Vogel's paradox of knowledge
This problem was devised by Jonathan Vogel.
1. Someone (call him Al) has parked his car on Avenue A (out of sight now) half an hour ago. Everything is normal, the car is still there, Al has a good memory. Does he know where his car is?
2. Every day, a certain percentage of cars gets stolen. Does Al know, right now, that his car has not been stolen and driven away since he parked it?
3. Meanwhile, in a parallel universe with a similar crime rate, Betty has parked her car on Avenue B half an hour ago. Betty is cognitively very similar to Al (just as good a memory, just as much confidence about the location of her car). Her car, unfortunately, was stolen and driven away. Does Betty, who believes that her car is on Avenue B where she parked it, know that her car is on Avenue B?
4. Having answered all three questions, would you like to revise your answer to any of them?
5. Why?
1. Someone (call him Al) has parked his car on Avenue A (out of sight now) half an hour ago. Everything is normal, the car is still there, Al has a good memory. Does he know where his car is?
2. Every day, a certain percentage of cars gets stolen. Does Al know, right now, that his car has not been stolen and driven away since he parked it?
3. Meanwhile, in a parallel universe with a similar crime rate, Betty has parked her car on Avenue B half an hour ago. Betty is cognitively very similar to Al (just as good a memory, just as much confidence about the location of her car). Her car, unfortunately, was stolen and driven away. Does Betty, who believes that her car is on Avenue B where she parked it, know that her car is on Avenue B?
4. Having answered all three questions, would you like to revise your answer to any of them?
5. Why?
Comments (123)
Why frame Betty's case in a parallel universe? There is nothing here that precludes it happening in the same universe or even same parking lot as in Al's case. Betty knows no more or less than Al does until she discovers that her car is missing.
2. No.
3. No.
4. No.
5. K = JTB.
1. Al's memory Justifies his Belief as to the location of his car, and his belief is True.
2. Al has no Justification for Believing his car to have been stolen, only for considering it possible.
3. Betty has a Justified Belief, that turns out to be Not True.
The situation would change if the crime rate was so high that it was reasonable to expect that one's car would be stolen, in which case one would presumably take extra precautions, or expect trouble.
Lets try another tact. Do the people deductively know where their car is at that moment, or are they making an induction?
The only thing they could know is, "I left my car at X spot." Do they deductively know their car is there still when they walk away? Of course not. Its an induction. An induction based on logic, reason, and memory, but an induction none-the less.
You're just bringing up the old justified true belief balderdash without calling it that. Pretty soon you'll get to the Gettier problem. JTB is the appendix of the philosophical world. Appendix as in that small, useless organ that is attached to our intestines. It keeps hanging around for no particular purpose and just pops up every now to cause trouble.
Having said that, I won't interrupt your thread anymore.
Al knows where he parked his car. He doesn't know whether it was stolen.
Not at all. It's very intuitive and would probably only be denied by certain externalists who believe knowledge reduces to behavior.
What this high-lights is that we rely on a whole heap of assumptions in deciding what is true, or may be true, or isnt true. But when we are reminded of them, we pause and question them and this can change our minds. Gathering evidence for all of them is impractical, so it is hard to see that this can be avoided. One might draw two conclusions from this.
1. There is an element of luck in all our knowledge claims, which makes it more difficult to distinguish lucky guesses, which most people would classify as not knowledge, from knowledge. To be honest, Im not sure what to say about this.
2. Knowledge can be fallible. Or rather, it is obvious that knowledge claims are fallible. The question is whether a knowledge claim that fails because it is wrong is still to be classified as knowledge or whether it should be re-classified as belief, (until and unless an infallible, conclusive claim is established). It may be that this is just a linguistic question and doesnt really matter. But if one accepts that knowledge (as opposed to a claim to knowledge) is fallible, I dont see what distinguishes it from belief, so Im inclined to the latter option.
This case is is too simple to do more than start considering the problem. We should consider a variety of cases. For example, consider another risk that Al has not taken into account, that his car may be smashed by a falling meteorite. Does that mean he doesnt know about his car? Again, suppose Als car has a sun-roof. Rain is not certain, but has been forecast. Does Al know his car is safe?
Each of these cases is different. Do the differences make any difference? Im not sure, but we should consider whether the question Does s/he know? is appropriate in the sense that it can really be answered.
Quoting Agent Smith
The problem is set by the similarity between the two, which suggests that their epistemic classification should be the same, and the difference in their circumstances (i.e. the fact that Bettys car has been stolen), which strongly suggests that it is different. So the fact that Bettys car has been stolen makes me classify her as believing and rather than knowing. Conclusion knowledge is not just about the psychological state of the knower. Hence, for example, how confident they each are is irrelevant.
Quoting Bylaw
It is certainly true that philosophers often get very dogmatic, especially about knowledge. I deduce that you would say that both of them know, except that Als knowledge is correct (so far) and Bettys knowledge is not correct and hence should be revised. I think that does reflect how we actually use the word. When she finds out her car has been stolen, she will know that. Would that be a fair summary?
May I ask what would you say to this possible outcome? Her car is stolen but only for a joy ride, and the thief, being cautious, took the trouble to return her car to its place and managed to do so before she came back to retrieve it. So she never knew her car was stolen and believed it had been safely parked all the time.
Quoting Fooloso4
Youre right. The parallel universe is a bit over the top. I based this on Jennifer Nagels version of it (I couldnt find the original). Youre also right that we only know what the example chooses to tell us, and that is usually very limited, which can be frustrating.
Surely, we can sometimes be conclusively right. For example, one could say that Al and Betty both have fallible knowledge. But then, when they get back to the cars and drive back home, they will know conclusively, wont they?
