Impromptu debate about nominalism
Wondering if someone would like to take up a casual debate exploring nominalism. Take pro or con as you prefer.
Nominalism is the thesis that universals and abstract objects don't exist. Only individual objects do.
If necessary, we could discuss whether being deflationary about the concept of existence, or reducing it to a facet of communication without any further significance addresses the question or just side steps it.
Nominalism is the thesis that universals and abstract objects don't exist. Only individual objects do.
If necessary, we could discuss whether being deflationary about the concept of existence, or reducing it to a facet of communication without any further significance addresses the question or just side steps it.
Comments (159)
I have never been involved in a discussion about nominalism, nor have I ever considered it much important as a subject, but I have to bring up what Wikipedia says about it, namely that "There are at least two main versions of nominalism. One version denies the existence of universals things that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things (e.g., strength, humanity). The other version specifically denies the existence of abstract objects objects that do not exist in space and time." You are limiting it to the second one. But I consider it more interesting, anyway! :smile: Although, Wiki's statement falls into a kind of "circularity" trap: space and time are themselves such abstract objects; they don't really exist!
Nominalism addresses the concept of existence better than realism does.
What kind of realism are you referring to?
Platonic realism or any realism in regards to abstract ideas and universals.
But can you really escape universals and abstract objects? When you separate the universe down to its tiniest parts, what do you call those parts?
They are useful for linguistic purposes, so one need not escape them. But in terms of metaphysics and ontology they are neither extant nor useful. I would not separate a universe down to its tiniest parts, for instance, because it presupposes a universe is its own particular. Particulars have parts but universals do not.
There are only individuals in res from which the predicates or properties they have in common are abstracted generalized into discursive classes and concepts.
So in Meinong's sense universals subsist in the mind, or in our grammar, but in Plato's sense it's mistaken that they also exist, which is misplaced concreteness (i.e. reification fallacy) deflated by nominalism and pragmatism.
So when you talk about electrons, which have the property of spin, you speak of spin as if it's something real, is that correct?
One "speaks of spin as if it's something real" because it is useful to do so.
No, I would speak of the electron as real (assuming there is a referent) and spin as a predicate.
So the spin of the election is not real?
I'm not ignoring your post, but NOS made a specific claim that I'm working back toward.
An electron spins. The spin needn't be abstracted into its own entity.
Is the spin real or not?
Im afraid it is not real in the way you say it is. Do you think the spin is real?
I haven't made any claims. I was simply asking if the spin of an electron is real, unreal, or some third option.
I was aiming to explain that if you rule out the existence of the properties of an object, you'll soon find that you have no words at all to describe reality. This is because you're left with raw, unformed matter as the only "real.". I wanted to debate it to work through that idea.
But your claim was about how we address existence, and what strategies serve us best in that regard, so you derailed me. :nerd:
Thanks for the discussion!
Debates usually involve two or more competing ideas, not a series of questions and answers. So if you believe in the existence of properties then surely there is a reason why.
To rule out the existence of the properties of an object is not to rule out the utility of the words. I can still use the words to describe whats real, in this case the electron.
You've moved to shifting the burden instead of answering my question. That doesn't bode well for your argument.
My mistake. How is it, then, that if you rule out the existence of the properties of an object, you'll soon find that you have no words at all to describe reality?
You'll have no way to explain what an electron is in real terms. It becomes blank. See what I mean?
But we already describe what an electron is. Were speaking about an electron when defining its movements in mathematical terms. So I do not see what you mean.
Are you saying that speaking of a specific electron's movements is sufficient to give the word "electron" its conventional meaning?
I dont know. Im not a physicist. Im only saying that were speaking about electrons when defining their movements in mathematical terms, such as with spin.
Spin is a particular kind of momentum, which is mass times velocity. Spin is represented as a vector. The electron itself is a point particle. It doesn't have any volume. Electrons are negatively charged.
The above description of spin and electrons is full of universals and abstract objects. If you deny the existence of those properties, you have no real terms with which to explain what an electron is. "Electron" becomes a blank.
Nominalism makes sense because of things in nature are in a continuum. If I took the time I could find many species of plants that look kinda like trees but are basically in the middle sonewhere. Do we say they have the universal of tree-ness and shrub-ness at the same time? Or is plant-ness the universal? Does a car have an essence? What if we take the wheels off? Humans group things in their mind in order to see reality from an intellectual perspective and they can get tangled up because we can't see all of reality as it is
Sometimes things have contrary properties, but the forms don't. :grin: That's from Plato's Parmenides.
Quoting Gregory
This suggests that the whole issue is beyond our ability to answer because we can't see beyond our own minds.
But we struggle to say something about it anyway. I think universals and abstract objects do have something to do with the architecture of the mind. I don't have the vantage point necessary to go further though, and say that this architecture fools us. How do we decide which part of our experiences are lies? Occam says properties are lies. Hume said the object is. How would I know who's right?
But how can contingent things have universals? Aren't universals our way of knowing a parcel of reality as it exists around us? Your belief in universals indicates knowledge of the world
In the OP, I offered to take either side of the debate. I'm interested in where the arguments lead.
What about an argument for non-duality (Forms vs earth)? Either everything is one or it is not and hence there are many things, the latter being the existential stance. Substance vs action
If that is how we are using the term exist (another abstract I should add) then maybe the reality of the term exist exists less than say the concept of number? :D
But there seems to be more to the story than that. If these universals are merely products of our minds, they'd be no more than imagination. However, when someone says a red apple is green, we tell him he's wrong. You can't be wrong if the redness of the apple is just our imagination. Guy just happened to imagine greenness in the apple this time. Nothing wrong with that.
Descriptions are full of abstract objects and universals, certainly, but the contention for the nominalist is that abstract objects and universals do not exist independently of descriptions. And their inability to exist independent of the descriptions does not limit their usefulness in describing things that do. So the electron can be described in countless fashions, in abstract and concrete terms, never blank.
They are without a referent, or at the most co-referential. Wherever they appear they can only prove to exist as products of the mind. How can a realist overcome such a deficit?
By disagreeing with you there. A realist thinks they are necessary to explain some phenomena for example:
Quoting khaled
It seems highly unlikely for me that all our minds just happen to author all the same universals. That we all just continuously happen to imagine the same things.
The purpose of my question was to see if you can find any sort of internal inconsistency in realism about universals if it is assumed. But your only problem with it seems that you believe it's unnecessary.
A description is an abstract object, since it's made of propositions, so you're confirming the existence of at least one independent abstract object.
Or you can define "description" as a specific action on the part of a specific human, in which case electrons are only negatively charged during those describing activities.
