Consciousness question
I'm still struggling with the issues involved with consciousness. The most pressing for me is how - if consciousness isn't entirely a function of the brain, and is somehow outside the brain - that wouldn't invoke the mind-body problem?
Comments (190)
If consciousness is the ability to gather and store information and use this as a "self - contained" system of reference for further perception (intake, collection and processing and storage to memory) then it is not limited to brains.
In theory anything that can store memory (any object that can hold information) and can be rearranged and processed has the ability to think and perceive itself as well as other additional information outside its gathered system.
So the low complexity, macroscopic, spread out scattering of matter in the universe could potentially be primordial memories as consciousness evolved out of the big bang and condensed further by evolution (self organisation) of all systems in a hierarchy from "seemingly inanimate" to what we interpret as "animate" - human consciousness (who's quality is inherently biased as its the only type weve really considered rigorously).
So yes this wouldnt cause a mind-body problem as all bodies (physical objects) would have some form of rudimentary mind (the construction/aggregation, storage, modulation, fission/fusion and deconstruction/scattering of information/energy) during time.
There is a claimed mind-body problem, it doesn't mean this claim is true. There are many problems in our understanding of the world and our minds, but a mind-body problem need not be one of them, unless someone likes to discuss terminology instead of ideas.
What we have most confidence in, out of anything there is, is our own experience. This experience, when looking at the best available evidence we have, should conclude that experience arises out of people, realized in brains.
Brains are made of matter, suitably organized. So, experience a product of matter (or physical stuff if you prefer), as is gravity and everything else. That's extremely astonishing - so much so in fact, that to add some other substance or property, does nothing but complicate our understanding, unnecessarily so.
I what way are you "struggling" and why? What is your adversary?
Quoting GLEN willows
I believe, yes. that would invoke the mind-body duality. But if you feel you have to struggle with that, it means that you either don't grasp it or you don't accept it. It doesn't make sense to you. It is not real for you. And if, as you say it poses a "problem" for you, well, it is this maybe the adversary you are struggling with. For one reason or the other you resist to it.
I don't think that this can be resolved by just getting involved with concepts and general thinking. An extroverted attitude is needed towards this subject. Posing practical questions help. E.g. "Who is conscious right now, me or my brain?", "Who has thought about and composed this topic, me or my brain?", "If I have a brain can I also be a brain?", "Can a stimulus-response mechanism, such a a brain, observe, be conscious, think, rationalize, solve problems in life, imagine, be creative, play music?" And so on
The 'so' suggests an inference, but I can't see a valid one without adding something in. Is it that experience is a product of the brain?
If it helps Glen consider this: take two humans. To human one: their experience of human 2 is part of their experience (the "out there") and vice versa for human 2.
If human one takes the assumption that everyone outside them is "objective reality" this includes human 2 (their behaviour, actions, articulations of beliefs etc).
But as ethics implores, its more prudent to assume the other person has an "I" too - a subjective experience (set of memories, beliefs, emotions and feelings) whether demonstrated or kept private.
How then can human 1 objectify/standardise their environment (which includes other humans and the content of their minds) without accepting the contradictory nature or differing belief systems of human 2 as being "real" (standardised/objectified) to them in their own right.
If they were to do this they would have to believe the other person is incorrect in their subjective experience and doesn't feel "hurt" they just simply aren't listening to our personal logic (objectification/standardisation and thus rationalisation) of our own external environment.
A "philosophical zombie" so it were, with any objections against us being invalid in light of our own superior objective/standardised understanding of the world/what is real.
So in conclusion 1). what is spoken/articulated (language/meaning) does not equal 2). the content of one's mind (consciousness/what is meant) does not equal 3). what is actual (the truth of reality).
This is a sort of "sacred trinity/triad" that permits contradictions between person 1, person 2 and what they observe 3 (the universe/reality as it truly is).
It allows for mutliple personal individual experiences and identities (partial truths) , communication (articulation and interpretation) between those partial truths (navigation/analysis and acceptance and rejection of partial truths - in other words agreement or argument with one another, and what is actual (the whole truth - actual reality), to exist simultaneously as three separate interrelated dynamics.
Yes, I missed putting in that word. But to be more precise, experience is a product of a person, realized in a brain.
I think the fact is that is happening, is a basic feature of the mind-matter system, so isn't really mysterious.
I want to make sure the mind-body problem is understood properly, even if this thread ultimately convinces me it's not a problem. I get a sense that at least a few of the responses here didn't understand the long-standing philosophical argument, and if so, how they would answer/dismiss it.
If it's been dismissed in modern philosophy, I can tell you it's still being taught at the university level, for what it's worth.
If you believe there are no material substances, or you're a panpsychist, there is no problem. But surely not everyone here is an idealist, panpsychist or anti-materialist?
Thanks for the reply. I'm not sure what ethics has to do with the belief in other minds, but I'm talking about something you can wonder about within yourself. Simply put - I have a thought. I have a body. How do they interact? How does my conscious decision to "stand up" turn into actual physical movements?
The issue isn't whether it's mysterious or not, I'm asking how it works. Just because something "is happening" should we not look for the mechanism(s) involved?
Embedded cognition is systems theoretic in nature. Many people view systems theory as offering a new paradigm of reality in which some traditional problems - such as the mind-body - are not so problematic. Laszlo calls his version bi-perspectivism. It definitely can be viewed as a variety of pan-psychism, although one solidly rooted in empirical science.
edit: you can borrow it here if you create an account https://archive.org/details/introductiontosy0000lasz
Perfect. I have read somethings on systems theory. I'll read then Laszlo and cross-reference Laszlo/dualism on good, or laszlo/mind-body problem.
On first blush, my question is this "regardless of what systems are at work, the parts of the system must be able to interact, no? I'm sticking with my OP because I find these discussions can go off-road and become very abstract.
So. The brain itself is a system of neurons that connect with dendrites, and are triggered by things like the optic nerve registering input. How does he integrate non-material consciousness with neurons and the synaptic system that then creates thoughts. This is obviously the common sense scientific view...I'm open to others.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11335/substance-dualism-versus-property-dualism-debate/p1
More links are embedded along the way to other resources IIRC.
NB: An aside on "panpsychism" that might interest you (noy just my post but the thread as well).
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/584575
It has to do with the belief that other minds have the capacity to experience pain/suffering as you do/have in the past.
As in it woukd be unethical to assume no one else actually experiences pain/suffering, they're only mimicking it/like robots. This is the philosophical zombie argument.
It also links in with some forms of solipsism.
That's all I meant.
Quoting GLEN willows
They interact in a two way system. Information from the external world (the room, the floor/terrain, even your own body parts with reference to your eyes) is converted into sensory stimuli (electrical impulses) through your sensory organs (eyes, ears, skin, muscles and tendons etc) that your mind can construct into meaningful awareness (where it is, how it is - sitting, what it can observe, what it may be able to do in this situation etc)
In turn the mind can reverse the direction of stimulus flow back to your body by referencing a). What's currently happening (as outlined above) and b). what it knows how to do - stored motor memory/learned skills.
In that way it can dictate control of muscles to make them move in the way it expects based on previous training. In that way you "stand up" because you learned to do it as an infant and ever since the information has been constitutional - valued and maintained, even improved (coordination).
In this sense anatomical structure of the brain behaves like the letters of a word - symbolic of the information stored within them. Just like any coding system does. The specific individual structures don't have to have inherent meaning to any external observer to function, because they have meaning in "self reference": that is to say in reference to electricity constantly cycling, surging and rippling around through the network, changing its structure as it goes (neuroplasticity).
