialism is false. Not true. False.
So if materialism is true then materialism is false?
If lightning strikes 10 kilometers away from me and you are right there, you will see it slightly before I do. But you will hear the thunder slightly after you see the lightning even though it might seem simultaneous to you, and I will se it several seconds after I see the lightning. We know that the sound of thunder occurs simultaneously with the lightning, they are present together where they occur.
So whose present is the real present? You, being right there, are closer to being present at the actual event than I am, being 10 kilometres away. Remember, the term 'present' has three senses: one temporal, i.e. now, one spatial. that is there and also the sense that events present themselves to us.
So, if p, then q.
The default is that our impressions are not systematically inaccurate.
So: not q.
Therefore not p.
'If' does not assert. If you say 'if' you're not saying 'is the case'.
Presentness is not individually subjective. You, like virtually everyone here, keep confusing 'appears to me to be' with 'is'.
There is 'the' present. There isn't your present and my present. There's 'the' present.
You're like a little kid with your "arguments": you present them, and then when others present you with reasonable objections, it's like you stick your fingers in your ears and go "Lalalalalalalalalalalala"."I'm not listening" "You're not responding to my argument" "you don't have much capacity for rational thought, do you?", and then you spray insults all over the place. I don't think I've ever seen you concede a point yet, and I've seen many points that tell against your contentions presented to you..
I think you have a lot of growing up to do, man, or should I say, boy.
Let's say it is, though. That would then amount to a form of idealism about the present.
So your objection is unreasonable for two reasons. First, you have conflated the impression of the present with the present. For if you try and defend individual subjectivism you will commit that mistake. Second, idealism is also known as subjectivism. So, if individual subjectivism is true, then materialism about the present is false. And I am arguing that it is indeed false. So what you've done is say "yeah, but bartfuckstupididiottricks is wrong because he's right".
Look, to be honest I don't think you can hold onto a view for more than 6 seconds.
When you say that x is present for me, what do you mean? Do you mean that it appears present to me, but may or may not actually be present? Or do you mean that it actually is present for me - that my impression that it is present constitutes its being present? Or has your attention span not extended to the end of that sentence?
When I say it is present for you, I mean that it appears present for you and that it actually is present for you. Being present has no more than a relative sense. If I yell my yelling is present for me as I yell, but for you one kilometer away it will be present for you when you hear it about three seconds after I yell. There is no objective meaning to "being present" beyond that. You can spit the dummy and spray all the insults you like; it's not going to improve your position.
Okay, q = our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.
Quoting Bartricks
q does NOT = The default is that
Is materialism the default? No. What our sensations tell us is the default. Thats the position of idealism. Therefore, if materialism is true we cannot always trust our senses, and if idealism is true we can always trust our senses. You are arguing that we cannot always trust our senses, so you are arguing for the truth of materialism, not idealism.
Yes, I know. The time lag argument is not decisive, for it is at least possible that our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.
I expressed the hard form so that it was clear to you that I am not arguing that p, I am arguing that 'not p' and I am doing so by showing how p implies something that we have reason to think is false. Christ!
Quoting Luke
No, as I said in the OP, appearances enjoy default justification. That is, if something appears to be the case, then that is default evidence that it 'is' the case.
That's not idealism.
Idealism is the view that the external sensible world is made of sensations.
See the difference?
When doing philosophy - at least, doing it properly - one does not assume a worldview at the outset. For if one does that, the same worldview will turn up in one's conclusions, for all one will be doing is interpreting data through your worldview and rejecting that which does not fit with it. That's not philosphy - that's dogmatism.
One follows the evidence. That is, one follows the appearances.
Now, if one does that where the appearance of presentness is concerned, one will arrive at idealism. For if materialism is true, then our appearances of presentness are all - all - illusions of presentness.
To follow the appearances is to respect them - to take them at face value. If one assumes that a whole range of appearances are systematically mistaken simply becuase one's favourite worldview implies such a thing, then one is a dogmatist. One should not assume they are mistaken, but one should assume that they are accurate. And if one does that, then one will arrive at idealism, becuase it is if idealism is true that they will indeed be accurate.
A simple example (though knowing this place, my providing it will derail the discussion into a discussion about cats). A cat appears to be on my dining room table. That's default evidence there's a cat on my dining room table.