Quoting unenlightened
The situation would change if the crime rate was so high that it was reasonable to expect that one's car would be stolen, in which case one would presumably take extra precautions, or expect trouble.
Your point that Al has no justification for believing that his car has been stolen is a good one. Until she discovers that her car has been stolen, the same is true of Betty, of course. Thats a key problem, of course. Justification can be less than conclusive.
Quoting Philosophim
Quite right. Im not sure whether you think that induction can never result in knowledge because it is always uncertain or not. Certainly, in this case, it is an induction that can be replaced by certainty when they get back. Though actually, I would say that unless one embraces full-blown scepticism, induction can also justify certainty. What is less clear is when we reach that point. I suspect that philosophers would be much less optimistic than everyday people.
Quoting T Clark
That's unlikely. I've been there and done that. But epistemology is perhaps in an impoverished state because all the big questions have been spun off into distinct philosophical fields. If you're not interested, that's fair enough.
I have to say, the only alternative to the JTB that I've come across is the "knowledge first" idea. That might have something so recommend it, but I haven't caught up with it yet.
Then I don't understand Vogel. Full steam ahead!
JTB is knowledge internalism, which asserts that in order to count as having knowledge, a subject must have access to some justification.
Knowledge externalism just denies that.
No, induction can never result in knowledge. However, certain inductions could be considered more reasonable or cogent than others. That is the problem of induction. What standard can we used to determine which types of inductions are more reasonable to hold than others? You mentioned you might take a look at my paper; I cover that there.
Of course it can. we are fallible. I always keep my keys in my right pocket so I always know where they are, unless I forgot to empty the pockets when I changed my trousers. In that case, I discover that I did not know where my keys were after all. Or unless there was a hole in my pocket, or someone has stolen them, or they have been dissolved by the alien key dissolving ray, or God has done a miracle, or I hallucinated having keys, or...
But meanwhile, I know where my keys are. Knowledge is provisional and fallible - if the car isn't there when Betty gets back she cannot have known it was there, but she thought she did until she learned better. This is only problematic for the pope, who is supposed to be infallible. You're not the pope, are you?
Seems to me that there is a play on two senses of "know" going on here. In (1) Al knows where his car is, since he has a justified true belief, and that is the sense in which "know" is being used. But in (2), "know" is being used in the place of "is certain that...", and not in the sense of "has a justified true belief that...".
Al has a justified, true belief that his car is in Ally A; but he cannot be certain that it is in Ally A.
The paradox is that Al has a justified true belief as to were his car is, but is not certain of it. So what is interesting here, and much more fun than Gettier, , is that the argument shows a difference between knowing and being certain.
And Betty, who just as easily might have been in the very same city as Al (no need for parallel universes here), can feel certain of where her car is, but is mistaken, and hence does not know where it is.
Make sure my name is on the paper when it's published.
And the distinction between "knowing" and the feeling of knowing. When I follow the proof of a theorem I know the theorem is true according to the rules of the game, and I have a feeling of knowing. But when I park my car out of sight I only feel that I know where it is. So it is conditional knowledge. Most of life is lived in a complex of probabilities.
But then I have the feeling of knowing what I have written is of no consequence in this forum. :roll:
Al knows where he parked his car. That's it. You might say he knows there is a better chance that it is still there than not, given the statistical likelihood of having your car stolen (I have never had a car stolen in over 50 years of driving). I think this points to the inadequacy of JTB, because, according to ordinary criteria of belief justification, it seems that Al is justified in believing his car is where he parked, and if the car is there then on that basis we would say that he knows that it is there. But if it is not there then he would not be said to know it was there. This seems too arbitrary to justify switching from saying there is knowledge to saying there is not knowledge.
I would not revise my answer because the way I see it we only know that which we can be certain of (not feel certain of, mind, which is not the same). I only know my car is there when I see it there. The old chestnut, "seeing is believing" should be "seeing is knowing".
Quoting jgill
For me what you said does have consequence. You are equating knowledge with certainty, and drawing a distinction between being certain and merely feeling certain, and that is exactly the point I have made. But I know what you mean: it won't be of any consequence to the JTB dogmatists. :wink:
A posteriori, he does, but not as a necessary fact.
1. Yes, Al believes his car is where it is.
2. If he believes it has not been stolen, and it has not been stolen, then yes, he knows it has not been stolen.
3. No, because her belief is not true.
4. No
5. There is no issue I see.
I second what and both say as well.
It is a curious consequence of JTB knowledge that one may be certain, but one never knows that one knows - one always knows absolutely of the hypothetical Al's and Betty's whether they know or not, because the truth is stipulated in the hypothesis, but one's own knowledge or another's in real life... Philosophers put themselves in the position of the conjuror revealing where the queen really is after taking the sap's money. It's probably over-compensating for their own gullibility. :wink:
As Hume described, there is no reason to expect, never mind know, that the future will be like the past, except the desperation that one has nothing whatsoever else to go on.
'Tack' is the expression. From what yachts do when they need to change course. (Sorry for being pedantic. I suppose it wasn't very tackful :-)
Try ChatGPT on Vogel's paradox!
Gracias for the suggestion. Will consider.
I actually didn't now that Wayfarer, so thank you! I've been using it for years assuming tact was short for "tactic".
Funny thing is, often reality is more accurate than fiction. In an ordinary conversation, we often pre-qualify our statements by saying -- "I left it there an hour ago, so I don't know if it's still there..." or "I saw your keys on the table at the conference hall when I left two hours ago, maybe someone took it to the front desk for lost item."
That (!) is a normal conversation.
But when we post a epistemelogic probing question, we want to highlight the idea that people are gullible about their own memory or knowledge of things so we post a leading question such as the above. My point is, this is not how we do things in actuality and we should give humans a lot of credit for their minds.