The component that acts as a conduit between the electrical impulses (mind) and the anatomic structures (body) are neurotransmitters. They allow the mind to influence its physical structure and encode its information (memories).
Does this explain how a thought can become an action (standing up).
The concept of "standing up" is memorised, after the neccessary information from different interactions with the environment are integrated toghether into a formula for standing: a pinch of balance, a dash of muscle contraction, a game of marco-polo with your limbs, a Kurt lecture from the eyes that what they see isnt happening as the brain expected, some corrections passed onto the muscles and hey presto: you wobbled to a standing position.
The brain stored that formula for later use. And needs to constantly reformulate and amend it as variables change: your limbs growing longer, your muscle strength changing - maybe due to illness, your bone density changing the weight and feeling and pressure in your joints, addition or subtraction of various weights that you may be holding the next time you try to stand.
Of course all of this processing is incredibly efficient and fast. Most of these formulas have great predictive value and that's why we don't forget them.
The mind is a non-material substance. Your feelings and thoughts are not physical properties.
So how doesn't something immaterial affect the material body?
Some points to help you spotting the problem of consciousness:
CONSCIOUSNESS "IS A FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN". This doesn't mean that it can work in an isolated way, in other words the brain is not sufficient but is necessary for consciousness to emerge.Consciousness is a dynamic process that requires a continuous interaction of the brain with the rest of the body and the body with the external world.
MATTER DOES NOT HAVE CONSCIOUSNESS. When panpsychists talk about consciousness being a property of matter they're talking about something different, they're not tackling any issue or adding any value to the explanation of the matter that we're trying to explain: "that thing that awakes in the morning and dies with us".
CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT AN ON/OFF THING BUT HAS GRADESConsciousness is something that has grades. Your brain's consciousness emerges and grows since you're born and starts degrading after certain age as well as your brain does.
THE SELF EMERGES WITHIN CONSCIOUSNESS. in order for you to make progress on understanding what consciousness is you need to do 2 things: 1) make clear to you what is NOT consciousness (you computer doesn't have consciousness "yet" :-) but a dog does have it)2) understand as well the difference between consciousness and the SELF. A brain can have consciousness but could not have a self. I invite you to read Vallortigara, Dehaene, Damasio, Dennett and Tononi's theories of consciousness. They will help you to better understand and dissolve some meaningless questions.
You will realize that the interesting problem would not be about consciousness but about the Self. Understanding the self and how the self emerges in a conscious brain is the interesting thing to investigate. The subject in our language, the I, You, He... this is the interesting topic.
A mistake quite a few people here make is that materialists don't claim they KNOW science will explain consciousness, no one knows what consciousness is at the moment. It's all conjecture.
you can add them to my list above :wink:
No I'm saying its a dualistic setup. The mind is electrical energy represented as meaning through symbolism - physical representations (anatomic structure).
The mind can be viewed as a process derived from the body in one direction: as a collection of meaning (beliefs, thoughts, feelings, memories) built from physical symbols (matter) that store the information of that meaning and can be viewed as a structural analogy or structural parallel to it.
In the other direction the mind can be viewed as equally influencing the physical structure of the body and propagating/maintaining it. As the mind can destroy the body if it wants (self-harm/suicide).
"healthy body, healthy mind" AND vice versa.
If it wasn't dualism, then the mind body problem exists and is irreconcilable.
But we already know its reconcilable by the simple fact that the mind can control/influence the body (as in standing up, eating, secreting hormones) and body can control/influence the mind (cancers, pain, inflammation, drugs - hallucinogens, psychiatric medications etc).
Two way system. Not one way system. So not absolutely materialistic, and not absolutely panpsychic, but both simultaneously (dualism).
A bit of tangent but taoism already outlined this Duality to things (yin and yang), as well as a universal flow that doesn't have to be strictly forced to flow in one direction (like materialistic thought would suggest)
As we can do with consciousness we can manipulate and study the self using technologies like chemical substances, MRI, etc.. and the results are stunning.
Hume could not experience consciousness as we do today, there was not the technology either the conceptual basis to do it.
Yes. I do.
Elizabeth of Bohemia stated against descartes dualism that the immaterial soul (which one imagines means consciousness or the mind) cannot have influence on the body as it cannot push or pull, being immaterial.
The classical mind-body problem is a debate about how thought, sensation or the experiential quality of a person can be linked logically with physical processes of the body.
As in where does the "feeling of pain/unpleasantness" come from when on stubs their toe. In essence the hard problem of consciousness.
In other words how can the quantitative (monism) and qualitative (dualism) be linked only using one form of logical reasoning (objective proof/materialism/monism). That whole assumption is just absurd and contradictory (hence the problem right?) How can you measure two distinct forms of information while only using the method of one of those forms. You can't.
I understand fully what question you raised was. And I understand the principles of the problem from a materialistic point of view (monism). I just didn't agree with it. Don't confuse my lack of agreement with my lack of understanding.
Now that we've established that, Elizabeth of Bohemia's "the immaterial cannot influence the material" I suppose did not have access to Einsteins energy-matter equivalence revelation some 300 years later. Energy and matter are fundamentally the same. Energy acts, material is acted upon.
If the immaterial cannot influence the material then we must disregard energy and thermodynamics altogether and start physics all over again. Which is obviously absurd.
Its more sensible to consider perhaps that descartes dualism like all dualisms, had better explanatory power than monisms.
Having 2 explanations is better than having 1 afterall.
If it wasn't, then metaphor, analogy, parable, innuendo and figurative verses literal speech can all be tossed out. That wouldnt do.
Not mine. On my view, identity is lost, not consciousness. So I no longer exist. But the functional unities that persist are conscious still, just as they still have mass. I'm a functionalist about identity, but not about consciousness. When I die I lose the functional unity that is bert1 forever. I might also lose it when I am in a deep sleep perhaps, or get knocked out. But it gets rebooted again.
We think alike bert1. A good explanation of the nuances between panspychism and personal conscious awareness. Bravo.
Yes, it's an important distinction to make I think. In a lot of conversations about consciousness, 'losing consciousness' when brain function is disrupted is taken as overwhelming evidence that consciousness is a brain function. Understandably so, if we don't make this distinction between consciousness and identity. It's also understandable that identity is seen to persist when someone 'loses consciousness', because from everybody else's point of view, the living body remains. There still is a sleeping bert1, with legal rights and spatio-temoral location etc, from Benj96's point of view. bert1 seems to still exist. But there is no bert1 from bert1's point of view. The deeply sleeping body has no point of view of its own, temporarily, and it is in that sense that identity is lost.
The problem isn't two explanations, the problems is that they have to end up in the same sphere - the material. Again, how does an immaterial thing affect a material thing? You seem to be saying "it just does."
Nevertheless, when you sleep you lose both consciousness and self/identity (except dreaming and lucid dreams, etc)
There is no reboot after death the same way you did not exist before you were born your self ends when you die.
Maybe I should use that word instead if it's clearer.
In a trivial, non-New Age way, yes, we create the world. We use our concepts, our reasons, our perceptions and our judgments and apply it to the sense data that hits our nerves, which we re-construct into something intelligible.
And yes, I also think there is an external world, independent of us, but I'd argue both are made of "physical stuff". Our perceptions are the results of physical processes, and the world is made of physical stuff. In order to show that something extra is needed that is not physical, you'd need to point out why thoughts cannot be physical, that does not depend on terminology.
