Is the harmfulness of death ante-mortem or post-mortem?
First, some assumptions that are not under debate here. Clearly I am assuming that death is harmful. And I will assume as well that it is harmful to the one who dies. If you think otherwise, debate the matter elsewhere as I am simply not addressing you. I am taking it as a given that death is harmful.
I shall also define death in a neutral way as the point at which a person is no longer here, in this realm. The question of whether death ends our existence or whether it takes us elsewhere is a matter for reasoned debate to settle, not a definition.
I believe that the majority of the harms that death visits on a person are post-mortem. Why? Because the ante-mortem harms seem relatively insignificant compared to the harmfulness of death. And because we seem to have reason not to kill ourselves even if our lives are relatively uncomfortable. Relatedly, we have reason not to kill another person, even if that person's life is relatively uncomfortable for tthem. And the death penalty is a stiffer penalty than life imprisonment - or at least, we generally consider it to be - even though life imprisonment is a ilfe of discomfort.
If the harms of death were ante-mortem, then they are harms of deprivation. Yet death is harmful to a person even when it deprives them of nothing worth having,
Perhaps one might argue that life here has an intrinsic value that is not reducible to its harm and benefit profile. And then one might argue that it is the destruction of this intrinsic value that accounts for why death is so harmful.
But that is not plausible, I think, because it seems clear enough that it would be wrong knowingly to create a life of discomfort. That is, if you knew that if you created a person, that person's entirely life would be one characterized by discomfort, then it would be wrong for you to create it (as even natalists can agree). So, the intrinsic value of life is clearly eclipsed by the disvalue of the discomfort. Yet if such a life is up and running already, then one should keep it going for as long as possible. That makes no real sense unless death itself exposes the person who undergoes it to new and worse harms than those this life is exposing them to.
Note: I am not denying that death causes most of those who undergo it ante-mortem harms. My claim is that it is not plausible that a full account of the harmfulness of death is one that mentions only ante-mortem harms. For death seems to be harmful even when it won't visit any ante-mortem harms on the person who undergoes it. And very harmful at that. So really the ante-mortem harms do not seem to be doing much work at all.
I conclude, then, that the harmfulness of death is mainly post mortem.
I shall also define death in a neutral way as the point at which a person is no longer here, in this realm. The question of whether death ends our existence or whether it takes us elsewhere is a matter for reasoned debate to settle, not a definition.
I believe that the majority of the harms that death visits on a person are post-mortem. Why? Because the ante-mortem harms seem relatively insignificant compared to the harmfulness of death. And because we seem to have reason not to kill ourselves even if our lives are relatively uncomfortable. Relatedly, we have reason not to kill another person, even if that person's life is relatively uncomfortable for tthem. And the death penalty is a stiffer penalty than life imprisonment - or at least, we generally consider it to be - even though life imprisonment is a ilfe of discomfort.
If the harms of death were ante-mortem, then they are harms of deprivation. Yet death is harmful to a person even when it deprives them of nothing worth having,
Perhaps one might argue that life here has an intrinsic value that is not reducible to its harm and benefit profile. And then one might argue that it is the destruction of this intrinsic value that accounts for why death is so harmful.
But that is not plausible, I think, because it seems clear enough that it would be wrong knowingly to create a life of discomfort. That is, if you knew that if you created a person, that person's entirely life would be one characterized by discomfort, then it would be wrong for you to create it (as even natalists can agree). So, the intrinsic value of life is clearly eclipsed by the disvalue of the discomfort. Yet if such a life is up and running already, then one should keep it going for as long as possible. That makes no real sense unless death itself exposes the person who undergoes it to new and worse harms than those this life is exposing them to.
Note: I am not denying that death causes most of those who undergo it ante-mortem harms. My claim is that it is not plausible that a full account of the harmfulness of death is one that mentions only ante-mortem harms. For death seems to be harmful even when it won't visit any ante-mortem harms on the person who undergoes it. And very harmful at that. So really the ante-mortem harms do not seem to be doing much work at all.
I conclude, then, that the harmfulness of death is mainly post mortem.
Comments (82)
You can't be serious.
Suicide is predicated on postmortem benefit (the cessation of suffering). How do you square that with your claim of postmortem harm?