Do you have another option?
I agree we can't escape the use 9f abstract objects and universals.
I am very much on the side of phenomenology when it comes to this kind of debate. There is no debate. People can argue over this or that but I will always maintain (correctly) that something is being argued over and the concept of nothing is still something that exists.
Things that do not exist we cannot talk about or refer to. This is one of the most obvious things that Kant pointed out that SO SO many find hard to grasp. The Noumenon is a concept that refers to the lack of being able to refer to and some find that hard to get their head around.
I believe abstract concepts and universals are necessary for language. I just cant find them outside of it.
Using a suffix to turn an adjective such as red into the noun redness is purely an exercise of the mind, not an observation of something in the world. It allows you to equivocate between using an adjective on one hand, and a noun on the other, but they both nonetheless serve to describe the same thing: the apple. We cannot point to or quantify something called redness; we can only point to or quantify things that are red, or at least appear red.
Its not independent, though. You said yourself its made of propositions. We make propositions, descriptions, abstract objects, universals, and so they are forever dependent on the human mind. They might manifest as words but they will never manifest anywhere else.
If so, then what is the explanation for all of us largely attributing redness to the same things? It sounds as though there is something in common between all the things we describe with the adjective "red" or to which we attribute "redness". What is that thing in common?
Quoting NOS4A2
Yes we can, what?
Redness is the property of reflecting light of wavelengths around 625-740nm and absorbing other frequencies. That's something in the world is it not?
Forget universals. Do you believe properties exist? Do things have properties?
Quoting NOS4A2
How come that we are able to predict the behavior of things in the world using these abstract concepts then? A concept such as "gravity" is certainly an abstract object right? If we just made it up, how come the universe seems to follow our predictions based on this supposed imagination?
I think the more likely explanation is that we discover abstract objects, not create them. Otherwise, how come they are so applicable to the world?
A proposition is a state of affairs. Propositions transcend time and space by definition. It's easy to demonstrate that they can't be the product of any particular mind, and if they're products of mind at all, it would be in a Kantian sense. An individual human may give expression to a proposition by uttering a sentence, but in that act, the only thing with spacial and temporal extension is the marks or sounds of the utterance.
But even if you reject the above and opt for some sort of hard behaviorism, you've still given an abstract foundation to descriptions: us.
For apples and other fruits its Anthocyanins. For blood its Heme. The color is similar because the light bouncing off of these compounds is similar and our biology is similar. They appear red, they can be described as red, but there isnt something called red in Anthocyanins and Heme. Weve looked.
No, things do not possess other things called properties. Properties are basically values we put into formulas. The boiling point, for instance, is the temperature at which something boils. There is something about the liquid that causes it to boil at a certain temperature, but there is nothing called boiling point in liquid.
Propositions do not transcend space and time. Ive quoted your propositions right here, the product of a particular mind. If its easy to demonstrate that a proposition transcends space and time perhaps you might entertain us by doing so.
Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin? Is an answer to one also an answer to the other?
The spin of an electron isn't like a top spinning. Electrons don't actually spin. So to address your question, let's think of tops. One of the properties of tops is that they can spin. The noun/verb issue showing up in this property isn't relevant to nominalism. The nominalist denies that it's appropriate to say that tops have this property.
It would probably bring clarity if you explained what you think a proposition is.
Do they deny that its appropriate to say that tops spin?
They would allow that some tops spin some of the time. Their starting point is that there are only individual entities. Think of M. Thatcher saying that there's no such thing as society. She was speaking as a nominalist.
Which surely is a sufficient account. Tops spinning is a real, concrete thing that can be seen and measured. Tops really do spin (sometimes).
What need and evidence is there for some additional abstract property, above-and-beyond the physical act?
The argument comes down to insisting that you can't think or communicate without using universals and abstract objects.
It depends on the sense in which you use it. If it is a state of affairs, then it is a statement. Do you mean it in another sense?
I put down my proposition: Abstractions and universals (non-physical things) exist but not in the physical world.
I base my argument on "Cogito ergo sum." It is not I simply who is thinking, but my mind. The mind is not physical. We connect it to the brain, but only out of desperation while and due to not knowing for sure, and out of observing coincidental events in brain activity and thought.
The mind is not physical, yet it exist. Yes, it exist due to knowing non-physicals, as the proof goes, but it can also know physicals.
And as the old saying goes, you can't connect the mind to the brain. Dead brains don't have minds. A dead brain is not much different from a living brain within five minutes of death.
Even if that were true it doesnt follow that universals and abstract objects exist in the realist sense. They might play a useful role in language, but thats all they are.
Propositions are the primary truthbearers. It's the content of an uttered sentence. Multiple sentences can be uttered to express the same proposition. This shows that propositions are not equivalent to sentences or utterances.
If you really want to wade into those thickets, we can, or we can go back to the fact that you provided "us" as the foundation for descriptions. That's an abstract object. No one individual creates language. It's created by humans. See what I mean?
Take speed. Speed is not a nominal. It has no physical presence. It is invoked by physical objects.
Yet you can measure speed just like you can measure physical objects.
So things that can be measured, exist. For instance Xaveria Hollander and speed.
Furthermore, the qualities of the qualities (non-nominals) also have qualities.
So if one insists that only nominals can have qualities, then their argument can be shown to be wrong.
I don't know how they exist, although I have speculations. I just know there's a logical problem with denying that they exist, which is the nominalist claim.
The whole discussion takes place in the shadow of Plato. You're offering his middle period view.
What logical problems? I dont need to accept the mind-independent existence of some abstract property of spin to accept that tops (and other things) sometimes spin. The concrete behaviour of physical objects is a sufficient account of spin.
States of affairs are truth-makers. So a proposition in your sense is not a state of affairs. Yes, I dont want to wade into these things, personally.
The fact that I use an object pronoun ought not to suggest I believe us exists as an object.
1. What does the discussion's place have to do with my argument?
2. Even if I was, you are not answering my argument.
3. Plato came centuries before Descartes.
In my opinion you are putting the hors d'raison before Descartes.
YOU wanted an argument. Then ANSWER with an argument. Not with a trite non-committal opinion that says nothing about anything.
NOS has been more gracious than I could ask for. He's rational, to the point, and eminently non-abusive. :up:
Then there's no real foundation for descriptions. Right?
I was not abusive in my arguments. But when you dismissed me and my arguments with a dismissive gesture, I became angry. And you wonder why I became abusive. You treated all other respondents with care and valid responses; you responded to them with respect inasmuch as accepting the validity of what they said. You shat on mine. I am sorry, I don't take that kind of treatment. THAT is why I became abusive. Disrespect. You showed me disrespect and I don't stand for that.
