On the Relationship Between Precedence and Necessity
If entity A is necessary for the existence of entity B (and B is not necessary for A), then does it necessarily follow that that entity A is also logically prior to entity B, and if entity A is logically prior to entity B, does that not also mean that it is temporally prior to entity B as well (in terms of the first possible occurrence of entity B), or does logical necessity not necessarily also imply temporal priority?
The reason why I ask is because I have created an entire system of philosophy which is based in this first principle which I hold to be self-evident because it cannot be denied without contradiction.
The reason why I ask is because I have created an entire system of philosophy which is based in this first principle which I hold to be self-evident because it cannot be denied without contradiction.
Comments (91)
I am a sceptic about necessity. But putting that aside, if A exists of necessity and B depends on A, A and B can nevertheless exist simultaneously. That is, in the beginning A and B can exist. Yet A exists of necessity and B contingently. Not that 'necessary' and 'contingent' mean anything, of course.
but of course, I am not using the word necessity here in the absolute sense, as in A necessarily exists because the existence of A is logically impossible, and hence that A exists eternally, I am using the term in the relative sense such that if B exists, and A is necessary for the existence of B, then B implies the prior existence of A (so long as A and B are not co-necessary).
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
I mean that I do not believe it makes sense as a concept. And nor does 'contingent' either. So I do not believe that reality contains 'necessary' and 'contingent' existences. There's just what exists. Nothing that exists exists of necessity or contingently, for those are empty terms. They say nothing about what exists. And no truths are necessary or contingent for the same reason.
If one tries to define a necessary truth, one will have to make mention of contingency and so one's definition will be 'a necessary truth is not a contingent truth'. And if one tries to define a contingent truth, one will be able to do no better than 'not a necessary truth'.
And so necessary truths and contingent truths are no different from hoity truths and toity truths, where a hoity truth is not a toity truth and a toity truth is not a hoity truth.
So, my claim that necessity is unreal is just true, I would say, and is neither necessarily true nor contingently true, but just true.
firstly, this is a logically impossible hypothetical scenario, so theres no point of even trying to use it as a mental experiment. secondly, it contains contradictions, for the first like part of the statement says that both floors are eternal and the second part says that the second is it eternal. if they both exist eternally, they are both exist necessarily. you cannot claim that they are both eternal and then subsequently that because the second necessitates the prior existence of the first, that the first is temporally prior to the second. this is a contradiction in terms here. this I why you shouldnt use logically impossible hypothetical scenarios in thought experiments.
You cannot deny the existence of the categories of necessity and contingency without denying the existence of time. Are you also prepared to deny that fact that the present logically follows from the past and that the past and present do not exist simultaneously? Where is this absurd belief that the categories of contingency and necessity are manmade constructs coming from?
when you say that logical necessity is logically impossible, you cannot do so without contradicting yourself, for the proposition is either necessary or it is not necessary and therefore contingent, and if it is contingent, it is true sometimes and not at others, and also, necessarily continent and not possibly contingent. do you see how your using the category of necessity to deny the possibility of necessity here?
No it isn't. That's question begging. Explain how it is logically impossible. (It's from Kant)
No, you're conflating 'exists of necessity' with 'exists eternally'. They're different. The first entails the latter, the latter does not entail the first. You're affirming the consequent.
Yes I can. There are no necessary truths or contingent truths. But it is true that time exists. There.
this is an easy one, because buildings cannot exist eternally. they are contingent upon the prior existence of manmade building materials, and also of humans. are you prepared to also make the claim that humans are eternal, that the earth is eternal, and also the solar system?
No, I do not deny that. Why would you think I would deny that?
how can it be possible for something to exist eternally and exist not necessarily, but contingently. this is another logically impossible state of relations here
You're begging the question. Remember: I deny the reality of necessity and contingency.
Look, do you deny that there are any hoity truths?
Can't you see that 'eternal' and 'necessity' are different?
what you mean to say is that there are no necessary or contingent truths except for the truth that there are no necessary or contingent truths, and this is a self-contradiction.
also, you cannot make the claim that time exists without also implying that the present logically follows from the past and this invoking the category of necessity, and also contingency (and this is because they are logical opposites).
These are different notions, then. Which is just as well, for eternal existence makes sense, whereas 'necessary' existence is nonsense.
No, I know better than you do what I mean to say.
I said it is true that time exists.
I say it is nonsense to say that time exists 'of necessity' and nonsense to say 'time exists contingently'. Just as it is nonsene to say 'time exists hoitily' or to say 'time exists of toitily'.
