Is "good", indefinable?
G.E. Moore, in his Principia Ethica has claimed that good is a simple and indefinable.
As per @Banno, definitions are circular.
So, what is good?
As per @Banno, definitions are circular.
So, what is good?
Comments (198)
Well, the good stuff, obviously...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-question_argument
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/
- "Moore's Moral Philosophy", SEP
But, how is stuff related to what is good?
"Good" is an adjective denoting that a thing that is good is a thing that is advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating OR at least three at the same time and in the same respect of the aforementioned qualifiers.
I invite examples that debunk this definition.
Please don't juxtapose something that is good now but will be not good later, or something that is good for Mr. X but not good for Ms. Y. Those violate the rule in the definition, "at the same time and in the same respect."
Answering this question depends on a specific evaluative context.
This might not be true of bad. For instance: I think we know what is bad for our species (i.e. harmful, deprivative, abject, traumatic) to intentionally do to ourselves or one another either by action or inaction (e.g. Confucius, Hillel the Elder, Epicurus ... Philippa Foot).
Well, the stuff that is related to what is good, is the good stuff.
How will you respond to 's specification? Think Socrates. Use the open question.
Seems all the more complex since good as a simple is defined by circular definitions. Again we have this relational stuff arising out of a simple.
Is that how it works?
So, good is context dependent?
I set up the stage, so I give the floor to you. :cool:
Quoting 180 Proof
Good has no fixed referent, but the meaning itself holds constant.
That which is willed
This is "good" as a noun, "the good", the thing desired, or the objective. Taking "good" from being an adjective, or even adverb, and making it a noun, as you've done here, is what makes "good" intelligible.
It seems to me and Banno, that what the open ended argument entails is that there are things that can be all those three and yet not be good. So, it seems there's room to provide more context here.
But, according to Moore, "good" is a simple. A simple is a thing that has no parts. Yet, we often use the term "good" in ways that make it seem as if it were something more than a simple.
Why is that, @Banno, if you care to mention...
@Banno, this is surely something in your ballpark.
Quoting bert1
Moore supposes that one might wonder if that which is willed is that which is good; and moreover, that this question makes sense. Yet if being willed were nothing more than being good, how could one question that equivalence?
That is, the notion of what is willed is distinct from the notion of what is good.
That is, one can consistently conceive of someone willing what is not good.
Moore supposes that one might wonder if that which is approved of is that which is good; and moreover, that this question makes sense. Yet if being approved of were nothing more than being good, how could one question that equivalence?
That is, the notion of what is approved off is distinct from the notion of what is good.
That is, one can consistently conceive of someone approved off what is not good.
Quoting Banno
Assuming @bert1 is a Kantian, does it follow that which is willed, is the good?
I think I can see what your saying. In that, treating good in the excluded of what is bad?
Oh sorry, I misunderstood you.
So, you say that it's dependent of the evaluative context. Do you have any criteria to propose? Mostly epistemic?
So, what's the consensus of the good in ethics? Moore proposed a form of consequentialism in terms of the good. Do you agree with him?
Never mind Kant and consensus and ethics and circularity of definition and stuff. Just give me one instance when three or four of my qualifyers are true but the quality is not good.
You guys just talk and talk and talk and nobody thinks around here. I need just one frekkin' instance of a thing that debunks my definition.
I am not saying that my definition is perfect. It may be, or it may not be. I don't know. But it must be accepted and all the other crap you people are talking about must be neglected until the definition gets debunked.
That's the only thing I don't like about this site. If I say something and it's inconvenient, but valid, people simply ignore it and talk around it.
I am not saying that what you stated there debunks my definition, but what you say may be a simple case of equivocation as defined by Aristotle.
But I think that's Moore's contention: good can't be defined by or analyzed in terms of any other properties, good is a simple, sort of an atomic unit or fundamental building block of moral language and reasoning. Whether Moore is right about this is, of course, a different story.
Yes. I think it's true.
Quoting busycuttingcrap
What do you think about whether it's right or wrong and why?
Quoting Shawn
Well, for starters, whatever it is, "good" is categorically preferred in ethics to "bad".
Anyway, IME, philosophy isn't about "consensus" but about perplexity and problematizing our givens.
I "agree" much more with his younger contemporary Karl Popper's (sketchy) negative utilitarianism but even more so with the moral philosophers I referenced above in my first post on this thread. A succinct expression of my ethical outlook on "good" is expressed in this wiki article
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffering-focused_ethics to wit: the pragmatic priority (good) of reducing disvalues (suffering) over aspiring to values (happiness).
Heh, way to put me on the spot. :wink:
Its been a while since I read any Principia Ethica, I'd have to think about it a bit (and probably do some reading) to say what I object to about Moore's view, specifically. But generally speaking, I tend to be sort of suspicious of realist meta-ethical views (and I think Moore's account certainly qualifies as such), and land more in the subjectivist, emotivist, non-cognitivist camp.
(That said, I think there's something nifty and fun about Moore's argument here- and same for his "proof" of external objects, i.e. the "here is a hand" argument- regardless of whether its sound or not; he was a rather clever chap)
If a unit is an atomic one, as you called it, it still does leave room for delineation from other things. For instance, an atom (in the sense you used it) "is an indivisible unit, something that has no components and inner structure".
This is to show that just because something is "atomic", it does not escape the possibility of getting defined.
This what I am saying is different from arguing whether "good" is atomic or not. I am arguing that just because something is atomic, it still can be defined, explained, described, and shown to be what it is.
That's A.
B. is that just because something is atomic, it still has properties. It behaves in one way or another in the world, and that behaviour can be traced back to the properties of this "atom".
Any number of factors, depending on context. Maybe she is moral and kind. Maybe she is a competent guitarist. Whatever it is, it is something innate about her that is laudable.
Good is good? :chin:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/768786 :chin:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/768887
Why do all of you ignore this? What's with the crap? Only because it renders all of our discussion meaningless?? you are all invalidating your arguments until you debunk the definition. This whole thread is meaningless crap, sophistry to the max, empty phrases that only sound good but have no weight in a thinking person's mind UNTIL you or I debunk the definition I gave here.
Don't be lazy, don't be stupid. Do it. Without first doing it, it is false and misleading and a LIE to speak "good is undefinable" when a completely good definition is staring you right in the face.
All you, or anyone of you, or I, have to do is come up with an example, a valid example, in which the definition fails. It is not an insurmountable task: just one example, and that's all we need to continue the hifolutin' discussion.
Do it, for chrissakes.
It doesn't even matter that I provided the definition. What matters is that a definition exists, that nobody invalidated, and then you ALL keep talking about how "good" can't be defined.
It is right there, for crying out loud. The definition. Why do you keep harping on it does not exist and it can't exist? Don't you see the irony of this?
How long do you think you want to keep on being ridiculous? The king has a green overcoat, and you are all wondering why it's not green and furthermore that it's impossible for it to be green... when it's green, right in front of your eyes.
Does Moore mean that good is bringing joy to people, you included, is circular? I'm using yer definition and looking at Moore's book's title Principia Ethica, he means business i.e. he's not making shit up.
I like it. So X is good iff it is three of advantageous, pleasant, helpful and accommodating.
These are interesting. Advantageous, helpful and accommodating are adjectives describing a means to an end. The end pursued is the good thing, and things that help you get there are instrumentally good, right?
Pleasure, as Hume observed, seems to be an end in itself.
So we have two theories here, do we? Would you like to unify these and say that the good is pleasure and anything that helps us get there is instrumentally good?
I can't conceive of a good that is good from nobody's point of view, that isn't willed by someone.
There can be contradictory goods in a world with multiple wills. From a rapist's point of view, raping someone is fab, if a bit sweaty.
Thank you, thank you, thank you!! finally someone who doesn't ignore my input.
You separated "good" into two kinds: pleasure, and instruments that lead to pleasure.