I think you're saying that you're satisfied that things sometimes spin. That tops have the property of being able to spin is a different proposition, though.
Are you ok with that proposition?
I wasn't being dismissive. I just didn't have any response.
As far as what I know about early nominalism, they did not deny truths of language or that objects have properties. They denied non material forms and Forms.
Which text from Occam do you derive the proposition that "Occam says properties are lies?"
When Occam admonishes those who 'multiply causes beyond necessity", is he not repeating Aristotle's demand for a crucial difference versus a classification like "featherless biped?" Which, by the way, was a criticism directed toward Aristotle.
A is B
B exists
Therefore A exists
If so, replace A with "boiling point" and B with "the temperature at which something boils" and you get "the boiling point (a property) exists"
Quoting NOS4A2
Quoting NOS4A2
Yes there is, you just described it. It is the property of:
Quoting NOS4A2
That light being within a certin range
Is the temperature at which something boils a property?
That's the question I asked of you. Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin?
If there isn't a difference, and if things really spinning is concrete, not abstract, then spin being real is concrete, not abstract.
If there is a difference then prima facie one can deny that spin is real but accept that things really spin. What issues would arise from this? We have evidence of things really spinning. What evidence is there of spin being real (as something else)? What need is there for spin being real (as something else)?
The temperature at which water boils is 100 degrees celsius. Is 100 degrees celsius a property?
Quoting khaled
The boiling point of water is the temperature at which water boils
The temperature at which water boils is 100 degrees celsius
100 degrees celsius is not a property
Therefore, the boiling point of water is not a property
A is B
B is C
C is not D
Therefore, A is not D
The boiling point is a property. The boiling point of water is not. The boiling point of water is a specific value.
Then your argument above either equivocates or begs the question.
You're saying that the temperature at which something boils exists. But this is meant in some abstract sense, not in some concrete sense, e.g. the temperature at which water boils exist. And so I will simply deny that the temperature at which something boils exists.
I will accept that the temperature at which water boils exists, but then if so we are only left with my argument above:
The boiling point of water is the temperature at which water boils
The temperature at which water boils is 100 degrees celsius
100 degrees celsius is not a property
Therefore, the boiling point of water is not a property
And then we apply that same argument for all things which (concretely) exist. There's no need or evidence for some abstract property in addition to this.
Yes.
Quoting Michael
Not intentionally. I thought when we speak of "boiling point" we speak of it in the abstract. Not a specific instance of it. So the boiling point is the temperature at which something boils (something is unspecified because we are speaking abstractly)
The temperature at which something boils exists, therefore the boiling point exists.
Quoting Michael
That just seems...weird. Would you deny the existence of distance between two points as well? When a mathematician speaks of "distance between two points a and b" but doesn't specify a or b, what is he speaking about?
When a chemist says "boiling point of substance X can be used in *insert formula here* to calculate the entropy of the system" what are they speaking about?
If these properties don't exist even abstractly then how are these two talking about them?
Also I want to understand what you mean by "abstractly" exactly. Does a unicorn exist abstractly? Does a "sphere" (with unspecified radius)? As I understand it the answer is yes for both.
Quoting Michael
Yes, which we seem to agree is valid. The boiling point of water is indeed not a property. Because the boiling point of water is "100C". That is a value in Celsius, not a property.
It seems iffy to me to deny the existence of properties in general, but to think they exist for certain things nonetheless, but I haven't thought about it much yet. I'll get back to this point when I do.
Good talk for now though. Gave me a lot to think about.
We can talk about the distance between two points without having to accept that the distance exists, just as we can talk about Mordor and unicorns without having to accept that Mordor and unicorns exist.
To repeat my earlier exchange with Frank:
[quote=frank]The argument comes down to insisting that you can't think or communicate without using universals and abstract objects.[/quote]
[quote=Michael]Even if that were true it doesnt follow that universals and abstract objects exist in the realist sense. They might play a useful role in language, but thats all they are.[/quote]
The idea that we can only talk about things that have some mind-independent existence, à la realism, is mistaken.
To me, an abstract exists if there could exist material things that act according to it. So gravity exists because things are pulling each other. Distance exists because if I represent things in xyz, and add up their vector positions, they seem to be where I'd expect them to be, etc.
To say gravity doesn't exist would be to say it is impossible to even have a world where material things pull each other. An example of an abstract that doesn't exist is a "square triangle".
What does existence for abstract stuff mean when you say it?
I'm not entirely sure what it means to exist, but according to Platonism the existence of abstract objects is independent of the physical and the mental. This is what I deny. Whatever it means to exist, things exist either as a physical or as a mental thing (with the latter possibly reducible to the former).
There is no evidence or need for this third "realm" of abstract objects.
There is just the physical distance between two points in space and our concept of distance. There is no abstract distance as some additional mind-independent thing.
As for a lack of need for it: If things are either mental or physical, then when we refer to "gravity" we must be referring to a mental thing, a physical thing, or having no referent at all. So which is it? I disagree because I don't think any of the options does it justice.
But other than that, your only problem for it is that it seems unnecessary? Not some sort of internal inconsistency or issues that arise from assuming it?
My view is a bit out there when it comes to ontology and probably long overdue for a good tearing down, but I think that what we call "mental" belongs in the realm of abstract objects, along with the traditional inhabitants of said realm. And that they offer the least problematic account of interactions between mental and physical.
Physical. It's one of the 4 fundamental forces.
Quoting khaled
There's no evidence or prima facie need for anything more, and so as per Occam's razor I can dismiss anything else.
Quoting khaled
Well, there's the question you asked of me; what does it even mean for an abstract object to exist (as some mind-independent thing)? It seems like an empty claim. And how do these abstract objects "attach" themselves to physical objects, or whatever it is that happens?
The boiling temperature varies with pressure, so it is relative. Therefore it is not true that there is a temperature at which something boils. And accordingly it is not true to say that such a thing exists.
That is the issue with Platonic realism, it only gets validated through absolutes. However, principles of physics such as "the boiling temperature" are always relative, and therefore cannot validate such realism. So the Platonic realist turns to principles which are more "pure", free from the influence of the physical world, mathematical axioms, and attempts to demonstrate that these are absolute.
Yes, there's a difference. Saying that tops have the property of being able to spin is not the same as saying that tops sometimes spin. You could have a top that spends its whole existence in a drawer. It still has the property of being able to spin.
Quoting Michael
Have you ever heard of Hume's bundle theory?