And I say that it is 'true' that there are no necessary truths or contingent truths. I do not say that is necessarily true, for that would be to speak nonsense.
they are not different. if x exists eternally, x exists necessarily, meaning that its existence is logically impossible. if x exists contingently, it is dependent upon the prior existence of something else, and is therefore not eternal (unless that contingent entity is co-contingent with some eternally existing entity).
how is this not obvious to you?
Oh, ok then. Jesus.
And no, if something exists eternally it does not therefore exist of necessity. Bloody hell. This is basic.
If something exists of necessity, then it exists eternally. The reverse does not hold. You know, because 'eternal' doesn't mean 'necessary'.
Look, if you're using the word 'necessity' to mean 'eternally' then you're misusing a word. Not my fault. Yours.
I didnt say that the word necessity necessarily refers to eternally existing entities, for something can be necessary for the existence of something else and not be eternal (e.g. space is necessary for motion and space is not eternal); however, it is logically impossible for an entity to exist eternally and not exist necessarily. this follows necessarily from the law of non contradiction. if you do not make the distinction between necessary and contingent beings, you cannot make a distinction, conceptually, between eternal and non-eternal beings (or relations), and you cannot simply presume that non-eternal beings do not exist without proof (which I presume is what youre going to do next).
So, if object X exists contingently, then that's consistent with it actually existing.
Now imagine that object x exists at every moment in time.
It's still existing contingently, isn't it? Or are you now going to deny this becasue you now can't accept that you were wrong to confuse 'exists of necessity' with 'exists eternally'?
Of course, if you are just using the word 'necessary' to mean 'eternally' (and 'contingent' to mean 'not eternal') then I do think that there are necessary and contingent existences!
No, that's just you asserting what you're mistaken about. Say it as often as you like, it's not going to be true.
Again: X exists contingently. Now imagine X existing at every moment in time. Now it exists eternally. But it still exists contingently.
You're just confused matey. Quoting TheGreatArcanum
What?
Show your working. You don't seem to know what important words mean. So, the law of non-contradiction says that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. Yes?
I think that's true.
Now, show me how you get from that law to the conclusion that if something exists eternally, it exists of necessity.
by definition, if something exists contingently, it does not exist necessarily, and therefore had the potential to come into and out of being (which is not true of something that exists necessarily because it is eternal).
if I imagine that a contingent being exists in every moment of time, which I cannot actually do, for that would take an eternity, then it wouldnt necessarily follow that that contingent being is eternal because my mere conception that something is physically possible doesnt make it physically possible.
You don't seem to understnad what I am asking you.
Something can exist and its existence can be contingent, yes? (Not something I beleive - for I believe 'contingent' is nonesense - but it's something you believe).
So, the fact something exists is not evidence that it exists of necessity.
You've be a total fucking spanner if you reasoned 'X exists....therefore X exists of necessity" yes? FOr then everything that exists exists of necessity -which, I take it, is not something you think?
So, does anything stop a thing that exists at one moment from existing at all others? No.
So, imagine that thing - the thing that is existing contingently now - existing at all monents.
Does it now magically exist of necessity? No. You: yes. You're wrong.
ok. Is it eternally true, or did it become true in some moment of time, and if so, how long will it be true and when will it become false again?
if it is not eternally true, it is by definition contingently true because its existence depends upon its truth maker, and if it is eternally true, it is necessarily eternally true because it cannot not be eternally true, that is, because its non-existence is logically impossible.
I think it's always been true. But perhaps I'm wrong about that. Doesn't matter: the important point is that it is true.
Now show me how that law somehow entails that if something has always existed, then it exists of necessity.
Then it exists necessarily and not contingently because its being false is logically impossible.
on that note. I think I call it a night. I need to get your poop smell off of me now.
No it doesn't. That's you just insisting that if a proposition has always been true, then it is true of necessity. Stop begging the question.
Now, once more: try and show how the law of non-contradiction shows how if something has always existed, it thereby exists of necessity.
You're having one of two thoughts right now - you're either thinking "shit, I am being hugely outclassed here and need to run away or have my face blown clean off by the force of this guy's reason" or you're thinking "this guy is making no sense whatsoever - he's clearly the biggest idiot here for nothing he thinks seems like anything I think. Better go - can't profit by reasoning with someone this stupid".
Which is it, punk?
An interesting OP. :up:
Mill's 5 methods (to establish causality).
1. Method of agreement
A, B, C occur with w, x, y
A, D, E occur with w, t, u
When w, also A (A is a necessary cause of w).
.
.
.
Visit Wikipedia for more.
thank you.
