Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism
Two simple forms of consequentialism are Behaviors that increase well-being are moral and Behaviors that minimize suffering are moral. These claims define what is moral based on its consequences - what the ends of moral behavior are. They are silent about the means by which well-being is to be increased or suffering minimized.
Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) summarizes the empirical observation that all past and present cultural moral norms are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13929/what-if-cultural-moral-norms-track-cooperation-strategies/p1). For example, when people follow the Golden Rule and Do not lie, steal, or kill they are following heuristics (usually reliable, but fallible rules of thumb) for initiating the powerful cooperation strategy indirect reciprocity. MACS is silent about the ends of the cooperation these strategies enable (silent about the ultimate goals people are cooperating to achieve).
So consequentialism proposes what ends are moral and MACS observes what means are moral. Ends and means are different categories of things. Perhaps they could be combined in a complimentary fashion?
Combining them, the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims become:
Behaviors that increase well-being by solving cooperation problems are moral and
Behavior that minimize suffering by solving cooperation problems are moral.
The remainder of this post will argue that these combined forms provide better reasons for judging them as normative (what everyone ought to do) than the bare consequentialist forms. For purposes of this discussion, I will take what is morally normative to be what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people (similar to Gerts SEP definition of normativity https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/morality-definition/ ).
I will argue that including MACS is complimentary because doing so reduces or eliminates classic problems with consequentialism.
First, bare consequentialism has an implied over-demandingness feature: that it is moral for one person to suffer a huge penalty, of either increased suffering or reduced well-being, so many can gain a tiny benefit. The new consequentialist/cooperation morality requires moral behaviors to be parts of cooperation strategies and cooperation implies a lack of coercion. The absence of coercion in moral behavior implies that the over-demandingness as so-called moral behavior has been eliminated. Moral principles without over-demandingness are more likely to be judged morally normative as what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people.
Second, bare consequentialism can lack innate motivational power because it is an intellectual construct. But the moral means of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because these cooperation strategies are what shaped our moral sense. This innate harmony provides motivating power to incline us to act morally even when we have reasons not to.
The presence of innate motivating power in the MACS part of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles provides a second reason that these claims are more likely than bare consequentialism to be judged normatively moral.
Third, the problems that MACS solves are as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics that define them. Everywhere those mathematics hold in our universe, from the beginning of time to the end of time, intelligent beings must solve the same problems in order to form highly cooperation societies. MACS feature of cross-species universality and application could be intellectually satisfying and attractive for rational people. MACS cross-species universality provides a third reason that the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims would be more likely to be judged normative than bare consequentialism.
I have not attempted to make a tight argument here that either of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are normative by the above definition. I have argued only that the proposed consequentialist/cooperation morality is more likely than bare consequentialism to be judged as what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people.
Could MACS and either form of consequentialism be contradictory? I have not yet seen how they could be, but this looks like new, unplowed ground to me. There may be many surprises out there.
Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) summarizes the empirical observation that all past and present cultural moral norms are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13929/what-if-cultural-moral-norms-track-cooperation-strategies/p1). For example, when people follow the Golden Rule and Do not lie, steal, or kill they are following heuristics (usually reliable, but fallible rules of thumb) for initiating the powerful cooperation strategy indirect reciprocity. MACS is silent about the ends of the cooperation these strategies enable (silent about the ultimate goals people are cooperating to achieve).
So consequentialism proposes what ends are moral and MACS observes what means are moral. Ends and means are different categories of things. Perhaps they could be combined in a complimentary fashion?
Combining them, the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims become:
Behaviors that increase well-being by solving cooperation problems are moral and
Behavior that minimize suffering by solving cooperation problems are moral.
The remainder of this post will argue that these combined forms provide better reasons for judging them as normative (what everyone ought to do) than the bare consequentialist forms. For purposes of this discussion, I will take what is morally normative to be what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people (similar to Gerts SEP definition of normativity https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/morality-definition/ ).
I will argue that including MACS is complimentary because doing so reduces or eliminates classic problems with consequentialism.
First, bare consequentialism has an implied over-demandingness feature: that it is moral for one person to suffer a huge penalty, of either increased suffering or reduced well-being, so many can gain a tiny benefit. The new consequentialist/cooperation morality requires moral behaviors to be parts of cooperation strategies and cooperation implies a lack of coercion. The absence of coercion in moral behavior implies that the over-demandingness as so-called moral behavior has been eliminated. Moral principles without over-demandingness are more likely to be judged morally normative as what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people.
Second, bare consequentialism can lack innate motivational power because it is an intellectual construct. But the moral means of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because these cooperation strategies are what shaped our moral sense. This innate harmony provides motivating power to incline us to act morally even when we have reasons not to.
The presence of innate motivating power in the MACS part of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles provides a second reason that these claims are more likely than bare consequentialism to be judged normatively moral.