At this point I agree with you.
As someone already mentioned it, "good" can only be a judgment by sentient beings. Plants, in my opinion, can't tell if something is good or bad, they just survive or not, thrive or whither. Animals are equipped with decision making survival capabilities, and that definitely needs to involve concepts of good and concepts of bad. Bad is suffocation, being eaten alive, having your mother torn to pieces in front of you. Good is being liked, sex, food, laughter, music, dancing.
A chair is good because it helps me sit comfortably. A magnet is good because it shows me which way to go. A wolf is bad when he jumps me, but good when it keeps the deer population at bay.
Good and bad are hopelessly tied to being alive and having senses.
An advanced version of this is morals: morals have to do not with pleasure or survival, but with the survival of the nearest available derivative of one's dna.
--------------------------
Thanks, Bert1, for picking up the baton.
Such is the case with "good" as well. There are masochists, whose idea of a good time is not pleasure but suffering.
Because of these extreme anomalies one must not reject a theory or natural law.
He's my favourite philosopher of them all. He had more fresh, individual and original insight than anyone else.
I think this by Hume is the proper answer to the claim that good can't be defined because any attempts lead to circularity.
Well, yes. If something can't be topped, if something is the end of the line, then that's what it is, instead of it being a logical conundrum. Good is a biopsychologically derived product of judgment, and since we are all in the category who behave to the rules governing that product, obviously we can't think of any valid "good" which could point us to something better than "good".
However, to define "good" is not that hard.
Where I come in is that I intuited the same truth, if you want to call it truth, without any prior reading; and that I tried to adjust the discussion to become sensible.
This is not the first time this happens to me. I invented an inertia navigation device, in principle; then I went to the library to research how to build its components, and there was a roomful of books denoted to the invention.
There had been quite a few revelations in my life like that. Coming to a realization that I thought was original, only because of my lack of previously engaging myself in reading about it in the applicable literature.
One day, I am sure, I'll come up with something that is truly original.
The only question is, is this going to happen before or after I die.
The first thought I had was justice.
Justice is generally considered good.
And yet justice is not...
Quoting god must be atheist
because sometimes justice must deal with rule-breaking. So while it is disadvantageous and unpleasant and unhelpful nor accommodating to punish people for breaking the rules, it's a part of what makes justice just: That the rules are fairly applied, even if inconvenient.
I think most rule-bound notions of justice would go against your definition, insofar that the rules were justified because of their fairness. (of course, rule-bound utilitarianism would go with what you said, it's just stating utility in terms of rules though -- that's not what I mean)
What is fair is not always pleasant. And, truth be told, we waste a lot of money on pursuing justice while failing to attain it, so its advantage is at least questionable. Sometimes it's advantageous to just let things go, fairness be damned. And sometimes it's good to be unhelpful and unaccommodating, such as when a group of people let their grievances be known publicly.
But even more directly, to get at what began the thread -- we can always sensibly ask, no matter what definition you provide, if the definition you provide is a good definition.
So if the good is defined by happiness, we can ask "But is happiness really good?" -- does that question make sense to you?
If we double down and say, yes, happiness really is the good, then the question falls flat.
But if you agree that the question makes sense, rather than it being a tautology, then there must be a distinction between happiness and goodness such that we can ask the question and make sense of it.
Quoting Moliere
What a mess. So far every contribution to this thread has used circular terms to define the good. Even fairness implies a moral notion of equivalence or balance. Fair refers to a good sort of balance. Justice may not be pleasant but it is good. Hmm, so there is no pleasantness associated with aim of justice? Whats needed is a definition of good , pleasant , happy , absence of suffering, that breaks out of the circle and shatters Moores contention. We have a number of options to choose from here. We could look at biologically-based thinking that grounds affective valuation in the organizational principles of living systems.
Of course , in the most basic sense, all life forms are shaped by pressures for survival. But it is not simple survival that is at stake, but the ability to preserve stable ongoing self-consistency of interaction with an environment under changing conditions. Thus living systems have an overall normative directionality, and it is this which it is necessary to maintain when we talk about survival. So what is good for an organism is good from the perspective of its own aims and purposes, which are anticipatory. Living systems are anticipatory sense-makers. In a cognizing creature, what is good is associated with what is coherent , intelligible, predictable in a relative sense, and what is better is aligned with what enables one to attain greater intimacy, consistency and intelligibility of events. What is bad is associated with chaos , confusion, the interruption of coherent sense-making.
It s not as if the subjective feelings of good and bad are mechanisms arbitrarily tacked onto these organizational
dynamics, such that at some point the correlation between goodness and intelligibility could be severed and good could become attached to incoherence.
Goodness is simply another way to talk about what enhances normative functioning of a cognizing system.
Goodness must be detached from the reliance most moral theories place on specific qualitative content of meaning, and instead conceived in terms of the anticipatory integrity of sense-making.
That is consistent, at least, with Moore's notion as I understand it.
So if you say justice implies a moral notion of equivelence or balance -- where fairness is the good sort of balance -- I understand what you mean by the good sort of justice vs. the bad sort of justice. Hence, justice is not goodness, because I can understand justice in both the good and the bad way.
I used justice because I think it's the sort of moral value that tends go against values that put happiness and comfort as the sum of all that is good, which I took @god must be atheist to be proposing.
But there is no sum of all that is good. There is no reducing goodness to some other thing. It's all those things, but then we find that some goods conflict with one another.
"Proper functioning" was the original position that I thought made sense of ethics in a naturalistic way, which is what counts against Moore. However, I think the open-question argument works against proper functioning just as well as any other definition proposed of goodness -- and not because it's a priori, but because "proper functioning" leads to contradictory goods that we must choose between. Even if there are natural, ethical facts -- people choose against proper functioning and call it good.
You lost me. How exactly are you understanding proper functioning and what does it have to do with the normatively oriented organizational dynamics of living systems?
And give me an example of how one chooses against proper functioning? I have a feeling you are conflating proper with a specific qualitative content of meaning, which places you squarely back within the circular defining of good( my qualitative meaning of good differs from your qualitative meaning of it).
et al,
This is a judgmental perception.
(COMMENT)
Good is unique to the observer's perspective. IF there is more than one observer, THEN there is the possibility that they may not agree on whether or not an event is either "GOOD" or "BAD."
Most Respectfully,
R
It's how William Casebeer likes to translate Aristotle's eudaimonia in Natural Ethical Facts.
Normatively oriented organization dynamics of living systems sounds a lot to me like what Casebeer was proposing in making a science of ethics loosely based on Aristotle's ethics, which is similarly natural and biological. So it's just where my mind went.
Quoting Joshs
Even if that's not the mistake I'm making, I'm probably making a mistake somewhere. If we're lost we're probably beginning from different places entirely.
I'm a meta-ethical nihilist of the error-theory variety. I don't think there's really a way to define good in some natural or factual way. I think the argument from difference is what persuades me of this, in the end -- people simply do disagree over what is most important and make choices between goods, and in those cases people have good reasons in spite of contradicting one another in a matter of choice, so to say one is good or the other is good is to make a similar choice. I think we make choices between competing goods, and "goods" is itself something which we define for ourselves. So, contra Aristotle, who believes there are proper functions of an organism, I'd say there are no such functions or teleologies or natural facts.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/768887
The organizational dynamics I laid out dont have to be understood in naturalized fashion. In fact I think its best understood as a metaphysical presupposition, and it underlies, in different ways, the ethical thinking of philosophers as diverse as Husserl, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Deleuze , Rorty , Gergen and Derrida.
