What do normative/moral terms mean on a realist construal?
Normative/moral terms are meaningless to me from a realist construal. Not to use meaningless as a rhetorical pejorative, but rather in good faith as in a non-cognitive sense. I am unable to form a concept from the purported meanings of moral realist terms, and they likewise are unable to successfully convey their purported meanings to me. I can only make sense of normative/moral terms from an anti realist construal. To better explain, consider the following example sentences with normative/moral terms italicized.
1. The heart is functioning properly
2. Shoplifting is wrong
Now, by anti realist, I simply mean that I interpret such terms to be stance-dependent (to be referring to the desires of an agent or regarding an established standard). In other words, sentence 1 seems to be saying that the heart is doing what it ought to be doing with regard to a medical standard; whereas sentence 2 seems to be saying that the act of stealing goes against the desires of the sentences author.
The problem is: to say that the heart is functioning properly or that the act of stealing is wrong, but in a stance-independent way (not referring to a subjects desires or an established standard), seems to me to be positing some kind of spooky metaphysics into the dialectic. What else is there besides desires and standards? Intuition? Reciprocal altruism? These are inconsistent, arbitrary and unreliable. Without a successfully conveyed meaning of these terms, not only am i not able to grant that the sentence is trueI am not able to grant that the sentence is even propositional. To me, its like saying Stealing is blah-blah-blah and without understanding the meaning of the terms the sentence could be false, non propositional or vacuous. Imagine analogously if I were to say This stone is big but instead of using the adjective big in a relational way (an object is big only relative to another object), I instead claim that the stone actually has non-relational bigness. Would that make sense to you? You would likely wonder what it is that I am referring to, and fail to form a conception.
If any moral realist here wants to help out by conveying their meanings and interpretations of such terms, I would be interested to hear you. Also, one last thing. Oftentimes while in this discussion amongst more uncharitable moral realists, attempts are often made at exposing a reductio on my position. I will be asked such questions as: Was the holocaust good? in effort to show an absurdity in my position by my responding For the Nazi, yeshowever, and please remember, that under my interpretation, to say that something is good is just to say that it corresponds with some agents desires. Therefore, to say that the holocaust was good for the Nazi is simply to say that the holocaust corresponds with the desires of the Naziit becomes a tautology.
1. The heart is functioning properly
2. Shoplifting is wrong
Now, by anti realist, I simply mean that I interpret such terms to be stance-dependent (to be referring to the desires of an agent or regarding an established standard). In other words, sentence 1 seems to be saying that the heart is doing what it ought to be doing with regard to a medical standard; whereas sentence 2 seems to be saying that the act of stealing goes against the desires of the sentences author.
The problem is: to say that the heart is functioning properly or that the act of stealing is wrong, but in a stance-independent way (not referring to a subjects desires or an established standard), seems to me to be positing some kind of spooky metaphysics into the dialectic. What else is there besides desires and standards? Intuition? Reciprocal altruism? These are inconsistent, arbitrary and unreliable. Without a successfully conveyed meaning of these terms, not only am i not able to grant that the sentence is trueI am not able to grant that the sentence is even propositional. To me, its like saying Stealing is blah-blah-blah and without understanding the meaning of the terms the sentence could be false, non propositional or vacuous. Imagine analogously if I were to say This stone is big but instead of using the adjective big in a relational way (an object is big only relative to another object), I instead claim that the stone actually has non-relational bigness. Would that make sense to you? You would likely wonder what it is that I am referring to, and fail to form a conception.
If any moral realist here wants to help out by conveying their meanings and interpretations of such terms, I would be interested to hear you. Also, one last thing. Oftentimes while in this discussion amongst more uncharitable moral realists, attempts are often made at exposing a reductio on my position. I will be asked such questions as: Was the holocaust good? in effort to show an absurdity in my position by my responding For the Nazi, yeshowever, and please remember, that under my interpretation, to say that something is good is just to say that it corresponds with some agents desires. Therefore, to say that the holocaust was good for the Nazi is simply to say that the holocaust corresponds with the desires of the Naziit becomes a tautology.
Comments (98)
Norms are procedural, not representational; they either (mostly) work or they don't, which is a fact (J. Searle ~ institutional facts). The traditional construal of "moral realism" is incoherent insofar as it's premised on the category error of conflating the procedural with the representational. And "error theory" likewise is incoherent for running with this "moral realist" premise claiming it is false and thereby concluding from this that moral statements are categorically false or meaningless. Logical Positivism by another name. The consequences of using norms practices are real (i.e. have inescapable impacts on matters of fact). Norms are practices, not just pictures (Witty).
