Argument for establishing the inner nature of appearances/representations
Schopenhauer states we know our body externally as an object of representation and internally as will.
He then says "We shall judge all objects (of representation) which are not our own body, and therefore are given to our consciousness not in the double way, but only as representations, according to the analogy of this body."
Christopher Janaway states that for Schopenhauer "The subjective backing to my body is my consciousness, and if there is to be a perfect parallel and consistency between the subjective and objective standpoints in general, as the root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (there is "no object without a subject") would dictate, then the remaining representations in my perceptual field must have a subjective backing as well.
I do not understand this argument. How does the root of the PSR- there is "no object without a subject" (and consequently "no subject without an object") establish that representations/appearances apart from my own body have a subjective side (like my own body does, as will)? If there is no object without a subject, then the existence of a tree, a table, a chair, etc. etc., requires a perceiving subject, but how does then entail that representations/appearances like a tree, table, chair, etc. also has an inner, subjective side??
Thanks!
He then says "We shall judge all objects (of representation) which are not our own body, and therefore are given to our consciousness not in the double way, but only as representations, according to the analogy of this body."
Christopher Janaway states that for Schopenhauer "The subjective backing to my body is my consciousness, and if there is to be a perfect parallel and consistency between the subjective and objective standpoints in general, as the root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (there is "no object without a subject") would dictate, then the remaining representations in my perceptual field must have a subjective backing as well.
I do not understand this argument. How does the root of the PSR- there is "no object without a subject" (and consequently "no subject without an object") establish that representations/appearances apart from my own body have a subjective side (like my own body does, as will)? If there is no object without a subject, then the existence of a tree, a table, a chair, etc. etc., requires a perceiving subject, but how does then entail that representations/appearances like a tree, table, chair, etc. also has an inner, subjective side??
Thanks!
Comments (93)
The alternative is to think one is oh so special, to have an internal being. The modern depopulation of the world of all the myriad sprites and gods and other spirits and agencies, right up to the Great Sky God himself, is actually the bizarre and unnatural position that stands in need of explanation and justification.
I agree with what you say here. I think you are referring to the "problem of other minds", right?
But, i still cannot see how "the root of the PSR- there is "no object without a subject" (and consequently "no subject without an object") establish that representations/appearances apart from my own body have a subjective side (like my own body does, as will)?"
The idea of "no object, without a subject"-- that comes from Berkeley, right?
I assume according to the author, In order to qualify as an object, they must have an internal side... but I cannot see exactly how?
Schopenhauer/Kant experts help?!
Quoting Wayfarer
The only way I can make sense of it that my experience/representation of a tree is personal and unique to me, even if you and I were to perceive the same tree from exactly the same spot at the same time and assuming identical perception (eye sight, smell etc.). I fell from a tree once and I'm reminded of it, you might not have been. Eg., there's a relational and contextual aspect to all our observations but I'm pretty sure this is not what he meant.
more context: (although i am still trying to work out the "PSR part" too...)
"Suppose then, I (or anyone) am experiencing a field of representations. Within this field, I notice that a section of it, namely, my body, has a subjective aspect that is congruent with the very mind (that is, my mind) that contains the entire field of representations in which that body is located. Since my body is a representation, it is in my mind, but my mind also permeates and enlivens that very body from the inside. It does not, however, permeate and enliven the remaining representations in my perceptual field. Within this knotted context, Schopenhauer is struck by how incomprehensible it would be if the remaining representations in my perceptual field the chair, table, knives, forks, etc. were not also backed by a mentality similar to what I apprehend directly as underlying the representation of my body. Here is the same argument, formulated from a slightly different angle. From the subjective standpoint, every representation in my experience is my representation and is a mental entity. The representations are identical in this respect. From the objective standpoint, the representation of my body has a subjective backing, but since the other representations in my perceptual field do not display one, it is difficult to know whether they have one or not. The subjective backing to my body is my consciousness, and if and this is the crucial point there is to be a perfect parallel and consistency between the subjective and objective standpoints in general, as the root of the PSR would dictate, then the remaining representations in my perceptual field must have a subjective backing as well."
Here he seems to admit that it's an assumption and an analogy. However, he does want the conclusion to be taken seriously, that the world in itself is will. It's a long time since I read it but I remember finding it too much of a leap.
I can't recall specifically how the argument here is related to fourfold root, other than that this leads to the two-aspect view of self as object and self as consciousness or will, which when applied to objects leads to the characterization of their own inner aspect as will-like too. On the basis that the thing-in-itself is a unity, whatever is inmost in us is what is also inmost in objects, though taking different forms.
Nice, thanks!
Here, but, the above is not really an argument for will as being Kant's thing-in-itself....it seems only to establish will as the "inner side" of representations (he doesn't even mention thing-in-itself" in the above)... So he still needs to get from "will as inner side of representation" to thing-in-itself. How does he do that??
he later relates will and thing-in-itself? I would assume it would be soon thereafter (one would think).
