A way to put existential ethics
You will always have to live with yourself. That's merely a fact.
It's the fact that you should always consider in making a choice.
Hence, a real ethic -- you *should* consider that you'll always be with yourself.
It's the fact that you should always consider in making a choice.
Hence, a real ethic -- you *should* consider that you'll always be with yourself.
Comments (83)
If i have reason to do something due to it serving some of my ends, then we describe that reason as an instrumental or practical reason, not a moral reason.
But if I have reason to do something due to it serving some other person's ends, or due to it bringing about a just state of affairs, or ameliorating an unjust state of affairs, or if I have a reason to do something because it will bring about something of intrinsic moral value, then we describe those reasons as 'moral' reasons.
I agree.
And, after you mistreat someone, you will still live with yourself -- knowing what you did.
Moral obligations are had by persons. So, one needs to be a person in order to have any.
And a defining feature of moral obligations seems to be that they concern acts we have reason to perform for the sake of others, or for the sake of the promotion of something of moral value or the prevention or amelioration of something of moral disvalue.
But there's no 'ethic' here, inasmuch as it is left open exactly what we are morally obliged to do. The point is just that when the ground of the reason for action is some consideration that is not to do with one's self - not to do with promoting one's own interests - it can qualify as a moral reason.
Just a category term, nothing more. Sartre, Camus, Heidegger, Levinas.
(EDIT: persons I still puzzle through. I'm no expert on any of them, and "existential" should be understood in a general category of philosophy sense. but this seemed like a synthesis/summation that might look good, or at least generate discussion ;) )
That's less egocentric than other renditions. In Sartre's terms values make demands on us, yet we must choose which of those demands we will meet. So we live with the results of those choices. Hence, commitment then becomes the basis for authenticity.
I agree. That's probably what I'm going for. I acknowledge that the extreme needs to be known though.
Perhaps replacing "authenticity" with "living with yourself"?
Yes, I'll go with that.
For Sartre, Marxism. But I think virtue ethics will suffice; a virtue being how we want to be, and hence authenticity remains "living with yourself".
Quoting Banno
Fair. "Living with yourself..." includes Sartre and Trump. Both of them lived with the decisions. And regardless of the facts, philosophically speaking we can see them both as paragons of how they wanted to be.
An existential interpretation of virtue -- hrm thinking the thoughts now
This inability to escape -- I agree that that's the theme! But I wonder why is "escape" the metaphor? (edit: not that you have to answer or anything... just an errant thought)
What is conscience but the realization that one has done wrong even when one has gotten away with it? The context, sensu amplo, is the perfect murder and the experiences of the murderer, morally and judicially speaking. Is an immoral act a cross to bear, a millstone around the neck, a sword of Damocles vis-à-vis an active, unforgiving, conscience?
[quote=Krishnamurti]Find out what it means to die - not physically, that's inevitable - but to die to everything that is known, to die to your family, to your attachments, to all the things that you have accumulated, the known, the known pleasures, the known fears. Die to that every minute and you will see what it means to die so that the mind is made fresh, young, and therefore innocent, so that there is incarnation not in a next life, but the next day.[/quote]
[quote=John 12: 24]Truly, truly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it bears much fruit.[/quote]
[quote=1 Corinthians 15: 31]I protest, brothers, by my pride in you, which I have in Christ Jesus our Lord, I die every day![/quote]
The existentialist is resigned to the prison of self, and seeks to make himself as comfortable as possible within the image he has of himself - that is the ethical life. Whereas the religious is determined to escape to that state of being wherein one can: ...
[quote=Augustine]Love and do what you want. If you stop talking, you will stop talking with love; if you shout, you will shout with love; if you correct, you will correct with love.[/quote]
Sometimes I just have thoughts come to me, and in this case that's all the thread was about -- here attempting a summation of sorts that captures many diverse thoughts into a few.
Perhaps a good frame would be to ask "What are the limits of an existential ethic?" ? That'd be a question that gets at what I was thinking through.
Quoting Bartricks
This is fascinating in relation to:
Quoting Banno
We can call ourselves moral by committing to something other than ourselves. That fits perfectly with the frame proposed here -- insofar that a person is committed to anything outside the self, then they are acting morally. So existential ethics don't prevent one from committing to Family, God, and Country. If that's who you are then you are acting in good faith, and the meta-ethical consideration is satisfied.
