Knowledge and induction within your self-context
Summary: Knowledge does not capture the truth, but is a tool to arrive at the most reasonable assessment of reality for survival and desired goals. Once we can establish what knowledge is, we can then attempt to rationally assess what to do upon reaching its limitations. The paper attempts to do the following.
Demonstrate that knowledge within a solo context can be subdivided into two separate approaches: Distinctive knowledge, and applied knowledge.
Demonstrate how Induction is a rational approach to situations in which the limits of deduction are reached. 4 subdivisions of induction will be analyzed to determine a hierarchy of inductions allowing a reasoned comparison between the cogency of types of inductions.
How to approach reading this paper: This may seem odd, but it is important to come to this paper with the correct mindset to keep discussion where it needs to be.
The discussion on this paper is intended to be an analysis of the terms and logic within it. Your primary approach should not be introducing your own idea of knowledge. Please make your own topic if that is what you desire.
Any outside reference to other theories cannot assume that theory is sound without first proving it is sound. Saying, Well X says this, is fine as long as you understand why X said that, that what X said can be shown to be sound, and its a valid point to bring against the theory.
Read the entire argument before posting please. If you have not read the full argument and have only read part of it, like just the summary for example, do not post here. I have encountered this multiple times in the past. It is extremely rude and a waste of my limited time to pursue a question or counter and find the person hasnt read the entire argument where this would be answered. I welcome all background levels and will not find any discussion poor as long as you have read the paper.
If this new attempt gets more traction I will post the second part that addresses knowledge in between more than one person, but for now this will remain in the context of a single person, or in your case, you, the reader.
Belief and Knowledge
Any discussion of knowledge must begin with beliefs. A belief is a will, or a sureness reality exists in a particular state. There are beliefs which are co-existent with reality, and there are beliefs which are contrary to reality. For example, I believe I can pick up a baseball with my hand from a table in front of me. If I act to reach over to the baseball, I can pick the ball up with my hand. My belief and my acting upon that belief is co-existent with reality. However, if I believe I can levitate the baseball with my mind alone, the baseball remains inert despite my will to do so. In this instance, my belief and the results of my acting upon that belief are contradictory.
Reality can therefore be defined as what results despite a belief being applied. It is better for one to apply a belief that one is certain will be co-existent with reality, and not contradicted by reality. This ensures that ones will and actions result in the expected outcome. The assessment of beliefs to ascertain that ones beliefs and actions will be contradicted by reality is what I would consider an attempt at gaining knowledge.
A contradiction from reality may be direct or indirect. A direct contradiction to a belief is a contrary existence. For example, I believe that eating this apple will be healthy, but the apple ends up being rotten and harmful. An indirect contradiction is an inability to experience ones belief in reality. For example, if I believe in an invisible and unsensible unicorn, there is nothing in reality with which I may apply this belief. There must be the potential for the belief to be applied and contradicted. Therefore such a belief could also not be knowledge.
There are two ways to reason whether a belief is not contradicted by reality. The first is induction. Generally I call this a belief that a belief is sound. The second is deduction. A deductive belief is that which cannot be contradicted from the information and experience available to oneself. Can a belief be deduced that cannot be contradicted by reality?
Such a belief was famously sought by Descartes in Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes begins to question all of his assumptions about the world. Is he dreaming? Are math and science real representations of the truth? Of what can anyone be certain? At the end of Descartes' journey of self-doubt, he arrives at a belief which appears he cannot doubt and requires no further justification in his mind, I think therefore I am. Of course, I can be doubted because what is I am?
I see, hear, smell, taste and touch. And yet this is still not basic enough. I sense. But even if I did not sense, I would be different from everything else. In recognizing a self, I am able to create two experiences. That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.
Why should I have this capability? I cannot answer this. What I can realize is I may sense, but I find I can focus on different parts of that sensation. I can see a field of grass. Now I create the identity of a blade of grass. Now a piece of that blade of grass. I part and parcel my sensations as I wish. I do not know what I am, or everything else is, but I do know that reality cannot contradict my ability to focus, create identities where I wish, and essentially discretely experience.
The beginning of knowledge Discrete Experiences
A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of ones experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can take a picture, look at portions of it, and make something within the everything else. It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of ones experience as one chooses.
Is this something I know? Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of discrete experience. But I also must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of the idea being contradicted by reality. For if I could not create identities, I could not create the idea of identities. For reality to contradict that I discretely experience, and to know this, I must be able to discretely experience. Therefore, I do not simply believe that I discretely experience, I deduce that I discretely experience. Therefore, I know that I discretely experience.
Thus, my first deductive belief that is not contradicted by reality, or bit of knowledge is not, I think therefore I am, but simply, I am a discrete experiencer. With my base established, I can now build more knowledge. I noted discrete experiences in regards to the senses, but what about discrete experience absent those senses? Closing off my senses reveals I produce discrete experiences I will call thoughts. If I think on a thought that would contradict the discrete experience of thoughts I again run into a contradiction. As such, I can deductively believe I have thoughts absent the senses as well.
It may seem odd that I am calling these things thoughts, as we all know what thoughts mean in English. At this time it is not that we can know things in English that I am trying to demonstrate, it is that I can know things. And if you can read and comprehend the ideas here, you can know things as well. English is necessary only as a medium to communicate to an other, something not yet known. There is only you, and you now know what thoughts are. You are the "I" of this paper.
I now combine my thoughts and my senses. This is another discrete experience, something I know I do, and so do. I look at a table in front of me. I close my eyes and think about the table. I open my eyes and I think, The table is still there. I am claiming two points. First, I am claiming I have memory, a thought which recalls itself as a prior experience. Second, I am attempting to apply this memory to the reality of my other current discrete experiences, that of the table before me.
Can I deductively believe I have memories without contradiction? A memory is a thought of a prior discrete experience. I find at this time, I cannot deductively justify that memories of a past discrete experience are accurate or inaccurate representations of that original discrete experience. I may believe they represent past experiences without contradiction, but this belief is indirectly contradicted by reality. I can never go back in time. Believing that a memory is not contradicted by past experience is currently something I cannot deductively believe, therefore it is an inductive belief. What I can deductively believe, is that I have the discrete experience of memories. Without memories, how could I remember my claim to what a memory is and deny its reality? The denial of experiencing the discrete experience of a memory is again a contradiction by reality, and I deductively believe, and thus know I have memories.
Distinctive Knowledge and Applicable Knowledge
Since I know I have memories, I wish to find a way to match a memory deductively to a current discrete experience without contradiction by reality. I will need some new vocabulary. A discrete experience could easily be called a distinction in philosophy. I know that I discretely experience. I will now claim that what I discretely experience is also known. This type of knowledge will be called distinctive knowledge. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of ones discrete experiences. Claims to their representations of a reality outside of the experience itself are not included.
What I discretely experience is distinctively known. Yet my distinctions assert more than the most basic discrete experiences about reality, such as applying meaning, consistent identities, and claims about greater reality beyond these distinctions. These types of distinctions are known to myself, but it is unknown whether their claims about reality apart from the distinction itself can be known. I find the only way to know such beliefs is to apply it beyond the distinction itself. This will be called applicable knowledge. The two types of knowledge summarized will not be explored in depth below.
The Formation of Distinctions
The first thing is to explore distinctions in depth. I travel down a road in the country and spy a strange thing which seems to interact differently from the existence I distinctly know. In English we this creature would be called a sheep, but I have never encountered the word, or the experience before now. To help me manage these many distinctions, I start to identify this new discrete experience and commit it to memory. There does not need to be a word, only a recognition of a distinction separate from another distinction. This is separate from that. Because I am capable of language, I will use a word as a symbol of this memory. I will make up a word and call it a shep.
There is no outside force that necessitates how I must discretely experience. Whatever I claim the distinction to be at the time of distinction, is what the distinction is. I decide to notice the shep as its own entity, (instead of part of the field for example). In that first moment of awareness, I observe the shep as an indistinct whole without detail. However, just like I can discretely experience words, then letters, then the ink which makes up a part of a letter, I find I can subdivide more discrete experiences within this initial discrete experience of the sheep. There are distinctions which may be made within distinctions. I notice that its curly fur and feet seem strange. If I wished, I could label these further discrete experiences as wool and hooves. As these separate discrete experiences are part of the larger discrete experience of the sheep, the subdivisions of the full discrete identity will be called properties of the shep.
There are also properties within the shep that I may currently or later discretely experience in my examination, but do not find important for my identity and memories. For example, smell, color, size, or any other properties besides the ones I use for my definition/memory, are irrelevant to me. Perhaps I am colorblind or deaf. As such, the colors and the noise of the shep do not matter. Perhaps I find it unimportant that a shep has a tail, as all creatures I have seen besides humans at this point in my life have had tails I could ignore the tail completely. I can decide how detailed, or how many properties of the sheep I wish to recognize and record into my memory without contradiction by reality, as long as I dont believe these distinctions represent something beyond this personal contextual knowledge.
The properties which I find are important to me for my memory, the curly fur and hooves, are identities of the sheep I call essential properties. Properties I observe which are irrelevant to my identity of the sheep, I call accidental properties. Accidental properties allow me to remark on how the identity is affected beyond its number of essential properties. If I wish to refer to those accidental properties, I may use them as addendums to shep. Thus, I could note a black shep, white shep, tall shep or short shep. What I ultimately define as a shep are the essential properties that I set, even if these essential properties are mere memories of experiences and beyond language.
Applying Those Distinctions to Reality
While these distinctions are known at their time of creation, I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality. To continue the example, later in the day I walk past another field and spy an experience that strikes me as familiar. I look at the discrete experience of the thing and further discretely experience two properties within the full discrete experience of the entity. I believe these two properties match what previously identified as curly fur and hooves. Can I apply these known memories to the current experience in front of me without contradiction from reality?
First, within my distinctive knowledge, I have no notion of any other memory of a discrete experience with the essential properties of both curly fur and hooves. Second, I choose not to identify this new thing as a newly defined memory. As such, I attempt to match this new discrete experience of the thing in the field, to a memory I know. Unlike the other forms of knowledge, I am not merely claiming the knowledge of the identities, memories, and experience I have. I am stating that these identities, memories, and experiences I have represent something apart from the experience itself. So I can distinctly know that I am attempting to match identities to an experience.
Can I have knowledge of, That experience over there matches the identity of a shep by simply having the experience itself? I know that Im having the experience of believing this, but can my belief about a thing that is outside of my immediate experience be deductively shown without contradiction from reality? This is one step higher than the distinctive knowledge of the experience itself. I am matching, or applying an identity beyond simply having the experience itself. If I can deductively do so without contradiction from reality, I will have successfully performed the seconds subdivision of knowledge, applicable knowledge.
To do so, I start with my current remembered identities. I have no other memory of anything with curly fur and hooves that is not a shep, but I still need to deductively confirm that what I observe are curly fur and hooves, if I am to know that the thing is a shep. I note that both my discrete experience of curly fur and hooves fit my images of curly fur and hooves in memory without contradiction from within myself. I could ask myself, But is the current image I have of curly fur the image that I had yesterday? That is a question of applicable knowledge that cannot be known with the information I have. The only thing I distinctively know is the memory I experience today. I find that I have no other memories that could match to my discrete experience of the creature before me. Since I do not wish to create new distinctive knowledge, and there is nothing within experienced reality which directly or indirectly contradicts my deduction that these memories match, I have obtained applicable knowledge that I am observing wool and hooves.
1. My discrete experience matches all of my created essential properties of what I consider a shep.
2. I cannot reasonably match the discrete experience to another known identity.
3. My belief that this creature is a shep is by deduction.
4. Reality does not directly or indirectly contradict the claim at the moment of conclusion.
Conclusion: Therefore I know by application this thing is a shep.
Considering Issues with Knowledge
What if I have two conflicting memories? Imagine I have a distinctive knowledge conflict with two separate memories of hooves. I will call them memory A and B respectively. I must decide which memory I want to use before applying it to reality. Perhaps in memory A, it is essential that a hoof is curved at the top, while in memory B, it is essential that a hoof is pointed at the top. I can decide to use either memory A or B without contradiction, but not apply both memory A and B at the same time. I can, however, decide to apply memory A for one second, then apply believe memory B one second later. Such a state is called confusion or thinking.' at the symbolic distinctive level. Once I decide to applicably believe either memory A or B, I can then attempt to deductively apply that belief. My distinct experience of the hoof will either deny memory A, memory B, or both. If I have a memory of A and B for hoof that both retains validity when applied, then they are either synonyms or one subsumes the other.
What if I experience a shep which seems to be different from the initial identity I created? What if the 'shep' is a perfectly convincing hologram? My distinction of a sheep up to this point has been purely visual. The only thing which would separate a perfectly convincing hologram from a physical sheep would be other sensory interactions. If I have no distinctive knowledge of alternative sensory attributes of a sheep, such as touch, I cannot use those in my application. As my distinctive knowledge is purely visual, I would still applicably know the hologram as a sheep. There is no other deductive belief I could make.
However, if I touch both the solid and hologram sheep and find a difference, I now have a distinctive choice. I could decide the lack of physical solidness of one sheep is an accidental property and simply state, Some sheep I can pass my hands through; others, I can't. If I decide the physical properties of a sheep are essential, I can create a new distinctive identity called a hologram with its separate and unique combination of essential properties. The distinctive decision determines what I then applicably know. If I distinctively know touch as an accidental property, then by sight alone, I will applicably know both a hologram and a solid sheep as a sheep. I must discretely experience an entity with touch before I could applicably know whether the creature is a perfectly convincing hologram or a sheep. The more essential properties I introduce within my distinctions, the more I have to apply them to reality to determine if this application is a deductive belief.
The specifications of my essential properties determine the essential differences I can apply, and it is entirely my choice. Instead of a hologram, imagine a more real world scenario. I continue walking down the field and spy another creature I have never heard or experienced before which society calls a goat. I look at the goat and notice some distinctions I will call horns and a beard. I continue to make further distinctions and note that I can deductively believe and apply that the animal has hooves and curly hair. Here, I have a choice.
Like the hologram, if I find the horns and beard are non-essential distinctions, then matching my memory of a shep to this goat, I would applicably know it to be a shep. Perhaps I did not notice the beard or horns. If I do, I may still only label them as accidental properties, and state, That is a shep with a beard and horns.
If instead I find the horns and beard as essential properties. In my mind, this sets it as something different enough from a sheep to see it as a more distinct identity. In this case, I have an identity with essential properties that a shep does not have. Once I have this identity to compare to in my memory, any future creatures with the essential properties of a goat can no longer be applicably known as a shep. While the shep and goat may share some essential properties, they do not share all of them.
Knowledge of Applicable Limits
Understanding the distinctive and applicable subdivisions of knowledge allows us also grasp the limits of when something is outside of these subtypes of knowledge. As an example I walk further down a field and spy a thing with wool and hooves walking away from me. Because it is walking away, I am unable to see its head. As I am unable to observe the creatures face and see if it has a beard or not, I am unable to claim a deductive belief, or knowledge that the entity is definitively a sheep or a goat. Any such assertive claim that the creature is definitively one or the other, would be contradicted indirectly by my inability to observe the face of the entity. Such a belief would be inductive.
Demonstrate that knowledge within a solo context can be subdivided into two separate approaches: Distinctive knowledge, and applied knowledge.
Demonstrate how Induction is a rational approach to situations in which the limits of deduction are reached. 4 subdivisions of induction will be analyzed to determine a hierarchy of inductions allowing a reasoned comparison between the cogency of types of inductions.
How to approach reading this paper: This may seem odd, but it is important to come to this paper with the correct mindset to keep discussion where it needs to be.
The discussion on this paper is intended to be an analysis of the terms and logic within it. Your primary approach should not be introducing your own idea of knowledge. Please make your own topic if that is what you desire.
Any outside reference to other theories cannot assume that theory is sound without first proving it is sound. Saying, Well X says this, is fine as long as you understand why X said that, that what X said can be shown to be sound, and its a valid point to bring against the theory.
Read the entire argument before posting please. If you have not read the full argument and have only read part of it, like just the summary for example, do not post here. I have encountered this multiple times in the past. It is extremely rude and a waste of my limited time to pursue a question or counter and find the person hasnt read the entire argument where this would be answered. I welcome all background levels and will not find any discussion poor as long as you have read the paper.
If this new attempt gets more traction I will post the second part that addresses knowledge in between more than one person, but for now this will remain in the context of a single person, or in your case, you, the reader.