Yes, but it does at least help answer the question in the OP. Im not going to attempt to set out the overarching argument that the thing in itself is will, mainly because I cant remember it and I dont want to read Schopenhauer again. :smile:
Will give longer response, but I like to think of Schop as a sort of Kantian Neo-Platonist. Will is the Unified One, but somehow it immediately has an objectified aspect of lower gradations. He doesnt explain why there needs to be this double-aspect as Will has no purpose. A poster long ago, mentioned the idea that the World of Phenonmenon is really a sort of playground for the Noumenal Will to reach teleology, but not realizing that it simply ends in strife for each manifestation. Anyways, thats all speculation of Schop. All you need to know is that Will has a phenomenal aspect whereby there is a subject for an object. The animal is he place whereby appearances play out. This is the root of his PSR and thus the world of appearance of an object for a subject. He thinks all objects, including forces, have a will aspect to it, but it is unclear to me if all objects create appearance as animals do. To my understanding, his construct needs the animal subject to have always been in the equation. Time is a flat circle then. It appears to start billions of years earlier but really always stars with the first subjective being which oddly can never be prior to itself. Its like the hand drawing itself Escher painting.
This is a really good discussion with a good opening post, even though I don't understand much of it. You're trying to trick me into learning about Schopenhauer.
Quoting KantDane21
I dont think that PSR , in and of itself, establishes Schopenhauers conclusions. If it did, then generations of philosophers who accept PSR would have to accept Schops metaphysics, which most dont. It is the original insights he supplements PSR with that allows him to see it as leading to the idea that all objects have a subjective side.
What sense does it make to ask if representations have a nature, if to find out what it is, if the only possible way to understand what it is, is by means of the very thing being asked about?
The aspect of this argument that most perplexes me is the suggestion that all objects possess subjectivity - for that is panpsychicm, which to my knowledge is not associated with Schopenhauer (where it can plausibly be with Spinoza and Liebniz). I think the passage quoted by @Jamal really nails it - that the sole real existent is will: 'Besides the will and the representation, there is absolutely nothing known or conceivable for us.' But, as he then mentions, and several others agree, it's hard to see how the argument from the principle of sufficient reason supports this contention.
Interesting. In my experiences in the Art of Dreaming (lucid dreaming) I become pure will.
Wouldn't that correspond to the real nature of the knowing subject? If the domain of representations corresponds to 'the phenomenal realm', then the nature of the knowing subject corresponds to 'being in itself' (to coin a phrase. This is the subject of an interesting blog post.)
But again the argument invents a thing-in-itself about which nothing can be said, then proceeds to tell us all about it. Again, it splits the world into subject and object and pretends surprise when it finds it can only talk from a subjective position.
As with any dichotomy, presuming a split between object and subject leads to an irreparable fissure.
And again, the subject/object dichotomy is the private/public dichotomy dismantled by the private language argument. The stuff we talk about is always, already public.
Hence Wittgenstein moves past Schopenhauer. Of course, you already know this. I'm just marking it out.
, my apologies for the digression.
If that is to be the case, it arises from a non-Kantian theory, insofar as conceptions are also representations, but with respect to their origin and use in understanding, have nothing to do with the phenomenal realm of sensibility.
Sorry .I dont know how to relate the knowing subject/being in itself to representation/phenomenal realm. I agree the self can never be a phenomenon, but we are still allowed to think that which represents the process of thinking, which, obviously, gets us into all kindsa trouble.
The link was interesting, made some good points and some I could leave be, so thanks for that. You have a highly commendable habit of coming up with the good stuff.
Quoting Wayfarer
Kant's idea is that phenomena representations "conform to" categories of reason (not "things" & "thoughts", respectively). If you understand it, it undercuts idealism.
https://epochemagazine.org/14/kant-and-the-idealists-reality-problem/
Quoting Banno
:fire:
Quoting KantDane21
It's not an "argument"; Schopenauer takes his extension of Kant's 'phenomena-noumena' distinction (à la Plato's 'appearances-forms' & Descartes' 'subject-object' / 'mind-body') as axiomatic and stipulates this 'idea' in the first sentence of the World As Will and Representation (vol. one): "The world is MY representation (Die Welt ist MEINE Vorstellung)."
It undercuts Berkeley's form of idealism, but Kant still maintains transcendental idealism.
Quoting Banno
The separateness of subject and object is undeniable. I experience myself as a subject in a domain of objects. You can't wish it out of existence.
Quoting Banno
I don't agree. I understand the assertion of the 'thing in itself' as only an observation about the limits of the understanding, i.e. we don't understand how or what things truly are, but are limited to knowing how they appear to be.
Of course. Similarly, the separateness of up and down, of left and right, of in and out, is undeniable. You don't get one without the other because they are grammatically linked; the meaning (use) of the one is found in the other.
Quoting Wayfarer
And yet we do understand how things are. There are true sentences. Drop the "truly", which does nothing but prolong the reification of the thing-in-itself.
What there is, is the stuff we talk about. This is a better way to deal with these issues than trying to make use of the grammar of object and subject that splits the word asunder, then puzzles that it cannot put the pieces back together.
said Ptolemy
Quoting Wayfarer
You understand that this is a sentence in English, in a forum on philosophical issues, in reply to your post...
And so on.
This is obfuscating what's going on. The language is public, but the experience is private. If you are making some argument that subjectivity is only had via language acquisition, I give you proof in that other animals assuredly have inner lives, and are not constructed via a publically-domained language capacity.
I can only assume that's where you are going, otherwise, it's a red herring outright, as it is a digression without context.
I was just sitting there, in me blue cup, mindin' me own business when suddenly, a gentle hand gripped me, and lifted me up ...
The main question that is hard to answer with Schopenhauer, is how it is that there are objects when there is only Will. What is objectification of Will? He goes on about Forms as the original objects, and how artists perceive them best in their expressions in art and music. But this generates more questions..