I think the charge is that existentialism is too permissive -- while one could be dedicated to Marxism, one could also be dedicated to building a cult of personality, and insofar that you are authentically a sociopath you can continue to live with yourself, or live authentically. So, at best, existential ethics can offer some persons a way to question what they are doing and whether or not it's something they ought to be doing or if they should do something else, it doesn't give a guide beyond that.
I wonder -- is there some way to state the existential demand which addresses this concern? Or is individualism and and selfishness enough of a charge to deflate the project?
Quoting Agent Smith
I think it could be, in that "the pricking of conscience" is a common way people make ethical decisions -- you mentioning murder makes me think of Raskolnikov, who was clearly overly bothered by the existential situation and took it to an extreme -- I wonder if the fear holds up? If there is no God, is everything permitted? Did Raskolnikov actually demonstrate our freedom to murder, or did he demonstrate the opposite? It's not like he lived a happy life.
At its broadest I think that existential ethics are possibly consistent with a religious life -- a life of death-and-rebirth, in a sense, gets along with how wide the existential condition is. I think that this point of contrast is good because I think that the existential religionists reinterpret their religions in light of existentialism (perhaps this is a way of filling out the existential ethic?) And I like your contrast between the death of the self with life-affirming (self-affirming?) themes in existentialism. There's something to that.
Perhaps the religious life sees an end-point -- to act out of universal love, as opposed to from the self. An atheist existentialist would say that such a condition of universal love does not exist due to moral rules or religious teaching. These too are images. Or, at least, if we are the saints that the religious talk about, we have no need for moral codes or injunctions from religious leaders, and no amount of social pressure will turn us into what we aren't. It's not the code doing the work, it's the person being who they are! We apes are partially saintlike, at times -- though not all of us.
***
Or, being who they aren't? funny thing here -- if who we are is what we do, then whatever we do we are who we are, but there is the theme of authenticity -- we can be ourselves authentically or inauthentically. For Heidegger he seemed to contrast authenticity with everydayness or being busy. Interestingly to the charges made here, if we include Levinas, then I'd say he actually manages to escape the charge of selfishness or individuality, given that we only come to know ourselves as ethical beings within the face-to-face relationship of the Other.
I thought I was off-topic. Anyway, if you'd like to pursue the general idea contained in my previous post, here's an amusing short story:
The Twelve Fools
Once there lived twelve fools in a village. One day they started on a journey in search of job to a distant town. On their way they came across a river. There was no bridge or boat so they had to swam and crossed the river. After landing on the bank of the river they counted themselves, but each of them did not count himself. So they counted only eleven instead of twelve. They thought one of their companions was missing so they began to cry. Meantime a traveller came near by and asked about their problem. They told him about the matter and he agreed to produce the lost man. The traveller told them to stand in a line, started to count and gave each of them a blow and counted twelve. After that the fools were very happy, thanked him for finding out their lost companion and went their way in search of jobs.
[quote=Bart Simpson]I didn't do it. No one saw me do it. You can't prove anything.[/quote]
:snicker:
Yeah, I specified self-image rather than social image, but point taken.
Quoting Moliere
I think it is a contradiction, how could one be what one already was: viz, the authentic coward and greedy arsehole, or whatever. Let alone attain to it as the philosopher's stricture on moral probity. But it is not to be wondered at that what one ought to be and do is in contradiction to what one is and does.
Quoting Moliere
This makes more sense to me too. I would talk of dependency on the M(other) as in "Be good for Mummy", and from this the ethical being arises as the internalised conflict, because what is good for Mummy is not necessarily good for me, but must become good for me, if I know what's good for me.
