In what sense does Santa Claus exist?
I find myself confused, as perhaps many young people do when contemplating the existence of fictional entities such as Santa Claus in the real world.
I attempted treating the problem as a reference issue between fictional entities and common sense language, which G.E. Moore himself acknowledged the existence of concepts, things, and entities as genuine knowledge or having a feature of truth to them even if they aren't eminently manifest in reality.
The issue is most explicit when adopting the correspondence theory of reference. In the correspondence theory of reference, there is no truth-aptness of Santa Claus in the apparent world. He's simply an entity which we do not have any access to other than the historical claims or various descriptions of the entity in question. Now, the issue is more perplexing if we endow Santa Claus the ontological placeholder of living over at the North Pole with his reindeer. But, that's fiction, right? I mean, that he "lives" at the North Pole. He's not there, yet linguistically he is ontologically ascribed inhabiting the whereabouts of the North Pole.
Clearly, I'm running in circles, and leave it to the reader to explain in what sense does Santa Claus exist? How can we instantiate his existence over the North Pole, and yet knowingly, without doubt, know he doesn't exist?
I attempted treating the problem as a reference issue between fictional entities and common sense language, which G.E. Moore himself acknowledged the existence of concepts, things, and entities as genuine knowledge or having a feature of truth to them even if they aren't eminently manifest in reality.
The issue is most explicit when adopting the correspondence theory of reference. In the correspondence theory of reference, there is no truth-aptness of Santa Claus in the apparent world. He's simply an entity which we do not have any access to other than the historical claims or various descriptions of the entity in question. Now, the issue is more perplexing if we endow Santa Claus the ontological placeholder of living over at the North Pole with his reindeer. But, that's fiction, right? I mean, that he "lives" at the North Pole. He's not there, yet linguistically he is ontologically ascribed inhabiting the whereabouts of the North Pole.
Clearly, I'm running in circles, and leave it to the reader to explain in what sense does Santa Claus exist? How can we instantiate his existence over the North Pole, and yet knowingly, without doubt, know he doesn't exist?
Comments (147)
The North Pole, reindeer and "real" world are as "fictional" as Santa Claus if relations don't ontologically exist in a mind-independent world.
Santa Claus is said to be "fictional", yet in what way is the North Pole, reindeer and "real" world any less fictional.
Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of the Mind 1949 included an example illustrating that relations don't exist in the world but do exist in the mind, supporting the idea that relations don't have an ontological existence in the world. A visitor to Oxford upon viewing the colleges and library reportedly inquired "But where is the University ?". Ryle discussed the problem in terms of categories. There is the category 1 of "units of physical infrastructure", including those parts that are said to physically exist in the world independent of the visitor, colleges, library, etc., and there is category 2 "institution", including unseen relations between those physical parts, role in society, laws and regulations, etc. The visitor made the mistake of presuming that the "University" was part of category 1 rather than category 2.
My belief is that the North Pole, reindeer and "real" world are as "fictional" as Santa Claus, as I have yet to come across any persuasive argument that relations do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world.
For me Santa clause is a patriarchal figure that is omniscient and knows when all children are "naughty" or "nice" and checks that list twice (he's thorough and takes your most recent deeds into account so that you may always have the chance to get in his good books at any moment, even right on the Eve of Christmas before the day of judgement - and the proof, the evidence under the tree - a gift or a bag of coal tells you what he thought of you this year. Although I suspect not many children have ever been truly bad in his eyes (witnessed that bag of coal).
For someone to care about all children everywhere that they might feel blessed with gifts on Christmas, he seems like the absent third parent that, although illusive, has a Great Love for the innocent in society.
He only appears once a year, in secrecy, under the cover of darkness, no child has ever seen him do his Christmas day great works (except for a few minutes at a Santa's grotto maybe). He is inaccesible, existing at the furthest pole, the most barren void, the greatest reach, beyond us all.
He hurtles along at magical speeds, spreading out, almost rippling around the world, on the news, in the papers, his path followed by NASA, confirmed by the postal service which has a direct connection to his letter box, films, stories, songs and plays alike written about him, in reverence of him, known to all but never fully witnessed, having his elves (our actual parents) do his bidding for him - United by something that moves faster than any physical object can - Belief.
Belief of all parents for their children's sake, belief acted out providing Santa's gift under the tree so that evidence of him can be reached, appreciated, by all children.
Santa is in a superposition of very convincingly real (to children) and well, not as much for adults, but amusing nonetheless - the sentiment is no less upheld despite that.
Santa has many parallels with other entities the adult world has written of and discussed at length many times over many millenia. And we can't shake the thought. Nor do we want to, for all the joy it brings not only to the lives of children but to those of the families that love them.
I mean, I'm guessing that didn't end well, as "fictional entity" is an oxymoron?
Not according to the SEP article Fictional Entities, which write: "While London and Napoleon are not fictional entities, some have thought that the London of the Holmes stories and the Napoleon of War and Peace should be classed as special fictional entities."
Also not according to Alberto Voltolini in his book How Ficta Follow Fiction, A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities, where he wrote: " I present a genuinely ontological argument in favor of fictional entities. According to this argument, we have to accept fictional entities because they figure in the identity conditions of other entities that are already accepted, namely fictional works."
The thing is you are assuming there is a reference relation between words and things. If there is no reference relation, the problem disappears, we have no trouble speaking about Santa Claus or Pegasus.