YMMV.
Thats all quite interesting. Im not committing to a particular metaethical view. I only mention normative and moral terms to refer to the terms used in the example sentences. Im not saying that the statements are indeed true, false or meaningless Im withholding judgment until I actually understand what the realist is referring to, if not a stance-dependent construal as I am.
I am merely asking what you are referring to when you say X is good or Y is bad.
For example, would you say that the holocaust was bad? If yes, are you saying that it was bad because the things that happened there go against your desires? Or, the desires of those afflicted? Was it bad independent from any desires?
I just dont understand how we can assess the truth value of a sentence when there is a term that we do not understand The words we use must succeed in transferring our concepts to one another in order for us to continue tracking the conversation.
Language?
Shoplifting is wrong because it's the sort of thing we use the word 'wrong' for.
"2+2=4 or Spoigle is a blothik" is true.
:up:
I could be getting you wrong but....What norms compel you to found your norms in terms of atoms and void ?
Quoting Isaac
What is it our language is attempting to capture? Whats the referent?
Quoting Isaac
That answer is a tautology (essentially): Shoplifting is wrong because we use the word wrong to describe wrong acts and shoplifting is one of those wrong acts.
Why need there be one?
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
We don't use the word 'wrong' to describe wrong acts. We use the word 'wrong' to describe some acts and not others. You're assuming there's some strict property we're identifying by that use but you've given no reason why you think there is. Why can we not use the word vaguely, or contextually, or without the other person completely understanding what we mean?
atoms and void? Democritus? Yeah, i dont understand.
I just rearranged your statement so to make it clear that it was tautological. That is not my view.
It's not tautologous. We use the word 'wrong' to describe certain behaviours, shoplifting is one of them. There's nothing tautologous about that claim.
TLDR : Justifying or asking others to justify norms-in-general is absurd.
Im not justifying norms. Im asking what moral or normative terms mean on a realist construal.
This wouldnt be moral realism though.
Are languages not real?
I'm using this definition of moral realism, by the way...
Quoting https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/
It is a fact that shoplifting is one of the behaviours we use words like immoral in connection with. Therefore the moral claim "shoplifting is not moral" reports a fact, the fact that shoplifting is not one the behaviours we use the word 'moral' in connection with.
If you ask "what does 'tree' mean" would you expect an answer other than just to point to a tree and say "It's one of those"? why would you expect the answer to "what does 'moral' mean" to be any different than to point to moral acts and say "it's one of those"?
The meaning of a word in a language is objective. We don't all have our own personal meanings, we couldn't talk if that were the case.
Quoting Isaac
This is not a tautology?
Im asking what is the meaning (metaethics) of good or bad (right or wrong). You respond with a tautological argument. Look, your believes are:
We use the word wrong to describe things like shoplifting.
Shoplifting is wrong.
You answer a tangential question Why is shoplifting wrong? (Which is the same as asking Why do we use the word wrong to describe things like shoplifting.) by answering, essentially, Because shoplifting is wrong. It is wrong because it is wrong. Tautology.
That has no bearing on what moral realists mean.
No. It could be otherwise. It could be that shoplifting is wrong because God said so, regardless of whether entire language communities use the word 'right' in connection with it. Since it could be otherwise, the claim is not tautologous.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Read again what I've written. Nowhere have I answered the question "why is shoplifting wrong?" by saying "because it's wrong". I've said it's wrong because it's one of the behaviours we use the word 'wrong' in connection with.
This could not be the case. It could be the case that it's wrong for some other reason. Hence the claim is not tautologous.
It's like Wittgenstein's 'game'. Why do we call some things 'games'? There's no single reason other than "because they are members of a group of things we use the word 'game' in connection with"
You said moral realists believe morality relates to objective facts. Being part of a group of behaviours associated with a particular word is an objective fact. If you mean to claim some additional criteria for moral realism, then state it.
Quoting Isaac
Either it is subjective (mind dependent) or objective (mind independent) like your tree. On a realist construal, moral good and bad are things of the worldthey are a thing or property of the world. Again, like your tree. So, yeah, point to the property something has to have to be considered wrong.
How is language not part of the world? An entire community of real people really use the word 'wrong' in association with the behaviour shoplifting. That's a fact about the world. It's objective. It's not the case only if I think it is, and I can be wrong about it.
But that's not equivalent at all. I wouldn't point to the property that a tree has to be considered a tree. I'd just point to the tree.
Moral realists claim that moral facts are objective in the sense that the speed of light and the existence of Mercury are objective. They don't claim that they are objective in the sense that the legality of marrying a 16 year old is objective. This latter kind of "objectivity" would count as a type of relativism. In your example, the morality of an action is relative to and determined by the linguistic practices of a language community.