Third, the problems that MACS solves are as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics that define them. Everywhere those mathematics hold in our universe, from the beginning of time to the end of time, intelligent beings must solve the same problems in order to form highly cooperation societies. MACS feature of cross-species universality and application could be intellectually satisfying and attractive for rational people. MACS cross-species universality provides a third reason that the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims would be more likely to be judged normative than bare consequentialism.
I have not attempted to make a tight argument here that either of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are normative by the above definition. I have argued only that the proposed consequentialist/cooperation morality is more likely than bare consequentialism to be judged as what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people.
Could MACS and either form of consequentialism be contradictory? I have not yet seen how they could be, but this looks like new, unplowed ground to me. There may be many surprises out there.
Comments (65)
I think the categorical goal implies, or constrains, every hypothetical means. To wit: reducing 'suffering' by any means which does not increase or exacerbate 'suffering'; increasing 'well-being' by any means which does not descrease or impair 'well-being'. "MACS" is possibly one such "means" in either case depending on, I think, how it is practiced with respect to 'minimizing suffering' or 'maximizing well-being'.
There is no contradiction as they are operating in categorically different spheres. But I think you also said this, so no disagreement here.
Quoting Mark S
I don't think MACS achieves what you claim it achieves. MACS is just as susceptible to the problem you outline. MACS would show human coorporation often has an out group that is excluded. It does not rule out causing massive harm to a few in order for the many to coorporate - this has been pointed out to you in the previous thread I think.
Quoting Mark S
I don't think this holds. In fact my observations of "what is" recently, suggests that MACS would motivate those already motivated, and not motivate those already not motivated. Try to motivate an anti-vaccine person by bringing out more scientific studies. I think you will fail more often than succeed. And that failure would be because the motivation is values driven rather than technocratic.
This is true for how the in group is treated in different societies. But many societies that thrived had no problem murdering, stealing and raping their outsiders.
Which is one reason among many others that I find it problematic to base morality on an observation of what society did.
The other obvious problem is the is/ought difference, but even ignoring that sledgehammer throws up the above issue - many societies survived and even thrived with some moral values you or I would find abhorrent.
Edit - i am not even sure this is true for the ingroup. Here is an excerpt from wikipedia about a society that was very successful, and yet murdered their children:
"The Inca culture sacrificed children in a ritual called qhapaq hucha. Their frozen corpses have been discovered in the South American mountaintops. The first of these corpses, a female child who had died from a blow to the skull, was discovered in 1995 by Johan Reinhard.[9] Other methods of sacrifice included strangulation and simply leaving the children, who had been given an intoxicating drink, to lose consciousness in the extreme cold and low-oxygen conditions of the mountaintop, and to die of hypothermia. "
I wouldn't want to base my morality on that.
Such scientistic thinking seems oddly tone deaf; it entirely misses the question of what we are to do, how we are to act, while advocates appear either not to see this or not to think it important.
But thanks, @Mark S, as at least this is a topic with some merit. There's been a dearth of decent topics of late.
Yes, we are no different, on the group level, from animals in that regard.
It is much more posiible now to develop a global notion of humanity than it has bee in the padt. It is arguable that our survival depends on it.
Quoting PhilosophyRunner
That's an anachronistic and tendentious way of framing it; they would not have thought of it as murder
Quoting 180 Proof
To reduce suffering (or increase well-being) for all as an end, I have been thinking that moral means will sometimes include a cost to be paid by those who are suffering less, or who have higher well-being. That is, a cost to those who can afford it that benefits the worst off.
I am not comfortable agreeing that a means can be found that does not decrease or impair 'well-being' or increase or exacerbate 'suffering' for anyone, ever.
That said, I like MACS for this task of regulating the means to morally achieve consequentialist goals for two reasons.
First, it advocates cooperation strategies which are positive-sum games. These strategies offer the possibility that no reduction in well-being or increase in suffering will be required of anyone the best result.
Second, coercion is ruled out since the means are cooperation strategies. Ruling out coercion implies any reduction in well-being or increase in suffering is accepted willingly to help other people who are worse off an intuitively morally acceptable means.
Quoting PhilosophyRunner
MACS begins as an observation about all past and present cultural moral norms (including the nasty exploitation of outgroups you mention) being parts of cooperation strategies. I agree, we cannot include the exploitation component of these norms that create cooperation problems as objectively moral means. (The morality of simple exclusion without exploitation is a more complex issue I want to do more work on.)
MACS as I envision it in the above consequentialist/cooperation moral principle defines 1) moral means as solving cooperation problems and 2) immoral means as creating cooperation problems. This evolved form rejects as immoral the exploitation component of domination moral norms.
I can see I need to do a better job of explaining how that evolution happens. Thanks for pointing that out.
Quoting PhilosophyRunner
Science can tell us about the motivating emotions produced by the biology underlying our moral sense.