:death: :flower:
If so, read the OP and look at what I said about the assumptions I am making. I am assuming death is harmful to the one who dies. I really coudn't have been clearer. Note, sometimes it may be the lesser of two evils, but the lesser of two evils is still an evil. Death is a harm. That's in the bank. That's not in serious dispute. And I am not disputing it. What I am arguing is 'where' the harm occurs.
Oh, and note too that what you mentioned are possible ante-mortem benefits that would accrue to those whose lives here have become terrible.
I don't think it's that simple but I do agree, as mythology attests, immortality aka cancer :snicker: (+ happiness) have been/are/will probably remain our top priority.
If this is real we just discovered that we still have awareness afterwards of death. Here is where I disagree with your arguments.
There always been a lot philophers, thinkers, writers, artists, etc... who understood death as the real nothingness or "Nirvana" (Buddhism). They even killed themselves trying to find specifically that scenario: the lack of awareness.
If you say harmfulness of death is mainly post mortem you are forced to accept the premise that we still maintain conciousness when we are dead...
Quoting Agent Smith
Exactly. I had the same question in my mind whenever I finished the read.
:up: :100:
Bartricks is in explore mode and he did make the case for an intrinsic value to life but then backtracked for obvious reasons (dukkha). It appears as though life is bootstrapping itself - it, in a sense, knows that it's value is 0 if we ignore gratuitous suffering and we can't.
If we think of death as an event, then it's the point where life is over (where one goes from "here" to "no longer here," as you put it). That event may be harmful (here I think "painful" or involving suffering) or even defined as harmful regardless of whether there's suffering (as it appears you do). But it's still an event, and once it's occurred I don't see how anything afterward (post-mortem) can be spoken of as "harmful." Pain, suffering, joy, pleasure, are all phenomena that apply to the living.
What you're doing in the OP is arguing that death itself, as an event, is more harmful than anything life can bring. But you never discuss "post-mortem" harms -- and I think for good reason: namely, because it's nonsensical. I cite the following:
Quoting Bartricks
Here arguing that death is worse than living even a miserable life in prison.
Quoting Bartricks
Same as above.
Quoting Bartricks
Two things here.
(1) The assumption that you make is that one should go on living "for as long as possible" is begging the question. Some people really would rather die than go on living. So it's true that IF everyone wanted to go on living no matter what life threw at them, then it makes sense that death must be far worse than even the worst of life. But that's simply not the case.
(2) Even if it were the case, you're still only speaking of an event: death. So all you've done, even assuming (1) is correct, is shown that death -- as an event -- is worse than any kind of suffering in life.
With the stipulation in place that talk of an existence after death is for another time, and that death is just when a person is "no longer here," how can we possibly discuss harms inflicted "post-mortem"? What does that mean unless we assume an afterlife of some time? How can the dead be harmed?
Again, all you're doing -- in my view -- is saying that death itself is a greater harm than going on living. That's arguable. So why add anything about the harmfulness being inflicted "post-mortem"?
I'm afraid this is essentially incoherent, at least without further explanation.
To reject my case on a reasonable basis you need to argue that death is no more harmful to us than the antemortem harms make it.
So, if the harms are antemortem, then the death of an elderly person barely harms them at all, as it deprives them of so little. And imagine a person whose life is mildly unhappy. That is the harms slightly exceed the benefits, but there's no agony or anything like that. Well, on the ante morten view death will benefit such a person, as it will deprive them of nothing worth having. Yet we would all, surely, counsel against them killing themselves? In real life we would. So we seem to recognize that it would not benefit them at all, but harm them. That implies the truth of the post morten view.
If - if - death ceases our existence, then it destroys something of intrinsic value. That's bad and could be construed as a harm I suppose - that we have been deprived of something of intrinsic value, namely our lives.
But it won't explain death's harmfulness. Consider: a life of moderate misery is not worth starting. Even most natalists will agree. The intrinsic value of life is therefore not sufficient benefit to eclipse the disvalue of the mild discomfort living such a life will impose on its liver. Yet if such a life is being lived by someone, we would not recommend suicide. It seems clear that it would be irrational to take the exit under those conditions, unfortunate though they are. Now we can't explain that by appealing to the intrinsic value of continued living, because we have already implicitly acknowledged that it doesn't make the life net valuable. So the harm that death will visit on this person must come from elsewhere.