Perhaps there isn't and I'm hallucinating. Ok, but that's not the default. The default is that appearances are accurate. If that's the default then which of these two theories is supported by the appearances:
Theory a: there's a cat on my dining room table
Theory b: there's not a cat on my dining room table?
It's a, yes? Not b. A. A is what the appearances support.
Likewise with presentness. If event A appears to be present, then that's good default evidence that A is present. It is not default evidence that it is not present. It is default evidence that it 'is' present.
If materialism is true, it would not be present, but past. Thus, the evidence does not support materialism. Just as my visual sensation of a cat on my dining room table supports theory a and not b, my sensations of the presentness of any event supports idealism, not materialism.
Again with the six second comprehension span! That's called 'individual subjectivism' about the present.
It's a form of idealism about the present.
It's a really stupid view, so I'm not surprised you hold it. I imagine you hold it about everything. Morality, aesthetics, truth - anything remotely tricky. It's the go-to view of those who can't reason but are pluckily giving it a go.
But it's not a materialist view of the present.
Again: it's stupid and false. But if it were true, it'd support my conclusion not materialism.
[Quote]If a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false.
[/quote]
This is a bit of a strange way to try to justify idealism. I don't know of a single ancient creation mythos that appears to represent any sort of idealist ontology. "Naive realism," is "naive," because its how most, if not all the world thought about things at first. "The things I see are not me and exist outside me," is quite intuitive, hence seeing it as a core concept everywhere in history.
To be sure, idealism also pops up very frequently in history, but in every case I am aware of it emerges as a rebuttal to naive realism, not as the primary ontology.
I can see the claim that idealism is more parsimonious than physicslism, or that it has fewer explanatory gaps, but that it's more intuitive/follows more from appearances? Then why are gods in all the creation stories making the world out of mud, fire, etc.?
Then your modus tollens argument is faulty. Christ!
Don't be stupid, Bloatricks; try exercising those few neurons of yours that might be working and you might find that other idle neurons join in and after a bit of practice you may even become capable of a coherent and consistent thought.Do you want to spend the rest of your life being an incorrigible fuckwit?
You might call it "individual subjectivism" and as I already acknowledged it is consistent with such a view. But it is also Einstein's view and he was no idealist. And as I said before, the materialist understanding that information about events takes time to emanate out from the source, from the actual event "in itself', is not only consistent with, but entailed by, a materialist understanding.
And it's not merely "individual subjectivism" anyway, unless you broaden the concept of "subject" to include material objects. So, from "the point of view" of the ground or the tree which is struck by lightning the event of the lightning striking is present, but again the inception of the event is not, because it is five kilometres up in the sky, or whatever.
Yeah thats making my point: accepting the appearances wrt presentness leads to idealism.
Materialism does not accept the appearances, right?
Quoting Luke
Which one do you think youve been arguing for?
Quoting Bartricks
That's not what you said. You implied that the idea that appearances are default justified 'is' idealism. No it isn't. It's an epistemological thesis that, if applied diligently, will lead to idealism. Though that is, of course, contested. But I am simply showing that it implies idealism.
Quoting Luke
I don't even know what that means. Materialism conflicts with the appearances. People accept or reject things. Theories don't.
Again: materialism is an 'ontological' thesis - a thesis about what exists. The idea that appearances enjoy default justified status is an 'epistemological' thesis.
An example to help you understand. A detective's method is to follow the evidence. The evidence implicates Tom as the murderer. That doesn't mean that 'following the evidence' and 'Tom is guilty' are the same thesis, even though adopting the former will lead to the latter.
Quoting Luke
I haven't the faintest idea, but I was arguing that the appearance of presentness will be systematically mistaken if materialism is true. You were taking issue with that by maintaining that just because an event occurs at time t1, that does not mean it is present at t1, even though it blindingly obviously does (and you've yet to explain how it doesn't).
I don't think you know what you're arguing now.
No, it was to help you see that I was arguing 'not p' rather than 'p'.
If someone is arguing that if p, then q - and then they proceed to explain why the evidence implies not q, then.....they......are......arguing.....that.....not p. Jesus!
So?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
So?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
See OP for details of how the case works.
Lets go back to your argument:
Quoting Bartricks
If materialism is true then our impressions of presentness are inaccurate. And if our impressions of presentness are accurate then:
Quoting Bartricks
So, if materialism is true (p) then our sensations are systematically inaccurate (q). However, our sensations are not systematically inaccurate (not-q). Therefore, materialism is false.
This is your argument, correct?
