Might I be God?
I do not think I am God. (By 'God' I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person). But can I rule it out entirely? No, I do not think so. And everything I am about to say will apply to you as well.
For instance, can I be absolutely sure I'm not omnipotent? I think so at first, because there are many things that seem self-evidently beyond my ability and plenty of other things that I have tried to do and failed.
But although that's pretty good evidence that I am not omnipotent, it does not prove it. It could just be that I do not know how to do those things. That is, I have the ability, I just do not know how to exercise it. I didn't seem to have the ability to ride a bike until I figured out how to do it. So, I don't think the fact I have tried to x and failed demonstrates categorically that I lack the ability to do x.
Does the fact I don't know how to exercise many of my abilities itself show that I am not God? That is, is there some contradiction involved in the idea of a person who is able to do anything not knowing how to exercise that ability?
Again, no. If I am omnipotent, then I have the ability to know how to exercise my ability to do anything, for that is one of the things an omnipotent person is able to do. But once more, not knowing how to exercise that ability is not cast iron evidence that one lacks it, for it is consistent with not knowing how to do something that one nevertheless has the ability to do it.
What about omniscience? Surely if one does not know how to exercise one's ability to do anything, then one manifests a lack of knowledge. And isn't that evidence that one is not God? For does not God know everything?
God is in possession of all knowledge. That's sufficient to qualify as omniscient. But as I have argued before, being in possession of all knowledge is consistent with being ignorant of any number of truths. For knowledge involves justified true belief, and so an omniscient person is in possession of all justified true beliefs. But that does not mean they are in possession of all truths - or at least, it does not necessarily entail that - for it could be that there are true beliefs that are not justified. And in fact, if I am God then I will be the arbiter of justifications. But what that means is that those true beliefs of mine that I approve of myself believing will be the sum total of knowledge at that time. And thus even if I also have lots of false beliefs and fail to have lots of true ones, I will not fail to qualify as omniscient. And so, once more, it seems I cannot be completely sure that I am not omniscient, even though I appear to be ignorant of a great deal and to have many false beliefs.
What about omnibenevolence? Can I be absolutely certain that I am not morally perfect? Well, as with knowledge, if I am omnipotent then I will be the arbiter of right and wrong, good and bad. That is, my own attitudes towards things will constitutively determine what is right, wrong, good and bad. And assuming that whatever I do on any particular occasion is something I approve of myself doing - at least at that very moment - then everything I do will be right. And if I disapprove of some character trait, then I nevertheless approve of myself disapproving of it, and so it seems that if I am omnipotent, then I will be morally perfect as well.
I think until I can prove that I am not omnipotent, then I can't be completely certain that I am not also omniscient and omnibenevolent. And I don't seem able to prove that I am not omnipotent. All I can do is put it beyond a reasonable doubt; but I can't demonstrate that my being omnipotent involves some kind of contradiction.
For instance, can I be absolutely sure I'm not omnipotent? I think so at first, because there are many things that seem self-evidently beyond my ability and plenty of other things that I have tried to do and failed.
But although that's pretty good evidence that I am not omnipotent, it does not prove it. It could just be that I do not know how to do those things. That is, I have the ability, I just do not know how to exercise it. I didn't seem to have the ability to ride a bike until I figured out how to do it. So, I don't think the fact I have tried to x and failed demonstrates categorically that I lack the ability to do x.
Does the fact I don't know how to exercise many of my abilities itself show that I am not God? That is, is there some contradiction involved in the idea of a person who is able to do anything not knowing how to exercise that ability?
Again, no. If I am omnipotent, then I have the ability to know how to exercise my ability to do anything, for that is one of the things an omnipotent person is able to do. But once more, not knowing how to exercise that ability is not cast iron evidence that one lacks it, for it is consistent with not knowing how to do something that one nevertheless has the ability to do it.
What about omniscience? Surely if one does not know how to exercise one's ability to do anything, then one manifests a lack of knowledge. And isn't that evidence that one is not God? For does not God know everything?