So the question is, whether there is an authentic-self in the resolution of the ethical conflict, and I think Paul and Jesus and Krishnamurti are saying "mu". Found this piece of paranoia in my inbox today:
[quote=Krishnamurti's Notebook]You should never be here too much; be so far away that they cant find you, they cant get at you to shape, to mold. Be so far away, like the mountains, like the unpolluted air; be so far away that you have no parents, no relations, no family, no country; be so far away that you dont know even where you are. Dont let them find you; dont come into contact with them too closely. Keep far away where even you cant find yourself; keep a distance which can never be crossed over; keep a passage open always through which no one can come. Dont shut the door for there is no door, only an open, endless passage; if you shut any door, they will be very close to you, then you are lost. Keep far away where their breath cant reach you and their breath travels very far and very deeply; dont get contaminated by them, by their word, by their gesture, by their great knowledge; they have great knowledge but be far away from them where even you cannot find yourself.
For they are waiting for you, at every corner, in every house to shape you, to mold you, to tear you to pieces and then put you together in their own image. Their gods, the little ones and the big ones, are the images of themselves, carved by their own mind or by their own hands. They are waiting for you, the churchman and the Communist, the believer and the non-believer, for they are both the same; they think they are different but they are not for they both brainwash you, till you are of them, till you repeat their words, till you worship their saints, the ancient and the recent; they have armies for their gods and for their countries and they are experts in killing. Keep far away but they are waiting for you, the educator and the businessman; one trains you for the others to conform to the demands of their society, which is a deadly thing;* they will make you into a scientist, into an engineer, into an expert of almost anything from cooking to architecture to philosophy.[/quote]
Yet also "You only exist in relationship".
I am in a relationship of conflict or negation or otherness with what I ought to be, and that creates the limit of self that identifies it. Therefore, when I am what I ought to be - authentically - there is no more division and I am the world in relation to itself.
For me this raises a notable question. When is someone actually living with the decisions they make? I know in practical terms, and from a panoptic overview, it appears that all people live with the decisions they make. But at another important level, they can only live with decisions if they are able to identify their own agency.
Does someone like Trump even have capacity to understand where he ends and the wider world begins? What is it to say that Trump lives with 'his choices' other than to say the real world is involved and/or reacts to him. Not everyone is able to see that they are even making choices and they may struggle to identify what their role is in how the world seems to treat them. For me this complicates the matter of choice and authenticity somewhat. Or maybe it means I need to reconsider what authenticity means.
This idea makes me think of personal integrity. Do you also see the connection?
Yes, and here Sartre's misanthropy comes into play. Since hell is other people one might not take into account the needs of one's tormenters. So Quoting Moliere is insufficient. being moral must include not just recognition of the existence of competing needs but a commitment to satisfying the needs of the other as well as oneself. Hence Trump must be a solipsist, ultimately lonely.
See my reply to Molie, immediately above. Trump is alone.
Yes, I could say that. But I wouldn't call it a "consideration", which refers to something to take into account, i.e. a thought a fact or any element that one uses to make a decision about something. I see integrity as an ethical state and practice in which a person shows consistent and uncompromising adherence to (his) ethical standards. This is what "integral" means: whole. We also have the term "integer" in Math, which means a whole number, not a fraction.
A very dear and important to me term and concept!
BTW, the word "personal" in connection to intergrity is redundant, although it is widely and commonly used. Esp. in an ethical context, it always refers to a person. Yet, I have been using it myself for years! It sticks with you. But I would never say, e.g. "A man with personal integrity", but rather "a man of/with integrity". Note that in Greek, we normally use simply "intergrity" in all cases. The word is preseved from Ancient Greek to our day, with only a slightly different ending in demotic Greek, since the last quarter of the 20th c.
:up: The good man enjoys sound sleep but the bad man doesn't. It boils down to that, oui monsieur/mademoiselle?
Unfortunately, it seems this is more fiction than fact - to be found only/mostly in novels/plays/movies that aren't, as they say, based on a true story. I'd love to be proven wrong about this though.
I guess it doesn't matter if I act morally, it only matters if others act morally. I like that, it gives me license to be a complete bastard :smile:
I would think, on face value, that a person who holds true to his principles is much more deserving of respect, and much more likely to have self-respect, than a person who conveniently betrays his principles on occassion.
I didn't get it from your remark. You posed a question, I was only answering it facetiously.
It does qualify as a moral reason, but morality is not rooted in selfless altruism. It is rooted in the individual's obligation to adhere to moral reason or ethical principles. If a person's moral reasoning tells him that it is good to be a selfish bastard that gets over on others, then it is the moral thing to do, and nothing can tell against it.