Belief and Knowledge
Any discussion of knowledge must begin with beliefs. A belief is a will, or a sureness reality exists in a particular state. There are beliefs which are co-existent with reality, and there are beliefs which are contrary to reality. For example, I believe I can pick up a baseball with my hand from a table in front of me. If I act to reach over to the baseball, I can pick the ball up with my hand. My belief and my acting upon that belief is co-existent with reality. However, if I believe I can levitate the baseball with my mind alone, the baseball remains inert despite my will to do so. In this instance, my belief and the results of my acting upon that belief are contradictory.
Reality can therefore be defined as what results despite a belief being applied. It is better for one to apply a belief that one is certain will be co-existent with reality, and not contradicted by reality. This ensures that ones will and actions result in the expected outcome. The assessment of beliefs to ascertain that ones beliefs and actions will be contradicted by reality is what I would consider an attempt at gaining knowledge.
A contradiction from reality may be direct or indirect. A direct contradiction to a belief is a contrary existence. For example, I believe that eating this apple will be healthy, but the apple ends up being rotten and harmful. An indirect contradiction is an inability to experience ones belief in reality. For example, if I believe in an invisible and unsensible unicorn, there is nothing in reality with which I may apply this belief. There must be the potential for the belief to be applied and contradicted. Therefore such a belief could also not be knowledge.
There are two ways to reason whether a belief is not contradicted by reality. The first is induction. Generally I call this a belief that a belief is sound. The second is deduction. A deductive belief is that which cannot be contradicted from the information and experience available to oneself. Can a belief be deduced that cannot be contradicted by reality?
Such a belief was famously sought by Descartes in Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes begins to question all of his assumptions about the world. Is he dreaming? Are math and science real representations of the truth? Of what can anyone be certain? At the end of Descartes' journey of self-doubt, he arrives at a belief which appears he cannot doubt and requires no further justification in his mind, I think therefore I am. Of course, I can be doubted because what is I am?
I see, hear, smell, taste and touch. And yet this is still not basic enough. I sense. But even if I did not sense, I would be different from everything else. In recognizing a self, I am able to create two experiences. That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.
Why should I have this capability? I cannot answer this. What I can realize is I may sense, but I find I can focus on different parts of that sensation. I can see a field of grass. Now I create the identity of a blade of grass. Now a piece of that blade of grass. I part and parcel my sensations as I wish. I do not know what I am, or everything else is, but I do know that reality cannot contradict my ability to focus, create identities where I wish, and essentially discretely experience.
The beginning of knowledge Discrete Experiences
A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of ones experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can take a picture, look at portions of it, and make something within the everything else. It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of ones experience as one chooses.
Is this something I know? Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of discrete experience. But I also must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of the idea being contradicted by reality. For if I could not create identities, I could not create the idea of identities. For reality to contradict that I discretely experience, and to know this, I must be able to discretely experience. Therefore, I do not simply believe that I discretely experience, I deduce that I discretely experience. Therefore, I know that I discretely experience.
Thus, my first deductive belief that is not contradicted by reality, or bit of knowledge is not, I think therefore I am, but simply, I am a discrete experiencer. With my base established, I can now build more knowledge. I noted discrete experiences in regards to the senses, but what about discrete experience absent those senses? Closing off my senses reveals I produce discrete experiences I will call thoughts. If I think on a thought that would contradict the discrete experience of thoughts I again run into a contradiction. As such, I can deductively believe I have thoughts absent the senses as well.
It may seem odd that I am calling these things thoughts, as we all know what thoughts mean in English. At this time it is not that we can know things in English that I am trying to demonstrate, it is that I can know things. And if you can read and comprehend the ideas here, you can know things as well. English is necessary only as a medium to communicate to an other, something not yet known. There is only you, and you now know what thoughts are. You are the "I" of this paper.
I now combine my thoughts and my senses. This is another discrete experience, something I know I do, and so do. I look at a table in front of me. I close my eyes and think about the table. I open my eyes and I think, The table is still there. I am claiming two points. First, I am claiming I have memory, a thought which recalls itself as a prior experience. Second, I am attempting to apply this memory to the reality of my other current discrete experiences, that of the table before me.
Can I deductively believe I have memories without contradiction? A memory is a thought of a prior discrete experience. I find at this time, I cannot deductively justify that memories of a past discrete experience are accurate or inaccurate representations of that original discrete experience. I may believe they represent past experiences without contradiction, but this belief is indirectly contradicted by reality. I can never go back in time. Believing that a memory is not contradicted by past experience is currently something I cannot deductively believe, therefore it is an inductive belief. What I can deductively believe, is that I have the discrete experience of memories. Without memories, how could I remember my claim to what a memory is and deny its reality? The denial of experiencing the discrete experience of a memory is again a contradiction by reality, and I deductively believe, and thus know I have memories.
Distinctive Knowledge and Applicable Knowledge
Since I know I have memories, I wish to find a way to match a memory deductively to a current discrete experience without contradiction by reality. I will need some new vocabulary. A discrete experience could easily be called a distinction in philosophy. I know that I discretely experience. I will now claim that what I discretely experience is also known. This type of knowledge will be called distinctive knowledge. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of ones discrete experiences. Claims to their representations of a reality outside of the experience itself are not included.
What I discretely experience is distinctively known. Yet my distinctions assert more than the most basic discrete experiences about reality, such as applying meaning, consistent identities, and claims about greater reality beyond these distinctions. These types of distinctions are known to myself, but it is unknown whether their claims about reality apart from the distinction itself can be known. I find the only way to know such beliefs is to apply it beyond the distinction itself. This will be called applicable knowledge. The two types of knowledge summarized will not be explored in depth below.
The Formation of Distinctions
The first thing is to explore distinctions in depth. I travel down a road in the country and spy a strange thing which seems to interact differently from the existence I distinctly know. In English we this creature would be called a sheep, but I have never encountered the word, or the experience before now. To help me manage these many distinctions, I start to identify this new discrete experience and commit it to memory. There does not need to be a word, only a recognition of a distinction separate from another distinction. This is separate from that. Because I am capable of language, I will use a word as a symbol of this memory. I will make up a word and call it a shep.
There is no outside force that necessitates how I must discretely experience. Whatever I claim the distinction to be at the time of distinction, is what the distinction is. I decide to notice the shep as its own entity, (instead of part of the field for example). In that first moment of awareness, I observe the shep as an indistinct whole without detail. However, just like I can discretely experience words, then letters, then the ink which makes up a part of a letter, I find I can subdivide more discrete experiences within this initial discrete experience of the sheep. There are distinctions which may be made within distinctions. I notice that its curly fur and feet seem strange. If I wished, I could label these further discrete experiences as wool and hooves. As these separate discrete experiences are part of the larger discrete experience of the sheep, the subdivisions of the full discrete identity will be called properties of the shep.
There are also properties within the shep that I may currently or later discretely experience in my examination, but do not find important for my identity and memories. For example, smell, color, size, or any other properties besides the ones I use for my definition/memory, are irrelevant to me. Perhaps I am colorblind or deaf. As such, the colors and the noise of the shep do not matter. Perhaps I find it unimportant that a shep has a tail, as all creatures I have seen besides humans at this point in my life have had tails I could ignore the tail completely. I can decide how detailed, or how many properties of the sheep I wish to recognize and record into my memory without contradiction by reality, as long as I dont believe these distinctions represent something beyond this personal contextual knowledge.
The properties which I find are important to me for my memory, the curly fur and hooves, are identities of the sheep I call essential properties. Properties I observe which are irrelevant to my identity of the sheep, I call accidental properties. Accidental properties allow me to remark on how the identity is affected beyond its number of essential properties. If I wish to refer to those accidental properties, I may use them as addendums to shep. Thus, I could note a black shep, white shep, tall shep or short shep. What I ultimately define as a shep are the essential properties that I set, even if these essential properties are mere memories of experiences and beyond language.
Applying Those Distinctions to Reality
While these distinctions are known at their time of creation, I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality. To continue the example, later in the day I walk past another field and spy an experience that strikes me as familiar. I look at the discrete experience of the thing and further discretely experience two properties within the full discrete experience of the entity. I believe these two properties match what previously identified as curly fur and hooves. Can I apply these known memories to the current experience in front of me without contradiction from reality?
First, within my distinctive knowledge, I have no notion of any other memory of a discrete experience with the essential properties of both curly fur and hooves. Second, I choose not to identify this new thing as a newly defined memory. As such, I attempt to match this new discrete experience of the thing in the field, to a memory I know. Unlike the other forms of knowledge, I am not merely claiming the knowledge of the identities, memories, and experience I have. I am stating that these identities, memories, and experiences I have represent something apart from the experience itself. So I can distinctly know that I am attempting to match identities to an experience.
Can I have knowledge of, That experience over there matches the identity of a shep by simply having the experience itself? I know that Im having the experience of believing this, but can my belief about a thing that is outside of my immediate experience be deductively shown without contradiction from reality? This is one step higher than the distinctive knowledge of the experience itself. I am matching, or applying an identity beyond simply having the experience itself. If I can deductively do so without contradiction from reality, I will have successfully performed the seconds subdivision of knowledge, applicable knowledge.
To do so, I start with my current remembered identities. I have no other memory of anything with curly fur and hooves that is not a shep, but I still need to deductively confirm that what I observe are curly fur and hooves, if I am to know that the thing is a shep. I note that both my discrete experience of curly fur and hooves fit my images of curly fur and hooves in memory without contradiction from within myself. I could ask myself, But is the current image I have of curly fur the image that I had yesterday? That is a question of applicable knowledge that cannot be known with the information I have. The only thing I distinctively know is the memory I experience today. I find that I have no other memories that could match to my discrete experience of the creature before me. Since I do not wish to create new distinctive knowledge, and there is nothing within experienced reality which directly or indirectly contradicts my deduction that these memories match, I have obtained applicable knowledge that I am observing wool and hooves.
1. My discrete experience matches all of my created essential properties of what I consider a shep.
2. I cannot reasonably match the discrete experience to another known identity.
3. My belief that this creature is a shep is by deduction.
4. Reality does not directly or indirectly contradict the claim at the moment of conclusion.
Conclusion: Therefore I know by application this thing is a shep.
Considering Issues with Knowledge
What if I have two conflicting memories? Imagine I have a distinctive knowledge conflict with two separate memories of hooves. I will call them memory A and B respectively. I must decide which memory I want to use before applying it to reality. Perhaps in memory A, it is essential that a hoof is curved at the top, while in memory B, it is essential that a hoof is pointed at the top. I can decide to use either memory A or B without contradiction, but not apply both memory A and B at the same time. I can, however, decide to apply memory A for one second, then apply believe memory B one second later. Such a state is called confusion or thinking.' at the symbolic distinctive level. Once I decide to applicably believe either memory A or B, I can then attempt to deductively apply that belief. My distinct experience of the hoof will either deny memory A, memory B, or both. If I have a memory of A and B for hoof that both retains validity when applied, then they are either synonyms or one subsumes the other.
What if I experience a shep which seems to be different from the initial identity I created? What if the 'shep' is a perfectly convincing hologram? My distinction of a sheep up to this point has been purely visual. The only thing which would separate a perfectly convincing hologram from a physical sheep would be other sensory interactions. If I have no distinctive knowledge of alternative sensory attributes of a sheep, such as touch, I cannot use those in my application. As my distinctive knowledge is purely visual, I would still applicably know the hologram as a sheep. There is no other deductive belief I could make.
However, if I touch both the solid and hologram sheep and find a difference, I now have a distinctive choice. I could decide the lack of physical solidness of one sheep is an accidental property and simply state, Some sheep I can pass my hands through; others, I can't. If I decide the physical properties of a sheep are essential, I can create a new distinctive identity called a hologram with its separate and unique combination of essential properties. The distinctive decision determines what I then applicably know. If I distinctively know touch as an accidental property, then by sight alone, I will applicably know both a hologram and a solid sheep as a sheep. I must discretely experience an entity with touch before I could applicably know whether the creature is a perfectly convincing hologram or a sheep. The more essential properties I introduce within my distinctions, the more I have to apply them to reality to determine if this application is a deductive belief.
The specifications of my essential properties determine the essential differences I can apply, and it is entirely my choice. Instead of a hologram, imagine a more real world scenario. I continue walking down the field and spy another creature I have never heard or experienced before which society calls a goat. I look at the goat and notice some distinctions I will call horns and a beard. I continue to make further distinctions and note that I can deductively believe and apply that the animal has hooves and curly hair. Here, I have a choice.
Like the hologram, if I find the horns and beard are non-essential distinctions, then matching my memory of a shep to this goat, I would applicably know it to be a shep. Perhaps I did not notice the beard or horns. If I do, I may still only label them as accidental properties, and state, That is a shep with a beard and horns.
If instead I find the horns and beard as essential properties. In my mind, this sets it as something different enough from a sheep to see it as a more distinct identity. In this case, I have an identity with essential properties that a shep does not have. Once I have this identity to compare to in my memory, any future creatures with the essential properties of a goat can no longer be applicably known as a shep. While the shep and goat may share some essential properties, they do not share all of them.
Knowledge of Applicable Limits
Understanding the distinctive and applicable subdivisions of knowledge allows us also grasp the limits of when something is outside of these subtypes of knowledge. As an example I walk further down a field and spy a thing with wool and hooves walking away from me. Because it is walking away, I am unable to see its head. As I am unable to observe the creatures face and see if it has a beard or not, I am unable to claim a deductive belief, or knowledge that the entity is definitively a sheep or a goat. Any such assertive claim that the creature is definitively one or the other, would be contradicted indirectly by my inability to observe the face of the entity. Such a belief would be inductive.
Comments (143)
While a method of evaluating beliefs through a deductive methodology has been proposed, there are times when a belief cannot be deduced. In these cases the only type of belief available is an inductive belief. So far, an inductive belief has been classified as merely a belief. Intuitively however, people have regarded certain inductions as more cogent than others. Understanding how beliefs can be deduced into knowledge also allows insight that not all inductive beliefs are the same.
In evaluating inductions I looked at them from the standpoint of their relations to distinctive and applicable knowledge. In looking at the interplay between distinctive and applicable knowledge, I noticed that certain inductions strayed more or less further from the knowledge process. This allowed me to definitely demonstrate why one induction is more reasonable than another. From this, I propose 4 baseline inductions: probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational induction.
Probability
The induction considered mathematically the most cogent is probability. An example of probability is the statement, The random chance of pulling a jack out of a normal deck of 52 playing cards is 4/52. If it is applicably known there are four jacks in a deck of 52 playing cards, the cards have been randomly shuffled, and the person who draws the card is unable to discern which card is which, deductively a 4/52 chance is the only possibility. Any prediction about the future is innately inductive, but a probability is the most rational type of prediction about the future because its justification the applicably known limits of what can occur given the situation.
Probability will also reveal how I can evaluate other inductions cogency. If applicable knowledge is a deduction that cannot be contradicted by reality, then the possible outcome when considering all of the evidence leading to that knowledge is 100%. There is only one conclusion that can be reached, no other possibilities. If I then make another claim of applicable knowledge using a prior claim of knowledge as justification, as justification, the second justification is a 1*1=100% probability of being applicable knowledge.
If I make a pure induction, its probability is less than 100% of being logically sound. The definition of an induction is that the premises do not necessarily lead to the conclusion. This means that the probability of an inductions result being a belief that does not contradict reality is 1 out of an unknown other possibilities. To simplify this concept, imagine an inductions probability of not being contradicted by reality is 50%, as in the shep/goat example when I could not see its face. I arrive at 50% because there are only two distinctively known possible outcomes. (Note: I am ignoring the possibility of a person forming new distinctive knowledge to simplify the example).
If more than one probable induction is combined, the likelihood of its occurrence can be reasoned out. For example, I guess that its a shep instead of a goat, then I guess that the shep is male. Since I distinctly only know of two possible sexes, the probability of both of them being sounds is .5*.5 or a 25% chance. Any probability of less than one multiplied by any probability of less than one will always result in an overall lower chance of being correct. The more inductions one uses as justification for new inductions, the less likely their conclusion will be a rationally concluded belief.
Possibility
From this understanding, the next cogent induction down from probability that can be defined is possibility. A possibility is a belief that something applicably known at least once, can be applicably known again without consideration of its likelihood. For example, I applicably know people can put a jack in a deck of cards, shuffle it randomly, and draw a jack on the first draw. Therefore, it is possible that when a deck of shuffled cards has a jack in it, it can be randomly drawn on the first draw again. However, I am not evaluating the probability that it will happen, only that it is possible.
