Intuition and Insight: Does Mysticism Have a Valid Role in Philosophical Understanding?
I am writing this thread question after reading Bertrand Russell's essay, ' Mysticism and Logic', which explores the relationship between the two contrasting approaches. He speaks of mysticism as involving 'belief in insight as against discursive analytic knowledge: the belief in a way of wisdom, sudden, penetrating, coercive, which is contrasted by a science relying on the senses'. Russell was writing in the twentieth century, and, in the twentieth first century, there is far more emphasis on the empirical basis of knowledge, especially in relation to scientific methods and evidence based research.
However, Russell was coming from a humanist perspective and this makes it different from the some mystical perspective which are based on assumptions about God and the supernatural. He traces mysticism back to the ideas of Plato and Parmenides. There is an emphasis on 'hidden wisdom' and the importance of intuition and its opposition with reason. He says,
'Instinct, intuition or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which reason confirms or confutes; but by the confirmation, where it gets possible, consists, in the last analysis, of agreement with other beliefs no less instinctive. Reason is a harmonizing, controlling force rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical realm, it is insight that first arrives at what is new'. He argues that logic was pursued by mystical philosophers but 'they usually took for granted the supposed insight of the mystic emotion, their logical doctrines were presented with a certain dryness..'
I am wondering about the role of intuition and mystical insight in the twentieth first century. Postmodern philosophy has broken down the metaphysics, especially in the form of the relativity of 'truth'. Wittgenstein has pointed to the limitations of language. Science is a major source of knowledge, although it can sometimes create a mystification of knowledge and expertise. What is the balance between empirical knowledge and imagination? How may the logical aspects of thought be understood and balanced effectively with other approaches to understanding, especially in the humanities? How may a full understanding of knowledge be gained, subjectively, intersubjectively and objectively, especially in connection with the opposition between mysticism, imagination in contrast to the understanding of empirical science?
However, Russell was coming from a humanist perspective and this makes it different from the some mystical perspective which are based on assumptions about God and the supernatural. He traces mysticism back to the ideas of Plato and Parmenides. There is an emphasis on 'hidden wisdom' and the importance of intuition and its opposition with reason. He says,
'Instinct, intuition or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which reason confirms or confutes; but by the confirmation, where it gets possible, consists, in the last analysis, of agreement with other beliefs no less instinctive. Reason is a harmonizing, controlling force rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical realm, it is insight that first arrives at what is new'. He argues that logic was pursued by mystical philosophers but 'they usually took for granted the supposed insight of the mystic emotion, their logical doctrines were presented with a certain dryness..'
I am wondering about the role of intuition and mystical insight in the twentieth first century. Postmodern philosophy has broken down the metaphysics, especially in the form of the relativity of 'truth'. Wittgenstein has pointed to the limitations of language. Science is a major source of knowledge, although it can sometimes create a mystification of knowledge and expertise. What is the balance between empirical knowledge and imagination? How may the logical aspects of thought be understood and balanced effectively with other approaches to understanding, especially in the humanities? How may a full understanding of knowledge be gained, subjectively, intersubjectively and objectively, especially in connection with the opposition between mysticism, imagination in contrast to the understanding of empirical science?
Comments (39)
I would assume anyone who authentically asks whether mysticism has a valid role must have had at least one experience that qualifies as mystical. So are you asking this question from a mystico-friendly perspective?
I would say that I come from a basic gravitation towards the mystical, having read authors like William Blake and WB Yeats. I have a mixed approach to the mystical, and mysterious. This is based on the need for understanding and my biggest issue with mysticism itself is that while language may be limited, in philosophy, there is a need for words to articulate and the need for explanations. In that respect, I respect the insights of the mystics, but think that philosophy is important too, in looking at the experiences of those on the mystic path.
It does seem that reductionist materialism is on the rise in popular philosophy. Aldous Huxley, with his emphasis on perennial wisdom was important at some point. It is hard to know what the current climate of thinking is, because there may be so much going on in people's minds, balancing the findings of the neuroscientists and the ideas of the ancients.
There is so much to be discovered in the realm of ideas in the information age Alongside the great sources of knowledge as information there is the experiential level of knowing and this may be the raw substance, useful for digging up ideas which have become buried in layers. Consensus may not prevail, but the ongoing search, like the quest for 'the philosopher's stone may fuel the need for careful and deeper understanding, whether it comes down to language or ideas.
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To my way of thinking mystical experience and insight, which I think is a very real phenomenon, is so personal that any particular faith or beliefs that grow out of that experience cannot be inter-subjectively tested or justified.
Quoting Pantagruel
I agree somewhat with this, although I would put mysticism more on par with aesthetics. For me, the moral dimension of ethics at least can be understood in the more pragmatic terms of fairness and commitment to social harmony.
Mysticism may have an important link with aesthetics. I have been reading about the idea of the sublime, going back to the ideas of Kant on imagination, in 'Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche, by Andrew Bowie, (2003). In the history of philosophy mysticism may be traced back to philosophers who saw the transcendent in terms of the idea of God.
