Anybody know the name of this kind of equivocation / strawman informal fallacy?
Would appreciate it if any of you know the name of a very common type of disagreement I find popping up everywhere :yum:
This is a simplified (yes, really) version of a discussion I was having with someone. I spotted a kind of error in between all the various "what do you mean" "no that's not what that means" threads of the discussion, so the full context might be useful for clarity, but might not be necessary to find and classify the error.
TL;DR down at the bottom.
ME: All languages originate in minds, and the laws of physics and mathematics are languages, so the existence of these laws implies the existence of God.
(to support my claim about language, I referred to physics being mathematical, which was then attacked falling within the category of "science" and therefore not opposed to "naturalism", a term they introduced to the discussion)
SOMEONE: whatever it is that you're getting at with the mathematical nature of physics, it won't get you a refutation of naturalism, a fortiori, it won't get you a strong argument for theism. Theism is a metaphysical theory, you cannot prove it either true or false using science, because science is set within a metaphysical framework that excludes the supernatural, and thereby excludes theism.
ME: I refute naturalism by asserting the relationship between consciousness and language. I think you're mistaking science for empiricism. Empiricism, not science, excludes the supernatural and theism. Science is compatible with theism.
SOMEONE: Science employs methodological naturalism, supernatural objects are excluded from the statements of science. You are confusing laws of science with laws of nature by stating that all laws are languages that come from minds.
ME: Experimentation and interpretation of data depend on intentionality and free will for one thing, and those aren't natural. Science is a process of hypothesising, performing experiments and interpreting data so I don't see how supernatural phenomena would be excluded from this.
SOMEONE: Of course they're natural! Science requires various non-scientific assumptions, but as science is part of naturalism, all those assumptions must be natural. If you don't see how supernatural phenomena would be excluded, I suggest you look up methodological naturalism.
ME: I don't know what you mean by laws of nature then. You said earlier that science excludes theism and you're saying this is because science employs methodological naturalism which excludes the supernatural, which theism fits the definition of. And this is to prove to me that I "won't be able" to prove theism by showing that physics is mathematical in nature. But the Britannica page on naturalism says it has no preference for atheism or theism.
SOMEONE: Methodological naturalism is not metaphysical naturalism, so we can employ methodological naturalism even if there are supernatural objects, but we cannot say either that there are or are not such objects by using science, because as science employs methodological naturalism, all the objects that appear in the stories told by science are natural.
ME: You said I'm confusing the laws of science with the laws of nature. I'm not sure how your conception of either applies to what I've made clear is what I mean by "physical and mathematical laws". If they "might not exist", we definitely aren't talking about the same thing, because what I'm talking about does exist and does meet my requirements (the requirements of a language). If you think otherwise, you're free to explain why. If you think, as you agreed earlier, that free will and intentionality are natural, then this makes my conception of God natural.
SOMEONE: Then you just aren't talking about what anyone in the discussion means by a "god", because gods are paradigmatic examples of supernatural beings.
ME: I mean the creator of space, time and all laws of mathematics and physics.
SOMEONE: your argument requires laws of nature but it only has descriptive laws, these have no metaphysical force. The creator of space, time is a supernatural being, so your position is inconsistent, viz: 1) god is natural 2) god is supernatural 3) nothing is both natural and supernatural 4) nothing is god.
ME: Now you're just winging it. I saidif you think free will and intentionality are natural, then I'm willing to mean "God" to be natural, or vice versa if you think free will and intentionality are supernatural. That doesn't mean I'm committing myself to God being both natural and supernatural. That's actually just your position, since you're saying free will and intentionality are natural and that the creator of spacetime is supernatural. You're just insisting that the creator of spacetime can't be natural and ignoring the content of my argument.
SOMEONE: Science includes the assumption that researchers have free will and science is part of methodological naturalism, so free will is part of naturalism. In order to create space and time a being must be outside space and time, as the only natural objects outside space and time are abstract objects and abstract objects are causally inert, and as a creator of space and time cannot be causally inert, a creator of space and time must be supernatural. I've had enough, thanks for your replies.
TL;DR
Basically, I claimed to deduce G exists, because Lan is only produced by m, Lan exists and G is an m. Someone then said Lan (and its means of production m) is "n" which excludes "s-n" and G is "s-n". I reply that Lan and m wouldn't be excluded if they were "s-n" (ie that the distinction between "n" and "s-n" is just an effete label) and therefore neither is G. I also add that if Lan and m are "n", as they insist, then this just makes G an "n", but doesn't disprove G's existence, and if they were to insist that Lan and m are "s-n",then this would just make G an existing "s-n". Someone then replies that by "G", I do not mean what everyone else means by "G". I reply that "G" means (thing that someone always categorises as an "s-n"). Someone then replies that "then your position is inconsistent! "s-n" is always the opposite of "n"! And the Lan and m of your argument are "n"! But "G" of your argument is "s-n"! Your argument contains a contradiction!".