Do they?
:up:
Folks forget that objective is just unbiased.
Is it not that certain statements about the speed of life are objective ?
:up:
Are looking for some Entity like goodness or badness ?
--It's raining.
--What is ? What is raining !?!?
The realist will say that there is more to the world than just statements. There is the statement "the cat is on the mat" and there is the cat being on the mat. The latter is the case even if nobody talks about it and is what makes the former true.
Quoting Isaac
At least as I have always understood it, with ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism being the two main types.
Here's Routledge...
It goes on to cite Crispin Wright...
"Punching old ladies is right" is an assertion which is amenable to being true in exactly the same way that "this is a game" is.
If I point to a bus and say "this is a game", what I've said is false, but it's false by no other criteria than that buses are not the sorts of things we use the word 'game' for.
Traditionally, as I understand it at least, the moral realist's claim that murder is immoral isn't comparable to the claim that murder is illegal. They tend to make a more substantive claim than that. They think that murder has some (natural or non-natural) moral property that is then correctly (or incorrectly) described when we claim that murder is immoral.
But if you want to argue for a more minimal account of moral realism (that moral claims are truth-apt and some are true) then I suppose you're welcome to, although I don't suspect that's the kind that the OP is asking about. I suspect hes asking about the meta-ethics that is comparable to mathematical realism, whereas yours is comparable to something like mathematical formalism, which is a type of mathematical antirealism.
I want to know what terms like good bad mean to a realist, if not being used in a stance dependent (relative to the desires of an agent or an established standard) construal.
Well, is functions as a determiner in your example. Implying ontological status. Very interesting, but I want to understand the meanings of normative/moral terms first.
Why would you want to disqualify or ignore or circumvent established standards ? It's as if you want an example of a norm that's not a norm.
If it helps, I'm coming from the position that the role of philosopher is implicitly normative. "We rational ones..."
Quoting Isaac
When you say the word tree, presumably, what it is that your language is trying to do is to capture and transmit the conceptual information pertaining to the properties of a tree (long trunk made of bark, green leafs, etc) through corresponding signs, which are encoded with the conceptual information, across a medium we call language in order for a recipient to subsequently decode and form a mental image of the shared concept (the tree).
That understanding of language is far from being the only one, so such presumption, in my view anyway, might be unwarranted.
An alternative is inferentialism.
http://jarda.peregrin.cz/mybibl/PDFTxt/580.pdf
Are you saying that my original question (what does it mean when realists use normative/moral terms?) is loaded?
If I'm a passenger in a rally car and I yell 'tree', I sincerely hope there's no decoding of concepts going on.
I mean for the driver to swerve.
Do you not understand my question, or are you being evasive? This conversation keeps getting off track.
I do. Do you not understand my answer?
You're asking "what does it 'mean'?" and then claiming that discussion of how words 'mean' something is 'off track'. If you have a particular direct reference theory of meaning that you want to use when looking at the question "what does it mean...?" then you'll need to make that clear, otherwise the answer is going to hinge entirely on different interpretations of how any word means anything.
Well, probably every question is. But what is implicitly assumed (and what commitments are made ) as the philosopher puts his philosophy hat on ? Perhaps we are both interested in wtf certain philosophers even mean by their keywords in the first place.
'Real' is as slippery as they come perhaps.
If this is what you mean, then I'm a moral realist. If someone says 'murder is wrong,' they don't just mean that they don't like it. In fact, they might like it very much, knowing that it's wrong, perhaps because it's wrong.
To me this is a point about language, how the concept 'wrong' (typically) functions.
Quoting Isaac
Could you reproduce my question?
What concept is it that wrong refers to? I have the concept for my view (to desires or standards: like the desire for pleasure or the standard rules of chess), however I do not have any idea what concept it is that you are referring to. Language functions to share concepts.
So you want an Entity ?
If God says its wrong, does that work ? If not, why not ?
Who wrote the logic textbooks ? And why should we trust them ?
I just want to know what it you mean by it.
God said its wrong is stance dependent. It depends upon the desires if God in that case. In order to accept that I would need you to provide a meaning for God as well because, like stance independent wrongs, I dont think have your concept of God.
If you have a different concept for a term we are using in a statement, then I need you to convey your meaning so that I can assess whether or not the statement is true, false, propositional, vacuous, or just meaningless mouth sounds.
I think I can assume and assert that the widespread proscription of murder is a genuine/objective/real feature of the world.