I don't think there is a reference relation between words and things. People refer, not words themselves.
Do you mean, these people deny that "fictional entity" is an oxymoron? Or that they have found that reasoning with oxymorons can end well?
But what do they refer to?
All kinds of things, ranging from ideas to mythical creatures to a car outside the window and so on.
The act of referring to a specific thing is one of many things we do when we talk. In a normal conversation we do all kinds of things, including showing emotions, laughing, talking with no particular goal in mind.
And then you have the politician, who can spend an hour talking and not saying anything, much less referring to an event or anything of substance.
In the sense that fictional is not necessarily contradictory to entity.
So we're back where we started. Among this subset of the things we do with language, the acts of referring to specific things, are there acts of referring to specific non-things?
I don't see why Santa Claus would be a "non-thing". It's a mental construction of a person in a red dress living in the North Pole, that's a thing - though it lacks concrete existence in the world.
I mean, most of the words we use all the time, even right now, aren't referring to anything.
Sometimes, we refer as when we speak of that car the ran through a red light or this cool moment in a novel. What's the problem? A "thing" must be concrete? Well, most of the universe isn't. We can't see quarks, but few physicists would say these are "non-things".
In another sense, one can do experiments that show the existence of quarks. Not so with Santa Claus. Neither are concrete.
Yet people speak about Santa Claus all the time, so the issue of the alleged difficulty does not arise, if one drops word-object obligations.
My belief is later stated in the OP, that somehow through language we can ascribe ontological placeholders to fictional entities such as Pegasus or Santa Claus. I find this feature of instantiation of imaginary objects perplexing in language. But that's how ordinary language works to my surprise.
Clearly language goes on holiday whenever we try and actually do that kind of stuff. What are your thoughts about instantiation and ontological ascription such as the case with Pegasus or Santa?
So Santa is the thought? Or the person thought about? Or both, or neither?
Depends on the context. If you know the mythology behind Santa Claus and want to explain it to somebody, you could say that Santa would be the person thought about.
If you are merely saying that Santa brought gifts, then Santa would be the thought, or so it can be argued.
We don't have a clear notion of what a thought even is.
But generally speaking, this distinction is more semantic than substantive.
I'm with Quine. And Goodman. Words often refer to (or are pretended to refer to, in acts of referring, which are only a game) actual things. Sometimes they fail to refer directly to actual things. Because there's no such thing. That doesn't stop them referring indirectly (but only indirectly) to other things. E.g. to actual Santa stories and pictures, and actual beardy old men.
What distinction? That between a thought and what it's a thought about? You've lost me. My thought about Hitler isn't substantively different from Hitler?
Fair enough. Do they say that non-actual is not necessarily contradictory to actual?
I think that's quite stringent. Santa isn't an individual and yet is in the domain of discourse. So, what can one do about that?
What do you mean when you say Santa is not an individual? you want to say that Santa is a common subterfuge.
Santa doesn't denote a person in the world, and yet is treated as if he is an individual in the domain of discourse.
The indirect reference to Santa stories and pictures and actual beardy old men is fairly free, isn't it?
Quoting Shawn
Do you mean there is no actual person answering to the usual descriptions and hence named by the relevant tokens of the word "Santa"? (Good.)
Quoting Shawn
Well perhaps you are talking here about the name "Santa" (or relevant tokens of it), and not some corresponding person? "Santa" is a name appearing in a declaration of the domain of discourse?
I can point to any set of words within a language and give the set a name.
For example, I can point to {"creator", "universe"} and give it the name "godlike".
I can point to {"winged", "godlike", "stallion"} and give it the name "Pegasus".
Also, I can point to {"tree", "snake"} and give it the name "trake"
I can point to {"trake", "invisible", "orange"} and give it the name "trakinor"
"Trakinor" is now a placeholder to the fictional entity trakinor, an invisible orange tree-snake. "Trakinor" has instantiated the imaginary object trakinor.
Is it really the case that naming a set of words is perplexing.
I doubt it. Not-A cannot be A, but an entity can be fictional.
The language regarding Santa Clause exists but he is unable to manifest beyond it. Thats the difficulty with all abstract concepts and universals. There is no referent. The word refers to other words, or to people who are not Santa. Language exists, certainly, but Santa does not.
But Pegasus flies. Your set of words doesn't.
Yes.
Quoting bongo fury
Is it? I don't think Santa qualifies in the domain of discourse as an individual. Yet, we can instantiate him freely in movies, towards children and anywhere else.
My point, if you will, is if we can freely refer to Santa then what is it that allows us to instantiate him ontologically in the domain of discourse?
No, that's not the point here. What I'm referring to is the fact that Pegasus or Santa doesn't exist in the world, maybe perhaps Meinongs jungle, but we refer to him as if he does.
On a close examination, would you assert that Santa alone exists as the sum total of descriptions that we have assigned to him? Such as the the man that delivers presents or exists on the North Pole with reindeer? Is Russell's theory of denoting entities really here at the gist of all Santa's descriptions?
Do you mean, depict him freely?
We can, but not in the sense of pointing his likenesses at him. Only in the sense of making Santa-pictures.
See https://monoskop.org/images/1/1b/Goodman_Nelson_Languages_of_Art.pdf pp. 21.
Assuming that everything exists, and to discover the nature of a thing we must describe what it exists as, I wager there are some extant particulars that we could gather into an aggregate and call that Santa. However it would never resemble how we imagined Santa to be.
