What makes an observation true or false?
Kant spilit observational sentences into analytic and synthetic. What makes an observation true? And in relation to self-referencing truth, how is their circular logic (A=A or a bachelor is an unmarried man) a determing factor in the truth values of truth statements? Must we turn to the Axioms of Logic to form in one's mind a structure of truth and falsehood? "The laws of deductive logic" is that a suitable prelimenary lesson?
I also have another question that can be related back to this if so be it, and that is what does deductive logic have to do with scientific determinations (Such as: living cells have a nucleus)?
I also have another question that can be related back to this if so be it, and that is what does deductive logic have to do with scientific determinations (Such as: living cells have a nucleus)?
Comments (12)
Observational sentence?
My question to. Do you mean propositions?
You might be interested in Quine's critique of the analytical/synthetic distinction.
It's unclear if there are analytical truths. Or rather, even if there are, there is no clear way to distinguish then from arbitrary dogmatic beliefs.
Kant would have had it that facts about triangles could be established a priori. That a triangles angles add up to 180 degrees was an analytical truth. Except that non-euclidean geometries were later developed where triangles' angles don't add up to 180 degrees (e.g. in curved space they can be greater or lesser than 180 degrees depending on if the space is curved inward like a saddle or rounded like a ball.)
A=A statements may still work, but it's unclear if these do any analytical work at all.
For further reference: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/#QuiMeaLin
Observations make propositions true/false (through verification).
Yeah....I dont know what an observational sentence would be, except maybe sentences regarding observations. I hope its not that, because that has nothing to do with what Kant split.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
.....Mathematical judgements are always synthetical....
(CPR.....referential pagination unavailable, cuz Im not at home. Sorry)
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Kant knew of spheres, and knew triangles could be drawn on spheres, and surely would have noticed the difference with respect to planar triangles. Doesnt matter if he didnt, and does nothing to negate his proofs, insofar as his exposition respecting triangles stipulates straight lines. In fact, to even arrive at the truth that interior angles on a sphere sum to more than 180 degrees, involves exactly the same synthetic a priori deductive judgements as demonstrated in the text.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Doesnt matter. The only reason for analytic truths in Kant, is to set the stage for the possibility of what isnt that, but at the same time, uses the LNC for its logical validity. Even if its a dogmatic belief, albeit hardly arbitrary I should think, while still susceptible to the LNC, it is a valid dogmatic belief, therefore useful for subsequent hypotheses, particularly in regard to the determination of principles.
As far as Quine is concerned, you were probably directing that to the Josh, I already know it, so Ill leave it alone.
What is the approved process of verification? Can I demonstrate x,y,z? If yes to any than x,y,z are verified to exist. In such an example as, x's are blue, as x has been recorded to emit blue light (I am remind of science lab we were using spectro-analysis). Anything blue would be equilvant to x. x=blue things. So I could say the x is blue upon observing that blue was a quality of x.
I don't know. I have a poor understanding of the scientific method and deductive logic, and pointedly here how they relate to propositions.
Well, it all begins with, as usual, definitions. The moment I define the words "the", "cat", "is", "on" "mat", it's true that the cat is on the mat when the cat is on the mat.
Ahhh, yes, thanks. Both my guess thats what you meant, and my assertion observational statements are not what Kant is splitting between analytic and synthetic, is validated.
You may have a valid argument in its own right, just not with respect to Kant. Something more modern than Enlightened, more analytic than continental, more conventional than metaphysic.....
I take you to mean a 'basic' observation statement (such as a measurement), as opposed to a theory? This is a deep question. My general advice is to read Karl Popper. Here's a sample.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/#BasiStatFalsConv
Roughly speaking, a basic statement is relatively noncontroversial. We can reason 'from' such statements and check that the implications of our theories 'against' them.
The correspondence theory of truth has some serious problems. How are concepts/words 'equal' to or 'representative of' some kind of non-word stuff ? I prefer thinking of the truth as what an ideal observer would say about the situation. That way we are comparing words to words, what was said to what should have been said. This is a tricky issue, so I'm just offering one of the more plausible approaches I'm aware of.
"Photosynthesis is what takes place in plants" is true only if photosynthesis is what takes place in plants.
And generally, "P" (note the quote marks) will be true only if P. This is called a T-sentence. T-statements set out the general form of all true sentences. Although T-sentences appear uninformative, they make a few things clear. For example, for "P" to be true nothing further is needed than that P. Including being observed.
In logical form,
"P" is true IFF P
That is, "Photosynthesis is what takes place in plants" will be true regardless of whether or not it is observed to be true.
Now no doubt all this is trite and obvious, but it may help in dissolving all sorts of philosophical conundrums, especially the one were folk think that a statement can only be true if it sits in some relation to a mind; that in order that a statement be true it must be believed, known, or as some folk suppose, observed. Views of this sort are often grouped together under the heading "idealism".
The take away here is that being observed, or not being observed, is generally irrelevant to the truth of an observation.
Now there is another way that the question "What makes an observation true?" might be understood: it might be asking under what circumstances ought we accept that an observation statement is true. This is a very different question to whether the sentence is true or not. It is not asking about the truth of the sentence as such, so much as about a relation between the sentence and ourselves. The exact nature of that relation is subject to some ambiguity, because of differing levels of acceptance, from an acknowledgement of the mere possibility that it is true through to thinking it indubitable.
The salient difference is that we are talking now about the attitude we might adopt to the statement. Should we assert the sentence? Should we believe it? Do we know that it is true?
And again, I apologise for spending so much time explaining that what makes an observation true is a very different question to whether we should assert, believe or claim to know that it is true. But in the Philosophy Forum, such simple things quickly become lost.
Watch.