Quoting Agent Smith
if one denies causality, that doesnt mean that one also denies necessity, and this is because the category of necessity can exist independently of the category of causality. that is to say that if x is necessary for y that it doesnt necessarily follow that x causes y (e.g. glass is necessary for glass jars, but glass doesnt cause glass jars), but that if x causes y, and only x can cause y, then the existence of c is necessary for the existence of y (so causality implies necessity).
An astute observation. What, if I may be so bold as to ask, exactly are you driving at here? As far as I can tell, we have on our hands an intertwined tangled ball of cognate concepts and our task seems to be obvious.
so you guys have chased all the philosophers away, and now theres only sophists left here? its a barren wasteland on this forum, a body without a soul, it seems.
not until you have a soul.
Philosophers vs. Sophists? A topic for another discussion mon ami.
Picking up where we left off, I'd say that you're on the right track but I sense multiple obstacles up ahead and I'm too old and exhausted to be of any help.
you ask me to define my terms. you then disagree with the definitions. and then we spend the whole time talking about definitions and not of what those definitions mean, and then we talk in circles all day getting nowhere, and this, by definition, is where the sophist wins his battles, on the battlefield of definitions, and of our supposed inability to define things and relations with absolute certainty. Its not like I want to go down this road either, as it only ends in disagreement.
As far as I can tell we're not doing anything that other ("great") philosophers haven't done!
To return to what you seem to be interested in, temporal precedence is implied in necessity; however, it may not be so for all.
What on earth are you talking about?
I'm scoutin'!
you cannot have an atom without a nucleus, so the existence of atoms is contingent upon the prior existence of nuclei, so to deny that logical necessity does not imply temporal precedence, you would have to prove that something can come into existence after the things which are necessary for its existence, and you would thus have to prove, for example, that an atom can exist without a nuclei. In other words, you would have to prove the logically impossible to be possible.
Quoting Agent Smith
for all? how can it be true for some and not for all? do you have any examples of things that can come into being independently of the things which are necessary for their existence?
I understand that youre claiming this, without proof. Im just asking for your proof that something which is logically necessary for something else, can come into existence after that thing (in terms of the first possible occurrence of that thing).
bones are necessary for human bodies, so all you have to do is prove that human bodies can exist independently of bones (in terms of the first possible occurrence), and you will have proven me wrong and you right.
If you wish to call yourself a philosopher, here is your chance to prove yourself.
The answer I am inclined to give is that causation, logical linking, and necessary existence for something else all require temporal precedence. However, this is not true in Quantum Mechanics.
Some philosophers came up with the idea that our LOGIC systems were developed by getting shaped by environmental observations of mankind. All human observation has been shaped, influenced and without fail, by events observed that all followed the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, and the laws of syllogisms. The reason our logic is so tightly wound around beliefs that they are always true, is that our evolving minds had no need to think any other way.
Then came quantum mechanics, quantum physics.
Its logic has spit in the face of intuition based on human logic.
The best the theoretical philosophers could do to doctor this situation was to call human-intuitive logic Logic 1 and counter-human-intuitive-logic, Logic 2.
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You are only half right in this demand.
Popper's theorem of what constitutes scientific findings is the key here, I think. An a priori proof has not been found to prove Hume wrong, inasmuch as events are in a causational flow or in a constant random sequence, where by coincidence -- for lack of a better word -- the illusion is generated of causation.
And you ask us to find that a priori proof, and present it to you, in order to be worthy of calling ourselves philosophers.
The bar is too high.
You did change the raw quesiton; you made a question whereby the cause is or prior event is necessary for the ensuing event. But that does not change the postion of the reclining beauty (a Hungarian expression -- pardon me). In other words, you are still setting up a theorem that -- in my opinion -- nobody can prove.
Why can't anybody prove it? Because. (And that's my best and final answer.) In other words, the theory of causality and the theory of coincidentality are perfectly flawless and acceptable, even though they are different. And they are not mutually exclusive.
I think that the logic of quantum mechanics is ultimately derived from classical logic. this is because quantum logical pertains to spatial categories, and space is not eternal.
Im not evening talking about causation here, but about the relationship between logical necessity and temporal precedence.
This question can be decided two ways: analytically, and experientially.
First I make a question from your wondering:
Can an event A which is logically necessary to precipitate another event B NOT precede B in chronological starting time of existence?
I am too small to decide it analytically. I put it to you that no human being can get close to the solution that way. I can supply no proof for that. And asking any philosopher to give you a definitive answer is asking too much.