I'm an atheist. I'm just trying to fish out your presuppositions.
This dictionary definition is not a bad start, especially the bold part. "Not in conformity with fact or truth; incorrect or erroneous. Contrary to conscience, morality, or law. Unfair; unjust. "
What do you make of this ? Does it relate ?
Why should I bother to be autonomous ? Is the force of reason a private matter ?
Note: Im not asking for a definition, but your meaning. That definition uses synonyms and is therefore tautologous, so yeah, I of course accept it, but it is rendered repetitive and has no force or additional meaning.
Would you mind explaining what you mean by 'meaning' first ? Please, though, no dictionary definition. Just your meaning.
I suspect I was right w/ my original atoms-and-void comment. You want an Impossible Object to make things Actually Wrong ? Or....you would like to think the moral realist needs one ? I see moral realism as at least potentially trivial. There are norms. Surprise surprise.
I suspect the outlandish theses are on the other side, lurking as secret premises. "Norms aren't really norms unless ... X "
The reals go round and round.
You seem to use tautology synonymously with necessary byw. If that was you earlier. Im working and only have moments to respond, sorry.
That may be the case. I tend to think necessity is grammatical.
What if philosophers tend to say too much ? Trying to define wrong or true ? What if that's like defining a chess bishop beyond its role in the game ? "Is he Catholic or Episcopalian or what ?" What does 'up' mean ? What is it that rains when it's raining ?
I just want you to convey your meaning as I have. If you asked my meaning for the word car and I gave you automobile it would be analytically true, but if you wanted me to give you a more empirical conveyance, then I would need to give you something like a machine humans use for transportation or something.
I need to understand the meaning of a term in order to make sense of a statement using it, dont you? I appreciate the problem of defining moral terms because they seem to have special importance (they are used as if they do). Philosophers reveal our utter uncertainties and presuppositions. They reveal to us the many cracks in the foundation we require to even attempt to make sense of this place. And yet their questions must either be satisfied or we must resort to delusion to sustain our comfort. Dont fear disillusionmentembrace it.
(This was poetic rather than logical, btw)
That's what I might tell you. There's nothing behind the mask. There's nothing hidden.
Do you understand/agree that at least one version of moral realism is boringly true ?
I agree. Of course. And water is wet, sir.
Are you just unable to convey your meaning? If so, thats fine.
Depends on what you mean by truth.
And what normative/moral terms mean on a realist construal.
I said 'true' not 'truth.' There is almost nothing to be said about truth. Its grammar is absolute and minimal.
Facts imply evidence based. Could you substantiate?
Do you want me to prove that the sky is blue ? I am not trying to justify the norm that murder is wrong but merely pointing it out. 'Murder is proscribed.' Does that help ? This is different than 'Timmy is saddened by murders.' One statement is about a community, what it does not tolerate or endorse. The other is about a single person.
Is it not you who seek something deeper here ?
Are you saying that murder is wrong by definition or wrong by an established standard? Then your meaning is just an abidance of said standard, or by definition? But you are a realist, right? It has to be cashed out empirically to be substantiated, doesnt it? Realism is a thesis in ontology, right?
Im a realist with regard to the general color of the sky in the daytime. Im not a realist with regard to some stance independent goodness or badness cashed out in spooky metaphysics.
Looks like I caught my fish. The reals on the bus go round and round.
Do you think promises are less real than electrons ? Than snowflakes ? Are inferences less real than mustaches ?
What spooky metaphysics is that ? The fact that people in this familiar world of ours proscribe murder ?
Consider that it may only be our mutual obedience to conceptual and inferential norms that makes this conversation possible. I also wonder why you'd be ashamed to embrace a spooky metaphysics. Autonomy perhaps ? Is that spooky ? Conforming to reason ? Wanting justifications for claims ?
Promises are stance dependent
Electrons are empirical
Snowflakes are empirical
Inferences are stance dependent
Mustaches are empirical
And ? Which are real ? What's your stance on this issue ? And why can't I be empirical about promises ? Isn't that what courts are for ?
Is it your stance that only stance-independent items should be counted as real ?
It's as if you hope a physicist will find Wrongness in a bubble chamber one day. And, if he can't...there is no sin, just like the mountains told Francis Wolcott.
Someone should justify all this obsession with justification.
If you think I've misunderstood your question just say so and tell me what you think I've got wrong. I'm not doing an exam.
Exactly. I can't see where people get the idea that the products of human societies are somehow unreal. On the one hand we have idealists telling us nothing but the products of human minds is real, on the other moral anti-realists telling us that everything except the product of human minds is real!