This whole forum is of no consequence, so that's fine.
Your post put me in mind of computer assisted proofs. I was playing with ChatGPT, asking it to disprove a few theorems in modal logic, which it happily did. When I pointed out its errors, it politely corrected itself.
If you have a computer assisted proof, do you know the result? Suppose it is a proof that you cannot follow; is the feeling of certitude necessary for the claim that you know the answer?
eg:
Now see this tree.
But ChatGPT replied:
This proceeded:
If someone asks Al where his car is and Al says that he does, is he mistaken?
I hit enter before completing the post. I resubmitted it.
Quoting Banno
When Al returns and his car is still where he left it is his belief then justified? Is there any justification for him to look somewhere else?
Yep, justified true belief vs. feeling certain:
Quoting Fooloso4
Don't you hate doing that?
Yes, unless he is looking at it.
Al is stopped by a cop.
Cop: Where are you going?
Al: To get my car.
Cop: Where is your car?
Al: I don't know.
Things may not go so well for Al.
Suppose the parking lot has a high fence that you can't see over but can see through the gaps between the boards. As Al walks he gets a glimpse of his car and then his view is blocked and the pattern repeats. Does he know where his car is and then not know where his car is and then know where his car is and then not know where his car is?
Of course we can question whether he can be absolutely certain it is his car even when he stares at it. There could be an elaborate plan to fool him. But such a thing would seem to be vanishingly unlikely. Or he could be hallucinating, but then we would be in Cartesian territory where skepticism knows almost no limits.
I prefer to accept less stringent criteria for certainty and I equate certainty with knowledge and uncertainty with varying degrees of doubt and belief.
Follow up:
If instead hapless Al is on his way home and get stopped.
Cop: Where are you going?
Al: Home.
Cop: Where do you live?
Al: I don't know.
After all, Al does not know that the place he lives is still there.
And if not?
Quoting Janus
Right, there is always the possibility of illusion or deception, but when you say that he is mistaken unless he is looking at it, such possibilities are precluded.
Quoting Janus
My position is similar to yours, but I intentionally avoid the problem of certainty. I accept less stringent criteria for knowledge then some philosophers impose.
Plato has Socrates ending the first discussion of Justified True Believe describing himself as a midwife to nothing but farts. Yet here we are two-and-a-half millennia later, still farting.
Al is playing the cop for a fool, or a philosopher. He does know where his car and his house are, within the implied conditions of the kind officer's question. is playing that game wrong.
Let's hope Al is white.
If the house is not there then he does not live in a non-existent house.
Quoting Janus
I agree. All of this reminds me of the problem of object permanence.
I do not think knowledge should be defined in terms of exceptions. We should consider the phrase: "To the best of my knowledge".
From another thread:
For a long time I assumed "wind egg" was a polite translation of fart, but a wind egg is an egg that is insufficient. Nothing is born of a wind egg.
Quoting Banno
So, are you in agreement that it is only fools and philosophers who get tangled up in such problems of knowledge?
Quoting Banno
Yes, that occured to me too.
Well, there are issues here. It's just that the discussion in Theaetetus is not of much help.
Thanks. That's the one I use, partly to get out of the burden of certainty and absolute anything. :wink:
The Four Color theorem was an interesting start in this direction. Some professionals still have doubts, while most reluctantly accept what the computer has done as "fact". I write BASIC math programs frequently to guide my intuitions, but I hope to never use a program to actually "prove" something. Luddite me.
It all becomes a matter of trust, and I fear the profession will ultimately call yield and allow CS to do the hard work. Then mathematicians will be relegated to philosophical discussions trying to interpret what the program has come up with. :worry:
"Where do you live" means 'where have you been living most recently' not 'where will you live'. The very question presumes that circumstances have not changed.
Meh, failure to commit.
If the chances of being wrong are extremely remote then it seems reasonable enough to speak in terms of knowing, but the threshold remains arbitrary.
For me if there is no certainty then there is no knowing and I'm happy to speak in terms of having varying degrees of reason to believe or doubt, rather than in terms of knowing or certainty.
But that's my entire philosophy, Banno.
Quoting unenlightened
It's perfectly true that examples are, inevitably, constructed or selected - usually to prove a point. Al and Betty are no exception, even though this one presents itself as asking a question. The author of this one is not simply asking a question, however, but taking the reader through a process. As each complication is revealed, the doubt whether Al knows increases, and finally, the comparison with Betty puts Al in a new light because we see an inconsistency between our assessment of Al and our assessment of Betty. So the moral of the story (and presumably of the author) is that we change our assessment of these matters, not only on the basis of facts about Al, but also because of the context we see them in.
As to the question whether Al knows, and indeed, whether Betty knows until the car disappears, I wonder whether we should resist being pressured to make a decision. After all, the situation for both of them is perfectly clear. They have parked their cars and assume that they are safe and will be safe until they return. This is a perfectly rational assumption. Millions of people do the same thing every day and find their cars safe. But the story is not yet finished, so although we could grant that their car is safe while it is safe, we should hold off deciding whether either of them knows their car is safe and certainly whether it will be safe and sound on their return. Then, we make different decisions, because different decisions are appropriate, but their is no inconsistency because we didn't make a decision earlier.
Perhaps in some way this isn't a legitimate move in philosophy. Nevertheless, I think it is rational.
Quoting Banno
It's nice that people quote Plato in this context, but the Theaetetus really is no help at all. It doesn't even really represent what Plato would like to say about it.
In the Theaetetus, Plato raises the question how we distinguish knowledge from belief by means of an analogy, supposing an aviary in which various birds of knowledge and of false belief are flying about. How are we to tell the difference? That's a real question, even if the metaphor is flaky. He also raises the problem in the Meno, and resolves it by appeal to reincarnation.