I've yet to see good reasons given to my request.
My thoughts precisely.
Why do they have to end up in the materialistic sphere to be considered valid?
Does everything have to come back to the material? Is it impossible to reason about things that are not material?
Because if so we cannot reason about imagination, concepts or meaning, as none of these things are explicitly material in nature.
If only the material is real we ought to dismiss innovation, lateralised thinking, creativity and invention as these things precipitate into the material world from the "non material sphère- the mind".
To me the immaterial and material both exist and are both reasonable. The material cannot exist in isolation from its opposite - Immaterialism.
For opposites create one another mutually.
You cannot have poverty without wealth, you cannot have light without darkness, and you cannot have material reason (the physical) without immaterial reason (potential/ imagination).
I couldn't have put it better myself! Such wisdom is heartening to see. Your logic is very sound to me.
Not really, all those things are material, those things (symbols, meanings, etc.) are in our brains within neural-traces that combine always following physical laws (in some case deterministic, others are not, ... physics and biology are very complex).
And as such those things can be manipulated, like we can eliminate or induce ideas, words, concepts in your brains, we can as well see where and how they re located, etc... we can induce and create a "religious" brain since religious thinking is quite understood today (see Ramachandran's studies), and a long etc... And we can manipulate in traditional ways (talking, educating, ...) or in more sophisticated ways (using chemicals, electromagnetic fields, brain-surgery, etc.)...
Yes, you can manipulate others beliefs and thoughts, for sure, it's easier than imagined, either through discourse or physically (by administering psychotropic drugs, surgeries etc as you explained).
Key Question: But should you? Is it ethical to instill in someone your ideas/notions of what is correct. And deny them their autonomy to believe what they wish?
In other words are you prepared to assert what you believe as ultimately correct/right for all people thus justifying your manipulation of their mind?
Or is it better to have a diversity of opinion just in case? To allow for review, consideration and adaption of your own beliefs in relation to their needs?
In essence of your were a God, would you prefer to manipulate others beliefs to be in alignement with your own (autocracy), or would you rather discourse, where people are allowed to object and explain the grounds for doing so? (democracy).
As I already said, a materialistic view by itself is dangerous. Because it doesn't allow for other ideas (anything outside the realm of what is considered real (material).)
God is a naif intuition of mortal humans... but my asnwer is that, as everything in life, IT DEPENDS. We have situations where we, ourselves ask for certain traumas to get fixed because are painful and need manipulation. In other cases it is not justified.
Technology gives us power to cure and so far has helped to improve the quality of life, at least in western countries. But we always have to be vigilant to the risks that it brings as well.
But back to the original statement, thoughts are biologically based. No biology, no thoughts!
Spiritual or inmaterial theory or system of believes have a social purpose (important but just that) to calm and govern our sufferings and fears (see role of religion and spiritual systems of believes in past and present wars) not understanding what we're.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/526924
No biology, no "biological thoughts" (thoughts strictly characterised by/and in biased reference to, biological organisms.)
If thought (storage and processing/modulation of information) can be manifested in a non biological way, and we are biological, then perhaps we will never see it through the veil of our own biological thought bias.
We can't assume that consciousness is "human-centric".
"because I said so" (humans projecting human notions on reality) is not a rational nor reasonable means to exclude other possibilities.
If we can created artificial sentience, which I believe we can, then we cannot assume consciousness is restricted to the human concept of it.
We must then "put ourselves in the shoes of others" so to speak. And try to imagine what consciousness may be like for a dog, for a plant, for a bacterium, for a robot, perhaps even for large self organising systems of matter in the universe.
Only then are we not being inherently biased towards our personal conscious perception but considering more or all possible concepts of awareness.
Quoting GLEN willows
I agree, but I'd moved past the eliminativists nearly two decades ago when I'd come across a masterwork on the neuroscience of 'consciousness' titled Being No One by Thomas Metzinger (here's a good summary in this old video lecture). By the way, I very much recommend his more accessible, less technical synopsis The Ego Tunnel. Studying Metzinger's highly counter-intuitive empirical work on 'mind' had reoriented me from an underdetermiined conception of 'consciousness' with his robust phenomenal self model which had then lead me further to read more broadly other 'materialist neurophilosophets' such as, to mention a few,
Stanislas Dehaene
Max Velmans
Peter Robin Hiesinger
Sebastian Seung
R.S. Bakker (online blog "Three Pound Brain")
whom most 'anti-materialists' and those without any background in either neuroscience, cognitive science or cognitive psychology (the latter two I did graduate work in during the early 90s) are wholly ignorant of. I still keep up with Patricia Churchland's and Daniel Dennett's work but not as intensely as I once had decades ago. The so-called 'philosophy of mind' lags significantly behind scientific developments in 'consciousness studies' but these are still early days I think.
Yes I agree I think science will make much headway in explaining consciousness. I think it will likely come from quantum physics tbh.
But because consciousness (sentient beings) can believe in non scientific beliefs I imagine it will be hard for science to explain them without putting them in direct explanatory connection with science which contradicts the non scientific belief they hold.
Its a contradiction. All it takes is one person who is absolutely against science, for a scientific description of consciousness to fail to describe why such a person holds anti-scientific views.
"For science to describe all things, it must also describe those things that contradict its explanation".
You won't need quantum physics to explain consciousness the same way you don't need it to explain many other physical or biological phenomena. Consciousness is a macroscopic phenomena...
Yes, consciousness and even the self could be one day created artificially by us... But we re far from that.
So far consciousness requires a brain, full stop.
The rest is wishful or religious thinking full of naif intuitions... Intellectual massages... However you want to call them..
Is it? Can you provide proof of that?
I think he fact that quantum physics shows us that observation has an influence on the outcome demonstrates that consciousness is more pervasive than we think, and influences both the microscopic and macroscopic
I'm not sure sure we are that far from it, given the pace of technology and the advancements in AI.
Quoting Raul
And what is a brain? How do you define the characteristics of a brain?
I think electronic brains are entirely possible, I also think rudimentary artificial brains are already developed, and ever improving.
Nope.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/638903
Oh interesting. I assume you're a quantum physicist then, having given such a definitive answer as "nope". I'm Sorry I didn't realise you were a professional in that discipline.
What are the limitations of your area of expertise? What are the intricacies of quantum physics that deem it impossible as a contributor to consciousness?
I look forward to your insights. Its been a while since I talked to an expert in the field.
Yes I have.
And apparently you haven't. Yet jump to conclusions despite that fact. Are all experts talking trash in that case? Should they just assume you're right despite not committing to the field?
Or maybe you're open to entertaining expert opinions and the people who've learned of them, in the potential to elucidate mechanisms of conscious behaviour?
If not, please provide your explanation as to why quantum physics has nothing to do with consciousness.
Well that seems reasonable. Theres no shame in assessing your own current limits of exploration of a topic. No harm no foul. We can't study everything.
I only have issue with people that pretend they do know with no credible evidence to support the claim. I'm always down to discuss though. That's (discussion is) open to anyone.
Many people, like you, puts their hopes on quantum physics to explain anything that is misterios today, it has a kind of exotic attraction because it is complicated (no one really understand it well) but quantum is about the super small and microscopic world that works in a conter-intuitive way .... you don't need it to understand consciousness the same way you don't need it to understand how an airplane works.
