How exactly does Schopenhauer come to the conclusion that the noumenal world is Will?
Paging PF's Schopenhauer experts, this question has really been bugging me.
So I've been trying to read Schopenhauer as a prelude to Nietzsche, and I'm really enjoying his criticisms of Kant so far-but there is one thing I don't get: How does he draw the conclusion that the noumenal world (reality as it is in itself) is pure will? Schop says that the narrow door to the truth is that our bodies appears to us as both external physical objects (as representation) and as something we can experience such as touch hunger and desire I.e as will. And because our bodies appears to us as both will and as representation-the noumenal world is entirely constituted out of will.
Maybe I'm misunderstanding him, but this to me seems like a kind of invalid inference? To me it seems that both representation and the will that we experience are both just phenomenal experiences we perceive. I still don't get how Schopenhauer comes to this conclusion, can anyone explain his thought process for me more clearly?
So I've been trying to read Schopenhauer as a prelude to Nietzsche, and I'm really enjoying his criticisms of Kant so far-but there is one thing I don't get: How does he draw the conclusion that the noumenal world (reality as it is in itself) is pure will? Schop says that the narrow door to the truth is that our bodies appears to us as both external physical objects (as representation) and as something we can experience such as touch hunger and desire I.e as will. And because our bodies appears to us as both will and as representation-the noumenal world is entirely constituted out of will.
Maybe I'm misunderstanding him, but this to me seems like a kind of invalid inference? To me it seems that both representation and the will that we experience are both just phenomenal experiences we perceive. I still don't get how Schopenhauer comes to this conclusion, can anyone explain his thought process for me more clearly?
Comments (50)
Its a good question.
Later on in the World as Will and Representation, I think volume 2, hell say that because we cannot know anything whatsoever beyond time, we cannot truly know the thing in itself but the will is the closest we can come and so he makes that leap. A pretty important point thats buried in the text. He mentions that the veil has been lifted as much as possible, or something like that.
I dont have it available to cite the page, but if youre interested Ill make a note to do so in the future.
So ultimately, youre right our experience of will is still experience.
To frame all that we experience "interiorly" or "somatically", that is whatever perceptual access we have to the body/mind, as "will", as Schopenhauer does or as 'will to power' as Nietzsche does, is, in my view very one-sided.
The noumenal, as Kant thought it, is what we can only think of as what lies beyond experience altogether; the logical counterpart to 'things-as experienced' is 'things in themselves". So, I think Schopenhauer was both a very poor interpreter, and a very poor critic, of Kant's philosophy.
My own interpretation of how Schopenhauer comes to see the will as the 'thing in itself' is through the idea of it being an imminent reality in mind/body consciousness. This is different from seeing as it as being transcendent and separate and, possibly unknowable.
I'd stop at Schop and respectfully advise to ditch the Nietzsche :smile:. Mainlander was a more interesting post-Schopenhauerian.
Quoting Albero
Things to take away from Schopenhauer:
1) Space, time, causality are not "out there" independent of a subject. There is no object without a subject. If you take away the subject, the material world vanishes.
2) How can we ever to make metaphysical claims about the world if we cannot get beyond a subject-relation-to-object (that is conditioned by various principles of sufficient reason like causal necessity, logical necessity, spatial reasoning, and motives)?
3) Our own bodies are conditioned by time/space/causality. They are objects like other objects. However, unlike other objects, our own bodies have feelings like hunger, pain, desires, etc. (will). He sees this inner sense of self as revealing a force that underlies all being.
4) Schopenhauer is not a solipsist. He makes the jump that the entire world has this same internal "willing" nature. He simply takes it as a kind of self-evident truth that it isn't just yourself experiencing this inner nature.
5) The jump here is that he sees this willing nature as some suggesting a more fundamental aspect of reality. That is to say, this willing nature that we experience ourselves, is behind all phenomenal activities we observe (everything from gravity, sub-atomic particles, to animal behavior).
So here I think is the part where we have to parse out his idea of will/Will.
Think of Will as an iceberg.
Most of the Will is "below the water".. It is a sort of unknown (not even an unknown..it's literally the thing-in-itself...An all encompassing nothingness/everythingness.. can't be described without being contradicting.. it can only be spoken about in the negative)....