Experientially it is easy to prove that the answer to my question's yes, and hard to prove that the answer is no. To show that the answer is yes, the philosopher has to find an example for it. No examples (real world events) exist in that way. So it is easy to prove, but the proof has not happened yet.
To show that the answer is no experimentally, you need to obsrve all events, examine the events in which such precipitation occurs, and see that they all follow the rule of intuition. If they ALL follow, including all events ever in the future, then you proved experientially that the answer is no, it can't.
On the other hand, while developing qm behavour's math models, the logic has shifted to observing calculated events that are logically impossible with an explanation using only classical logic.
While the math is all classical logic, the interpretation yields real events that are not logical by our intutition and by our logic.
If mathematics are not illusory, and if the occurrence of geometric points is necessary for the occurrence of geometric figures, then this would be one example of logical necessity devoid of temporal priority: the geometric figure logically necessitates geometric points thought both are fully concurrent.
I believe other examples of conceivable relations wherein temporal priority is not implied in the given logical necessity are possible, but nowhere as easy to articulate. Backward causation is one such (and it presumes a block universe). Even more complexly would be top-down and bottom-up constraints (as theyve been often enough termed on this forum). Were Aristotle's causes to be viewed as metaphysically occurring rather than as merely being "explanations to why questions", the same could be argued to apply to some such, like material causes.
Out of curiosity, if this happens to make a difference: Are you addressing this issue in regard to what does or can ontically occur or, else, in regard to our human capacity to conceptualize various forms of logical necessity (whether or not our conceptions be illusory)?
what is an opinion to you may be an analytic a priori truth for me (which is proven elsewhere).
Quoting god must be atheist
even if it were to be shown to be false, empirically, it wouldn't negate the analytic necessity of the a priori truth; it would simply mean that time has a bi-conditional arrow, that there are two different directions in which logical necessity can flow (which is always in the direction in which time is flowing, I presume).
Quoting god must be atheist
I do believe that we must use non-classical logic to understand QM, but not that classical logic is derived from non-classical logic. according to my understanding, if classical logic is necessary for non-classical logic, then classical logically is at the very least logically prior, and at the very most both logically and temporally prior to the categories of non-classical logic.
one can speak of the relationship between precedence and geometry without invoking temporal relations, but one cannot speak of the relationship between knowledge and geometry without invoking temporal relations.
Quoting javra
I am looking to use the a priori analytic truth: "If A is necessary for B (and B is not necessary for A), then A is necessarily either logically prior or both logically and temporally prior to B in time (in terms of the absolute first possible occurrence of B), as a foundation for a new modal method which is based, not in the concepts of necessity and possibility (as antitheses), but the concepts of necessity and contingency (antitheses).
of course, I have already created this new method and philosophy, and am ready to publish it. Using this fundamental a priori axiom as a foundation for my methodology, I have determined the precedence relationships between the natural categories of physics (e.g. space, time, mass, velocity, volume, etc) and the natural categories of the mind (e.g. memory, understanding, and intentionality, etc), and have shown, undeniably (I believe) that the categories of the mind are logically necessary for the categories of physics.
According to my understanding, the only possible way to disprove my philosophy is to disprove the truth "If A necessitates B , then B is logically prior to A," hence the reason why I am posting it here.
Of course, as expected, I was gracefully met by those who deny the possibility of logical necessity while (unknowingly) using thoughts that necessitate the category of logical necessity. But would this even be a philosophy forum if I were not greeted by sophists first?
Got it. Thanks for the background info. I think I agree with the case you've just made, because ...
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
Since you use "or both" I so far don't find any problems in this a priori analytic truth as expressed.
Good luck to you.
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
I am not a very careful reader. but I sense that in the first quote you ask us to prove the proposition, or rather, to make a judgement on it (which implies it can be decided by voting) and then in the second quote you refer to the proposition as a put down fact. (Correct by an a priori consideration.)
So which is it? Do you want us to prove your proposition, or else to accept it as truth unconditionally, since an a priory proof exists?
Now I am confused. Please enlighten me. Why are we asked to prove something when it's true in an a priori way?
sorry, I do not mean to say that it is in need of proof, either a priori or a posteriori; but rather its truth is self-evident and therefore not in need of any proof, and this is because one cannot deny it without presupposing that it is true (i.e. because it pertains to the structure of thought itself, which cannot possibly be organized differently).
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
... but this question was not put in the OP. One can find out the need for the post only by getting to this line... which forms the kernel of the inquiry.... would be nicer, and more conducive to your cause, if you included this dilemma in the op.