That is a non-sequitor. Just because it varies with another value doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
Gravitational pull varies with distance. That does not mean gravitatoinal pull doesn't exist.
OK, then is there a difference between spin being real and a top really being able to spin?
Right, but then are the fundamental forces themselves physical? What physical properties do they have? Do they have a mass or a velocity?
What about "Newton's second law". Is that one physical, mental, or has no referent?
Quoting Michael
I told you:
Quoting khaled
The liquid exists, the atmospheric conditions exist, but the boiling point is just a value produced by a human mind, as is temperature. Youre just describing the state of the liquid.
That light exists, yes, and it appears red, sure, but red is just a description of the light.
I've lost track of your point. It seems like you're constructing word salad.
My question to NOS about whether spin, as an essential property of electrons, is real, was aimed at his earlier statement that nominalism addresses the concept of existence better than the alternatives.
You started talking about the verb "spin", which electrons don't do. So I tried to adjust by talking about tops, which do spin, and have the property of spinnability, spinness, or the ability to spin, however you want to put it.
Could you clarify your point?
I'm trying to point out the ambiguity in your question.
The Platonist might say that height is real iff height is a mind-independent abstract object. The nominalist rejects the claim that height is a mind-independent abstract object. The Platonist might then respond by claiming that the nominalist rejects the claim that height is real. But then the nominalist will respond by claiming that height being real just is that physical objects really have a height, and that physical objects really having a height does not depend on height being a mind-independent abstract object.
So simply asking something like "is height real?" doesn't address the issue at all.
Your question for @NOS4A2 should be "is an electron's spin a mind-independent abstract object?" rather than the ambiguous "is an electron's spin real?"
Hume gives a non-Platonic alternative to nominalism.
I wasn't really interested in pushing any particular account of abstract objects and universals. I was pointing out the problem with denying that they exist, which Hume's bundle theory explains pretty succinctly.
Quoting Michael
You've misunderstood the discussion between NOS and me.
But Hume was a nominalist?
When the nominalist weighs a stone he understands hes measuring the stone, not something called weight. This can be observed: he is indeed putting the stone on the scale. Nothing called weight even needs to be postulated.
The realist, on the other hand, implies that the stone possesses something called weight. So now we have two substances, the stone and weight. Yet there is only stone on the scale.
So why must we evoke two or more substances when there appears only one?
Sorry, I should have said his account is an alternative to traditional nominalism like Occam's. He didn't believe in objects. A thing is a bundle of properties and properties are identified by resemblance of perceptions.
I'm sure you realize stones don't have any weight in outer space. By your account, the nominalist is pretty confused.
How is he confused? He hasn't evoked "weight", so no property called "weight" has suddenly vanished. The stone has not changed. Instead the nominalist can focus on what has changed and come closer to accuracy in describing states of affairs.
I agree. My point is that he'll continue to speak in terms of universals and abstract objects while maintaining that the things he's referring to don't exist.
There's some arbitrariness in what he's decided to call real, or rather it's probably a matter of the bias of his times.
If he lived in 2nd Century Rome, he'd just as confidently speak of forms as the truest reality, with just as much justification. He'd argue that this talk of particulars is just a trick of speech.
Yeah I think abstract objects and universals are inescapable features of speech.
There is a Russian political philosopher known as Putins brain, Alexander Dugin, who claims that the advent of nominalism is the precursor to liberalism, and thus represents the inherent danger of The West. He claims that it serves to destroy notions such as community and family and has led to the worst kind of individualism. So I wonder if nominalism has had such an effect on the one hand, and if it is indeed a strictly western notion in the other.
Arent you a sight for sore eyes, friend.
Interesting. Some see in Plato's Forms a hint of the real anti-democratic sentiment of Plato. I guess the accompanying folklore is that Plato saw in Socrates' execution, which was part of wave of post-war scapegoating, just how ugly the People can be.
Liberalism was partly about wresting power away from the aristocracy, who were kind of like social icons. Liberalism definitely has an affinity for a mechanical outlook. So yes, I see what he's saying.
Quoting NOS4A2
Russia has never really had a strong sense of identity. Russians are traditionally difficult to govern because they're so independently minded. Community has been a concern of Russian thinkers for some time. The West, on the other hand, is marked by potent super identities like the British and the Americans. The West never has to worry about the community being endangered by individualism because each person is deeply marked by the looming figures of cultural personality.
I guess I'm saying Dugin is probably right that Russia has an allergy to nominalism. That doesn't mean it's bad for the West though.
What are your thoughts?
As I said, it means that there is no such thing as "the temperature at which something boils", which is what your claim was. The same thing will boil at many different temperatures. Spin it however you want, but your claim was false.
I think youre right and I like your take. I know in my own case that my politics is the inevitable conclusion of my metaphysics. I cannot put any value into abstract objects and universals when I cannot believe in them. But I disagree with Dugin that these valuations will lead us to a post-human world, where we will abandon the notions of humanity itself. And I doubt that nominalism is a prevalent as he claims.
That makes sense. For me, despite my attempts to see the issue in a neutral way, I lean toward realism, by which I mean that what each of us is directly aware of is a world of ideas. The mind can't do anything with a disparate hodge podge of data, which is what it would appear the brain is receiving.
I myself am an idea. I can't deny the existence of society without denying my own reality, and in fact, I see societies as being like giant people in some respects.
I can see why some people might see me as embracing the mythological as real, but I dont think they really have any contact with what they're calling real.
An indirect realist I suppose, at least according to the philosophy of mind and perception. I myself am a direct realist. Its fascinating that these ancient philosophical quandaries will forever reappear.
Do you identify yourself as the brain, or some other internal locus? I ask because I can see such a belief orientating a person towards a belief in the reality of abstract objects, universals, representations and the like.
Ok. And what is a "state"? Is it a physical thing, a mental thing, or some sort of quirk in language?
Because your language certainly makes it seem like a "state" is something a liquid possesses.
"Sir, there is a sum of money you must pay to the government called taxes"
"Aha! But this sum of money changes for different people at different times in their life! Therefore there is no sum of money I must pay to the government called taxes! Taxes aren't real!"
If only it was that easy.
In this case its the liquid at any given point and under any given conditions, what it looks like, what its doing, how cold it is, etc.
Were not talking about any particular liquid here so its entirely a product of the mind.
Ok. So the state of the liquid is entirely a product of the mind yes? (as long as we're not talking about a particular liquid)
We also know that when liquids change states they change their capabilities too correct? So if the liquid changes states such that its temperature is 90 degrees Celsius, it starts being able to cook food for example.