The error seems to originate in insisting that a particular name is within a certain category, and that this category can't coexist with its opposite. They're then insisting that parts of my argument are one and other parts are the other. There is then some discussion with them saying I can't conclude the existence of the "name", because I'm confusing the meat of my argument with something else that has less power than the category they say would prove it. I respond providing an argument that I've catgeorised the meat of my argument within their categorisation system correctly (ie, I stand my ground within the categorisation they're insisting on, purely for the sake of brevity). I also include that they can apply any category they like.
It then just turns out that they're simply insisting that I accept the labels they impose as productive, and ignore the substance of my argument. This seems to be done to avoid addressing whether my points about free will, intentionality and language productively infer the existence of "the creator of space, time" while instead just making the uncharitable imposition that "The creator of space, time is a supernatural being, so your position is inconsistent, viz: 1) god is natural 2) god is supernatural 3) nothing is both natural and supernatural 4) nothing is god." In other words, I'm actually breaking the categorisation, and they're ignoring that I am.
Whatever the error is, it's where someone just insists that you adopt the same categorisation they do and any internal distinctions it makes, that you accept the way they label your position within that system and therefore any conclusions they make using it. It seems to be like a definitional fallacy or straw man, combined with missing the point.
This is a simplified (yes, really) version of a discussion I was having with someone. I spotted a kind of error in between all the various "what do you mean" "no that's not what that means" threads of the discussion, so the full context might be useful for clarity, but might not be necessary to find and classify the error.
TL;DR down at the bottom.
ME: All languages originate in minds, and the laws of physics and mathematics are languages, so the existence of these laws implies the existence of God.
(to support my claim about language, I referred to physics being mathematical, which was then attacked falling within the category of "science" and therefore not opposed to "naturalism", a term they introduced to the discussion)
SOMEONE: whatever it is that you're getting at with the mathematical nature of physics, it won't get you a refutation of naturalism, a fortiori, it won't get you a strong argument for theism. Theism is a metaphysical theory, you cannot prove it either true or false using science, because science is set within a metaphysical framework that excludes the supernatural, and thereby excludes theism.
ME: I refute naturalism by asserting the relationship between consciousness and language. I think you're mistaking science for empiricism. Empiricism, not science, excludes the supernatural and theism. Science is compatible with theism.
SOMEONE: Science employs methodological naturalism, supernatural objects are excluded from the statements of science. You are confusing laws of science with laws of nature by stating that all laws are languages that come from minds.
ME: Experimentation and interpretation of data depend on intentionality and free will for one thing, and those aren't natural. Science is a process of hypothesising, performing experiments and interpreting data so I don't see how supernatural phenomena would be excluded from this.
SOMEONE: Of course they're natural! Science requires various non-scientific assumptions, but as science is part of naturalism, all those assumptions must be natural. If you don't see how supernatural phenomena would be excluded, I suggest you look up methodological naturalism.
ME: I don't know what you mean by laws of nature then. You said earlier that science excludes theism and you're saying this is because science employs methodological naturalism which excludes the supernatural, which theism fits the definition of. And this is to prove to me that I "won't be able" to prove theism by showing that physics is mathematical in nature. But the Britannica page on naturalism says it has no preference for atheism or theism.
SOMEONE: Methodological naturalism is not metaphysical naturalism, so we can employ methodological naturalism even if there are supernatural objects, but we cannot say either that there are or are not such objects by using science, because as science employs methodological naturalism, all the objects that appear in the stories told by science are natural.
ME: You said I'm confusing the laws of science with the laws of nature. I'm not sure how your conception of either applies to what I've made clear is what I mean by "physical and mathematical laws". If they "might not exist", we definitely aren't talking about the same thing, because what I'm talking about does exist and does meet my requirements (the requirements of a language). If you think otherwise, you're free to explain why. If you think, as you agreed earlier, that free will and intentionality are natural, then this makes my conception of God natural.
SOMEONE: Then you just aren't talking about what anyone in the discussion means by a "god", because gods are paradigmatic examples of supernatural beings.
ME: I mean the creator of space, time and all laws of mathematics and physics.
SOMEONE: your argument requires laws of nature but it only has descriptive laws, these have no metaphysical force. The creator of space, time is a supernatural being, so your position is inconsistent, viz: 1) god is natural 2) god is supernatural 3) nothing is both natural and supernatural 4) nothing is god.