No big deal, I am okay with this, it's only a small mistake in composition. But now it seems you are moving the goalposts, nevertheless.
I have edited the original post. I have removed the poll and posted that I intend to use it as a fundamental axiom for an entire system of philosophy.
I am actually ready to publish and am looking to hire editors, but I cannot seem to find any competent ones, and this is because I've probably been looking in the wrong places.
You have a thesis that is false, but you're so convinced it is true no argument will sway you, as any argument that contradicts your confused thesis is, as you see it, faulty for that very reason.
You think that existing eternally and existing of necessity are the same. That is already profoundly confused. They're not the same. Something that exists of necessity will always exist - so it will exist eternally - but it does not follow that if something exists eternally it will exist of necessity.
Now, I showed you this. Anything that exists contingently right now, can - in principle - exist at every moment in time. And then it would exist eternally. But it wouldn't thereby exist of necessity - it remains a contingent existence.
If you can understand that, then you will also be able to see how there is nothing in the notion of necessity that requires a necessary existent to exist 'before' a contingent one. They can exist concurrently.
I have already cleared this up. I think that you are confused here. I think that there is a difference between relative necessity and absolute necessity, and that absolute necessity implies eternal necessity because its non-existence is absolutely logically impossible, and then theres relative necessity, which doesnt imply absolute necessity, which is what my method pertains to (e.g. apples necessitate apple trees, therefore apple trees are logically necessary for apples. I dont claim that because apple trees are logically necessary for apples that apple trees are eternal. This is where you misunderstand me.
However, I do think that if something is eternal, that it is absolutely necessary and not relatively necessary, unless it is co-necessary with another eternal thing (then it is both relatively and absolutely necessary). But I think that we are getting beyond what you have the potential to comprehend here.
You cannot claim that something eternal does not exist of necessity, or rather, that its non-existence is logically possible. This is what you are saying, and this is a blatant contradiction.
Your thought experiment doesnt imply the existence of eternal contingency (i.e. just because you can imagine a contingent being existing eternally it doesnt follow that it is necessary that that is the case), and Im not sure why you would think that thats the case. You cant imagine a contingent being existing eternally without being eternal, what youre saying is I can imagine a contingent being existing for a short duration of time, therefore, I can imagine a contingent being existing for an eternal duration of time, and this isnt necessarily possible unless you are also eternal. Is this what youre claiming, that you are eternal and contingent? Where is your proof? Because youre making an a valid induction here.
also, this is checkmate. I have to move on to having meaningful discussions now. be well, and remember, if you dont question your own skepticism, you are a dogmatist and not a skeptic.
as I said in my comments above, I have already created an entire method and system of philosophy using axioms such as these, as well as others. my conclusions prove mental monism true. It really is quite a spectacular system. I am almost ready to publish and am looking for editors. Im also ready to present my work in a formalized setting.
Yes, but you just think that and I refuted the idea. So this is tedious. I can just keep refuting it if you want, and then you can just keep insisting that if something exists eternally then it exists of necessity, even though that's demonstrably not true.
For example, presumably you do not believe all things exist of necessity. So, some contingent things exist alongside some necessary existences. Now simply imagine that at the beginning .
Well surely you see that I'm rejecting that sense of "necessary"?
:wink:
You could always quote something from that link and discuss it.
It would benefit this community if after publication you'd kindly let us know the publisher, the publication, and the venue (in case it's a paper you present) and the corresponding details so we could follow the events. This of course is not a demand but a request. Thanks.
Ooops. I discounted the rule on this site to preserve anonymity of users. I'd ask prior permission from Jamal before disclosing the facts, or else just forget about my request, if I were you.
he thinks that because he can imagine the existence of a past eternal contingent being that past eternal contingent beings exist, and therefore that it isnt necessarily the case that all eternal beings are contingent beings, and I told him that and eternal being is, by definition, a necessary being, because its non-existence is logically impossible, which is not the case for contingent beings (which have a non-existence that is logically possible). he thinks that when I say necessity, that I am saying that something is eternally necessary, and that that isnt necessarily the case, and I keep trying to tell him that I conceive of a difference between eternal necessity and relative necessity, which does not entail relative necessity (e.g. trees are necessary for paper, therefore trees are logically prior or even temporally prior to paper (but not eternally existing because they are necessary).
of course, I would deny that one cannot deny the existence of naturally existing (non thought dependent) modal relationships without denying the existence of time and mind as natural (non thought dependent) categories of being.