So if on top of that states were entirely products of the mind, then one would be able to change the capabilities of a given liquid by convincing themselves its at a different state. But we cannot do so. If I try to cook a piece of meat in liquid (water/broth/etc) with 30C temperature, it won't cook, even if every single person on earth convinced themselves that the liquid (water/broth/etc) is 100C temperature.
So it seems to me you either deny that a change in states changes the capabilities of a liquid, OR states are not entirely mental constructs.
No, you cannot change the capabilities of a given liquid by thinking about it. But you can imagine different values in its properties and get a fairly accurate idea of what it will do in that state.
if you were to describe the condition of any given liquid, do you believe the liquid possesses something called a condition by virtue of using such possessive language? If so, which is wet? the condition or the liquid?
That's right, because it's arbitrary. There is no such thing s the sum of money you have to pay, claim some expenses and other deductions, and lower the amount if you do not like it. And so tax issues can either be settled arbitrarily out of court, or become long drawn out court cases.
Quoting khaled
You're wrong here though, it's not easy, but more difficult. The easy way is to just give in to what they say, give them what they ask for. The more difficult way is to find all the deductions you are eligible for, and reduce that amount of taxation.
That's the way reality is, the simple representation ('water boils at 100 degrees') is not the truth. The truth is complex and difficult. 'There is a temperature at which water boils' is the simple representation, but it\s not the truth, as the truth is much more complex and difficult.. We simply chop off the complex and difficult aspects, ignoring them, for the sake of making life simple. But that puts us in Plato's cave.
I know. The notion that we've made philosophical progress in the last 2400 years is an illusion.
Quoting NOS4A2
I guess I do identity with an internal locus. Plus I'm very protective of my privacy. So I guess when privacy is an ideal, I don't want to hear that I'm something that's socially mediated.
How do you see yourself?
It wasn't just me that used said possessive laguage:
Quoting NOS4A2
But yes, the liquid possesses a condition.
Quoting NOS4A2
The liquid. Why would it be the condition? A condition doesn't possess any of the qualities that would make up "wet". It can't as it's not material.
Quoting NOS4A2
Alright but that can't be mere coincidence right? Why does it happen to be the case that what we imagine matches up with the behavior of the liquid every time?
That's why I posit that the liquid itself has "laws" that determine its "states". We merely discover those laws. We don't make them up. If they were entirely mental constructs, then how come when we alter them, the things bound by them don't change behavior accordingly?
Also I am curious what the "gravitational constant" is in your view. Is it a mental thing, a physical thing, or something else? Unlike temperature and such, it's not really a property, just a value (6.6743 × 10^-11), but an important one. Where does that land?
And yet taxes exist....
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see what this has to do with anything.
My point is simple. The amount you have to pay in tax varies a lot. And yet taxes exist. Hence just because the value of it varies does not mean the thing does not exist.
Same with gravitational force. Gravitational force exists even though the gravitional force changes based on distance.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
(I hope this isn't an unfair quote, it seems to me to be what you mean)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A system where "taxes do not exist", "the boiling point does not exist" and "gravitaional forces do not exist" are true just sounds silly to me.
So what? Boiling water exists too. But that wasn't your claim
Quoting khaled
You've changed the subject with your analogies. You were not talking about whether boiling water exists, you were talking about the existence of the temperature at which water boils. So the existence of gravity, and the existence of taxes is irrelevant. What you were talking about is the specific quantity which is assigned to a thing, a measured value, and whether that measured value exists or not.
Yes, my claim was that the boiling point exists. That a "temperature at which something boils" exists. You said it doesn't because that temperature varies with a lot of factors.
I then said taxes exist. You said they don't because they vary with a lot of factors.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But I didn't say the existence of gravity. I said "gravitational force". Specifically because it is also a value that varies with a lot of factors. But it exists.
But by your logic, since the gravitational force depends on distance, and the mass of the two objects, it doesn't exist. Similar to how since the "temperature at which something boils" depends on the something and the pressure, therefore it doesn't exist. Similar to how since the "amount of money you owe the government" varies based on a lot of factors it doesn't exist (again, I wish it was that easy to dismiss taxes).
A question for you. If the "temperature at which something boils" doesn't exist, then when chemists use the boiling point in a formula, what are they talking about?
"Gravitational force" is just another way of saying "gravity", it is not an expression of a gravitational value. That gravitational force is just a general reference, rather than a specific value is evident from the fact that the gravitational constant expressed by "g" in the formula "mgh" is applicable in approximation on the earth only. If we want to produce a gravitational value for other places we must employ a different formula. This might be a formula such as you proposed, a relation between two masses and distance, or it might be something more vague like what is expressed in general relativity.
Quoting khaled
No, by my logic, the value assigned to any specific instance of gravitational force does not exist, because it is somewhat arbitrary depending on the formula chosen to figure the value. Likewise, the value assigned to the boiling point of water at average seal level air pressure might be 100 degrees, or 212 degrees, or even 373 degrees, depending on the formula employed. And this does not even account for the formula required to determine average sea level air pressure.
I am making no claims about whether gravitational force exists, or whether boiling water exists, I am making claims about the measured value of such things.
That there are things to be known, is given; how the things are to be known, is determined.
No it isn't. I was referring specifically to the value that represents the strength of gravitational pull, but sure, let's say they're the same.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So the value of gravitational force does not exist since it varies based on what units/formulas we use? Is that what you're saying?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But the "boiling point" is on exactly the same level as "gravitational force". We use both in formulas abstractly. And neither are talking about a specific value.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, but in all of these cases, the boiling point exists yes? There exists a temperature at which something boils, although we can use arbitrary units to represent it leading to different values. Similar to how there exists a gravitational force between two objects, even though we can use arbitrary units to represent it leading to different values.
Yes
Quoting khaled
"The boiling point" when represented as a specific temperature value, (which is what you were saying, the temperature at which something boils) is a specific value. "Gravitational force" is something general and does not represent any specific value. So, the value which is assigned to the "gravitational force" depends on the circumstances and the formula used to figure that value. But the specific value, 100 degrees, which we call the boiling point, is derived from the application of a formula. So the former, the general description of "gravitational force" is a descriptive statement prior to the application of formula, while the latter, 100 degrees, posterior to the application of a formula, as a value produced from that application.
Quoting khaled
No, there is not a temperature at which something boils. That is the point. There is no such thing as the temperature at which something boils. That's what I've been telling you. The temperature at which a liquid will boil depends on the air pressure. Try taking some water to the moon and see what happens to it. Maybe someone has already done this experiment, google it.