Why does Will (unified and solo) have Forms? Why do forms have lower gradations of physical objects? It's all a bit obtuse.
He does go on about The World of Appearance being a mirror for Will, so perhaps it's something like: Will becomes objectified in order to experience itself and understand its own nature through the subject-object relationship.. But that is not explicitly stated in Schop as far as I know. It also gives a sort of story/mythos and perhaps even teleology, which really doesn't seem to be what Shop liked.
From on another forum "what exists is that we can encounter but cannot will". Was Schopenhauer part of German idealism?
As far as I can tell, Schopenhauer's will is either poorly defined or is left (deliberately?) undefined, like Robert M. Pirsig's Quality in his book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.
I regret to inform you Herr Schopenhauer, but the conditions of my employment are as of the moment unacceptable. However, I'll be regularly monitoring your ideas in case we might be able to come to a mutually satisfactory arrangement. :lol:
It isn't defined because it is gotten at indirect means. He can only gather that it strives, and thus there needs to be a playground for striving to take place... I guess?
He at the same time seems to want Will to be a double-aspect to reality, yet seems to also think it is prior in some sense. The Will, "wills life". But that implies that the Will was there first before the "will-to-live". But then again, I don't know.
Just a bit.
I say: There are toothbrushes!
The question is how do we work with just a word, an empty term, that from what we can infer has no referent. Are we supposed to plug in our own personal meaning for "will"? I've seen this kinda thing happen elsewhere as well, but I can't seem to recall the particulars.
Not to mention coffee cups, although if we went on, this would become rather a large list.
Anyway, to hark back to Schopenhauer, as the thread was about him, I will quote verbatim two paragraphs that I regard as key to his magnum opus, namely the first:
Quoting WWR
and from page 35
Quoting WWR
(added paragraph breaks)
From Brief Peeks Beyond 2015
Page 28:
Page 183:
You can see the attraction a consciousness only ontology has, particularly when physicists postulate a reality of quantum fields as the present incarnation of 'physicalism'.
"Water seeks its own level", we used to hear. More generally, the will of matter is to clump together - I think that's called gravity, There being no lawgiver, the universe must follow its own will. It dances wildly to its own song, and the will of physicists is to learn the tune.
(The will of toothbrushes is to fall into the toilet at the first opportunity, as every skoolboy kno.)
And yet
[quote=Steven Weinberg]The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless.[/quote]
Alfred North Whitehead said that the laws of physics nowadays play the role assigned to the inexorable decrees of fate in Greek drama.
The thought police insist we speak of 'determinism', and pour scorn on 'fate'.
Here's a simplification, KD21, which may or may not help you to understand.
When I look into my internal self, in introspection, I notice that the representation of myself as a body is a creation of my mind. And, the part of my mind which demonstrates the power to create is the will. So I can conclude that the representation of myself as a body is a creation of my will. From here I can proceed toward understanding the general principle that any representation of a body which I may hold in my mind, is equally a creation of my will.
If I assume an independent body which influences my will in its creation of the representations of bodies which I hold in my mind, I have no way to assess this influence unless I can understand how my will creates these representations. In other words, if I look toward any proposed noumenon, or thing-in-itself, I reach an end to my investigation, at my own will. I see that my will is responsible for creating the representations of things, within my mind, and unless I can make a thorough understanding of how my will does this, I have no approach to any proposed noumenon.
You can see that this analysis goes deeper than Kant, because it looks for the cause of phenomena, the cause of the appearances of bodies within the mind. Kant has proposed a separation between phenomenon and noumenon. If this separation is true and real, as proposed by Kant, then there cannot be a direct causal relation between a noumenon and a phenomenon. This is because a direct causal relation would allow us to know the noumenon through the implications determined from an understanding of cause and effect. So the reason why we cannot know the noumenon is because there is no such causal relation. This is because one's own will is what creates the phenomenon.
How this relates to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is a bit more difficult. I believe the relationship is something like this. The PSR states that there is a reason for the existence of anything, and everything. When we look at the occurrence of representations within our minds, phenomena, we must turn to the will as the reason for their existence. So the reason for the existence of bodies, (as how noumenon appear to us), is a cause in sense of Aristotelian "final cause", a teleological willful cause. This means that there is a reason for, in the sense of a purpose for the appearance of bodies, as this appearance has been created by the will.
Do you see an argument there, and if so, what is it?
How is that not an argument?
That's a conclusion, or an assertion.
Argument: a series of reasons meant to persuade, usually in the form of a treatise or doctrine supporting an opening observation or logical premise.
. The world is my idea:this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness .
And with that .were off to 450-odd pages of persuasions.
Yes, I was going to add something along those lines.
Ha... were you persuaded?
Oh HELL no but I mighta been if I hadnt already been exposed to greater persuasions.
Just agreeing that your statement was itself an argument, a reason indirectly supporting the persuasiveness of treatise itself.
Quoting Wayfarer
I don't think there is an answer. The argument is roughly that because, in his terms, we experience our bodies internally and externally, all other things suffer a similar duality, and hence while we can access their external aspect, they have as well an internal aspect unavailable to us.
Idealism has to presume something along these lines in an attempt to avoid solipsism; it has to admit other, inaccessible, "internal" experiences in order that there be other people. Schopenhauer's novelty is perhaps his extension of this to ordinary objects... the internal life of the toothbrush.