In what sense does Santa Claus or even - Pegasus exist?
This one will upset some folk: Santa wears a red hat. Therefore something wears a red hat.
"Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" do exist in our world, which is why we refer to them as if they exist in the world, but this is a world that exists only in our minds.
As it is difficult to justify that relations ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, it would follow that
it would be difficult to justify that things such as "mountains", "factories", "apples", "universities", "governments", "tables", "Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" exist in a mind-independent world.
It would also follow that "Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" don't exist in a possible world of Lewis, they exist in the actual world of our mind. Also, "Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" are not the non-existent things of Meinong's Jungle, they are the existent things of our minds.
These things can only exist in the mind, which is our world, which is why we refer to them as existing in the world.
Sure. As fiction. Fictionally true. It's a fiction that "Santa wears a red hat" is true. So, it's false. Logic with oxymorons. Great fun!
Yes, this is quite upsetting to say the least, and to add to the confusion, then what does Santa denote? Or is that the wrong way to present the issue as him only denoting his own descriptions?
Yes, so why is it necessarily an oxymoron? Must Santa denote something the the world or can he just denote his own descriptions as I already believe he does?
In that way Santa is an immaterial thing that acts materially. There is a colossal amount of evidence of his existence sufficient enough to maintain his belief by children - film, media, literature, songs, the postal service, Santa's grotto, Nasas broadcast of Santa's flight path around the globe, the news, every question posited to children by adults that confirms his existence such as "are you excited for Santa visiting you?" or "have you been good for Santa?" or "what do you want Santa to bring you this year? " All questions based on the assumption that he exists.
We bolster his existence out of love for the innocent amongst us. We believe the innocent deserve such a figure in their life.
The adult existent of course is God - the one that knows if they have been naughty or nice and rewards them with a gift (heavenly afterlife) if they choose to be a source of love rather than hatred.
Santa, in essence, is religion/spirituality for children. Used by adults as a moral compass to guide children to understand action and consequence, to be better people.
Nicholas Griffin, in an essay in 'Russell vs. Meinong: One Hundred Years after ""On Denoting"' https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/19960205-russell-vs-meinong), points out that we merely suppose that there is someone called Santa who lives at the North Pole. In this particular 'context of supposition' (to use Griffin's own term), both Santa and the North Pole exist, and so does the relation between them 'Santa lives at the North Pole.' Outside this context of supposition, in the real world, the North Pole exists, but Santa does not, and nor does the relation 'Santa lives at the North Pole.'
Works for me. :)
Do you mean, can the name "Santa" be its own referent, since it doesn't denote anything in the real world?
To suppose Santa's existence is to ontologically ascribe him to the domain of discourse based of of his fiction as an entity. Yet, a fictitious entity is an oxymoron, so how is that so?
Quoting Herg
I'm not sure if this is some sort of category error. The North Pole actually obtains in the real world; but, Santa over at the North Pole, does not. How is that so?
Yes, well, if you pick up my gist, my intention here is to suppose that Santa has no referent outside of his fiction that are elucidated by his ascription to the non-denoting ontological placeholder of living at the North Pole. So, don't we just default to making his descriptions representative of his obtaining relations in fiction (the sum total of fiction about "him").
Is life fair?
Life is patently not fair, and in the sense that justice does not prevail, it does not exist. It exists though, to that small extent that we live justly.
St Nicholas, according to the myth is related to good King Wenceslas; power employed to the benefit of the powerless. This is the non-existent truth behind the multi-billion dollar industry of Santa Claus. If you are looking for the real Santa Claus, you will find him at the homeless centre, treading down the snow, and delivering a little warmth to those with nothing, not just at Christmas, but every day - everyone knows that. Santa Claus is an idea you can live by, not an old man creeping about in children's bedrooms.
Santa is a person that ascribes a jolly old man over at the North Pole. He is known by two names, both "Santa Claus" and "St. Nicholas".
Soo, what can be said about him is based off, of his descriptions we all know about him as delivering presents on Christmas and other stuff about him.
Also "Father Christmas". But he is an archetype, not a person.
Yet, we refer to him as a person in everyday language. Is that a feature of language, and why is that so?
Psychologically, that makes sense. But, I believe language acquisition came first or its primacy dominates over psychologies, not depersonalization.
A fictitious supposed entity is not an oxymoron. We suppose that there is such an entity, when in fact there is not.
Quoting Shawn
Apologies, I should have been clearer. The North Pole in the context of supposition is not the actual North Pole actual entities can't exist in contexts of supposition but a fictitious analogue of it.
I think that as long as we are careful not to mix the real with the supposed or fictitious, there's no problem. If we mix them, unsolvable puzzles ensue, but they are puzzles of our own making. "We have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.
Soo, when we talk about God, or Allah, are those supposed entities or do they just have a historical background? Are you noticing that the lines are getting blurry when thinking about stipulating existence to supposed entities?
Quoting Herg
This seems incoherent. We can't assume that Santa lives in his "own" North Pole, while the "true case" of the actual North Pole not having Santa Claus over there.
Quoting Herg
But, this happens all the time. We don't distinguish for children that Santa lives over at Walmart or at the North Pole. It's all ad hoc here.
How is this different from saying that we merely entertain the fiction?
Quoting Herg
You might as well say, a fictitious fictitious entity.
