Philosophy of Science
I'm a fan of Philosophy of Mind and pretty comfortable with it. Not at the level of most of you here, but I "get" it and have expressed my views in an (I think) intelligent manner. Even though being an Eliminative Materialist didn't make me many friends.
I had a much rougher time with Philosophy of science, and had to constantly remind myself that someone said "if you don't understand something, it could be because it's complicated, or because it's just wrong."
Without going into too many specific thinkers (though I could) ...is the prevailing attitude of Phil. of Sci. still Empiricist, to an absurd degree (IMO)? I have verbatim quotes from people like Van Fraasen to the affect that if we can't DIRECTLY experience objects, they are not "real" but just "convenient to use" including such pretty large non-real objects like planets. Or smaller stuff like atoms, electrons, quarks, etc. Because microscopes and telescopes only show us an image of the object, but nothing that can be deemed "real."
I also got a whiff of hardcore social constructionism of the "if we don't name things they don't exist" or "we create reality to match our theories" type. Meanwhile the notion that some of these theories seem a tiny bit skeptical, if not dismissive, of science met with firm denials.
Meanwhile, as usual, these theorists still have no problem using the results of the "not-real" theories of science everyday in a thousand ways. This doesn't bother me that much, Hume and Berkeley did it etc.
Isn't the result a different meaning of real that...is essentially meaningless?
Any help would be appreciated.
I had a much rougher time with Philosophy of science, and had to constantly remind myself that someone said "if you don't understand something, it could be because it's complicated, or because it's just wrong."
Without going into too many specific thinkers (though I could) ...is the prevailing attitude of Phil. of Sci. still Empiricist, to an absurd degree (IMO)? I have verbatim quotes from people like Van Fraasen to the affect that if we can't DIRECTLY experience objects, they are not "real" but just "convenient to use" including such pretty large non-real objects like planets. Or smaller stuff like atoms, electrons, quarks, etc. Because microscopes and telescopes only show us an image of the object, but nothing that can be deemed "real."
I also got a whiff of hardcore social constructionism of the "if we don't name things they don't exist" or "we create reality to match our theories" type. Meanwhile the notion that some of these theories seem a tiny bit skeptical, if not dismissive, of science met with firm denials.
Meanwhile, as usual, these theorists still have no problem using the results of the "not-real" theories of science everyday in a thousand ways. This doesn't bother me that much, Hume and Berkeley did it etc.
Isn't the result a different meaning of real that...is essentially meaningless?
Any help would be appreciated.
Comments (105)
I have no formal philosophical training, and I read mostly the works of philosophical scientists, instead of professional philosophers. So I had to look-up the term "eliminative materialist". I think you should get a positive reception from many Materialist posters on TPF. And, although I am not a Materialist of any prefix, I can agree with Churchland's assertion (stating the obvious) that "beliefs are not ontologically real" Such mental states are, however, ontologically Ideal, in the sense that they exist as metaphysical*1 concepts not physical objects. I don't understand how anyone posting on a philosophy forum could deny the importance of immaterial*2 ideas to humans, and perhaps to some animals.
Homo Sapiens is differentiated from other mammals in its use of imagination to "feel" things that are not real (e.g. Love), and to "see" things that are not yet real (e.g. Possibilities & Probabilities), and to "know" things they have never personally experienced. Such non-physical subjects are not studied by Chemists & Physicists, but by Psychologists & Philosophers. Ironically, there is a segment of posters on TPF that seem to be embarrassed to engage in such trivial pursuits, that cannot be verified or falsified, but only reasoned & argued. It would seem to be a paradoxical waste of time for an Eliminative Materialist to engage in the exchange of unreal Ideas & Opinions on a disembodied Forum that does not exist in any particular place & time. :smile:
PS__Maybe there's more to EM, than the Wiki article indicates. I assume it's a reaction to some specific ideas & opinions, that I'm not aware of.
*1. Metaphysical :
Literally, not physical, hence not subject to the laws of physics.
I'm not referring to religious Theology, but to secular Philosophy.
*2. Immaterial : literally, not made of matter.
But ideas, & feelings & opinions & beliefs are important to their holders, even if they can't see & touch them. So, why denigrate them with a dismissive "eliminative" philosophical attitude? Such "attitudes" are also un-real & immaterial & ascientific (outside the purview of physical science).
Yes.
An old sko0l scientific realist (via methodological naturalism), model-dependent realism seems to me more grounded (i.e. adaptive) than "social constructionism" or any other flavor of fashionable "anti-realism".
The mundane, to survive, must create an illusion of the sublime. I remain ever so grateful mundane! Fool me, fool me all you want for a time will come when a false friend becomes a true friend.