In the Theaetetus the discussion of knowledge moves smoothly through belief and truth. When he reaches the final point, he does use the word logos. This is usually translated "word", but extends more widely than that to include "story" and "account" but can mean "explanation" or even "justification". Socrates suggests that an account explains the elements of which something consists. Theaetetus accepts - (he has more or less given up by this point). Socrates then asks, innocently, how we can give an account of the elements; which sets off an infinite regress. So the Theaetetus is indeed no help.
What might be more help is the Gorgias. Plato there paints a picture of the captain of a ship, who does not have knowledge but a tribe (long "e"), which is usually translated "knack". I take a knack to be what one acquires through experience without training and without necessarily understanding why it works. If he is to have knowledge, he needs episteme, which is usually translated "understanding" and is derived from the same root as one of the Greek words for "know" epistemi. (Yes - epistemology) He has in mind, of course, the understanding of a philosopher and I'm sure this is much closer to something he would accept. It is not much help to philosophers, but is a lot more help than the Theaetetus.
We distinguish between true and false accounts by means of of intellectual skills. Which are not beliefs, so the regress is ended.
Sorry if this is a long way to a short story, but I have been looking at mentions of the Theaetetus and swearing to myself for a long time and I couldn't resist telling the story that is always left out.
I don't know what this means. The echo of Kripke doesn't help.
I don't get why we would say he's justified in saying he knows where the car is. He thinks he knows?
I don't see where there's a paradox. We use the word "know" in various ways? Is that the point?
Not much help to what end? I think it helpful in pointing to the inadequacy of JTB. But if what one wants is a definition of knowledge that provides knowledge of what knowledge is then the dialogue is of no help. Unless, of course, one comes to see that knowledge is not transmitted in this way.
The Theaetetus doesn't point to the inadequacy of the JTB, but only to the inadequacy of Plato's idea of an account or an explanation or a justification. Insofar as it can be taken to suggest that the JTB is inadequate, it doesn't offer any clue as to what the alternative might be.
Sorry, I was a bit vague. They know where they parked their car and assume that it's still safe, and where they left their respective cars. They assume that the cars are still there and that they will be there when they return. I'm waiting to see how the story turns out before I decide whether they know or not.
If I ask Allen if he knows where his car is, he might say yes. If I nod menacingly at him, he may realize he doesn't.
He's lacking justification, so JTB doesn't work here.
Can you be more specific? What is Plato's idea of an account? In what way is it inadequate? Is there an adequate idea of an account?
Theaetetus says:
Note the irony. Elsewhere Socrates tells the myth of recollection, but here in the dialogue about knowledge, where we might think we are most likely to find it, he is silent. Rather than recollection there is the problem of forgetting.
All I'm saying is the location of his car is not a necessary fact, but contingent. So his knowledge of the location of the car is also contingent on circumstances.
That's true, but did I suggest it was a necessary fact.
Certainly, I would happily agree that the location of his car is contingent and that his knowledge of the location of the car is contingent. But that's because they are different facts, as demonstrated by the fact that they are contingent on different circumstances. Yes, it is true that his knowledge is partly but not entirely contingent on the location of the car.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes. I found that puzzling, given that, so far as I know, he never abandoned the doctrine of reincarnation. But perhaps we can see it buried in the discussion of memory, since, for Plato, all knowledge is really memory.
He doesn't mention the theory of recollection in the Gorgias either. But again, perhaps it is buried in his mention of philosophical "understanding".
Plato's idea of an account in the Theaetetus is what we might call an analysis of whatever we are giving an account of in terms of its elements. (I would look up a quotation, but I don't have much more time for philosophy right now.)
Quoting frank
He's lacking conclusive justification, that's true. But I'm not sure that justification must be conclusive. If that is the case, the J clause and the T clause will have exactly the same content and it's clearly a presupposition of the JTB account that they will be different.
I'm still puzzled about this.
Plato does not have a doctrine of reincarnation.Socrates tells some problematic myths. One problem is that if we start with the premise that knowledge is recollection of what was learned in a previous life then there would never be a time when knowledge was learned. But, on the other hand, if it was learned then it could not have been in that case that knowledge was recollected.
In the Phaedo the immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)
The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul.
Socrates is well aware of the weakness of his arguments:
Certainly, in many ways its still open to suspicions and counterattacks - if, that is, somebodys going to go through it sufficiently. (84c)
His hint should not be overlooked. If you go through the argument sufficiently then its weakness becomes apparent.
Quoting Ludwig V
An analysis of an account is itself an account, but the Greek term logos, is much broader than analysis. Perhaps @Paine can point to the passage from the dialogue.
If he lived in a universe where cars never move once you park them, he'd be justified in his belief.
In this universe, a person would be a fool to imagine their car couldn't be towed or stolen or molested by small, mutant drug addicts.
He's not justified in believing he knows where his car is unless he has access to a surveillance cam? Or he has small, mutant, drug addicted minions who check on it for him?
What then could be the general criteria to justify thinking there is or could be justification for belief in any particular case?
I've looked at some sources and I agree that I was wrong to be so confident that he believed in reincarnation when he wrote the Theaetetus. I still think it likely that he did when he wrote earlier dialogues. Presenting an idea as a myth, I suggest, is evidence that he could not prove what he was saying, but not necessarily evidence that he does not believe it. As I'm sure you know, mythos in ancient greek just means story, not necessarily false story.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes, I was aware of that and pointed it out in what I wrote. But the example he presents in the Theaetetus is as I describe it. My point is precisely that the model of account is not helpful for the problem he is considering. He was quite capable of presenting a different kind of logos which would have been less obviously unhelpful.