And when it comes to moral reasons, they are a subset of normative reasons. A reason to do something because it serves one's own ends - so a reason generated by one's own interests rather than those of another - is called an 'instrumental' reason, not a moral reason. They are both from Reason. But one is grounded in one's own ends - and so we call it 'instrumental' - and the other is not, and so we call it 'moral' (although there are other defining features).
Why not? What if I were to make a vow (based on moral reasoning and ethical principles) to serve only myself in every interaction with others? To honor such a vow, I would be obligated to abide by its demands.
Quoting Bartricks
You are treating the wrongness of selfishness as an absolute ethical principle. Perhaps, you are right, and there are abolute principles, althought it is exceedingly hard to prove. And I don't disagree.
Moving past all that, that which is universal to ethics is obeying the rules. So, regardless of whether ethical principles are relative or absolute, that which matters most to each and every ethical individual is loyalty, devotion, and absolute adherence to one's subscribed morality. This is because the primary, universal, ethical imperative is to be good. Each and every ethical individual seeks above all: to conform to the good and eschew evil...not to serve others (which is secondary at best).
What kind of reasoning is it when an individual does something that serves his own ends because he thinks it is the good or morally right thing to do? For example, you steal food to eat because you think being hungry is wrong.
What kind of reasoning is it when an individual's selfless altruistism is generated by his own interests rather than those of another? For example, founding a charity that makes you rich.
:100:
Maybe you know:
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Instrumental reasoning.
So then, it follows that moral reasoning can be instrumental reasoning, but instrumental reasoning cannot be moral reasoning.
What about when a person does the morally right thing because he thinks it serves his own intetests?
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/721614
I get it
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Moral reasoning
Are you saying it's instrumental reason if it is the morally right act, and instrumental reasoning if it is a selfish act?...that is just plain stupid reasoning.
Quoting 180 Proof
You haven't defended your position here, but you are right, it is hard for me to digest bullshit.
(Edit:)
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
You conviently ignored this inquiry btw.
An instrumental reason is, by definition, a reason to do something due to it's being in one's interests to do it.
Moral reasons are not instrumental reasons. That's why we call them 'moral'and not 'instrumental'.
For instance, if it is in the best interests of others that I do what is most in my interests, then the moral reason to do what I gave instrumental reason to do remains grounded in the interests of others, just as the instrumental reasons remain grounded in my interests.
Exactly. Moral reasons, although normative like instrumental reasons, are of an entirely different qualitative nature. Moral reasoning can only relate to instrumental reasoning in assigning it an ethical value (viz. it is good/bad to serve one's interests). While instrumental reasoning can only relate to moral reason by assessing to what degree a moral/immoral act is instrumental in serving oneself. And although they overlap occasionally (e.g. if it is in the best interests of others that I do what is most in my interests), they represent discrete normative categories that are mostly incompatible.
That is an example of moral reasoning assigning ethical value to self interest (which involves instrumental reason).
The normative (ought) in instrumental reason is about much more practical matters, it usually is concerned with doing things the correct way to achieve one's benign nonmoral interests. But, it can sometimes interfere with and contradict ethical reasoning, forcing a person to choose between the two. And this is precisely when moral reasoning invokes the notion of "being self interested when one OUGHT not to be - selfishness."
You: we are in Paris
Me: no, we are clearly in Cairo.
You: Cairo is Paris. If you set off from Paris and arrive in Cairo, then Cairo is Paris
Me: no, they're quite different places. That you set off from Paris does not entail that where you arrive will be Paris
You: Exactly. They're different places.
"Flatter" me, @Merkwurdichliebe, and show me where this conception goes wrong
Again, show me where this conception goes wrong
Did I say that somewhere? If so, I was most likely being extemporaneous, an meant it rhetorically... If so, I retract the insinuation of any literal intent.
I was really wondering why you randomly brought up instrumental reason when the subject is on existential ethics. Weird. :chin: I suspect it was mere sophistry on your part, trying to prove that morality can be reduced to selfishness and altruism.
If you'd taken the trouble to read what I said on the subject, then you'd know that I do not know what an 'existential ethics' is.