Yes, people do disagree over what is most important if we look at their preferences strictly in terms of qualitative content. But we cant stop there , because then we are only reifying the domain of good as an arbitrary value rather than getting at its origin. There is no such thing as a good in itself , even if we are restricting this good in itself to a contingent subject. What arises for any of us as something good is what works for us within the framework of a system of values to enrich and move forward that system. But value systems are always in the process of changing into new systems, so that the particular qualitative content that represents a good within one system is no longer works within the new system. So this is the contingent and relative aspect of good. But the other aspect of the good is universal and a priori.
This is the aspect of the good which survives changes in values systems, its formal rather than specific structure. This aspect of the good we all can agree on. Since eventually any good within a particular value system will stop working for us as we move beyond that system, the philosophers I mentioned above agree that it is universally better to keep oneself mobile , to celebrate the movement from one value system to one that replaces it rather than getting stuck in any one system for too long. So you see that for these thinkers the universal , formal aspect of goodness as efficacy of relational change ( usefulness) is more significant that the contingent and relative aspect that you highlight. It is this understanding of the universal aspect of the good that allows us to honor an endless plurality of value systems, and along with them an endless variety of qualitative senses of the good, rather than looking for the correct one. We understand that each sense of the good works within its system, and is valid for that reason and within that context.
Quoting Shawn
Kantian or not, it's clear that @bert1's account leads quickly to incoherence...
Quoting bert1
He can't say for sure if even rape is not a good.
While Bert may have trouble seeing it, I'm sure most here would agree that what someone wills is not the very same concept as what is good.
That'll be because definitions are circular....
In particular, the question as to whether it is good to "preserve stable ongoing self-consistency of interaction with an environment under changing conditions".
That's by no means obvious. Perhaps ask @schopenhauer1 or any other antinatalist.
In more philosophical terms, your account is that the extension of good is the very same as the extension of any of advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating.
Moore's point is that even were this so, the open question shows that the intension is different.
And that's the problem with the open question - if there were such an extensional equivalence, then as you might say, who cares if it is not intensionally equivalent?
So Putin's invasion of Ukraine is, for him, advantageous and helpful and accommodating, if perhaps not altogether pleasant. And hence by your standard, a good.
So I don't see that your definition is of much help in working out what we ought do, which is, after all, the point of ethics.
Sure I can. Rape isn't good. Which just means I don't want to do it nor do I want other people to.
And yet it satisfies your definite of "good":Quoting bert1
You don't see a problem here? Again, Quoting Banno
Edit: Or are you saying that the rapist rapes against his own will?
So I gather what you're wanting to emphasize is how any value we posit will be valid within a system-context, where system-context is always changing and so the validity of a posited value will always be questionable. On one side of the reflection we might say what you say -- that all goods have their own specific place, and we should honor them all rather than compete over which of them is good.
I think I'd say this just moves the question one step back -- on the other side of the reflection now, rather than arguing over what is good, we're going to argue over which system-context is valid (and, at least for myself, I'd pick the system-context which validates what I believe to be good)
So the open-question argument would work still, I believe. It'd just be saying "Is it a good time to change values?" -- that element of choice that I've been emphasizing would still be there.
Definitions are circular within a finite frame. The circular series of terms for good used in this thread that I referred to are mutually defined according to a common or interwoven sense, in which the meaning of the good is contingent, either relative to the individual or culture, but arbitrary in its basis. My circular frame of definitions for the good are interwoven via a different sense. In my circle, the arbitrariness of the good is only an apparent arbitrariness. That it is only apparent makes it neither true nor false, but a certain useful way of understanding the good. My definition is useful in a different way , which leaves the previous definition intact ( if one only sees the good as arbitrary then that is valid, as far as it goes). I invite others to see my definition as enriching the arbitrary definition, by saying what others are unable to say about the good besides the fact that it is arbitrary. This would be like inviting others to see that the relation between an electric current and a magnetic field is not arbitrary but interlocked. I dont need to say that what I show them is true, only that it allows me to do things that connect the two concepts in more ways than what they were able to do.
Schopenhauer1 believes it is good to not be born, and that it is not good to be alive. Is this a disagreement with
the idea that goodness is synonymous with "preserving stable ongoing self-consistency of interaction with an environment under changing conditions"?
I would say no, in the same way that showing a connection between electricity and magnetism is not a disagreement with seeing them as unconnected so much as having something more to say about them.
In this case , the more than can be said concerning the condition of possibility of having a desire to live , die or not be born involves showing what is presupposed in having any desire whatsoever namely the avoidance of interruption, discontinuity and chaos. This is not inconsistent with a circular frame of definitions that an antinatalist might use , rather it also says what they cannot say , or see.
I think there is one fault in your logic. The rules for justice are set by a law. The law most likely is to promote something that the lawmaker considers "good". To punish the law breaker is just; this will deter the lawbreaker from breaking the law in the future, and will show an example to other would-be-law-breakers to not break the law. Therefore justice is good, because it reduces the number of breaches of law. And that is good for the law-maker. It is advantageous, helpful and accommodating for the law-maker.
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No, no, no. Read the previous page. Read my definition of "good". It is not circular.
It's not good to you, it's not good to society, it's not good to most people, and it's not good for me, either, and presumably not to bert1 either, but to the rapist raping someone is good, because it gives the rapist pleasure.
You really did not see that?
According to my definition, you always must consider the point of view and the time. "At the same time and in the same respect."
You are one I suspect who deliberately did not read my definition, and then Bert1's adjustment on it, or else who deliberately ignored its contents, in order to be able to ignore its impact on the topic.
I abhor rape, and all senseless violence. But you must consider the logic imbedded in this vile example, which still proves the point.
The point of reference is the rapist's view. All other reference points are ignored for the time being, because we want to focus on how the rapist views rape. This was discussed in the definition, and you wilfully ignore that part: Quoting god must be atheist
Regarding your argument:
Quoting Banno
You conveniently switch (for your own benefit) and switch in an invalid way, the evaluation of "good" in Bert1's example. He says the rapists wills to rape, and to him it's good. You say "to most here" rape is not good. You are switching the point of view in a clandestine yet invalid way.
Your argument does not hold.
I can't respond to the first part to "... intensionally equivalent?" because my education level does not include the knowledge of the names of concepts you mention. In particular, I don't know what you mean by "open quiestion", "intensional difference", "intensional equivalence", and "intension". I am not sure whether you wanted to say "intention"? I am not going to guess, I just say that I can't comprehend that part of your reply.
But your example that follows does not debunk my definition as amended by bert1. You admit that to Putin the invasion of Ukraine is good; then you turn around and say it's not good. But you did not invade the Ukraine. Putin's will was fulfilled. He feels pleasure. So compare this to the original definition.
And if you say to this: but Putin is not pleasured (emotionally) because the invasion has gone sour, then obviously the definition stands, because the goal that would have pleasured him, and which was going to be a "good" for Putin, did not happen. So the "good" is missing, because the act that would please him is also missing.
What you, I, or the rest of the world thinks is immaterial when you consider what is good for Putin.
And your opinion whether my definition serves the point of ethics is immaterial. All you needed to do is to give one, (1) ONE example that debunks my definition. Whichh you failed to provide.
My definition with bert1's adjustment certainly does not coincide with your idea of ethics. That's is not a fault with the definition, it is an artificial problem you superimposed on the whole. You are saying "whatever theory does not serve my idea of what ethics should be is bad", is not an argument. Your insistence on "good" to serve your ethical ideal is a demand that is unwarranted. It is a haphazard, arbitrary demand.
I can't beleive, 180 Proof, that you bought Banno's argument, which is full of holes when you consider my definition of "good" as amended by bert1. Have you read that part of the thread?
All I need is one (1) example that debunks my definition as amended by bert1.
You applaud something that miserably failed at it.
As I see the general problem in the reception of the definition is that people fail to distinguish between what THEY, the readers think is good, and what the actual point of view of of the actor in an action deems is good.
Without internalizing that there is a difference there, the whole exercise is to the shits. And that is certainly not my ineptitude, but that of those who are unable to see the importance of it.