These motivating emotions can be taken to be empathy, gratitude, anger (at moral violations), shame, guilt, and elevation (a mix of pride, satisfaction, and optimism in the cooperative company of friends and family). All of these motivate either components of cooperation strategies or, in the case of elevation, are pleasurable biological rewards for cooperation.
Since these motivating emotions, like past and present cultural moral norms, were selected for based on their ability to solve cooperation problems, moral norms that solve cooperation problems can be innately motivating by our moral sense. A norm to initiate or maintain indirect reciprocity can be motivated by empathy and gratitude. A norm about punishing moral norm violators can be motivity by righteous anger (regarding others) and by shame and guilt (regarding ourselves). Elevation can motivate cooperation as a way of life.
Thus, I am confident that MACS components are innately motivated for everyone with a normal moral sense. Obviously, it would not be innately motivating for a rational psychopath.
I agree. As I said in the OP regarding why this is true:
Quoting Mark S
Right.
So all you've demonstrated is that all societies have social mores.
You've not shown any unity regarding the content of those mores.
If 'murder' is just the word given to killings society thinks are wrong, then all societies are going to prohibit murder aren't they? It's the definition of the word - 'those killings which we prohibit'
Quoting Isaac
The killings which will be prohibited are the ones that will cause social disharmony or at least unmanageable social disharmony; it's just pragmatism at work.
Of course I could be wrong, especially if humans have evolved from earlier anthropoid species which acted more on instinct than rational choice, like other social animals presumably do. I also don't want to diminish the role of empathy, fellow feeling, in moral choices.
But that's what the example of the Incas disproves. No one wants to be left on a hillside to die. Yet it was not proscribed.
Quoting Janus
On what grounds do you claim this. It could just as easily be that the killings which are prohibited will be those which most harm the powerful.
Jannat = Summa Cooperante!
:rofl:
Yes, and I'll be happy to read your expanded explanation.
At the moment, this is what I see you doing, in order:
1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods
2. Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like and leave only those you like based on your values.
3. Presenting this as what "is" and claiming scientific methods. However it is not a scientific observation, it is a pruned version filtered by your values. You have already introduced imperative oughts here, but done so through the back door.
4. Deriving an "ought" from what you presented as an "is" in step 4. This runs into the is/ought problem
So really I see you making 2 mistakes. What you present as an "is", is not actually an "is." And then you try to derive an ought from an is.
If I may make an almost facetious analogy:
1. You take a raw chicken
2. You cook the chicken
3. You present this cooked chicken as a raw chicken
4. You blow on the chicken
5. You say that blowing on the chicken has cooked the raw chicken.
The thing is blowing on the chicken did not cook the chicken, and what you presented as a raw chicken was not a raw chicken in the first place.
We profoundly disagree. I'll post a response in a day or two.
Incidentally, this kind of topic is the reason I got into philosophy during the pandemic in the first place. So even though I think your analysis is flawed, it is a topic I am interested in - how we can use moral philosophy to practically affect changes for the better, and how science can be used as an effective tool in this aim. I think science has an important role, but not in the way you describe.
Such acts are only performed in a ritual context when what is seen as some overarching context trumps what individuals want. Besides I am speaking broadly, an exception or a few exceptions, even if they were not religious exceptions, would not disprove the general rule.
Quoting Isaac
Then why are rape, murder, theft and lying generally prohibited in most societies? Sure it may be the case that those who have entrenched themselves in power can transgress such prohibitions, or make a special exception from the rule for themselves, without completely undermining social harmony, but so what?
Your points seem so trivial and carping that sometimes I think you just like to argue for the sake of it.
Both consequentialism and deontology seek an algorithmic approach to ethics, as if such things were calculable. The enormous complexity of event the most simple decisions weighs heavily against such an approach.
While cooperation is not itself a virtue, it is implicit in friendliness and magnanimity.
Of course you do. Because the alternative would require you to entertain the possibility that you might actually be mistaken.
Quoting Mark S
Im wondering how you would respond to Jesse Prinzs moral relativist argument, which grounds moral values in innate emotional responses which become culturally conditioned to form an endless variety of moral values across the cultural landscape.
Reason cannot tell us which facts are morally good. Reason is evaluatively neutral .moral judgments are based on emotions, and reasoning normally contributes only by helping us extrapolate from our basic values to novel cases. Reasoning can also lead us to discover that our basic values are culturally inculcated, and that might impel us to search for alternative values, but reason alone cannot tell us which values to adopt, nor can it instill new values .
We can try to pursue moral values that lead to more fulfilling lives, but we must bear in mind that fulfillment is itself relative, so no single set of values can be designated universally fulfilling. If my goals come into conflict with your goals, reason tells me that I must either thwart your goals, or give up caring about mine; but reason cannot tell me to favor one choice over the other.