But anyway, my point - whether you're interested in it or not - is that one of the marks of a moral reason is that it is grounded in interests other than one's own.
Make of that what you will.
Quoting Moliere
You then contributed a facetious remark and I then responded and here we are.
I'll flatter you good like :kiss: .
That is probable, but not necessary. As I have previously said, the instrumental and moral are discrete categories. You are assigning no ethical value in this case, so it is a case of instrumental reason. If you are intending to assign ethical value, I only ask that you clarify.
I'll flatter you some more. This is an example of moral reasoning (as opposed to instrumental reasoning). You are not assessing the situation in terms of how its satisfies self interest, but in terms of how it conforms to your (hypothetically speaking) conception of good and evil. If I am off, I only ask that you clarify.
These are completely different ways of thinking, which everybody does all the time, every day.
Firstly, you are a fine interlocutor. I hope we can have a passionate and edifying discourse.
I want to thank you for providing that summary. Let'ssee where this thought experiment takes us. "Standby while I reply.": (Trademark: @Merkwurdichliebe)
I have shown why I disagree. I'll continue to reinforce my position in this issue as long as this thread has life.
Quoting Moliere
That is indeed a case of instrumental (not moral) reason. But if we assign it an ethical value (such as the right/wrong, good/evil, &c. of serving one's interests) it is no longer instrumental, but moral reason.
Quoting Moliere
That is accepable to me because it is a possibility (that altruism can be counted as something moral in the proper context), but it is by no means a necessity. The problem you and @Moliere are not recognizing in this exchange is that you are reducing morality to selfishness/altruism. But these are only particular perspectives based on moral reasoning. And until we can demonstrate the existence of an universal and absolute moral code, morality as a matter of selfishness/altrusism has ground in nothing but baseless subjectivity.
No you haven't.
It's entirely unclear to me what your view is, as you said 'exactly' when I said something that contradicted something you'd just said.
Now, do you think that moral reasons are grounded in self-interest or not?
No. Moral reasoning is not grounded in self interest nor altruism. It is the reverse, self interest and altruism (as well as every other norm) become grounded in moral reasoning when they have been assigned an ethical value (e.g. good/evil, right/wrong). If there is no ethical value applied to a norm, it is likely an example of instrumental reasoning. Then, norms such as self interest and altruism become a nonmoral practical matter (e.g. correct/incorrect, like/dislike).
Morality is not universal in its particular demands (such as selflessness), unless, of course, we can show the existence of absolute morality. Until then, moral reason can only be universal in its demand for absolute compliance. Moral reason generally has no middle ground and makes no exceptions outside the case of an ethical dilemma.
That means if an individual reasons that selflessness is an ethical good, he must always choose selflessness. That doesn't mean that selflessness is an ethical good for every individual.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Hrmmm... smells like - Kantianism! :D
To which I'd say: go right ahead. Speak your mind. The abstruse nature of your reasoning will ensure that it never escapes into the wild, and you can have your truth all to yourself. The Kingdom of Ends, because God does not exist on high, will also not exist -- so why bother, if you're not immortal, to live with a code for a world that doesn't exist, that will not exist, and is even counter to the type of being you are?
As it is, baseless subjectivity is the defect being explored. Dedication to principles for a kingdom of ends that will eventually be is one way human beings carry on, ethically -- they even convince themselves that if they repeat certain patterns to themselves that they have contact with Forms or Eternal Good or something. We're an odd, irrational species.
But it's not a satisfying one, from what I can see. Who even understands it but a handful of nerds who like to read?
It's what I term a ghost-morality. The Holy Ghost on high watches you watching yourself doing things in a moral world that will never be.
Well, first of all you never know how well or not someone sleeps. And then, it has to do with someone's ethical standards. I believe that criminals can sleep perfectly well, because they have their own "criminal" standards of ethics based on the group they belong to or are identified with. E.g. Mafia people place "family, "honor" and "loyalty" very high in their standards. And as long as they don't break these standards --i.e. their integrity-- I believe they can have a perfect sleep!