No one is saying quantum physics is not contributing, I'm saying it is not needed to explain consciousness because consciousness is a macro-phenomena already fairly well explained by people like Dehaene and Tononi. They re quite exhaustive in their explanations and studies, still a lot to be done but they have shown the way that is far from quantum mechanics...
Chalmers and the nobel price Roger Penrose could not agree maybe but they tried already to seriously related consciousness to quantum physics and scientific community is not agreeing with them...
Like you claiming consciousness requires quantum physics to be explained?
Well now in fairness you didn't ask more about it did you?
I'll oblige you with an explanation but only if asked for. I can't force feed views down someone's throat, they have to be willing to entertain them in the first place.
That willingness being demonstrated through asking more about the topic.
Speak for yourself. Haha. I do understand to well. And can explain that if you want me to.
First of all you just contradicted yourself saying "no one is saying quantum physics is not contributing" and then said "it is not needed".
Surely consciousness as the product of physics has a link to the quantum. Nothing exists in isolation. If it did that would violate information theory, that all information is connected and un-isolatable.
So instead of bombarding one with arbitrary impenetrable walls of disbelief, perhaps it's better to entertain others, gosh you might actually learn something you didn't know already.
Whatever!
are you saying we need now a quantum physicist to explain everything?
Right, this comment is perfect for you.
Read the people I mentioned in my posts, from what you write it is clear that you will learn a lot.
Take it easy my friend.
Perhaps I will. I'll do that to satisfy your whims. Im open to having my opinions swayed by reason. If I wasn't open to that, I guess I would just be arrogant.
I look forward to learning from others. As I'm sure their experiences/insights have value, as perhaps do mine. It will be determined on the basis of agreement or rejection of such notions.
These kind of strong statements interest me. What is it that makes you so confident of this? Is it that alterations in brain function alter what we experience? And too much disruption of brain function leads to loss of consciousness? Is that what convinces you so strongly?
There is no mind body problem.
Consciousness is a state. It's not a thing. It's a state of a thing. It's a state minds - and minds alone - can be in.
That is, if something is in a state of consciousness, then it is a mind. For that is a defining feature of a mind: a mind is an object that has consciousness as a state it can be in (some would say that it is always in it).
So, first, let's not make category errors: consciousness is something minds 'have'.
Brains do not have it. Or at least, there is no evidence they have it and plenty that they do not.
Therefore, minds are not brains and brains are not minds.
If anyone thinks that there is evidence that brains are minds - that is, that brains have consciousness - then all they will do (for to date, this is all they have ever done when I have asked for evidence) is point out something that no one seriously denies. Namely, that brain states seems to be causally responsible for our mental states.
But only someone incredibly thick would think one can go from A causes B to A 'is' B. Yet that is how thick these people are. For that is precisely how they get to the conclusion that the mind is the brain.
It goes like this "dur...doing things to brain does things in mind....hit head, causes ow, ow is in mind. Therefore mind is brain. Neurscience. Sam Harris. Mind is brain. Dennett. Mind is brain. Take away bit of brain, person go dumb dumb. Therefore mind is brain."
Consciousness is a state of mind. And minds are not brains. They - some of them, namely our ones - are in causal relations with them.
Is there a mind body problem? No. What would it be? What problem?
The only people who think there is a mind body problem are those who are unable to accept that minds are not brains and so then wonder 'but how can a brain be conscious?'.
It's like supposing cheese has consciousness and so is a mind, and then wondering how that could be and calling such wonderings 'the cheese/mind problem'.
There's a sparrow outside. Let's imagine it isn't outside, but is in fact inside my locked cupboard. And now I have something to wonder about - how on earth did a sparrow get inside my locked cupboard? It could not have opened the doors and shut them behind it. So how did it get in there? That is contemporary philosophy of mind. It's a bunch of people who have decided that something is the case that clearly isn't the case, and now they're wondering how it could be the case. A truly spectacular waste of time.
Be honest, you're a panpsychist because you like the word and want to belong to a gang.
So, to be clear, you think your consciousness is the state of what - an atom? You think you're an atom, do you? And presumably you think that your body contains billions upon billions of other persons? And that everything around you is teeming with billions of persons.....why are you not in a straightjacket?
And to be clear some more: you think the way to solve the problem of how consciousness - which is clearly not a property of matter - could be a property of matter, is to make all matter have it? How does that work? How does that explain anything? You think if you multiply the problem enough times, it goes away?
Why not just say that some things are conscious - such as complex arrangements of meat - and some things, such as sandwiches, are not? That'd still be false and not solve anything, but at least it wouldn't be totally mental.
The problem with thinking anything material is conscious is that consciousness is not a property of material things and everything our reason says confirms this. That's why there is a 'problem ' confronting those who choose to ignore what our reason says and insist that material can be conscious.
But you do not solve that 'problem' by attributing consciousnes to everything or to little things rather than big things. You solve it by listening to reason and concluding that the mind is not a material thing. Jesus. You people.
This is my polite way of telling you to go f**k yourself.
That wasn't polite at all and so now you deserve to be spoken to with outright contempt - do you see that?
You also do not know what an ad hominem attack is.
So, you know, this wouldn't have been a profitable debate. Snowflake.
It's also understandable that identity is seen to persist when someone 'loses consciousness', because from everybody else's point of view, the living body remain
The living body isnt consciousness. And its not identity. When you sleep you are literally unconscious, and lose your identity . unless you have a lucid dream. Nothing to do with your body, clothes, legal rights, or how other people see you. This seems pretty obvious.
Why do they have to end up in the materialistic sphere to be considered valid?
What do you mean by they? Im saying in the case of consciousness (it should be obvious by now) that if an immaterial thing (consciousness) causes a material thing (body) to move, what is the pathway between them? This is honestly pretty basic stuff.
Thank you.
Its funny how panpsychists always want proof for a materialist view of consciousness when theres zero for panpsychism
More importantly NO Scientist would claim theres proof that the mind is part of a material brain. Its all speculation. Its a whats the word .theory being explored, just as panpsychism - ex. that a rock has some level of consciousness - is a theory.
Sorry if Im getting a little snippy. Too many coffees
There's no proof for any theory of consciousness afaik. It's more a process of figuring out the least problematic one.
It is simple Bert1, I experience my consciousness waking up every morning and fading out every night. Anything else is not consciousness, it is something else.My interest is in understanding this thing that wakes up and goes to sleep, this thing that correlates with the global neural space of your and my brain (see Dehaene), this thing that grows in my brain as we grow and stops as we die, tis thing that Tononi measures using his PHI methodology. This is what is interesting, and I call this "CONSCIOUSNESS" and I'm even more interested in how the SELF comes to mind (as Damasio would call it). All the rest is not interesting for understanding what we're (panpsychism, spiritualism, metaphysics, etc...).
The Self, you, me, is a process that is confined to a synchronous integrated information exchange activity between the cortex pre-frontal ventro-median area and the temporal and parietal (praecuneus) lobes. This is known, it is proof and all the rest is speculation.
There is, it is you that don't want to see it. Read my post if you're really interested in knowing about consciousness and the self.
CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT A STATE.
"state" is not the right word to define consciousness, it doesn't help, it is too simplistic. Consciousness has certain characteristics that differentiate it from the state of matter or the state of a system. Consciousness is the result of a dynamic and synchronous exchange of information with a very special function.