I am certainly HUGELY surprised that you failed to see too, what a difference it makes to see or not to see the importance of the point of view.
Good is not mere approval, as I point out:
Quoting hypericin
Can a speaker assert they approve of x, due to an innate quality of x , while at the same time assert that x is not good? I say no.
I prefer not to go into gory detail in talking about ethics -- it seems to defeat the point? -- but can you imagine a person who makes a law for themself? So, in the case of the lawmaker, the law is most likely promoting something which the lawmaker considers good. So it fits your definition. However, at the same time, the rule-breaker made a law for themself -- not institutionally, but just chose it all on their own -- that said the lawmaker was breaking their law.
Now, realizing that the lawmaker would punish them, being a clever sort, they just decided that they'd become the lawmaker themselves. Say the one who disagreed with the lawmaker (a king in a previous time) was a prince, and they could kill the king. Then --
Quoting god must be atheist
As Thrasymachus pointed out, what is just is what the powerful say. To even have an opinion on the matter, one must first be powerful.
Is that the point of ethics? I don't know. If so, it has always seemed to me to be a misguided pursuit. Suppose I work out, by a consideration of ethics, what I ought to do. What happens then? Why would I do it? My will has to somehow be engaged, no?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/769109 then you'd not be so surprised, gmba, that I'm sympatico with
[quote=Banno]I don't see that your definition [of good] is of much help in working out what we ought do, which is, after all, the point of ethics.[/quote]
Suppose someone comes up with an example that they claim debunks your definition. How can we tell whether their claim is true? Is the example the standard by which the definition is to be judged, or is the definition the standard by which the example is to be judged?
The two questions are these: "What is moral?" and "what is morality?"
The first question is the question at the heart of what has become known as 'normative ethics'. The second is at the heart of what is known as 'metaethics'. (I stress, these distinctions were not employed at the time of Moore's writing, but as a result of it).
These are very different questions. One is about which acts are right and which states of affair etc, are good. Whereas the other is about what the rightness and goodness themselves are.
The problem is that both questions can be expressed using the same words. The ones you have used. "What is good?". That question is ambiguous. There are two quite different questions that could be being asked by the same words. What things are good? And "what is goodness, in and of itself". So, both the normative question and the metaethical question can be asked with exactly the same expression.
What Moore called (somewhat misleadingly) 'the naturalistic fallacy' is essentially the mistake of confusing the answer to one question, with the answer to the other.
So, let's imagine that utilitarianism is true. Well, then that means the answer to "what is good?", when used to express the question "what things are good" is "those things that maximise happiness".
But even if utilitarianism is true, that is not the answer to the "what is goodness, in and of itself?" question.
This is what the open-question argument brings out. For as goodness itself is not identical with the property of 'maximum happiness', then it is possible for maximum happiness to lack goodness and for something else to possess it. That's true even it utilitarianism is true. That is, even if it is true that all right acts have in common that they maximize happiness, it remains entirely possible that there could be an act that maximizes happiness yet is not right. This is because the property of 'maximizing happiness' and the property of 'being right' are not one and the same.
So, the lesson from Moore is that you need to clarify your question. What are you asking when you ask us 'what is good?'? Are you asking us which acts are good and which ones bad? Or are you asking what goodness is, in and of itself?
So, although Moore showed that no normative theory is an answer to the metaethical question "what is good, in and of itself?", he did not thereby show that the question "what is good, in and of itself?" lacks an answer. All he did (no mean achievement, incidentally) is show that a whole range of 'answers' to it were no such thing. But that isn't evidence there's no answer to it. It's just evidence that people have been confusing one question with another.
I'm asking mainly, what constitutes labeling an act or deed as good, and how that qualifier arises in our description of ethics.
For an analogy: there's the question "what is green?". That's ambiguous. Are you asking which things are green - that is, which things have greenness? Or are you asking what green is, in and of itself?
Similarly then, are you asking which things are good, or are you asking what goodness itself is?
Well, Moore provided the example of yellow existing at a certain wavelength for example. I think what one can call good is something like that, as a simple.
I don't think I'm concerned with the relations themselves but more with goodness itself as we all can discern what "good" is.
It seems you are asking the metaethical question "what is goodness, in and of itself?" and not the normative question "what things are good?", yes?
It's crucially important to be clear about this, as you'll just confuse answers with one with answers to the other if you do not - which is precisely what Moore was trying to teach us not to do.
Yes.
For something to be morally good, is for it to be morally valuable. That is, 'morally good' and 'morally valuable' are synonymous expressions.
And for something to be morally valuable is for it to be featuring as the object of a valuing relation. That is, it is for it to be being valued.
For example, if I say "this is valuable to me" I mean no more or less than that I value it. And if I value something, then what I value is the object of a valuing relation. That is, it is 'that which is being valued'.
Of course, if I value something that does not entail that it is morally valuable. So we can rule out that goodness is made of our own valuing activity. (For what I have just said seems to apply to us all).
Whose, then? If moral value is made of valuing activity, whose valuing activity does it consist of? Well, the person whose values constitutes moral values. That's a Moorean-style conclusion. Moral goodness is made of the valuing relations of the person whose values constitute moral values (a person who is not me or you).
So, the axiology of good is what Moore advocated. I'd have to read about that... Got sources?
I read the Wikipedia article. His argument is basically this:
What is good?
X is good if X possesses the property Y [we usually stop here, but not Moore]
Moore asks, why is Y-ness good?
For every property P that defines good, the question "why is P good?" can be asked - there's no end (it goes on ad infinitum).
I think it's irrelevant to ethics (re: "goodness").
There are absolutes in this world, and there are relatives. "Good" is a relative. Only ethicists on the Kantian (?) vein of thought (or maybe in other veins as well) think that there is some ideal, everlasting, and perfect "good" out there.
Well, sorry to break your bubble, but there is NO Santa Claus and there is no universal "good" out there. Not one that we have discovered yet, anyway.
Once you realize that "good" is subjective, then you must make sure you understand as well that since it's subjective, something can be good and not good at the same time, but NOT IN THE SAME RESPECT. This is of utter importance, that you apply this consideration.
Quoting Moliere
Anyone can have any opinion on any matter. No powerful social standing is required to have an opinion. I am not powerful in any sense, and yet, as you can see, I have opinions. If you are powerful, which I can't tell from here, but it's possible, then I can see how you can agree with Th...us.
I am sorry, 180 Proof, that you expect the impossible.
Think about it.
Banno put down his opinion in a post. You replied with a flaming approval of an icon.
I am supposed to decipher from that, that you only meant a particular point in Banno's reply, not the entire reply, and I am supposed furthermore to be able to pinpoint precisely which part you are agreeing with?
How can you seriously expect that people will properly guess that when you give a blanket statement of approval by indicating ONLY whom it goes to, and a flaming icon?
It is now obvious that you did not mean the entire post to be approved, and I am glad for it. It is only obvious, however, because you explained in long hand and naming each term in unambiguous ways. I suggest you do that in the first place, and not as an apology after a misunderstanding has happened and been reported.
I am glad that I misread your intention of what you meant to say, but I won't take the blame for this misreading. You must really be more clear in your communication if you want people to understand properly what you actually mean.
Good question.
By examining the logic and finding that the definition fails.
------------------------
Caveat: the definition I gave has been amended properly by Bert1, which states that pleasure is good, and a final means by itself (as per Hume), and the other thing that is good is a process, tool, action, opinion, that promotes the eventuality of a pleasure to happen.
------------------------
The definition fails if you find something that is good, yet does not fit the criteria of the definition.
For instance: A triangle has three points and three sides.
I have a two-dimensional object that has four sides and four points.
Therefore the two-dimensional object I have is not a triangle, because it fails to satisfy the criteria given in the definition of the triangle.
Banno made his opinion.
You approved it with a flame.