God is in possession of all knowledge. That's sufficient to qualify as omniscient. But as I have argued before, being in possession of all knowledge is consistent with being ignorant of any number of truths. For knowledge involves justified true belief, and so an omniscient person is in possession of all justified true beliefs. But that does not mean they are in possession of all truths - or at least, it does not necessarily entail that - for it could be that there are true beliefs that are not justified. And in fact, if I am God then I will be the arbiter of justifications. But what that means is that those true beliefs of mine that I approve of myself believing will be the sum total of knowledge at that time. And thus even if I also have lots of false beliefs and fail to have lots of true ones, I will not fail to qualify as omniscient. And so, once more, it seems I cannot be completely sure that I am not omniscient, even though I appear to be ignorant of a great deal and to have many false beliefs.
What about omnibenevolence? Can I be absolutely certain that I am not morally perfect? Well, as with knowledge, if I am omnipotent then I will be the arbiter of right and wrong, good and bad. That is, my own attitudes towards things will constitutively determine what is right, wrong, good and bad. And assuming that whatever I do on any particular occasion is something I approve of myself doing - at least at that very moment - then everything I do will be right. And if I disapprove of some character trait, then I nevertheless approve of myself disapproving of it, and so it seems that if I am omnipotent, then I will be morally perfect as well.
I think until I can prove that I am not omnipotent, then I can't be completely certain that I am not also omniscient and omnibenevolent. And I don't seem able to prove that I am not omnipotent. All I can do is put it beyond a reasonable doubt; but I can't demonstrate that my being omnipotent involves some kind of contradiction.
Comments (86)
I think there can be two readings of omniscience. If we just take it to be the possession of knowledge, then the rest of what you said follows. However, perhaps a more intuitive notion that captures what theists usually mean by 'God' is K(God, p) ? p (if something is true, then God knows that it, and vice versa). Generally, lots of theists will want to say that there are is no lack of awareness diagnosing their God, no truths he is unaware are true. In any case, they'll take your God to be 'less perfect' than theirs in this respect.
But allow me to take your analysis as a pretense and forget what I'll said. I'll give you a reason that satisfies your Cartesian hunger even with the stipulation of your analysis of omniscience, where, as an omniscient agent, I only know things which are in principle knowable, i.e., can have a justification.
Surely, this is the case for any arithmetic operation on the natural numbers 1, 2, 3, ... and so on: there is a mathematical method to derive the result of any of said basic arithmetic operations, and thus a way to justify (and know). But I can introspectively access the fact that I would not know what (49082423 / 234765) x 54 equals: I know that I do not know this because I do not even have any belief on any simplified expression that is equal to this expression, and surely a belief is one of the first prerequisites for my knowledge of anything.
In fact, since I can be introspectively aware of what I believe, disbelief, and lack an attitude of belief on, then the very fact of me knowing that I lack both belief & disbelief (i.e. withhold judgement) on arbitrarily many matters, like, "what is the first letter of the 3rd chapter in Harry Potter?" (I haven't even read Harry Potter!) allows me to verify that I am not omniscient.
You're not close.
Hm. An omniscient being that knows all there is to know yet "fails to have many true beliefs". Sounds a bit iffy to me. Sort of like not knowing "that thing you know how to do" happens to makes a whistling noise yet knowing "anything is possible" thus emulating a kind of omniscience where you both know and don't know how to whistle? :chin:
Omniscience means 'all knowledge'. If - as many contemporary theists foolishly do - one defines it to mean 'all truth beliefs' then one is simply misusing a term (for one can be in possession of all true beliefs and yet not be in possession of all knowledge). Certainly it is no abuse of the term 'omniscience' to use it to label someone who is in possession of all knowledge.
Furthermore, if one defines God as a person who is in possession of all true beliefs, then one runs into difficulties, for that seems incompatible with omnibenevolence. God would turn out to have true beliefs about my bowel habits and my inner most secret thoughts - all of which are things a good person would not wish to acquire true beliefs about, due to it disrespecting another's privacy. And God would also have to believe that he is morally perfect, which is incompatible with being morally perfect (you're not humble if you believe you're morally perfect, yet humility is something a morally perfect person would need).
So, the contemporary theist is simply abusing language and abusing it to no advantage, as their abuse makes their view incoherent.
Anyway, like I say, it is no abuse of the term 'omniscient' to use it to denote someone who is in possession of all knowledge - after all, what else would one call such a person?
But you are willing to grant me this and think that I can still know that I am not omniscient in this (correct) sense of the term. But in fact you swapped my definition of omniscience for another and said that it is to be in possession of all potential knowledge. To be omniscient is to be in possession of all actual knowledge, not all possible knowledge. If a true belief is a possible item of knowledge, yet does not yet qualify as such, then lacking it does not make one lacking in knowledge. If I own all the world's trees, but not all the world's acorns, I still own all the world's trees, even though i do not own all the potential trees.