The same goes with cannibals eating human flesh ... It's in their menu of the day! :grin:
Always with the flattery, You just can't help yourself. :mask:
Quoting Moliere
If it matters for any reason, it is because: to stand firm on one's moral principles will prevent one from being a hypocrite, a pathetic wretch of a creature, worthy of neither love nor respect. Those people know who they are, regardless if it can ever be known or proven to another. Of course, this only begs the question: is this merely a relativistic opinion, or a universal truth?
Quoting Moliere
Quoting Moliere
We certainly are odd. Its also why nerdy philosophers invent shit that nobody else understands nor cares about. And I also agree, that its not an edifying view of ethics. To be honest, i'm being lazy here. Compared to arguing for an absolute universal morality (in the Platonic sense), I have been taking the path of least resistance by settling on a more phenomenological perspective of morality (as you indicated).
Yeah, on target! One has to care for conscience to do its damage to the psyche, but it's precisely because one doesn't care that one is unethical/immoral.
Conscience is there to make the lives of good people more miserable than it already is with how the world works: without some evil survival is impossible!
Right. I rarely if ever use the term "conscience", but I can see that in this case it fits perfectly!
The little Latin I knew from school has been faded away. So, I have to believe you! :grin:
I am still thinking the thoughts, but I got to a point where I've assigned myself some reading - I got an idea for a bit of writing, so thanks for the proddings as always. I felt I owed a response, at least though, so here it is.
I'd call it camaraderie :D -- @180 Proof and I get along well, and who likes to be alone?
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
I think that from the existential situation it's enough to say that it doesn't matter if its relative or universal -- the choice remains. It's because freedom is forced on us by our very existence that we find these questions.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
I think even here that Nietzsche could say the same -- let the philosophers have their truth in their academies where they commune with the forms. No one is moved by these thoughts anymore -- objective or subjective, humans desire and do things from desire. No moral law or form could possibly hold sway, except on a small individual basis or, in the case of communities, with the use of violence.
But I will also add
Quoting Banno
Aporia?
Or progress?
As always, thanks to everyone who responded.
Perhaps, that certainly is an optimal view of morality. But what about the cases where being moral necessitates ignoring the existence of competing needs, and neglecting to satisfy the needs of the other as well as oneself?
I like the approach, but it occurs to me that you are leaving something out: death.
Romeo and Juliette are together in eternity. We can be like they are.
A slave might risk life and limb to escape or avenge or defend a comrade. A pessimist might hang himself by stepping off a stack of freshly printed volumes of his cold but windy manifesto.
To paraphrase Kerouac, maybe each of us is the void pretending to be a man pretending not to know the void.
https://www.amazon.com/Levinas-Reader-Emmanuel/dp/0631164472
The rest of the list so far: Totality and Infinity, and Anthony Burgess' A Clockwork Orange, which I hadn't made the connection to before but actually is a great story for exploring Totality and Infinity since the main character sort of makes the arc which Levinas is describing in the essay. Also, specifically referencing the book since it includes the crucial 21st chapter, which Kubrick cut out for a nice bit of drama (but totally changing the meaning of the story!)
So far what I have heard being left out, and agree with: Akrasia, the needs of others, and now death.
:up: Thanks for this! I'd never made this connection either. Taking both off the shelf now ...
I agree, existentially speaking, universality is irrelevant. The reason I'm bringing up the universal is because I see a lot of opinions on this thread that say morality is about selfishness vs altruism, and I see this as taking the conversation away from existential ethics.
My point is: that which is universal to morality is necessary for existential ethics, whereas, a particular set of ethical principles (or a specific moral code) is not. Things like choice and conscience (meaning: an immanent sense of good and evil, not specific ethical principles) are universal to ethics, and hit directly on existential notions of morality.
Quoting Moliere
When philosophers talk about desire, they call it normative. I can understand why no one is moved by these thoughts anymore.
Morality has it's greatest significance for the individual. There is always a demand on the individual to conform to the good, and in many cases this does not require the individual to judge others by his own moral standard. It is when the individual begins judging the other by his standard that community morality becomes relevant. I could see a genuine ethical system in the dynamic of a nuclear family. But outside of that, community morality begins veering off into the domain of appearances (viz.: what can you get away with, and what can they prove), and violence (whether through brainwashing or coercion). In ethics, the individual is always primary.