If materialism is false, then so is the fact that our sensations are systematically inaccurate (q). Time lag supports materialism, not idealism.
So naive idealism? Ancient skepticism would have a field day with this approach.
Quoting Bartricks
The stick appears bent in water. The honey appears to taste bitter to the sick. The tower looks small form a distance. The sun appears to move around the Earth. Lightning and thunder appear to happen at the same time when the storm is near. An optical illusion appears to be colored a certain way.
I read the OP. It just seems like a very similar argument could be made where materialism comes out on top under a quite similar yardstick.
The other issue you may want to consider is why so many other idealists have dropped absolute time. I haven't come across any post-relativity idealists who deny the theory of relativity and who demand an absolute present. You might be able to deal with the observations that led to relativity without ditching absolute time, but it will lead to non-absolute distances, with lengths stretching or shrinking for different observers. In general, I suppose this seems more problematic than opting for a subjective present. Also, even when you get past relativity, you still need to explain all the empirical evidence for the subjectivity of time from psychology.
Contemporary physicslism has ditched absolute time. You're taking absolute time as a given and saying the fact that physicalism has ditched absolute time, when it is a given, is a point against it. I'm not sure how this isn't begging the question.
Is an ontology that claims the world isn't flat also necessarily weaker because our senses tell us the world is flat? But then isn't it empiricism, data from our senses, that also told us that time is relative and that the world is round? Which data from the senses are being violated then? The reason space-time was accepted as a new paradigm was because it explained both the old way we saw things and new observations that didn't fit the old paradigm. One of the best arguments in favor of idealism is that so much of what we know, perhaps all of it, comes from the world of first person experience, but here you seem to be privileging naive conceptualizations based on those senses over models that cohere with more of our observations.
Space-time itself is a creaky, wounded paradigm, so I don't know if I'd accept it as the final word in any case, more of a predictive placeholder.
I don't think idealism necessarily has a harder time explaining these things, but it seems like it would if it kept hold of absolute time.
Just as an example of how this can work: even Hegel's pre-relativity idealism would have the present as the event horizon of the past, the line of continual becoming. In the sense certainty of the absolute present there is only abstraction, and so really contentless nothing. This isn't absolute, it's a contradictory period from which we get the emergence of lived experience.
Really? What argument is that?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
So what? That's not how philosophy works.
Incidentally, if there's no absolute present, there's no present. And those who think time is relative are utterly confused individuals. If you want to explain to me what evidence there is that time is relative, by all means present it and I'll show you how it implies no such thing.
Anyway, you seem not to be remotely concerned with the soundness of the argument in the OP.
The objects we experience appear to exist outside of us and independently of us. Idealism, at least in its subjectivist versions, says this common naive belief is wrong.
Not what proponents of relativity are really arguing. Yes, there is no present, because there is no time. There is only space time.
Generally, the view of time taken vis-á-vis relativity is eternalist. That is, the past, present, and future all exist simultaneously. The illusion of a definite present is the result of how our bodies work, the terms themselves are arbitrary. See also: "the block universe," and "thermodynamic arrow of time."
You're saying your opponents are speaking nonsense and contradicting themselves, but if I'm following you correctly, this is because you are assuming a premise they don't accept is a given.
Obviously, even if there is an objective present there is still also a subjective sense of time. Anyone who has had to endure a road trip with a child aged 4-10 and has heard "are we there yet, we've been driving for days!" over, and over, can attest to this phenomena.
No it doesn't. You're attacking a straw man. Berkeley concluded that the objects of experience exist outside of our own minds. And he concluded this precisely because they are represented to have 'outness' (his term...or perhaps it was Malebranche's). Thus, they exist in the mind of another - the master mind.
The externality of the sensible world is respected by idealism, then. And certainly that's my view too.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Right, so that's a black mark isn't it - for obviously there is time.
I don't think you're following correctly.
Do you agree that to assume a worldview right at the outset and then to interpret all appearances in light of it - rejecting as illusory those appearances that, if taken at face value, would imply the falsity of the worldview and accepting as non-illusory those appearances that are consistent with the worldview - is stupid? It's not philosophy, is it?
You would, I am sure, reject it when the worldview is a religious one. If I just started out by assuming the Christianity is true and then rejected any appearances that seem to conflict with it as illusions sent to test the failthful, you'd recognize the dogmatism inherent in such an approach.