So, the fact that I do not know what 175 x 345 = does not necessarily entail a lack of knowledge on my part, for if I am omnipotent - something I can't establish with certainty that I am not - then I am the arbiter of knowledge and thus when or if I figure out what 175 x 345 is and favour myself believing it, there is no knowledge of what that sum equals, only true and false beliefs about it.
That's solely due to conflating true beliefs with knowledge. They're not the same. One can be in possession of all true beliefs and not be omniscient. What if, by pure luck, one just accurately guesses all the truths there are and comes to believe them? Well, that person does not know a thing, yet they are in possession of all true beliefs.
Furthermore, there is good reason to think that God isn't in possession of all true beliefs, for that'd mean he has true beliefs about everything everyone has done and thought etc. No good person who had the power to resist acquiring such beliefs would acqurie them, as that'd be a gross invasion of other people's privacy.
This is just etymologically branded linguistic prescriptivism. Regardless, I already granted your analysis as you pointed out
Quoting Bartricks
I made the most charitable interpretation. If you truly mean 'all of actual knowledge' by omniscience then this is an awfully trivial definition wholly divorced from what anyone means by 'omniscient', since, I, like many other living people, know everything that I actually know, which has virtually nothing to do with knowing everything that is knowable (which was my initial charitable interpretation) let alone knowing every truth (what most theists think). This just prima facie renders anyone that knows anything to be omniscient, since they know everything they actually know.
Omni is latin for 'all' and scientia is latin for 'knowledge'. So historically it has meant 'all knowledge'.
If one wants one can define omniscience as 'in possession of a potato'. Hell, one can define 'God' as a potato and then insist that you just dug God up in the vegetable patch.
I have also justified this use of the term: if you define it differently, you'll get an incoherent collection of attributes, for it does not seem possible for a person to be omnipotent, and omnibenevolent and in possession of all truths.
Quoting Kuro
It's not at all charitable and you've ignored what I said. It is not charitable to attribute to someone a view they did not express and furthermore a view that doesn't make sense.
I'll simply repeat what I said: to be in possession of all trees does not require being in possession of all potential trees. LIkewise, to be in possession of all knowledge dose not require being in possession of all potential knowledge. We're all potential murderers - should we all be locked up for actual murder?
And my definition of omniscience is clearly not trivial. How is it trivial?
When Buddhists talk about no self and emptiness, they are referring to the map, as I understand it.
So if by "I" you mean the territory I, then maybe that is pure awareness, and pure awareness is what the map called God is a representation of.
If I may. I too was thinking along the lines he mentioned. From what I gather the conflicting premise is when someone says someone "knows everything" it, absent of sarcasm, typically means or implies anything that will or can happen which includes the product of 175 x 345 and whether or not it will or will not come to exist and if so what it's projected value is anyway. The idea of loose definitions and semantics is confusing, but from what I gather you assert that an omniscient omnipowerful being can define what is and what isn't knowledge per reason of creating new knowledge, essentially anything, at will, changing current meanings or realities, or destroying knowledge due to its intrinsic nature as omnipowerful ie. the number 2 doesn't exist unless it wants it to and if it does it can equal 3? Sorry if I'm muddying the waters or missing the point entirely. Men have debated this for millennia. It's confusing, lol.
Apologies.
Ignore my comment.
How do you feel about omnipresence? Omni-gods are sometimes omnipresent, sometimes omnibenevolent, but curiously not often both in these kinds of discussions.
Don't put yourself down Bartricks. You can take humility too far.
An omnipotent being has the ability to be omnipresent, but they would not exercise it.
So if I understood well, since you don't have enough proofs for the opposite, you do leave an open window as to you to be the actual God indeed aw??
So you are sure that God must definitely be one of us walking around somewhere on earth,"dressed up"like a human. So why not you to be that one? Ok. No further questions.
You can choose whatever omnis you like for your definition, of course. You prefer benevolence to presence, I was just wondering why. Is benevolence simply more traditional? Or you feel it is more consistent with the others? Seems to be that latter.
For me presence seems to be the most important one, and the one that generates the most difficulties if left out.
If you want you can insist that having red hair is the God making, but then you are simply using the term God to denote red headed people and are not using it as I am.