The non-materialist's impossible burden is to explain ... the difference betwixt the immaterial and nothing. Mayhaps that is what non-materialism is all about - a study of nothing!
If I heard a deep growling behind a tree, in a forest, and can't directly see whatever animal it is, my belief that it has large teeth and can kill me seems quite real. Even if it was a prank using an audio speaker and no animal - there was a something there, not a nothing. That was my point.
I think your understanding of what was said is incorrect. Direct experience doesn't just mean "seeing". We experience in all five senses. I can't see Mars from here, but the evidence produced by man on Mars should suffice to say, there have been experience of the planets.
Of course, the fallacy of the absurd is a frequent part of interlocutors' conversation. I can't see that there's a brain inside my friend's head, I can't even see my own brain, does that mean brain isn't real?
:up:
You missed the point mon ami! Perhaps if you can think of an example of something that is immaterial and try to distinguish that from nothing, you'll see what I'm driving at.
However, the oculus menti is its own kinda eye. I consider it the 3[sup]rd[/sup] eye of Shiva the destroyer - it's what in the Occident is known as sixth sense which is synonymous in my universe with logos (reason).
As for the rest - I'll take your word for it. Too many words to Google and I have a good true crime series going on Netflix - MY world
.
I struggle with explaining this because - at the moment - I do think it's nonsense. I'm hoping someone can explain it to me better than it has been in the past.
:fire:
"Whatever you want ..." :cool:
No problemo! It's just that I'd like that question answered; thought you might've studied the matter in more detail than I could.
I have the opposite dilemma. I can't differentiate between matter and nothing.
Matter is elusive. Some mysterious whatever somewhere outside of personal experience, causing the experience.
Trying to define matter is infinite regress?
I don't see how matter triggering subjective experience is any different than a computer simulating subjective experience.
Both matter or simulator are unfindable in experience, by definition, since they are defined as being independent of and the cause of the experience.
But I don't expect we will get anywhere debating the topic.
Interesting! Quite obviously you're using a different definition for nothing. We're allowed to do that. Create worlds of our own, with unique rules & objects, and whatnot. I wish I had the time to explore Yohan's universe, but looks like I'll have to do it on another day. Hope you don't mind.
"But I don't expect we will get anywhere debating the topic." :smile: Don't mind at all.
I'm uncertain how good my analysis is, but here it is for what it's worth. I'll present the short version of the argument.
1. Apophatic theology: neti neti (not this, not that). Is God a potato? No! Is God Justin Beiber? No! This exercise in denying every question of the form "is God x?" continues until all possibilities are exhausted.
2. Look up the definition of nothing. Not any thing.
That's how I grok God & nothing - I can't tell 'em apart.
I see. That's fine by me. Good day.
Is the God comment humour? And I guess the "nothing" definition depends on what you mean by the word. Is a Unicorn "nothing?" No it's a mythical figure....I've seem pictures of them. But there's no actual Unicorns, so they're immaterial. Is Justice or Love "Nothing." I don't think so....but they're immaterial.
Consciousness is considered immaterial, but I think science will find the brain process that produces it. Ok that's all I've got
[quote=Laozi][...]Without laughter there is no Tao.[/quote]
Superb!
That's me line monsieur!
Cintamani (wish-fulfilling jewel).
Any comment on your real question - about immaterial vs nothing? If I missed the point, can you clarify....sans the cryptic humour? If not let's get back to science of philosophy maybe?
:lol: Did I write that? :snicker: It is a humorous question given the contrast between a vegetable and what we believe is a supreme intelligence.
[quote=David H. Wolpert]It's stupid to be smart.[/quote]
Quoting GLEN willows
[quote=Ms. Marple]Most interesting.[/quote]
What meanest thou by this, kind sir/madam?
Im not aware of anyone who makes either of these claims. The social constructionists Im familiar with assert the following:
"Realism is the view that science (often successfully) aims to provide theories that truthfully represent how the world is--independent of human categories, capacities, and interventions. Social constructionists typically reject realism on two counts: first, the world that science describes is itself socially constituted; and second, its aims in describing that world are socially specifiable (satisfying interests, sustaining institutions and practices, etc.).(Joseph Rouse).
Social constructionists dont say nothing outside of language exists, they say that language is our only access to what exists. And they dont claim that any theory we construct is as good as any other. The theories we create have to work according to criteria based on our goals and purposes. There are reasons to accept or reject a theory. We dont create reality to match our theories, we create theories to match our goal-driven social realities, and they can succeed or fail in this aim.
I think this is spot on.
I would say that science at its purest is a method we use, to the best of our current ability, to create theories that match the physical reality we can interact with. However as you point out, we are a social species and everyone including scientists have goals, hence I agree with you when you say that in actual fact "we create theories to match our goal-driven social realities."