:up:
Quoting Isaac
I think this generalizes pretty well too, into something like a quasi-mystical phenomenology versus crude nihilistic 'scientism' (as seen here, I suspect.)
Yes, indeed. One of the limitations of scientism (among many) is that the proponent's outlook is necessarily limited to those scientific models that they are aware of (and understand!). Most often (for some reason) these tend to be some extremely complex aspects of quantum physics or cosmology...
The 'science' of human beings (speculative and young as it is) is rarely in the playbook. Although I'd still object to it on other grounds, I feel the hard edges of scientism would be much reduced if the 'science' they were 'istic' about was a little more expansive in scope.
No. The Shoah was evil.
No. The fascists systematic mass murder was against "the desires" (Spinoza's conatus) of their victims & the survivors as well as further dehumanized themselves as co-conspirators & perpetrators.
Yes. See above.
If by "desire" you mean preference, taste, attachment, lust, greed or the like, then I say yes. If, however, you're referring to fundamental, or intrinsic, 'drive to persist in one's being' (Spinoza's conatus), then I say no nothing "morally bad" is "independent" of increasing diminishment or causing destruction of 'the drive to persist in one's being' (i.e. gratuitous suffering).
Depends on what you mean by real. I believe the common meaning would be something like actually existing rather than imagined but there are many different meanings. I would use a similar meaning using the term generally speaking. I would describe a promise using genuine if attempting to portray authenticity but thats me.
Im happy to give you my stance and hear your criticisms regarding stance independent realism, after we settle what your meaning is when using normative/ moral terms stance independently. Are you not able to convey the meaning? Ill accept that as well.
If you cant reproduce your interlocutors question, then it is foolish to think that you have answered it.
I think we agree, then. I cant imagine what stance independent badness with regards to suffering would be. And by adding the qualifier (gratuitous) suffering seems to highlight the necessity of an agent to judge whether or not sufficient meaning or purpose can be derived from a particular case of suffering. Although, im sure from the perspective of the Nazi, there was indeed sufficient meaning and purpose to justify such suffering. Or else they wouldnt have done so. I would like to think that we could reason them out from such a belief using premises based on their own values and principles, but I must concede that such a belief be fanciful, indeed. The lack of information that stands likely now unattainable forms an unbreachable void obfuscating such logic.
I think conspiratorial rationalizations are never "sufficient ... to justify suffering" and mass murder. :brow:
I didn't say I couldn't. I said I wouldn't. I'm not taking part is some condescending test.
Exactly. @Cartesian trigger-puppets has misunderstood what the term 'justify' means. One does not justify to one's self (other than perhaps to rehearse a justification to one's community). The Nazi was wrong and the Second World War proved as much. They attempted to justify their actions to their larger community, and failed so monumentally that it is now illegal to even deny they tried.
What or who would a "realist construal" be?
:up:
I think you are right about @Cartesian trigger-puppets, and I and others seem to mean something like formalism (to meet the minimum standard anyway), but I'd like them to acknowledge it, defining what they mean by 'real.'
:up:
I'd expect biology and psychology to be fronts that could support a 'fancier' moral realism...if that was actually needed. But, as I think we both agree, it's a simple fact about the world that we have norms.
Another issue probably in the background here is cultural relativism.
Do I only imagine that murder is proscribed ?
My hunch is that you want to say something like "humans in general only imagine that murder is wrong." This is like saying that everyone drives on the wrong side of the road.
Unless it's you who are the precisely the kind of theological moral realist who needs a god or an elementary particle to make it wrong.
Do they reveal truths ? Are we in the same place ? Is it good to know truth ? Good to have reasons for our beliefs ? Wait a minute....is the philosopher implicitly a moral realist ?
Yes, I think people are, wary of relativism ("the Nazis were right, from their perspective"), but it's never something I've found in the least worrying. I'm embedded in a culture (and I'm probably wired with several moral-like beliefs from birth, like any other human). So the idea of some Nazi thinking they're right seems to hold no concern. They weren't right, there's no doubt about that, and the fact that they thought they were doesn't seem to have any bearing on the matter.
Quoting Pie
Perhaps one also imagines the cell in which one would be placed after being convicted of this imaginary social proscription?
It also doesn't bother me. While a philosopher (and his less pleasant cousin, the sociopath) might be able to see around some of the tribal norms more than others, he or she is still mostly reliant upon them. To strive to be reasonable is to be willingly captured by Enlightenment autonomy norms.
The OP doesn't want to admit it, but it sure looks likes a demand for justification, which implicitly invokes this autonomy norm, for which he can't find a source in his telescope yet, I presume.