However Will has the unfortunate aspect of having representation. Thus there is a form of Will that is subject-for-object. Pure subject-for-object is apprehended through aesthetic genius (the artist/musician and the experience of art and music). It is disinterested insight into the the object. However, most of life is not this, but rather the suffering version whereby subject-for-object is conditioned by space/time/causality imposed by the subject which is to say desiring, lacking, wanting, appropriating. It is the pendulum swing of pursuing a goal and boredom and being caught up in the negatives of conflict with environment, others, for survival, comfort, and such.
Of course, his suggestion will be to deny the will to negate the subject-for-object relationship all together. This would be akin to perhaps Nirvana/Enlightenment. This would be closest perhaps to a sort of pure gnosis of the Will "below the water" and not just will as it manifests in representation.
Right.
But heres my confusion: do we just not know this Gnosis we get in that ascetic self-denial is true knowledge of the thing in itself? Per Kant, we could never truly know, right? Or is @Xtrix correct in assuming that what Schopenhauer means is that the gnosis is the closest we can possibly get because anything else couldnt exit the principle of sufficient reason?
Schopenhauer disagreed with Kant on a number of points, especially about being able to decipher the "thing-in-itself" so it probably wouldn't be a consideration whether Kant thought one can "truly know" or not.
Quoting Albero
In a sense yeah. We are all Will full-stop. So there is no need for any further understanding of this other than to recognize it. However, denying our natures as subjects-for-objects manifested in us as the animal's "will-to-live" would bring us as close as we get to understanding Will in and of itself not mediated as subject-for-object. At least, that's my interpretation.
Another interpretation might be that it is complete denial of Will to nothingness. But then "what" nothingness in this Nirvana-like state is, would have to be explained.. That's why I make the iceberg analogy.
Yes, an unnecessary connection. However, if you think of it this way...The artist "knows" the object in its "purest form". This purer vision of the object is closer to directly communicating the world as the object is. He makes a parallel to Plato's forms.
I also think that you can see Schopenhauer somewhat in Neo-Platonic tradition.. Will is a unity that is broken into subject-object... This is similar to Jewish mysticism (ironically, since he didn't seem to look into the mystical parts of Judaism as much).. The Ein Sof is the unknowable nothingness/everythingness/infinite/unlimited/unified (you can only get at it from the negative of what it's not) aspect of God (Will below the iceberg).. The sephirot is like Ein Sof manifested into Platonic forms.. The bottom sephirot is the material world that is most concealed.. There are even more parallels in Lurianic Kabbalah whereby the perfect "vessels" of the sephirot are broken and are concealed. Gnosticism also has many parallels.. The One God of Light gets divided and many gods and worlds emanate down to the Demiurge who is an evil god that creates this world..
Schopenhauer had an admiration for some of these concepts which more for the kernel of truths about this world being a source of suffering and denying this world. He obviously didn't like the way it was believed literally.
Contrary to some of the advice offered here I would suggest that if you are interested in reading Nietzsche then start with Nietzsche. If you read Schopenhauer as a prelude to Nietzsche then there are others to be read as a prelude to Schopenhauer. An endless downward spiral.
The first Schopenhauer, our own @schopenhauer1, illustrates the problem, although his intent may lie elsewhere.
Sorry, I am confused.. Are you saying I am stating the problem or am the problem? And what problem would that be?
Neither.
You point to some of the influences on Schopenhauer (Plato, Platonism, mystic Judaism, and much more that you did not mention). If the advice is to first read Schopenhauer in order to read Nietzsche, which is clearly not your advice since you recommend stopping with Schopenhauer, then since, as you point out, there are other things to read that shed light on Schopenhauer, the same advice, again not yours, to read Schopenhauer as a prelude to Nietzsche, could be extended to reading other thng as a prelude to reading Schopenhauer.
Though this is throwing some shade on me... I do agree that philosophical traditions can have a sort of infinite regress of influence down to the earliest philosophers. But I do see the logic in specifically studying Schopenhauer before Nietzsche if only to understand what Nietzsche would invert. Denying the Will-to Live becomes embracing the Will-to-Power etc. etc. But, as you mention, it's not necessary. Nietzsche is a philosopher who can very much be read on his own terms.