Consciousness is more an ability, a funcition that has arise from biological evolution because it has been a competitive advantage for those living beings that developed it but you cannot say that it is just a "state". The word "state" is used differently in current or professional language and it has different connotations that do not help understanding the complexity of consciousness.
But the most important thing why you should not use word "state" for consciousness is that consciousness is not an "ON/OFF" thing while the word "state" suggest it. Consciousness is, let's say, analogical, it grows as you grow and it fades in a gradual way as we get old. And to be more generic, a system could be more or less conscious depending on the grade of functional synchronisation and complexity (see Tononi's PHI)
If you're saying that your consciousness depends on you, or that the consciousness of a brain depends on that brain, then I agree. But what justifies the generalisation that only you, or only brains, are conscious?
The thing that wakes up and goes to sleep, is you, I suggest, not consciousness. That is consistent with the view that consciousness, in the sense of the capacity to experience, does not fade in and out.
Tononi measures the quantity of integrated information. And then he goes on to suggest that consciousness just is integrated information. At best he has a correlation, although I believe that has been challenged (need to look that up). My question for Tononi, and other kinds of functionalists, is "Why can't a system integrate information (or whatever function you want to specify) without being conscious?" To put it another way, what is it about what a system does that demonstrably necessitates it's capacity to experience?
I think I know what you mean, and if so, I think it is based on a confusion between consciousness and the content of consciousness. The content of consciousness changes all the time (what we are experiencing) whereas the fact that we are experiencing something-or-other changes not at all.
Quoting Raul
I agree with you that characterising consciousness as a 'state' is wrong, but not for the reason you give. The difference between experiencing something and experiencing nothing can only be a binary difference, no? There's no intermediate state between something and nothing, don't you think?
This is a good question Bert1, the answer is in physics and how complex systems auto-organise. I suggest you read Alberto Felice de Toni for example on how complex systems auto-organise. Do you know Conway's "Game of Life"? It will help you as well understand and get rid of naif intuitions.
Quoting Bartricks
No, not my consciousness, because I'm not an atom.
Quoting Bartricks
I don't. No sir! Not me.
Quoting Bartricks
Possibly, depending on definitions.
Quoting Bartricks
Maybe, again depending on what a person is.
Quoting Bartricks
It makes it easier, yes.
Quoting Bartricks
You stop thinking that only some things are conscious, and you start thinking everything is.
Quoting Bartricks
It avoids the problem of explaining why only some things are conscious and not others. If you say there are two types of thing, conscious and non-conscious, it raises the question of why (or perhaps 'how' is a better question) some things are conscious and others are not. This is really really hard. So hard it's called the 'hard problem'. So panpsychism is one theoretical way to avoid the hard problem. The other way is eliminativism, which is to say that nothing is conscious. All three options: panpsychism, emergentism and eliminativism are problematic. Dualism is a bit like emergentism in the problems that it faces, it seems to me.
Quoting Bartricks
In a way, yes. If we have so much trouble figuring out how matter-structures and how they behave somehow constitute consciousness, then suggesting that consciousness may just be a basic brute property of substance becomes more of a viable theoretical option. I know we should limit the number of fundamental properties as far as we can, after all it is cheating just to suggest that anything we don't understand is just a basic unexplainable fact of the universe, but sometimes such a move is justified. Charge, for example, seems to be one of these, perhaps, I don't know. Maybe spatiality. I don't know enough science to be able to say. I really think we are in that position now with the concept of consciousness.
No Bert1, there is not confusion on my side. You weren't born conscious as you re today. The capabilities of your brain have changed. Your brain is born with the potential of being conscious and then it is the environment it grows in that enables and develops your consciousness. Your senses and the funcitonal areas of your brain will make your consciousnes more or less powerful. Ask your parent or your grandparents and they will tell you how their capacity to be consciouss diminish with time. Driving a car for example is not as easy for them as it is for you... The context of consciousness is within the functional areas of the brain that are synchronise (i.e memory, language, vision, etc...)
You're wrong, "things" can be experienced in different levels, it is not an ON/OFF. Don't confuse consciousness with experience (as Koch does). Do you think you experience things the same way when you're drunk? Consciousness is not a state as I say above but there re different states of consciousness ....
Consciousness makes experience richer and enables integrating it in a broader way in the "model of the world" that a conscious system has. Would be long... anyway, when you go to sleep you go to sleep gradually independently of what you remember the day after (this is studied and well known).
No one remember anything before having 3 years old because his brain was not ready to store memories and integrate them with your consciousness...
Do you think babies have experiences?
Then I think we may be talking at cross-purposes. I think to understand one another we would need to examine the concept of consciousness and set the limits of the application of the word 'consciousness'. Conceptually, for example, if a baby has experiences it is, by definition, also conscious. That's just how I (and many philosophers of mind) use the word.
EDIT: I think you might mean 'conscious' in the sense of 'not asleep' or 'not knocked out', which is a perfectly good usage in medical and scientific contexts. But it's not quite the sense in use in discussions of consciousness that philosophers of mind typically engage in. Deviant perverts that we are.
Nevertheless it is a mistake done by several neuroscientists like Koch to say that consciousness is experience. It is too simplistic and doesn't help to understand consciousness, its complexity and its function.
Oh sure. I don't disagree with that. However I do think it entails that consciousness does not admit of degree. 'Primitive immature consciousness' is still consciousness. Complicated mature consciousness is still consciousness. The consciousness of an adult is the same kind of consciousness that a baby has, namely the kind of consciousness that permits experiences to happen at all. It is that very simple basic capacity to experience that is the subject of discussions in philosophy. It is in that sense that I don't think the concept of consciousness admits of degree.
EDIT: To put it another way, the adult is no more or less able to have experiences than the child. They do differ in the kind of experiences they can have. But that's a difference of content, not a difference of consciousness.
EDIT: To put it a third way, the hard problem is located at the difference between no experience happening at all, and some experience, no matter how 'primitive' it is.
While I wouldn't put this is quite such an annoying and dismissive way, I do agree with the substantive point, namely that too much is made of the relationship with brain function and what we experience. Not as much follows from this as people often immediately think. The close relationship between brain function in humans and what we experience is compatible with any theory of consciousness, even extreme forms of dualism.
You have said it is a 'function'. That makes no sense. Explain what you mean. My mug has a function - it's function is to contain water. What sense is there in saying that consciousness 'is' a function. Functions are functions.
It's like me saying consciousness is a number.
Minds are things. They have states. We call them mental states. They include conscious states. That's why we call them conscious states.
But you think atoms are conscious, yes?
Quoting bert1
What are you then? What else has consciouness aside from atoms?
Quoting bert1
How would it depend on the definition? Do atoms have mental states?
Quoting bert1
Really? Er, no it doesn't. So, you flood the bathroom. Your solution is to flood the rest of the house?
How do you 'solve' the problem of consciousness by simply supposing tiny things rae conscious and there are lots of them. How does that solve a thing?
If you're happy enough with atoms being conscious, why not be happy with lumps of meat being conscious? That is, why do you think there is a problem with lumps of meat being conscious until or unless you can show that the little atoms composing it are? The same leap - the same leap in defiance of reason is made either way, you're just making it a gazillon times for some reason.
Quoting bert1
"why the F is lounge sopping wet?"
You: "The bathroom and hallway are wet, as are the bedrooms and every other room in the house"
"Oh, okay. I am happy with that explanation.".
Only that's nor reality. In reality the question would be "and why the F are they wet!!! Why is the entire house sopping wet?"