I would like to do this. As of right now, I am having trouble finding people in academia who are willing to help me, I am also thinking about presenting my work in a YouTube video after my book is released, and then just making a condensed bare bones academic paper which does not include any of my prose sections, but only the method and its application, and applying to present it at a graduate conference.
my doctoral dissertation is pretty much done, as Ive created an entire original system of philosophy and this, I think, probably makes me worthy of a receiving a PhD (at least in some places?), but I dont even have my bachelors yet because I am self-taught, so I am not sure if it is possible to just apply for a PhD and get it without getting my bachelors (which is what I would prefer to do).
Er, it isn't. So, I present you with an argument that demonstrates your view to be false (and the example I employed is based on one by Kant so, you know, not some dumbo). And your reply is simply to reiterate your conviction that if something exists eternally, then it exists of necessity.
Once more: if something exists of necessity, it exists eternally.
It does not follow that if something exists eternally, then it exists of necessity.
Now, try and address my argument. The mug in front of me exists contingently (or those who believe in contingency and necessity will all agree it does). And it exists now. Nothing in principle stops something tah exists at one moment in time from existing at all of them. There aren't weird 'no entry' signs around some moments of time and not others.
So, it can exist at every moment in time. But it wouldn't thereby magically become a necessary existent. See yet?
YOur view is demonstrably false. There is nothing in the notion of necessity that requires that a necessary existent must exist 'prior' to the existence of any contingent thing, for there is nothing in the notion of a contingent thing that is incompatible with a contingent thing existing eternally.
All you are saying in reply is to reiterate over and over your conviction that to exist eternally is to exist of necessity.
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
I think it was either Plato, Socrates, or Aristotle (although I might be totally wrong) who said that a future event could be considered the cause of a previous one in the sense that the future event is the only possible end for the previous one (I might also be totally wrong here). How I see it, for example, is that I imagine there is a black hole which originated from a star; and I consider the possibility of there being a black hole right now as the cause for the origin and evolution of the star. So, that the star will become a black hole and that a black hole is possible to occur after the death of the star is what causes the star to become. In this case the black whole would be logically prior to the star (as in it is necessary that a black whole can form for the star that will become it to exist) but would follow it, temporally.
Now that I think I recall a bit better, I think the original argument concerns form and substance and that it is the end of substance to acquire shape through the assimilation of form and that it is this end the actual cause of the behaviours one observes in substance, or something like that. I guess one could consider the end of an evolving process to be its own cause if the end is necessary.
Yeah, I'm not keen on using "necessary" to discriminate between kinds of true statements. I prefer the way I set out in that OP. We may discuss the differences, or not.
my philosophy is defined in terms of contingency (dependency) and not necessity, I just see them as being logical opposites (e.g. if x is contingent upon y, y is necessary for x).
You cannot have one without the other. Earlier you spoke of necessary truths didn't you?
I didnt say that you could. I speak of relatively necessary truths and then absolutely (eternally) necessary truths.
Ive laid all of this out as clearly as I possibly can in my previous comments.
I'm not doubting that you have not laid it all out. I'm rejecting using the notion of "necessary" as a means to discriminate between kinds of true statements.
It also seems like you're equivocating the term "necessary", at first blush anyway.
Perhaps, but in order to have accomplished such a feat, pursuant to the query in the OP, logically consistent refutation of CPR B288 should be presented, or at least be expressed in abstentia.
The Kantian provision says .
.. It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding .
.which is to say, entities A and B, and the relations between them, are irrelevant without an exposition beforehand on the faculty of understanding, such that A and B are entities determinable as conceptions in a predicate, or entities as simple stand-alone subject.
On the other hand, if this should be the case provable in your thesis ..
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
.then you havent created an entire system of philosophy at all, but instead, merely clothed an established transcendental philosophy in a different colored dress, insofar as the understanding, being conditioned by time alone, makes temporal priority explicit in the deduction of its categories.
Still ..cheers for diving into the metaphysical deep end. Most folks dont much care that there is one, and thereby dont realize how deep it can be.
the intuition is grounded in self-intuition, and my method is grounded in the structure of self-intuition, or rather, in the axioms that mediate the categories of the mind.
I have also used my method to establish an original philosophy of mind. I believe that philosophers will find this section to be very profound, and even, one of the most profound sections on the mind ever written.
Quoting Mww
there is no method like mine, so far as I am aware, although, there maybe similar methods which are not widely known because a prior methods are presupposed by many today to be less preferable than empirical methods.
also, I would say that intuition is not conditioned by time alone, but also by memory, and also, that time and intuition are co-necessary.