I did not like that you agreed with THAT opinion.
You did not indicate that only PART of that opinion of Banno's you agreed with.
I took it out of context *by what you meant to indicate, not by what you ACTUALLY indicated* because you did not separate the context out of the whole post pinpointing what you meant by the flame.
:up:
Heh. I'm not being clear. I do not agree with Thrasymachus. I was attempting a reductio of your position -- if what is good is just what is good for someone, then for a prince that wants to be a king killing the king is good for them. So, by your definition, at least some of the time, killing for the purpose of obtaining a better social position is good.
The allusion to Thrasymachus was just to draw an analogy that what you're saying is similar to what he said in The Republic -- not exactly so, but given the above scenario, can you see the parallels?
I think all absolutes are also, at the same time, relatives. For instance, the qualitative content of a moment of awareness is contingent and relative, but its condition of possibility is time consciousness, the appearance of now as a tripartite structure of past(memory , present and future( expectation). This is true of good, of course, but in addition, what is experienced as good involves a validation of expectation, whereas
what is not good involves a mismatch between expectation and appearance.
The Kantian hope of an absolute specific qualitative content of meaning associated with the good ( categorical imperative) turned out to be only relative, but there are formal structural conditions of possibility for the experience of goodness that post-Kantian philosophers argue are absolute.
I can't read and comprehend my posts for you, bert. :yawn:
I dont understand his open question argument, though, because it looks like he assumes the subject and predicate are conceptually identical, rather than the predicate serving to modify the subject, which the grammar entails. The sentence Bananas are yellow does not entail bananas are identical to yellow, for instance, yellow is bananas. Can anyone clear this up for me?
I must have missed how your definition avoids being circular. Did you somewhere indicate how good is more or other than just what benefits an individual relative to their needs?
It's been a long-standing fracture between 180 and me. I like the guy, actually, I respect him, and I bow for his knowledge and mind. But he doggonedly avoids being clear and most times even being committal. It's not a fault, only an irritation. The fault is when he expects people to know what he means when his description is less than scanty.
You're right. Every definition is circular. But it has been created, and it is not impossible therefore to create a definition for "good". The initial opening post asked this question, and I answered it.
Maybe I would, but I read The Republic a long, long time ago, and stopped halfway, although I enjoyed it tremendously. But I can't see the parallel, because I can't remember the passage that deals with Thrasymachus.
My fault. I admit.
True, but this problem can be circumvented by giving parametric conditions or assigning parametric properties to the quality of "good".
Quoting god must be atheist
OP is asking if good can be defined, and is therefore, by implication, asking for a definition of 'good'. I think that what you have provided is a list of reasons why we might want to call something 'good' that it's advantageous, or pleasant, or helpful, or accommodating which is not the same thing as a definition.
However, I think your list gives us a clue. Here are two lists, the one you gave for 'good', and a corresponding one for 'bad':
Good: advantageous, pleasant, helpful, accommodating
Bad: disadvantageous, unpleasant, unhelpful, obstructive
The four words in the first list are all positives; the four in the second list are all negatives. I think this is a clue as to what 'good' and 'bad' are doing: they're somehow separating objects into two groups, those about which we want to say something positive, and those about which we want to say something negative.
Here's another clue:
Quoting hypericin
I think this is pretty nearly right. The only thing I would want to do (apart from removing the words 'intrinsic' and intrinsically', because we can say that something is good because it is instrumentally good, not just because it is intrinsically good) is to replace 'approval' with something more general, in keeping with the fact that god-must-be-an-atheist's list has four items in it that aspire to cover a range of different responses. As I see it, if I say 'Sally is good', while it may indeed be the case that I approve of Sally and think that she is likeable, what I'm actually saying (because 'good' serves only to connect an object with positivity, and not with anything as specific as approval or liking) is that Sally deserves or merits or warrants some kind of positive attitude or response which might indeed be approval or liking but without pointing directly at any one of these responses, merely waving a hand vaguely at the entire class of positive responses, from mild approval through degrees of liking to active seeking out, without telling you which of them is my actual response or attitude. (I think of this as the 'Monty Python and the Holy Grail' theory of the meaning of 'good': John Cleese on the castle wall saying, with a comic French accent, 'I fart in your general direction.')
Where this ends up, I think, is at some kind of fitting attitude theory (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitting-attitude-theories/). There's a quote from A.C.Ewing in this article which I think just about sums it up:
if we analyse good as fitting object of a pro attitude, it will be easy enough to analyse bad as fitting object of an anti attitude, this term covering dislike, disapproval, avoidance, etc.
My personal preference is to define 'good' as 'merits a pro-response', and 'bad' as 'merits an anti-response', but I think that's detail. The article makes the point that "FA theories come in both cognitivist and noncognitivist versions, and can be given either a realist or a quasi-realist gloss." My view is that it should be given a cognitivist and realist gloss, but I won't go into that here.
I hope some of this has been helpful, and that I've not trodden on too many toes.
What?
Quoting Joshs
Well, yes, since homeostasis leads to reproduction.
But then he was puzzled by the idea that ethics is about what we ought to do...
Yes, Bert, ethics is about what we ought do. And I guess it's clear, so far as it goes, that we ought do what is right, and we ought do what is good.
The fun begins when someone asks what is right, what is good and what ought we do.
Quoting bert1
Of course. One presumably ought to will what is good.
But if what is "good" is just what one wills, one has a conceptual problem, since it remains that we can ask if one ought do what one wills.
That would pretty much amount to "do whatever you will", saying nothing about what we ought to will, and so not answering the question.
And even if rape is good for rapists, and invading other countries is good for oligarchs, we are still left with the question as to whether such folk ought to be let do as they please.
You see, the thing about ethics is that it takes a step past doing what you want - the question you both have addressed - and asks instead about what one ought do. It's the difference between a question for children and a question for grownups. Sure, one might as well do what one wants. But as one grows up one notices one is embedded in a social structure that places limits on what one does.
Of course, one might respond by modifying "Do what you want" to "Do what you can get away with".
But most folk are able to take on a more nuanced approach. And that's were ethics comes in. We can have a reasoned discussion about what sorts of things one ought to do. In the process we might find ways to better articulate what is disagreeable about rape and invasion.
Quoting god must be atheist
Perhaps instead most folk are able to distinguish between what they want and what is good, and choose not to rape or invade even if it would be pleasurable or convenient.
Goodness is itself a property, according to Moore. Excuse my stupidity, but how is it possible to give a property properties without first considering goodness to be an an object in itself?
That's verging on the naturalistic fallacy.
I think those you mention understand that.
They will also understand that there is an area of discourse around what is good and what is not, around what we ought to do and what we ought not. A conversation that is about ethics.
That good is not absolute (however one is to understand that) does not tell us much about what to do.
Nor does telling us that folk want what they want - even if that is phrased as "the good is what one wills" or "the good is a thing that is advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating".
Ethics is not about what you want.
So sure, some folk want one thing, some folk want another. We realise that. Now there can be a whole conversation about how we work out who gets what.
And "Once you realize that" you will be doing ethics.
(Edit TL;DR at openAPI gave this post as "Your argument that "good is not an absolute term" does not tell us much about what to do. We need to engage in a conversation about ethics in order to decide what is good and what is not.")
An example comes to mind from Mah?y?na Buddhism and the 'eight worldly concerns' (annotated by me):
hope for pleasure (good) and fear of pain (bad),
hope for gain (good) and fear of loss (bad),
hope for praise (good) and fear of blame (bad),
hope for good reputation and fear of bad reputation.
a commentary on that:
Letter to a Friend by N?g?rjuna
Insofar as the 'definition' of the good is concerned, this doesn't offer a definition as such, which after all is only a matter of words, so much as a prescription whereby such an unalloyed good is to be sought.
Interesting, but hard to imagine what that might be and possibly hard to access such knowledge.