A possibility is cogent because it relies on previous applicable knowledge. It is not inventing a belief about reality which has never been applicably known. Like probability, a possibility is an applicably known outcome. We applicably known there is a Jack in the deck of cards, and thus if someone randomly pulls a card, it is a possible outcome that it is a jack. A possibility is less cogent than a probability because while both rely on applicable knowledge as a justification for their inductions, a possibility does not examine all of the facts to conclude a deduced chance of its likelihood. For example, it is possible that I could win the lottery, but highly improbable. I would be more rational in my belief that I will likely not win if I buy a ticket based on probability, then ignoring probability and simply believing it is possible that I will win if I buy a ticket today.
What I cannot do while comparing inductions is state the specific likelihood that one is more possible than another. I can claim that it is unlikely that I will win the lottery, and also believe it is possible. But what I can do is base my decisions on what is most applicably known. If I examine the possibility of winning the lottery, I can realize it is incredibly unlikely that I will win in a particular place, lets say 1 out of 1 million. If however I examine another lottery elsewhere, I find the chances of winning are 1 out of 100,000. If both pay out equally, I can take the more rational probability and bet on the one that has the greater chance of winning.
Without probability, if I know it is possible to win the lottery in both states, but do not know the odds, there is no way to determine which possibility is more likely to occur. Thus if there are two possibilities, I cannot deductively conclude which one has the greater chance of occurring. If I only examine the possibility that I can win without analyzing the probability, my belief has less applicable knowledge involved, and thus I cannot know the likelihood of winning.
While I cannot compare possibilities alone and determine which one is more cogent, I can compare probabilities to possibilities and determine that probabilities are more cogent to make decisions on. Thus, a hierarchy of inductions seems to be a better way to evaluate inductions than evaluating what is more cogent within the particular hierarchy set. Still, both probability and possibility rely on the belief, What has been applicably known once could be applicably experienced again. This brings up the problem of induction by Hume. What reason compels us to believe that what has happened once can happen again? If one has applicable knowledge of moments in which one applicably experienced something, and moments in which one did not applicably experience that same thing, one cannot applicably know that the applicable knowledge will, or will not be experienced again. The only way to applicably know one will or will not experience what one applicably knew again, is if one either does experience, or does not experience what one applicably knows again. Thus the decision to make an induction is something outside of applicable knowledge.
Relying on Humes base criticism of induction is not a rational decision,, but an ingrained thing that I simply do. I in fact, must do it, just like I create discrete experiences. Making inductions is something that is necessitated by our very existence. Forming applicable knowledge takes time and careful reason, something the world does not always afford an individual before a decision must be made. With the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge, just like I can shape our discrete experiences into better expressions and tools for greater success, I can manage and shape my inductions as well.
Plausibility
Continuing on, this leaves the remaining two classifications of induction: plausibility, and irrational. While probability and possibilities rely on applicable knowledge, these two new inductions rely only on distinctions. A plausibility is the belief that an applicable belief will be applicably known before an application has been made. This breaks down even further into two subgroups. There are applicable and inapplicable plausibilities. An applicable plausibility is a plausibility which has not been applicably tested, but can be. An inapplicable plausibility is a belief which is unable to be applicably tested.
Imagine I open a brand new deck of 52 cards and have looked at them. I know that its a 4/52 probability that the first card I draw will be a jack. I know that its possible for the first card drawn to be a jack. However, my mind whirls and I think to myself, What if its possible that all the cards are actually magical cards that grant me a wish when I pull one? I've never experienced this before in opening a new deck of cards, so using the word possible is incorrect. I dont applicably know if its actually possible that all the cards could grant wishes. The correct term is plausible" when I have formed a new distinctive idea that has not yet been tested in application.
Without the understanding that knowledge has the two subdivisions of distinctive and applicable, the distinction of plausible can be difficult to identify. However, there is a clear difference between the possible, and the plausible. What is possible must have been applicably known at least one time. What is plausible is a distinctively known concept that has yet to be applicably tested.
An applicable plausibility is previously unapplied distinctive knowledge that can be applied. In this case, an easy way to test the idea that all cards are magical wish granting cards, is to pull the cards and see if my wish is granted. If at least one of the cards does not, then my plausible belief is now applicably known as incorrect. An inapplicable plausibility would be when I had no means of applicably testing My claim. For example, I are unable to, or refuse to open up the deck of cards and pull one.
Another example of an inapplicable plausibility is Descartes Evil Demon, argument. In his meditations, Descartes stated that perhaps his entire view of reality was flawed because an Evil Demon tricked him into believing a false reality. There must be essential properties of this Evil Demon that I could apply. As the Evil Demon cannot be sensed in any way, there is no criteria of application. The plausibility is inapplicable.
What is common to both plausibilities is that they are distinctive ideas without application. In the hierarchy, plausibilities are less cogent than possibilities. The simple reason is that possibilities and possibilities are based on something which has been applicably known. A plausibility has not yet reached this level. It is more cogent to base my reason on what has been confirmed to exist in reality, then what has not. Myths and conspiracy theories are good examples.
Irrational
Finally, an irrational belief is a belief that distinctive knowledge which is applicably known to be contradictory to reality, still may somehow be real. An example would be a person watches a deck of 52 cards being shuffled, a jack is randomly pulled, and it actually grants a wish. There are no tricks, and this is applicably confirmed. Despite the applicable knowledge that a jack was randomly pulled, the person irrationally insists on believing it is impossible for card to grant wishes.
Justification for irrational beliefs cannot rely on applicable knowledge, irrational beliefs are a contradiction to applicable knowledge. Irrational beliefs are either justified by reliance on other inductions, or simply have no justification at all beyond ones personal desire. This does not mean irrational inductions cannot be eventually found to be an applicable outcome. Perhaps in the future new experiences demonstrate that the card wasnt actually magical, despite the idea that it granted wishes being the only deduced outcome that could be ascertained at the time. Irrational inductions are at the bottom of the hierarchy of inductions, as they go against rationality itself.
Hierarchy of Inductions Summary
Induction examined from the applicable knowledge of deductive justification provides a rational way to evaluate competing inductive beliefs. This is important, for while one cannot rationally argue which possibility is more rational to believe in, one can argue a probability makes the claim of a possibility irrelevant. Thus I can now take different inductions and determine which is most rational to make decisions on.
To summarize:
In an applicably known deck of 52 playing cards with four jacks,
It is a 4/52 probability that a jack will be drawn the first pull.
It is possible that a jack will be drawn.
It is plausible that drawn card will grant me a wish.
It is irrational that if I draw an applicably known Jack, I believe it is not a Jack.
Here I can see how each progressive induction is lower in the hierarchy. To be clear, when comparing inductions within the same hierarchy (besides probability), there isnt an easy way to determine which induction is more cogent. It is possible that a jack could be drawn, but also possible that a jack could not be drawn. Looking at possibilities alone cannot tell us which is more rational to believe in for the first card draw. It is equally plausible that the drawn card could grant myself a wish, but also plausible that it sings a tune for me. It is equally irrational to believe the Jack I draw is not a Jack, and that despite my drawing the card, I did not actually draw it.
At this point, this theory of knowledge has been distinctively known and applied within a single individuals context. This does not yet address knowledge between more than one individual, but I will definitely post the continuation if this gets enough traction and discussion. Thank you for reading all the way! Feel free to post questions and criticisms at this point. I honestly have so much more to say, but I understand the length is already quite long for these forums. I will be reserving the next post for optional reading focused on questions and comments that are repeated below.
So far, deductive beliefs have been made from the self. But what of other people? Can I deductively believe other people exist? I will define other people as other Is. Recall I is a discrete experiencer. Distinctly, I know a language and have written ideas expressed in this language on this paper. To comprehend this language, a thing must be able to discretely experience and be an I. I have written words down, and if another being, which would be you, is reading the words right now then you too are an I. Therefore, if you are reading this, then you exist as an I. If I come across you reading these words and understanding these words,, and you are not correlative with my will, then you are an I separate from myself. For my current purposes in applicably knowing other people exist, this is enough.
If other people exist as other Is like myself, then they too can have deductive beliefs. I will call another I a subject and their ability to deduce is their subjective deduction. How do we handle that two of us can have different distinctive knowledge? The sensible way is to realize we must come to agreement on two things. First, there needs to be agreement about our distinctive knowledge. To agree, there must be an agreement of enough essential properties that we would conclude the same deductive result when applying this new distinctive agreement.. What properties are agreed to be essential between two people is called distinctive context.
To demonstrate a resolution of conflicting distinctive context, imagine I walk by a field and spy what I distinctively and applicably know to be a sheep. It has curly fur, hooves, and lacks a beard. A rancher is in the field tending the sheep. I call to him saying, Nice sheep! The rancher turns to me puzzled and states, Actually, thats a goat.
I assume it is a difference in distinctive knowledge within the definition,, so I politely ask the rancher what it is that makes that a goat.. Smiling the rancher explains not all goats have beards, but one distinction between sheep and goats is their tails. He shows me the short upright tail of the creature and explains that this property is essential to define a goat.
I reply,, I didnt know that, thanks! If I do so, I am expanding my distinctive knowledge to equal the ranchers. However, context adds another layer of choice and complication. My agreement might amend my personal definition, or, it could be my definition is only within the context of speaking with ranchers, while keeping my old sheep definition the same for non-rancher contexts.
Alternatively, I could reject the distinctive knowledge of the rancher. Instead, I could state The tail is unimportant. Its just a sheep with a short upright tail! Its silly to call it a goat when the defining feature of a goat is its beard. There is nothing innate to reality which requires I accept the distinctive context of the rancher, just as there is nothing innate to reality that requires the rancher to accept my personal distinctive context. Distinctive contexts are choices of Is, and not laws of reality.
As there are potentially as many distinctive contexts as there are combinations of people in the world, societies invented languages as distinctive contextual standards. A language is a societal construct of distinctive knowledge one may reference when communicating with another person. If someone decided to define a goat as a sheep, they could not do so within the established prescripts of the English language. A language gives a standard of distinctive knowledge to encourage a common ground for communication. As such, we will go forward with more confidence that we are using English in this papers communication, with a few of my own distinctive words that we are agreeing to for this topic.
Even within a language, peoples ways of discretely experiencing the world can change the distinctive context.. A person's genetics or past experiences may incline them to discretely experience properties different from others when experiencing the same stimulus. A colorblind person will discretely experience a green and red apple differently than a person who sees color. A weak person's experience of what is heavy will differ from a very strong person. One person may look at a sheep for the first time and marvel at its wool while another thinks nothing of the wool and marvels at its tail. As such, a language is usually only a baseline, and a contextual context of essential properties must be agreed upon within each new group of communicating people.
For example, one way to establish a discrete context is to agree to forgo discussing any discrete experiences two people are unable to share. For example, when speaking with a blind person, both people may decide to forgo any communication regarding sight. Such an applicable context does not negate the distinctive knowledge of a sheep having visual properties, those properties are simply not important or useful in this particular contextual communication. Thus I could file away in my head, Sheep that is in the English language for people with sight, sheep for people without sight, and sheep between me and a group of friends, and these would all be valid distinctive contexts.
Imagine two friends are lifting weights in the gym. One lifts 100 pounds with every ounce of their strength while the other lifts 100 pounds with ease. When communicating, the stronger weight lifter praises their friend for lifting such a heavy weight. The intention of this context is to enter into the weaker weight lifters distinctive experience, and is not addressing the stronger weight lifters personal context of heavy that he uses for only his self-context.
In some cases, there may be a distinctive disagreement two people can never agree on. One person might like the color blue more than any other, while another person likes the color green more than any other. In this case, we cannot enter into the same distinctive context regarding the appeal of colors. Our understanding of this and acceptance of anothers self-subjective distinction is called an opinion.
Just like a language is a standard baseline to share a contextual discrete set of beliefs, there are often standards set to deal with the differences within perceptions and measurements. One such standard in society is math. Math does not consider the specifics of what a person is discretely experiencing. Instead, math considers the logic of discrete experiencing itself. A discrete experience is one. The act of discretely experiencing two discrete experiences as a group is two, therefore, 1+1=2. These standards are translated into tools of application. As the distinctive knowledge of math is consistently applied and deductively confirmed as a representative of the logic of discrete experiences itself, it is one of the standardized languages of discrete experience.
Yet even with math as a baseline, its application is still within a context as well. For example, we can measure a large group of people together and say, X height is higher than average, so well call that tall. Tall of course can change, even with math, based on the group of people one is measuring. If Im only measuring Americans, what is tall might differ greatly when comparing to Chinese people. And of course, the context of tall may change once again when I apply it to both countries.
Once contextual agreements are established, the deductive steps needed for an applicable conclusion are the same as within a self-context.. If those contextual beliefs are applied to reality without contradiction, they are applicably known within that context.
While optimally, we should use distinctive contexts that lead to clear deductive beliefs, deduction takes time and energy, and is not always practical. When a well-designed context runs into limits, there is no recourse but induction. Fortunately, we have the hierarchy of induction once again. As long as we agree on the definitions involved, we can practice contextual applicable knowledge.
This is my first real post, when leaving my introduction. I am not well versed in philosophy, so it took me a couple of hours to read and understand this, and I am still far from actively grasping it, but I am also eager to respond as well. It was very captivating, and I have enjoyed it so far, as I believe I will further when I delve more into it.
Since you welcome all background levels, I assumed that includes me. I have read the paper, and have tried to keep a correct mindset. When I strayed into my own ideas or patterns, I went back to understanding and deduction ;)
It was a challenge to understand, and it felt like starting to grapple with puzzles in Riven (Myst games) Like how does this work, what is all this information etc., but as I am starting to get it, I must say I am honestly positively surprised at how well I liked this, even though I have a very different approach.
I decided to show you my summary. It is very short compared to what was written there originally, but written more in my own words. I thought it would be helpful to get a grasp on how I structure things. But I do not want any comments on the summary, except for with regard to what I wrote under Plausibility. I am curious about your view on what I wrote there.
After the summary, I will write some of my thoughts. In line with your intent for this thread, I will try to keep it focused.
Hope you like it.
Quoting Philosophim
Belief and Knowledge
Beliefs are intentions that are congruous with reality.
Gaining knowledge is finding out if beliefs are contradicted by reality.
Belief, without the potential to be contradicted, cannot increase knowledge.
The deductive axiom - The self-recognized thinker and everything else. My ability to focus, create identities and to discretely experience.
The beginning of knowledge - Discrete Experiences
I am a discrete experiencer.
Discretely experience is to give form meaning in ones inner world. Since it actually happens, it is a congruous belief, and becomes knowledge.
Memories are true in that they are form given to experiences.
Distinctive Knowledge and Applicable Knowledge
Distinctive Knowledge is that which you are aware of in ones inner world.
Applicable Knowledge is beliefs that are compared with reality.
The Formation of Distinctions
Distinctions are individually made, and means to create a form in the mind different from another. Some factors are defining of the form, essential properties, others are optional, accidental properties.
Since these are still experience, it doesnt necessitate that what I find essential, is what differentiates an object in reality from another.
Applying Those Distinctions to Reality
Applicable knowledge is when a form I have created in my mind, fits reality. The simpler the properties in the distinctive knowledge, the simpler the applicable knowledge accrued. If the essential properties of sheep are curly fur and hooves, this would be indistinguishably from for example a goat.
Considering Issues with Knowledge
Memories can both apply, or neither can, or one of them.
I choose if new properties are added as essential or accidental. But as I add more, I would also need to check more to be certain of the applicable knowledge.
Properties can create a new form separate from another, depending on how the properties are understood, or even noticed.
Knowledge of Applicable Limits
Deductible beliefs need direct affirmations to become applicable knowledge.
Induction
Induction, seen parallel to the process of deduction - as a mean to differentiate different inductive beliefs and their closeness to the knowledge process.
Probability
Predictions about the future are inherently inductive, and probability means to limit error by knowing all available options that could occur, to increase the likelihood of said induction being applicable.
So, when the factors are known, induction is used mathematically to improve the chance of the induction being applicable.
It is also possible to circumvent this reasoning by simplifying the distinctive knowledge.
Possibility
Possible induction refers to situations that have happened, which we have applicable knowledge about, but where the probability is unknown. The similarity lies in the belief that the knowledge could happen again.