ME: Now you're just winging it. I saidif you think free will and intentionality are natural, then I'm willing to mean "God" to be natural, or vice versa if you think free will and intentionality are supernatural. That doesn't mean I'm committing myself to God being both natural and supernatural. That's actually just your position, since you're saying free will and intentionality are natural and that the creator of spacetime is supernatural. You're just insisting that the creator of spacetime can't be natural and ignoring the content of my argument.
SOMEONE: Science includes the assumption that researchers have free will and science is part of methodological naturalism, so free will is part of naturalism. In order to create space and time a being must be outside space and time, as the only natural objects outside space and time are abstract objects and abstract objects are causally inert, and as a creator of space and time cannot be causally inert, a creator of space and time must be supernatural. I've had enough, thanks for your replies.
TL;DR
Basically, I claimed to deduce G exists, because Lan is only produced by m, Lan exists and G is an m. Someone then said Lan (and its means of production m) is "n" which excludes "s-n" and G is "s-n". I reply that Lan and m wouldn't be excluded if they were "s-n" (ie that the distinction between "n" and "s-n" is just an effete label) and therefore neither is G. I also add that if Lan and m are "n", as they insist, then this just makes G an "n", but doesn't disprove G's existence, and if they were to insist that Lan and m are "s-n",then this would just make G an existing "s-n". Someone then replies that by "G", I do not mean what everyone else means by "G". I reply that "G" means (thing that someone always categorises as an "s-n"). Someone then replies that "then your position is inconsistent! "s-n" is always the opposite of "n"! And the Lan and m of your argument are "n"! But "G" of your argument is "s-n"! Your argument contains a contradiction!".
The error seems to originate in insisting that a particular name is within a certain category, and that this category can't coexist with its opposite. They're then insisting that parts of my argument are one and other parts are the other. There is then some discussion with them saying I can't conclude the existence of the "name", because I'm confusing the meat of my argument with something else that has less power than the category they say would prove it. I respond providing an argument that I've catgeorised the meat of my argument within their categorisation system correctly (ie, I stand my ground within the categorisation they're insisting on, purely for the sake of brevity). I also include that they can apply any category they like.
It then just turns out that they're simply insisting that I accept the labels they impose as productive, and ignore the substance of my argument. This seems to be done to avoid addressing whether my points about free will, intentionality and language productively infer the existence of "the creator of space, time" while instead just making the uncharitable imposition that "The creator of space, time is a supernatural being, so your position is inconsistent, viz: 1) god is natural 2) god is supernatural 3) nothing is both natural and supernatural 4) nothing is god." In other words, I'm actually breaking the categorisation, and they're ignoring that I am.
Whatever the error is, it's where someone just insists that you adopt the same categorisation they do and any internal distinctions it makes, that you accept the way they label your position within that system and therefore any conclusions they make using it. It seems to be like a definitional fallacy or straw man, combined with missing the point.
Comments (38)
Quoting Hallucinogen
Someone says - "That's baloney." His reason? You've mistaken science for metaphysics.
He's right. You're wrong. The rest of the discussion is just restating the arguments and arguing about language. And then you lost me completely in your tl;dr. I guess that just shows my ignorance of logical notation.
His argument seemed straightforward to me. I didn't see anything illogical. He argues well. Please invite him to join The Philosophy Forum. What forum was your discussion on?
The relationship between physics and mathematics isn't a scientific one; it is metaphysical. This is inconsequential for my argument however (it wouldn't prove me wrong even if you or he were right about my premises appealing to "natural law" and my conclusion being "supernatural").
I believe this isn't true. Mathematics is a descriptive language invented by people that turns out to be very good at describing the world. There is no more a metaphysical relationship between math and physics than there is between the English language and the reality it describes or a map and the terrain it depicts.
I've said this definitively, but I admit to some uncertainty about what I've written. I need to think more about this. It's an interesting question.
Human language and the world likewise have a metaphysical relationship, albeit one less precise, hence the need for mathematical language.
Accepting this isn't necessary for my argument, but only necessary for the rebuttal of their objection to my premises.
This isn't what I wanted the post to be about though. I'm looking for the kind of error being committed when he's basing his disagreement on a few definitions about natural and supernatural in which they contradict and insisting that I'm concluding a supernatural thing from natural premises. I was trying to get through to him (presumably a he) that I'm letting him decide whether my arguments basis was either natural or supernatural and that it made no actual difference. If my premises are natural, then God is natural. If God is supernatural, then the very definitions he's insisting on that natural premises exclude supernatural conclusions is wrong.