Quoting Janus
I'm sorry, I'm not ready to venture on articulating general criteria. It's a very complex topic and I have never seen anything more helpful than very general remarks.
Do you have something specific in mind?
Quoting frank
This is the problem. A complete justification would consider every possibility (except, perhaps, the purely imaginary ones), including the possibility that it might be struck by a meteorite. Theoretically doubtful, practically impossible. So the question is, what possibilities can he not cover and still count as knowing?
I think we can just rely on cultural norms here. If common sense says I was justified, I was.
I'm justified in believing there are satellites orbiting the earth, even though I have no way of checking on that. My justification is that experts tell me so and I have no good reason to doubt it.
Do I have good reasons to doubt the location of my car? I do, but maybe others don't?
I mean, if you parked your car somewhere, would you say you know where it is? Or just that you know where you parked it?
Quoting frank
That's really interesting. I don't know which I would say. It might be one in one situation and another in another situation.
But most people would regard it as indifferent which I said, because, they would assume, that one follows from the other.
Which reinforces the view that I'm developing, that many of these problems are created by the bad habit of saying more than we need to. If I say I know where it is, I'm making assumptions that I'm not making if I say I know where I parked it.
That's why I suggest holding off being pushed to decide whether he knows where it is or not until all the evidence is in.
Without the specifics of the account I can only speak in generalities. When you say he is capable do you mean Socrates or Theaetetus or Plato? If he was capable of presenting a different kind of logos then why didn't he? What is this different kind of logos? It should be noted that the problem of the logos of knowledge leads to the problem of knowledge of logos.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes, but in some cases, such as the myth of the metals is the Republic they are lies, even if noble lies. Myths are a mode of persuasion. In Plato's dialogues they are mostly salutary. It is not a question of true or false but of engendering good behavior. I do not think that Plato ever believed the myths but he did believe that believing them could be, for those in need of them, beneficial.
I think Plato frequently used myths to paint pictures of our capacities and environment rather than completely explain matters. This is why I challenged Cornford's interpretation in the Socrates and Platonic Forms OP. The focus on immortality misses the role recollection plays in the dialogues.
In the Meno, for example, recollection is a myth being used in another myth:
By saying "as you and I have agreed to call it", it becomes a dialectical X that can be treated as a known for the purpose of separating elements of our experience. It assumes the difference between knowledge and true opinion rather than arguing for that difference.
In Theaetetus, however, we find Socrates demonstrating that knowledge is not true opinion (as I summarize here and here).
Quoting Ludwig V
Do you think Socrates playing a mid-wife is withholding something from us?
Right. There's a thing where a news broadcaster asks if you know where your children are. The point is to suggest you might not. So if the issue of knowledge is spoken of, it's likely that said knowledge is in question, right?
I'm trying to point out that the notion of justification is vague and that judgement in particular cases that beliefs are justified is therefore more or less arbitrary, so as a general principle justification fails at its purported task of providing a criterion for differentiating between what is knowledge and what is not.
Like what?
I am not the one who expressed dissatisfaction with the dialogue. Do you have an opinion on the matter?
Cryptic. :chin:
In the passage from the Meno what must be held fast to are the images of Daedalus. But he goes on to say that this is an illustration of the nature of true opinion.
There is a connection here with elenchus and Meno's complaint that Socrates is like a torpedo fish. Socrates questioning leaves his interlocutor numb and unable to answer. If one has knowledge, however, then it is held fast to and abides. The interlocutor is not made numb and is able to give an account, a logos. Where there is knowledge there is not forgetfulness, rather than becoming confused one recollects what is known.
More cryptic than asking: "Like what?"
Are you asking me to present possible candidates for an argument I am not making? I was not asking a rhetorical question of Ludwig V. I don't know the answer. I am genuinely interested in any reply.
Oh, sorry. I misunderstood.
Quoting Janus
I agree that the notion of justification is vague. It follows that judgements about it are not as crisp and clear as they hopefully would be if there were clear criteria. But that's not the same as being arbitrary
The game of giving a formal definition is quite difficult. Fortunately, we manage to function, linguistically speaking, perfectly well with concepts that we have learnt, but never learnt to define. Formal definitions have their place and their usefulness, but they are not an absolute requirement, as they are, for example, in logic and mathematics.
Quoting frank
You're right. Asking the question changes the context, which can change one's attitude to what one thought one knew. That's inherent in the example, which is constructed to exploit it.
So it looks as if we expect knowledge to be proof against changes in context. That's a tall order.
Suppose I asked Al whether he is aware that there is a non-zero probability that his car will be hit by a falling meteorite. Do you think he would change his mind then?
Quoting Paine
You mean that Socrates is offering a wrong, or at least incomplete, account in order to stimulate Theaetetus to come up with something better. I guess that's a possibility.
But I have the impression that when he made that remark he meant to compare the process of cross-questioning someone with being a midwife. So I would expect Socrates to cross-question Theaetetus to elicit the alternative. That's more like his usual procedure, isn't it?
The awkward thing about Plato is that he never speaks in his own voice (except possibly the Seventh Letter). I think he's only mentioned once - a walk-on part present in Socrates' death-cell. So we never know for sure. It is possible that when I criticize the Theaetetus I'm going beyond what we can be sure of.
So our difference of opinion probably cannot be resolved. The issue at stake was whether I was justified in thinking that citation of that dialogue in the context of our discussion about knowledge was helpful or not. I'm saying that I regard that dialogue as irrelevant because the notion of justification that is considered is obviously inadequate and the dialogue recognizes that. More than that, no-one nowadays is suggesting an account anything like that one.
It's the measurement problem. Looking at it changes it.
Quoting Ludwig V
If it was me, I'd say that I'm VERY aware of it and glare at you knowingly. I don't know what Al would do.