If our knowledge is by description, then "Santa Claus" is no less nor no more fictional than "The North Pole"
Denoting phrases
For Bertrand Russell, "Santa Claus" and "The North Pole" are denoting phrases, which have no meaning in themselves. A propositional function containing a denoting phrase is neither true nor false, such as "Santa Claus brings children gifts" or "The North Pole is the northernmost point on the Earth". Only when something is added to the propositional function to turn it into a proposition does the proposition become true or false, such as "it is said that Santa Claus brings children gifts" or "many believe that The North Pole is the northernmost point on the Earth".
Knowledge by description
The vast majority of people only know The North Pole by description rather than acquaintance. We take it for granted that The North Pole exists even though we may never have seen it, yet we take it for granted that Santa Claus doesn't exist although we have never seen him. We know "The North Pole" by description as "the northernmost point on the Earth, lying antipodally to the South Pole, defining geodetic latitude 90° North, as well as the direction of true north." We know "Santa Claus" also by description as "bringing children gifts during the late evening and overnight hours on Christmas Eve of toys and candy or coal or nothing, depending on whether they are "naughty or nice."
The fact that I have never seen Santa Claus is not proof that Santa Claus doesn't exist, as is the fact that I have never seen The North Pole proof that The North Pole doesn't exist.
Our belief in the existence of things we have never seen rests on description, and description is not proof one way or another.
The question is, how do we know things without doubt that have only been described to us.
... such as, some indication of which quantity (e.g. none, some or all) of the world's objects are to be denoted by each denoting phrase. Whereas, your suggested examples of suitable supplementation:
Quoting RussellA
are way off. This might not affect your stuff about knowledge. But it shouts a bit.
Typo, I presume.
Quoting RussellA
@Shawn might agree that this is the question.
I expect it's only the question if you are a foundationalist, and assume that some absolute kind of knowledge is required.
I'm not sure what dichotomy you're setting up here. By 'have a historical background', are you suggesting that they may be based on something that once really existed? Anyway, all gods are merely supposed entities, until it is shown otherwise, if that answers your question.
Quoting Shawn
No. Real entities have real existence. Supposed entities only have a supposed existence (that is, we only suppose that there are such entities and that they exist.). If someone wrote a scientific paper claiming that Santa existed in the real world, that would be claiming real existence for him. But if someone wrote a story in which a scientist went to the North Pole and found Santa, and said, 'Wow, Santa really exists,' Santa in the story would not have real existence, he would only have a supposed existence, like everything else in the story. There is real existence, and there are supposed existences which are analogues of real existence, just as there are real objects, and supposed objects which are either analogues of real objects such as the North Pole with Santa living in it) or are supposed objects with no real analogue (such as Santa himself).
Quoting Shawn
That Santa lives only in a fictitious or supposed or imaginary North Pole isn't an assumption, it's a necessity. Being imaginary, he can't live anywhere else.
Quoting Shawn
I don't think I really understand your point. What you describe doesn't sound to me like the kind of mixing I had in mind. When I spoke of mixing, I was referring to the mistake made by some philosophers (e.g. Meinong) of thinking that merely supposed objects can have real properties (such as existence). This sort of mixing is a category mistake.
Walmart and the North Pole both really exist, and if you wrote stories about Santa living in Walmart, that wouldn't be the real Walmart, because the real Walmart doesn't have Santa living in it; it would be a fictitious analogue of the real Walmart, having only a supposed existence, an existence only in the context of supposition created by the story. But if I've misunderstood your point, please explain further.
No. This is where it gets complicated. Can you demonstrate that Santa Clause is identical with those others? I would suggest to you that Santa Clause, St Nick, Kris Kringle and Father Christmas are four separate figures who work together over Christmas. Their stories appear to be different and don't match up.
It doesn't differ in any important way. I think the reason Griffin talks about 'contexts of supposition' rather than 'fictions', is that there can be other contexts of supposition than those created by writing fiction. For example, if kids play at cowboys and Indians (though I guess they don't do that anymore), this play creates a context of supposition in which they are, indeed, cowboys and Indians.
Quoting bongo fury
Mea culpa. 'Fictitious supposed entity' does not accurately capture my meaning. A fictitious entity is a supposed entity. As you imply, a fictitious supposed entity would be an entity that is merely supposed to exist by people who are themselves fictitious. I apologise for my terminological inexactitude.
Since all of these people are imaginary, they cannot be either really separate or really identical. (Imaginary objects cannot have real properties.) @Shawn imagines them as identical, you imagine them as separate. Therefore in his context of supposition they are identical, in yours they are separate. End of story.
Ok, what does? What form of words is satisfactorily not an oxymoron?
At last one of those in that list was a real man. :wink:
I know you claimed that 'fictional entity' is an oxymoron. I don't agree. It would be an oxymoron if calling something an entity implied that it was real, but it doesn't, because you can refer to something as an entity in a work of fiction. (There's a Star Trek episode in which there's something called the Crystalline Entity. It isn't real.) Calling something an entity does not amount a claim of real existence, only of existence in either the real world or a context of supposition. My mistake was duplication: I shouldn't have used both 'fictitious' and 'supposed'.
I'd forgotten that there was a real St Nicholas. He can't either be identical to, or work with, three imaginary people, because a real object and an imaginary object can't have relations with each other neither real relations nor imaginary relations. However, an imaginary St Nick who is an analogue, in a context of supposition, of the real St Nick can be identical to these other three people in Shawn's context of supposition, and can be separate from them and work with them in yours.