The value of the gravitational force depends on gravitational constant, the masses of the object, and the distance between them. Which for some reason makes it so that the value of the gravitational force doesn't exist
And yet the gravitational force exists.
The value of the boiling point depends on pressure, the type of liquid, and a bunch of other things. Which for somea reason makes it so that the value of the boiling point doesn't exist.
And yet the boiling point exists.
It's the exact same situation with the exact same logic. I don't know where you got this distinction:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
but (and excuse my french) it is complete nonsense.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not what I was saying. I was not referring to the value "100C" (in case of water) as the boiling point.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's not what boiling point means. Boiling point is every bit as general and condition dependent as gravitational force. See:
Quoting khaled
Quoting khaled
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It seems like you misunderstand what boiling point means which is why you say this. Hopefully the above clears it up.
As I said, the issue is with your statement that "there exists a temperature at which something boils". This is completely different from the statement "the boiling point exists". The former, "a temperature" is a value assigned to the latter, the named thing, "boiling point".
Do you apprehend the difference? Suppose there is a pile of money on the table, a bunch of paper notes. Do you see the difference between the pile of paper, and the value assigned to it? If you do, then let's stick to the value, and inquire whether the value exists. Please do not keep saying that you only want to talk about the pile of paper, implying that you think that if the pile of paper is determined to be existing, we can somehow infer from this, that the value is also existing. That's a pointless exercise in the context of this thread.
So if you just want to discuss whether "the boiling point" exists, instead of your original claim that "the temperature at which something boils exists", this is not even relevant to the thread, and rather pointless to discuss. But if you honestly want to discuss whether the value which we assign to that thing named "the boiling point" exists, the thing which you call "the temperature at which something boils", then I'm ready to proceed.
Considering I defined them to be the same I would say my intent is pretty clear:
That you then proceed to argue against what you mistakenly thought I said even after the misunderstanding has been cleared up is pointless.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That implication is in your head only. You seem to have a habit of misunderstanding me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, those were intended as the same claim. But I understand the difference you drew between.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sure, I believe they still exist. And to be clear we are discussing values correct? Like "100 degrees Celsius". I must say that seeing a realist that believes that "boiling point" exists but that its value doesn't exist is a first time for me.
I'll start with asking you, if you think these values don't exist, then what are we referring to when we use them?
OK, so we're talking about values. That's right then, we have understanding, I do not think that values exist. I believe they are mental constructs, products of the imagination, which like any other objects of fiction, do not exist. So when we "use them", they are used just like a creative work of fiction, from which there is an intent to achieve some sort of goal, or end. So by the same principle that a lie (which intentionally refers to something non-existent) is useful, so also are values (which intentionally refer to something non-existent), are useful.
As an analogy, consider a parent who tells a child a fictitious story about Santa Clause, for the purpose of some goal of culturing love and good will within the child. Be aware though, that fictitious stories can be used for all sorts of ends from evils like deception, cheating, fraud, stealing, to good things like the love and good will mentioned above, along with social institutions, and products created through the fictitious stories of mathematics and engineering.
I think there is a problem with saying values are fictitious, being that if they are fictitious, then changing them should not mean we are wrong.
Take the Santa Clause story. That's fictitious because even if you change the story so that Santa uses flying horses, you're not "wrong". It's a work of fiction after all you can do whatever you want. Santa could be a vampire.
However if you have 5 boxes lined up in front of you and you say there are 4 boxes, you are wrong. That tells me that values aren't works of fiction.
I think the principal issue is that there are different ways to derive "the value", as I described. Each formulation of "the value" is correct in accordance with its formula, though they are different. This is fundamentally a relativistic perspective. The value assigned is relative to the formula employed, and is correct, but different from the value assigned relative to another formula.
Now, when we point at something "real" in the world, like a pot of water which starts to boil, we want to know the cause of that activity, and this is where the problem of thinking that the value is real arises. If we think that the formula produces a value which is real, we might tend to believe that any specific formula provides a true representation of the cause. So for example, if we think that 100 degrees Celsius is a "real" value for the boiling point of water, then we would tend to believe that the real cause of the water boiling is that it reached that temperature.
However, as I explained already, this is not a true representation, air pressure is just as important, but not expressed in that formula. Therefore thinking that the value is real, misleads us into thinking that the faulty representation which the formula is derived from, is a true representation. But we know that the representation from which the value is derived, is not necessarily true, because we know that there are different values for the very same thing, produced from different representations, all of which are considered to be correct.
Now the problem is that we have no way to determine the true representation, the true cause, if each is equally correct ('model-dependent realism'). Each is itself a real representation, therefore a true representation, and if they are incompatible, that's just the way reality is, it has incompatible parts. So the assumption leads to the conclusion that reality is impossible to understand because it has incompatible parts. That reality is impossible to understand is not necessarily the truth though, it is just a conclusion produced from the assumption that the incompatible values are equally real.
Quoting khaled
This is not true, because even in a work of fiction there are conventions which must be adhered to otherwise you step out of that specific fictional story. So if you say that Santa uses horses instead of reindeer, you are wrong, because you've removed yourself from the acceptable convention, and you ought not call your fictitious character by the name Santa. Notice I use "ought" because you still can if you want, but you would be out of line with the convention.
Your "boxes" analogy needs to be revised to be applicable. You premise "5 boxes", so by that premise "4 boxes" is wrong. You need to start with a premise like "a multitude of items", or "a line of boxes" then we have to assign values and there is a judgement to be made. The premise "5 boxes" already makes that judgement. and so by that premise anything else would be wrong, even though someone might argue that one item is not correctly a "box" or something like that. So your analogy needs to premise that the evaluation has not yet been made, then you can see that evaluation is similar to a work of fiction..
I don't think so. Because if there are multiple ways to derive something that doesn't lead to it not existing, but you seem to have been working with that assumption so far though I don't know why.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is certainly something people do, but it is a fallacy, not proof that the value "isn't real". At this point I really don't understand how you use that term. People also believe that positively charged objects have gained protons, rather than being deficient in electrons often because of the way we represent it. That doesn't mean that protons and electrons aren't real.
Do you think math is discovered or created? That might shed some light for me on the enigma that is what you're saying.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it isn't. Let's first assume that all the items are boxes without a doubt, for simplificiation. Regardless of what system we make up, there will be a correct answer within it, not so for pure fiction.
For santa, I can make up any story I want. I can make up a story about a vampire santa, I can make up a story about a lesbian female santa, I can do whatever, and these stories will not be "wrong". They will just be different stories from the original.