Schopenhauer himself recommends reading mainly Kant, and some Plato; he would be right because those directly influenced him..
He himself draws parallels with Gnosticism and such, but Neoplatonism itself has parallels and interplay with ideas in Gnosticism and Jewish mysticism. I can also see ideas of Spinoza which he wrote about in regards to his brand of pantheism.
But yeah, I don't recommend Nietzsche other than to maybe understand what he said.. As far as the ideas (what can be distilled and organized from much of the aphorisms and disparate thoughts). Nah.
The problem is always being in the "prelude" state.
What I recommend, and I think most of us actually do, is to start somewhere and then move back and forth, expanding the picture, filling in gaps, and correcting the picture.
So I found it -- from my bookshelf, in the end. Very old-school of me.
[Emphasis is mine.]
(Pages 196 to 198 of the E.F.J Payne version. I copied the above from the Internet once I found it in my book.)
I think this is extremely important to keep in mind when reading Schopenhauer. It's one of those things that simply gets overlooked -- probably because most people don't really read these books, or if they do, don't do so carefully enough. It took me a while before I even really noticed it or let it truly sink in: he's not saying he's discovered the thing-in-itself after all. He's not contradicting Kant in really any way, other than to say that, since he claims the will is the most immediately known thing to us, this should be what's used to describe the entire world and the thing-in-itself. A kind of "force" which permeates all beings.
Hope that helps a little. I would continue reading on as well, because he next says:
Which I think is getting at your question, too. I won't spoil it by posting the answer... :wink:
Fair enough. Makes sense. Read what you want to and supplement when needed unless you want to make a point to read chronologically.
Yep. This very much goes with my analogy earlier.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The "Ein Sof" in Jewish mystical thought has nothing whatever to do with "Will". And the creator God is not merely blind will either. Why do you seek to interpret everything through the lens of a second-rate philosopher?
Not by choice, but as an undergrad we had to take a sequence of courses that lasted all four years, beginning with the pre-Socratics through toAlthoug the 20th century using mostly primary texts.
Although the program director had written a book on the pre-Socratics, which of course we had to use, his bias was in favor of historical development - later philosophers correcting earlier mistakes. I never bought into that, but I do think there is a benefit in reading the history using primary texts. Even though such an approach, within the time constraints just touched the surface and skipped over a lot, it was a good start, but not the only or even for everyone the best approach.
In my opinion much better than Copleston's or Russell's histories of philosophy, which I have a very low opinion of. Or the approach that focuses on "problems in philosophy", that is, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and so on.
:up:
Quoting Janus
I think thats a bit harsh. I think theres plenty to learn from Schopenhauer, and hes an excellent writer very clear. I also think his interpretation of Kant is a good one. Although he does take some liberties
I agree he's a very good writer; I just don't think that highly of his ideas, or his interpretation and critique of Kant. A second rate philosopher as compared to first rates such as Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Heidegger is still pretty good compared to a tenth rate. Anyway, it's just my opinion...
Cant argue with that list. Ive been meaning to read Hegel. Seems daunting but probably isnt once one starts.
Hegel's prose is dense; and he's not the most elegant writer. I've only read the Phenomenology (and I cannot claim to have thoroughly and closely read that), and secondary works and lecture series, mostly that deal with the Phenomenology. I have this, which looks like it would be a comprehensive introduction, on my shelves but I haven't read it yet. (Too many books and other pursuits and not enough time)
My criticism of Schopenhauer's understanding of the "thing in itself", and of his critique of Kant's idea of "things in themselves" (that there cannot be things in themselves because there can be no space or time, which make possible differentiation, in the noumenal, and that since there also can be no causation in the noumenal, that Kant's idea that things in themselves cause the things we perceive is incoherent) is that it overlooks the implications of Kant's idea, implications that Kant himself may not have addressed (I say "may not" because I have not studied Kant's works exhaustively, a lifetime's study, and so cannot say for sure whether he did address these implication explicitly).