Davidson's T-Sentence such as "schnee ist weiss" means snow is white uses a word in inverted commas to refer to something in language and a word not in inverted commas to refer to something in the world.
Therefore, there are two possible interpretations - i) "Walmart" and "The North Pole" both really exist and ii) Walmart and The North Pole both really exist
"Walmart" and "The North Pole" exist in language, otherwise I wouldn't be able to write this sentence.
But how do you know that The North Pole really exists? If by description, then it is knowledge by language. But if knowledge by language, then how does one know whether "The North Pole" refers to The North Pole, something that only exists outside language, or is self-referential, referring to something that only exists in language.
Ok, but now you've done it again, with 'real' and 'existent'.
Do you mean the brain shiver?
The thought. The neurological activity.
Well we were talking about words failing to refer to things in reality. I'm interested to hear about other kinds of things failing likewise. Just wondered what they are, if not words.
Quoting Sam26
So they do have a referent or they don't?
It depends on the context. If you're talking about a fictional character, the referent is the character in the story. If you're referring to what's veridical, then they have no referent.
Can we talk veridically about fiction?
So, false?
As an unregistered trademark that execs at Disney have wet dreams about owning the rights to.
Or would more appropriate be the Coca-Cola company?
It sure ain't this saint:
Nope. I know you'd like to nail words like 'real', 'entity' and 'existent' to the world we live in, so that they can't be applied to fictional or imagined objects, but it can't be done. Any word at all can be used of either real or imaginary objects. Any concept instantiated in the real world can be imagined to be instantiated in this world or some merely imagined world. 'Real' does not always mean actually real; 'existent' does not always mean actually existent. That's just the way things are.
I don't. I was taking a bet. The odds of me winning are proportional to the amount of evidence I have that the North Pole exists. The odds of me losing are proportional to the amount of evidence I have that it doesn't. I think my bet is fairly safe, but nothing is guaranteed.
I'd like to focus on this a little bit more, as this opens up a can of worms and I'm not too sure if Wittgenstein would have agreed with this. What do you think, @Banno?
"Concepts". The term is fraught with problems. Folk treat them as if they were the furniture eof one's mind, metal things we can push around and rearrange - reified.
I've sometimes found it useful to replace the notion of a concept with thought of the way we use a word. Instead of attempting to ponder the concept of 2, think of the way we use the word "2"; in the place of wondering about the concept of democracy, consider the way we use the word "democracy".
So consider Quoting Sam26
Try instead "there are many ways we use words that have no actual or real existence or referent..." Well, a way of using a word is not the sort of thing that we would expect to be actual or to really exist... We can use words pretty much as we chose. We might say that the word "democracy" exists, but the way we use the word "democracy"... doesn't seem to be the sort of thing that we talk of as existing or not, nor does it quite work to say that the way we use "two" has a referent.
Such considerations lead me away from talking of concepts existing - avoiding their reification. And looking at the use of a word rather than it's meaning is straight out of the Wittgenstein cookbook.
Quoting Sam26
This qualification perhaps shows Sam was using "concept" somewhat loosely. So if we consider a fictional character, what is real - again replacing "concept" with "the use of the word" - is the use of the word. Well, this is so - what is 'real' about Santa is the way we use the word "Santa" in our Christmas antics. I don't think Sam would disagree.
Don't you think it's rather obvious that if we're talking about concepts, in this context, we're talking about how we use them, which is why I gave examples of different uses (fiction, mythology, etc.). Concepts have an ontology within various language-games. So, there is no need to replace concept with the use of the word.
The concept democracy exists, which is why we are able to use it. Moreover, I surely wouldn't say that the number two has a referent, but it does have a use, and within that use it has an existence of sorts. It exists as an abstraction.
We can say that what gives a concept life, is the way we use it in a language. So, again, the concept has existence within our various forms of life, or language-games.
I agree with @Sam26, and also that the concept of "concept" is fraught with problems.
However, how would it be possible to use the word "democracy" in a sentence without having a concept of what the word meant ?
Without language, we wouldn't have the concept of democracy, in that our concept of democracy has come from language, yet without the concept of democracy we wouldn't be able to use "democracy" in language.
For example, thinking about a foreign language, "theluji" means "maji, waliohifadhiwa, nyeupe na ardhi". I may know how every word in a foreign language is defined, but if I have no concept of the meaning of any word, how can I meaningfully use these words in sentences.
If we had no concept behind the words we use in language, we wouldn't be able to meaningfully use them in language.
Does 'actual' always mean 'actually actual'? Perhaps Santa is the first but not the second?
Santa Claus, alas, doesn't exist.
How do you know, as it's not possible to prove that something doesn't exist. Are you inferring that the Mariana Trench, for example, doesn't exist because you haven't seen it.
Are you saying that only those things that you have seen exist, and everything you haven't seen doesn't exist?
Is that true? I thought I had £20 in my wallet. I looked and there was £0. I think I just proved something doesn't exist. The 'something' was £20. Its non-existence was proved by inspection.
The £20 note is a concept in the mind which may be instantiated in particular locations in the world. The £20 note exists as a concept in the mind, regardless of whether it exists in the world or not.
True, you can prove that a particular instantiation of a £20 note doesn't exist in your wallet by inspection.
But as you cannot prove that there are not instantiations of a £20 note other than in your wallet, you cannot prove that £20 notes don't exist in the world.