Sorry.
Quoting Hallucinogen
Can you explain this clearer? Your premises involve supernatural entities for which there is no demonstration. Your interlocutor seems to be saying that there is no way for us to identify anything supernatural, hence a need for methodological naturalism.
I think this discussion between you and your interlocutor uses very imprecise language, and a lack of specialist knowledge which makes the discussion a messy one.
Quoting T Clark
Quoting Hallucinogen
This is not my subject but I think TC is correct. Maths is created by people, not discovered. There are of course several significant thinkers who hold to mathematical Platonism (Roger Penrose being one) but I suspect this view is waining.
There's an entire thread debating the subject of the origin of math.
Incidentally calling anything a law is vexed - it implies a lawgiver even before any actual thinking is done. The laws of logic (which allow for math) are also called the logical absolutes or foundations of reason. Claiming that only a god can be the guarantor of these is functionally no different to saying they were created by alien intelligence or that a magic man made them.
I am not aware that a demonstration has been made to tie math to some kind of magic being. Or a demonstration that proves math can only originate outside of human thought. Although for some folk it may be a reasonable inference. The best we can say is that the status of math is complex and open and subject to reification.
By the way, I believe I follow your argument (it really doesn't matter whether God is natural or supernatural); God exists if only we accept the premises that a) the universe is a book written in the language of mathematics and b) language implies the existence of (a) mind(s).
What sort of world would it be, if mathematical descriptions did not apply? Mathematics can cope with analogue or digital, perfect order or total chaos and anything between, any number of dimensions including fractional numbers of dimensions, different geometries... and I don't doubt that new mathematics can and will be invented to describe more outlandish worlds than have yet been imagined.
Let X be a world indescribable mathematically, - only God could begin to conceive such a thing. :wink:
The emoji is winking, so I don't know if you're serious. If you are, I disagree.
Sorry, we can leave it there.
Quoting Hallucinogen
I've looked over the OP discussion several times and I don't see any logical problems. Seems to me that any confusion comes from disagreements on the meanings of several words - natural vs. supernatural, methodological vs. metaphysical, and science vs. nature. I think you also just disagree with each other.
Tell me more; disagreement excites me.
This is the old unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics argument. Is math a human invention or is nature fundamentally mathematical. I come down on the side of invention. I don't think this is the place to have that discussion and I'm not sure I can make a good case with my current understanding.
My suggestion is that mathematics is the study of abstract arrangement, such that absolutely any world comes under its purview. So neither is its effectiveness unreasonable, nor is it an invention of the mind. I mean fancy inventing that there are 17 wallpaper patterns. It's just untidy! Of course if we lived in a world where wallpaper was not a thing because geometry was different or whatever, we may not have been interested to find out about wallpaper patterns, but then some other 'construct' would become relevant, and that would be 'unreasonably effective.'
No, I'm saying his imposition of natural vs supernatural makes no difference to the argument. I am not disagreeing at all with what they mean. I even said at least once that I'm letting him decide what they mean.
I object that you won't be able to do this, because to establish such truths, we use a certain methodology, which is only applicable to beeb-bobs and excludes any proof about super-beeb-bobs.
A beeb-bob is someone who can be proven to have killed their ex-wife.
A super-beeb-bob is the opposite of this, someone who cannot be proven to have killed their ex-wife.
The evidence you're trying to present is all about beeb-bobs. But people with the name "O. J. Simpson" are super-beeb-bobs.
Why are they?
Because I JUST INSIST.
You then attempt to present the argument or evidence that you have. But I just ignore what the evidence, absent of any preconceived notions, proves. Instead, I focus on calling it a beeb-bob, so therefore it can't be used to prove anything about super-beeb-bobs.
You then reply that this beeb-bob/super-beeb-bob distinction doesn't detract from the evidence and that it doesn't matter what I call it. You say that if your evidence is beeb-bob, then whoever it proves to be a killer of their ex-wife is also a beeb-bob.
I then reply that it isn't clear who you're talking about, because anyone with the name "O. J. Simpson" is paradigmatic of such super-beeb-bobs. And I JUST INSIST that no beeb-bob evidence can evidence a super-beeb-bob.
You then say, you're talking about whoever killed O. J. Simpson's ex-wife.
I then say "your argument requires super-beeb-bobs but it only has beeb-bobs, these have no metaphysical force. O. J. Simpson is a super-beeb-bob, so your position is inconsistent, viz: 1) O. J. Simpson is a beeb-bob 2) O. J. Simpson is a super-beeb-bob 3) nothing is both beeb-bob and super-beeb-bob 4) nothing is O. J. Simpson."