And note too, if the harm is mainly post morten, then that implies we survive our death, which in turn means that death does not destroy the intrinsic value of continued existence.
1. Thanatos/Death (vegans feel guilt)
2. Algos/Suffering (veganism is preferable to carnism)
My take is that 1 (killing) is immoral because life has intrinsic value; for you its because of postmortem harm. It's the same thing, no?
2 is something we can all agree on.
This isn't about the morality of killing, but about the harmfulness of it. These terms 'harmful' and 'immoral' are not synonyms.
I am arguing that the harmfulness of death is plausibly mainly post-mortem as opposed to ante-mortem. That is not to deny that death also harms us in ante-mortem ways. It is just to point out that ante-mortem harms cannot capture the full harmfulness of death, for death harms those whom it deprives of nothing worth having.
Again: Tom's life is moderately uncomfortable and shows no prospect of being anything but moderately uncomfortable. Would killing him harm him? Answer: of course it bloody would. Yet it would not deprive him of anything worth having. Is it rational for him to kill himself? If he came to you expressing suicidal thoughts, would you say 'go for it!' or 'don't go for it' - the latter, yes? So, in realty we would virtually all judge him to have reason not to kill himself - instrumental reason - even though his life is moderately uncomfortable for him. Again, same moral: his death will harm him despite the fact it will deprive him of nothing worth having.
If X will harm you despite the fact it deprives you of nothing worth having, then one obviously can't explain the harmfulness of x in terms of what it deprives you of.
So, if I harm a person, that isn't necessarily moral/immoral?
How come this latin phrase primum non nocere appears in bioethics?
No, if you harm a person that is not necessarily immoral. Sheesh. For instance, right now I just punched the wall. I hurt myself. Was that immoral? No.
When Tom tries to kill Jane and Jane kills Tom by defending herself with a gun, she harms Tom but does nothing wrong.
And when we catch a serial killer and put them in prison and/or kill them we have not necessarily done anything immoral, even though we harmed them.
And so on and so on and so on and so on.
Now, don't start questioning the above - that's derailing.
This thread is about the harmfulness of death and whether it is best understood to be mainly ante-mortem or post mortem. It's not about whether punching a wall is immoral. It is not about veganism. And it is not about metaethics.
Quoting Agent Smith
Whatium? Relevanti? No sensium you makium.
It's quite intriguing - the part where you say harm isn't necessarily immoral. There's plenty to unpack; perhaps best that you start another thread on the topic.
Coming to the postmortem harm of death, what's your response to some posters saying that post death there's literally no one to injure/damage? Here too there's a lot going on than meets the eye. Your ideas have antinatalistic undertones and I would love to hear more from you, if it's not too much of a bother.
They arrogantly suppose that they already know what death does to us.
Nobody's perfect - we'll have to work with what we got. Their position does have merit though as death seems to have that finality to it which is the reason why we dread it.
In line with your own view, religion comes along and raises the specter of naraka (hell). :scream: Just a few days ago I was on my bed doing nothing in particular when I heard a a threatening voice on my daughter's phone (she was on TikTok) say "I'm not done with you!" Death may not be the end suiciders hope that it is. Et in Arcadia ego :groan:
Suicide is incredibly stupid under most circumstances. If someone's life is going moderately badly, we - virtually all of us - would not recommend suicide, would we?
So, even if your life is going moderately badly, you don't have reason to kill yourself.
What does that imply?
Here's an analogy. Imagine there's a company that is losing money every year and shows every prospective of continuing to do so. Yet the accountants tell you not to wind up the company but to keep funding the losses.
Why? What does the accountant's advice imply? They have your best interests at heart - so what does it imply? Here: it implies that winding up the company wiil incur costs far greater than you'd incur by suffering the losses.
Our reason tells us to keep our lives going even if they are recording moderate losses. Join the dots.
How do you know that?
Quoting Agent Smith
Er, what? You think reality gives an F about these matters?
Quoting Agent Smith
Again: what?
Explained what? I am at a total loss to understand what you're talking about.