The problem is that the evidence that The North Pole exists is descriptive, We may see a travel company advertising "Join us on the family adventure of a lifetime aboard the magical Journey to the North Pole". We may see the documentary "The Last Degree - North Pole Documentary", yet ultimately our evidence is descriptive, is linguistic.
Russell's Theory of Descriptions may be relevant.
As I understand it, in the sentence "The author of Waverly is Scott", the phrase "the author of Waverly" is not a reference to Scott but is a quantifier of "Scott". Similarly, in the sentence "the northernmost point on the Earth is The North Pole", the phrase " the northernmost point on the Earth" is not a reference to The North Pole but is a quantifier of "The North Pole".
Our evidence of the existence of The North Pole may be linguistic descriptions such as "the northernmost point on the Earth", yet as Russell's Theory of Descriptions points out, these descriptions are not references to The North Pole but quantifiers of "The North Pole".
Descriptive evidence therefore doesn't refer to something that may or may not exist in the world but is a reference to another word in the language and is in this sense self-referential.
Evidence that is linguistic is evidence that the language is coherent, not evidence of something that exists outside of language.
Whether you win your bet depends on the decision of the betting company. As the betting company is basing their decision on linguistic evidence, which is more about a coherent language than about what exists outside of language, your win will be based on the coherence of "The North Pole" within language rather than the actual existence of The north Pole outside language.
That's because they do. I can prove that £19 notes don't exist in the world. I mean, really I can. Outside the philosophy schoolroom. And if it can be done outside - but I am prevented from doing it inside by some theory - then I think it's the theory that is probably at fault, not the proof.
A challenge.
The Bank of England web site says"There are four denominations (values) of Bank of England notes in circulation: £5, £10, £20 and £50" and "There are over 4.7 billion Bank of England notes in circulation."
One possible proof would be to inspect the 4.7 billion bank notes, but this assumes that only the Bank of England has printed £ sterling notes.
The other possible proof would be to prove true the statement "There are four denominations (values) of Bank of England notes in circulation: £5, £10, £20 and £50".
Both difficult, if not impossible.
No. Just everyday proof - as I say, outside the philosophy schoolroom. Think how you would sincerely answer a visitor's question whether there are twenty pound notes and their second question whether there are nineteen pound notes. If you hesitate for purely theoretical reasons over the second question then you are tripping over your own theory and not doing them any service at all. You know there are no £19 notes and you can prove it whenever it might be needed.
Yes, I believe that there are no £19 notes and can justify my belief through the Bank of England web site, but I don't know that there are no £19 notes in that I cannot prove that my belief is true. I believe that my belief is true, but I don't know that my belief is true.
I just don't want to jumble up all this talk about descriptors, beliefs, and qualifiers into the discussion ongoing between other users.
For the matter, I think Banno is right about use instead of concepts existing in separate categories of existence.
Compare the following 4 entities
1. Vladimir Putin
2. Santa Claus
3. Sherlock Holmes
4. Arthur Conan Doyle
Consideration of concepts (or their status) is perhaps relevant in the analysis of the existence predicate. Frege maintained that existence wasn't a first order predicate because that could entail absurdities like "There is an x such that x doesn't exist". Frege held rather, that existence is a second order predicate: a property of concepts, not individuals. This existence property can be instantiated or not.
A. Santa does not exist.
B. The property of being santa is not instantiated by any individual object
Here is the relevant SEP entry.
You might find this irrelevant. Depends how you want to analyse "exists".
And just because we use words in a similar way (e.g. proper names, definite descriptions, etc) when we talk about people/entities that do exist as we do when we talk about fictional characters (who do not exist) doesn't mean that both cases must be alike in having an existing referent, that there must always be a referent whenever we use such language: language is far more flexible than this, people can and do use the same words or expressions for different purposes in different contexts. And after all, not existing is what distinguishes fictional characters as such.
So I guess I just don't see the advantage of venturing down the Meinongian path towards an ontology littered with non-existent existents (not an ideal result), especially after Russell's analysis. It seems easier and less problematic to just say that fictional characters don't exist.
I could play devil's advocate and say that the mainstream media's analysis of real people often approaches that of an analysis of fictional characters.
How many "documentaries" presented as fact are in reality "imaginative speculations".
As you say "people can and do use the same words or expressions for different purposes in different contexts". Fictional characters exist as fictional characters, and real people exist as real people.
In one sense of "exist", fictional characters exist and in another sense of "exist", real people exist.
If I may help you to grasp the point here... People can and do use the same kinds of words (e.g. names) for the purpose of referring to people or objects in some contexts and for the purpose of non-referring word-use in others.
I'm afraid it's the blurring of fact and fiction in a Postmodern world.
"Apple" and "dragon" are concepts that exist in the mind. Concepts are fictional in the sense that they don't exist in the world - in the belief that neither abstracts nor universals ontologically exist in the world.
An "apple" can be instantiated in the world, but a "dragon" cannot be - even though a model of a "dragon" can be instantiated in the world.
"Apple" can refer to either a fictional concept in the mind or an actual instantiation in the world. "Dragon" can only refer to a fictional concept in the mind.
"Apples" and "dragons" both exist, but in different senses.
Yes. Apart from real beardy old men, and the real north pole. And real charity workers, as @unenlightened rightly points out.
The real Saint Nicholas has many miracles attributed to his intercession, is said to have calmed a storm at sea, saved three innocent soldiers from wrongful execution, and chopped down a tree possessed by a demon.