Sorry, I've read the exchange in the opening post three times and your characterization of what Someone has done is a misunderstanding on your part. You don't seem to grasp the distinction between methodological and metaphysical naturalism that is such a big part of his argument. I have no problem following his argument. As far as I can tell, it is completely responsive to your arguments. You just have failed to understand.
I'll assume this is tongue in cheek.
Quoting unenlightened
I don't think I can do the anti-unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics argument justice, but I'll take a swing at it. First off, to be clear, the term itself is not one I made up, so I have no stake in using it. Mathematics works very well when we are dealing with phenomena far from human scale - cosmology and sub-atomic physics. At those scales, the effects of deeply complex interactions between phenomena can be ignored. Objects can be treated as abstract geometrical entities.
The closer you get to human scale, the less that works. Application of math to biological, neurological, psychological, climate science, sociological, geological, ecological, and evolutionary biological phenomena is much less effective and precise. The laws of these levels of the scientific hierarchy are different, and not derivable, from the laws of physics. Much of it depends on statistical and probabilistic methods which are inherently imprecise. Irreducible differences between the characteristics and environmental elements of phenomena become more important and complex.
Add to this the fact that much of science is expressed mathematically in differential equations. All but the simplest DEs can not be solved rationally. They can only be solved approximately or numerically using computers. Even beyond that, complex dynamic systems, which include much of what is studied at human scale, are subject to the complexity of chaos theory which makes accurate calculations much more difficult.
If Someone failed to provide an argument that will convince you, there's little chance I will be more successful. I think how he expressed it is better than I can do it.
You said
Quoting T Clark
but someone didn't explain any distinction between the two and didn't explain why it would affect my argument. So you and they are claiming I've misunderstood something without any elaboration.
I suspect that whatever that distinction is, it turns out to have no more an impact on my argument than does labeling my premises natural and my conclusion supernatural and insisting I can't make the conclusion because of that.
I thought he explained it pretty well, but I'll try to be more explicit. This is my last effort on this. I think your attachment to your own position makes it hard for you to accept what Someone is trying to say.
Metaphysical naturalism says there are no supernatural phenomena. Scientific methodological naturalism says only that science is not capable of examining supernatural phenomena.
Some fallacies that you might wanna consider
1. Ignorantia elenchi (missing the point)
2. Non sequitur (it doesn't follow)
3. Fallacies (dive in).
Yes, it's ignorentia elenchi, thanks! :up:
the error of assigning to something a quality or action which can only properly be assigned to things of another category, for example treating abstract concepts as though they had a physical location.
Santa exists because Gifts are only produced by Givers; Gifts exist and Santa is a Giver.
The premisses are everything after the word 'because' and these are ok. A gift does entail someone's giving something, that is, a giver. And there are such things as gifts. And Santa is famous for being a giver. But he's a special kind of giver. He's the kind of giver that doesn't exist. And there are many other givers. The conclusion 'Santa exists' does not follow. Reframed as an Aristotelian syllogism it would be an Undistributed Middle.
"But if God doesn't exist, who wrote the laws of physics?" This is analogous to asking: if Santa didn't put the toys under the tree, then who did? In the case of the toys, it was Dad. In the case of the laws of physics, opinions vary. God is in the line-up but is only one suspect out of several mentioned in this thread.
So, you're not really trying to understand Someone's argument. You are just looking for excuses to dismiss it. You came looking for a non-existent so-called "logical fallacy" rhetorical magic wand to wave at it and make it disappear.
Key thing you are missing: whoever did, has to have a mind (which you already granted with your Santa-Giver analogy).
And the reason why this is actually what Someone is doing is because this appeal to the difference between methological and metaphysical naturalism is just as effete as insisting my argument can't work because of the difference between supernatural and natural.
Quoting T Clark
And why should I care about this? It has no effect on my argument. It's just coming up with a distinction that I'm not logically committed into accepting and insisting it stops me from making my conclusion. Sort of like a rhetorical magic wand to wave at my argument and make it go away.
If my premises are about natural things, then God is natural. If they are about supernatural things, then God is supernatural. I made this point to someone in the argument and a couple of times here in the forum and I don't know why you're not accepting it.
I'm basing my premises on facts about physics and mathematics. If someone insists that makes it metaphysically natural, then the consequence is my argument proves metaphysical naturalism wrong. If someone insists my argument exists within the confines of methodological naturalism (which is what they insisted), then it proves that God is not one of the phenomena excluded by methodological naturalism.
That's my metaphor. You should think of one on your own.
We're clearly not making any progress. Nuff said.