Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies

Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) begins with an empirical observation, “All past and present cultural moral norms are heuristics (usually reliable, but fallible rules of thumb) for parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems.” See “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”.

This empirical observation suggests two universal moral principles that describe moral ‘means’. Those principles are:
• “Act to solve cooperation problems” and
• “Do not act to create cooperation problems”

Note that domination moral norms and marker moral norms are not universal.

MACS’ moral principles can be culturally useful the same way the Golden Rule is even though both are silent regarding moral ends. (The MACS perspective reveals versions of the Golden Rule are unusually effective heuristics for MACS’ principles.)

And since MACS’ principles are silent about ultimate moral goals (ends), they, like the Golden Rule, are complementary with consequentialist moralities as described in “Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism”.

But are MACS’s moral principles normative, what people morally ought and ought not do? Or are they only morally irrelevant principles that underlie descriptively moral behaviors?

Bernard Gert’s definition of morality implies a way to determine normativity that is independent of any specific moral premise. He suggests that “…the term ‘morality’ can be used … normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.”

I know of no better definition of normativity and will use it to argue MACS’s principles define right and wrong concerning the ‘means’ of interactions with other people.

Gert’s inclusion of “given specified conditions” makes his criterion flexible enough to be adapted to separately judge the normativity of moral ‘means’ and moral ends (goals). I will adapt Gert’s proposal as:

“What is morally normative regarding the means of interactions between people is what all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people would advocate as moral.”

For this specific case, “well-informed” includes understanding objective scientific claims that:

1) “Past and present cultural moral norms are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems” and

2) The ability to solve cooperation problems that are present everywhere in our universe is necessary for the existence of all highly cooperative societies regardless of biology or environment. Cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment) that are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems are necessary for all highly cooperative societies composed of intelligent, self-interested agents such as human beings.

But even assuming the above scientific claims are accepted as true, would “all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people” agree to advocate for MACS’s two principles?

In favor of advocating for the claims:

1) Advocating for MACS will make it more likely we can maintain a highly cooperative society with all the social and individual benefits that cooperation brings.

2) MACS defines moral principles that are more than just cross-culturally universal. Because the cooperation problems they solve are innate to our universe, they are cross-species, environment, and time universal.

3) MACS’ principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because the reproductive fitness benefits that following them produced helped select for the biology underlying our moral sense. These principles specifically selected for our sense of fairness and our moral emotions: empathy, gratitude, loyalty, righteous indignation at the violation of moral norms, shame, and guilt. Their reproductive fitness benefits also selected for our emotional experience of ‘elevation’ (a pleasurable mix of satisfaction, pride, and optimism in the cooperative company of friends and family) as an incentive for living in cooperative groups. The emotional experience of elevation may be central to experiencing durable happiness.

4) MACS’ silence on moral ‘ends’ (the goals of this cooperation) leaves rational people largely free to advocate for their preferences or needs for moral goals. Those preferences could include: a) “Maximize well-being”, “Minimize suffering”, or “Maximize virtue”, b) claims that the morality of goals is culture dependent (implying moral ‘ends’ are subjective while moral ‘means’ can be objective), or c) whatever they favor at any given time.

5) MACS is attractive simply because it has the strongest argument for universality (independent of its normativity).

Why might “well-informed, mentally normal, rational people who accept the above scientific claims as provisionally true”not advocate for MACS’s principles?

1) Because one’s theology contradicts MACS’s principles. For example, a theology could claim that women must be submissive to men, which is immoral by MACS’s principles.

2) Because one’s rational thought leads them to otherwise define moral means such as Kant’s categorical imperatives.

3) Because one did not want to constrain their own behavior. They might expect to personally benefit if everyone else followed these principles but want to feel free to violate them based on their needs and preferences.

These negative reasons are arguably not compelling since:

1) Rather than rejecting MACS for theological reasons, it seems more likely that a rational, well-informed theologian will embrace it as an insight into how their god or gods created morality. Theologians are typically already well-informed about ongoing ‘reinterpretations” and ‘evolution’ of their theological moralities in the face of internal and external contradictions. Resolving those contradictions using principles innate to the universe their god created should be welcomed by rational, religious minds.

2) I expect a rational person would favor the MACS definition of moral means that are innate to our universe and harmonious with our moral sense rather than, for example, Kantianism with its well-known inherent disharmony with our moral sense. For example, a murderer could ask where his next victim is. The Kantian might feel morally obligated to tell the truth. By MACS, you would be morally obligated to lie to avoid the cooperation problem (violating indirect reciprocity) caused by murder.

3) Finally, a person could rationally advocate for moral principles for society without necessarily committing to always following them. A person could rationally decide to act immorally. In the case of MACS’ moral principles, this does not result in incoherence because while MACS’s principles are arguably normative (define right and wrong) they are not imperative (what everyone must do regardless of needs and preferences). It can be rational to violate them.

Someone may think of other reasons that rational, well-informed people might advocate for some other moral ‘means’ than MACS’ principles.

On the balance of the above pluses and minuses, it seems to me that all, or virtually all, “well-informed, mentally normal, rational people who accept the above scientific claims as provisionally true” will advocate for MACS’s principles rather than any other. MACS’ moral principles would then be classified by Gert’s criterion as normative.