The fictional Santa Claus is said to bring children gifts during the late evening and overnight hours on Christmas Eve. Either toys and candy or coal or nothing, depending on whether they have been "naughty or nice".
It is the nature of language that the real can become indistinguishable from the fictional, and vice versa.
Fictional characters don't exist. That's what makes them fictional characters. As far as Santa Claus is concerned, all that exists are the traditions we have of talking/writing about this fictional character Santa Claus. The jolly old man at the North Pole doesn't exist- there is no such person- but the stories, books, words, language, does.
I mean, solving the issue of non-referring expressions at the expense of not being able to differentiate between things that exist and things that don't, or between fiction and non-fiction, strikes me as a very poor bargain. Better to just say that non-existent things like fictional characters don't exist than to have to create a special category of existence for non-existent existents like Santa Claus and unicorns and so forth.
Exactly :up:
I agree that non-existent things don't exist, and that there shouldn't be a special category of existence for non-existent things. If we accept Bertrand Russell"s On Denoting, then I also agree that Santa Claus is not a referring expression, but rather a quantificational expression.
For Russell, existence is not a first-order property of individuals but instead a second-order property of concepts.
Santa Claus is a fictional character, and as a fictional character doesn't exist in the world, but as we are discussing Santa Claus, Santa Claus must exist as a concept in our minds.
To argue the blanket statement "fictional characters don't exist", accepting that fictional characters don't exist in the world, you must also be able to argue that fictional characters don't exist as concepts in the mind.
Hey! That's what I said (Frege and Russel were in concurrence here). I tend to agree with this line of thinking.
Quoting Heracloitus
Good old Frege and Russell :100:
No, it can follow that Santa only exists as a concept or idea and not an individual or object in the world.
Santa Claus is fictional, and fictional people differ from real people precisely in that they don't exist. Its really that straightforward. And leaving aside beetles and boxes and reifying concepts and all that tricky philosophical stuff, to say that something exists only as a "concept in a mind", and not in reality or the world, is just another way of saying that that something doesn't exist.
So the answer to the OP's question is that Santa Claus does not exist, period, full stop, because Santa Claus is fictional.
Isn't your position contradictory, when you say: "something exists only as a "concept in a mind" is "another way of saying that something doesn't exist".
If something exists, it exists. The fact that something exists does not mean that it has to exist everywhere.
No, I don't see any contradiction in saying that there does not exist a plump old man living at the North Pole delivering presents to children on Christmas, but that there does exist a body of literary/oral traditions involving such a character.
Remember, I was only humoring you with this talk of "existing as a concept in a mind"; this is not the way I would say it- I think reifying concepts in this way is philosophically problematic- I instead would prefer to speak of language/linguistic activity (concepts being inherently linguistic, after all): so Santa Claus does not exist, he is fictional, but stories involving a character named Santa certainly do exist. But as these are not the same, there can't be any contradiction here. And colloquially, to say that something exists only as a concept in your mind is simply a different way of saying that something doesn't exist (consider: a conspiracy theory, an imaginary friend, etc)
Numbers?
Yep: I'm not sure if this was intended as a counter-example, but I actually think that it is a good example: for one thing, you could come up with a worse summary of the realist/anti-realist debate RE abstract objects than the dispute between those who think that e.g. numbers exist "only in the mind" and those who do not.
I don't follow how you can say:
X exists in the mind
? X doesn't exist
How is it therefore, that we make use of something that doesn't exist (numbers)?
Also, conspiracy theories do exist. That's why we can talk about them.
As I've remarked a number of times, I don't like talking about things "existing as concepts in the mind" (or similar expressions). So I'd rather not use such language at all.
But if I'm humoring people who do use such language, I would point out that Santa Claus is a plump old man living at the North Pole, not a plump old man living "in the mind"- if there is no such person, Santa Claus does not exist. We might say that he "exists only in the mind"- as in, "its all in your head"- as another way that we can and very often say that something doesn't exist. As when someone believes a conspiracy theory, when the conspiracy they believe in isn't real or isn't happening- the conspiracy doesn't exist, it exists "only in the mind", it is "all in your head".
I mean, if your position is that Santa Claus or Pegasus exist, when not existing is what distinguishes fictional characters as such, that's... not a great result.
Perhaps the problem is that one moment you use "exist" in a formal sense and then the next moment in a colloquial sense without making it clear, because otherwise, it seems that you are saying that something that exists doesn't exist.
What does "'exist' in a formal sense" even mean here? Are you referring to existential quantification in formal logic? Or do you mean "exists" as a technical term in ontology (as if there were only one sense of the term as used by philosophers over the centuries)?
Rather, I think the problem is that you're conflating Santa Claus with "concept-of-Santa-Claus". Leaving aside the (not inconsiderable) problems with talking about the existence of concepts in minds, Santa Claus and the concept-of-Santa-Claus are not the same thing. If if there is no jolly old man living at the North Pole making yearly deliveries to children on xmas, then Santa Claus does not exist: "Santa Claus exists" is true if there is such a jolly old man living at the NP, and false if there isn't. And there isn't. So even on your preferred terminology, only "the concept-of-Santa-Claus exists" is true: "Santa Claus exists" is still false... because Santa Claus is fictional, and not-existing is what makes someone/something fictional.
