Schopenhauer's Will as blind?

KantDane21 October 25, 2022 at 17:06 2750 views 6 comments
Copleston stated of Schopenhauer's notion of a metaphysically "blind" will:

"If the Will is blind it cannot know itself either directly or through the phenomenon, while, if it is the phenomenon, it must recognize itself as the phenomenon, setting itself in distinction, under its phenomenal aspect, from the noumenon and so turning the latter into object, idea, into phenomenon."

I understand the first part of this passage (that which is blind cannot have direct knowledge (aka a type of "intellectual intuition" of itself, or indirectly through appearances in the phenomenal world, it's "blindness" prohibits this knowledge, clearly), yet the rest is not clear. As phenomenon, how can it possible "set itself in distinction...from the noumenon, and thereby turn in into object? I'm lost!

Comments (6)

jancanc October 26, 2022 at 08:32 #751689
It is a little trick, not entirely clear what he means. This is how I see it:

If the will is blind it cannot know itself directly or indirectly (through the phenomenon).
Since, if it is phenomenon it must recognize itself as phenomenon. If it recognizes itself as phenomenon it knows, but it is not the noumenon (the noumenon cannot know).
It then must then, as phenomenon, distinguish itself from the noumenon.
This act of distinguishing turns noumenon into an object of knowledge.

But, how this last part relates to the Will being blind, I am not so sure.
Tom Storm October 26, 2022 at 09:07 #751691
Reply to KantDane21 I think it means, as per Bernardo Kastrup's words, that Schopenhauer's Will is without metacognition; it is instinctive and striving.

Brief essay.

https://blog.apaonline.org/2020/03/12/vindicating-schopenhauer-undoing-misunderstandings-of-his-metaphysics/
Metaphysician Undercover October 26, 2022 at 12:01 #751704
In traditional Christian theology, I believe the will is considered to be independent from the rational part of the intellect. It does not necessarily follow reason, nor does it necessarily follow concupiscent feelings. This is what makes it free, and not necessarily following reason accounts for the fact that a person can knowingly do what one knows to be wrong. This renders the cause of willed activity fundamentally unknowable, and the will itself, as that cause, is fundamentally unknowable.

KantDane21 October 27, 2022 at 08:28 #751898
Quoting Tom Storm
per Bernardo Kastrup's words, that Schopenhauer's Will is without metacognition; it is instinctive and striving.


but would you say it is a criticism per se? it seems very odd the wording...
KantDane21 October 27, 2022 at 08:29 #751899
Quoting KantDane21
"If the Will is blind it cannot know itself either directly or through the phenomenon, while, if it is the phenomenon, it must recognize itself as the phenomenon, setting itself in distinction, under its phenomenal aspect, from the noumenon and so turning the latter into object, idea, into phenomenon."


Tom Storm October 27, 2022 at 09:37 #751911
Reply to KantDane21 I think the essay I attached explains it. But it will take 10-15 minutes.