Again, he divides the world in to subject and object, then argues that the object is the product of the subject - the will - and then in explaining how there are objects finds himself ascribing subjectivity to them.
It's as if he were to suppose that everything is either to the left or to the right (Subject or object), but then through sophisticated dissertation conclude that everything apparently on the right (material stuff) is actually on the left (the will); and then find himself trying to explain how it is that there are things that appear to be on the right... (material objects must have a subjective side)
My very high-level paraphrase of Schopenhauer and Kant is that the mind (nous, I think, in the traditional sense) brings together (synthesises) the elements of the understanding with the objects of perception to create a unified whole, which we designate as 'the world', but that we generally overlook or ignore this fact, because 'the mind does not see itself'. So we take for granted the independent reality of the world, while ignoring the role the mind plays in its construction. I think contintental philosophy, generally, is much more aware of this, than current English-speaking philosophy which is tied to scientific naturalism as a normative framework (although the times are a' changin.)
Quoting KantDane21
I don't know if I agree that this is entailed by Schopenhauer's argument. I haven't read Christopher Janaway's book on Schopenhauer, but I recently completed Bernardo Kastrup's Decoding Schopenhauer's Metaphysics and I do know he was pretty scornful of Janaway's book. But then, I'm also sceptical of what Kastrup and his followers call the 'mind-at-large', which plays a role suspiciously like that of God in Berkeley's philosophy. (I actually joined the Kastrup forum and had this out with them.) But the long and short is, it's not necessary to posit whether objects have an 'inner life'. That amounts to speculative metaphysics. I think this is where the Buddhist analysis has influenced me. I think considerable circumspection is required at this point, a clear awareness of what it is we don't know. That's the sense in which scepticism can counter-balance idealism.
[hide][quote=Bernardo Kastrup]Christopher Janaway characterizes Schopenahuer's metaphysical contentions as "something ridiculous" or "merely embarrassing," which should be "dismissed as fanciful" if interpreted in the way Schopenhauer clearly intended them to be. He claims that "Schopenhauer seems to stumble into a quite elementary difficulty" in an important passage of his argument. And so on. The freedom Janaway allows himself to bash Schopenhauer, and the arrogant, disrespectful tone with which he does it, are breathtaking. It is so easy to bash a dead man who can't defend himself, isn't it?
Ironically, all this actually accomplishes is to betray the utter failure of Janaway's attempt to grok Schopenhauer. Indeed, his apparent inability to comprehend even the most basic points Schopenhauer makes, and to think within the logic and premises of Schopenhauer's argument, is nothing short of stunning. Here is someone who just doesn't get it at all, and yet feels entitled not only to write books about Schopenhauer; not only to characterize Schopenhauer's argument as "ridiculous," "embarassing" and "fanciful" (Oh, the irony!); but even to edit Schopenhauer's own works! By now Schopenhauer has not only turned in his grave, but strangled himself to a second death.
Even more peculiar is Janaway's suggestion that it is Schopenhauer who is obtuse, for the "elementary difficulties" Janaway attributes to him couldn't be seriously attributed even to a high-school student today, let alone a renowned philosopher. At no point does Janaway seem to stop, reflect and ponder the glaringly obvious possibility that perhaps Schopenhauer does know what he is talking about and it is him (Janaway) who just doesn't get it. Instead, he portrays Schopenhauer as an idiot; how precarious, silly and conceited. He even accuses Schopenhauer of crass materialism, despite Schopenhauer's repeated ridiculing of materialism and the fact that Schopenhauer's whole argument consistently refutes it in unambiguous terms. I discuss all this in detail in DSM. Here it shall suffice to observe that, to be an expert on anything, it takes more than just study; for if one can't actually understand what one is studying, no amount of scholarly citations will turn vain nonsense into literature.
I richly substantiate my criticism of Janaway in DSM: I carefully take his contentions apart, while clarifying Schopenhauer's points in a way that should be clearly understandable even to Janaway. So if you think I am exaggerating in this post, please peruse DSM: it can be leisurely read in a weekend or, with focus, in a single sitting, so it won't cost you much time at all to see whether I actually have a valid point.[/quote][/hide]
But, too far off-topic.
Yeah, Schopenhauer is not arguing that objects have subjectivity, only that they have an inner aspect, the inaccessible object-in-itself. He calls it will or will-like on the basis that the thing-in-itself is undivided, so what is inmost in us, being part of the wider thing-in-itself, is what is inmost in everything.
No, its an imaginative leap. Id call it an insight, but that would imply its right. As you said, and unlike Kant, he invents a thing-in-itself about which nothing can be said, then proceeds to tell us all about it.
Quoting Schopenhauer, SEP
It is rather like what East Asian Buddhism calls 'realising the true nature'. (Many critics have noted the convergences of Schopenhauer and Buddhism in this respect.)
Without the idea of a collective mind, how to explain the easily deduced fact that we all see the same things in their respective locations? For example, if I place an apple on one corner of a table, a cup on another, a flower on another and a dog turd on the last; assemble fifty people and ask them what they see on each corner, they will all agree. Collective mind explains this, as does realism; so it seems it must be one or the other.
Even my dog obviously sees the ball I've thrown in the same place I do, which is evidenced by the fact that he runs to where I see it land.
Individual minds, that all operate under the same conditions and parse experience in the same way. Mind is collective in the sense that were all members of the same language group, culture, and so on. Hegel made a lot out of that, didnt he?