So, Kant's idea is that if there are representations, then there must be "something" which is represented, and which is not the representation itself. Things-for-us are representations, according to Kant, and so there must be things-in-themselves that are not those representations, but which give rise to them.
To repeat Schopenhauer's criticism, there cannot be things in themselves, for the reasons given above, so there must be only the thing in itself, absolute, non-spatiotemporal and undifferentiated. But this reifies what for Kant was unknowable things into a transcendent absolute, the very kind of reification which Kant sought to show was not justifiable by pure reason.
So, to get to the "implications" mentioned above, if everything we experience is a for-us, things-for-us, which leads logically to the idea of things-in themselves, then why would it not follow that space-for-us, time-for-us, causation-for-us lead logically to the ideas of space-in-itself, time-in-itself and causation-in-itself, thus defusing Schopenhauer's whole critique and transcendent reification of the thing-in-itself?
I was thinking along similar lines but it turns out Schopenhauer's will has a very specific, technical definition in his philosophy much like arguments in logic. We would be barking up the wrong tree if we were to understand Schopenhauer's will as having something to do with its conventional definitions.
That said, it can't be ruled out that Schopenhauer settled on the word "will" because its conventional meaning has just the right psychological force to appeal to his readers.
Good day.
Well yeah, that's obvious. You've heard of analogies right? It doesn't have to be exact fits. Of course I know that Schopenhauer is explicitly atheistic. His Will is a striving force that just "is" and has no purpose. It has no telos and certainly no plan or scheme. However, the part that is analogous is that the Ein Sof is Kabbalah is the part of the godhead that is inaccessible. If you read what I said earlier about Will and its analogy to the iceberg, it nicely parallels Schop's idea about Will. I said:
Quoting schopenhauer1
Now, it is not perfectly analogous of course. Obvious, the godhead in traditional Judaism is a metaphysical entity that directs, creates, and has a goal, etc. But that's not the part I was making a parallel to.
I also saw the 10 Sephirot idea as a sort of Platonic one (Neoplatonic to be more precise). There are "forms" that the godhead had cleared his own "being" to form for which other parts of the heavens/physical realm were created. Sort of templates that when combined, are like the blueprint of known existence. Anyways.. Way into the weeds here, but that can be analogous simply to Schop's use of Plato's Ideas/Forms.. Some sort of template forms that are not conditioned time/space/causality but are somehow part of the system of Will.
So anyways, it is an interesting debate in Schopenhauerian studies as to whether one can "deny the Will" if Will is all there is. I think, the system Schop was thinking was that "denying the will-to-live" (the will as it manifests in the subject-to-object) is what he meant, and that the rare state of Nirvana.. a kind of ego suicide through starvation and quietism, is really just having some sort of gnosis of Will proper, whilst diminishing the will via subject-to-object.
Quoting Janus
I don't interpret everything through the lens of Schopenhauer (who is not a second-rate philosopher). Why do you think he is second-rate? He did have some essays that were off-the-mark (on Women for example), but his philosophy proper was much more clearly written than much of the other philosophers of the time preceding, during, and after him. His ideas were indeed unique with much analytical force amongst his ideas. Second-rate to me is focusing on symbolic logic, for example, and using it to say very little. The fact is, he is the kind of philosopher that knew logic and kept up-to-date with the science (though it was obviously outdated within a generation). Luckily post-Kantian philosophy wasn't based on empirical findings in science so much as it was trying to understand how the mind is related to the world, and what the world is, in-itself. You may disagree with this approach, but it is indeed one way of approaching the problem. Science always rides upon the assumptions and a priori habits/forms that the human brain provides.. And that is what many post-Kantian philosophers tried to explore.
Because space, time, and causation are not just space-for-us, time-for-us, causation-for-us. It is rather space/time/causality are but conditions of the mind imposed on the thing(s)-in-it(them)self. Thus the thing-in-itself is not conditioned by space/time/causality. What can be a critique perhaps, is his step that the Will is somehow a "unity".. There are ways around this.. and it can be simply how language is used in our everyday usage (pace Wittgenstein), but one can make the critique that a "unified" Will is also a condition.. Schop himself I believe addressed this and really meant to say that Will is really only talked about in the negative (what it can't be).. And even such description as "unified" really is a category error. I don't think this creates any huge blow to the general idea though.