I am not sure that what I am saying is part of your philosophy. However, many Christian believers may see Jesus as the son as God; as having the share with God, the Father, in the source of omniscient knowledge. This may miss the way in which everyone is a Son ot God. Carl Jung spoke of the image of God evolving through human consciousness and understanding, which may involve human beings as consciousness, perhaps in conjunction with Schopenhauer's understanding of human consciousness and will, as an interpretation of Kant's 'thing in itself', as the transcendent, which may be what is deemed as the absolute source, as God.
Possible knowledge is not actual knowledge. A possible murderer is not an actual murderer. These are not trivial differences.
I did not say that God changes the definitions. My point was that an omnipotent being will be the arbiter of knowledge for the presence or absence of a justification for a belief will rest in their hands. And thus their own attitudes determine what does and doesn't qualify as an item of knowledge. The definition of knowledge has not changed and nor has the definition of omniscience.
Quoting Bartricks
Oh, OK. You think omnipresence is neither necessary nor sufficient for God, but the other onmis are both necessary and sufficient? Is that your position?
Oh, but that's not right. I did read your OP. From this:
Quoting Bartricks
You are clearly saying it is not just a matter of arbitrary stipulation that God need not be omnipresent. You give reasons for its exclusion other than its not meeting your stipulated definition. Namely, that omnipresence is consistent with multiplicity, but God is one. But not according to your definition, which you are taking as primary! You didn't include uniqueness in your original stipulation.
I am a bit of a caffeine fan, not much of a sugar freak though, although I am having a glass of red wine as I speak. It may not be relevant to the discussion, except in terms of states of consciousness, and, perhaps, in making thinking about philosophy more intense and enjoyable.
It contains no stipulation of uniqueness
You mean this? You were intending that as part of the definition? If so, that's not clear, and uniqueness is implied not explicit.
Isn't the default that a proposition is innocent of impossibility until proven impossible?
Why not instead ask the opposite? Is it possible I am not God?
That means that possession of those properties makes one God and failure to have any means one is not God. That is, it means that omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence are necessary and sufficient for qualification as God.
So either you did not read that opening line or you read it and did not understand its implications.
Now, engage with the substance of my case and stop telling me about how you misuse the word God.
You're not my real dad
OK, but that's still not part of the definition you gave.
Because that one is philosophically uninteresting. It's obviously possible that I am not God. What's interesting is that it is genuinely metaphysically possible that I am God. Highly unlikely, of course. But nevertheless, entirely possible.
Sorry I'm so stupid
I have moved on to lemon squash now. No more alcohol for me, especially in the hot weather. If I drink too much I often get lost going home or in great big metaphysical knots and in need of philosophical resuscitation, on this site or going through my cluttered piles of books. Enjoy your drink!
I am basically taking your question deeper.
Hypothetically might you be God? Sure, why not? Anything is possible.
Might you ACTUALLY, REALLY be God???
Isn't that more interesting? If you are ACTUALLY God, then it would mean you are God by NECESSITY, which would mean you couldn't possibly NOT be God.
So I'm saying lets try to prove you are God, rather than just asking if its possible to be God...because anything "could be" possible, which is not that interesting.
Although the possibility of being God is more interesting than the impossibility.
It also does not follow from my actually being God that I am God of necessity. God is not God of necessity, for then there would be something he could not do, namely cease to be God
It's not clear to me why this is the case. Are you viewing it like there are two omnipotent beings having an arm wrestle and one of them has to win?
Might I be God?
No, you may not.
If there are two omnipotent beings neither will be able to do all things as the other will place a limit on those abilities
The standard understanding of omniscience is alethic: if you're to go ahead and suppose that the way the term is standardly used is inaccurate on etymological grounds, then your charge is in the class of linguistic prescriptivism
Quoting Bartricks
This makes a conflation of the dispositionalism about propositions being in principle knowable versus propositions that are actually known with its generalized notion. If being 'omniscient' requires you to just know all that which you actually know, then it's trivially true.
Consider a child who only knows his 123's and ABC's. It's true for that child that he knows all what he actually knows, and not the wide array of what is potentially there to know, like the fact that his humans procreated to conceive of him, a true fact which is potentially knowable that he is completely clueless of with respect to his actual knowledge. Your analysis entails this child be omniscient, since he knows all his actual knowledge, which makes the term largely moot and absolutely useless. This is not uncharitable, this is quite literally your view: I initially took on a far more reasonable interpretation which you so kindly corrected me on by clarifying that it was not your view by asserting this ridiculous view that confines knowledge to just actual knowledge (and thus defining omniscience in terms of actual knowledge, which is as trivial as it gets).