But here you refute exactly the same argument in your support of mathematical platonism. You are derisive of the attempts to see number as unreal and your opposition derives entirely from the fact that our mathematical models , assuming number is real, have been extremely successful in predicting previously unknown facts about the world.
Firstly, if number ought be considered real on the grounds of the success of models which treat it as if it were, then our models which treat the external world as equally real have had even more success and so should count even more as evidence of a real external world.
Secondly, your argument for mathematical platonism itself relies on the reality of an external world described by physics because without it, the success of mathematical theories in predicting physical constants is not at all surprising and is evidence only of internal consistency.
So,are those "conditions" mind independent? We know they are independent of any individual mind, and if there is no collective mind, then how would they not be mind-independent?
if individual minds "parse experience in the same way" that explains how we experience things in similar ways generally, but it cannot explain how we all see the same things at each corner of the table. Nor does it explain how my dog sees the ball landing where I see it, since the dog is not a member "of the same language group, culture, and so on".
Not 'entirely'. The fact that mathematics can make predictions that can then be confirmed or refuted by experience is mainly an argument against fictionalism or conventionalism. My argument for mathematical platonism more generally is simply that number (etc) is real, but not materially existent. Numbers, and many other 'intelligible objects', are real, in that they are the same for anyone who can grasp them, but they're only able to be grasped by a rational intelligence. So they're independent of your mind or mine, but are only real as objects of the intelligence.
I think the conventional physicalist view is that ideas, as such, are a product of the mind, which in turn is a product of brain, which in turn is a product of evolution, and so on. That is the ontology of mainstream physicalism, as I understand it. Whereas this attitude is that these intelligibles are not a product of the mind, but can only be grasped by a mind. It is close to what is called objective idealism.
For Kant and Hegel, the only reality we know is constructed by the activities of the intellect. Hegels idealism differed in that Hegel believed that ideas are social, which is to say that the ideas that we possess individually are shaped by the ideas of the culture of which we're a part. Our minds have been shaped by the thoughts of other people through the language we speak, the traditions and mores of our society, and the cultural and religious institutions of which we are a part. We're embedded in that matrix of language, thought and convention.
Again I'm not saying, and I don't think any mature idealism is saying that the world is 'all in the mind' or that objects per se don't exist. It's just that they don't possess the mind-independent status that physicalism wants to imbue them with. It does not seek to orient itself with respect to experience of objects, in the way that empirical philosophy seeks to do (even if it fully respects empirical philosophy in respect of that vast domain within which it is authoritative).
For the second time in this thread you seem to be confusing an argument for a statement. There's no argument there, no series of logical steps from a common foundation. You've just said "numbers are real". A sentence of the form "X is y" is a proposition, not an argument.
Quoting Wayfarer
...but...
Quoting Wayfarer
How do you square those two? If the only reality is "constructed by the activities of the intellect", then how can real numbers (which you claim are a part of reality), be "not a product of the mind"?
Either reality (part of which you claim includes numbers), is a product of the mind or it isn't.
As you should know, I think the world and its objects are a collective, that is an inter-subjective, representation, so of course I am going to agree that the empirical world is in that sense mind dependent. But whatever it is that appears as the empirical world cannot be said to be mind-dependent unless God or some universal or collective mind is posited.
And further "whatever it is" cannot be anything for us other than the empirical world, which means we cannot rightly say it is mind-dependent or material.
When materialist theories of mind say that something is a product of the mind, then it is positing an identity or equivalence between brain and mind. That is 'brain-mind identity theory', isn't it? That is a reductive explanation, i.e. it seeks to reduce ideas to a lower-level explanation i.e. the neurobiological.
So I'm attempting to argue for the generally Kantian view that knowledge comprises a synthesis of experience and intellect. Within that context what I'm arguing is that some fundamental ideas (what Kant calls the categories, and also logical and arithmetical primitives) are apprehended or discovered by the mind - that they're not a product of the brain, in terms of being understandable as a configuration of grey matter (i.e. 'discovered not invented'.) They are real on a different level of explanation or abstraction than that which materialism proposes (pretty much as per the last paragraph in the Schopenhauer quote I provided in this post.)
Quoting Janus
I agree that it's a delicate philosophical position. I drafted a piece on that on Medium about it, from which:
[quote=Mind at Large; https://medium.com/@jonathan.shearman/mind-at-large-169bb5f0c3a7]Consider this. All of the vast amounts of data being nowadays collected about the universe by our incredibly powerful space telescopes and particle colliders is still synthesised and converted into conceptual information by scientists. And that conceptual activity remains conditioned by, and subject to, our sensory and intellectual capabilities determined by the kinds of sensory beings we are, and shaped by the attitudes and theories we hold. And were never outside of that web of conceptual activities at least, not as long as were conscious beings. That is the sense in which the Universe exists in the mind not as a figment of someones imagination, but as a combination or synthesis of perception, conception and theory in the human mind (which is more than simply your mind or mine). That synthesis constitutes our experience-of-the-world.
Another example from Western philosophy is provided in an account of Schopenhauers philosophy:
The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied [by idealism] than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room [or the reality of Johnsons rock]. The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper ~ Bryan Magee, Schopenhauers Philosophy, p105.
What we need to grasp is that all we know of existence whether of the rock, or the pen, or the Universe at large is a function of our world-making intelligence, the activity of the powerful hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species. Thats what empirical reality consists of. After all, the definition of empirical is based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience. So, asking of the Universe How does it exist outside our observation or experience of it? is an unanswerable question.