I don't agree. Just as things are things-for-us, meaning things as experienced and conceived of by us, so are space, time and causation such as they are experienced and conceived of by us.
I am quite familiar with Schopenhauer's philosophy, have read WWR, and secondary works by McGee and others, and I think his philosophy is pretty superficial and uninteresting compared to the likes of Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Husserl and others.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Calling it "Will" is already talking about it in the most positive way. And I think he pinched the idea from Spinoza's "conatus" in any case. The difference is that Spinoza did not reify conatus as "substance". The idea of "will" or volition is the idea of just one aspect of mind or awareness.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I think I've already answered that. His philosophy lacks depth, subtlety and nuance; it's a bastardization of Kant blended with his misunderstanding of the Upanishads and Buddhism. He cannot be compared with the greats, and his thought consists in an absolutization of what is merely an aspect of life. I have a similar criticism of Nietzsche's 'will to power', which I think is the weakest part of his thought, but the difference is that Nietzsche is a much more subtle thinker in my view. And this is only my view after all, as in all aesthetic matters there is no fact of the matter.
But it wasn't an aspect of mind.. It was simply the foundational principle that he named "will" for good or bad. It was to denote that the root of existence is the principle of striving (pace Buddhism). It does have similarities to conatus but whilst conatus was sort of an enjoyment of being in its fullness, will is a negative principle. That is to say, it is always becoming, something that it is not- at least in the world as representation.
As far as using one's subjective consciousness as "proof" that there is some striving force at play in existence-writ-large is an interesting one. I don't know that I would fully agree with that step he is doing. Rather, I would simply agree with the more modest conclusion that human (and animal) nature leads to a sort of striving principle which does lead to much suffering- the pendulum swing of trying to satisfy needs and wants. Again, this is all very familiar with Buddhist understandings of suffering.. And no, please don't try to "school" me in what "real" Buddhism means.. Of course we are just talking very generally here.. I am not going into whole analyses on the corpus of sutras and the Pali Canon and whatnot.. and variations on the Theravada school versus the Mahayana and such.
So I think here you are demonstrating a misunderstanding of how Schopenhauer is using "Will". It is NOT just a psychological aspect. It is a metaphysical principle at play. It may be unfortunate that he calls it "Will" because of precisely this misunderstanding whereby it is confused with other things. Willing rather is the background principle behind at work behind the representational playground of the subject-object conditioned by time/space/causality- that is to say, the world as it is in representation. Other psychological aspects may take place in this playground, but the foundation of it all is that striving principle.
Now, the ineffable part is mentioned because if you know of Schop's philosophy, his main recommendation is to escape one's own willing nature through ascetic practice. The question remains, how can one escape from something that is a sort of totality of being? That's where I mentioned that Will has the aspect of representation but there is also the aspect of Will submerged beyond the representation. Perhaps that is how one reaches a sort of Nirvana-like state whilst retaining Will.
Spinoza's idea of conatus is precisely that of "striving", not "sort of an enjoyment of being in its fullness"; that would be more thriving.
I don't see will as a "negative principle" at all; will is a positive striving for what one wills. This is something we recognize in ourselves and generally project anthropomorphically onto other lifeforms as, most basically, will to live. But we also have the ideas of the will to procreate, the will to consume, the will to seek pleasure and avoid pain, the will to understand, the will to know, the will to possess, the will to be (this or that) and so on. We even have the idea of thanatos; the will to die.
Quoting schopenhauer1
As I said, I think it is an absolutizing anthropomorphic projection.
Quoting schopenhauer1
No, I understand very well that is the way he is using it, and I think it is, as I said, an anthropomorphic reification. What else could he call it without losing the character he portrays it as exemplifying?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes, I understand all that and its commonality with certain interpretations of the Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism. But I don't see escape or ascetism as being valorized by those practices, but rather an attitude of calm contemplation and acceptance, which is exemplified in the idea found in both teachings that samsara is nirvana.
We, as long as we live, are never going to lack will, and nor would we want to; it is attachment to that will, that is being unable to happily accept when things don't go our way, that is the real problem. So, will is not the negative, it is attachment that is the negative, and I cannot think of a philosopher whose life shows more attachment than Schopenhauer.