(But then, I did read somewhere that 'The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no valueand if there were, it would be of no value.' Can't remember where, it's a scrapbook entry.)
Sounds like Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus... :smile:
I am not defending Moore's view, however. Far from it. As I say, Moore thought that 'good' is indefinable. But he thought that on the basis of an argument that commits the very same fallacy that he was accusing others of. That is, he took the inability of answers to the normative version of the question "what is good?" to answer the metaethical version of the question "what is good?" to be evidence that the latter is unanswerable (or rather, that the answer is that 'it is what it is'). That's as fallacious as thinking that an answer to the normative question is, by dint of being an answer to it, also an answer to the metaethical question. He correctly identified a common fallacy, and then proceeded to commit it!
So, Moore was correct in his criticism of moral theorizing up to that point, he was incorrect in his positive moral theory. He thought the good is what it is. But it isn't. It can be defined.
'The good' is that which features as the object of a valuing relation that has the source of all moral value and norms as its valuer. And as only persons - minds - can be valuers, the source of all moral value and norms is a person. Which person? The person who it is. That last claim is Moorean in spirit, but the view is far from Moorean. It's a form of divine command theory, rather than a form of non-naturalism (the latter being Moore's view).
Moore's view was, frankly, insane.
That's directional ethics, for lack of my knowledge of a better, well-accepted expression for it. Instructional ethics is another way to summarize it in an expression. It is, however, not the only area of ethics, and it does not apply to all domains of thoughts on ethics.
Therefore to say that ethics is about what we ought to do is false, inasmuch as the tone presupposes that it's the purpose of all ethics; well, it's not.
I don't know where you get this from. I agree with it, but the thread is not about ethics; you are derailing the topic. The topic is, as stated, "good" is impossible to define. (Not worded precisely as this, but it's close enough.)
To bring in ethics is, as I see it, is to counter the definition I and bert1 proposed. But we had no notion of bringing in ethics. You did, which is fine, but it's not a counter-argument to the definition. It is a completely different kettle of fish, so to speak.
You are pivoting the definition of "good" and the notion that ethics dictate we must do good, on the point that both endeavours use the word "good".
I put forth, that it's an equivocation. The "good" in the definition defines a subjective quality. The good in ethical theory describes a restricted value range of good, namely, that only those good-s are acceptable in the "ought" domain of ethics, which contain no "bad" for anyone concerned.
This restriction may be warranted in ethical theory of the "ought" kind, but it diverts from the definition of "good", and unnecessarily so for the general meaning of "good". The "ought" ethics does ask for a certain condition for "good" that is NOT part of the general meaning of "good", therefore the two are not equivalent, and that is where your fallacy lies: you want to force a meaning on a general meaning, which forced meaning is only applicable to a sub-field of ethics. And that is an invalid application.
This can be shown by the following thought experiment:
A man thinks of a house. He calls that house "House". The name of that house is House, while it is at the same time a house.
Now someone comes along, and saye to the man, "I hear you have something that you call House. But I actually don't know what you call House: your car key, your fridge, or your wife. What is the thing that you call House?" To which the man truthfully answers, "Well, the thing that I call the House is my thought of a house."
I hope this clears up your confusion on how it is possible for qualities to have qualities.
This can be transferred very easily by lateral thought to how it is very possible for properties to have properties.
Define definition then for me, please, so I can proceed on satisfying your demand to comply to the form of the definition of any thing, as defined by you.
I Googled 'definition definition' (that was fun), and it said 'a statement of the exact meaning of a word, especially in a dictionary.' That will do for me.
I'm suggesting that if someone says 'that painting is good', they probably don't mean 'that painting is any 3 or more of advantageous, pleasant, helpful, or accommodating.' It seems unlikely. What advantage would the average person find in a painting? What would it help them to do? What wishes would it accommodate? They might find it pleasant, but equally, I think someone could find a painting unpleasant (think of Francis Bacon's Screaming Popes) and still think the painting was good.
So, if you like, paintings are my offer of the counter-example you were asking people to provide.
You got the pleasant right. And you're right, it is not to the viewer's advantage, the look of the painting.
In the meantime, since I wrote that first paragraph, bert1 has helped me out. He started with Hume's claim that pleasure (of any kind, not only physical, base, dirty pleasures) is the... forgot what he called it, but basically, it is the end of all endeavours. Beyond pleasure there is nothing a man or a woman wishes to attain.
So bert1 improved my definition by saying that something that is "good" is pleasure, or else an instrument to attain pleasure.
Then I went into saying that that's basically why "good" is a concept that is subject to subjectivity: it is fully subjective. I feel my pleasure, but not yours. (Althoug I can interpret your reactions to know you are in a state of pleasure.)
I rested on my laurels after that.
Banno, (please correct me if I say something that is not attributable to you) raised objections, and I shot them down saying that raising those objections served only his objective to debunk my definition, but the object, kernel to his objection, was using the word "good" in a different context.
I also talked about equivocation; meaning, that the same word means different things in different contexts.
I hope this explains that "good" is something that is pleasurable, or else it is helpful, accommodating and advantageous.
And finally, your second comment: Quoting Herg
They would have to elaborate what they meant by the painting being good, if it did not please them. I really can't wrap my head around that. I mean, there are tons of possibilities: good, because other people find it pleasing, or good, because it is the print of the queen's head on the twenty-dollar Canadian note, or good because the paint is not chipping yet, and there are no dried spit spots on the surface. In this latter sense, they are pleased with the condition, it pleased them, so it is some form of pleasure. In the case of the queen on the $20 bill, it pleases them because they know the money is not counterfeit. Good, because if other people like it, the person who does not revels in the fact that pleasure is still disseminated by this picture in the world at large, and though he does not personally enjoy viewing it, knowing that other people are caused to feel pleasure viewing the painting is pleasing him.
I really don't know, next time ask the guy and then get back to me, what he precisely means.
Quoting Herg
So there you have it. The definition is a statement of the exact meaning of a word, especially in a dictionary.
Now look up what it says about the entry "life" and the entry "time".
I thought that the gist with Moore was in pointing out that the naturalistic fallacy constantly occurs when surveying what is "good".
I explained this above. So, normative theories - theories about what makes an act right or something good - are theories about what 'has' goodness and 'has' rightness. But they are not metaethical theories - that is, they are not theories about what goodness and rightness are in themselves. The naturalistic fallacy involves confusing normative theories with metaethical ones. That's another way of saying what I just said in the above paragraph.
Moore himself commits the very same error when he arrives at his conclusion that good is indefinable.
Have you read Moore?
Note, when I attempted to define what good is above, I did not commit the naturalistic fallacy. That is, I did not make the mistake of trying to isolate some feature that all good things have in common aside from being good and then identify the goodness with that feature or features. Rather, I simply noticed that for something to be good is for it to be valuable and for something to be valuable is for it to be the object of a valuing relation that has the source of all moral value and norms as its source.
it's good that here we are actually referring to Principia.
A note, if you would. If A=B, if they are the very same thing, then extensionally, any property of A os also a property of B, and necessarily. So if an ethical naturalist insists that "the good = B" then any extensional property of B will also be a property of the good.
But anyway, all of this is beside the point. The point is that the naturalistic fallacy involves taking the true normative theory to be, by dint of its being the true normative theory, the true metaethical theory.
All you are doing is pointing out that if the true metaethical theory is some form of naturalism, then the true normative theory will be a description of what 'goodness' is made of. But that's beside Moore's point. Moore's point is that you cannot infer that naturalism is true from the fact that the true normative theory will describe which natural properties moral properties track. For that is all a normative theory tells us - it tells us which, if any, natural properties moral properties such as goodness and rightness seem to follow from, but it does not license one to conclude that the moral properties 'are' those natural properties. Whether they are or not remains an open question.