Plausibility
Plausibilities are untested distinctive knowledge, that has not happened to the I before, and furthermore classified as either applicable or inapplicable. The difference between the subgroups is in if it possible to test it, which also means an inapplicable belief can become an applicable if you find a way to test it?
Descartes stated that perhaps his entire view of reality was flawed because an Evil Demon tricked him into believing a false reality. I find this example interesting. Even though it makes sense that the undetectable Evil Demon is in itself an inapplicable plausibility example, I see something else as well.
This sentence speaks to me differently. If we break it down into parts:
Is it possible that his entire view of reality is flawed? Yes, if at one point he changed his view of reality, and he viewed the former view as limited or flawed. Then it would be possible.
Is it possible he was tricked? I do not know Descartes very well, but I assume that is something he would have had experience with. Moreover, he could have applicable knowledge with tricking someone without them knowing, and therefore it is possible that he has been tricked without his knowledge as well.
Believing something false should be something he has ample experience with as well, which makes it something possible.
So if we remove the Evil Demon, I see the statement more as an assertion. He believes it is possible that he could view his current worldview as flawed and based on a false reality.
Irrational
Irrational beliefs do not rely on applicable knowledge. They are in direct opposition to applicable knowledge, but there is still the possibility that it might be true.
Irrational beliefs are contrary to the surmiseable options available.
Hierarchy of Inductions Summary
The hierarchy makes comparing beliefs possible, and where there is direct competition between a possibility and a probability, to apply the knowledge of induction hierarchy to heighten the relative success these inductions will have in relation to reality.
With regard to different beliefs on the same hierarchy level, it is not possible to argue for one over the other.
Summary ends here.
Ok, that finishes my summary, and some of my thoughts whilst reading this. I still find it curious how well I enjoyed reading this, even though it took a lot of conscious effort. Again, thank you for writing this, and thank you more for opening up to feedback from everyone. I wanted to post this, and I will think more on it over time, but I wanted to get out something. I will have to let it sink in, at it might be some time till I circle back, but I will read your response.
Maybe I am missing some obvious point, but I was wondering if it is also possible to include the subconscious with regard to the discrete experiencer, or see it as a parallel axis or something? As I am very much more fluent in intuition, emotions and feelings, I am trying hard to focus on the task at hand and not dive into that. Still, I thought this feedback could fit the bill without digressing.
Kindly,
Caerulea-Lawrence
Hello Caerulea! I'm so sorry that I never saw your notification that you had replied. I'm pretty upset about it as you spent such a nice amount of time in your reply. Hopefully you're still around to see my response.
First of all, this is a fantastic summary. You nailed the message all the way through. I may use your summary at a future date, so your reply is most welcome. I wrote this so that it would be able to be understood by even someone without a background in philosophy. The fact you nailed it so well, makes me extremely happy. :D
Onto your questions now!
Your summary of the Evil Demon, your point, and your conclusion, are all correct. It is the evil demon itself which is plausible, as no one has ever applicably known an evil demon before. But if we do remove the Evil Demon and use Descartes applicable knowledge of being flawed and misunderstanding reality, your statement:
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
you are correct.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Great question, and I'll need to think about it. You've waited long enough for a reply for now however, so I'll come back when I've had time to think about it and answer.
I have. Anything in particular you wanted me to consider?
Yes, I got the notification, and I am glad I heard from you, as there was this little part of me that thought that my answer was totally off the mark.
Congratulations on achieving your goal of more accessibility, and yes, I am also thoroughly pleased that I got this, and that even the summary is on point. That makes me happy, and I share your enthusiasm and happiness too.
I am not sure it can be made more accessible, though, without losing its inherent strength. At least that is something I am pondering whilst reading my earlier comment. It made an impact on me, but I imagine that was also due to it being outside my regular way of thinking, but also because of the specific instructions about how to go about reading it. Without both, it might just end up being mislabeled and added to other categories, without the growth in mindset it can have (More at the end).
To be fair, I haven't come back to this yet, but at least I reread my summary now. Still, I must admit that your post is still a bit daunting, as I did have to focus very extensively and intensively, and follow your guide to the tee. I did manage to not get lost, and consequently I am still in a state of Relief after achieving something that looked to be too steep a climb, than I am quite ready to take a look at how the **** I did it :)
I mean, the reason isn't only because it was 'difficult' to do, of course. I tend to do this with regard to new knowledge or ideas, that even when I am very satisfied with them, and like them very much, and I even start to apply them a little bit in my cognitive space, I ease things in, slowly.
In due time, I will circle back, and if you do talk more about this, I would be very pleased if you would notify me somehow.
If there is a small nit-pick I can mention, [hide="Reveal"]I do not like the word Irrational... It has some bad connotations, and made it harder to focus on the content and remember it.[/hide]
God-damn, I am so pleased about understanding the "secret" to the Evil Demon example. Well played by you, too, on that one. There were some hints there that made me question it a bit more, not sure how you did it. Like you subtly 'forced' the meaning or something, not sure.
The growth from reading this:
I remember reading a post here.
And just noticing that I wasn't very bothered with claims, and could just look at it more relaxed. They write about the experiences NDE survivors have, and I noticed I could add it to a long list of "Possible human experiences/abilities". I also noticed, that I can start formulating why, that it became quite clear that there isn't really any evidence for the Consciousness surviving the body there, and there are quite numerous reasons for that being the case.
But I also found that I could say that it seems quite plausible that we humans might have abilities and can have experiences that most of us are unaware of. For example, the ability to see others from a distance, is something argued in a documentary about Anna Breitenbach, where they link it to some kind of tracking-skill.
That doesn't mean that we literally see from a distance, but that we are underestimating the amount of information our brain can process, and what kinds of conclusions it can draw. And in that sense, maybe it is true to say that science is underestimating consciousness a bit too much, and talking about NDE's this way is a kind of backlash to a certain unwillingness, on the flip side, to bother with acknowledging Distinctive Knowledge at all.
If you find an answer to the question of subconsciousness, I'll be back for that. It will be a while before I circle back for a round 2, but I'll let you know more then.
KIndly,
Caerulea-Lawrence
Thank you for the valuable feedback. I have written and rewritten this over a long period of time. The first iteration was 200+ pages, more like a rough draft of ideas. Slowly I pared it down to what I felt was absolutely essential due to feedback from other people. It is nice to hear from someone else that it seems like there's not much else that could be cut without losing something.
To your point about the instructions, those came about because of responses in previous attempts to post this. You are correct. Without those, many people do not understand how to approach a discussion like this. To your point, tackling something outside of your normal line of thinking is difficult. It can be fun with the right mindset, but without that, its easy to let our emotions get the better of us and we look for surface level reasons to escape having to read it.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
I appreciate this feedback as well. My intent was to use inductive terminology that was positive at best, neutral at worst. All four of the induction types have value in certain situations in life. Originally I used the word 'faith', but later stepped back from it because I was worried it would evoke an undue response from some people. I wanted people to focus on the logic first, so eventually I settled on a logic word. However, I agree with you that "irrational" still has more of a negative connotation. Any suggestions on what word you would rather it be named?
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
It wasn't a secret or a trick, you simply used the internal logic of the argument and came to the correct conclusion! It makes me happy to hear that you concluded this yourself, as it lends credence to the internal consistency of the system.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
That's the greatest compliment I could receive. Good philosophy should enable a person to enhance their life. If you feel you are better able to comprehend the world of ideas, then I am very glad. I use this theory myself in my daily life, so it is gratifying to see it help another.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Consciousness is sort of the hot topic of the boards recently. I highly encourage people to look to neuroscience over philosophy first, as I believe it is more up to date and necessary to know modern facts about the brain to have a discussion of any validity.
Thank you again for reading and contributing!
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
No, you wasted my time with that question. Obviously phenomenology does not have a hierarchy of inductions. I'm looking for serious discussion and contribution from your end, not troll posts.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/eidetic-reduction
No, that's not the right way to approach this. Spend some time going over the argument, then explain why you believe the entirety of it and its conclusions is simply identical to eidetic reduction and nothing new.
This proves two things to me:
1. I know you've read the OP and actively tried to understand it.
2. You've read and understand what you've linked.
Do that, and I'll know you're serious about discussing. If you can't be bothered, neither will I.
You didn't say the thing you said that I quoted? You're saying my answer that the hierarchy of inductions does not exist in Husserlian philosophy didn't answer your question? I spend my free time here with serious people. Attempt to make an actual point of discussion and I will engage. Otherwise I will be ignoring your posts going forward.
If you are going to make bold claims like above and then snap at people you are on your own.
What you have done looks pointless. I was trying to direct you to compare and contrast what you say with Husserl because there are obvious parallels.
Ill leave you to it. Enjoy.
And what you've done IS pointless.
I answered your initial question by informing you that Husserl does not have inductive hierarchies. That's a key point of the OP, and anyone who read it and Husserl would, looking at them in parallel, know what I said was true. Or at least try to show why I was wrong.
That was your test. You clearly didn't read the OP. Hierarchy of inductions is in the summary of the paper, as well as has its own underlined section. You were lazy sushi, and you got caught. Instead of owning up to it and actually trying, you dug in. A first time forum poster nailed the OP flawlessly, while you, a long time poster, mucked about wasting my time. You bet I'm disappointed in you.
Read it twice. I told you that. Why would I lie? Never mind not interested anymore. Enjoy.
What does your proposal have to say about the probability of Last Thursdayism?
Good question!
For those who don't know what that is, last Thursdayism is the idea that the universe was created last Thursday, but with the physical appearance of being billions of years old.
This proposal wouldn't be a probability, it would be an inapplicable plausibility. The outcome is designed in such a way that no one could ever find out if it were applicable, so fits the definition. That's lower down in the hierarchy of induction, so any probability or possibility would be a more cogent belief.
I would love to see more of these types of questions.
Hello Philosophim,
First of all, as I have stated before, I think that this methodological approach is severely underrated and underappreciated (especially in this forum): it is a deceivingly simple but yet an incredibly effective pragmatic approach!
After thinking about it more and reading your new post here, I have some reservations (or perhaps confusions (; ) I would like to voice to you (pertaining thereto); however, I know we already had a long conversation (and I would imagine you probably moved to a new thread due to the immense number of posts between us) so I wanted to reach out preliminarily and ask you if you would like me to voice the concerns or not? This is your board, and I want to respect that. So, absolutely no worries if you were wanting to hear from other people and would like me to refrain from continuing/starting a conversation again about it.
Just let me know either way. I look forward to hearing from you.
Bob
Thank you Bob, your input and insight is always welcome! My availability to respond is more limited this week, but as long as you don't mind a possible delay between responses, I would very much enjoy your questions and concerns!
Hello Philosophim,
Absolutely no worries on time! (:
Firstly, I want to disclaim that, although I read your discussion board posts herein, I may be misremembering a thing or two (inadvertently); so please feel free to abruptly correct me here and there if I do (and I apologize in advance).
After coming to understand your methodological approach better, I think that the hierarchy of inductions, as a hierarchy of categories (e.g., probability, possibility, plausibility, and the irrational) that definitively trump one another (e.g., probability is always more cogent than a possibility, assuming they are at the same point within the chain of reasoning), is insufficient to account for cogency of inductions.
To provide my reasoning on this, I would like to lead you through a thought experiment and see what you think. I am going to do it sequentially so you see my full line of reasoning.
For this thought experiment, I am going to refer to a box-without-air and a box-with-air. By both, I mean a glass box which has a trap door close to the top which has room to place objects that upon pressing a button fall through the trap door. So we can place a wooden cube in that top space, click the button, and observe it fall through the trap door and land at the bottom of the box. Now, by a box-without-air, I mean just that the air has been removed from the box (so it is like a vacuum sealed container). By box-with-air I mean a normal box that has air in it.
You and I are sitting on the porch (of one of our houses: whichever) and we are presented with a box (which is a trap door box described above) that is either a box-without-air or a box-with-air: we arent told which it is. It has a wooden block in the upper floor area that will fall once the trap door is released.
We are asked: how fast will the wooden block fall once the trap door is released?.
You calculate an estimation of X m/s^2, which factors in air resistance. I, on the other hand, make the exact same calculations and estimations but minus the factoring in of the air resistance.
I ask you: which of our beliefs is more cogent to hold? This is going to depend on if it is more cogent to factor in air resistance, which depends on whether it is more cogent to believe it is a box-without-air or a box-with-air. Now, at this point, I think both of our reactions is to invoke the hierarchy of inductions to decipher who is correct. Lets narrow down this experiment to make things interesting (and explicate some worries of mine).
Lets say we dont know the probability of either and we have both have experienced a wooden block fall from a trap door within a glass box before that was a box-without-air and a box-with-air.
We cant appeal to probabilities, so our strongest form of induction is out. Now we can both invoke the second strongest, which is possibility to defend our beliefs (which are at odds with one another). So how do we resolve it? I think the solution could be, since it is a comparison of the same category of knowledge (i.e., possibility) and the same link in the chain (i.e., first chain link), prima facie, the quantity of experiences of each could suffice. So if we have both experienced 100 times boxes-with-air and only 50 times boxes-without-air, then we could say that most cogent solution is to believe that the box has air in it.
But, lets make this more interesting (; . Lets say we have both experienced the boxes-with-air 100 times on the moon (in special labs thereon) and the boxes-without-air 50 times on the earth (in normal neighborhoods in which we live). Now, although the quantity is in favor of saying the box is full of air, it is more cogent to hold that it is without air because our experiences of the boxes-with-air compared to boxes-without-air is located far away from where we are currently encountering a box (which is on the porch on earth). So now, location is the deciding factor. Likewise, we could say, to make things equal, that weve experience them the same amount (but still in those drastically different locations) and, according to your view as I understand it, we would have no means of deciphering which is more cogent even though, to me, it is clearly that it is a box-without-air (in this case). We cant appeal any category within your inductive hierarchy to explain this cogency nor can we appeal to the number of instances within a category: its purely location this time that breaks the tie.
But we can go even deeper: lets say that weve experienced boxes-without-air only once and boxes-with-air a million times (and both within the same reasonable locale), but the box we are presented with (of which we are calculating the fall acceleration) looks identical to the one box-without-air we have experienced and absolutely nothing like the boxes-with-air we have experience (way more many times). It feels just like the box-without-air, has the same structure, same colors, same mechanisms are there, etc. The sheer matchability of uniqueness makes it more cogent to hold that it is a box-without-air even though we are comparing two possibilities and one possibility clearly has a larger quantity of experiences in its favoryet it isnt more cogent. It is purely the uniqueness identified in the box that is the differentiating factor.
Now, lets make it completely break (by my lights) the induction hierarchy: lets prove a plausibility is more cogent than a possibility and probability under certain conditions. Lets say we dont know the probability, and weve never experienced a box-without-air and we have experienced a box-with-air a million times. But, we inspect the box that is presented to us (which we are calculating the fall acceleration for) and see that it has box-without-air inc. on the bottom (engraved thereon). We google that company and find reasonably that it is a real company, they make actual boxes-without-air, and this box (which we are inspecting) looks exactly like the ones in the photos on their website. Now, all of that is a plausibility: we havent done anything about that company except for google them. We do, however, have know that it is possible that it is a box-with-air because we have experienced it before (many, many, and I mean many times): but, I submit to you, that that possibility is less cogent than holding, in this nuanced case, that the box is a box-without-air. The plausibility has outweighted the possibility in my eyes.
Likewise, lets say I know the probability of the box being a box-without-air is 90% and that the box brand says not an airless box inc.. Upon only googling around, the not an airless box inc. is adamantly against the idea of selling and using boxes that are capable of creating an airless vacuum (perhaps its against their religious beliefs). Firstly, the sheer fact that there is a probability and the other is a plausibility entails that one should go off of the former under your view, but, I submit to you, it is actually more cogent to hold that it is a box-with-air. Secondly, even though there is a high probability that it is a box-without-air, given the nuanced circumstances, it is more likely that this one is not one of them. Now, importantly, this is an example of a probability being outweighed by a plausibility.
By point here is that, upon further reflection, it is insufficient to use the inductive hierarchy you have proposed because they do not supersede eachother absolutely in the manner you have proposed. The context and circumstances matter, of which are not elaborated upon in your expounding of your view. Such as, simply as examples, location and uniqueness. Likewise, I do think that plausible evidence can outweigh probable evidence (as seen above).
I wanted to get your take on this: am I misunderstanding or misremembering the view here?
Bob
Yes, you are misremembering, but I believe its because I don't go into significant detail about context here. Upon re-evaluating the original paper, I found I could pare down explorations into context to lessen the size of the paper which seemed to be intimidating to people.