But if we make up a system where instead of "one box" we have "aosidjf" and instead of "two boxes" we have "psidbu", if there is one box (by our traditional system) we would be wrong to say "psidbu". Regardless of how arbitrary or convoluted our system for counting boxes is, at the end of the day there will be a right and a wrong evaluation.
Point is: For pure fiction, we are not wrong for making up or changing stories. But for the evaluation of the number of boxes, REGARDLESS of what system we pick it will contain right and wrong answers.
Because santa is purely made up :sad: we can do anything with him, but we cannot alter the number of boxes with our mind. So regardless of how we count them, there will be a right and wrong answer for each counting method. But there will never be a "right fictional story" and a "wrong fictional story". That's the fundamental difference.
To repeat the kind of question I asked frank before, is there a difference between saying that the boiling point is real and saying that things really do boil? I don't think there is.
And that things really do boil does not entail that some universal or abstract object exists.
That we have a language with a grammar that includes universals and abstract objects isn't that realism about universals and abstract objects is true. Such a view is simply an unfounded projection.
Note: When I say "boiling point of water" I mean under normal conditions.
I think the boiling point can exist even if things don't really boil. If we lived in a world where the maximum temperature ever detected or achievable by us was 60 degrees celcius, the boiling point of water would still be 100 degrees celcius.
We would find that other things boil (there are things that boil at less than 60 degrees) and then theoretically calculate the boiling point of water. In that case, even if water doesn't really boil, the boiling point exists.
Additionally, even if we never discovered anything boiling and had no conception of what boiling is, the boiling point of water would still exist and be 100C (as it is still water), or do you disagree? There you have a case where water doesn't really boil, yet the boiling point exists.
Quoting Michael
Sure, but that wasn't the motivation behind saying those objects exist. The motivation was that things like "boiling point" cannot simply be relegated to "mental stuff". The boiling point is not a purely mental concept, if it was, it would be pure imagination. We do not say a fictional story is "wrong" or "right", but we do say that the boiling point of water under normal conditions is 100C, not 110C, and you would be wrong to say it is 110C. The explanation for this, I believe, is that there are abstract objects that we discover.
It's clearer in the case of math. Without the belief in abstract objects, then I do not see how you can believe that mathematical questions can have right and wrong answers. If we make up math and its rules, we should be able to say the answer is whatever we want. But REGARDLESS of what system of mathematics we employ, there are always right and wrong answers within it. Boolean math has right and wrong answers, linear algebra has right and wrong answers, etc. If it's all made up then why is that?
I'll repeat my question from last time. Is "Newton's second law" just mental stuff? If it is, then how come the universe was abiding by it even before it existed (before it was made up by newton)?
That water would boil were it to reach 100 degrees celsius isn't that some universal/abstract object exists. Such a view is a realist misinterpretation of counterfactuals; a fallacious projection of grammar.
Also could you engage with what I'm typing instead of 1 line responses that don't illuminate anything?
Imagine saying "John would die were he to be decapitated, therefore his death exists." It's obviously ridiculous if interpreted in a realist sense. So too with "this water would boil were it to be heated to 100 degrees celsius, therefore its boiling point exists."
Quoting Michael
Wouldn't it be "therefore decapitations exist" if we're keeping the same form? I don't find that ridiculous, for "decaptiations" to exist in the abstract in the same way as boiling point.
If there was no such abstract, how can we tell that someone is wrong when they call death by a gun wound a "decapitation"?
I think it's very obvious that mathematics is created by human beings. But I also think it's pointless to discuss such an issue with you, because I've come to see that when there is an obvious difference between two things, (like the value and the thing valued), you just define one so that it is the same as the other, deny the difference, and argue your point from a position of denial.
So I'm quite sure that if we proceed in a discussion as to whether mathematical axioms are created or are discovered, you'll end up defining "discovered" in such a way that it has the same meaning as "created", just like you defined the "value" given to the point at which something boils, to be the same thing as "the point at which something boils".
So for example, when human beings 'discovered' consistency in the way that water boiled, and that there was a point which boiling came from not boiling, and we 'created' a value for this point, you will simply define this creation of the value to be the very same thing as the discovery of the thing which is valued, and deny the separation between the discovery and the creation.
Here's an example to elucidate the difference. say you are walking in the wilderness, and you discover something new, never before seen by a human being. You go back to your fellow human beings and describe and discuss that thing. A name is created, and given to the thing. Do you apprehend, and accept the difference between discovering the thing, and creating the name for it?
Quoting khaled
This is just begging the question. If you assume a realist premise, you will get a realist conclusion. If we want a correct answer to how many boxes there are, the first thing we need to do is stipulate what qualifies as "a box", otherwise there can be no correct answer.
You assume that the choice has already been made, as to what does and does not qualify as "a box", and therefore someone has already gone through and sorted the items, effectively counting the objects already. That's how you conclude that there will be a correct answer. Who do you think, makes this decision as to what qualifies as a box and what does not, God? Do you think that God has already counted the boxes?
Quote when I did this.
No what happened was I said "A is B" (A is boiling point, B is "temperature at which something boils") before you even posted on this thread, then you proceeded to deny the existence of B. I was confused the entire time because you didn't deny the existence of A. Then you created the difference you accuse me of denying, and once created I said:
Quoting khaled
And then proceeded to discuss the existence of "values" next as you wanted.
If you disagree that that is what happened, then quote when I did what you accuse. Or quote where any part of the above didn't happen. I was already spending 99% of my typing on dealing with your misunderstandings, I don't intend to spend 99% of the remaining 1%, denying nonsensical accusations.
Until you show that your accusation has any basis in reality, I do not intend on continuing this discussion.
I've been cordial with you despite thinking what you're saying is wrong. I don't intend to continue an already unproductive discussion if you can't return the favor.
Perhaps, depending on your interpretation. And what does "decapitations exist in the abstract" even mean? I can understand it in the sense of "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated", but that has nothing to do with the realist existence of abstract objects.
'Things with heads' is an abstract objects. It's basically criteria for a set. That's abstract.
Quoting Michael
It does, since you haven't escaped talking about abstract objects yet. I propose that you can't do that. Universals and properties are too embedded in the way you think to escape them. For instance, try imagining an object that has no properties.
What you can do is just leave their status undetermined. What you can't justifiably do is say they don't exist.
That there exists a "pattern" or "arrangement" that "decapitations" is pointing to.
Quoting Michael
It doesn't prove it but it also doesn't deny it, so I'm not sure of its relevence. "decapitations can exist in the abstract" and "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated" can both be true.