And that's the same question you should be asked. How are brains conscious?
"The atoms composing them are."
Er, and how are they conscious? (and, you know, they're not and that doesn't do anything at all to explain how the brain is conscious).
You're not explaining anything at all. No problem has been solved.
The problem, note, is that extended things do not appear to have conscious states and anything that has a conscious state does not appear to be extended.
You don't do anything whatsoever to address that problem by supposing all extended things have conscious states. So, the problem is how any extended thing can be conscious, not how is it that some are and some aren't.
Note, if you think the problem is 'why are some material things bearing conscious states and not others, then you've already solved the problem of how any material thing can be conscious.
Why would you not put it so dismissively? That really is the only argument I have ever been given for thinking that the mind is the brain (or anything else material).
Doing things to the brain affects what goes on in the mind......therefore brain is mind. That's it.
The slightly more sophisticated might throw in the dogmatic claim that two fundamentally different sorts of thing can't causally interact, but it's the same argument just with added dogmatism (and it backfires anyway, as the conclusion to be drawn is not that the mind is the brain, but that the sensible world is immaterial).
It's not, then, that 'too much' is made of the relationship. It is that the entire case - the whole of it - for the materiality of the mind is based on the fallacious inference from 'A causes B' to 'therefore A is B'.
There are loads and loads of arguments for the immateriality of the mind. I just want one for the materiality of the mind that isn't reducible to those appalling ones just mentioned above.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/755060
Neuroscience is illustrative, however it may not be fully explicative either. Luhmann has an interesting take, based on an innovative brand of systems theory:
In consciousness, we imagine that all we perceive is somewhere outside, whereas the purely neurophysiological operations do not provide any such clues. They are entirely closed off and internal. Insofar as it is coupled with self-reference, consciousness is also internal, and it knows that it is. And that is a good thing, too, for it would be terrible if someone could enter someone else's consciousness and inject a few thoughts or a few perceptions of his own into it. Consciousness, too, is a closed system. But its peculiarity seems to lie - if we choose a very formal mode of description - in the transition from the purely operational closure of the electrophysical language of the neurophysiological apparatus to the difference between self-reference and hetero-reference. Only this central difference constitutes consciousness, of course on the basis of neurophysiological correlates. I do not intend to claim that consciousness is no longer in need of a brain. However, it is of great interest to ask whether we are dealing not just with a new level of reflection, as is often said - a learning of learning or a coupling of coupling - but with the introduction of a critical difference. (Introduction to Systems Theory, 2013)
Since "critical difference" is fundamental to Luhmann's definition of a system, this does seem to beg the question of where the boundaries of consciousness lie, vis a vis internality/exterality and self and other.
Not all approaches to neuroscience assume that neurophysiological operations are entirely closed off and internal. For instance, neurophenomenology, an enactive approach to neuroscience, makes the body and social environment an essential and inseparable aspect of neural functioning. There is only one system, and it is simultaneously neural, embodied , and embedded in an environment. This makes consciousness also irreducibly interactive, because it is the integration of all three aspects.
Parsimony cuts both ways, Rogue: why assume there is conscious stuff at all? There isn't any non-anecdotal evidence for it ... (re: problem of other minds, etc).
Because I am conscious.
Not non-anecdotal evidence; besides, that's what a "zombie" would say.
Your position is that consciousness is a "folk" term, that will eventually be replaced by a scientific objective understanding of brains. Is that correct?
No. However, it's your position on "consciousness" that's at issue, Rogue, so let's get back to that. Non-anecdotal evidence that you or anyone else or anything at all is "conscious"? :chin:
YesQuoting Bartricks
It avoids the problem of explaining how consciousness is generated from non-conscious things. It introduces other problems, of course.
Quoting Bartricks
Because then we have the problem of explaining how consciousness arises from non-conscious things. Which is the hard problem. Quoting Bartricks
It just is. That's the answer wrt consciousness. It's a brute fact.
Quoting Bartricks
OK, that's interesting and well worth considering.
Quoting Bartricks
I don't think there is a how. It's just a brute fact that stuff is conscious.
Quoting Bartricks
Well, that's not the problem for panpsychists, That's the problem for emergentists, and it hasn't been solved.
Sure. But I do think there is a strong intuitive appeal for functionalism of some kind or another, and that should be taken seriously by any theoretician, even if it is rejected upon consideration. It is a fact that changes in brain function change, in consistent lawlike ways, what a subject experiences. This cries out for an explanation. The simplest and most obvious explanation is that consciousness just is a kind of brain function. That's the wrong conclusion (and on that I agree with you), but it's intuitively powerful. And it puts a lot of pressure on the non-functionalist to explain this correlation between brain function and what we experience. If it's not an identity, what the hell is going on?
You queried what functionalism was. It's something the brain does, that constitutes consciousness. There are a number of versions. Computationalism is the view that consciousness is brain computations. Another is that consciousness is the brain making models of the world that allow for useful predictions. Another view is that consciousness is the brain integrating information.
My difficulty with all of these is that they are not theories of consciousness. They are re-definitions, by fiat (or by wishful thinking), of what the word 'consciousness' means.
No it doesn't. You've just stipulated that everything is conscious. That doesn't explain how consciousness can arise from material substances. Again, you seem to think the problem of consciousness that confronts a materialist is how some things are conscious and others aren't.
Er, no. It's how anything that is material is conscious, for our reason represents conscious states positively NOT to be states of sensible things (and similarly, represents sensible things positively not to be conscious).
You haven't solved a thing, you've just generalized the problem. Furthermore, at extraordinary cost: for if anything is clear, it is that molecules are not conscious. Quite how you can, with a straight face, think that pantyschism is any kind of solution to anything is beyond me. Like I say, I think the allure resides entirtely in the fact it has a fancy name. If it was called 'solving problems by making them a gazillion times bigger' then it'd not be as attractive, methinks.
Quoting bert1
Oh brilliant. Well, if, at base, 'that' is the solution, then you can apply it to complicated lumps of meat alone and be done. It's just a brute fact that complex lumps of electrified meat have consciousness as one of their properties. Done. No matter that this conflicts with what our reason tells us. For we're not listening to reason when reason starts saying things that conflict with conventional views about the nature of reality. And at least by just supposing that complex electrified meat has conscious states but nothing else does you don't earn yourself a place in a mental asylum.
To be clear then: your solution to the problem of how a material thing can be conscious, is that it just is. And if that is your solution, then at least apply it sparingly and stick to supposing that electrified meat is conscious and not that molecules are. The molecules are conscious thesis adds precisely nothing.
Why do you think there is a problem of consciousness? There isn't, note, a problem for immaterialists about the mind. The problem is only one confronting materialists.
And why is there a problem? Wherein lies its source? That is, why does 'matter just is conscious' not fly as an answer (for note, if it did, then the problem doesn't get out of the starting blocks)?
It is for this reason: our reason represents extended stuff positively not to be conscious. That is why we put in padded cells those who think cheese thinks. And that applies as much to ham as it does to cheese. Yet 'ham is conscious' is what you think if you think brains are conscious, for brains are ham.
So, our reason represents the extended not to be conscious. And it represents conscious states positively not to be states of extended substances.
And there are about 10 other arguments - 10 other independent ways in which our reason says the same thing - for the immateriality of the mind.
Therein lies the problem: reason says our minds are not material. Conventional views in the academy say that only material stuff exists at base. Bingo: problem for the conventionalists who prefer to cleave to contemporary intellectual fashions than to follow reason.