Quoting Herg
But this then becomes "good for".
The point of "intrinsic" was that the pro-Sally sentiment expressed by "Sally is good" is about Sally, as opposed to my personal preference. Even if Sally is just "good for" something, that usefulness of Sally in this situation arises from her, not from my opinion of her.
Perhaps, but I'd characterise it as mistaking the extension of "good" for it's intension. That's the error the Open Question outs.
Just sense and reference.
So an open question supposedly shows that, even if some naturalist term picks out the very same things as "good", we have a different sense for "good".
"But does good just mean what is pleasurable?"
What do you mean?
Note, I provided a very clear explanation of the error that Moore was highlighting. The error involves confusing two very different questions that can be expressed with the same words (and thereby thinking the correct answer to one is the correct answer to the other).
Now, either what you're doing is trying to find a more obscure way of saying the same thing, or you're saying something quite different. Which is it?
Sure, I'll tag along. Is that something you wanted to survey?
It wasn't on my to do list, but I'm not disinterested.
So part 1, Moore is supposing that moral statements have a truth value, and that this truth value is not just the opinions of the individual involved. And Moore is supposing that moral judgements are distinct from and not reducible to other sorts of judgements.
Stop trying to sound clever. It isn't working.
Now, once again, did you take yourself to be saying the same thing I was saying, or did you think you were saying something different?
Is a normative theory a theory about the extension of the word 'good' and a metaethical theory a theory about the intension of the word 'good'. Come along. Say what you think.
In terms of what is a moral statement a truth value? Further, what does it mean to say that it's not reducible to other sorts of judgements?
Moral statements have a truth value - they are true or false; as opposed to being, perhaps, mere expressions of one's opinion, grunts of appreciation or contempt.
So, how do they obtain as either true or false?
Yes, in that how do they represent true state of affairs or not?
A humdrum!
Before Moore no distinction was drawn between normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction is a result of his work. The naturalistic fallacy involves conflating the question at the heart of normative ethics - "what is moral?" - with the question at the heart of metaethics - "what is morality?". Those distinct areas of inquiry grew out of his work. That is, he drew our attention to the fact these were distinct questions and that how we go about answering one is not how we go about answering the other.
The naturalistic fallacy - to which the distinction between normative ethics and metaethics can be seen as the result - involves confusing answers given to the first with answers to the second.
That's not how he himself would describe the naturalistic fallacy. Indeed, as he himself admitted, he provides no very clear explanation of what the fallacy actually involves. But that's actually what it involves, and that's precisely why these two distinct lines of ethical inquiry developed. They developed out of his work.
There's the destructive part of Moore - the part that involves highlighting (which, note, he does quite badly and confusingly) the mistake I have just described. This part lands us with a puzzle - if what we have been thinking were answers to the "what is morality?" question were, in fact, no such thing (they were answers to the "what is moral?" question), then what is morality? We thought we knew, but now we find we don't.
Then there's the constructive part in which Moore attempts to tell us what morality is. And his answer, which he assures us we'll find unimpressive, is that morality 'is what it is'. He arrives at this conclusion fallaciously. Ironically, he's committed his own fallacy. For he sees the failure of other answers to be evidence that morality is indefinable. But of course, if those answers were not answers to the 'what is morality?" question, but a quite different one, then one is not licensed to draw this conclusion.
Anyway, Moore's positive view is original, even though it doesn't enjoy the support he thought it did. His view is that as morality exists - we clearly have moral obligations - but has resisted (it hasn't) our best attempts to say what it is, it is itself and not another thing. That is, it is among those basic elements of reality, the raw ingredients, that cannot be broken down any further. It might be thought to be analogous to time and space, which are also candidates for that status. Time is time and not another thing and space is space and not another thing. Yet things are 'in' time and have temporal properties. The things that are in time do not constitute it. They just have temporal properties. Likewise then, we and our actions and the states of affairs around us are 'in' morality and have moral properties. Happiness is sometimes good. But happiness and goodness are not the same, just as some events occur at 3pm but are not thereby constitutive of 3pm.
That's Moore's view and it is known as 'non-naturalism'. It's a misleading name. But it is basically the view that morality is morality and that we make a mistake when we assume it must be made of something more basic than itself.
Non-naturalism is a form of what's known as 'objectivist' metaethical theory. 'Objective' in this context means 'exists as something other than subjective states'. Moore positively rejects the idea that morality could be made of our own - or someone else's - subjective states, for that would be to reduce morality to something else.
And Moore himself was a realist. A 'realist' about morality is someone who thinks morality exists. That is, moral objects and relations are real.
Many non-naturalists are not realists, however, but often endorse 'nihilism', the view that nothing is right or wrong in reality.
But, see the quote by Banno above. It clearly states in the SEP entry that:
Quoting SEP
To say that something in inherently intuitive (such as morality in Moore's case) seems to indicate that what moral claims represent are at least very subjective states, that are commensurably agreed upon. Do you think that's something correct to state?
Like I said, Banno regurgitates SEP entries. Now I think neither your nor Banno actually know what that quote means.
Now, do you think I'm someone who a) knows nothing about Moore or b) knows a shit load about him?
Have you read Moore, Shawn? Or have you only read 'about' him?
How on earth do you get that from the quote above?
Moore is not a subjectivist about morality.
A subjectivist about morality is someone who believes morality is made of subjective states.
What you're doing is confusing states of awareness with objects of awareness.
You're thinking "if we're aware of moral rightness and goodness via subjective states - intuitions - then moral rightness and goodness are themselves made of subjective states". Yes?
So, I'm aware of my partner via subjective states. I can see her. That is, I have a visual impression of her. That's a subjective state. Therefore - by your logic - my partner is made of subjective states. She exists in my mind and as states of mind.
That's the conclusion you're going to draw about everything, if you are consistent.
But you're just making a basic error. It's like confusing a book about Obama with Obama.
Moore is an 'objectivist' about morality. He - like most moral philosophers - believes that morality does not exist 'as subjective states'. At least not as 'our' subjective states. (Strictly speaking divine command theory is a form of subjectivism, but the standard objections to subjectivism do not apply to it).
Why?
Because the view is stupid. It means that if you approve of yourself raping Jane, then it is morally right for you to rape Jane.
It means Hitler did nothing wrong so long as he sincerely appproved of what he himself did.
It's a stupid view that has nothing to be said for it, which is why no ethicist - including Moore - endorses it.
You only think he's a subjectivist because you're confusing intuitions - which are subjective - with what they give the bearer an awareness of - which is not subjective, or need not be.
Note as well that subjectivism about morality is a reductionist view - it reduces morality to something else (in this case, subjective states). And Moore is not a reductionist. His whole point is that morality can't be reduced. He's wrong about that. But 'if' it can't be reduced, then clearly he's not a subjectivist, as that's a reductionist view.
I can't see why the word "good" is indefinable. If it were, then most if not all the adjectives would be indefinable and it would be impossible to communicate.
The word "good" is mostly used to indicate a satisfactory level or degree of something, based on commonly or generally accepted standards. It is applied to both quality and quantity: Good food, good joke, good essay, good news, good health, good friend, ...
Then it is also used in reference to morality, also based on commonly or generally accepted standards: doing good, good behavior, good person, ...
Being relative and dependent on context does not mean that it cannot be defined.
Well, instead of running in circles, what does that something mean?
Why running in circles? I can only see a straight line! :grin:
I gave you examples, Shawn. I can't do more than that.
(And please don't ask me "What does 'examples' mean?" :smile:)
The good is that which is life-enhancing, pain and discomfort diminish the life force. Avoidance itself is good if it protects one from that which would diminish one's will.
If X is good because X is beneficial, why is beneficial good? If the response is beneficial is good because it enhances cooperation, we can then ask, why is enhancing cooperation good? So on and so forth ad infinitum/ad nauseum. It seems to be one of the dentes of Agrippa's trident (infinite regress).