So, Ralph's life is not going particularly well. It's just boring. Well, is it not obvious that he nevertheless has instrumental reason not to kill himself? None of us - surely - would recommend suicide to him. On the contrary, we'd encourage him not to take the exit. So, in reality we all recognize that even those whose lives are not going particularly well have instrumental reason to stay.
Now, a deprivation account of the harmfulness of death can't make sense of that. Ralph's death would not deprive Ralph of anything positively worth having.
So, join the dots. If Ralph's death will be very harmful to him - and it will be, else why does he have instrumental reason to avoid it? - yet will not deprive him of anything worth having, then the harmfulness of death must lie elsewhere.
Added to which, it is hard to see how one can be deprived of something if one does not exist. So, in order for death to harm a person by depriving them of something, they would need to exist.
So deprivation accounts of the harmfulness of death are in double trouble. They're of questionable coherence, given that it is arguable incoherent to suppose that someone who no longer exists can be deprived of something. But even if they are coherent, they are clearly inadequate, as they deliver the verdict that Ralph above is not harmed by dying, yet manifestly he is.
Isn't that view, you know, obviously false? Certainly virtually every philosopher writing on the subject thinks that death harms the one who dies and would accept the hermit example as a reductio of the view that death is harmless.
And again, isn't it obvious that the hermit themselves has instrumental reason not to kill themselves, other things being equal? Surely.
Finally, note that in the OP I said very clearly that I am assuming that death harms the one who dies. The question is in what way, not 'whether' it does.
If it did that, then we would have reason to stay here for as long as possible, unless our continued existence here would be even more terrible for us.
And that's exactly what our reason tells us, no? It tells us to stay where we are unless staying would be a torment. Thus, our reason is telling us that death takes one to a terrible place. That's also why it can operate as a penalty. Note, those who oppose the death penalty typically do so because they seem it too severe a penalty to risk visiting on those who might be innocent. That makes no sense at all unless death is among the most serious of harms.
What is then?
If death takes you to it, then that would make sense of what our reason tells us about death's harmfulness to us. If, by contrast, you suppose death ceases our existence then you have to account for its harmfulness by citing ante-mortem harms.
In the sense that death deprives the person of their future. It's a harm one can predict with some measure of certainty at any point of one's life.
For a time, in some legal systems, the punishment for murder was calculated in a peculiar way: an autopsy was performed on the murdered person and the doctors estimated how long the person could have lived had they not been killed. This was then the duration of the punishment for the murderer.
This system didn't last, apparently it was too tricky to make such calculations. But the idea is interesting: the murderer should be deprived of as much time in which they could live a valuable life as their victim.
Nonsense. I was speaking of postmortem harm to the individual who dies. After death that person is no more and will endure no more harm.
So killing a 90 year old barely harms them?
And a person whose future here promises to be one of mild discomfort is not harmed if they're killed?
It is obvious that these people are harmed and harmed severely. So deprivation accounts simply won't work.
And then explain how you could possibly think you're addressing the OP when I said in the OP that I am assuming that death is a harm to the one who dies.
I yield. Carry on. :roll:
And it will harm him, will it not, even if he has no plans that killing him with thwart.
And it will harm him even if he isn't particularly enjoying his life.
So, it will harm him even if it deprives him of nothing.
Thus, the harm of death cannot reside primarily in what it deprives a person of. For it harms those it deprives of nothing worth having.
Any attempt to account for the harmfulness of death by appealing to ante-mortem harms will run into this problem. We can easily imagine someone whose death will not create the ante-mortem harms in question, yet it seems obvious that that person's death will nevertheless harm them greatly.
Thus, the harmfulness of death is post-mortem, not ante-mortem.
To be harmed or hurt requires feeling physical or emotional pain. You seem to be saying that a person is alive to these sensations after they die. "harms the death visits" is poetic, but confusing.
Quoting Bartricks
Sounds like Clint Eastwood in The Unforgiven. Good points. What I am saying is it does no harm to him after he ceases to exist.
So, you know already what death does to us, do you?
I refer you to what I said in the OP:
Quoting Bartricks
Stop assuming you already know things you don't know.
You don't know what death does to a person, yes?
Nobody does.
So stop thinking you do.
Nobody does.
Now that you have taken your slice of humble pie and realized that you don't know what death does to person, stop discounting the possibility that you survive it and suffer terribly.