Functionalism is not a theory about how conscious states can arise from matter. It is, rather, a theory about when this happens. If we have two functionally isomorphic systems and one has conscious states, then the view is that the other has them as well.
Again, that doesn't solve anything for we simply have consciousness posited of one (so, problem solved!) and then a view about what consciousness tracks.
Me: how can ham be conscious? My reason tells me that extended things do not have conscious states.
Functionalist: this thing over here functions like ham. Ham is conscious. So this is too. Questionie answerdio.
Me: er, no.
It is analogous to confusing normative theories about ethics with metaethical theories, where the former are theories about what properties rightness and wrongness track, and the latter is a theory about what those properties are, in themselves.
Incidentally, functionalism does not have any intuitive support, for it seems clear to most that if there was an artificially created mechanism that nevertheless functioned in the same way as our brains do, it remains an open question whether the functionally isomorphic mechanism has conscious states.
Indeed. That's the whole point. Consciousness doesn't arise from anything. It's there already.
Quoting Bartricks
That's not at all clear to me. What do you take to be evidence of consciousness?
Yes it is. For example: before matter models its environment and makes a prediction, it isn't conscious. After it does, it is. That's a putative expanation for when matter goes from being non-conscious to conscious.
It's an explanation because that function just is consciousness. It's a reductive theory.
Why not restrict that to ham rather than extend it to molecules?
No it isn't. Like I said, it's a theory about what consciousness tracks. it's the idea that is supervenes on function.
That is an option. It's one Chalmers considers in terms of strong emergentism. I think panpsychism is far more plausible.
That, true, would be a theory about consciousness. But it is incoherent, isn't it?
My cup has a function. So, a function is a purpose something serves. It is not consciousness. It's like suggesting apples are numbers or sounds.
No, you're wrong. Functionalists, wrongly, identify consciousness with a function. It's not a correlation, it's an identity. If it were a correlation, they would be some kind of dualist, not a functionalist.
Yes, I think so.
Yes, it palpably isn't.
So, solution one to the 'problem of consciousness' = some material things are conscious.
Solution two - every material is conscious.
Er, how is ANY material thing conscious?
So it has no intuitive support whatsoever. A theory has to be coherent to have intuitive support, for one has to be able to represent it to one's reason for a verdict.
A function is something that a system does. In computing terms (I'm winging it here), you put an input in, the system does something to the input, and you get an output. What the system does is perform a function.
EDIT: And yes functions can be seen as purposive. In computers, functions serve the purposes of the programmer. In bodies, functions, such as digestion, serve a purpose for the organism. Functions tend to be useful, I guess, or they wouldn't be identified as functions.
Correct!
The view makes no sense at all.
It just denies that they have any legitimate concern, yes?
Sort of, yes. It's like asking "Well, why do subatomic particles have spin?" The answer is, "Well, they just do. We've gone a low as we can go in terms of explanation." I don't know if I've actually got that right or not, there may be more basic concepts now, I don't know. I'm suggesting that consciousness does not admit of explanation in terms of more basic non-conscious things. It's not emergent. It's there right at the start.
I don't know about a category error, but maybe. I think of it as a redefinition usually, a hijacking of the dictionary. When pressed, functionalists have sometimes said to me (on these forums) that "That's just what consciousness means." To which the answer must be "No, it doesn't." Then they say "Your definition is a folk definition, and mine is a scientific one." Then I say, "Then your theory doesn't explain what I mean by 'consciousness'". Then they say "What you mean doesn't exist or is incoherent. You should give that concept up and grow up." To which I say "But my concept has a perfectly clear referent, get off my dictionary." And it goes on.
You can 'solve' any problem by saying 'it just is so'. One can do that with complicated lumps of electrified meat without having to suppose that anything else supports conscious states. So the panty person has no motivation for their wildly excessive use of this 'solution'.
Second, there are rules about when you can say 'it just is so'. You can say it about self-evident truths of reason, for all arguments have to come to a end somewhere and the name of the game is to ground one's case in self-evident truths of reason. There is, as Kant said, nothing higher than reason and so one has done what one can to show something to be the case when one has shown how things that reason has said entail it.
You can't just say it at your convenience. Now, is it self-evident that molecules are conscious? No, on the contrary, it is self-evident that they are not, for it is self-evident that extended things are not conscous.
Note, if it were not self-evident that extended things are not conscious no one would even recognize a problem here.
There is a problem of consciousness confronting the materailist. No one denies that. But the only explanation of why there is such a problem is that the thesis conflicts with some apparent self-evident truths of reason about the nature of conscious states.
So, what you're doing is stipulating in the face of self-evident truths of reason.
The problem is how consciousness could be a state of any extended thing. The proposal that our brains support conscious is just a particular version of this more general problem. But you do not solve that particular problem by just insisting that everything is conscious.
If, for instance, one could explain all of those rational intuitions that represent the mind to be immaterial to be the product of clandestine manipulation, then they would be debunked and would no longer count for anything.
And once one has done that - once one has knocked out all of those representations of reason that tell us our minds are immaterial (and there are lots) - then and only then could one argue on grounds of simplicity that our minds are material substances (assuming materialism is even coherent, of course, which it isn't) and then and only then could one stipulate that it just must be a brute fact about material substances - or some of them, such as those made of meat and that are above a certain level of complexity and have electricity running through them - are conscious. Not becuase there is any positive support for that view - there isn't (beyond the fact that we are conscious and we now have no grounds for supposing us to be anything more than our bodies) - but just because all the countervailing evidence has been reduced to rubble and this is the only option left.
That's how one solves the problem of consciousness.
One does not solve it by simply assuming materialism about the mind is true and then simply finding some arbitrary point at which to insist that 'here consciousness arises' or 'here consciousness is always present'. That is no solution to anything.
People act in a way that is consistent with them having consciousness. For example, they react to pain by drawing their hand away, they react to greed by screwing each other over for money, etc. But this consistency can only be had by the presupposition that I am conscious. And we're back to square one: I am conscious.
The problem with locating any process entirely within some segment of the body is that it is a purely artificial move. We can designate some function or process as being associated exclusively with an anatomical part of the body, but that process is fully interconnected with the rest of the body, and the body is fully interconnected with its environment. Is respiration a function of the lungs? What about the role of the circulatory system that brings blood to be oxygenated or co2 to be eliminated? And isnt the air part of the lungs? Consciousness involves much more than just the brain. It is a synthesizing center that brings together information coming from all parts of the body as well as from the external environment. Thus, the coordinated communication among brain, body and environment constitute what consciousness is. I would agree that the higher the level of consciousness, the more complex and dominant role is played by cerebral neural activity relative to body and environment.
Dude, like, in your decent into Cartesian doubts regarding other minds (given that the belief in other minds is not infallible on grounds of it all being anecdotal to you), do you then presume yourself to thee solipsist? (Because if what you wrote is sincere that's the only logically alternative to "other minds".)
One, how does this - logically, coherently - evidence the unreality and/or physicality of consciousness again?
Two, if indeed it is you that is responsible for the simulation of the world the rest of us zombies inhabit, some of us zombies might get displeased with you on account of the unpleasant conditions were living in then one might get into a zombie apocalypse scenario. A one against all kind of picture. Not saying you wouldnt survive but it might be an altogether unpleasant experience for you this solipsistic nightmare you might precipitate upon yourself. So, in conclusion, stop it with suggesting that were all numbskull zombies on account of your inability to accept that were not!