Applying this thinking to a specific example, Prinz would
argue that no cooperative meta-theory could bridge
the gap in values between core Trump supporters and social leftists. The best that could be hoped for is the use of rational argument to persuade both parties that neither sides values are THE objectively correct values, and therefore each sides perspective needs to be tolerated and even respected.
Do you think that MACS can achieve some better mutual understanding than this?
Law seems to have replaced morality. We just need to enforce the law which already prohibits a lot of harmful behaviour but the law needs to prohibit even more harmful behaviour and then people vote on it.
I think it is harmful to try and manipulate moral behaviour from people because this makes people pray to ideas they wouldn't accept without coercion. It will just prove that social scientists can coerce a range of behaviour from people.
I think we just have to rely on people having spontaneous moral intuitions and emotions concerning harm and exploitation.
Only 4 out of 613 "Commandments" concern morality, which are not unique to any 'peoples' at any time, so this statement doesn't make much sense.
As I have said elsewhere I think morality needs truth value and one reason for that is so that one feels compelled to be moral.
An ambiguous theoretical morality seems good for nobody. In the end we want compliance to some compelling rules.
I think we are probably actually stuck with perpetual moral disputes.
You shall have no other gods before Me.
You shall make no idols.
You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.
Keep the Sabbath day holy.
Honor your father and your mother.
[b]You shall not kill.
You shall not commit adultery.
You shall not steal.
You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.[/b]
You shall not covet.
You'll note of the famous ten only four cover off on morality. And here's the problem. These commandments are pretty ambiguous, you need commentary or legislation to make them intelligible.
Ask Bill Clinton what adultery consists of. Is it oral sex or penetration? Is an open marriage adultery?
What is murder? Is killing in war ok? Self defence? How do we tell? Is abortion allowable?
Is taking land from First Nations people stealing? Is the way capitalism is structured and wage slavery a form of stealing?
Coveting? Isn't the entire model of capitalism and the Western way of life based upon wanting to enhance our status based on seeing the status others can achieve if they work hard?
The ten commandments are inadequate - where are the commandments on slavery, or environmental destruction, or war, or child labour, or the treatment of animals?
I wasn't advocating them seriously.
I was advocating commands over suggestions and theorising which is what people want from morality. for it to work like a command. Just tell people it is wrong to kill and theoretically no more killing.
I am a moral nihilist anyway. The more threads I read about morality the less convinced I am by it.
Are people saying there are things we should feel compelled to do? Are people saying there are objectively good and bad phenomena? I don't know what people are saying anymore.
Life is extremely complex and I don't believe most of it could be subject to moral type calculations.
I hear you and that's understandable.
I just pointed out the commandments and their lack of clarity as part of the general thrust of the conversation. It amuses me that when they ask Christians to name the commandments they often struggle to recall more than 2 or 3.
Quoting Andrew4Handel
Yes, those are two of many choices. It's a veritable cornucopia of moral systems out there in the marketplace. I'm happy to sit with acts being assessed in terms of the impacts they have on conscious creatures and the environment. We can build oughts and ought nots from there, subject to debate and discussion. Morality, (even the 'god given' stuff) has never been much more than a conversation about how we treat others (and animals). Pragmatically we have no choice but to build 'codes of conduct' with each other. Well, the other choice is, of course, living in a failed state, where chaos and violence determine all the moves.
I accept the idea that I might be mistaken, but you have given me no good reason to think that I am. Do you accept that you might be mistaken?
Items 2., 3., and 4. are inaccurate.
More correctly,
1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods Specifically that the function (the principle reason they exist) of past and present cultural moral norms is that they solve cooperation problems.
2. Proposing that Quoting Mark S
3. Providing reasons that the consequentialist definitions of morality combined with the limitation that behaviors to achieve them solve cooperation problems is more likely to meet the above normativity criterion (what all well-informed, rational people would advocate ) than the bare consequentialist definitions of morality.
Thats it. I see no derivation of ought from is or "Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like."
For convenience, the reasons that Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism are:
Quoting Mark S
I derive no 'oughts' from 'is' in either OP's thread.
You might read my above reply to PhilosophyRunner which rebuts your claim.
I agree with Prinz that our moral judgments (values) are initially grounded in innate emotional responses. But my consideration of higher levels of causation for these phenomena causes me to part company with Prinz.
Why do we have these strange emotional responses which often motivate acting in ways (moral ways) that can appear to be against our best interests, at least in the short term?
We have these emotional responses because they are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. Our predecessors who experienced these emotions were better cooperators, left more descendants, and became the vast majority of our ancestors. Our predecessors who did not experience these emotions almost all died out.
What is the source of these cooperation problems? Their source is in the nature of our universe which can be expressed in the simple mathematics of game theory's cooperation/exploitation dilemmas.
From the same basic observation, Prinz makes a moral relativist argument and I see the basis of a species and time-independent universal morality.