As for the second part, no nothing I have said implies the child is omniscient.
For example, the boulder. If the omnipotent being can make a boulder he couldn't lift, surely that means there's something he can't do, i.e. lift the Boulder. I'm not claiming that it's unresolvable, just that if it is, I'm sure two omnipotent beings can be resolved similarly.
If I have the power to create a boulder too heavy for me to lift, then that's a power I have. If someone else can create a stone to heavy for me to lift, then that's a restriction. For it is now not up to me whether there are any stones I can't lift. And if someone creates such a stone, then there is something I can't lift, which is incompatible with omnipotence. Whereas if I create the stone myself, then although I will have given up my omnipotence, I will have some so by exercising one of my powers.
So your claim is demonstrably false. I have already pointed this out. And all you have done is repeat your belief that there are problems with omnipotence for one person (there are not) and no reason to think these would not arise with two (whereas there are contradictions with two, and none with one).
Yes that might be true
Quoting Bartricks
This is reminiscent of my personal thought that I shouldn't be bothered with things I don't know. There is no evidence there is a problem of something contradicting my knowledge until I discover a problem myself. This gives me certainty about my beliefs. But I know there is more knowledge to be gained
Quoting Bartricks
Well I think this paragraphed shows you are off the true path. We have moral obligations which we bind ourselves to but the "we" who binds them is God. God is the source of it all but your identity is not God. You lose your identity if you follow the right path and become One again. But as long as you are you you must do what is correct otherwise you will never find yourself at home with yourself again
I fail to see a logical progression in your threads
So then it seems an omnipotent being can cause themselves to lose their omnipotence, and that doesn't contradict their nature of being omnipotent? In which case, an omnipotent being need not necessarily always be omnipotent? Perhaps you're saying that an omnipotent being has the potential to do anything, but need not actually do it for they would lose their omnipotence? It's all very confusing, so I'd like to go back to basics.
What is an omnipotent being? I think a useful definition would be a being that can make anything possible, actual. That is to say, an omnipotent being can't make a square circle, but could mold a unicorn into reality, perhaps. Some additional properties I'd think such a being would havein virtue of it being "a being"are identity (has a sense of self), persistence (that self doesn't go away or lose its identity), and will (the ability to conceive and make changes to reality).
Under this conception, I'd probably say an omnipotent being couldn't make a boulder that they couldn't lift, because that would be an impossible state of affairs. However, the being would still be omnipotent, because the thing it couldn't do was impossible, and couldn't become actual. Also, it seems to me under this definition there could be any number of omnipotent beings, simply because any contradictions that would arise don't entail something they couldn't do, but an impossibility that can't be made actual.
This is all under my definition of course. I don't know how you understand omnipotence. How would you describe it, and however you do, I'd like to refer you back to my initial questions of whether an omnipotent being has to always be omnipotent or if they can be omnipotent without actual doing actions that make them lose their omnipotence.
Yes. If they were unable to stop being omnipotent, then they would not be omnipotent.
Being able to do something does not mean one has done it.
This: " there is an omnipotent being and there is a rock he can't lift" is a contradiction
This "an omnipotent being is able to create a rock he cannot lift" is not.
This too is a contradiction "there is an omnipotent being and there is something he can't do".
Indeed, if you recognize that this is a contradiction - " there is an omnipotent being and there is a rock he can't lift" - then you should recognize that its contradictory nature lies the fact that the situation described is one in which an omnipotent being is unable to do something.
Quoting Jerry
It isn't at all confusing. It's very easy to understand.
An omnipotent being is a person who is able to do anything.
So, to the question "is an omnipotent person able to....." the answer is 'yes' no matter what.
Quoting Jerry
No, that is not omnipotence. Why? Because it is a contradiction to suppose that a person with fewer powers than another is the more powerful.
A person who is bound by what is currently possible, is a person who is less powerful than a person who is not bound by what is currently possible.
So, an omnipotent being will a person who can make anything possible. Not just 'can make anything that is possible, actual' but 'can make anything possible' .....and then actualize it if they so wish.