Dont worry about 180. I hold a non-infallible but inexpressibly strong justified-true-belief that you are conscious. And theres a whole bunch of others that also know it as well as I do. Just saying. :smile:
Quoting Joshs
I fully agree with this statement and your argument for in, but find that it pertains to only one of two equally valid interpretations of what consciousness is. The other equally valid, but inconsistent, sense of consciousness being linguistically represented by the "I" in statements such as "I perceived X (in my environment)" and "I chose X (this irrespective of whether choice is illusory, for it would yet be an aspect of consciousness). In the latter sense, consciousness stands apart from percepts (etc.) which are experienced by consciousness, whereas in the former consciousness and percepts (etc.) are necessarily entwined and codependent in order for either to be.
For me these are two disparate possibilities in respect to what consciousness is. Curious to know how you'd address the distinction between these two senses of consciousness.
No.
Non sequitur (strawman assumption).
One of the aspects of the mind and body problem which I wonder about is how much is due to the brain and to what extent it is distributed throughout the body. Of course, the brain is involved in the organisation of the nervous system, but it can be asked whether other organs are of equal importance, as recognised in the Eastern tradition of chakra points, including the heart, root and sacral chakras and meridian points.
Some may see this understanding of energy centres as being a form of folk wisdom, but I wonder if the focus upon the brain, especially in neuroscience places too much emphasis on the brain alone in the generation of consciousness. In particular, emotions are connected with the physiological aspects of the entire body.
.
Memory is part of consciousness
We were talking about consciousness, which is not an anatomical location within the body ( like a hand) but a function or process. There is never a neat relation between anatomically defined parts of the brain(amygdala, frontal lobe, hippocampus), and functions such as language and memory. This is because anatomy is defined mostly by visual appearance. These parts of the brain appear to us as distinctly identifiable blobs so we name them and try to squeeze unique functions into them. Then we remove those parts or observe the results of damage to them and see if the resulting deficits allows us to cleanly assign them a function. This doesnt work out very well. We now know that memory isnt located in one anatomical part of the brain but is distributed throughout the entire brain. The hand is also defined anatomically . We can loosely agree
that the hand is that part of our anatomy above the wrist. But does this describe a functionally unified entity, or does it encompass a variety of interconnected functional systems that we arbitrarily group together as hand?
What Im arguing is that we dont fully understand the functions of any aspect of the body without recognizing that our pointing to a body is arbitrarily separating one aspect of a system based on anatomical criteria( the body is a blob of attached parts that can be visually distinguished from its surroundings). The body and the environment which sustains and interacts with it are one system, not two. Bones dont survive without gravity putting pressure on them. The nervous system doesnt exist without external stimulation. A digestive system needs food particles to keep it working, muscles need resistance in order to continue to be muscles. Our perceptual systems dont allow us to develop the ability see or hear properly without our physically interacting with an environment that actively participates in defining its functioning. The very structure of a body with all its internal components implies a very specific environment, just as a birds or fishs or snakes body implies a specific body-environment system.
The animal isnt simply a body placed in an environment. It is an inseparable body-environment system.
Consciousness in a sensory deprivation chamber functions very differently than on a crowed street, or when getting a massage, or when mediating , or when drunk. That doesnt mean these different environmental factors define consciousness by themselves , any more than it means that consciousness can be defined in isolation from its surroundings. Rather, consciousness is an organized system of interactions between an environment and an organism. Biologists and psychologists are coming to the conclusion that all
consciousness requires , at the most primordial
level, is sensitivity to an outside, and this includes even single-called organisms.
Not just animals are conscious, but every organic being, every autopoietic cell is conscious. In the simplest sense, consciousness is an awareness of the outside world. And this world need not be the world outside one's mammalian fur. It may also be the world outside one's cell membrane. Certainly some level of awareness, of responsiveness owing to that awareness, is implied in all autopoietic systems. (Margulis and Sagan 1995, p. 122)
Of course I'm speculating. My argument hinges on (and I know you don't want me to post an exhaustive list of these) all the phenomena and theories that were deemed "impossible to explain" or just "impossible" in the past, that science nonetheless revealed to be indeed possible.
Is this what we're looking for? What does that even mean?
Not saying neuroscience is futile, but it shouldn't be extrapolated into a solution for everything. Consciousness depends on factors other than our everyday experience. Doesn't even matter if the brain is an important factor, which it is. That still doesn't root us in "materialism" which is really a misnomer.
Is it not this:
"materialism, also called physicalism, in philosophy, the view that all facts (including facts about the human mind and will and the course of human history) are causally dependent upon physical processes, or even reducible to them. Epicurus."
On the contrary the hard problem of consciousness lies between the two opinions as to what consciousness is. So the zero proof of the wholly panpsychic is the same zero proof of the wholly materialist. The hard problem. How to connect the two: consciousness and body.
And I proposed dualism. That the (pseudo) dichotomy is based on the set of conditions standardised (preassumed as constants).
In materialism collective, the presupposed constant is objective observation. "See it to believe it". But who's doing the seeing eh? And who's applying the ethics to scientific practices of objectification? The mind is. The immaterial. It's governing how science can prove things (through ethics). So if we are to apply science to consciousness: scientific method is unlikely to work, unless we do something unethical because you cannot objectify (reveal) the entirety of a person's mind, their consciousness- all their memories, experiences, traumas etc that go to make up their awareness.
It would be an invasion of privacy. Wouldnt it?
In the opposite schools of thought: the presupposed constant is "I believe it therefore I see it." - supposing that our previous assumptions (beliefs) dictate what we can consider (see).
For example in jumping to conclusions, misinterpreting peoples intentions or words, distrust/ skepticism.etc. All processes derived from the influence of our assumptions on interpretation of incoming communication.
If I for example assume the belief "nobody likes me I'm lonely" then I will only be able to consider "the empirical evidence/observations" that upholds that assumption - all those things that people did/do that proves I'm alone.
By doing that we are placing less weight/value or outright dismissing the observations that would suggest otherwise unless I were to reassess the belief I assumed in the first place.
So it seems neither materialism nor mentalism/psychism/immaterialism either have the upper hand. In combination however they seem more insightful.
Fully materialist views cannot explain ethics and yet are under its full control on how they are allowed to investigate materially.
Whilst mentalism/psychism is easily deluded if it sees what it wants to based on false beliefs.
A combination leads to someone who believes what they observe (current state of affairs) but wishes to observe what they believe (make a change). Whether that's ethical or not is another question.
These are standard philosophical terms, no?
Thats exactly what I said.
How does panpsychism explain ethics et al.?
From our PM exchange earler:
You might find this post interesting:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/756516
Ok you win. I'll change my belief that science will explain consciousness from a "theory" to a "conceptual dependence of a physical (neurological) substrate." And I'm actually an eliminative materialist (sorry for the M word), which is NOT just about folk psychology..
"Paul Churchland has come along and pretty much said, 'I don't think so!' Tossing aside the concept of dualism and the brain, Churchland adheres to materialism, the belief that nothing but matter exists. In other words, if it can't somehow be recognized by the senses then it's akin to a fairy tale."
It's from this essay. You might find it interesting: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1295&context=senproj_s2015
Ok I'm done, we've beaten this to death, and can't even agree on basic terms. You're more than welcome to the last word. I'll stick with the Churchlands. They're also Canadian!
Thanks for the discussion. Cheers.