Recognize the pattern. Identify the fault. What is it? Christianity? No, the dogmatic assumption of a worldview at the outset.
Isn't it dumb to decide that time doesn't exist because its existence is an inconvenience for one's favourite worldview? I think so. Arrogant, dumb, and not philosophy.
Now, I am not like that. I don't start with a worldview. I do philosophy. I follow reason.
If you do that, you'll arrive at idealism. You won't arrive at materialism. But by all means try and show me wrong. Just don't do it by assuming materialism at the outset.
Now again, you've said nothing whatever to challenge the argument I presented in the OP. Follow. The. Argument. Don't ignore it and just tell me everything you know about idealism (which seems mistaken anyway). Follow. The. Argument.
So perhaps you can explain here then what the difference is between these two propositions...
"there appears to be a present in which events are occurring"
"there appears to be an external world made of mind-independent material objects"
Why is one labelled a 'worldview' and bad philosophy to start with, but the other is labelled an 'instinct' and is good philosophy to start with. How do they differ in form such that you can identify such a significant difference between the two?
Berkeley doesn't think external objects exist when no one is perceiving them (naive realism). See the Principles:
His responds to the objection that his theory has it so that our office furniture disappears whenever we close the door to our offices, only to reappear when we open the door. He does not say, as you suggest, "no, you misunderstand, the office furniture exists the whole time (as in objective idealism)." He says, in so many words, "so what?"
Which is fine for his purposes, but definitely runs into the problem I highlighted above, where this does not jive with naive appearances.
He argues, as would I, that it exists external to our minds.
Not 'all' minds. Our minds. That is, those minds whose sensations represent the world they are sensations of to have outness. It appears external. He concludes that it is. That does not mean it exists unpercieved.
Have you actually read the principles or are those cherry picked quotes from a website?
Because if you actually read him he's very clear about this. Those quotes are taken out of context. Willfully. Read him and see.
He doesn't think your desk disappears when you stop perceiving it. He does think it can't exist unpercieved. Read the actual principles, not misleading quotes taken out of context.
Read paragraphs 1-7. He references 3 and 4 himself - read them.
Then read my op. Then address it.
I don't see how you conclude not-p when you are strongly arguing for q.
For example:
Quoting Bartricks
If p, then q. You are strongly arguing for q. Therefore, you are strongly arguing that materialism is true.
Oh bloody hell, will you get with the programme!? I am arguing that 'if p, then q'. I am then arguing that not q. Not q here means I am arguing that our impressions of presentness are NOT systematically mistaken. That then gets me to the 'not p' conclusion.
You don't seem to understand what 'if' means. That's worrying.
The mind-independent material objects bit. That's a worldview. That's not an appearance.
There appears to be an external sensible world, yes?
Whether that external sensible world is independent of all minds is not something one can see. How would you 'see' that?? You need to 'conclude' such things from premises whose content is appears to be true. (And as Berkeley argues, you can't even conceive of such a thing).
Where can I find that argument?
Exactly, and that contradicts naive realism, i.e., the belief that the word does exist unperceived. That's my entire point. Take Berkley, he is advancing a novel argument about the way reality differs from people's naive conception of it. It's a fine argument. However, "if a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false." seems to apply to Berkley here, no?
I assume there is a typo confusing me here, but I can't figure out what it is or what you're trying to say.
I've read the Principles many times. What makes you think that? I've quoted the entire paragraphs in question.
>The desk can't exist when it is unperceived.
>You are alone in your office.
>You get up and leave, shutting the door.
>Your desk is no longer being perceived; it thus does not exist.
Quibble with the use of the word "disappeared" if you want, but the logic here is that the desk ceases to exist when no one is perceiving it.
Arguably, Berkley is saved from this conclusion through God's perception of all that is, but notably he does not invoke that solution when he anticipates the argument about things like "disappearing desks."
He says:
Or to paraphrase: "a thing existing without being perceived is meaningless and incomprehensible, less so than that things might come into existence as they are perceived."
Just in general it would help if you integrated my response into your response to that. You seem to have restated your position, but I can't tell if it deals with my objection or not.Quoting Bartricks
Same reaction: did I do this? Where?Quoting BartricksRight, that evidence. Other evidence may support it. Your argument would mean that appearance trumps any evidence. But science, for example, studied appearances and kept studying them and found a delay. They found appearances - observations - that led to understandings of perception, how brains work and so on. These brought into question the presentness. And, in fact, they could argue that they need not have a materialist model. A decision on substance. They followed observations and found delays in the appearances.Quoting BartricksThey are rejecting one interpretation of one kind of appearance because that is contradicted by a whole lot of other ones. Whatever the substance of reality. You would need to have an explanation within idealism, say, for why other appearances demonstrate a delay to dismiss their model.