However, states of consciousness may be also compatible with the sublime, as being those of deep intersubjectivity, such as in core understanding of ethics, intelligence and wisdom which can be applied in human affairs in life. The parallel between the good in the form of its connection with the 'good' may be important. However, that is not to say that there are no conflicts and exceptions to the rule, because truth and fairness may sometimes be ugly, or uncanny aspects of life, ugly rather than beauty. There may be inversions of aesthetics and conventions of wisdom, which may involve startling aspects of intuition and imagination, going beyond traditional boundaries and ways of perception.
I am not sure that the idea of the ineffable is particularly helpful, but that may be an overgeneralised simplification of mysticism. Figures like William Blake, Walt Whitman and WB Yeats may stand out as making major contributions to human thought. Within philosophy, mysticism may be dismissed but simply replaced by blandness, which may say little of any meaningful consequence. Of course, the mystics have their weaknesses, just like everyone else. It is all about dialogue and the widest expanses of thought arising in the human imagination, in mythic and rational explanations.
Examples?
Sure, it's shorthand, I'm thinking of the apophatic traditions in theology as a for instance.
Quoting Jack Cummins
So you operate via a presupposition that non-mysticism is impoverished and disenchanted - a la Weber
William Blake made important contributions to the understanding of pleasure, challenging puritanical aspects of Judaeo- Christian thought, especially within the thought of Jonh Milton, which was far more puritanical and mainstream. He and Whitman were radical in their perception of puritanical doctrines. Also, Yeats went back to the mythical aspects of the Celtic tradition. While the mystics may appear traditional in their views, looked at from the perspective of twentieth first century thinking, in their own historical and cultural contexts they were fairly radical and subversive.
knowledge from imagination (lowest, common)
knowledge from reason
knowledge from intuition (highest, rarified)
The last kind Spinoza refers specifically to scientia intuitiva infinite intelligence, mind of god/natura naturans (I think this concept, by analogy, had inspired David Bohm's implicate order) a rationalist variation on the Hindu Tat Tvam Asi or Martin Buber's I-Thou (i.e. encounter with "the eternal Thou"). Another term for this concept I prefer is reflective understanding.
Quoting Pantagruel
I do as well, and consider myself an ecstatic naturalist (after Spinoza's 'ecstatic rationalism').
I have read a little of Spinoza and probably should read more. I do have a copy of Buber' s 'I and Thou' on my shelf. One thing which I do find interesting is how all these philosophers explore these ideas. It may be that in the present time science seems to be considered as the most ultimate authority of ideas. Of course, it gives incredible knowledge but it is questionable as to how much insight it has, and many do have some, but certain aspects may be discussed in meaningful ways in philosophy, as in metaphysics.
Quoting Tom Storm
In (Western) philosophy, "mysticism" seems the consequence of reason recognizing its own limits active attention to the gaps in and between reasons (as well as between breaths or heartbeats).
Also, add to my list above of speculative analogues to "intuition": Karl Jasper's encompassing (transcendence), Emmanuel Levinas' infinity (meontology) and Henri Bergon's la durée.
I remember we both participated in the "What is mysticism" thread where we discussed some of these issues. As we discussed then, "mysticism" means different things to different people. Ditto with "intuition." For me, intuition has nothing to do with any mystery. For me, it means knowledge I have that I can't connect with a specific rational or perceptual source. That doesn't necessarily mean there isn't one, just that I wasn't aware of it when it happened, it isn't associated with a single event, or it is lost to memory. And then, some knowledge may be innate, unlearned at least in part, example - language.
I remember you making this point and I think it's a useful one.
:chin:
Eg. Eating a sandwich is pretty ordinary. But if you think of everything that goes into the making of a sandwhich, and then went into the making of you, its quite extraordinary.
Depends what you eat before you eat the sandwich... :lol:
I definitely recall your thread on mysticism and how you have more of a 'meat and potatoes' approach and question tbe idea of the 'hidden'. I am not sure that there is a literal hidden reality of the mystics but feel that perception varies, with some people being more attuned to the mundane and others to more alternative ways of seeing. However, I would not elevate the mystical ones, because that would be putting the mystics as having superior insight, which may be an extreme generalisation and a far too black and white value judgement.
I remember several months ago we were discussing Aldous Huxley, and his book, 'The Perennial Wisdom'. He is an interesting example of someone who paid attention to the mystics' approach. Also, in the post I have just written above I spoke of the 'hidden' as possibly being unhelpful but his writing in 'The Doors of Perception/ Heaven and Hell' points to the dimensions of perception under the influence of Mescalin which is like seeing alternative dimensions or parallel universes.
That is interesting. I have never read any writing by Liebniz. The concept 'of the fundamental reality underlying our own existence' is interesting because it is open to dispute, especially whether it is physical or non physical, or a complex category of another kind.