You can, if you want, just insist that you want to use the word omnipotent to label a person who is unable to do some things, but then you will simply be using the term different to how I do and will not be engaging with the OP.
In the OP I am wondering whether it is possible that I am able to do anything. I am not wondering whether I am able to do some things and not others.
I have given the answer several times now: an omnipotent being can do anything and thus has the power to cease to be omnipotent.
Again: an omnipotent person is able to be cease to be omnipotent.
Why?
Because they're omnipotent!
Once more: if you can't do something, you're not omnipotent. Yes? So the idea of an omnipotent being who is unable to stop being omnipotent is a contradiction. It is no less contradictory than the idea of a square circle.
So of course - i mean, it is blindingly obvious - an omnipotent being can stop being omnipotent. They can do anything!
We can now return to the question: can I rule out that I am omnipotent?
Presumably, for example, you can be both god and not god.
Any argument can be rendered valid by the will of god.
To suppose otherwise would be to limit god's omnipotence...
To suppose otherwise would be to place a restriction on god's omnipotence.
Quoting Banno
I am not supposing I actually am God. I am just wondering if I can entirely discount the possibility. I do not think any contradictions are true. So, if I am God, then there will be no true contradictions.
That God can make contradictions true does not seem relevant, as I myself think there are no true contradictions.
Well, if you say so.
Quoting Bartricks
Really?
Yes, I am asking whether I can discount the possibility. In the OP I said very clearly that I do not believe I am God and that I take the idea to be a very unreasonable one.
But you agree that any argument can be rendered valid by the will of god?
Saying otherwise would limit god's omnipotence, no?
An omnipotent being can do anything and so an omnipotent being has the ability to make any argument valid. For an argument to be valid is no more or less than for God to instruct us to take its conclusion to be true if the premises are.
Remember: I don't think any contradictions are true.
So either you are god, or you are not god.
If you are not god, we don't need to show a contradiction in order to show that you are not god.
If you are indeed god, them since the validity of any argument depends on what you will, whether an argument shows you to be god or not depends only on what you will.
Yes.
Quoting Banno
To 'show' it you do. I am wondering if I can be shown not to be God by the idea of me being God being shown to be one that contains a contradiction. That's what I am wondering: does the idea of me being God contain a contradiction?
Quoting Banno
Yes, and I think that if a contradiction is involved in the idea of me being God, then I am not God. Forget God for a moment: I think contradictions are not true. I don't think they're true and not true. I think they're not true.
But you could be god and will that the idea of your being god contains a contradiction.
So if you are god, then an argument showing that you are not god does not show that you are not god. You could will that there are arguments showing that you are not god. Suggesting otherwise is placing limits on god's omnipotence.
Quoting Bartricks
Similarly, if you are god you might will a contradiction in the idea that you are god; so the conclusion that you are not god would not follow.
But let's say that my own belief that contradictions are not true is somehow consistent with me being God and with contradictions being true - all that does is confirm what I am arguing, namely that it is possible I am God.
Like I say, I think that establishing a contradiction in the idea of me being God does serve to preclude the epistemic possibility of me being God, given what I actually believe. But if I am wrong about that, I am possibly God even under those circumstances.
I do not believe I am omniscient. The question is whether that is consistent with me being omniscient. Can an omniscient being be ignorant of their omniscience? If the answer is yes, then the fact that I do not believe myself to be omniscient would not establish that I am not God.
God's own will constitutively determines what is and is not an item of knowledge. So, if God does not believe a thing, then that thing lacks a justification, even if it is true. And so if God does not believe he is omniscient, then what that would mean is that the true belief that he is omniscient is unjustified and thus not an item of knowledge. Until or unless God believes in his own omniscience, the true belief in it will not be an item of knowledge and thus God's ignorance of his omniscience will be compatible with his possession of it. And thus the fact that I myself do not believe in my own omniscience does not establish that I am not God.
But if you were god, and god can contradict himself, you could make it so that you don't believe that there are true contradictions, and yet that there are, and that this was consistent...
All you're doing is pointing out something that I have been very clear about myself, namely that God can make true contradictions.
Indeed.
Because once you admit contradictions, as you have done, rationality ceases.
I am pointing out your petard.
I am able to be in France. You think that means I am in France, don't you? You think I have just admitted being in France. Crazy. I don't know how to reason with someone who thinks that follows. I have not 'admitted contradictions' then.
You have said I have committed contradictions in what I have argued above. Locate one.