What counts as justification depends on what the justification is of. In the case of the car it is seeing or showing that the car is still there. Plato's question is quite different. He is asking about knowledge of knowledge, what it means to know. Knowing where your car is hardly stands as an adequate exemplar of the scope of knowledge. Of utmost importance for Plato is self-knowledge. How does one justify that one possesses self-knowledge? What would count as justification of ethical knowledge?
There are ways of justification available in both those cases. Not that I can write down a rule book, but I'm sure you are familiar with both practices. The question how to justify one's knowledge of knowledge is one thing, but not the same as what Plato has been discussing, which is knowledge of everything else.
That's very good. :smile:
Quoting frank
Quite so. But this is philosophy, which Has great difficulty recognizing irony except in Socratic dialogues and Kierkegaard, where it is officially allowed. Al would undoubtedly do whatever the author of the story makes him do; he doesn't have free will, or any will.
We could get chat-gpt to tell us what he said.
I'm not really clear what ChatGP is. But if you think it has some special access to what's going in Al's head, there's no harm in hearing what it says. There's a good chance it would be amusing and an outside chance it might be helpful.
Right, I did say "more or less arbitrary". The point is not that we don't know anything, but that any attempt to show that we do know is subject to skeptical critique. Knowing is easy; it is trying to show knowing that you know which brings all the issues.
The dialogue begins and ends with the question of reputation.
Theaetetus quickly agree when Socrates asks him:
But Socrates has his doubts.
It is significant that Theaetetus is a mathematician. They are skilled at providing proofs and demonstrations. The mathematician has demonstrated knowledge. It is not simply that he has a good reason the believe what he says, for example, about roots is true (147d). What justifies that he knows rather than believes is the ability to demonstrate that knowledge.
In some sense Theaetetus knows what it is to know, even though he is not able to say what it is that all forms of knowledge have in common. But Socrates' concern goes beyond giving a definition. In the exchange above, in asking Theaetetus to exhibit his qualities , he is looking to see not only if Theaetetus is virtuous and wise, but if one who possesses knowledge is virtuous and wise.
He addresses the same question in the Apology. The craftsmen have knowledge of their craft. This is not simply knowledge how but knowledge that. They know their materials. But they are not wise. It is then not only a question of what forms of knowledge have in common, but of how knowledge differs from ignorance, as well as how knowledge related to wisdom.
Socrates pursuit of knowledge of knowledge is part of his desire to be wise. Abstracted puzzles fail to catch what is at issue in the question of knowledge.
That certainly seem to be true.
That is certainly an interesting question. But Plato seems to veer away from it when Socrates says
I'm not sure what you mean by "abstracted puzzles". Perhaps you mean the thumbnail sketches that are used as examples? I'm not very fond of them myself, I admit. But they seem to focus attention and discussion better than abstract statements.
And, what is at issue in the question of knowledge. Do you mean wisdom? Then by all means, let's discuss the relationship between knowledge and wisdom.
I think it would help to take a step back. You claimed:
Quoting Ludwig V
What you are referring to is Socrates dream, which begins at 201d:
What he used to imagine he heard certain persons say does not stand as Plato's idea of an account. Socrates intentionally distances himself, and Plato distances even further. Why relate it in terms of a dream? Why say that it is something he imagined he heard? Who are these persons?
Quoting Ludwig V
Why would he use this as the model of an account if it is not helpful? The question becomes more pressing if this is the only account given, and that he could have provided a different kind of account but didn't.
The point of all these questions is to question your assumption. If this is not intended to stand as the model of an account we should not dismiss it on the basis of that false assumption.
Quoting Ludwig V
He does not veer away, he is in pursuit of the question of the relationship between knowledge and wisdom. Knowledge can lead to ignorance, more specifically ignorance of ignorance. Socrates human wisdom, his knowledge of ignorance, is in a limited sense knowledge of knowledge. It is knowledge of both what one knows and does not know.
Quoting Ludwig V
More specifically, extracting things from the dialogue, as if they were stand alone arguments.
Quoting Fooloso4
That is the puzzle.
Quoting Fooloso4
It seems to me that what the citations I'm complaining about are doing. They ignore the conclusion that Plato draws, without refuting his refutation.
Quoting Fooloso4
True, knowing what one doesn't know may be wisdom or at least the beginning of wisdom. I can see that the dialogue could then be an object lesson. But I don't see that justifies citing the dialogue and then ignoring it.
The reason, I think, he introduces it is not to provide a model of an account but to address "certain persons". Empedocles, for example, claimed there were four elements. Leucippus and his student Democritus, who proposed an atomic theory.
Quoting Ludwig V
Are you referring to anyone specific? Do you think that this is what I am doing, despite my many references to the dialogue including Stephanus numbers?
In general I agree that we need to pay attention to the dialogue, but I am not sure what you mean when you say that the Theaetetus is of no help. Does this mean that it does not address JTB because you think it gives only one example of logos, a bad one, or that since the dialogue does not answer the question of what knowledge is it is of no help? I have already addressed the former. As to the latter, it is helpful to the extent that it says what knowledge is not, that is, JTB.
Good point. That seems very likely. Thanks.
Quoting Fooloso4
It doesn't disprove JTB. It disproves that the model he proposes isn't appropriate for JTB (or anything else very much).
That's helpful if anyone has proposed such a model, as you point about "certain persons" shows. But I don't think anyone since Plato has.
Quoting Fooloso4
I wasn't. But I can cite Gettier as an example.
You didn't drag Plato into the discussion. Banno did. He was bemoaning the fact that philosophy was still discussing JTB without any results. As I said at the time, my post wasn't directed directly at him, but was an excuse to vent about the use so often made of Plato in discussing JTB.