Yes. Non-materialists are aware that such mundane non-sense as Love & other abstractions are physically nothing. But unlike cold-hearted materialists, they feel that immaterial non-things are meta-physically important. Sometimes more dear than Life itself, another nothing. :wink:
PS__The vacuum of space is literally nothing, but it has been found, from studies of the nothing between material things, to have enormous Potential for energy, including the power to push space itself to expand & accelerate into the emptiness beyond the material universe.
I think the term real is the problem here.
If we want to define whats real as whats understood by science, or by empirical observations, thats a choice. I wouldnt do so myself.
It does well to keep in mind where science comes from and what its ontological underpinnings are. Theres a lot we can learn by remembering natural philosophy was once the name for what we now would call science.
Science assumes a naturalistic, if not a materialistic, worldview. So we might enquire about the word nature (and material) and go from there. Thats normally the line I take when having these discussions. We can get into that if its of interest to you. Ive written about it elsewhere.
There are more reasons. And, in most cases, the major reason for not undesranding a subject is that one does not undestand or misunderstands and ignores (omits to clear up) one or more words --esp. key ones-- used in the subject.
And I think it misrepresents what the average scientist does. Which is simply going to work studying phenomena and .doing science. Im a lefty, for sure, but Phil of science displays a definite lefty bias and not all scientists are complicit in a hegemony.
And you can argue there is no reality at all. This is another question I have. Why the anti-real, pro real argument in the first place?
- curing cancer and all serious illness,
- improving medical methods
- finding methods of pain relief
- Curing blindness, deafness, mental illness
- ways to counteract climate change.
- on and on
If this causes some eye-rolling, know thats Ive mentioned the inherent misogyny, racism and white privilege. And yes protecting the institutions. Although it implies that institutions are bad.
But again - science responds to the social realities, and unless youre deeply cynical at least SOME of these realities involve the desire to limit suffering.
It's more nuanced than you're implying. It's similar to criticizing a failed philosophical/political theory because the people who practiced it used it for their own selfish gains.
My question to you is regarding the scientific method. Do you think there's a method of understanding the world that is more effective?
Not to be rude, but can't you apply this to the study Philosophy? Advancing in academia, making more money, social status, working in an institution within it's rules (University).
In fact most scientists work in universities. How is this social milieu different/less biased than science? And isn't what's important the soundness of the IDEAS?
I was kidding with Agent Smith, and he knows what I was talking about . . . . and it wasn't you. No offense intended. :smile:
I do think humour usually has at least a whiff of truth, and I have heard materialists accused of that and more.
On point señor!
What about the fact that when Lawrence Krauss' book A Universe from Nothing came out philosophers wasted no time in distancing themselves from Krauss, saying the nothing of physics is not the nothing of philosophy i.e. Krauss failed to answer the philosophical question why is there something rather than nothing?
1. Realism: Science shows you reality as it is. Mass actually does warp space-time.
2. Anti-realism: Science doesn't do what realism says it does. Science is nothing more than a sense-making schema where hypotheses are generated to fit observational data and the best one, selected based on criteria other than truth e.g. elegance, beauty, simplicity (novacula occami), is given the stamp of approval. Mass warping space-time is the best explanation for the experimental findings, it may not.
Abd again many of the same criticisms of bias and institutional obedience could be said of philosophy in academia .no?
https://bostonreview.net/articles/windows-on-reality/
I skimmed through the linked article. Personally, I'd say there's no issue as regards trying out new perspectives but ... with the proviso that they yield testable claims. Science is no longer science without experiments in my humble opinion. If memory serves one of the main problems with string theory is that it isn't experiment-apt. That being the case string theory is just a pretty face, lacking ... absit iniuria ... any substance.
Too, giving due respect to Massimo, the Antivax movement is weak evidence that there's something wrong with science. These folks are against vaccination less because science is flawed in some way but more because there are allegedly compelling political reasons. Science merely serves as a sidekick, a henchman to the Antivax political agenda.
That said, I would love to see a novel approach to our world, one that's nonscientific and equally or even more effective than science - a radical proposal compared to Massimo's rather conservative stance to only experiment with scientifically valid perspectives.
That's not what she's saying. She's sayng the antivax movement is one visible aspect of the anti-science sentiment sweeping populist circles. She talks about the amazing success rMRA vaccines have been, and in an unheard of time frame.
Quoting Agent Smith
All theories are ...theories, until proven. Entanglement was a theory (which even Einstein denied) until it was finally tested.
Agent Smith "I would love to see a novel approach to our world, one that's nonscientific and equally or even more effective than science".
Apparently all philosophers would. This is what's vexing to me. Better how?