And now follow my reasoning and draw my awful conclusion. jeez.
The harmfulness of death is post mortem.
To be harmed you need to exist.
So guess what - death doesn't cease your existence, it makes your existence a whole load worse. See?
If the harms of death are post mortem - and you have yet to explain how the hermit's death could be harmful ante-mortem - and you need to exist in order to be harmed.....then he will exist after his death.
'Death' does not mean 'ceases to exist'. As I said in the OP, if you define death that way then you've just built a conviction about what death does to us into the definition.
What I mean by death - and I made this very clear in the OP - is the point at which we are no longer 'here'. Here in this realm. Not 'here in existence'. But 'here, in this universe'.
That definition leaves open - as it should - whether death ends our existence or merely alters it in some way.
Incidit in scyllam cupiens vitare charybdim.
:scream: :rofl:
:lol: I wish! I dunno where the other monkeys are? :grin:
This is the view by the majority in the West and the minority in the East. There is so much said on the subject, that we cannot just ignore or reject the case that our non-physical part continuing to exist as such after the death of our body. That would be lack of wisdom. On the contrary, admitting that "I don't know" is a sign of wisdom.
You'll find the current location of the main monkey in Book 6. Facilis descensus.
Also, note that I am taking for granted that death harms the one who dies. I was very clear in the OP about this. THe question is 'how' it harms us, not 'whether' it does. It does. There's no serious dispute that it does. So don't dispute it.
Good question señor! It would all depend on what mors is, si? So, what is mrityu (death), what is it mon ami?
I've never heard of this book! Do you recommend it? I wonder why you picked this book and not another. The path to hell is easy. Some might disagree for obvious reasons, one of which is the so-called prick of conscience which, if movies & books are to be believed, consumes the soul ... slowly and ... painfully.
Ha ha, my bad!! I assumed 'Incidit in Scyllam... etc' was a quotation from Virgil's Aeneid, but I was wrong, it's a medieval tag. Book 6 of the Aeneid is about Aeneas's visit to the underworld and I meant that Virgil was the typing primate now inhabiting the hereafter...
Our reason tells us to suffer almost anything to avoid death. That is evidence it harms us. You are simply ignoring that evidence in deference to your convictions
[quote=Ms. Marple]Most interesting.[/quote]
Animals have been vivisected, by the father of modern philosophy René Descartes even (imagine that!), and yet the thought of suicide never, I mean never, crosses their mind! Curious, very curious!
So why begin this thread?
Try reading the OP.
So an argument that begins, "Assuming part of us suffers after death . . ." is evidence we survive our deaths? :roll:
This: Quoting jgill
Is not a quote from me, is it?! I did not 'assume' such a thing. It's a 'conclusion'. Big difference.
Read the OP if you want to familiarize yourself with my argument.
At what time are the harms of death visited upon us? They are visited precisely when death itself is visited upon us and not a moment earlier or later. Not earlier - because before we die we are still alive and not yet harmed by future events. Not later - because after death we are beyond the harm of losing life and its benefits, having already lost them.
(Our bodies can still be harmed after death, e.g. by desecration.)
:up: Pretty much says it all, unless one wants to speculate about surviving death in some form. That would be a thread to which Houdini might contribute - or not.
So, john has no goals. No plans for the future. And his life is not going especially well. Do I harm him if I kill him?
Obviously. Yet I have not deprived him of anything worth having. I have not frustrated any plans and he was mildly unhappy. So in terms of antemortem harms and benefits I have benefitted him! Yet I harmed him
If I harmed him - and there is no question I did - yet antemortem benefitted him, then the harm I did to him was postmortem.
Quoting Bartricks
The times to consider are not just:
Before death
After death
There are three:
Before death
Moment of death
After death
The moment of death is the moment when we lose everything with no prospect of recovery. We don't lose it earlier because we are still alive. We cannot lose it later, having already lost it. So when you harm someone by killing them, the moment at which you inflict the harm is the moment at which you kill them. The point at which everything slips away from us in the course of nature is the moment of death.
You prove that the harms are not ante-mortem. Then you conclude, by elimination, that the harms are post-mortem. You have not yet considered the third possibility, which is the moment of death.