But I've benefited from the opportunity to discuss it with you. If you can check out Gettier's original article, you can decide for yourself about my complaint.
I have read it. It is actually Gettier himself who drags Plato in. He says in a footnote:
The passage from Theaetetus is like the Gettier cases in that the the distinction between knowledge and true opinion is maintained:
But the questions of knowledge that Plato raises far exceed the narrower cases that Gettier addresses. In addition, for Plato the issue is not "are you justified for believing" in the sense of having some reason, however insufficient for believing, but "can you defend the belief" in such a way so as to demonstrate its truth.
Quoting Ludwig V
My contention is that it is the misuse of Plato, based on a misunderstanding of the dialogue.
I'm glad we agree about that.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes. "Drag Plato in" is exactly right. And his footnote, though it shows a certain respect for him, doesn't help matters.
Actually, given that he actually cites three different versions - all modern - and explicitly claims that his argument will refute all of them, we might guess that citing Plato recognizes that to cite just one version of the definition may mean that he (Gettier) only refutes one version. But then, he should perhaps have included Plato's version in his collection and added it to the list to be refuted. Perhaps he didn't believe that his argument does refute Plato's version. I think he may be right. But then, Plato refutes it anyway. So it's all a bit of a mystery.
It reminds me of the way some people like to cite Epicurus' atomic theory as in some sense a predecessor of modern atomic theory. Which it isn't. Why would it be? I think it is an attempt to give modern theories respectability. But they would do better to let their own theory stand on its own feet. Indeed, I haven't seen that trope for quite a while, so perhaps it isn't done any more.
Quoting Fooloso4
Quite so. For me, that's a dilemma. My problem is I haven't been able to develop a third alternative. But I haven't given up hope.
What is Plato's version? Gettier may have an opinion on this, but is noncommittal. He does not know if his opinion, whatever it might be, is a true opinion:
Emphasis added.
The case cited from Theaetetus does not argue in favor of some version of JTB. It states that the judges:
This is not a version of JTB.
The passage from Meno also makes the distinction between knowledge and true opinion. Socrates says:
Socrates claims that he knows they are not the same.
He goes on to say:
The assertion is that knowledge and true opinion are not the same, but there is no difference when it comes to actions based on one or the other. Theaetetus agrees but has already forgotten what he had just agreed with, that true opinions, are like the statues of Daedalus, do not stay put. So too, the man who acts on true opinion may not stay put either. Fleeing when his conviction fails.
Quoting Ludwig V
If we let go of the false belief that knowledge is JTB the dilemma is dissolved. In both the Theaetetus and Meno mathematics plays a key role. Socrates KNOWS how to solve the geometric problem in the Meno, he does not just have an opinion, true or false, about how to solve it.
What one knows and what one believes are not the same, but one can believe he knows.
Quoting Fooloso4
I'm very confused by what you say about the dialogues. I would have to look up the dialogues to comment intelligently.
But what I collect from the passage I quote is that you think that the difference between knowledge and true belief is that one has the skill to establish the truth that is at stake. (I'm not sure that's an adequate formilation, so I hope that's reasonably close.) That's a theory and it fits well with what Plato says in the Gorgias about episteme. It's a very demanding criterion, but that also fits well with Plato's ideas about philosophy and common life.
Quoting Agent Smith
That puzzles me. I was suggesting that the paradox is best understood when we move away from that question and begin to ask others, like "Where did you park your car?". Simply asking "Do you know where your car is?" presents a limited choice of answers and masks the complexities of the situation. These are revealed when you start to ask other questions.
Is that what you meant?
I think so, but that is not the whole of it. There are two senses of establish The first is to determine that something is true, the other is to demonstrate that it is true. The first is a form of learning or coming to know, the second is the ability to provide and defend an account of what one knows. One wrinkle here is that A, who does not know, may be convinced by B, who also does not know, but is able to persuade A that he does.
The rejection of the claim that knowledge is perception can obscure the role of seeing in knowledge. Note that in a passage quoted about Socrates says:
There is also the case of knowledge via noesis, what the mind sees. There is the well known example of working on a math problem and not making much progress until "now I see!".
When Socrates says:
I think he is expressing a genuine type of skepticism. We do know what knowledge is but in trying to say exactly what it is and is not, it alludes us.
Quoting Ludwig V
What does he say?
Quoting Agent Smith
Yes. Exactly.
Well, that is the classic conclusion of the early dialogues. So you are probably right about that.
I'll look up the Gorgias and give you a reference. It gives you the opportunity to see for yourself. You would probably want that even if I wrote my account of it.
The point for me is that:
1. "knowledge" claim is a principled based or procedural form of certainty. And principles/procedures can validate our "knowledge" claim to the extant they are reliable.
2. we can't meaningfully set validation epistemic procedures arbitrarily high.
Condition one makes "knowledge" claims legitimate. Condition two makes knowledge" claims fallible.
Quoting neomac
I think I accept that. A lot depends on what you mean by "certain". On some interpretations, that might conflict with reliability, or least, the standard of reliability needs to be compatbile with the standard of certainty.
My feeling is that the question of reliability is indeed important, and that's what justifies the J clause and indeed the infuriating (so some) vagueness about what it means.
Given a choice between the two, I would prefer truth to reliability, but that conflicts with the idea of a definition. But then, I don't think that definition is as all-important as many people seem to think. We seem to manage quite well without water-tight definitions for many of the words we use.
Quoting neomac
It depends a bit on what you mean by "fallible". I prefer to call knowledge claims "defeasible" because I think that if a knowledge claim fails, in the sense if the proposition that is (claimed) to be known is false, the claim to knowledge loses any legitimacy and must be withdrawn. The same applies to any assertion we make, so it isn't as radical as one might think.