Great question. Well, if science could speak, it would say "I would looove to find truths!" Science's ultimate goal is to figure out, as some say, the true nature of reality. However, it can't - its mainstay, hypotheses/theories, are only instances of abduction and thus inherits the limitations of that method (it offers not truths, only good explanations).
The question then is ...
[quote=Bob Dylan (Blowin' in the Wind)]
How many roads must a man walk down
Before you call him a man?[/quote]
In a sense science (induction/abduction/explanations) aspires to be philosophy (deduction/proofs)!
Oh, I didn't take it as a joke. I would if e.g. you said "if you don't understand something, it could be because you are stupid!" :grin:
Well, anyway, what I said is true and it has nothing to do with philosophy, but with study and language.
So, I believe my intervention serves some purpose anyway! :smile:
What's the difference between a materialist and a monist then?
Quoting Agent Smith
There is another option:
Both scientific realists and antirealists presume semantic realism--that is, that there is an already determinate fact of the matter about what our theories, conceptual schemes, or forms of life "say" about the world. Interpretation must come to an end somewhere, they insist, if not in a world of independently real objects, then in a language, conceptual scheme, social context, or culture.
Cultural studies of science , instead, reject the dualism of scheme and content, or context and content, altogether. There is no determinate scheme or context that can fix the content of utterances, and hence no way to get outside of language. How a theory or practice interprets the world is itself inescapably open to further interpretation, with no authority beyond what gets said by whom, when. This position has at least two important consequences in comparison to social constructivism. First, cultural studies can readily speak of statements as true, for "truth" is a semantic concept that never takes us beyond language: to say that "p is true" says no more (but also no less) than saying "p." Second, this position dissolves the boundaries between cultural studies of science and the scientific practices they study. Cultural studies offer interpretations of scientific practices, including the texts and utterances that such practices frequently articulate--but scientific practices are themselves already engaged in such interpretations, in citing, reiterating, criticizing, or extending past practice."(Joseph Rouse)
Materialism is a subtype of monism I believe. If there's monism of any other kind, they need to be asked the same question.
As for language and its role in science, I'd havta admit the former's limitations eventually bleeds into the latter. If the well is poisoned, so is every drop of water drawn from that well. For better or worse, I'm in the dark as to the nature of the poison Rouse seems to refer to. Something to do with semantics or truth or maybe something else eniterly? Whatever it is, my response is that Rouse did have a notion of meaning, truth, and other linguistic elements as he penned his thoughts on the flaws in language, but isn't that a paradox? You're using language in particular mode (combination of semantics, truth, syntax) to make the claim that such usage is not good enough. Doesn't that make the criticism pointless. Rouse and his ilk are drinking from the very well they say is poisoned. :chin:
Hes not saying that such usage isnt good enough. He is asking how language, syntax and truth statements hook up with the world. His answer is that structures of language shouldnt be seen as supervening on causal perceptual relations with natural objects, as though causation and the normative functions of language and rationality are distinguishable domains. Rather than maintaining a sharp distinction between contentful language and the world, Rouse wants us to recognize that:
"The understanding of conceptually articulated practices as subpatterns within the human lineage belongs to the Davidsonian-Sellarsian tradition that emphasizes the "objectivity" of conceptual understanding. Yet the "objects" to which our performances must be held accountable are not something outside discursive practice itself. Discursive practice cannot be understood as an intralinguistic structure or activity that then somehow "reaches out" to incorporate or accord to objects. The relevant "objects" are the ends at issue and at stake within the practice itself. "The practice itself," however, already incorporates the material circumstances in and through which it is enacted. Practices are forms of discursive and practical niche construction in which organism and environment are formed and reformed together through an ongoing, mutually intra-active reconfiguration.
Yes. Krauss had to admit that "something" (space, time, matter, energy, laws) must exist (presumably eternally) prior to the ex nihilo emergence of our physical world. I differ with him only in that I think it's necessary to add Math & Mind to that list of pre-existing factors, in order to explain the emergence of logical thinking creatures from an otherwise mindless process. Potential Mind (LOGOS) is the presumptive cause of Actual minds emanating from a substrate of Matter & Energy. :nerd:
PS__Most of those pre-existing factors (space, time, energy, laws, mind, math) are immaterial, hence not subject to Entropy. And Matter itself is an effect of space-time & energy + laws. Hence, subject to reduction into its essential elements. You can guess why Krauss didn't mention Mind & Math (Logic) under the heading of Nothing.
Nec caput nec pedes mon ami. I'm afraid I've wasted your time, but I remain grateful for introducing me to advanced concepts in linguistics. It appears that like how education is flagged off, with language first, with philosophizing too language is first.
These are topics that I know very little of monsieur! Best I zip up lest I contaminate the thread with my foolery.
I would say science is the least biased (but not devoid of bias) of the lot. Then again as someone with a science background, that could be influenced by my own bias...