Context and circumstances matter greatly. These determine both what distinctive and applicable knowledge you have available to you. So lets break down your examples one by one.
First case: Air box, no air box. No probability, both are possible. No other context.
Hierarchy results: Both are possible. Therefore one is as likely as the other.
Second case: Air box most probable on earth, no air box most probable on moon.
Hierarchy results: While both are possible, its more probable for an air box to be on Earth and a no air box to be on the moon.
Third case: Air box, no air box. It is known that air boxes look like X, it is known that non-air boxes look like Y. You are provided a box that looks like Y. Is it an air or non-air box?
Hierarchy results: Depends on how you've personally defined non-air boxes. If the look and feel is an essential property for you, then you know its a non-air box. In fact if you later found out it had air, you could easily say "Its a defective non-air box". If of course the look and feel are irrelevant, and the only thing that matters is that it does, or does not have air in it, then you could say its probably an air box. Remember, your distinctive knowledge is created at your particular context. So based on how you structure that context, it would be probability or possibility comparison.
Fourth case: Chains of sub-knowledge and beliefs about whether its an air box or not.
Hierarchy results: Find the chains of reasoning, and compare them through the children up to the parent.
The flaw is here:
Quoting Bob Ross
A plausibility is never more cogent then a possibility due to the logic and reasoning involved. You have to break the actual logic and reasoning behind each induction. Making a complex example without carefully and correctly identifying the chain of reasoning, and when it relies on sub-inductions, is not a counter.
First, if you've never experienced a "Box without air", then its not a probability. You simply know that people make boxes with air, and you don't yet know that people make boxes without air. The number of times this has been experienced is irrelevant.
Now lets shorten your example down to a context in which you think of a plausibility that a box could be made without air. You're comparing applicable knowledge to a plausibility. Remove the wording that notes it is a box without air. Its more reasonable to assume its a box with air.
Now lets add in the writing. Depending on context, this is a plausible truth, or a possible truth. Is it possible that when someone labels a box that it does not contain air, that it might not contain air? Or is it only plausible in your world? This is also inconsequential to your point. The real question is, once you've correctly established whether its knowledge or a type of induction, then you compare.
Perhaps an underlying point to your critique is, "Do I always have to choose the most cogent answer and not attempt to explore lesser cogent inductions?" No. The cogency is about making the most efficient and rational choice when presented with two alternatives. But, one may wish to be inefficient because they believe there is a greater payoff in the long run.
For example, its highly unlikely you will ever win the lottery. But its possible. You may be willing to forgo your time and money to buy a lottery ticket, even if you never win. In general its not the most rational or efficient use of your money, but if you DO win, it will be. Same with plausibilities. Perhaps there is a plausible challenge to something you know. It might take a week to fully explore that plausiblity to see if it is correct or not. Is that worth your time and energy? If not, it is perfectly rational and efficient to choose not to explore it. But of course, if the plausibility were correct, it very well might lead to knew knowledge which saves you two weeks of time and energy down the road. Is it worth it? That's for you to decide.
Hello Philosophim,
Good response!
Fair point. I think it may be easier for us if we stick to one specific sub-scenario of the thought experiment to really dive into this. So I am going to hit you with a more oddly specific version of this so that I am identifying the exact reasoning chain and see what you think.
So lets talk about this specific scenario:
A box is selected at random from a sample size of 100 and presented to you. 51 are boxes-without-air and 50 are boxes-with-air.
1. Probability is 51% that the box does not have air.
2. You hold that the only essential properties of a box-without-air is that it is a box (i.e., a container with a flat base and sides, typically square or rectangular and having a lid) and it is not filled with air in its empty space (within it).
3. You hold that the only essential properties of a box-with-air is that it is a box (i.e., ditto) and it is filled with air in its empty space (within in).
4. You have experienced a billion boxes with design X and every one was a box-with-air. Every part of the design is an accidental property except for it being a box and having air (as defined above). You have never experienced a design X which was not a box-with-air.
5. You have experienced a billion boxes with design Y and every one was a box-without-air. Every part of the design is an accidental property except for it being a box and not having air (as defined above). You have never experienced a design Y which was not a box-without-air.
6. The box presented to you (which was picked at random) matches the design of design X.
7. Design X and Y look absolutely nothing alike.
If probability is more cogent in this case, then you should hedge your bets that it is a box-without-air.
If possibility outweighs probability in this case, then you should hedge your bets that it is a box-with-air.
If your claim that probability is always a more cogent bet than possibility, then you are committed to saying that it is a box-without-air in this scenario.
I think the possibility in this case is more cogent, what say you?
Bob
I would like to add a 7th aspect to remove any ambiguity:
7. Design X and Y look absolutely nothing alike.
If these are truly accidental properties, then they are not in consideration. As a reminder of an accidental property, these are properties that are variable to the essential. So a "tree without branches" would have no bearing on its identity as a tree. So we can eliminate the variables X and Y from our consideration.
As it is irrelevant whether the design matches X or Y, if I am given a box and I know that probability is 51/49%, then the more reasonable guess is to guess that the box I am given is the 51% chance that it does not have air.
The problem is that in your example, it is unlikely someone would consider box X to be an accidental property. We can't just say its accidental, it has to match accurately to the definition of an accidental property. Implicitly, what most people would think in this context is, "Box X is designed to have air, Box Y is designed not to have air." These would become essential properties for most people in their context of encountering billions of each kind and having the same outcome in regards to air. If its truly accidental, then the person would not even consider Box X or Box Y as being associated with having air, because it doesn't matter.
You don't have to have an example at all to question my conclusions Bob, its like an equation. The examples so far are doing nothing to counter the underlying claims about essential and non-essential properties, they're really examples in which you need to correctly identify if a property is essential or non-essential based on the person's context. Once that identity is complete, everything falls into place.
Hello Philosophim,
Why would resemblance and inductive association to the accidental properties in relation to the essential thing not be a consideration?
I am saying that, in this hypothetical consideration, the designs are accidental: it isnt a question of whether people are implicitly claiming them as essential properties (in this scenario).
The definition of an accidental property is just that it is non-essential: that doesn't mean that it is irrelevant to the context of the situation.
Since the probability that it is a box-without-air is negligible (because it is only a 1% difference) and the experiential association of the box-with-air with design X, although the design is not a part of its essential properties, so many times (viz., a billion) warrants claiming that the first random box pulled from this sample, being of design X, is a box-with-air.
Thank you for the clarification, but I was under that understanding as well. My point is that the accidental properties are not removed absolutely from the consideration of what is most cogent to hold. This scenario is a great example to me.
This is true if you are removing a large portion of the context of the scenario I gave which, arguably, isnt the scenario anymore. Are you claiming that the scenario in which you are simply given the knowledge that there is a 49/51% chance is equivalent to the scenario I gave for epistemic purposes? I find that hard to believe that you would disregard all of the rest of that context.
To clarify, this is irrelevant. The scenario outlines explicitly that they are accidental properties.
In the scenario, as I hold the possibility is more cogent than the probability, I can say that I do not hold that the design X of the box has anything to do with its essential properties but yet it factors into what is most cogent to bet on. Resemblance and inductive association matter to me.
But the whole point is that I outlined it very clearly what the essential and accidental properties were. Pointing out that most people wouldnt assign them that way is irrelevant to the thought experiment.
The point here is that I think the equation is incorrect because, in this scenario, it is not more cogent to claim that the box is a box-without-air (due to there being a 51% probability) when the rest of the context is expounded. Without that context, then my claim would be different. You basically just countered a straw man of the scenario: one in which a box is handed to you and you are only given the knowledge that there is a 51% chance it is a box-without-air and a 49% chance it is a box-with-air (and there are no other options). But that wasnt the scenario, unless you would like to claim that they are equivalent for intents of epistemic evaluation?
Bob
Because they are accidental. You're just not properly identifying the situation.
Lets simplify this. Why are the boxes accidental? Lets not just say they are. Lets prove they are. You know that the manufacturer does not care about whether X or Y design has air or not. It is known that they randomly switch between box designs for air and not air, and it turns out the box design X and Y have exactly 50% change of having air or not air.
Thus whether the box is design X or Y is accidental to whether it has air inside. This is a proven accidental property.
Now, lets say that I receive a billion boxes of X, and a billion boxes of Y. low and behold, it turns out all the X's have air, while all the Y's don't. Its an incredibly improbable scenario, but it can be independently verified that yes, its completely a 50/50 chance that either box has air or not.
It doesn't matter the result of the odds, they don't change the odds. Remember that a probability is based off of knowledge, not other inductions.
Here is another way the properties can be accidental. Lets say that X always has air, and Y does not. X is red, and Y is green. You are color blind and can't tell the difference. Within your context, whether its box Y or X is irrelevant to you. It is outside of your distinctive knowledge to know there is a color difference, and outside of your applicable context to tell the colors apart.
Lets take your accidental property that no longer remains accidental.
Quoting Bob Ross
The designs are accidental, not an accidental property then. If you have no foreknowledge of whether box X or Y should or should not have air, then you have not yet decided whether X or Y design are essential or accidental to the identity.
Also, we have to clarify what we're referring to here. If we're referring to the core identity of the box itself as a particular type of measuring tool where air doesn't matter, X and Y are accidental. If we're referring to the probability of whether a X or Y box has air or not, then the box design is no longer accidental to our point!
Taken another way, a type of dog can be green or blue. Whether its blue or green is irrelevant to knowing the identification of the dog. However, you later discover that 74% of these dogs are green, while 25% are blue, and 1% could be any other color. When you are asking, "Is this dog that I cannot see behind a screen green or blue," at that point the probability of the color becomes an essential set or properties in knowing the outcome. At that point, because the point is directly about the color, it is pertinent to the guess at hand. These odds also do not retroactively make the color a primary attribute in identifying this type of dog? No.
To sum up an accidental property - A property which is completely irrelevant to one's assertation or denial of the identity. Meaning that you cannot make an accidental identity suddenly be relevant to the assertation or denial of the identity. As soon as it is relevant, it is no longer accidental.
Quoting Bob Ross
You can decide that you would rather explore the possibility than the probability, but you did not prove that a possibility is more cogent than a probability. Again, all the examples are going to boil down to needing to prove that what one is examining is a known probability, possibility, or plausibility. All that's been done so far is a misunderstanding of the terms.
To see if you understand, take your example again and try breaking it down into clear and provable accidental or primary properties for the context. Second, clearly demonstrate what is a possibility, probability, and plausibility. Only after that careful dismantling, try to prove that you can make a plausibility more cogent than a possibility.
Hello Philosophim,
They are accidental because they have been defined as non-essential: distinctive knowledge is definitional. Thats all the proof that is required.
For the personal knowledge within the scenario, I defined a box as a container with a flat base and sides, typically square or rectangular and having a lid and defined an box-with-air as a box + air. That is the proof that it is unessential what design the boxes have, because I have defined box-with-air and box-without-air to have everything but those two factors as unessential.
Firstly, in the scenario I gave, there is no probability known about how many they design in X or Y fashion; so this isnt analogous. Secondly, that can be your reason for defining a box-with-air and box-without-air as having designs that are always accidental, but an accidental property is just an unessential property; which does not necessitate that there is a 50/50% chance of it occurring.
This is irrelevant, because you dont know in my scenario that it is a 50/50 chance; and it is not, by definition, true that something which is an accidental property has a 50/50 chance of occurring.
This contradicts your own definition of accidental properties:
Your definition simply does not equate accidental properties with something which is proven beyond definition as non-essential. It clearly defines it as that which isnt an essential property of the thing in question. Regardless, in my scenario, when I say that the designs are accidental, I do not mean that they have an equal chance of occurring nor that there is a defect in my ability to identify (such as you color blind analogy): I mean more broadly that the designs are unessential properties.
Firstly, by your own definition of it, any non-essential property is an accidental property (i.e., Properties I observe which are irrelevant to my identity of the sheep)it is irrelevant if you have foreknowledge of all the potential properties of a thing. If you define a sheep as [X, Y, Z] essential properties, then it is necessarily the case that a property which is not X, Y, or Z is unessential and thusly accidental. Now, you can refurbish accidental properties to become essential ones given new knowledge; but that is different than your lack of knowledge of a property being undecided yet.
Secondly, whether the first point is true is irrelevant for the scenario I gave: I said definitively that what I am distinctively calling a box-with-air and box-without-air is those two aforesaid properties, and all the rest are unessential ones. So you cant validly claim that my accidental properties are no longer accidental. It is a matter of definition, which is distinctive knowledge.
I think you are thinking beyond the scenario, when I am looking for you to address specifically the scenario given. I am saying that the core identity of a box and with-air vs. without-air is those two aforesaid properties, and everything else is an accidental property. I can do that because it is distinctive (and not applicable) knowledge in the scenario, which is definitional.
No. In the scenario when you are determining the most cogent solution, the box design is not an essential property of anything. I am specifically saying that the design is irrevelant to the definition thereof: I am not saying that the design for the airless box has some necessary component to it that enables it to vacuum out the air.
Likewise, you arent calculating the probability of it having air in the box: you cant. You will never be able to calculate the numerator and denominator for that question: the only probability you know in the scenario is that there is a 51% chance that the box does not have air.
It is not an essential property of what a dog is (which I think you agree with me on that) and it is not an essential property of anythingit is essential to answering the question nevertheless. An essential property is a property first and foremost, which is of a concept (i.e., distinctive knowledge of a thing): you have no concept here to attach the color to. This is implicit in your example: The properties which I find are important to me for my memory, the curly fur and hooves, are identities of the sheep I call essential properties. I think you are confusing something being essential for answering purposes with an essential property.
This contradicts your definition in your OP:
These definitions are incompatible with each other. If an accidental property is actually something which is completely irrelevant to its assertation of the identity of a thing, as opposed to merely being not within its set of essential properties, then not all non-essential properties are accidental (i.e., not all non-essential properties meet your first quote here of a definition just because they meet the second quoted definition). I think you are thinking that in virtue of a property being non-essential it doesnt matter for identifying the said thing, but that is a separate claim than that it is non-essential (and currently in dispute).
I am saying that, although it doesn't matter for meeting the definition of a thing, the accidental properties play a role in identifying it pragmatically (and am thusly questioning your separate claim that non-essential properties are irrelevant for identification purposes).
I already did this in my post outlining the scenario:
I am shaping an identity distinctly out of discrete experience. Theres no further proof needed. If I say, for this example, green is the number one, then the set of essential properties for green is [1]. Theres no further proof required.
A possibility is something which has been experienced before at least once. In the scenario, the billion experiences of each are the experiential context for it being possible that the box presented is filled with air or not.
A probability is a quantitative likelihood: a numerator divided by a denominator, where the latter is the whole quantitative sample size and the former is the selected items within the sample size that one wants to know the likelihood of occurring. In the scenario, the only probability given is that there is a 51% chance that the box is a box-without-air, and any deducible information therefrom (e.g., theres a 49% chance that it is a box-with-air).
I am saying that:
In this scenario, the incredibly strong correlation between design (X or Y) and the box type (air or airless) outweighs merely going off of the probability. This doesnt mean that a strong correlation between design and box type always outweighs probability.
Bob
1. Probability is 51% that the box does not have air.
To be clear, this means that any box given has a 51% change that it does not have air in it. So regardless of box design, its a 51% chance that it does not have air.
I'm going to simplify the others.
The only essential property for a box is that it is a six sided box. If it has air, its a box with air. If it doesn't, its a box without air. Anything else is non-essential.
We'll call call a box with air a BWA, and a box without air a BWOA because I'm tired of typing those phrases. :)
Any box you pick has a 49% chance of being a BWA, while it has a 51% chance of being a BWOA.
Now lets include some non-essential properties. What they are is irrelevant. Lets call them properties X and Y.
So I can have a BWA with a X, and a BWA with a Y. Does this change the probability of the BWA being picked? No. Its still a 49% chance. What about a BWOA with a X and a BWOA with a Y? No, still a 51% chance of being picked. This is because we know that X and Y are non-essential the the probability.
Lets say that I pull any number of boxes. It turns out that I only pull BWAs with X's and WBOAs with Y's. I've never pulled a BWA with a Y or a BWOA with a X, but its still within the odds that I can.
Is is possible that I could? Of course. But does that change the probability? No, non-essential properties don't affect the probability. If they did, they would be essential properties of the probability. Therefore it is still more rational to assume over the course of picking more boxes that I should always guess that I'll pull a BWOA, whether that's a X or a Y.
