How do you define Justification?
Justification as in epistemic justification to me has to at least be something that increases the probability that your belief is true. Is there an agreed upon definition between coherentists and foundationalists? How would a phenomenal conservativist accept my definition when there is no reason we should think an intuition increases the probability that a belief is true?
Comments (8)
Would you agree a justification for something, is obtained by a judgement on that something? That justification is a derivative of the act of judging, which itself a derivative of judgement?
Welcome to the forum.
I've made the case here on the forum many times that intuition is a valid source of justification. Whether or not it is adequate in itself depends on the consequences of being wrong. If the consequences are significant, intuition might have to be validated with additional information.
You could also follow the Descartes route to achieve justification: destroying doubts, popping them off as you go.
The biggest problem of course comes up in courts of legal proceedings. Justification there is of utter importance, yet it is never achieved fully. Therefore the idea is to come down with a judgment that is more justified than its opposition. This is the precise situation where justification meets failure; many innocent men and women are in prison due to improper lining up and evaluation of justificatory evidence.
Aren't we all, though! My lexicon grows by leaps and bounds from TPF.
To justify an act is to appeal to some form of authority external to ones' self.
A justification is something you need in order to appear rational. That gives you deposits in your social bank account among some circles.
If you're a symbol of the fundamental irrationality of nature, someone will ride out on a whaling vessel and try to harpoon you.
It is not, then, that epistemic reasons raise a proposition's likelihood of being true, it is rather that judgements of epistemic probability just are judgements about what we have epistemic reason to believe.
Authority or evidence, external to one's own self.
Problem arises when the authority is evil, or has a practical sense of humour.