So there is no need to posit a supermind to account for it, because theres nothing to account for.[/quote]
I note in the essay that this is in line with the Buddhist view - refer to it for further details.
We're still waiting for the argument. So far, all you've done is claim it.
This is very consistent with the Christian (theological) view of the temporal continuity of objects, commonly represented as inertia. Newton stated that his first law of motion is dependent on the Will of God. If God pulls out His Will (which is His choice to do at any moment as time passes), then the temporal continuity of objects, which constitutes the material existence of an object, represented as mass, disintegrates, and we have no more material objects.
But this: "What we need to grasp is that all we know of existence whether of the rock, or the pen, or the Universe at large is a function of our world-making intelligence, the activity of the powerful hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species"
I think goes too far. All our knowledge is in a form conditioned by our world-making intelligence, but the content is a function of something beyond that intelligence.
And this:[i]" So, asking of the Universe How does it exist outside our observation or experience of it? is an unanswerable question.
So there is no need to posit a supermind to account for it, because theres nothing to account for."[/i]
is just another dualistic position, the converse of which would be that it could be, for all we know, an answerable question. And we do come up with different mutually exclusive answers, but we cannot ascertain which answer is the more correct or even if the notion of any answer couched in dualistic terms (as all our answers inevitably are) could have any bearing at all on a non-dual reality.
The element of truth in the idea that there is nothing to account for because the question is unanswerable is contextual and a matter of interpretation. like the element of truth in its negation. All discursive truths are dualistic, and thus inadequate to a non-dual reality, but then dualistic truths are all we have that can be stated.
This is Hegel's perspective, as I understand it, and the reason he rejects Kant's noumena. If the noumenal cannot be anything more than literally nothing for us then it cannot be part of the discursive conversation. It cannot be the basis for any conclusions about the nature of reality.
You seem to want to have your cake and eat it: that is you say there is nothing to account for, that it is an unanswerable question, and yet you want to draw firm discursive conclusions from that idea. From our necessarily dualistic intelligence we want to account for the fact that humans (and animals) share a common world and the only two possibilities we can think of are a mind-independent actuality or an actuality produced by a collective or universal mind.
We know there can be no way of definitively choosing between those two possibilities, but one or the other might seem more plausible. What seems more plausible to individuals comes down to what their grounding assumptions are, that is it is a matter of taste; and there is no way to show that it could be anything more than a matter of taste.
Your reply resonates with me. And this conclusion is one I have often suspected, as a matter of taste informed or driven by aesthetics. Some varieties of meaning making (ontology) seeming to be more aesthetically pleasing than others.
Exactly, and as the old adage tells us: "There's no accounting for taste".
(Again, I found the book I read last year before taking a break from the forum, Mind and the Cosmic Order, brought a lot of these ideas into focus. It's worth just browsing the abstracts.)
I agree that the ultimate truth, if there is one, cannot be a matter of taste or opinion, but what humans think is the ultimate truth is inevitably so, it seems to me. Thanks for the book recommendation: I think I may have already downloaded that book, but in any case I'll take a look when time permits.
Not opinion. I think we are drawn to forms of reasoning and inferences which appeal to our aesthetic sense. The very fact that certain ideas become the focus of our attention is itself an expression of preferences and attractions.
Quoting Janus
There's an idea in the early Buddhist texts (which I will probably add to the draft I linked to):
Quoting Kaccayanagotta Sutta
You can see how this 'polarity' might map against the 'only two possibilities' you posit.
That is why I say that it is 'the idea of the non-existence of the world' that gives rise to the perceived necessity of there being a 'mind-at-large' which is thought to sustain it. It is thought that in the absence of this global mind, the world would not exist if not being perceived. But, says the Buddha, that is to fall into the 'polarity' of supposing that the world either 'truly exists' or 'doesn't exist'. 'When one sees the arising of the world' means, I think, attaining insight into the unconscious process of 'world-making' which the mind is continually engaging in. It is seeing through that process which is the aim of Buddhist philosophy.
(I expect you might find some discussion of this in the book you mentioned on non-dualism by David Loy. On that note, enough out of me for the time being, as I always I write too much. I've unexpectedly gotten a full-time tech-writing role for the next six months and next week I'm diving in the deep end so I have to switch focus for a while. Not that I'll dissappear completely. Thanks for reading.)
Yes, existence and non-existence is just another dichotomy of dualistic thought. I'm not sure how well it maps against the idealism/ materialism polemic though, since in my understanding, , the world exists in either case, as ideas in the mind of God or actual consciousness for different forms of idealism, pace Berkeley and hegel respectively, or as an ever-changing configuration of matter/ energy in the case of materialism. Materialism takes different from too, from naive realism to ontic structural realism and others.
If we want to have a metaphysics these seem to be the only two possibilities to choose from. In Loy's book Nonduality, he points out that Nagarjuna's philosophy, the Madhyamika dialectic, abjures all and any metaphysical views on the grounds that any view, being dualistic in character, simply fails to capture the non-dual reality. Gautama is also renowned for discouraging metaphysical views of any kind.
The interesting corollary seems to be that dualistic views have only an empirical provenance, and any claim that any such view could have significance beyond the empirical context is nonsensical. Surprisingly this seems to be consonant with some aspects of logical positivism, although of course the positivist idea that empirical hypotheses and theories, which go beyond merely observational claims, can be verified, is itself nonsensical.