Another sign what you're defending is on the wrong track: if "Santa Claus exists" is true in virtue of the existence of the concept of Santa Claus, then any question of the form "does X exist" must always be answered in the affirmative: in order to ask whether some X exists, we must first have a concept of X. And if the existence of the concept of X entails the existence of X (as in "the concept-of-Santa-Claus exists, therefore Santa Claus exists"), then us being able to ask whether X exists at all means the concept of X exists and thus that X does too. But that's a bad result- some things exist and some things do not, and any analysis that implies that everything of which we can name or conceptualize exists, regardless of whether it actually does exist or not, then all the worse for your analysis.
But, Santa's ontology exists in the fictional realm. Why do people conflate the two?
Why do people conflate existing in a realm with existing in a realm-diagram or a realm-description?
You wrote: "And colloquially, to say that something exists only as a concept in your mind is simply a different way of saying that something doesn't exist (consider: a conspiracy theory, an imaginary friend, etc)"
As colloquial is defined as informal speech, "exists in a formal sense" contrasts with "exists in a colloquial sense".
You say that in an informal colloquial sense, the sentence "Santa Claus does not exist" means that although Santa Claus exists as a concept in the mind, he doesn't exist in the world.
Contrasted against this, in a more formal academic sense, the sentence "Santa Claus does not exist" is misleading, in that although Santa Claus doesn't exist in the world, Santa Claus does exist as a concept in the mind.
However, I am not even sure that in informal colloquial speech people would say that fictional characters don't exist, otherwise people wouldn't make such significant emotional investment in fictional characters within books and films.
Yes. Why is that?
Touche! :lol:
Do you think that the sense of Santa's existence belies itself in the cultural context of the sum total of his depictions and literature? Because, I think that as to answer this question by appealing to "meaning as use" is one of the few alternatives for addressing the instantiation of Santa's existence. Other than that one can entertain the notion that the realm-description of Santa guarantees his fictional existence. Does that make some sense?
I wasn't asking for an explanation of the difference between technical and colloquial usage in general, I was asking what exactly you think is THE formal definition of "exists" in philosophy. A rhetorical question, since there isn't one (existence in philosophy having been understood as everything from "being perceived" to "being the value of a bound variable", and plenty more in between)
And in any case, as I previously pointed out, the issue here isn't equivocation between technical and colloquial senses, the problem is conflating Santa Claus with the "concept" of Santa Claus. At most we can say that the concept of Santa Claus exists (if you don't mind the untenable language about concepts existing "in" minds), not that Santa Claus exists (because he doesn't- he is fictional). Supposing that "Santa Claus doesn't exist" is false because the concept of Santa Claus exists is about as naked a non-sequitur as one can imagine.
Why would that be anything untenable if that is what we mean when we say "Santa Claus exists". Furthermore, Santa routinely escapes his description realm when people (mostly children) start believing that he lives at the North Pole.
Hence, "Santa Claus exists" and "Santa Claus exists at the North Pole" are distinct, wouldn't you say?
As the SEP article on Existence notes that the question of existence raises deep and important problems in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic, it's highly unlikely that I could come up with one.
Right; that was precisely my point- there is no such thing as THE "formal" or technical definition of existence in philosophy (so this isn't a failure on your part- no one has been able to establish an uncontroversial technical usage for "exists" in philosophy, including the greatest minds in the history of philosophy, let alone philosophy grunts like you or me).
Is that what we mean when we say Santa Claus exists? That the concept of Santa Claus exists? If that is what we mean, why don't we just say that instead?
And "Santa Claus exists" and "Santa Claus exists at the North Pole" are distinct, but not in any way that changes things wrt his alleged existence (not so far as I can tell, at any rate). Both express a false proposition, because Santa Claus is fictional, and doesn't exist at the North Pole or anywhere else. All that exists are stories, words, beliefs, language- the "concept" of Santa Claus, not Santa Claus.
Do you agree that Santa Claus exists as a concept?
But the point holds regardless of terminology; Santa Claus doesn't exist, Santa Claus is fictional. What does exist are stories, songs, language- or, the concept of Santa Claus... not Santa Claus.
happy new year everyone! :smile:
[quote=Agent Smith]Santa, do you exist?[/quote]
[quote=Santa Claus]You tell me Smith, do I exist?[/quote]
[quote=Agent Smith]If I knew I wouldn't ask.[/quote]
[quote=Santa Claus]Don't you like me Smith?[/quote]
We can give any time of the year but the spirit of Christmas is something we share together and that makes it a bigger deal than just buying someone a gift. It is special foods, traditions and songs. As one song says, it is a wonderful time of the year, and participating in Christmas is not being alone but a part of something much bigger than ourselves.
I think we have a hard time with spirits. I believe they are real, such as morale, that high-spirited feeling we have when we believe we are doing the right thing. We experience spirits and that makes them real, but they are not materialistic and most of us are limited to materialistic thinking.
1. Definitely exists: The Eiffel tower, The Uluru rock (Down Under), Mammoth caves (USA), Joe Biden, Vladimir Putin
2. May/may not exist: Spirits, leprechauns, Santa Claus.
3. Definitely does not exist: A married bachelor, and other self-contradictory objects.
So we can't say/believe that something doesn't exist unless its existence is literally a logical impossibility?
Are we sure that's a reasonable standard? :chin:
So, does Billy-Bob Butterybuns exist? Can we justifiably say that Billy-Bob Butterybuns doesn't exist, or no? (and if not, why not?)