Quoting Fooloso4
:100: :up:
Quoting Janus
:yikes: WTF?
Quoting Janus
No doubt.
Well, now we are parsing out analyses and interpretations, but it can be derived from things like this:
[quote="(Ethics, part 3, prop. 6)] each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being[/quote]
Quoting Janus
But you are parsing out Will into its various manifestations as it plays out in representation (in animal form). That is precisely what he is saying.. Will is a unified principle that plays out in how the human animal strives forward. That striving principle in all its variations as they play out (like the ones you list) come about through a "lack" of what is not present currently. There is an incompleteness, or more appropriately, a dissatisfaction that leads to the goal, want, need, etc.
Quoting Janus
Again, I think it is an unfortunate use of the word Will here.. You can change it to a sort of impulsive force, that in humans/animals is more embodied as a will-towards/striving. I go back and forth as to whether he is truly an idealist proper or an early panpsychist.. He mentions the "force" being in inorganic matter because.. But perhaps he means simply the forces at play in the matter? Even if so, he discusses time going back billions of years earlier, yet not existing without the sentience of the animal. So there is some murkiness there.. but not quite in the way you are describing it. I think you are being just uncharitable rather than engaging with it.
Quoting Janus
I mean, certain sanghas /arhats would probably disagree.. There are a multitude of interpretations, but I don't think all of them are as non-ascetic as you portray.. Yes some Buddhists aren't advocating for hardcore ascetic practices, but there are some that are more about this.. And ones that deign to be close to achieving Buddhahood probably have this kind of rigor... It is very bohemian-convenient-modern to put a spin on it like.. "Nah, real Buddhists are too cool for ascetic stuff".
Quoting Janus
Well, through living one achieves nirvana.. etc. The samsara can be considered the "veil of tears" with which the nirvana is the clarity of realization. It's all linked together. Nowhere to go, nothing to do, but there is sort of. It's all contradictory as the Zen exercises would at least have it..
Quoting Janus
Just purely uncharitable and using old canards. He wasn't purely Buddhist by-the-way.. Clearly his ascetic ideas were of a much more rigorous idea about negating self. It is taking the negation of Will to its ultimate end. I don't think he expected most people to reach it or even try.
I'd like to reiterate here, I am just trying to answer this thread.. I don't agree with everything Schopenhauer said about metaphysics and epistemology. I'm not a blind follower. I have my own ideas on lots of things.
I see no reason to posit some transcendent overarching Will to explain its phenomenal manifestations. I suppose you could say that just as there is the trees-in-themselves, which is thought as the counterpart of the trees-for-us, so you could have willings-in-themselves as counterpart of the willings-for-us. But I think it should be remembered that for Kant this is a merely formal or logical move and should be accorded no ontological status.
Quoting schopenhauer1
According to a biography I read years ago by Safranski (I think that's the name) he was an irritable, egomaniacal arsehole who treated people like shit (if my memory serves). He was also a spoiled rich kid who never had to work a day in his life, a fact which enabled him to spend his time philosophizing. In my view, neither an admirable character nor a great philosopher; but as I already said that is just my opinion, and it doesn't bother me if you disagree. A lot of people disagree with me about Heidegger, who I think was also probably an arsehole, but a great philosopher.
If Schopenhauer hadn't use the word 'will' what other word could he have used while remaining true to his philosophical vision?
But this isn't Schopenhaurian but perhaps more Kantian. There is no "will-for-us" or "tree-for-us" or whathaveyou. Rather, there is representation, which is simply the "maya" of a conditioned existence (of space/time/causality) and there is the Will, which is a unified thing that is the principle with which the representation separates using the principium individuantionis that is illusory of some kind so that the will can present as if it was a subject-for-an-object.
Yes, I realize this is not Schopenhauer; it is precisely what I think he is lacking, that is nuance. I just see no reason whatever to identify the transcendental with Will, and the 'Will/ Representation' thing for me is a dualistic reification akin to Plato's duality of phenomena and the reification of their essences as universal forms, which leads to the notion of two distinct realms; one "illusory" realm and its substantive underpinning. Of course I'm not saying that Schopenhauer's philosophy equates to Plato's, but there is a certain commonality there, to be sure.