I find this idea of the nonsensicality of dualistic views projected into the metaphysical context most compelling, as I think you already know, since I have been flogging it for quite a while now. Of course the wrinkle in the fabric is that duality/ nonduality is also a dualistic dichotomy, so it seems that all metaphysical roads lead to aporia. This is probably why the Buddha discouraged any concern with philosophy and advocated practice designed to quieten the dualistic tendencies of the mind in order to enter nondual consciousness and see things afresh from there.
Not sure why Schopenhauer would be considered off here for positing the subject-object. The object is intrinsically tied to a subject. The object qua subject- the thing-in-itself is what, without a perceiver exactly? It's something, sure. Schopenhauer conceived of Will as this something.
HOWEVER, where I see conundrums in Schop's metaphysics is when he starts discussing the Forms as the "immediate" object of Will. This smuggling in of Plato, gets problematic as we now have to ask "Why?" and there seems to be little answer, other than the post-facto that we know objects exist. Also, how do these Forms turn into the sensible world of "phenomenon" that is of the PSR variety? All of this just gets confusing.
ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed.
To my way of thinking Schopenhauer was "off" for positing that this "something" we cannot help imagining without being able to have any definitive idea of what it is, is something definite, i.e. Will. It is an anthropomorphic or biomorphic projection of the idea of human unconscious or animal instinct on his part, and as far as I can tell he has no grounds for such a projection whatsoever. I would change my mind if someone could demonstrate convincingly that he did have justifiable grounds, but I am yet to encounter such a demonstrative argument, or even the whiff of one.
Spinoza had essentially the same idea with his "conatus", and I don't think his position on that fares any better; in fact I consider it the weakest aspect of his philosophy.
It was basically introspection writ large.
Probably true, but is there any warrant for postulating that what we think we find introspectively is universal?
Buddhists have a much broader definition of what constitutes 'experience', based on the experience arising from the jhanas. Even though Buddhists themselves wouldn't describe those states in terms of 'the supernatural', the Buddha himself is described as 'lokuttara' translated as 'world-transcending'. And the jhanas clearly exceed the boundaries of what would pass for 'empirical experience' in the modern sense.
Getting back to constructivism*. As Charles Pinter puts it,
But at the same time, although this scene appears 'given' to our perception, in reality it is the faculty of apperception which combines all of the stimuli arising from the inputs into a unified scene - the panorama. And the process which enables the experience of unified cognition, called the subjective unity of perception, is (according to this source) an aspect of Chalmer's 'hard problem of consciousness'. That reference claims, citing research, that the faculty which synthesises the various disparate elements of experience is not well understood; it says that 'The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry.'
Yet you can say that it is within this domain of the subjective unity of experience, that we 'make sense' of experience. Isn't this where the observation of cause and effect actually takes place? Isn't this the domain in which order is sought and connections are made? And where is that domain? Is it 'out there', in the world, or 'in here' in the observing mind? Or both? Or neither? Not claiming to have an answer, but I think it's an interesting question.
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* [quote=ChatGPT]Constructivism is a philosophical theory about the nature of knowledge and reality. The central idea behind constructivism is that knowledge and reality are constructed by human beings, rather than discovered. According to constructivism, our experiences and interactions with the world shape our understanding of it, and our perceptions and beliefs are constructed as a result of these experiences.
In other words, constructivists argue that there is no such thing as an objective reality that exists independently of our perception and interpretation of it. Instead, they maintain that our understanding of reality is shaped by our experiences and the mental structures we use to process and interpret those experiences.[/quote]
I would say that the independent Forms are of God's Will, and the phenomenal representations of them are of the human will, as basic idealism, though I am very unfamiliar with Schopenhauer in particular.
If we remove God, then any proposed independent Forms are unsupported and meaningless conjecture. The only "world" or "worlds" are those created by human wills, and there is nothing to justify anything external.
Quoting schopenhauer1
In my opinion, the op does not make clear the relationship between the PSR and the will for Schopenhauer. It is stated as "no object without a subject" which is no consistent with my understanding of the PSR, and also the inverse "no subject without an object" is derived without any demonstration of the logic behind this inversion. So it is no wonder that you are confused. Maybe can help to explain this.
Certainly, god has no place in Schops metaphysics. Will is blind striving. But is it? Let me examine
Schop posits Forms as immediate objects of the will. So what this could mean is that forms are created in order to have desires to achieve so the goals can be directed towards something. But it never achieved anything. It is the illusion of satisfaction. Its the devils playground. So in a way, Will does have a telos, that is, to create never ending goals for itself in the goal of completion.
The problem again is how the one becomes Forms and many.
Would the jhanas not be states of mind or concentration, rather than experience or perception of any particular thing? Empirical experience or perception is characterized by being of publicly available objects. Dreaming is a state of mind that one might call "world-transcending', but it is a temporary state. If samadhi states are sustainable, or even may become permanent, then this would count as world-transcending in the sense that worldly experience is dualistic, or at least understood dualistically. I think our ordinary experience is non-dual and that it is the experience of duality which is a kind of illusion: "samsara is nirvana".
Everything is not seen at once; the eye flits around in ordinary waking consciousness, noticing this, then noticing that, so I'm not sure what is meant here by "single, undivided experience". There may be "gaps" where nothing is noticed in between noticing particular things, but there seems to be no breaks in the sense of being totally unconscious conscious ( except in deep sleep states or anaesthesia), no moments where there is absolutely no awareness of anything at all, whether external phenomena or bodily sensation or emotional response, so perhaps that is what is meant.