If you believe that because every BWA you've pulled so far is a X, therefore its more reasonable that a box with a X is going to be a BWA, that's not rational, its just confirmation bias. Your biased results don't make something more or less cogent. It is always more rational to believe that the box will be a BWOA whether its an X or a Y.
Confirmation bias isn't new either. https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-a-confirmation-bias-2795024#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20imagine%20that%20a,supports%20what%20they%20already%20believe. Its an easy trap for all of us to fall into.
With that simplified, does that answer your question?
Hello Philosophim,
Correct. The box is, at random, picked from the group and presented to you. The probability is 51% that it does not have air.
This definition is circular. But I get the point and, for intents and purposes, lets go with that for now.
Correct.
Lol. Sounds good! (;
Correct.
They are not irrelevant: they are irrelevant to the identity of the thing. That is not the same thing as them being irrelevant flat out.
Yes it is logically possible (I am not using possibility in your sense here). On top of that, in your terms, it is possible that a BWA has design X and not proven to be possible it has design Y (because you have only experienced it with X). It is, likewise, possible that a BWOA has design Y and not proven to be possible that it has design X (ditto reasoning).
Correct.
Correct.
For fear of you equivocating here, I am going to stress that all this means is that the probability is independent of whether they have design X or Y. The wording non-essential could be equivocated there as having to do with non-essential properties, which has nothing to do with this claim.
It is not provably possible under your terms that a BWA could have a design of Y because you havent experienced it before. Just to clarify.
Correct.
No. You are forgetting that you have experienced this correlation a billion times each (and none vice-versa). Yes, it is logically possible (note: I am not using possible here in your terms) that, even after experiencing X with BWA a billion times, the box is design X and BWOA but you are more justified in inferring that it is a BWA since the probability is so close to each other.
Lets make it even more obvious what I am getting at: imagine that in the scenario you also know that, although you dont know which design the box will definitively have (because it is a non-essential property), only design X and Y have ever been associated with either a BWA or BWOA. Now, to clarify, this does not make the designs essential properties: I am saying that these unessential designs have, by happenstance or purpose, been associated (correlated) with them in the past. Maybe theres a law in place that you have to make BWAs with X and BWOAs with Y, but the actual definition of them both doesnt include X and Y as essential properties (which is entirely possible).
Now you have really good reasons to believe that when you see a box presented to you with design X, although designs arent essential properties, that it is a BWA. Is it logically and actually possible that someone broke the law (or what have you) and made a BWOA with X? Absolutely. But guessing BWOA on the X designed box when there is merely a 1% more chance it is such isnt very cogent given these circumstances.
Firstly, I am not saying that you have drawn a billion times from the sample of 100. I am saying that you have experienced, independently of drawing from the 100, a billion times each correlation.
If I were saying that just because I pulled a BWA last time that the next will be BWA, then I would agree that is irrational and confirmation bias: thats not what Ive been saying.
Secondly, if you would like to call what I just clarified as irrational, then you would have to say all inductions and abductions are irrational because that is how they work. Take Humes problem of induction, which you mentioned in your OP: you would have to say it is equally irrational to hold that the future will resemble the past. But this is nonsense: it isnt irrational to induce or abduce: it can be quite rational.
Wrong. If I know that the designs X and Y have always been associated with either box and that there is a colossal correlation between X ? BWA and Y ? BWOA and the probability of one is only 1% greater than the other of occurring, then I am rationally justified in thinking that an X will be accompanied by a BWA (although I could most certainly be wrong). So when they present one at random to me and I see it is an X and only 1% less likely that it is a BWA, I am justified in claiming it is a BWA.
You are basically hedging your bets on a minuscule 1% difference and expecting, given the contextual background knowledge you would have, that this next one will be the only one out of a billion and out of every single one that you have seen that will break the correlation.
I think you are right to assume that if we were to keep drawing, returning, amd re-shuffling the boxes that it would even out over time to 51% being BWOAbut we are talking about one selection here.
No. I think the above explains why I think that.
Bob
Quoting Bob Ross
Ok, I think we've narrowed down the point of contention. I think we're seeing two different contexts here. When you say, "The odds of any box being without air are 51%, and the only thing that matters to the identify of the box, is that its a box," then the non-essential properties of the box do not matter to the probability. If X and Y are non-essential, they don't matter to the probability then. I think that's a straight forward conclusion right?
Your context doesn't quite seem to fit this though, and that's what I'm trying to piece together here. Are you saying that the probability of 51% is only a guess? Or that we only think that the design of the box is irrelevant? In other words, is our 51% open to change, and do we not know if it depends on X or Y?
This is where I'm having trouble seeing your argument. You may have a good argument, but I'm just not understanding it yet. From my point, if X and Y are unessential to the probability, then they are unessential to the probability. Any results from experience, if we know the probability is correct, would not change the probability. Therefore no matter if we simply pulled 99/1 airs to no airs, that doesn't change the probability. The outcome of the probability does not change the probability.
I don't consider confirmation bias irrational by the way, I think that's a bit harsh. Its simply less rational then relying on knowledge we know. If we know the odds, its more rational to play the odds over the long term then not right? Even if we're currently beating the odds, it won't last over long term if the odds are correct.
Back to your point where I feel you changed the context a bit. You noted that it wasn't possible for you to have experienced a Box with Y that did not have air. I had assumed you had. That's true, you don't know if its possible for you to pull that box. Despite the odds, you never have. And yet you know its probable that you will, and its only incredible luck that you haven't so far. If the odds for the air or not air do not depend on X or Y, then each X and Y has a respective 49/51 split as well. This is just a logical fact. Results defying the odds do not negate the odds if the odds are known.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, you don't. Because it is more rational to stick with the odds that you do then the possibilities that you don't. If you flip a coin ten times and it comes up heads ten times, does the non-essential property of you being in your living room change the odds of the coin's outcome? Of course not. If you start saying, "Every time I flip a coin in the living room, it changes the odds to where I always flip heads," then the living room is no longer a non-essential property to the coin flip, but has now become, in your head, an essential property of the coin flip.
Same as if after you count all the X and Y boxes that have ever been made, and sure enough, it turns out that all X's are airs, while all Y's are not airs. The odds didn't change, that's just one extremely unlikely outcome out of many possible outcomes. At that point since you know all of the boxes, and you've noted something special with the property of X and Y with the box, you could say that all boxes with X have air, while all boxes with Y's don't, and applicably know this. It just so happens that there are 49 billion X's, and 51 billion Y's.
In all of this, you have not shown a case in which it is more rational to not go with the odds beyond confirmation bias. But feel free to try again, as perhaps I'm missing something that you're seeing.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, I don't. I simply rely again on the hierarchy of inductions, which rests on applicable knowledge as noted. All inductions ARE inductions, but it simply notes which inductions are more rational to believe in when compared to each other. It is more rational to believe that known rules and laws will remain as they are until we first experience them breaking. Then we will know its possible for a rule or law to break. The sun has always risen in the East and set in the West. It is in induction to believe it will do so tomorrow, but it is the only possible outcome which has ever happened. As such, it is more rational that we believe the possibility over the plausibility that it will rise in the West and set in the East.
My counter to you is to note that the hierarchy holds, so it does not destroy it.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is isn't hedging a bet. This is simply taking the most rational induction I know of, a probability, and holding it over my confirmation bias of the results I've obtained. My desire has nothing to do with what is more rational. However, being less rational could be less stressful for me right? Perhaps the issue you're really holding here is that you want to make decisions that are less rational sometimes. That's fine. There can be a host of reasons to be less rational in one's inductions. Perhaps you're just tired of examining the boxes and want to get through them faster. Perhaps the penalty for guessing wrong is irrelevant. What you really seem to be saying is that the 1% doesn't matter to you. Which is fine. But it is still 1% more likely, and therefore the more rational choice.
Hello Philosophim,
To clarify, I am saying that the odds of any box being without are is 51% and the only thing that matters to the identity of the box is that it (1) is a box and (2) has or does not have air in it.
Something can be useful to identifying a thing without it having to do with the identity (essence) of that thing. For example, it is not a part of the identity of being human to draw art. You can be a human and never have drawn art and you may be so disabled that you literally cant do it. However, if I am walking in the park and see some extravagant art (perhaps graffiti), then I can reasonably inductively infer that that was a human that did it. Philosophim, I identified the origin of the art to be human, while never conceding that the identity (essence) of a human is that it draws art. Likewise, it is actually and logically possible that an alien drew the art, or it formulated naturally as a freak accident.
Accidental properties of a thing, such as experiences a strong correlation between humans and drawing and never experiencing anything else doing it, can influence rationally what we identify as being the case.
That is correct. But I think you are perhaps misunderstanding: the probability is given to you by a person who knows whether each box (out of the 100) has air in it. They are using strictly essential properties to calculate the probability because they can know whether the boxes meet those 2 essential properties. However, when they present it to you, you cant know if the box meets your criteria because you dont know if it has air in it: thats the whole point!
Now, the probability being unaffected by the unessential properties does not entail, in itself, that it isnt rational, depending on the circumstances, to use them to infer what you think it is.
No. It is the actual probability of pulling a box without air.
Irrelevant to what? To the probability that was calculated? Yes. To your evaluation of what you think it is, no.
The scenario is only granting implicitly the former, not the latter.
The probability stays the same regardless of what design they have because the guy in the back room knows whether they are (1) boxes and (2) they have air in them. Those are the essential properties, so he uses that to calculate the probability. We, on the other hand, only know they are boxes and that they either do or do not have air; but with consideration of the rest of the context as well (e.g., weve experienced them strongly correlated with those designs a billion times each).
I agree with you here, but I think you are focusing too much on the calculation of the probability and not that it is a minuscule difference in probability. Imagine there was a %50.00000001 chance that you will pull a BWOA. Now imagine that youve experience in your lifetime (1) only BWAs having design X, (2) design X only being on BWAs, and (3) you have experienced #1 and #2 a BILLION times. Imagine, likewise, same thing for BWOA but with design Y. This extra info doesnt change the fact that you are 0.00000001% more likely to pull a BWOA.
Now, imagine that the box pulled has design X. Given that there is only a 0.00000001% chance more of pulling a BWOA and the sheer incredibly correlations youve experienced inductively of BWA ? design X. I think that you are warranted in claiming it is a BWA instead of going with the probability. It is more probable that it will be a BWOA, but by 0.00000001%.
Take away the probability for a second, just think of the inductive aspect I am talking about. If you only ever saw design X on BWA and never anywhere else a BILLION times throughout your life. All through society where you have gone and travelled, its always the same ole design X ? BWA. You confirmed each time (a billion times) that the box did have air in it and it had design X. The next time I show you a box with design X, forgetting about probability for a second, what would be the most cogent answer? Clearly that it is a BWA. This is no different than thinking that gravity will work the next time you drop something. Actually, in this case, since it is a billion times, you have stronger reasons to think that a design X ? BWA than gravity working next time you drop something (as I doubt youve experienced thinks drop a billion times yet in your life).
Now, the only extra information we add into the scenario is that there is actually a 0.00000001% in the sample of 100 that this design X is not BWA (as its BWOA). By my lights, if you go off of the probability, then you are saying that you would rather hedge your bets on a 0.00000001% difference that this design X box presented to you is the first box out of a billion and 1 that is going to break that life-long correlation you have experienced. To me, that 0.00000001% difference doesnt outweigh.
Now, if the person told me that after each guess the presented box is not returned into the sample and they tell me if my guess is correct, then each time I guess I do have to consider that the probability is changing and eventually that outweighs my experiential knowledge of the correlation. If theres a 99% that it is a BWOA, then I am definitely going with that.
As far as Ive understood confirmation bias, it is the tendency to seek out a result without sufficient justification for it. Its like placebo effect: if I think that aliens are ruling the world and I start actively seeking out reasons to believe it, then I will definitely find them. Not because it is true, but because I am intensely trying to fit the world to my narrative. This is irrational.
Confirmation bias is not, as far as I understand, the same as inductive and abductive reasoning. You can assume rationally that gravity will work for the next thing you drop because you have sufficient evidence, which wasnt just a result of you trying to fit the world to you wants, that that will be the case.
I was just clarifying that, under your terms, you couldnt claim to know it is possible for a BWOA to have design X.
Likewise, in the scenario, I am not saying that you know that there actually is at least one BWOA which has design X. You dont have that information. You just know that it is logically and actually possible that a BWOA could have a design X: but possible here is being used in the standard philosophical sense and not your sense (because you hold that you have to experience it for it to be possible). So, in your terms, you cannot claim it possible despite it being logically and actually possible.
No they dont. The probability of one having design X or Y is completely unknown to you. The probability of picking a BWOA or BWA is irrelevant to the probability of it having a particular design. To know that you would have to know how many in the actual sample have design X and how many have design Y and divide that by 100: you simply do not know this in the scenario.
Thats disanalogous: I am not saying that non-essential properties always weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occuring. Thats why I picked this very specific example scenario.
Also, you being in your living room wouldnt be a non-essential property because it isnt a property of the probability. Is an unessential reason or factor: not a property.
However, if youve experienced a billion times living rooms having a strong gravitational pull than non-living rooms, then, yeah, I think that unessential factor becomes at least a relevant factor. I think this is what you mean by:
Sure. I already agree that the probability itself wouldnt change.
No, the sample size for the scenario that you are drawing from a sub-collection of them in the real world. You dont know that there are 49 billion Xs and 51 billion Ys but, rather, only that in this sample of 100, there are 51 BWOAs and 49 BWAs. Thats it.
No philosophim, I am saying it is less rational to go with the 1% chance or 0.00000001% chance that it is a BWOA as opposed to a BWA in this specific scenario.
Bob
Here is where you also have to clarify. Does the design of X or Y have anything to do with the probability? For example, if the ration of X airs to Y airs was 3/4, then X and Y are essential properties to the probability. Both of these can co-exist.
So on one hand we could say overall, there's a 51% chance of no airs vs airs, not considering X or Y. Then we can drill down further, make X and Y a part of our observations, and note that X has a 75% chance of being no air, while Y has a 25% chance of being air. These are two different probabilities, and we could even math them together for an overall probability if we wanted to.
Once you start including an attribute in your probability, it is now essential to that probability. While you are considering X and Y, you're not considering the how heavy they are right? Anything you don't include in the probability is non-essential. Since you don't care about the weight of each box, it doesn't matter. Once you notice X and Y designs, and start actively noting, "Hey, X's so far have all been with air," then you've created a new probability, and X is essential to that probability.
Quoting Bob Ross
If it is known information that the X or Y is irrelevant to the design, then you cannot make a probability based off of it when referring to the boxes in general. If it is unknown whether the X or Y is relevant to the air inside of the box, then you could start to note a probability that is again, separate from the box disregarding the design.
I think the part of confusion Bob is you keep making non-essential properties essential to an induction, but think because its non-essential in another induction, its non-essential in your new induction. That's simply not the case. Once you start including the X or Y as a consideration, it is now an essential consideration for your new induction. That's your contradiction.
Quoting Bob Ross
Its completely analogous. Non essential properties never weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occurring. If they do, they are now essential to that probability. That's why the living room is non-essential to the probability.
Quoting Bob Ross
A reason or a factor is a property of something. If you wish to interchange it, its fine. The point still stands.
Quoting Bob Ross
Only if you consider the X, Y design of the box. In which case, it is now an essential property of your induction, and you've made the separate probability as I noted earlier.
Hello Philosophim,
No they do not. It is a 51% chance that it is a BWOA, and that is calculated solely of its essential properties, which is that it (1) is a box and (2) has or does not have air in it.
The scenario does not give you a probability of a box being design X or Y and you cannot calculate it given the information for the scenario. So, although you are correct that that probability would be separate from the probability of pulling a BWOA or BWA, you cant use that probability. That fundamentally changes the scenario if you did.
No. Again you are confusing what is essential to calculating the probability, which in this case is the essential properties, and what is useful for infering what a thing is (when you cant know that it meets the essential properties).
Although in this scenario weight is not something to consider (to keep things simple), how heavy it is could play a factor into what you guess if you experienced a strong correlation of two distinctly different weights with BWOAs and BWAs a BILLION times. The weight is still an accidental property, but the sheer correlation in the actual world (which can happen) makes it cogent to factor that into consideration since you cant know by looking at it if it has air or not.