Soundness of ideas is what is important, but so is the impact of the work. The second part can't be decided by science (by which I mean pure scientific method), but rather needs philosophy/ethics.
I can create a study on testing people's responses to torture. Take subjects into a room, torture them and diligently and scientifically record their biological responses. In order for it to be good science I need to make sure the study is reliable, accurate, good enough sample size, can be replicated, etc. And we will discover accurate new information from such a study.
So should we do such a study? No! and the "no" comes from ethics rather than the scientific method. There is nothing in the scientific method saying that it should be used for good or bad - both penicillin and the atomic bomb were cases of scientists performing very good science (as in using the scientific method correctly). It is ethics and philosophy that says the former did "good" and the latter "bad."
So the science we perform is influenced by the society in which it is done, for good and for bad.
Thanks for the very clear explanation of your position I really appreciate it.
Overall I dont disagree and certainly agree that that science clearly has problem. I think that there needs to be improvements. But philosophy of science seems to be implying something more insidious. And I think theres a straw man lurking.
I dont hear a lot of scientists declaring that science is the jewel of civilization or their job is to explain reality - not in 2022 anyway. The implication that scientists = science are the same thing is also simplistic. Most scientists are not unaware of philosophy and the problems with defining reality in the first place.
As for theories, theyre theories. Im pretty sure scientists understand the definition of the word. They may be biased and some scientists do twist the results to fit their theory, but how many philosophical theories have been wrong, or at least illogical or based on a God proof? All theories can be wrong, in fact the ability to falsify a theory is a definition of a good theory - if you believe Popper.
Yes they're based on human desires - build a better bomb is sometimes one, but alleviate suffering is too. A scientists mother may have died of cancer, inspiring her to experiment with potential cures.
Here I feel like I'm being a cheerleader for science but Im not. I just feel the urge to point out some of the negativity - and bias - of some of the attitudes here.
Back to theories - I believe the social-construction tinged idea that theories create the reality is disproven by the thousands of theories that have been wrong - and science has admitted were wrong. You know the list - phlogiston, alchemy etc. Again most scientists look at them as educated guesses.
No one has addressed my point that philosophers are also far from objective in the way they formulate their theories. Why? It just seems like a basic fact.
Philosophers are part of an institution, they depend on their living from it, desire tenure, and many of their theories have roots in other thinkers from hundreds of years ago. Theyre influenced by societal norms, current politics, their own evolutionarily-intrinsic instincts, just like in any human-based endeavour.
Hardly subjective. Nor, I would say, any more successful at discovering ultimate truth or reality. The issue seems to be a war between anti-realists and realists. Yet the definition of real is - as has been pointed out - up for debate. To some people, if a scientific discovery cures millions of virus sufferers, isnt that at least one definition of real?
Or lets say real adjacent :smile:
I fixed the typos
So the science we perform is influenced by the society in which it is done, for good and for bad.
As is philosophy, social sciences, psychology, politics - in fact every human-created endeavour.
Quoting GLEN willows
Lets talk about bias. Theres a different way to think about how we should understand such notions as social and cultural bias and their relationship to scientific truth than what you have mentioned so far. You begin with an assumption about what science does: it tries to represent how things are in a world at least partially independent of our concepts and traditions. You then draw up a dichotomy between those philosophers of science who believe it is possible to shake off our cultural biases and see things perfectly objectively , and those who pessimistically believe that we can never cross the veil of appearances separating our assumptions
and theories from material things in themselves.
But there is an entirely different way of thinking about what science does , and what truth is, that rejects from the getgo that scientific truth is the attempt to mirror or represent a world out there via our schemes.
They dont think of knowledge as representation or mirroring, but the building of systems of interaction with the world. We can build these systems in many different ways, and the world will respond very precisely, but differently. to each of these ways.
Quoting GLEN willowsWhen we abandon one science theory for another , it is not because the theory is found not to correspond with what is out there, but because we prefer a new way of organizing our interaction with our world, a way that allows us to do more things , albeit differently than before. New theories no more falsify old ones than new artistic movements falsify older movements.
From this vantage cultural bias is not a distortion of objectivity. There is not a more or less correct way to build a scientific system, any more than thier is a more or less correct way to produce art. Some scientific systems we construct solve puzzles better than others, not by getting closer to representing what is out there, but by allowing us to interest with our world in ways that are more useful for our purposes. The world is a continually changing development , and for this reason there is no one way that things really are. Our theories contribute to accelerating this process of transformation by allowing us to interact with our world and with each other in ever more complex and intricate ways. The central role of science isnt getting it right in the sense of capturing the way thing really are, but finding new and better ways of interacting usefully with a
world that is constantly changing as a result of our innovative ways of dealing with it.