Quoting Wayfarer
So, I can't think what "the subjective unity of experience" could mean other than that we have a sense of continuity of awareness, and in relation both to the world of objects and bodily sensations, there is a general sense that everything "fits" into an overall conceptual web of relation between the self and other things and processes, both external and internal, due to an experienced impression of familiarity. Psychedelics can break down that ordinary sense of familiarity, a sense which after all is a kind of culturally acquired illusion.
To me the "in here" and 'out there" dichotomy stems from the ordinary understanding of being a sensate body in a world of sensed objects. The "internal sensations belong to the body, and what are perceived as objects in the environment are perceived as external to the body, since the body is experienced as being in a world or environment, and we can feel our bodies "from the inside" so to speak, but we cannot ordinarily feel objects from the inside..
Much more beyond this basic understanding could be said about this difficult topic, and this is precisely the domain of phenomenology as I understand it. On the other hand all phenomenological analysis can give us are different perspectives from different starting points or assumptions, and all such perspectives are going to be dualistic in character and will have their own aporias. I think this is because all discursive dualistic understandings of what is intrinsically non-dual must be, in the final analysis, aporetic. It's like trying to chase or even eat your own tail; and a fitting symbol of this is the Oroubouros.
As I understand it Schopenhauer, like Kant, posits that it is via the primal understanding that every event is caused (PSR) that we (and animals in simpler and non-self-reflective ways) are able to make any sense of experience.
Imagine if everything was completely arbitrary and disconnected, just a succession of images and impressions without any connection or continuity between them; it would be James' "buzzing, blooming confusion".
Its a tangled knot for sure. Will is the animal desiring objects which are simply representational versions of Will trying to obtain goals that it can never truly gain satisfaction from.
That part I get. Again, the objects are then seen as beyond time and space when not mediated by PSR. Thats the Platonic element. He then goes to say art gets at these forms in a way that circumvents the PSR of mediated representational Will. Again all an entangled knot.
There is no such thing as blind striving. Striving must be directed or else whatever it is that is occurring cannot be called "striving". That's what "striving" implies, directed actions.
Quoting schopenhauer1
So this is backward. "Will" implies goals. The goals don't need to be directed toward something, because they are what actions are directed toward. The actions are the means, the goals are the ends. So subjugated goals are means, and the goal which the means are directed toward is logically prior to the means. Therefore the object which the goals are directed toward, if it is supposed to be a Form, is prior to the goals which are directed toward it, as these are the means.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Since you reversed the logical order, it is not really a never ending process. The means are determined, and carried out, the goal is achieved. That's why the goal is called "the end", when it is achieved it puts an end to the process.
If you posit a further purpose (goal) for the will itself, a purpose to the process of creating goals for itself, that purpose would itself be an end which would be achievable, by that nature of being an end. Therefore the process could not be characterized as never ending. So if this were the goal of completion, that would be an achievable goal and the process would not be never ending. But if the process whereby the will creates goals for itself is completely purposeless (contrary to the PoR), this would turn out to be a never ending process. But that perspective, of course, is to deny the PoR.
I think my earlier post you were replying to it is best seen in conjunction with the last post.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/780262
But to go further Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I think you may have misinterpreted. I do agree with this sort of. However, I wouldnt say that anything is prior in a causal sense. Rather, it seems to be a knot where they are all somehow one in the same. That is to say, Will manifests in the animal, desire and movement, and simply experience in space-time but thats just the realization of Will in its flipside aspect of phenomenon. It is the playground.
In the playground (phenomenal aspect) Platonic form is both ones own body (in ones own character and manifestation of Will), played out in space/time (will-to live) and this form is directed towards other forms mediated by PSR (objects/representations) which provides the background or playground to play out its striving- towards. Space/time/causality is the necessary conditions for Wills playground which is not prior but one and the same as Will. They are never disentangled. The Will is dreaming itself (maya) immediately.
Schopenhauer did not deny that goals could be met. It was just the never ending nature of the goals, and the fact that one never truly got satisfaction from obtaining the goals so I dont think that interpretation is quite accurate in terms of completion.
The point though, is that the PSR (sorry, I said PoR in the last post, but I meant PSR) is only circumvented by assuming the reality of randomness. And that would render "will" as unintelligible, or nonsensical, as is "blind striving".
There are ways in which the artist may attempt to minimize the role of the PSR in one's creations, by employing elements of randomness, but this exclusion of the PSR cannot be complete. The artist must choose a medium of presentation, and this choice is always made with a purpose. So even if the goal is to minimize the role of the PSR, this cannot be complete, because that is in itself a goal and therefore subject to the PSR.
Before I answer, I guess Im getting confused are you debating my interpretation or Schopenhauer himself?
As i said, I am not very familiar with Schopenhauer.
The most primal experience, I would say, is of embodiment. Body as experienced is primordially spatio-temporal and causal (in the sense that we find we can act in and on the world). Before all else we are a dynamic and vulnerable body-mind in a dynamic and dangerous world.
We do satisfy our desires (sometimes). but of course satisfaction is temporary, everything in a temporal world is temporary because everything is changing constantly. The desire for permanent satisfaction is thus absurd. If we give up that desire we may become, ironically, satisfied in the moment which never ends.