The existence of abstract objects is needed because "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated" is not enough. There are things it can't account for. Such as HOW we know that a death by a gunshot is not a decapitation. Or what we refer to when we say "decapitation".
It doesn't follow from the fact that we talk about abstract objects that abstract objects exist in the realist sense. The latter notion is unfounded projection. There's no evidence for it and there's no need for it. It is sufficient that just the physical and the mental (which might be reducible to the physical) exist.
It also doesn't follow from the fact that we talk about physical objects that they exist in the realist sense.
That is also an unfounded notion. There is no evidence for it and no need for it.
If you must downgrade the existence of something that is embedded in the way you think, you pick your poison.
Correct.
Uncertain. The realist would argue that the realist existence of physical objects is a parsimonious explanation for the occurrence and regularity of observable phenomena. Of course, subjective idealists would disagree, but then that's a separate discussion.
I don't think you can make the same argument in favour of the realist existence of universals and abstract objects. Why do we need something like "things with heads" to exist as an abstract object for a concrete, physical thing with a head to exist? I don't think we do. Rather, a number of concrete, physical things with heads exist, and then we conceptually abstract from this the notion of "a thing with a head". But this abstract "thing with a head" is just a facet of our thought and language, not some object with a mind-independent existence.
Quoting Michael
Physicality is most definitely a facet of our thought and language. Whether it has some mind independent status is unknown.
You're free to think in terms of physical realism. Just don't make the mistake of thinking that your view is better founded than some other. The weight it seems to carry is just a matter of the times in which you live.
Suppose you turn two batches of carbon and oxygen into water. Where did the nature come from? They are identical because they share identical structure. Nominalism doesn't deny things can be identical. It denies they are sharing an abstract philosophical form. We know what we are talking about when we say "tree" but that doesn't mean my mind shares in yours
Sure. Yet the answer to: "What is the square root of 2?" is not a mental or physical object. It's an abstract object, which means it's something I learn about, something I could be wrong about,etc.
Truth is real and ideas are real. Ideas only go together in certain ways. But applying substance outside the mind to truth is to put material reality on them. So you say that means rocks are united in a cloud Form? They are just rocks, each individual.
True. I dont have the universe figured out. Nobody does. What I discern is the way we're bound to think. Form and matter. Statue and clay, clay and atoms, atoms and subatomic particles, down to the last pair of form and matter. This is the schematic of thought.
Matter and form are the same for nominalism. If you say objects don't share an abstract form, then they must share a material one. And then all rocks become one object! So you have to say something abstract is involved in an object, which is to reject matter altogether
Form, by definition, isn't material. It's a property.
Quoting Gregory
That's one possibility. One could also think in terms of neutral monism.
"decapitation" can exist abstractly even if it was impossible for things with heads to have their heads cut off. If all necks were made from an uncuttable material, "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated" would be false, but "decapitation" as a concept would still exist. If enough people imagine it and find it amusing enough, we may even create a word for it.
As to what it means for something to exist abstractly, another way of putting it is that it conceivable. So not something like a "square circle". Even in a world were necks are uncuttable, decapitation is conceivable. Just like Santa is conceivable in our world despite the impossiblity of flying raindeer.
But the condition of the water is wet. It possesses a wet condition. The abjective wet describes the noun condition. The point is, the fact that we use language in a such a manner need not evoke entities such as qualities, conditions, states, or properties in our ontology. Its just another way of saying the water is wet.
Its simply an empirical point. in learning about water we never come across something called a law and there is nothing law-like about liquid. Liquid doesnt describe itself. Weve devised the units of measurement, the languages, the formulas, the metaphors, the laws, the conditions, the experiments, hold it up to nature and make sure its an as accurate representation as possible.
No it doesn't. In this case it's not an adjective, it's a value. In the same way that "the boiling point of water is 100C". But "condition" instead of "boiling point" and "wet" instead of "100C".
Quoting NOS4A2
I think you have it the other way around. In order to say that water is wet, we have to have some idea of what "wet" is. That definition, will be an abstract.
The condition comes first, then the adjective, otherwise no one knows what the adjective means.
Quoting NOS4A2
What kind of things are all of these things in your ontology though? Formulas certainly refer to something right? I'm not asking what it is, just what kind of thing it is. If you're a materialist you'd be forced to say"matter" for example (which seems clearly false to me, formulas are not matter).
Because they all seem like abstracts to me.
Quoting NOS4A2
What determines its accuracy is how well it can predict the liquid's behavior yes? And for us to even bother with all of this, we must believe that the liquid behaves with some regularity correct? This regular behavior of the liquid, what kind of thing it? Or is it nothing at all?
Nominalism is not saying that two objects can't be identical. They are saying each object has one principle (insteadbof two) that is physically shaped a certain way and two things can be identical in structure. But they don't share a form because all they *share* (own in common) is being in space. Sharing is the key term. Is there something that is in two rabbits or do you have two objects that each separately have the same biology
In my own case, I imagine attaching one end of a string to a word and the other to the referent. Since a universal or abstract object would not string to any particular object in the world, it is without a referent or is self-referential, and has little bearing on my ontology beyond the marks on paper and the guttural sounds that spell out the universal.
The idea that an abstract object must refer to some concrete object because we can speak about it and treat it with noun-phrases doesnt suffice for me to accept its reality.
OK
Quoting khaled
Just when I thought we were starting to make some progress, you take us right back.
Yes, that occurred before you showed up:
Quoting khaled
Afterwards, you proceeded to deny B, without ever clarifying that you disagree with my initial definition. Likely because you never saw it. Which led to us wasting 2 pages before it finally became clear that you think A is different from B.
It is not that you defined A and B differently and I insisted they are the same, as you accuse me of.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would not think spending 2 pages to get to a point where we agree what is being talked about progress. I made more progress in a single reply to NO4 or Michael. Why would I waste my time typing to you when it yields nothing but unprovoked nonsensical accusations?
In my case, Im not satisfied with that. Boiling point clearly doesnt refer to the word boiling point and it clearly has SOME referent. Its not a word like a, for or the, we mean something when we say boiling point.
And I think an ontology that has a word which refers to something it cannot account for is incomplete. It sounds like when some materialists say Emotion is self referential or has no referent.
It just seems to me more trouble to deny than its worth. We talk in universals ALL the time, and there are many things we cannot express at all without them (like the entire fields of mathematics), and their existence doesnt seem to offer any internal inconsistencies, or inconsistencies in coexisting with matter/minds, so why deny them? Theyre harmless
Quoting NOS4A2
Well thats not the only idea that could lead to the belief, but I see where youre coming from.