Theres no probability afforded to you of whether has a design X or Y. So correct. But that was never the claim I was making. The billion experiences of X ? BWA and Y ? BWOA is inductive evidence: it doesnt give you a probability and that is the whole point.
No you couldnt: the antecedent there doesnt necessitate the consequent. If I am unsure if X and Y are relevant to whether it is a BWA, I dont thereby gain knowledge of the probability of nor do I gain inference-like knowledge that it does. I think you may be confusing an inductive inference with a probability proper. Unless you know the numerator and denominator (and divide them) then you cannot claim to know anything about what is probable or improbable.
Theres no contradiction (that I can see): maybe explain where it is in more detail.
Let me clarify something though: what is essential to the inductive inference is not the same thing as what is essential to the identity of a thing. I think you may be conflating those two here.
Personally, I would say that it is useful and more rational to the inductive inference to go with BWA (in this scenario) (rather than saying it is essential: I am not sure what that would entail, as we are not talking about essential properties there).
I can say the designs are not essential properties of the identity of a BWA and BWOA while holding that the designs, given the inductive evidence and super low probability given of pulling BWOA, are relevant to inferring (guessing) what it is (even though it isnt an essential property of it). Again, I will refer you to the example of the human drawings.
There is absolutely no contradiction here.
Correct. You keep focusing too much on the probability. The idea is that there is a probability which is calculated independently of the designs, but it is a miniscule difference. Now, couple that with the inductive knowledge that the design is always consistently (a BILLION times) associated non-essentially to the boxes and that knowledge outweighs going off of the probability.
If by this you just mean that we use the essential properties to calculate the probability, then I agree. But reasons are not properties of the things.
Its not though. I am saying that there is a strong correlation between this design and this type of box, and I know that this box doesnt have to have this design--but it has had this design a BILLION times anyways. Theres a difference between something being essential to what a thing is, and it being accompanied by something else consistently.
Bob
I think what you are trying to say is that if one is using something as a consideration of what something is (i.e., its identity), then it should be an essential property: but that just simply doesn't follow from you methodology. I can claim that I distinctly know that a BWA is just a (1) box and (2) has air in it.
I can experience design X with BWAs my whole life and never refurbish its definition to include design X as an essential property: and that is how the scenario is setup. So you can't side-load the designs into the 51% probability because they should be essential properties because in the scenario they are not. If that makes any sense.
The probability was calculated with only the aforesaid two essential properties. The designs were not considered for it.
Bob
True. But if you're going to later include, "I believe property X is a property that indicates it has air," then you've made it an essential property to identifying whether it has air. Basically you're saying its not an essential property, but then in your application, it is. You can claim its a non-essential property within the induction, but then in your application you must show it is. If it was non-essential, then it would have nothing to do with your induction of whether the box has air or not. Once you believe the design pattern does, its now essential to the predictive outcome of the identity despite any belief otherwise.
Quoting Bob Ross
Introducing different words does not change the outcome. "infer" is "a guess" which is "an induction". So we're right back to the hierarchy again. If you include the "non-essential" property as essential for your induction to the outcome of the box, then it is no longer non-essential to your belief in the outcome of the box's air or not air identity. Again, it does not matter if its non-essential in your original probability identification. You've made it essential in your new one.
Quoting Bob Ross
It is correct that the essential properties of a known identity, and the essential property of an induction about that identity are not the same. I've said that already by noting that we can hold the original probability while considering this new pattern. Regardless of the pattern of design, we still know that any box has a 51/49 probability in regards to its air. But if we later consider the design in believing whether the box will have air or not, its now essential in that belief. You don't get to decide what's essential or non-essential in application. In application, the design is now essential in your belief on whether it holds air or not. You can deny it, but you haven't proven it yet.
Quoting Bob Ross
And the miniscule difference is irrelevant. Its still 1% more rational. Or .0005% more rational. If X > Y, and no other considerations are made, its always more rational to choose X. It does not matter how small the difference is. Your original claim is that the hierarchy breaks. I'm not seeing how there being a miniscule differences breaks the logic of the hierarchy. That's a personal reason to not want to choose the more rational induction. That's not an argument for saying the probability is less rational.
I feel we're just repeating ourselves on this point. You know I'm very open to conceding whenever I see the logic, but in this case, I do not see a logical point that breaks the hierarchy. If you're going to use a property as a basis for an induction, its essential to the reasoning behind the belief. If you removed the design of X and Y from your second inference, do you have a second inference anymore? No, that inference is based on there being a X and Y design. If you can't remove the property and still hold the induction Bob, its essential to the induction. Unless a new point is made, I don't really see anything to add to this at this point.
I want to get to another point which you made which I think is valid and worth discussing over instead.
Quoting Bob Ross
So here, you are correct. A probability is based off of our knowledge of limits. I've been using it in the generic sense, but depending on the context, the repeated occurrence of X and Y is not one. Here, we do not know the actual limit. You may not remember from the original paper, but I noted that the hierarchy is a basic identifier of inductions that almost certainly could be broken down further.
What we're faced with here is something that is a repeated possibility pattern. Lets say there's a mole in a hole. It comes out of the hole every other day for four days. Does that mean it will do so for the next four? The next forty? We don't know, its only an induction. But the longer the pattern repeats, the more cogent it seems to believe the pattern will continue.
We hold patterns as more persuasive than mere possibilities. If I only observed the mole for two days, I would see it is possible that the mole comes out of the hole, and also possible that it does not for the day. But that's not a probability. Its not a 50% chance that the mole emerges. Its a pattern. Its an observed repetition of possibilities. In other words, its something we applicably know of again and again. Applicably knowing a thing 20 times seems more solid to cogent to believe in it happening again opposed to only seeing its possible one time.
Patterns are a more detailed identity of a cogent argument than possibility alone, yet still less cogent than probabilities. Lets view our cards as an example. We know a jack has a 4/52 chance of randomly being drawn if there is no pattern in how the cards are shuffled. This is the only logical solution. Even if we observe a pattern within the draws, for example, over 10 decks our chance of pulling a jack is 10/52, we still haven't broken the odds if we still applicably know the card shuffling is random. Its like flipping a coin and getting heads 10 times in a row. Its a pattern of success, but not more cogent than the known probability.
The sun rising in the East and setting in the West is not a probability, its a pattern. An extremely long pattern that has remained unbroken. If we consider the box design in relation to whether its an indicator to its identity being an air box or not, this is also a pattern. But a pattern is not more rational than a probability due to the fact that a probability has more applicably known quantities like limitations. That being said, in absence of their being a probability, a pattern is the most cogent inference.
Hello Philosophim,
It seems now that you are referring to two things by essential properties: what is essential to what one induces something is and what is essential to what that something is. Is this correct?
Firstly, when I say that the design is not an essential property of what they are, I am not referring to the essential property of an induction about the identity of them: I am referring to the essential properties of a known identity--in this case, the box.
Secondly, I am also not even claiming that the designs are essential to inducing what box it is (which would be the latter thing in your quote), because that would imply that if I didnt know the design then I couldnt induce at all what box it iswhich is clearly wrong. I am saying that it is a relevant factor. To say it is essential means that I couldnt decide what it is (inductively) without knowing the designs. If I didnt know the designs in the example (with all else being equal), then I would go off of the probability.
If by essential property of the induction you just mean that I am using designs to make my induction, then I have no problem with that; but that has nothing to do with the substance of the scenario nor does that entail that it is essential to the induction. The point is that the colossally observed pattern of design ? box, in this particular context, outweighs going off of the minuscule probability.
If you agree that there is a separation between these two things (which you seem to agree in the above quote), then I dont know why you said:
It is not an essential property of the identity of the boxes, but is relevant to inducing which box it is. You are simply noting that, at a minimum, that the designs are relevant to inducing which box it is and then conflating that with my claims that they are not essential properties of the identity of the boxes.
This is false. Something being essential means that it cannot be removed, so to say that it is essential to an induction is to say you cannot induce either way without that essential factor. However, if the situation changes, then the induction changes. For example, in the scenario where Ive always experienced gravity pulling things to the ground for 40 years, I am going to induce that the next thing will fall that I drop. However, if it were the case that Ive experienced gravity not work in those 40 years 500,000 times more than it work, then I would say it wont fall (all else being equal). Gravity working in the first example is not an essential property of my induction of whether the object will fall when I drop it, because my induction would change if the factors changed. Sure, I wouldnt have made the same inductive conclusion if that factors changes, but it is not essential to know gravity is working all the time to be able to make an inductive inference in this case.
This is irrelevant. Again, you just noting that I am using the design in my induction, which doesnt negate the fact that design is not an essential property of the identity of the boxes.
If thats all you are saying, then it doesnt matter for the scenario. You cant somehow deduce the probability of the designs in the sample of 100, and that was the whole point. Since the person calculated the 51% probability off of the essential properties of the identity of the boxes, which doesnt include designs, there is no way to know probabilistically which design they will have: it is an induction.
It is not essential to the belief about the probability, because it wasnt used in the calculation of it. Just because you use the designs in your inductive inference, does not mean it has any relation whatsoever to the probability of pulling a type of box. Thats a non sequitur.
It is relevant to whether the box has air or not; and this has nothing to do with whether it is an essential property of the identity of the boxes. So I am failing to get what your point is here? You have seemed to veer off into an unrelated observation (but I could be wrong). The probability is still 51% that you get a BWOA, and that BWOA could have design X (despite you experiencing strong evidence to support otherwise).
And this is really what is under contention: for you, it seems as though really strong inductive observations dont matter if you know a probability and I disagree. If I have experienced a BILLION times design X ? BWA and I join a thought experiment where they have 100 boxes (of BWA and BWOA) and they tell me there is a 51% chance of getting BWOA and the box presented to me has design X, then, on the first pull, I am going with it being BWA.
You are saying that having a 1% more chance of getting BWOA is a better bet (inductively) and, consequently, that this box is going to be the first youve experienced (out of a previous BILLION) that does not have design Y.
In order for that to be the case, you would have to argue for a really unparsimonious general account of what is happening in the thought experiment. E.g., you would have to argue that perhaps the gamer makers are deceptive, that they have got a hold of a really rare manufactured set of BWOAs without the normal design that is associated with and decided to use those rare ones with you (a normal person), perhaps broke the law, etc. These are just examples, but you get the point.
Now, where I think you are right, is if the probability is not miniscule (e.g., 99% it is a BWOA). Since that calculation is deduced from the sample of 100, then that means there are 99 BWOAs. In that case, I think the probabilistic odds outweigh the experiential evidence of the correlation, and so it is more reasonable to go with BWOA.
I can even make the scenario even more specific to prove my point: imagine that, on top of what has already been said, in this scenario you also have strong inductive evidence that, although there can be a BWOA with design X, it costs an insane amount money to manufacture it with any design other than Y. You, as a normal person, engaging in a basic thought experiment (of pulling a box from 100 sample size) should not expect, given a miniscule 1% difference, that a BWOA has design X.
My point is that the entire situation matters, and it isnt as easy as saying probability > possibility when making informed inductive decisions. If that were the case, then we end up with really unparsimonious explanations of things.
Correct. But this is a scenario where other considerations are made. So this is irrelevant. If all you knew was that there was a 51% chance of it being a BWOA and all else being equal, then, yeah, go with the probability.
Correct. I am saying that the patterns in this case weigh into the inductive inference: it isnt as easy as going with the probability for the sake of going with it.
Bob
Quoting Bob Ross
Disregarding your first point for a minute, this is what I'm trying to inform you of. A relevant factor is an essential property. A non-relevant factor is a non-essential property in regards to the induction. Anytime you make the design relevant to an induction, a pattern in your case, it is now a relevant, or essential property of that induction. Again, can you make the pattern induction if you ignore the design? No. Therefore it is an essential property of that pattern. .
Quoting Bob Ross
It is what I'm saying. But your claim is not proven. You can include the pattern design in your thinking, but it does not outweigh the known probability. And to this, it must be re-iterated again. This probability is applicably known without the X Y consideration. When you include a new property, then you create a new induction that takes that property into consideration.
We then evaluate that induction. In this case its a pattern. A pattern is less cogent then a probability. This pattern also includes certain properties than the original probability. It is not more cogent than the original probability. However, it is also not fully comparable either. The initial probability does not include the design of X or Y in its consideration. Meaning once we include the X/Y as an essential property in our pattern, we don't have a probability to compare to. We could take the pattern as the most cogent decision if X and Y are essential properties, because there is no probability considered for the X and Y properties. But it does not negate a probability as being more cogent.
So once again, we do not have a lower hierarchy being more rational to pick then a higher hierarchy. What you've attempted to do is make X and Y irrelevant in a probability, say they are then also irrelevant in a pattern, despite them being absolutely necessary to the pattern's conclusion. I'm going to condense the points I made above below in some simple logic.
This is a fair comparable probability and pattern in the hierarchy:
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I pull 1 billion A's and 1 billion Bs.
A pattern is not as cogent as a known probability (The probability is not wrong, this would of course be a different discussion)
The more rational belief is that I will pull a ratio of A to B at 49/51%, despite the patterned solution I've seen.
This is another fair comparable probability and pattern in the hierarchy:
Probability of getting either A or B with design X is 75% or Y at 25%
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y
In this case, the probability is still more cogent than the pattern. This is because all relevant properties to the conclusion of each induction is being considered.
An incorrect comparable probability and pattern (What your example is doing):
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B, (X and Y not considered).
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y (X and Y considered)
Then you're claiming the pattern is somehow more cogent than the probability.
1. You have not shown that a pattern is more cogent than a probability. To do so, you must resolve a very simple problem.
The probability of a random coin flip is 50/50.
Someone flips a coin ten times randomly and it turns up heads all ten times.
"Randomly" is proven and not doubted.
Why would it be more cogent to predict the next coin is heads rather then saying it could be either on the next flip? Give a reason there, and we can start to question whether a pattern is more cogent than a probability.
2. You are not comparing inductions properly. The first induction does not consider X and Y. You cannot say a later induction that does consider X and Y is more cogent than the first, because the first is a different scenario of considerations. You need to have a probability that does consider X and Y to compare fairly.
I hope this finally clears up the issue! This has forced me to be clearer with my examples and arguments, and I think the entire paper is better for it.
Hello Philosophim,
To you as well!
I dont have a problem with this: you seem to just be noting that I wouldnt have made that exact inductive inference without the pattern which, to me, is a trivial fact. If theres three cards of 2 aces and 1 king and I hedge my bets that I will randomly pull an ace because there is a 66% chance, then, of course, I could not have made that exact inductive inference without the probability because that is what I used: but, my question for you is, why explicate this? What relevance does this have to the scenario I gave you?
I agree that the calculated probability (which is not an inductive inference) is not considering Y and X while the inductive inference about X and Y is; but this doesnt make it an unfair comparison; and the scenario hasnt changed because of it: there is a probability you are given and there is an inductive inference you could make either (1) based off of that probability or (2) off of the experiential pattern. In this scenario, they are at odds with each other, so you cant induce based off of both (as they have contradictory conclusions): so you have to compare them and determine which is more cogent to use. If you think this is an unfair comparison, then please elaborate more on what you mean.
Also, a real example, like my scenario, cant be negated by saying it is an unfair comparison because, in reality, you would have to compare them and choose (as described above). In the scenario, you wouldnt just throw your hands up and say UNFAIR COMPARISON! (:
This is disanalogous because in the scenario you didnt pull a billion times design X ? BWA (and ditto for the other one). I agree that if that were the case then the probability is a better pick.
The point with the scenario is you are coming in with experiential knowledge that shifts how you will play the limited 100 sample game. You, in this example, are talking about knowledge you get by randomly pulling in the limited, small sample game.
This is disanalogous for the exact same reasons as the above one.
Yes, and you cant just say unfair comparison: in the scenario, like the real world, you have to compare them: I specifically made in so that you have to compare them to make an informed decision. You are going to induce it is either with air or not based off of either the probability or the pattern.
Likewise, if you are saying that the probability is a better choice in the scenario, then you are thereby conceding that you can compare them.
It wouldnt. If all you know is that you are performing a 50/50 random coin flip, it doesnt matter how many times you get heads: its the same probability. This is disanalogous to the scenario because your knowledge of the design correlations is not derived from the sample size.
The scenario is the exact same: they are both a part of that scenario. In it, you clearly have to choose which you think is more cogent to go off of. You cant just throw your hands up in the air.
I wish it did, but I still dont think you have addressed the scenario properly. You seem to keep conflating it with a straightforward comparison of a probability vs. knowledge acquired from randomly pulling from a sample: obviously the former is more cogent. Theres no debate in that.