Quoting Joshs
I doubt that MAGA people who benefit from the domination (exploitation) moral norms and values they find so attractive will be convinced by any rational argument. However, the MAGA supporters being exploited - the poor, women, the elderly, immigrants, and other outgroups could be motivated (once they realize how they are being exploited) to understand and advocate for rational arguments that explain what is being done to them. So yes, MACS could be a powerful force (at least on the side of the exploited outgroups) in arguing against domination moral norms.
Quoting Agent Smith
Claiming something like Cooperation is moral fails for just the reasons you describe. People can, and too often do, cooperate to exploit outgroups.
The recast claim Solving cooperation problems is moral does not suffer the same failure.
This recasting can recognize the cooperation and self-sacrifice within criminal organizations as moral, while rejecting the goal of that cooperation, the exploitation and harm to outgroups, as immoral based on it creating cooperation problems the opposite of the function of cultural moral norms.
Quoting Mark S
Perhaps these strange, higher level emotional responses you are referring to have something in common with Martha Nussbaums rendering of emotion as involving intentional thought or perception directed at an object (as perceived or imagined by the person who has the emotion) and some type of evaluative appraisal of that object made from the agent's own personal viewpoint. This appraisal ascribes importance to the object in terms of the agent's scheme of goals and ends.
Like you, Nussbaums approach is a form of moral universalism, which determines her cognitive appraisal model of emotion as rationalistic. That is to say, if emotions ground our moral values, then moral universalism considers our emotion-based appraisals in terms of correctness or incorrectness in relation to universal valuative norms we can arrive at to solve cooperation problems.
I am closer to Prinzs value-relativism than to Nussbaums universalist rationalism. Like Prinz, I believe that rational goals cannot be divorced from the underlying affectively-based values that make them intelligible, and thus affective values are relative to the individual.
Unlike Prinz, I dont attribute affective values to a combination of innate emotional programs or modules and social conditioning. I believe our motives for cooperation as well as competition and hostility arise out of social interaction, but not in a blind conditioning fashion. Rather, humans are cognitively and perceptually oriented toward anticipative sense-making.
Quoting Mark S
Cooperation is a means to an end, and that end is the expansion of our ability to anticipatively make sense of our world. Put differently, we derive pleasure and joy from events that we are able to assimilate meaningfully into our ways of understanding the world. We perceive events we cannot assimilate and make sense of coherently as threatening, and we strive avoid or destroy such alien stimuli. We are able to function socially with others in a community to the extent that we are able to anticipatively construe their behavior. We may relate to their perspective but never arrive at the very same outlook as theirs, which explains the unavoidable strife and violence within families and among friends.
Political polarization like that between MAGA and the left is a result of incompatible worldviews. Each side not only sees the world through a different schematic lens, but is unable to subsume the other sides perspective as a variation of their own. This leads to accusations of bad intent , immorality , stupidity and irrationality that each side constantly charges the other side with. Because you fail to grasp the pragmatic rationality of MAGA adherents relative to their way of looking at the world, you blame them for your failure of understanding and reify this hostility as correctly scientific rationality which you will then attempt to shove down their throats with the blessing of your fellow scientists. Just rinse and repeat and we have a perfect recipe for the perpetuation of intercultural violence.
Is this similar to Lakoff's frames?
Quoting Joshs
I think this is an important insight. People slide into 'they're sociopaths, morons' alarmingly quickly. If a worldview doesn't make sense to us, anger and denigration are easy responses. I've done it myself many times in the past.
Any quick ideas for how we break this worldview impasse?
True that. I guess one is moral to members of a group you belong to to be immoral to members of other groups. Basically its some kinda military pact between individuals and between groups against other individuals and other groups. However, this is the current version of morality that people are questioning the validity of - animal rights, speciesism, vegetarianism, veganism, eco-movements, etc. are attempts to rectify the problem (from pirates to Jains, we must become).
Quoting Tom Storm
I believe Lakoffs approach isnt as relativistic as mine, but we have in common the treatment of ideological and political differences in terms of holistic schemes expressing a unitary logic.
Quoting Tom Storm
I think there is an evolutionary trajectory to cultural understanding, so societies will eventually find more pragmatically useful ways of making sense of others. We just have to be patient.
1. We observe that past societies had moral rules that helped cooporations. These took many forms, including humans sacrifice, murdering and raping the outgroup, etc.
2. What was observed in 1. is what was morally normative in that society.
3. Consequential definitions of morality combined with the limitation that behaviors to achieve them solve cooperation problems, include the human sacrifice, murder and raping of the outgroup.
Of what use is this? Perhaps dictators and gangs have got it right morally, since they are very strict about cooperation?
It doesn't help with us solving today's moral issues, because of the is/ought problem. The above says nothing about would ought to be done - if it did it would be advocating gangs and dictators. But it doesn't advocate for anything, because it is a review of what is.
Quoting Agent Smith
These are circle of moral concern issues.