As I write, the time is not earlier than 9:08. I cannot conclude that it is later than 9:08. In fact, it is 9:08.
Quoting Bartricks
And thankful of that I am. :roll:
It responds to the OP claim that if harms are not ante-mortem then they are post-mortem. It shows that it's a false dichotomy and that there is a third possibility. Then the explanation goes like this. We die. At that moment of death we lose all opportunities we ever had. Before we die, we have not lost them. After we die, we have nothing left to lose. If our life is taken from us, it is at the moment of its being taken that we are robbed of those opportunities.
Quoting Bartricks
If the words I use are 'at the exact time of death' and the fact is that I'm talking about 'before death' then I'd better brush up my communication skills. The loss of all opportunity is the biggest possible loss. That is why death is such a big deal. It's game over. So these are not ante-mortem harms and they are not small. And they are not post-mortem either. After we are dead we are beyond being harmed aside from desecration of the body, for example, or (arguably) perversion of a Will.
It's the Lady Macbeth defence. Macbeth thinks it's a big deal that he killed Duncan. Lady Macbeth says: "He should have died hereafter!" Meaning, we're all going to die so it doesn't make much difference if I die on Monday rather than Tuesday. But of course it's a big deal.
It doesn't because it would just qualify as another antemortem harm and would not be sufficient to account for the harmfulness of death.
It isn't coherent anyway - but I am putting that aside. I'll just give you this third option. The fact is that the harms that would accrue to you at taht point are trivial compared to the harm death does to you.
You consistently seem to miss the point. It's not about where the harms of deprivation occur. It's about their sufficiency.
If you appeal to harms of deprivation, they're inadequate. This can be easily shown. Imagine someone who won't be deprived of those things and ask yourself if death would still harm that person. ANd it will.
Now, it is not to the point to keep arguing that those harms - the harms I keep demonstrating to be inadequate - occur at this point rather than that. That's irrelevant. The point is they're insufficient
If death takes you to a much, much worse place - that'd do the trick. If you just keep appealing to harms of deprivation, then you're on a hiding to nothing, regardless of whether you locate their occurrence.
So, once more, it obviously harms a person to kill them, and it harms them even if it deprives them of nothing - hell, it harms them even if it benefits them by depriving them of some great suffering.
Now, if that's true, then you can't appeal to those harms of deprivation to account for death's harmfulness.
For an analogy: susan plans on going to the cinema. But she accidentally sets herself on fire and spends the evening writhing in agony in hospital. Now, the accident deprived her of a nice evening at the cinema. No question about that. But it would be manifestly absurd to suggest that 'that' is what the main harm of the incident consistent of, would it not?
Sandra planned on doing her accounts - a task she hates - but she too accidentally set herself on fire and spent the evening writhing in pain in hospital. Now, she was not deprived of anything worth having. But she suffered about the same harm as Susan, yes? That's because the main harm is the intense agony they suffered, not the harms of deprivation.
That's how things are with death too.
I agree that we may sometimes reasonably wish to die. But death does always deprive us of something. It deprives us of every chance we have and of life itself, which is (amongst other things) the sum total of those chances and opportunities - even if we welcome death or are facing a 'fate worse than death'.
Quoting Bartricks
If the main harm of death were the intense agony we suffer and not the harms of deprivation, then a painless death would be relatively less harm. But death's harm is equal. It's the loss of everything. The experience of dying - the ante-mortem harms and suffering - vary greatly. Dying happens before the moment of death. You are appealing to ante-mortem harms to make the comparison. But regardless of ante-mortem harms, death is a harm in itself.
Quoting Bartricks
That would be so, if it were trivial to lose every chance we might ever have without prospect of recouping any opportunity at all. It doesn't seem trivial to me. It sounds like the biggest loss of all, regardless of any present misery we endure. It's the loss that death visits upon us.
"not deprived of anything worth having"?
Sandra would probably think her prospect of endless accounting, however grim, is worthwhile. That's why she takes food and water and as far as possible avoids serious burns. As it happens, I am in precisely that situation. Another day, more accounts. But at least I'm alive (as I write).
Quoting Bartricks
Rather, I'm consistently responding to the false dichotomy of the OP and showing that the response holds up so far against challenge.