Predicting war, preventing war
False prediction leads to false prevention. Accusing a state of a behaviour that it hasn't comitted yet is equal to accusing a state of a behaviour of a state that it hasn't comitted at all. If the prediction turns out to be false all the action commited by the preventing nation has no justification. If there is a chance that a nation will not turn out to do what another state has ppredicted it will do, then there is an equal chance that the measure of the preventing nation has got no grounds. This will even lead to a situation where a preventitive nation will have to be held account to an unjustified conduct than the predicted nation. A supposedly immoral action by one state leasds a possible immaral action by another state. If a state is punished for what it hasnt done in the present it is unjust , irrespective of what it will do. However what if it is highly likely it will conduct somethig worth a preventitive response? According to this, the question arises who will define what is highly likely and such a moral stance will likely be misused for tyranny and even genocide because of the accusation of a threat be it from a people or a state which then needs to be erradicated.
Comments (11)
That's not to say you get to throw children from windows as long as you have a good faith basis for doing it, but I'd expect some amount of careful deliberation, considering the consequences.
In your example of wat, which seems to be an alternative spelling of war, I would say you have a right to preemptive action if it can be rationally justified in terms of protecting against risk. You will be judged later upon what information you had, what you could still reasonably obtain, what other options there were, etc. Considering the consequences of war, morality would demand a high level of investigation and deliberation, but I can't buy into the view that if your factual assessment is imperfect, then you're per se immoral.
If this method is used to evaluate intent and then morally judge any given subject, then there will be a great disparity in the effort to act morally than if intent was to be measured by other possible means.
It's easy to predict war, just look which country buys most gold.
Russia for ex. was buying a lot of gold in recent years.
We must decipher intent from behavior. That's all we can ever do. That's how criminal trials are conducted thousands of times a year.
[quote=SEP (Ethics of belief)]Clifford's essay is chiefly remembered for two things: a story and a principle. The story is that of a shipowner who, once upon a time, was inclined to sell tickets for a transatlantic voyage. It struck him that his ship was rickety, and that its soundness might be in question. Knowing that repairs would be costly and cause significant delay, the shipowner managed to push these worries aside and form the sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy. He sold the tickets, bade the passengers farewell, and then quietly collected the insurance money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales (1877, 70).
According to Clifford (who himself once survived a shipwreck, and so must have found this behavior particularly loathsome), the owner in the story was verily guilty of the death of those men, because even though he sincerely believed that the ship was sound, he had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him. Why did he have no such right? Because, says Clifford, he had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts (1877, 70). After making this diagnosis, Clifford changes the end of the story: the ship doesn't meet a liquid demise, but rather arrives safe and sound into New York harbor. Does the new outcome relieve the shipowner of blame for his belief? Not one jot, Clifford declares: he is equally guiltyequally blameworthyfor believing something on insufficient evidence.
Clifford goes on to cite our intuitive indictments of the shipownerin both versions of the storyas grounds for his famous principle:
(Clifford's Principle) It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.[/quote]
What about ignorantia juris non excusat?