Well, we could say this:
1. What we wished for: Philosophy
2. What we got: Science
Our genie isn't exactly the best there is out there.
Quoting GLEN willows
You should talk to Joshs on language skepticism.
For such a linguistically minded person you certainly are misrepresenting what I - didnt -say. Please show me where I said that. In fact I agreed that scientists KNOW the problems with the definition of the word real.
New theories no more falsify old ones than new artistic movements falsify older movements.
Again you misrepresent. I was referring to poppers theory of falsification. I agree that new theories dont totally falsify old ones.
You seem to think were arguing when were actually agreeing on pretty much every point.
Language skepticism, to my reckoning, is a devastating blow to philosophy and everything else that depends on language. If it is the case that a tool is defective, it'll quite naturally manifest in the work we do with it. Philsophers, writers, speakers, time to request a product recall!
How does it apply to science specifically? And did you decide not to reply to my question? Do you not think science is at least doing some interesting things in neuroscience these days?
You're asking the right questions to the wrong person. Go to Joshs.
Quoting GLEN willows
Indeed, neuroscience has made great strides, but it's a work in progress.
Neuroscience is a work in progress, yes - isn't everything? It's finding far more exciting things than modern phil is, IMO.
Hey I've got an idea...why don't the two disciplines work together instead of showing disdain for each other? In fact a lot of philosophers and scientists are collaborating, and stunningly, find it almost painless! Might be worth a shot.
I second that motion! In medicine they've come to the conclusion that a multidisciplinary approach is the best approach to treatment.
Hey of course scientists can be equally dismissive of philosophy. Equally wrong. Bringing people together - that's what I do.
(That was ironic to the humour-challenged).
[quote=Benjamin Franklin]We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.[/quote]
I go one step further than Diogenes who claimed he was a cosmoplitan (citizen of the world), I'm a cosmopolitan (citizen of the universe). :smile:
What about language skepticism? Anything to report?
My definition then. Language skepticism is the position that language is (too) flawed to perform the tasks we assign to it and that includes everything spoken, written, signed. It can be summed up as trying to measure the correct length of a rod (find truths) with a defective scale (with a faulty language). It's quite odd that nobody's tried to invent/create the perfect language, powerful enough to get the job done.
I do understand that and have read a lot of the Philosophical Investigations, but It's a pretty dour theory - pretty doom and gloom. Do you really find language that flawed? Are we not at least PARTLY communicating our ideas right now? Enough for a worthwhile dialogue?
And it has one of philosophy's favourite methods - criticizing and asking questions without proffering any positive suggestions for improving things. What would the perfect language look like? I don't think W. shares anything on that.
Wittgenstein has nothing against language in general The perfect language is whatever language we are actually using at the moment. His beef is with ways we have been inclined to talk about how language works. This isnt the fault of language , but of our desire to reify it, to box it up and objectify it in that way we treat concepts such as grammar, meaning, sense and reference. Language is never faulty, but our use of it can be confused.
"....language is (too) flawed to perform the tasks we assign to it and that includes everything spoken, written, signed." Though he's a landmark thinker, I think this is an overstatement. These days more than ever language is being misused, but I don't think in the sense he meant.
Language has flaws, science has flaws, philosophy has flaws...
"Can't we all just get along?" - Rodney King.
Is my red the same as your red? We can never know, oui?
Of course, if my red is A and your red is B in a consistent way i.e. when we see red, I always see A and you always see B, we will agree on all issues of redness. However A [math]\neq[/math] B still.
The same applies to words. Take the word "god". It may mean X to me and Y to you. In the domain of ideas however, we have a way of checking whether we're talking about the same thing or not. Logic! X will be consistent with ideas that maybe inconsistent with Y. Not out of the woods though because these other ideas are also problematic in the exact same way X and Y are.
Imagine a world with only 2 words W[sub]1[/sub] and W[sub]2[/sub] and two people P[sub]1[/sub] and P[sub]2[/sub]. When P[sub]1[/sub] sees W[sub]1[/sub], he thinks meaning M[sub]1[/sub] and when P[sub]2[/sub] sees W[sub]1[/sub] he thinks meaning M[sub]2[/sub]. How do they determine whether they're talking about the same thing? They'll need to check for consistency/inconsistency vis-à-vis W[sub]2[/sub], its meaning to be precise. Unfortunately, when P[sub]1[/sub] sees W[sub]2[/sub], he thinks meaning M[sub]3[/sub] and when P[sub]2[/sub] sees W[sub]2[/sub] he thinks meaning M[sub]4[/sub]. It's quite obvious as to what they have to do - check for consistency/inconsistency in re the meaning of W[sub]1[/sub], but that's exactly what they don't know. W[sub]1[/sub]'s meaning can't be understood without W[sub]2[/sub]'s meaning and W[sub]2[/sub]'s meaning can't be understood without W[sub]1[/sub]'s meaning i.e. neither's meaning can be understood. Chicken-and-egg situation.
