Objects of knowledge logical priority
Here is what I think is true.
The objects of knowledge exists logically prior to the knowledge of those objects.
I think that this has implications for theology.
It seems if the objects of knowledge are logically prior to the existence of knowledge then it would seem that God would have to be a contingent being.
For if God knows the x is true God can only have this property because x exists and is true.
It seems like God needs the existence of a non-god thing (x) in order to have his essential property of knowledge.
Thus he depends upon ex to be what he is.
Does anyone find the thesis that the objects of knowledge exists logically prior to the existence of knowledge objectionable?
The objects of knowledge exists logically prior to the knowledge of those objects.
I think that this has implications for theology.
It seems if the objects of knowledge are logically prior to the existence of knowledge then it would seem that God would have to be a contingent being.
For if God knows the x is true God can only have this property because x exists and is true.
It seems like God needs the existence of a non-god thing (x) in order to have his essential property of knowledge.
Thus he depends upon ex to be what he is.
Does anyone find the thesis that the objects of knowledge exists logically prior to the existence of knowledge objectionable?
Comments (5)
I guess this is a kind of Platonic idealism. I've always thought that application of such a metaphysical view requires an assumption of the existence of God. I don't think it adds any explanatory value beyond just assuming that objects of knowledge do not exist prior to knowledge. Applying Occam's Razor, I choose the later assumption.