That is why Aristotle proposed "happiness" as the end which breaks the infinite regress.
I fear that doesn't work. Why is happiness good?
Happiness does not depend on "good" or "bad". It is not a virtue but an objective. Aristotle claimed that happiness is a state of mind that every person aspire to achieve, because (and he was so right in his arguments) it is the main engine which makes the people to make and elaborate objectives, dreams, things, etc...
So no, nothing much to do with the nonsense of Platonic forms.
And this regress:
Quoting Agent Smith
is avoided, since the "why" is an illegitimate question, a grammatical error, a misunderstanding of what ""...is good" does.
Quoting Agent Smith
Almost. Better, "Is happiness the very same as what is good?" The answer is "No", since it is conceivable that we might have to give up one's happiness for what is good. Happiness anf the good are not the very same thing.
The open question is supposed to show that any mooted equivalence between good and something else will fail.
To say it is a form of Platonism is not to say that there is a form the Good, but that it is a type of Platonism in that it consistent with Platonist claims, that is is something known in itself by themselves by the mind itself.
Seems to me that introducing Plato only servers to add more fog.
It just seems clearer to say that the good is indefinable.
It means that it is not a product of the mind or a deduction or arrived at by analysis. It is known independently of all else.
Quoting Banno
It was a deliberate choice that does not add more fog but clarity. Moore himself said in a letter to a friend:
I was not aware of this, I found it just now while looking for support. I found it here
From the same article:
From the article:
I have read some of her novels but not her work on ethics.
What are your thoughts?
Ok, other folk have shared that interpretation. But did Moore? What evidence is there that he thought of his argument as platonic? Seems to involve too great a reification for comfort, at odds with Moore's rejection of idealism.
Again, this is a side issue. SO for instance the SEP article on Moore makes no such comparison, mentioning neither Plato nor Forms.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/705105
Btw, I don't care for her fiction but I believe I've read all of her (collected) philosophical papers & lectures a few times, though decades ago.
I don't know. The truth is, I have not read him. More than once I tried. Reading through the posts here it occured to me that it sounded a lot like noesis - something known by direct intellectual apprehension.
Quoting Banno
Yes, that is the point. What is and is not rejected in his rejection of idealism?
From the article:
Plato's Forms are completely independent of us.
Quoting you from the link:
I agree with the importance of the imagination for Plato. I also agree that it cannot be determined by logical demonstration. If it is known it is known noetically not via reason or dianoia. But I have argued why the good cannot be known
I would add that Plato is a political philosopher. As important as the inner life is, so is the shared life of friends and the public/political.
I disagree with it as well, but the reasons are given in the Nichomacean Ethics. Basically there is the appearance of infinite regress, as you described. So Aristotle looked for something "self-sufficient", wanted only for the sake of itself, because that would put an end to that regress. If X is good because it is for the sake of Y, and Y is good for the sake of Z, and Z for A, etc., he figure that there needed to be something final, that all the others would lead to, as ultimately being for the sake of that final thing. That's the ultimate end, wanted only for the sake of itself. This he assumed is the person's happiness.
I suspected as much. Danke!
:up: Read Banno's reply to me here: Quoting Banno
In line with your via negativa approach to many things - let's deal with what is not good first; our intuitions tend to be less at odds with each other in re disvalue than in re value and before I forget, reducing harm is more actionable than increasing benefit. The Epicureans were of the view that happiness is the absence of suffering and the highest happiness is the complete cessation of suffering (aponia).
That's part of the reason why I disagree with Aristotle on that point. However, the argument is not as simple as Banno makes it look. To prove that point one would have to show how something is better than happiness. Just stipulating that X is better than happiness doesn't prove the point. That is the problem which Plato had with those who equated good with pleasure. You can't just stipulate that good is something different from pleasure, and leave it at that. That does not convince anyone. You need to produce descriptive premises concerning "good", and descriptive premises concerning "pleasure", and show how the nature of each of these differs from the other. As Plato found out, it's not an easy task to convince someone who already believes that good is pleasure.
The point though, was how Aristotle moved to put an end to the infinite regress you noted. The thing he named as the ultimate end (wanted for the sake of itself), was perhaps not the correct solution, but he showed a way toward that solution. We could name "the good" as the ultimate end, but that's completely intangible. Swapping "the good" for "happiness" provides us with something tangible, while being slightly more palatable than "pleasure".
I'm inclined to agree with @Banno that on occasion one has to sacrifice one's happiness for good, implying they aren't the same. I'm shocked Aristotle missed such an obvious fact.
The other issue is that we can ask the question why is happiness good?. To me the infinite regress doesn't terminate.
As I said, this would require proving that there is something better than happiness, to show that one ought to sacrifice happiness for this better good. Just stipulating that X is better than happiness, therefore you ought to sacrifice your happiness for X does not suffice.
But the very existence of the word "sacrifice" is the proof you seek.
I don't see the point. That "sacrifice" exists doesn't mean that sacrifice is good. In fact, an examination of most instances of sacrifices will probably show that they are generally misguided, and very often far from good.
Perhaps we're conflating equality with predication.
1. Good = Happiness (g = h)
2. Good is happiness (Hg)
In the former case, happiness and good are the same thing, but in the latter case, happiness is a property of good. The question why is happiness good? makes less sense in re 1 than 2.
Also ...
The word "sacrifice" has a positive connotation of a kind such that even if the devil sacrifices, it doesn't affect the word's positive valence. :lol:
And ...
Moore's question, as @Banno pointed out, is a bit weird.
It amounts to asking, if I told you that water is transparent (good is a beneficial act), why is transparent water? (why is a beneficial act good?) The question makes zero sense (to me). I dunno, it feels odd.
Indefinable for every context, definable when used?
Maybe the reason I can not answer the original question is because I (we?) dont know the language game its being used in.
And yes, if you aren't looking at a particular use, then how can you define it? So, maybe you just have to ask the question a bit differently, then your answer will be less fuzzy. There are word definitions that are much more precise, but many definitions aren't precise.
Wittgenstein wrote in most cases the meaning of a word is maybe this is an example of a time when a word is used within a sentence and meaning is not use. It seems we (I) like to wait around for a playable language game when we are looking at the unplayable one.
Is good indefinable? Why not answer yes?
A good Aristotelian-Thomistic response to this comes from Dr. Peter L. P. Simpson's freely available article, "On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas." Here is an excerpt:
Quoting Peter L. P. Simpson, On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas, pp. 2-3
Moore's reasoning is inductive, not deductive, and it implicitly begs the question. He takes just two suggested definitions (that 'good' means the same as 'pleasure' or 'what promotes the greatest happiness'), finds these implausible (which is what he means when he says we can ask 'with significance' whether they are good), and then infers, simply on the basis of these two failed suggestions, that 'this result will always happen whatever definition one proposes' (my underlining). He does not justify this inference from the particular to the universal in any way; the inference rests on nothing more than Moore's own prior conviction that good is indefinable, and thus begs the question. Moore's conclusion would only be justified if he had considered all possible suggested definitions of 'good' and found them wanting.
A plausible definition of 'good' is given by A.C.Ewing:
"'We may... define "good" as "fitting object of a pro attitude"... it will [then] be easy enough to analyse bad as "fitting object of an anti attitude", this term covering dislike, disapproval, avoidance, etc.' (The Definition of Good, pp. 152 and 168)
This kind of definition is characteristic of fitting attitude theories. I think it needs further refinement, but it is a step in the right direction, a direction that never occurred to Moore.
That sounds fair to me. But then suppose Moore said, "Because it makes sense to ask whether 'fitting object of a pro attitude' is good, therefore it must not be the definition of good." How would you answer?
Further on in the article:
Quoting Peter L. P. Simpson, On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas, pp. 5-6 (footnotes omitted)