Could someone think grey, while another thinks yellow, without either noticing a difference. I'm not sure that's possible. If person A saw the yellow sun as grey, then all the light from the sun would be grey. If everything on earth was a dark grey, then would person A find the colour grey bright and cheery, and yellow dull? Would that person then say "too much grey hurts my eyes.
How would yellow person react to this?
The point is people WOULD notice differences in how they react to grey - one would be sheilding his eyes, the other not. Surely the difference would be noted.
That's a start
Can you fill in your formulas with real words in a way that wouldn't impact behaviour?
My argument speaks for itself, no? The agreement we sometimes encounter has to be a fluke e.g. when we accidentally see the same meaning in words. As far as I can see, there doesn't exist a failsafe method to ensure we all have the same meaning in mind when we discourse. The one that immediately jumped out at me - inconsistency checks (as you can see I've refined my position) - is no good. If there's a way out of this bottle, it is a Cartesian one i.e. we must find at least one word whose meaning is identical for everyone and then build up from thereon
Let me leave you with three questions to indicate the things I can't wrap my head around.
1) Is it possible for me to believe a round ball to be square, and you the opposite? Would I then say things like "don't be silly, that ball won't roll, it's ROUND!" Now multiply that confusion by thousands, possibly millions of times this would happen everyday all around the world. Finding a few words we use differently is mundane. So W. must have meant about a massive flaw in communication, suffered worldwide, and do you see evidence of that?
2) Is it possible to have a theory that is airtight, and SHOULD be true using reasoning, but simply isn't the way things really are? It's absolutely true that at this time we can't see into other's minds, and thus can't prove with absolute certainty that they see colours as we do. So I would never say I KNOW they see blue as I do. But I nonetheless can infer from things like if a person said to me "kittens are generally 10 feet long and attack giraffes out on the plains" she might be referring to a very different thing from me. In the real world it falls apart it seems to me
3) And isn't that the trouble, with many theories. The minute folks leave the university, they behaving very differently. They don't say "I better explain to Ann that we're going to the lake, because her word for lake my be different from mine"
I know I'll be accused of being low brow, and I've written proper formal essays on these issues. But I knew if I argued with the big W., my mark would plummet, so I didn't. But the more I think of a world with people all defining words differently, and ensuing chaos, the more I think it's at least a valid argument.
Causation and Hume is another perfect example. He was right, logically we never SEE causation, and even if something happened a million times, it might not have the 100,000,001th time. That's brilliant. But does anyone live that way, when the inductive probabilities are that hi? Even Hume didn't. Because induction actually works pretty well, as it turns out.
Cheers
Quoting GLEN willows
Many scholars argue that for Wittgenstein the very structure of language makes radical doubt impossible.
Thus we arrive to the end of Wittgenstein's critique of
skepticism. The core of his argumentation lies in asking the following: What kind of doubts does the skeptic raise? To which extent is it valid to insert those doubts in the language game in which we live? His answer to these interrogants emphasizes that some aspects of our thoughts cannot be doubted, since they are what allow us to construct our thoughts themselves, included the very formulation of any doubt. Thus the analysis of the skeptical doubt, its premises and consequences, allows him to prove that any doubt presuposses the existence of a field of certainty and hence, that skepticism cannot be the last word.
(WITTGENSTEIN AND THE LIMITS OF SKEPTICISM
Stella Villarmea)
Well true, communication, despite my, what is to me an interesting, argument (not in any way to be construed as tooting my own horn), seems to work. However, in the simplified scenario of a world with just two words, my argument seems to be sound, oui? As the number of words (our lexicon) expands, the difficulty in re ensuring we're on the same page seems to compound as the possibility space of meaning (of words) explodes.
I'll get back to you if I hit upon anything worth discussing, ok?
Thanks.
[quote=Ms. Marple]Most interesting.[/quote]
To say "Language is no good" is gibberish as language has, by that statement, been blackballed by the skeptic (sawing off branches one sits on, suicide) and so is unavailable to him.
On the flip-side, I really can't say "Language is good" because that would be a circulus in probando.
So the choices are:
1. Self-refutation (unacceptable)
OR
2. Circularity (unacceptable)
It's a dilemma! :snicker:
:zip:
3. Language needs improving?
Sorry I havent had much time lately. I made a post of what Im driving at here a year or so ago: basis for modern science. Maybe youll find it interesting.
There was an implicit conviction of a relationship between the cosmic, natural and human order
Do you mean a physical connection, as in were all made of atoms, come from stars, etc or do you mean a psychological connection of some sort, ex. Panpsychism?. And are you saying this is what modern science is missing?