All that aside, S pats Kant on the back, then criticizes his foremost error, by committing the exact same kind:
....That the will which we find within us does not proceed, as philosophy has hitherto assumed, first from knowledge, and indeed is a mere modification of it, thus something secondary, derived, and, like knowledge itself, conditioned by the brain; but that it is the prius of knowledge, the kernel of our nature, and that original force itself which forms and sustains the animal body, in that it carries out both its unconscious and its conscious functions;this is the first step in the fundamental knowledge of my metaphysics.....
(WW & I, 3, XXIII, 1844, in Haldane/Kemp, 1889)
.....That, further, it is that same will which in the plant forms the bud in order to develop the leaf and the flower out of it; nay, that the regular form of the crystal is only the trace which its momentary effort has left behind, and that in general, as the true and only ?????????, in the proper sense of the word, it lies at the foundation of all the forces of unorganised nature, plays, acts, in all their multifarious phenomena, imparts power to their laws, and even in the crudest mass manifests itself as gravity;this insight is the second step in that fundamental knowledge, and is brought about by further reflection....
(Ibid)
....For it is the tracing back of that which is quite inaccessible to our immediate knowledge, and therefore in its essence foreign and unknown to us, which we denote by the words force of nature, to that which is known to us most accurately and intimately, but which is yet only accessible to us in our own being and directly, and must therefore be carried over from this to other phenomena. It is the insight that what is inward and original in all the changes and movements of bodies, however various they may be, is in its nature identical; that yet we have only one opportunity of getting to know it more closely and directly, and that is in the movements of our own body. In consequence of this knowledge we must call it will. It is the insight that that which acts and strives in nature, and exhibits itself in ever more perfect phenomena, when it has worked itself up so far that the light of knowledge falls directly upon it, i.e., when it has attained to the state of self-consciousnessexists as that will, which is what is most intimately known to us, and therefore cannot be further explained by anything else, but rather affords the explanation of all other things. It is accordingly the thing in itself so far as this can ever be reached by knowledge. Consequently it is that which must express itself in some way in everything in the world, for it is the inner nature of the world and the kernel of all phenomena....
(Ibid)
.....The unity of that will, here referred to, which lies beyond the phenomenon, and in which we have recognised the inner nature of the phenomenal world, is a metaphysical unity, and consequently transcends the knowledge of it, i.e., does not depend upon the functions of our intellect, and therefore can not really be comprehended by it. Hence it arises that it opens to the consideration an abyss so profound that it admits of no thoroughly clear and systematically connected insight, but grants us only isolated glances, which enable us to recognise this unity in this and that relation of things, now in the subjective, now in the objective sphere, whereby, however, new problems are again raised, all of which I will not engage to solve, but rather appeal here to the words est quadam prodire tenus**, more concerned to set up nothing false or arbitrarily invented than to give a thorough account of all;at the risk of giving here only a fragmentary exposition.
** it is something to proceed thus far, if it be not permitted to go farther (Horace)
(ibid XXV)
So....Kant says there is that knowledge unavailable to us simply because our particular intelligence is not equipped for it, to which S says he merely didnt examine properly why such should be the case. S then goes about substituting force of nature, or, unity of will, or simply will, which is the most known to us of all things, for the ding an sich. But, alas....even that unity of will, which is a facile euphemism for will-in-itself, is that of which human knowledge has no immediate access, but at the same time, will is that of which each otherwise rational human intellect, has full and complete access, albeit on an individual basis. Just as things are that which are known as opposed to things-in themselves which are not, so too is will that which is accessible, but will as force of nature, is not. All that really happened here is effectively reducible to a recourse to pitiful sophisms (CPR, A58).
There may be a force of nature by which ...the plant forms the bud in order to develop the leaf and the flower out of it..., but by what warrant should that force be derived from the conception....as transcendental as it must be....of the human will?