I have worked the relationship between time and precedence out in a way that is sufficient for me to use my method in a apodictic way, and to establish the precedence relationships between all of the most fundamental categories.
Quoting Mww
Thank you for your response. I have had the most rewarding experience while writing this book, I am no longer just conceiving of spirit anymore, I have become it.
I am using a variation of Kants definition of synthetic and analytic truths, one which is defined in terms of necessity and contingency and not containment and non-containment.
That would be interesting. What does a propositional account of such axiom look like? In a tripartite logical human cognitive system, the categories are the mediator. Being pure conceptions themselves, it would seem self-destructive of the system for the pure mediator to be mediated.
But I see why you might attempt such an exposition, insofar as no established philosophical doctrine has been able to state that by which the categories are themselves legislated. I might caution, perhaps unnecessarily, that metaphysical reductionism can only go so far before it becomes logically absurd.
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
but also by negates alone. Minor self-contradiction, to be sure, but might warrant some re-consideration.
If you say intuition is conditioned by time alone, are you referring to the faculty of phenomenal representation in itself, without regard to sensibility? I ask because intuition of real physical objects by which our internal phenomena are possible, are also equally conditioned by space.
Time and intuition are co-necessary ..for what? For cognition in general, sure. Intuition, whether faculty or representation created by that faculty, without time is impossible for humans, but time is already given whether there be intuition or not. Your thesis should demonstrate how time is in fact a given, if it is, or, how the system would operate if it is not.
Finally .do you have a connection between the conception memory and the conception consciousness?
my categories are not purely abstract, as is the case with Kants, but natural categories. My main categories of the mind are memory, understanding, and intentionality, not modality, quality, quantity, and relation. I think that Kant went too far in his deduction, and this is because there are no categories beyond the understanding that exist independently of the understanding.
Quoting Mww
I am not sure what you mean by this, but I probably disagree with it and have a sound reason for doing so.Quoting Mww
I went back and edited my comment shortly after posting, it is supposed to say not conditioned by time alone.
Quoting Mww
I would never claim that intuition is conditioned by time alone unless Ive made a typo. Also, I would contend that the category of understanding can exist independently of the categories of sensation (touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing), and can prove rather easily using my method that this must be the case.
Quoting Mww
co-necessary for each other, and also, for memory, and also, intentionality. the totality of which formulate cognition (although, I would never use that word because it is too robotic and lifeless), or rather, as I like to call it subjectivity.
time is given whether or not there is intuition, if and only if the mind is not an eternally existing entity. I can show that the mind is eternally existing, and therefore that time and mind are eternally co-necessary for each other.
Quoting Mww
consciousness is an ambiguous term, hence the reason I dont use it very often. but my conception is that consciousness pertains to the logical relationships between the categories of the mind and the categories of sensation (and also, the categories of perception), while subjectivity, or the mind in itself, pertains to the internal relationships between the categories of the mind considered in themselves (independently of the categories of sensation and perception).
Thats fine, although I myself see your distinction as exchanging category for faculty, but to each theory its own definitions, right?
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
Cool.
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Quoting TheGreatArcanum
In my parlance, and perhaps I should have made it explicit, the time I talk about is no more than the time I conceive as ground for something else also of mine that I can talk about. Hence, a mind considered as eternally existing is not a required antecedent for this conception of time.
Perhaps in your parlance, time is being treated as a completely self-subsisting something-or-other, then the argument could be made that kind of time needs an eternally existing mind for its possibility. Dunno how an eternally existing anything can be shown beyond logical conditions. And logical conditions alone have no warrant for ontological existences.
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Quoting TheGreatArcanum
Yes, Id agree with that, with the caveat that time is also co-necessary for the objects of the understanding, which are usually called conceptions.
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Quoting TheGreatArcanum
Ok.
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
Ok, with qualifications, in that you assign categories differently than what Im used to. Usually, the categories proper have no internal relation, at least to each other, which I take you to mean.
Anyway .this new philosophical method. How does it work? Whats the irreducible starting point?
Im not entirely sure what this means exactly.
Quoting Mww
in my philosophy, time is nothing but the persistence in existence of that which exists. one could also call this duration. It is distinguished from relative time, which is defined in relation to the categories of space and motion. This is not the case for the category of duration (which I also call absolute time, for it pertains to that which exists outside of space, and is not contingent upon relative time.
In my philosophy, logical conditions are presupposed by ontological conditions and ontological conditions are presupposed by logical conditions. that is, the law of identity (for example) (X=X) is defined such that X represents a particular category, and that category is what it is and is not what it is not in each moment of time so long as it exists, meaning that that which exists is necessarily defined in relation to what it is not, and also, in relation to time because as a fundamental principle of ontology, nothing can exist that does not persist for a non-zero duration of time.