Well, it was a good thing I checked. What the Gorgias says is rather different from my account of it. You will find that at 463 he characterizes rhetoric as "flattery" and then as "experience and a knack". He contrasts those things with skill or art (techne (and not episteme as I thought. Many examples of techne are discussed. The skill of kubernetike ("navigation" in my translation - which calls the navigator "pilot") apparently includes knowing its limits, in which respect it is contrasted with rhetoric. But then, Socrates calls swimming an episteme at the beginning of the same speech.
See what you make of it.
A knack is flattery disguised as techne.
Sophistry is flattery disguised as philosophy.
Rhetoric is flattery disguised as logos.
Opinion is flattery disguised as knowledge.
Pleasure is flattery disguised as good.
Socrates then puts it "like a geometer". (465b):
opinion : knowledge :: pleasure : good
It is in light of the good that the difference between opinion and knowledge can be seen.
"reliability" instead of "certainty", "defeasible" instead of "fallible".
What's the difference in both cases?
Something reliable can fail once or twice and still be classed as reliable. But if something certain turns out wrong, it is no longer certain.
I prefer "defeasible" because "fallible knowledge" can be taken to mean that If I claim to know something on good grounds but it still turns out false, it is nonetheless knowledge. So I'm anxious to insist that knowledge doesn't fail - people do. So a claim to knowledge that p must be withdrawn if p turns out to be false.
Yes, that is persuasive. Opinion is like knowledge, but deceptive and turn out not to be knowledge. Something pleasurable can be deceptive and turn out not to be good.
I say it is only persuasive because someone who wants to resist the conclusion will simply question the comparisons, and I'm not sure there are compelling reasons to say they are valid.
The underlying assumption is that things are and are known in light of the good, and to know something is to know why it is best that it be as it is.
The problem is, we lack knowledge of the good. We remain in the world of opinion. In the cave. Socratic skepticism is zetetic.
For Plato philosophical inquiry is not value free. We do not seek to know for the sake of knowledge. We seek to know because it is good to know. The examined life is the life in pursuit of the good life. The pursuit of the good life is guided by the inquiry into the good itself.
It is Socrates interest in the human good that guides his inquiry into the good as the cause of what is.
I'm afraid I don't know what to make of these two messages.
Some of it I understand and agree with, though I'm not sure I'm interpreting it in the same way as you are.
Some of it I don't understand.
It seems as if you are a platonist. Is that fair?
I feel I want to ask you where you are going with this?
No. I make a distinction between Plato and Platonism. By Plato I mean the dialogues. As I think you pointed out, Plato never speaks in the dialogues.In the Seventh Letter he says:
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm not going anywhere. I can't find my car. I thought I knew where it was but I was wrong!
Seriously, I'm just trying to put some things together from the dialogues around the question of the difference between knowledge and opinion or belief.
One thing I was trying to make clear is that the centrality of the question of the good is not about claims such as this is the best possible world. In the Phaedo Socrates "second sailing" (99d) is a shift from Anaxagoras' claim that Mind orders all things, to the way Socrates mind orders or make sense of things. A second sailing is when the ship cannot move because the wind fails and one must take to the oars. it is in line with this that the good comes into play. Concerns for knowledge is not separate from concerns for the knower.
But I have taken the ship off course.
I get your point. Still it depends on what we are certain about. We can also be certain that something is reliable. So if that something turns out to be wrong that doesn't mean it's unreliable, or no longer certain.
Quoting Ludwig V
I substantially agree but what I find more interesting to notice is the following: while the falsity of p implies that "I know that p" is false, the epistemic "withdrawal" from a belief that "turns out" to be false (as opposed to "unjustified") might correspond to different epistemic conditions: e.g. "I don't know that p", "I know that non-p", "I believe that non-p", "I don't believe that p", or "I doubt that p". Yet only "I know that non-p" would make sense to say to me in that case. In other words, knowledge claims defeated out of falsify are not just "withdrawn" but "replaced" by other knowledge claims.
I think you are on to something here. I hadn't thought of it. The difference between "I don't know that p" and "I know that not-p" is particularly relevant here. And you are right, of course, that only "I know that not-p" is the contradictory of "I know that p". The relationship of those two to the other three is clearly complicated. In this example, it seems plausible to say that Al doesn't know that p and that he doesn't know that not-p. I'm inclined to say that he believes that p. I would also say that "I doubt that p" implies "I don't believe that p" and "I don't know that p".
But all of that gets more complicated if you consider "s/he knows that p" etc.
Ah! I was hoping you didn't mean Dr. Pangloss's belief that all is for the best in the best possible world. I think you may be right in suggesting that knowing p is good for the knower. Believing that p may or may not be beneficial. Thinking that p is usually harmful - because "he thinks that p" suggests that he is wrong.
This might be true from a third person perspective. Not from a first person perspective. If a person makes a knowledge claims and then she herself discovers that what she believed is false, the discovery of her belief's falsity itself would support another first-person knowledge claim.
That's different from the knowledge claim where the justification is to be questioned. Imagine I claim: I know that Erik the Red used to wear horned helmets because Erik the Red is a Viking and Vikings used to wear horned helmets. But then I discover that archeologists have widely called as a myth the belief that Vikings used to wear horned helmets. Then I might say: I didn't know (not "I don't know"!) that Erik the Red used to wear horned helmets, or I doubt that Erik the Red used to wear horned helmets.
Yes. First person use of "know" is different from the others, because there is no difference between justification and truth. In the case of second or third person uses, they are. That was the point of the last sentence of my last post.
But it seems to me that the paradigm use has to be second or third person uses, because there is no real difference between "I know that p" and "I believe that p", except emphasis.