S comments that Ks thesis is a form of negative knowledge, in that K grounds his theory on what knowledge is not, or, on how knowledge illegitimately acquired is no knowledge at all. S then stipulates that his own metaphysics, taken as an improvement on Ks insofar as the thing-in-itself can be immediately known to us when conceived as will....but ultimately declines to forward a positive knowledge with respect to it, by invoking Horace.
Over the years, Ive come to favor the notion that if S hadnt begun by heaping praise on Kant by the bucketful, thereby putting himself in the limelight of a paradigm shift, hadnt deemed himself a proper German transcendental idealist, thereby conforming to the philosophical standard of his time and place, and at the same time hadnt ridiculed his peers mercilessly....especially Hegel and somewhat less-so Fitche.....his metaphysics wouldnt have however much traction subsequently attributed to it. It seems rather obvious that if WWR preceded CPR, or, which is the same thing, if proper human intellect had been attributed necessarily to an external ontological domain rather than an internal epistemological one.....it may not have even got off the scholastic ground.
Thus it is, contra S is not so much a second-rate philosopher as a coattail rider, and, in affirmation with , a poor critic of Kant.
All that, without ever asking...... how in the HELL is it possible to trace back from the unknowable, re: a necessary force of nature, to the most known, re: freedom as ground of the human will? How S accomplished that, is even more suspect than the exchange of the Kantian unknowable thing-in-itself (an altogether empirical something), to a Schopenhauer-ian knowable metaphysical condition (an altogether transcendental something). This isnt just apples and oranges; its more like apples and dump trucks.
Now...back to the noumenal world: what about it?
I have to go so can't spend much time on this right now, but are you looking for the specific term "nominal" in his writings? Or rather, are you simply trying to understand more about his notions of Will as the thing-in-itself? Seems like you sort of get it, etc.
No. Im questioning the OP, in which is stated, Schop says that the narrow door to the truth is that our bodies appears to us as both external physical objects (as representation) and as something we can experience such as touch hunger and desire I.e as will. And because our bodies appears to us as both will and as representation-the noumenal world is entirely constituted out of will.[/quote]
I cant find any justification for S relating the dual nature of our understanding of ourselves, to the noumenal world. Maybe there isnt any, in that S never did actually relate one to the other, instead, invoking the thing-in-itself, which the post-Kantians, and meager philosophers in general, illegitimately seized upon as noumena.
I guess I was hoping someone could transfer the notion of will with respect to the empirical world, to the noumenal world.
I think Kants use of noumenal vs thing-in-itself is notoriously convoluted.
Is there a difference that makes a difference?
My crack at it is noumenal in its positive sense is an intuitive understanding of an object that somehow isnt amenable to the senses. The negative sense is something akin to the thing-in-itself which can only be known in a sort of hedging way of what it is not.
But Id like to know your interpretation before stepping forward with Schopenhauers demonstration of this or that.
But I can start by saying the demonstration was the use of ones own internal willing nature and he took the leap to apply it to all phenomena where there are forces, and animals with a striving force etc.
The relevant texts sustain the fact he doesnt convolute one with the other; they are entirely different conceptions. It is those who followed that are guilty of it. His interchanging of the terminology is understood, and forgiven, in context.
A difference that makes a difference? I think not, insofar as our knowledge extends to neither of them.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yeah, I see the demonstration, but dont quite accept the justification. I mean, hes authorized to speculate as he wishes, as are philosophers in general, but he still needs to give empirical evidence in support of it. To equate force of nature with unity of will just seems a bridge too far.
So, Schopenauer is not even a second rater, in your view? Interesting post! After further digestion, if I have any questions or concerns, I'll come back to you...
Ehhhh.....his philosophy is, in my view. And as a regular guy, I think hes way too harsh on his peers, almost disrespectful. Combining the two subjective judgements, one could relegate S to the second tier. On the other hand of course, if there has already been one chosen to be at the top, all the others are second-rate, or less.
Im a Schopenhauer newbie not an expert. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for Arthur Schopenhauer
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer/
has An alternative title for Schopenhauers main book, The World as Will and Representation, might well have been, The World as Reality and Appearance. Similarly, his book might have been entitled, The Inner and Outer Nature of Reality.
Maybe will is not an ideal label for what Schopenhauer had in mind?