Quoting Mww
I think that the purely logical categories do share modal relationships with each other.
Quoting Mww
the irreducible starting point is the first principle shown above in my original post. I call it the Law of Precedence. There are other variations of it that I have not yet divulged. I am very excited about it. Im having my book edited right now.
Does it escape Quine's deconstruction of that distinction in Two Dogmas?
Id agree modal categories share the relationship of time with each other, but thats the extent of my agreement so far. Mostly because I dont consider the categories in accordance with your thesis.
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
What method? There may be an irreducible first principle employed by the method, but first principles do not describe the method that uses it.
Precedence. As in ordered sequential priorities? So Law of Ordered Sequential Priorities? Sounds an awful lot like plain ol cause and effect to me. Why isnt it?
And ..
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
.is straight outta Aristotle, unequivocally applicable to objects whether in concerto or in abstractia
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
Yeah, that too. For any given conception, for whatever can be thought, its negation, is given immediately by it. It follows as a matter of course the relation of a definition is that it simultaneously defines its opposite. Its the complimentary nature of the human intelligence itself, writ large.
As long as you are a human being, reason is the irreducible starting point for the construction of your philosophical method, as it has ever been for anybodys method. Even principles themselves precipitate out of reason, or, to put in other words, you had to reason to your first principle.
Even if I got all that wrong, it shouldnt be so easy to compare something claimed as new, with something already established. If its new, it shouldnt have anything to compare with, insofar as the new cancels the established, or at the very least, makes it obsolete.
(Sidebar: like Humes philosophy, positing that interrupted impressions of a particular is proof subsequent impressions of it are always new relative to its antecedent impression, when in fact, a new philosophy showed each impression is merely a member in a series of successive identicals, therefore not new at all.
On a new philosophical method. Interesting? Yeah, somewhat, sure. A paradigm shift? Nahhhh, I dont think so.
Yes. His distinction is a categorical error.
for example, does the category of identity relate to the category of modality, that is to say, can something be is identical to itself and not possible, necessary, or contingent? absolute not, and further, can something be possible, necessary, or contingent without being self-identical, absolutely not. Hence, the categories of modality and identity are co-necessary.
Quoting Mww
Its not an irreducible first principle, but an interconnected web of co-necessary first principles. the method is defined in relation to itself, in a circular fashion, but it isnt fallacious because not all circular arguments are fallacious. The notion that they are is really just presupposed.
Quoting Mww
no. If x is contingent upon y (e.g. motion is contingent upon space), it doesnt mean that y causes x, and this is because they could be mediated another entity z that causes.
Quoting Mww
Ive altered it to be defined in terms of time, that is, ontologically, and also in terms of the law of contradiction, rather than purely logically, that is, not defined in terms of time and ontological antitheses, so its not the same as Aristotles notion.
Quoting Mww
Yes. But there is no problem with this.Quoting Mww
Its just a new way of looking at things, and a way which guarantees certainty if used correctly. I think that the academics are going to ignore it because its metaphysical, and also written by a non-academic philosopher who writes under an alias (me). I am going to market the book to the general public and not the academic philosophers for this reason. eventually, the students are going to become better philosophers than their professors because theyve read my book, and then the professors will have to acknowledge its existence. Its going to create a second renaissance, I believe.
Self-fullfilling prophecies/outcomes come into being from none other than themselves. They require no external neccesity.
"Jane fully believes she will fail her maths class on Monday. Jane is so sure that she becomes depressed, feels worthless and wholly anxious. Jane does not listen to any support/wisdom provided by her parents and friends (external neccesity to avoid failing).
Jane thus fails her exam. All by herself. Resounding Belief manifested as real with time.
Yes. Can we say y is merely the necessary condition for x? If theres going to be an x, there must first be a y?
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
Agreed. Reason is like that, intrinsically circular, and the basis of my position that metaphysical reductionism taken too far leads to absurdities. So dont take it too far, and it is non-fallacious.
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
Youd have to unpack that for me. For that which is identical to itself just is itself, fas as I can tell.
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
So if something identical to itself just is itself, then we have .can something be that is not possible, not necessary or not contingent. To possibility and necessity, I would agree, absolutely not. As for contingency, not sure. There is no possible knowledge of uncaused causes, so it may be possible for something that just is itself not to be contingent on any cause. All predicated on the conception of time as a relational qualifier.
Whose distinction is a categorical error?