From my "What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?" posts OP: What about its limits? ,,, It is silent about who should be in our circle of moral concern (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited.
MACSs strategies are silent on all those circle of moral concern issues you bring up.
Science is inadequate to answer those questions. We must look elsewhere.
You are more familiar with Prinz and Nussbaums work than I am.
But I would reiterate how revealing it is to move up a few levels of causation from emotions being the ultimate source of moral judgments (close to Prinz and Nussbaums positions?) into what caused these emotions to exist. It is much more revealing and useful for resolving disputes about moral norms to understand the ultimate source of cultural moral norms not in our emotions but in strategies that solve cooperation problems.
Quoting Joshs
You misunderstand me. As I have said, I dont expect the MAGA adherents who benefit from their morality to be swayed by MACS arguments. I expect the MAGA people being exploited or concerned by those arguments (women, gay people, people of color, average people in MAGA areas) to use them as an intellectual moral cudgel they have not had against the oppressors. What I am after is providing intellectual weapons for resolving intra cultural (within MAGA) disputes about morality.
I suggest you reread my first post.
What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?.
It will help clarify that the examples you mention are Domination and Marker norms, not Partnership moral norms.
As I describe in my next post: "Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies"
Partnership moral norms conform to MACS moral principle, Act to solve cooperation problems and are universally moral.
Domination moral norms (and sometimes Marker moral norms) violate MACSs Do not act to create cooperation problems. These violations make them immoral in an absolute sense.
For example:
"Domination moral norms (and sometimes Marker moral norms) violate MACSs Do not act to create cooperation problems. These violations make them immoral in an absolute sense. "
That is not what is observed. Observation of past societies show that domination moral norms are just as effective at cooperation. However you are pruning away the domination moral norms by using some other "ought" based morality, but then presenting it as if it were an "is" observation.
So this is the version with pruning.
Thanks for posting again, I think I understand you better this time.
Yes, I must show how domination moral norms are pruned (nice turn of phrase) to not be a part of MACS. And there must be no hidden moral oughts involved in that pruning.
From my OP,
Quoting Mark S
Here, I am claiming that solving cooperation problems is moral means". (Note I also claim the implied creating cooperation problems is immoral means".)
What may not be obvious is that these principles innately exclude domination moral norms no sneaky separate pruning required. Domination moral norms are excluded because their goals of exploiting outgroups are excluded. Exploiting outgroups creates cooperation problems for the outgroup and are therefore immoral (even while solving cooperation problems for the ingroup).
What is the objective source of the moral claims:
Solving cooperation problems is moral and
Creating cooperation problems is immoral?
That source is the observation that the function of past and present cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems. These cooperation/exploitation dilemmas are present everywhere in our universe and must be solved to enable forming highly cooperative societies.
What is the objective source of their imperative bindingness? There is none. This is a claim about what moral behavior is in our universe, not a claim about what it ought to be. What ought to be moral is 1) a different category of thing and 2) the focus of traditional moral philosophy.
But this is not what is observed in past societies
Let's take a step back and look at your original question in the other thread: "What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?" I agree, in the "is" form, cultural moral norms often track cooperation strategies, often to the exclusion of the out group. That is what is observed.
So the foundation of your theory, is based on observing past societies. And in this observation we see that total cooperation including the outgroup is not what is the moral norm, rather the moral norm includes domination of the outgroup.
And so your pruning of the domination moral norm is not justified by the method you use. You claim that the "is" excludes domination moral norms. But the "is" that is observed includes domination moral norms.
If I were to base my morality on past societies, it would be to form an in-group and then dominate the out group - that is what many of the great past civilizations did. To get around the problem, I need a moral theory based on "oughts" - just because past successful civilizations dominated the out group doesn't mean I should too.
You are not recognizing the innate pruning of domination norms by MACS ultimate source. The ultimate source of MACS is not past and present cultural moral norms. Past and present cultural moral norms are only a signpost pointing to MACS ultimate source.
We find MACS ultimate source by answering Why do cultural moral norms exist?
As I have been saying, cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems. Domination norms which exploit outgroups are creating cooperation problems for the outgroup the opposite of MACS function and therefore automatically excluded (pruned) from the start.
MACSs moral principles are not based on the morality of past societies. MACSs moral principles summarize solutions to cooperation problems that are present everywhere in our universe from the beginning to the end of time. That is a much grander and more insightful view of morality,
But this is not correct. Cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems in the in group. The out group is often disposable for cultural moral norms, historically. This is what is observed as "is."
I think your mistake here is saying that observing how cultural moral norms are selected is in their ability to solve universal cooperation problems for everyone. That is simply not what is observed. Rather we see many instances of cultural moral norms that are selected to strengthen cooperation in the in group, while dominating the out group.
So what you claim as "is", is not really what is observed as "is."