How much richer could an irony become?
Added to which you're assuming materialism in assuming that there's an extended ball out there in space.
If the earth does not appear to be the shape it actually is, then that counts against materialism, not immaterialism. It doesn't. There isn't a problem there. But if - if - materialism is true and the earth appears flat when it is round (which it doesn't!), then that would be further evidence of materialism's falsity.
Anyway, how about addressing the argument in the OP? With which premise do you disagree?
Theres no illusion that the world is flat? You have just accounted for the illusion that the world appears flat even though its a giant ball and isnt flat.
Quoting Bartricks
And you dont?
Quoting Bartricks
So, basically, if science discovers that things are not as they appear, then thats evidence of materialisms falsity? According to what definition of materialism should things be as they appear?
Quoting Bartricks
Ive already told you. Youve provided no argument that things are exactly how they appear to be. Saying that this is the default justification is not an argument. If it was, then you should agree that the world is flat, just as it appears to be.
No. How?
The sensible world appears to exist outside of our minds, yes?
He concludes that it does. Not that it doesn't. That it does - it does exist outside of our mind. It has, as he put it, 'outness'.
But it can't exist unperceived, as it is self-evident to reason that a percept can't exist absent any perceiver.
Thus, the external sensible world exists as the sensations of another mind.
Now, that does not conflict with any appearance. What it conflicts with is a widespread belief - belief, note, not appearance - that the world is an extended realm that exists extra-mentally.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
There's absolutely no justification for not being able to figure it out.
The sensible world exists outside of your mind.
And mine.
And everyone else's bar one mind - the mind that it exists in.
So, you seem unable to distinguish between two distinct claims: that the sensible world cannot exist unperceived and that the sensible world exists as 'your' percepts.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yeah, I don't believe you. I think you've read paragraphs that have been taken out of context. If you'd read him you'd know he never argues that the sensible world exists in 'our' minds. It exists in another mind. Read paragraphs 6 and 29-33 (and plenty of others, but those are just some)
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
That's not a quote from him. That's you misunderstanding him.
When he talks about the desk, the point he is making is about the nature of sensations, not the location of the sensations constitutive of sensible desks of our experience.
Again, it's clear that you haven't read him, just paragraphs taken out of context. Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Again, you haven't read him. You're just reading quotes taken out of context. He's referring you back to the early paragraphs - 3,4 and c. Paragraphs you should have read by the time you read the one you're quoting, and thus should already understand taht he's not arguing the desk exists in your mind, but rather that the desk can't exist unperceived.
Like I say, you haven't read him.
Certainly. Here:
Quoting Bylaw
You are simply assuming that materialism is true and then concluding that the appearance of presentness is illusion.
That's to assume a worldview and then interpret the data in light of it.
It's no different from, say, assuming that God exists and then concluding that the existence of evil is an illusion because God would not permit any.
It's not a case. It's just you imposing a worldview on the data. It's not following evidence. It's interpreting evidence in light of one's worldview.
It's not philosophy. It's what you did. And it's not philosophy. It's not how Berkeley argues. Berkeley's idealist worldview is in his conclusion, not his premises.
Appearances ARE the evidence. Jesus!
You're too confused for words. I'm not going to explain again.
Quoting Luke
Read the OP.
Appearances are default evidence in support of what they represent to be the case.
So, if event x appears to be present, that's default evidence that it is present.
If a certain theory about the world implies that x is not present, but past, then we have default evidence that the theory in question is false.
Surprise me - understand what I just said.
Quoting Luke
OP.
I don't think you know an argument from your elbow given you think if someone says "if p, then q" they are defending p!
You can't 'see' presentness either. So being able to 'see' that which is assumed doesn't seem to distinguish the two propositions.
:clap: :lol:
I don't believe that what appears to be the case is evidence that it is actually the case. Otherwise, it follows that the Earth is flat, that the Sun revolves around the Earth, that optical illusions are not illusions, and a host of other things that are known to be untrue, simply because that is how they appear to be. The "evidence" of appearances supports both an inaccurate theory (if the appearances are non-veridical) and an accurate theory (one which better accounts for those non-veridical appearances). Which of these is the "default evidence"?