One book which is Huston Smith's, 'The Forgotten Truth, which is about comparative religion. However, it gets into metaphysics about the nature of dimensions beyond space and time, as well as 'levels'. Any understanding of levels which is hierarchical or beyond the nature of the seen is open to dispute. However, it may also be said that the perspective of realism may be too flat, because perception is so bound up with awareness, almost breaking down or calling into question the separation of subject and objects of perception.
Too, I think, perception and awareness are essentially integrated with action. In a sense, we only perceive that which we "push up against". Which raises a whole lot more questions about subjects and objects.
Maybe this:
Intuition concerns mere thatness (haecceity, e.g. that X is) and not whatness (quiddity e.g. what X is).
Mysticism concerns attention to encounters with ineffable / sublime thatness (haecceity).
Quoting Jack Cummins
Incoherent (e.g. realer reality, reality behind / beneath / beyond reality, etc).
Are waves on the surface of the ocean any less the ocean than the deepest extent of the ocean?
Is this a difference in kind or just a difference in degree?
Is the horizon any less "fundamental" than the ground beneath us or sky above? If so, tell me how so.
Like ocean waves, life paths are existents ripples of reality, no?
To say something is "hidden" says something about us and nothing much about the so-called "hidden" X. "Perennial wisdom?" or rather just developmental, vestigial biases / naïvetes at work with "ancient sages & mystics" like
change blindness
confirmation bias
cognitive dissonce
status quo bias
etc ... which they had intuitively guessimated have distorted perceptions-conceptions of nature? :chin:
Philosophers have always speculated on the causes and extent of these perceptual-conceptual distortions, and mostly compounded them with additional, extravagantly speculative projections which, in some notable cases, they've developed proto-psychological conjectures to account for "seeing things as we are" instead of "seeing things as things themselves are" (e.g. Democritus' "atomic combinations", Plato's "shadows in the cave", Descartes' "secondary qualities", Spinoza's "modes" (natura naturata), Kant's "phenomena", etc).
Re: contra gnosis, "fundamental"( or "hidden") "reality" ...
[quote=Twilight of the Idols]How the True World Finally Became a Fable. The History of an Error
1. The true world attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it.
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, I, Plato, am the truth.)
2. The true world unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man (for the sinner who repents).
(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible it becomes female, it becomes Christian. )
3. The true world unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it a consolation, an obligation, an imperative.
(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.)
4. The true world unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?
(Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)
5.The true world an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating an idea which has become useless and superfluous consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Platos embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.)
6. The true world we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)[/quote]
:fire:
Ok. But yours is the first mention of epistemology in the thread. Are you suggesting the mysticism isn't rational?
As I see it, spirituality/mysticism involves assigning significance to something that transcends what is generally experienced as empirical. Now, not to put to fine a point upon it, but consciousness itself meets this criterion. Which is a pretty common theme of spirituality. Consciousness is a bridge.
I'm saying that empiricism and rationalism are sufficiently broad churches so as to accommodate anything that might be called 'mystical'. There is no room for 'mysticism' in philosophy as a distinct third form of epistemological inquiry.
A mystic is just another person who theorises in response to sense data towards the same epistemic ends as a non-mystic. Even if we grant the mystic extrasensory perception and super-powers of reason, his process of inquiry isn't categorically different from the ordinary philosopher.
I won't clutter up this thread with more of my personal view on this. I don't think my way of seeing things is very helpful in this particular context. I would like to say that I think this kind of thinking, whatever you want to call it, is the primary way that all of us "know" things. People just tend to focus on more self-aware kinds of knowing. You can take credit for that I guess, but less so for intuition. It's as if the parts of us that we are not as aware of are not really "us."
Zizek tries to interpret Marxist class struggle through the Hermetic principle of "as above, so below". His formulation is: "Your alienation from the absolute is the alienation of the absolute from itself." He interprets this to mean that if you feel alienated from society, that is because society is itself split into mutually antagonistic classes, and this political split pervades all levels of discourse. The ones who find themselves outside the central club should unite in a para-Christian (yet atheist) Communist party.
I alsi think some aspects of esoteticism can have applications in a philosophical theory of the emotions. For example, the Tarot cards compile a vast range of emotional snapshots. You could use those to make sure a theory of human emotions like Spinoza's hasn't been oversimplified. I believe there's a free Android app and website called Labyrinthos that describes each of the 78 cards in 3 or 4 keywords and a brief paragraph if you don't have the time to wade through long-winded mysticism. Note that the Tarot deck is not a comprehensive compilation of emotional postures. It needs to be supplemented by modern cognitive science as well as amateur collections like the Dictionary of Obscure Sorrows.
:up:
I see the core of ethics consisting in compassion, in fellow feeling and a practical sense of fairness and justice. Insofar as this is in the dimension of affect it is in common with the aesthetical and mystical, however I think it has essentially communal dimensions that don't necessarily belong to aesthetic and mystic experience.