Yep. We keep coming back to the idea that cooperation is not of itself a sound or neutral moral position, but may be used to dominate, subjugate and murder. Are there not ethical considerations or questions that need to be asked before one can get to morality as a cooperation strategy? Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell?
Quoting PhilosophyRunner
This may be true in a sense but is not relevant.
You are still focused in the weeds of our diverse, contradictory, and strange past and present cultural moral norms. You will find all sorts of cultural adaptations such as cooperating to exploit outgroups, markers of membership ingroups, and respect for authority and sacred objects. None are innate to what morality is at a its most fundamental level.
Cultural moral norms are only signposts to MACSs source in the cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.
It would help to briefly describe how those cooperation problems, which can be understood as cooperation/exploitation dilemmas, arise in our universe.
Cooperation is commonly beneficial everywhere in our universe. However, cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation because exploitation is virtually always the winning short-term strategy and can be even in the long term. Unfortunately, exploitation destroys motivation to cooperate in the future and its potential benefits. These circumstances create the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.
Our ancestors chanced across reciprocity strategies that can solve this dilemma. The solve the dilemma by motivating punishment of people who exploit others. In this way, our ancestors chanced across morality.
Dont kill, steal, or lie are moral norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. Why? Because they are violations of reciprocity within a society. That unstated reciprocity agreement is I will not kill, steal, or lie (even when I really want to) and I expect no one will kill, steal, or lie to me.
Solutions to this innate to our universe cooperation/exploitation dilemma are the ultimate source of MACS moral principles:
Act to solve cooperation problems.
Do not create cooperation problems.
Exploitation (of an outgroup by an ingroup) cannot be part of those principles because that would contradict the function of what morality at its most fundamental level is - preventing exploitation.
Tom, please read my above response to PhilosophyRunner on the same topic.
And consider MACS's actual proposed moral principles rather than some kind of "Cooperation is Moral" idea which I agree would be poor moral advice. MACS's principles are short on exploitation and bad behavior:
Act to solve cooperation problems.
Do not create cooperation problems.
You ask a relevant question "Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell?"
That question I answer in "Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies" as
What is morally normative regarding the means of interactions between people is what all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people would advocate as moral.
Quoting Mark S
...cis white hetro middle class males...
Mark apparently can't see the joke.
Sorry Mark, but I can't seem to follow what you are advocating. The language seems really unclear to me.
So is your model predicated on making moral choices about those who we decide can make moral choices? How do you determine 'well informed mentally normal or rational'? I think you might find that many of Hitler's prominent supporters fit this description. This is what makes cultural expressions of evil so challenging for us to understand. Morality is complex.
I need to see this in action or it continues to remain a strangely opaque theoretical ideal.
Can you tell me how would you assess capital punishment as a penalty for, say, killing someone? Is capital punishment morally sound - how do you go about answering or contextualizing this using your method?
Tom,
You bring up important issues about my adaptation of Gerts definition of morally normativity how to judge the normativity of moral claims.
Are Gerts definition and my adaptation perfect? No, they are just the best I know of.
Without them, I am left with personal preference regarding which moral claims I adopt and advocate. Personal preference is not so culturally useful making that choice method less preferred.
But attempting to resolve such issues about normativity is too complex and important to try to append to the end of this thread.
How about I start a new thread only about Gerts definition? People can share what they think about normativity.
Quoting Tom Storm
MACSs claimed universal moral principles about moral means are:
The morality of capital punishment can be a mixed bag depending on circumstances.
Capital punishment is part of a strategy that solves cooperation problems. It punishes reciprocity violations about not killing each other with the intended outcome of reducing future killing. Capital punishment can thereby increase or maintain the future benefits of cooperation in societies. This is why it has commonly existed.
But capital punishment also creates cooperation problems by 1) itself being a reciprocity violation about not killing each other and 2) potentially reducing trust and its resulting cooperation in the society by motivating revenge or other bad behavior by friends and family of the executed person.
The morality of capital punishment comes down to if it will, on balance, increase or reduce the trust needed for a cooperative society.
In advanced societies, I expect the answer is that capital punishment is immoral on balance it reduces trust and cooperation in society. Other remedies, such as long prison sentences, are morally preferable.
A simpler answer would have been nice, but morality is complicated.
Banno, no I dont see the joke and I expect neither would Bernard and Josuha Gert who have maintained the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the definition of morality for over 20 years. All I see is your assumption of bigotry.
That's why I chose this issue, to see how the idea works in practice with a more complex issue. That's a helpful summary, thank you.
Quoting Mark S
Another take is that it provides retribution and consequences for a bad deed, which people seem to find psychologically satisfying in a way which may not be easy to measure - psychological wellbeing might be one approach. But I understand your position here.
Quoting Mark S
How do you determine which of these it does? How would a state set up a mechanism to assess all potential moral choices people could make in society?