Would you allow for any alternative evidence to outweigh the "default evidence" of appearances?
Quoting Bartricks
I was disagreeing with your second premise, not-q: that our impressions/sensations are not inaccurate and that things are exactly how they appear to be.
I have not only read Berkeley, but sat through lectures on him and read secondary sources on the Principles. My reading of paragraph 45 is fairly common.
You're also confusing what I'm saying. "Things do not exist outside their being perceived by minds," is most definitely Berkeley's point. I'm not sure why you're getting hung up on external versus internal here. I mentioned "external" (and independent) objects, because that's what naive realism posits as existing.
Perhaps look up the principal of charity? Perhaps consider that your interpretation of Berkeley might not be everyone's, and that anyone who disagrees with you is not necessarily misunderstanding. I also really don't get your objections in light of how Principals is written. It's quite obvious that Berkeley knows he is saying something that is unintuitive.
I think what might make more sense for your argument is to simply drop the claim that being unintuitive/violating appearances is a black mark against a theory. After all, that same standard says that the world being round, germs causing disease, the periodic table, and the theory that squares A and B in the image below are the same color, are all bad theories simply because they clash with immediate intuition and sensation.
We have a sensation of externality. We have a sensation of materialness. We have a sensation of mind-independance. We have a sensation of persistence...
By what means are you determining that your belief that events are happening in the present is a 'sensation', but my belief that objects are mind independent is not?
Do they have little labels on them that only you can read?
Now you haven't read him because all you are doing is quoting big standard out of context paragraphs gleaned from websites written by ignoramuses, yes? Now read 29 to 33
What the F do you mean? Do you have an Issac sense? What is a sense of materialness? Do explain
It's the sense I have that, for example, the chair I'm sat on is made of solid material.
Possibly. I think it's moot. It wouldn't be incoherent to say that a computer sensor is receiving a 'sensation'. It's called a 'sensor' after all.
I've just answered that question. No. I don't think a sensation need be a mental state. I think a computer's response to a sensor could reasonably be called a sensation.
Pssst. The answer is yes. And then Berkeley beats you.
No. Why are you asking these questions? A sensation is the response from a sensor. My sensations might be electrical stimuli in my retinal ganglia, or in my somatic nerve endings or some such. We might also use the word to refer to the 'sensation' thst there's someone behind me, for example. Without context I can't answer questions about what a word means. Words mean different things in different contexts.
I have sensations which are mental events. If that answers your question.
:rofl: Album alanis? All bum? All anus? Hugh Janus? Is that the extent of your toilet philosophy Bortricks or is there more?
Because they're directly relevant.
No, a sensation is a mental state. This: Quoting Isaac is circular and uninformative.
Look, you're clearly just a dogmatic materialist who hasn't got any interesting arguments to offer, just nay saying. It's boring.
If the effects of events take time, the information about events takes time, to reach the perceiver who will naturally perceive the event as occurring, being present, when its effects have already acted on her senses and been registered in her brain, that's exactly what one would expect and hence there's no illusion of presentness, just as there's no illusion of flatness in the earth seeming flat. It's a good analogy; if you don't agree then explain why you don't think it is a good analogy.
But if you are very tiny and stood on a giant ball, then nothing your visual sensations are telling you is not, in fact, the case. That you can't see you are on a giant ball is due to your location, not a failure in sensation.
Tell me, what tune started playing in your head halfway through that second paragraph? I'm betting it was "Ding dong, the witch is dead, the witch is dead dobidobidoo, do do be dobedoobedoo"
By the same kind of reasoning if your sensation presents the Earth as being flat, when it is in fact spherical, then the sensation constitutes an illusion.
Feeling the event to be present is no more a "failure of sensation" than feeling the Earth is flat; the event seems present when you experience and the Earth seems flat as you experience it.
Moreover, if you reasoning or feeling convinces you that you have a good idea what is going on in my head then your reasoning or feeling constitutes an illusion.
I'm not here to entertain you. I'm here to point out the flaws in your argument If you don't want public critique of your arguments then I suggest you stop posting them on a public discussion forum.
If light speed were infinite you wouldn't be able to know which is true, idealism or materialism. Time doesn't exist for light: according to some scientists though it takes 8 minutes for light to travel from the sun to the earth, for light it happens instantaneously.