I dont recall making that statement. Could you link me to where you found it? Ill be able to explain better if I remember the context. Thanks!
I know etymology is important to how weve developed our concept of nature and physical. Do you feel this shows that weve strayed from a more accurate portrayal of those terms? If not, Im not sure what youre point is, other than tracing the history of the words.
The words help us see what's actually happening, and so it's important to understand them.
The point is this:
1) "Real" is a loaded term that usually is defined as anything that science says is real.
2) What is "science"? Science is natural philosophy. Its ontological underpinning is naturalism.
3) What is "nature"? The word comes from the Latin natura, which is a translation of the Greek phusis, which is also where we get "physics." What does phusis mean? For the earlier Greeks, it meant something like a blooming or emerging, and for the later Greeks (e.g., Aristotle), it starts to take on a meaning closer to ousia -- which gets translated often as substance.
4) "Nature" has its ontological roots in substance theory. Today we describe the material world of objects and use empirical means -- observation, experimentation, etc. -- to explain them. This is usually how science is characterized. Nature is matter, energy, and forces.
So in terms of what's real -- yes, I think it's an honorific term. All kinds of things are real. If we define what's real as what's scientific, or natural, then that itself has a long tradition associated with it. Why should substances be any more "real" than anything else?
I think we should learn a little something from the earlier Greeks: reality is this. It's what's happening in our awareness and, importantly, outside our awareness. It's what's present before us, but also what's absent.
Lots more to say about this but I'll leave it there.
Thanks for your response, sorry for the delay in mine.
I'd like to clarify a couple of your points by asking some questions.
First I think it's fair to point out that science is not a `thing,' it's the result of the work and study of individual human beings. And it evolves as you point out - it was part of philosophy at one point. So when you say science tries to corner the market on the definition of real do you mean it existed in Aristotle's science, Galileo's science, modern science?
Secondly, If not as far back as Aristotle, then when in history did the scientific takeover of the definition of real take place?
Thirdly, are you saying that, again, science tries to corner the market on the definition "real" for us back as far as the greeks, or is this a more recent development?
I'm not being facetious or snarky, I ask this in the interests of "defining terms" or in this case tracing a historical background.
Glen
Why is science not a "thing"? Of course it's a thing. It's a human activity, yes. It's as much a thing as philosophy or art is a thing. It's just the name given for a certain kind of human activity.
Quoting Xtrix
It's not that science tries to corner the market, it's that science's ontology is essentially naturalism, a substance ontology. Perhaps many people claim science is the sole road to truth and "reality" -- that's undoubtedly true -- but science itself, as a human activity attempting to explain the world, assumes an idea about the world that attempts to explain it in terms of natural processes -- i.e., in terms of "nature." If it doesn't, it's not science. At least in my view.
In that respect, yes it existed from Aristotle onward -- all the ways its changed notwithstanding.
Quoting Xtrix
I'm saying science takes for granted that the world (and what's "real") is what's natural. Almost by definition. It assumes this. Anything "beyond" nature is considered supernatural and beyond science's understanding, and is usually (and rightly) met with skepticism.
Philosophy (and sometimes religion) isn't so restricted, however. In terms of ontology, which itself underlies science (natural philosophy), we can ask about beings in general -- and what "natural" beings are, what nature means, etc., and even inquire as to what being itself means. At the heart of this question is the nature of one being in particular, of course the human being.
Quoting GLEN willows
Science is not a unified thing, in the sense that you were using it. Saying "science says..." this or that is as simplistic as saying "philosophy says there is no truth." Whose philosophy, and when?
We do agree that science doesn't deal with the supernatural and metaphysics, and indeed we agree "rightly so" as you said. Science deals with objects that provably have substance, so as of this date science can NOT explain consciousness.
I may have assigned a more negative tone to your texts, because I do sense a negative aspect to a lot of comments on TPF regarding science, which I find puzzling. And it's usually surrounding the issue of what is "real." Science looks at objects with substance as real, different philosophers have different theories...keeping in mind they are just theories.
To me the arguments that nothing can be called "real" unless directly observed (ex. Van Fraassen] are silly and create an unnecessarily competitive context (you are either anti-realist or realist}. Empiricism ad absurdum. It rules out even microspores or telescopes. This is still taught at the university level BTW.
But I understand the argument, and the different uses of the word 'real" - just not sure if there's a major problem with that. Many words have different meanings to different people *morality, justice, etc.
So can you clarify a} are you making a critique of science and the scientific method, or just a benign comment that it has a particular ontology and b} can you name a different definition of real other than what science uses? Are you referring to pan-psychism...supernatural claims? I honestly could use some info on that.