Quoting Tom Storm
Like past and present cultural moral norms, our psychologically satisfying inclination for retribution for evil deeds such as murder is part of cooperation strategies. Specifically, our feeling or righteous indignation motivates the punishment of violation component that is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Indeed, our moral senses judgments and our other moral emotions of empathy, gratitude, loyalty, shame, and guilt are also explained as parts of cooperation strategies.
In these three threads, I was trying to simplify my argument by not mentioning the shared origins of the biology underlying our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms.
Quoting Tom Storm
I dont foresee states setting up a mechanism to assess all potential moral choices.
MACSs principles can be additional criteria for judging how to refine cultural moral norms to meet human needs and preferences better.
How does that operate in a culture? Surely you would need a panel or body which can understand the model and help to implement it? I suppose at heart I am asking - 'Ok so you have a model what ideally would happen next?"
Quoting Mark S
So I am now confused. How does your model decide then if capital punishment is morally good or bad?
I may well be missing something but I still struggle to see how a cooperation strategy is of itself useful or even entirely comprehensible to a diverse community, where cooperation is understood differently and where society is understood differently. A Muslim culture, for instance. Or an atheist culture. When we get to issues like abortion or capital punishment or gay rights, or whether creationism should replace evolution in school learning - how do we determine what is right?
Quoting Tom Storm
MACS would assist in refining cultural moral norms the same means cultural norms are refined now - by a chaotic system influenced at least in part by ethicists. The difference would be that ethicists would have available an objective definition of moral 'means', in addition to their concepts of moral goals, to add to their toolkit for resolving moral disputes.
You could ask the same question about "How would it work?" regarding utilitarianism or virtue ethics. There is no magic answer machine for everything we might want to know about what we morally ought to do. We have to do some work.
Surely if everyone agreed upon the Koran as a basis for guiding all action, then we would have a cooperative basis for an ethical system and a cooperative, trusting culture. But would this culture be moral?
Quoting Mark S
It's the question I would ask of any moral system. But at least with virtue ethics it is me asking how I want to behave in a situation. It's more immediate. But my moral system boils down to 'prevent suffering' - I am not a theorist.
I can't quite work out how your system would apply to an individual in their day to day choices or how we would involve a community in discussing or implementing it.
The first thing to understand about how individuals can apply MACS in their lives is that well-intentioned people around the world already practice heuristic versions of MACS. Remember that past and present cultural moral norms empirically are heuristics (flawed rules of thumb) for MACS.
Normally, MACS practitioners would act according to their existing cultural moral norms just as they always have.
However, two circumstances may arise that would lead people to question if they morally should follow a particular cultural moral norm. MACS can then be called on to help resolve their questions.
The first circumstance is that the person may know what the heuristic says to do, for example, versions of the Golden Rule, but intuitively feel doing so would not be right. Such wrongness intuitions about following the Golden Rule arise, for example, when dealing with criminals, in wartime, or just when tastes differ. By revealing that versions of the Golden Rule are heuristics for solving cooperation problems, MACS provides an objective criterion for not following the Golden Rule when doing so does not solve cooperation problems, but instead creates them. MACS does not tell us we morally should abandon the Golden Rule, but instead informs us about the rare occasions when it might be immoral to follow it.
The second circumstance is that people disagree about the morality of a moral norm, for example, homosexuality is evil. MACS reveals that this moral norm has two components 1) a marker norm of membership and commitment to an ingroup which can motivate increased cooperation, and 2) a norm by which an ingroup can exploit an outgroup as a supposed threat to the ingroup, also thereby motivating increasing cooperation in the ingroup. Since the second component creates cooperation problems for homosexuals, it is objectively immoral on that count by MACS based (I argue) on fulfilling Gerts definition of morally normative.
MACS also is silent about the ultimate goal of moral behavior. When MACS's explanation of moral means alone cannot resolve moral disputes (perhaps about abortion, euthanasia, or animal rights), people can try to agree on the ultimate goal of moral behavior in their society. Even if that goal is unique to their society, it can still help promote cooperation to achieve that goal within their societies.
Based on the above description, MACS appears to be easier to apply in ones life than any other available moral theory I know.
Quoting Mark S
Interesting.
It does seem as if this particular model is aligned to a secular humanist worldview and as such might struggle to be applied in a society which must balance pluralist worldviews about values and morality. Thoughts?
Do you personally think about morality yourself in terms of ought's and ought nots? Do you ever find yourself needing to work through a potential action in order to determine if it is moral?
I see MACS as most useful when applied in societies with "pluralist worldviews about values and morality". By explaining what the cultural moral norms 'are' as parts of cooperation strategies rather than mystical entities, people have an objective basis for resolving their disputes.
I've used MACS as moral guidance for about 15 years now. It has worked well for me. It has given me, for example, a different slant on the morality of telling the truth and obeying the law. Neither are moral absolutes. We all know that, but MACS provides a judgment criterion that I find more useful than simple intuitions.