Likewise, this has made me be clearer in my scenario (;
Bob
Quoting Bob Ross
Your point has been that the hierarchy does not hold and that there are certain instances in which a lower level of the hierarchy is more cogent to hold than a higher one. My point is that you are incorrectly using the hierarchy.
Quoting Bob Ross
Quoting Bob Ross
Ha ha! No, I'm not saying its unfair as in, "I don't like it." I'm saying its not how the hierarchy works. Its been a while since we covered it, but we covered a similar situation a while back.
Probability: A coin has a 50/50 chance of landing heads or tails.
Possibility: The sun will rise tomorrow
We don't compare the two because they don't apply to the same situation, or the same essential properties. We compare coin flip with coin flip with what we know, and sunrise to sunrise to sunrise with what we know. The hierarchy doesn't work otherwise. You're simply doing it wrong by comparing two different identities Boxes without X and Y, and boxes with X and Y, then saying you broke the hierarchy.
Quoting Bob Ross
Sure, and I already pointed out the solution, but I'll be more clear.
If you do not consider the X and Y properties as relevant, you choose the probability. If you consider the X and Y properties as relevant, you do not have a probability that considers the X and Y properties. Therefore you choose the pattern. You're comparing an apple to an orange and trying to say an orange is more rational. You need to compare two apples and two oranges together.
Quoting Bob Ross
The point was to demonstrate that patterns are less cogent than probabilities. We both agree on this then. If that is the case, then if you use the hierarchy correctly by comparing the types of inductions we can make from all the essential properties considered among the inductions, you still choose a probability over a pattern.
Hello Philosophim,
It sounds like you are in agreement with me that the best choice in the scenario is to use the pattern, but you disagree that it is an example of a possiblity outweighing a probability: is that correct?
You say:
Which indicates to me you are agreeing with me that the pattern is the most cogent choice in the scenario, but you are disagreeing whether that conflicts with the probability. Is that right?
I honestly dont understand how I could be misusing the hierarchy if the two options are a probability or possibility (fundamentally).
The probability and the possibility are both being used to infer the same thing, so it is disanalogous to:
The implication with your example is that they are completely unrelated, but the probability and possibility in my example are both related insofar as they are being used to induce a conclusion about the same question. Thats why you have to compare them.
Another way of thinking of this is that any induction used to infer a conclusion is related to other possible inductions thereof, because they fundamentally are trying to answer the same question. If they were completely unrelated (like you would like me to believe), then one would not be capable of deciding which induction is most cogent to hold.
If you are right that the probability of a pulling a BWOA and the possibility of a BWOA having design X are completely unrelated, then you would not be able to determine which induction to use in the scenario because that requires you to compare them since they are both being used to make an induction about the same question. Its impossible in the scenario for them to be completely unrelated!
Just to hone in on this: they absolutely do!!! The question is does the box have air? and they are both within that situation that I outlined: to answer that question you must compare them or answer with undeterminable. When I said throw your hands up in the air, I wasnt meaning that you dont like it, I meant figuratively (in a fun way) that you cannot determine which induction to use in the scenario if you are saying those two inductions (which are used to answer the same question) are completely unrelated. There would be, in that case, two inductions that could answer the question which cannot be evaluated as more or less cogent than the other.
We dont agree on this. All your example demonstrated was that patterns extrapolated from random pulls from a sample are not more cogent than probabilities pertaining to that sample. That is not the same thing as proving that patterns are less cogent than probabilities.
Bob
Correct! This is what I've been trying to get across all along, so I'm happy to see this is cleared up.
Quoting Bob Ross
Also correct!
Quoting Bob Ross
quote="Bob Ross;817572"]The implication with your example is that they are completely unrelated, but the probability and possibility in my example are both related insofar as they are being used to induce a conclusion about the same question. Thats why you have to compare them.[/quote]
Because for one, it has never been that fundamentally the hierarchy is applied without context. If you introduce new properties which are of consideration within the probability, that is a new context. You are not asking the same question. You're not using the hierarchy if you introduce properties in one induction that are not considered in another.
To prove that the hierarchy breaks, you need to show me a comparison of two inductions which both consider all the same properties. Otherwise its just a strawman argument.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, they absolutely don't because you include an X/Y design consideration in your second induction, where this is not considered in the first induction. The first is, "Does the box have air?" While the second question is, "Does the box have air based on its design being either X or Y?"
A^B != A^B & X^Y
That's hard proof Bob. You'll need to disprove the above, and we both know that's not possible.
Quoting Bob Ross
Simply prove the coin flip example wrong, and then you'll be able to back that its not proven. Until then, it holds. And again, the hierarchy is when we have competing inductions within the same context. You have not demonstrated that you understand this yet. Please work to understand that first. As a challenge to you to help you do so, take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.
After, do the same as above, but this time add in the X/Y consideration for all the inductions. All the inductions must now include the X/Y. Then try to demonstrate why a lower hierarchy is more cogent than the higher one. Do this, and you'll have an argument. Don't, and you're not arguing against the hierarchy, but against something else different to the discussion entirely.
Suppose I sit down with a bunch of strangers at a poker game. The dealer deals himself a full house. Then he deals himself four of a kind. Then a royal flush. Then another royal flush. What does your theory say about when I should leave the table?
Hello Philosophim,
I think we have finally pinned down the disagreement: so I am going to focus on that. Which can be summarized on your post as:
You can have two induction which use different relevant factors to infer a solution to the same question in the same context. The use of different relevant factors does not change the context.
The context in the scenario includes both the information that the probability of pulling a BWOA is 51% and that youve experienced the design correlation which can be used to produce two induction that use different relevant factors in the context to derive a solution.
To summarize:
1. The context does not split into two contexts in virtue of the possible inductions using different relevant factors.
2. You have to compare them, because you must either use one or the other as your inductive inference.
#1, A ^ B & X^Y are a part of the same context: the inductions are what use varying aspects of that context. They are not two separate contexts themselves if they are a part of the same scenario and answering the same question with in that scenario.
#2, It is very clear in the scenario that you have to compare them, so if you are saying that the induction hierarchy is unapplicable then it is useless for practical situations and thusly warrants a new methodology.
You do agree that you are comparing them by saying that you think the pattern is most cogent, right? If so, then you are contradicting your claim that they cannot be compared (because they are different contexts).
Perhaps the scenario wasnt clear enough: within the scenario you know (1) probability of pulling BWOA and (2) a strong correlation with the designs; this is within the same scenario. The question that is asked is does this randomly pulled box have air?, and that question is within that same scenario. Since both bits of knowledge are within the same scenario, you can either to induce a conclusion; but not both (because they contradict each other). Theres no room for you to claim that it isnt asking the same question.
Obviously, the inductions themselves are using different relevant factors, and so they dont reach the same exact conclusion (in this case) nor do they have the same reasoning behind them; but that doesnt matter: you have to compare those two inductions to see which is more cogent to hold.
Think of it this way. You say that the pattern is more cogent in the scenario, but I say it is the probability. If you also hold that you cant accurately compare them, then you cant claim my conclusion (to the same question within the same scenario) is less cogent. As a matter of fact, you wouldnt be able to justify you own claim that it is cogent at all. Do you see the problem here?
I honestly think this is an iron man argument, and your hierarchy is being demonstrated to break here. I think you agree that the pattern is more cogent, so we are getting closer to seeing why.
You are just noting that the inductions themselves dont use the same factors, but that is irrelevant to the dilemma: which are you going to use to make your educated guess? The one that is more cogent. But, wait, according to you, they cant be compared! So, according to you, you could only say it is undeterminable. Do you see what I mean?
This is unproductive to say this. I already addressed this: in the coin flip example you are right, but it doesnt imply that probabilities are more cogent than possibilities. The antecedent does not imply the consequent that you want it to.
For example, if I claimed giving someone a hug is always worse than killing them and tried to prove it with the example:
1. A person is skinning your wife alive.
2. You go give them a hug.
3. That was worse than if you would have killed them (to defend your wife).
You could agree with the example and disagree that it proves the claim I made: no problem.
In logic, you are a committing a fallacy of a claim about the some to the all, and I can demonstrate it in a predicate logic:
?y?x (Prob
Thusly, I can completely agree with you on the coin example and claim that that is insufficient to prove that all probabilities are better than possibilities. You asking for me to disprove it disregards what I am telling you my position is: you would have to provide a proof that ever probability is better than a possibility, which is clearly unafforded by your example.
They dont. In real-world practical (and theoretical) scenarios, there are a range of possible inductions one could use that are (1) competing and (2) using different factors of that context. One has to pick one as the most cogent inference. Period. If you hierarchy cannot handle this scenario, then it isnt complete enough.
Bob
No, you cant in the instance I noted. You usually do fair readings, but this time you're not. I've told you how the theory works, you don't get to say my own theory doesn't work the way I told you!
You know I have no problem admitting when I'm wrong or you've made a good point. In this case, you're telling me the theory I made should be something different. That's a straw man. If you don't like the theory that's fine. But insisting it is something it is not is wrong.
I've asked you to do the induction breakdown in my last post so you would understand. Until you do so, you won't have understood the hierarchy theory. Your reticence to do so indicates to me you're more in attack mode than discussion mode. It's ok, I've done that myself. On the next post do the breakdown I asked and then I know your criticisms will come from an understanding. As it is, this is all a strawman, intentional or no. List those first, then see if your criticisms still hold.
A good question! Before I answer, I want to make sure you've read the theory first. To do so, use the terms for knowledge and inductions in the paper and tell me from your viewpoint what the theory would conclude. At that point I will either agree with or correct you. But if you haven't read the paper and understand the ponts first, you won't have the ability to understand the answer. Don't be lazy or insist that you have, prove that you have and we'll discuss
Hello Philosophim,
I apologize if I am misunderstanding you! To better understand what you are saying, let me ask you these:
1. In the scenario I gave, is the possibility or the probability what you would go with (or perhaps neither)?
2. Do you agree with me that if you decide one over the other that you are thereby comparing them?
3. Do you agree that all the possible inductions for a question within a context are thereby within the same context as each other?
Although I think I understand what you are saying, it isnt necessarily a straw man to point out that a theory needs to be revised; and that is what I am trying to convey.
From your perspective, you just disagree with that; but that doesnt make it a straw man argument.
I am going stop here for now because I need to know your answers.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
And I should clarify for question #3 that by "question" I am referring to the same asked one within the context. Of course, I could ask question X in context Y and question X in context Z, but I am asking you if you think that all possible inductions formulated for answering question X in context Y are within the same context. If that makes any sense.
I will refurbish it in the original post.
Take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.
After, do the same as above, but this time add in the X/Y consideration for all the inductions. All the inductions must now include the X/Y. Then try to demonstrate why a lower hierarchy is more cogent than the higher one.
Once we have those examples, we can use those as a base of discussion, as that will accurately represent the hierarchy of inductions.
Absolutely no problem! I will answer your questions, but my questions aren't related directly to yours; so if you could answer them as well that would be much appreciated!
My situation is an example of this, and to keep it simpler I excluded a plausibility: do you want me to add in a plausibility as well? I think it will just clutter up the discussion adding it in.
To do that, in my scenario, we would have to add in the idea that each box has a 50.001% of it being a BWOA and design Y, and you've experienced design X <-> BWA and design Y <-> BWOA a billion times. I just don't see the relevance of this, as it is no longer the same scenario, but that is my answer.
Bob
Sorry, I meant air and no air situation first without the X/Y's. Missed it on the phone, but I have access to a computer again. I wanted you to walk through it yourself as I thought it would help you understand. I'll just do it here however. I will answer your questions btw, I just understand that they are directly related to mine, and we cannot discuss them until this one point is understood. Lets slowly build this up so we have solid footing each step of the way.
An example of the hierarchy
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I pull 1 billion A's and 1 billion Bs.
We can compare them because all the properties considered for the induction are the same.
Another example of the hierarchy:
Probability of getting either A or B with design X is 75% or Y at 25%
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y
Again, we can compare them because we're involving the same properties in both inductions.
An example that is NOT the hierarchy:
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y
We cannot compare them using the hierarchy, because while some of the properties are shared, not all of them are in regards to the inductions that are made.
Its that simple Bob. Your example does not address the hierarchy. The second induction involves X and Y where the first induction does not. You are trying to compare apples to oranges when the hierarchy only allows you to compare apples with apples, and oranges with oranges. You cannot use this as an example to show that the hierarchy is wrong, because its not addressing the hierarchy. There is no debate on this. This is what the hierarchy is.
If you understand this, we can move on. Understanding this does not mean that you believe the hierarchy is adequate, useful, etc. It does not mean your example cannot be discussed as its own situation. But you must understand this definition and its application before we move onto any more questions. If you don't, we're not talking about the hierarchy. If you understand this, then I will address your previous questions.
Hello Philosophim,
I understand what you are conveying, but this just segues into my questions because if you are saying that the inductive hierarchy doesnt apply (like in your last example one above), then, by my lights, it is useless (since it cannot be applied) for practical examples. My scenario is an example of that. But to not get ahead of myself, please answer my previous questions directly.
Bob
Great! This absolutely had to be understood before I addressed your questions. Now let me get to them! If I miss any of your questions or points in this answer, please redirect me and I will address them.
Quoting Bob Ross
Lets use the hierarchy to answer the question. First, it is understood that within the hierarchy, we choose the most cogent induction within a comparable set. But what if we're missing a higher level of cogency? For example, what if I only have a pattern and no odds to consider? At that point, the pattern is the most cogent to choose from.
Hierarchy 1 Just A and B
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern (Not available)
Hierarchy 2: A and B and X or Y
Probability (Not available)
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y
As you can see, in the first example, we have a probability and no pattern established yet. Even if we had a pattern, we would choose the probability.
In the second example, we do not yet have a probability involving A and B and X or Y.
So which do we rationally choose if we have two hierarchies? That depends on what you find essential in pulling the boxes. If you consider the X/Y distinction irrelevant, then you would choose the probability in example one. If you find the the X/Y distinction relevant, then you would choose the pattern in example two because you do not have a probability to compare in the hierarchy. You can compare hierarchies depending on what properties you find essential to your induction, but you cannot cross parts within hierarchy 1 and 2 together to compare.
Quoting Bob Ross
No. You may be comparing the properties, but you are not comparing the h1's probability with h2's pattern.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'll need more details in what you mean by this. If you mean considering all the relevant properties to that hierarchy, yes. If you mean comparing hierarchies with different relevant properties, no.
Quoting Bob Ross
I hope this shows that it is not. You still have to evaluate your inductions and make sure they are accurately evaluated and compared. If you cannot cross hierarchies, you still have a rational conclusion based on the highest tier of inductive argument you have within that hierarchy comparison. To my mind, there is also no rational argument for handling inductions in any way in philosophy. I would say what I have is a pretty good foundation to start.
Hello Philosophim,
I understand better what you are arguing, but, in light of it, I think, by my lights, that is a concession that the hierarchy does not function (as I thought it was intended) in this scenario; and here is the crux of it:
Correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be admitting that these two inductions (which pertain to answering the same question in the same context) cannot be evaluated with respect to each other to decipher which is more cogent because you are generating two different hierarchies for them; and you are expressing this in the form of saying that it is up to the person to define what they think is essential. However, this is very problematic.
Firstly, unless there is some sort of separate criteria in your methodology for what one should consider essential, then it seems like, according to your methodology, a truly arbitrary decision of what is essential. I am ok with the idea of letting distinctive knowledge be ultimately definitional: but now you are extending it to applicable knowledge.
Secondly, because it is an arbitrary decision whether one wants to include the X and Y designs into their consideration, the crux of the cogency of their induction is not furnished nor helped by your induction hierarchy and, thusly, your methodology provides no use in this scenario. I think you are agreeing with me here implicitly by admitting that you had to generating to two competing but completely uncomparable hierarchies. This is a clear demonstration of the inapplicability of your methodology to determine cogency of inductions.
Thirdly, I find that it would actually be less cogent to go with the probability (in that scenario) and someone merely saying they dont want to include the designs as essential doesnt seem like a rational counter. The strong pattern, in this case, clearly outweighs using the miniscule probability. So I think that, as far as I am understanding it, using this methodology in this scenario can lead people to making an irrational decision (in the case that they arbitrarily exclude their knowledge of the patterns).
To me, this is the cost of claiming these two inductions as uncomparable, and it seems way too high to me to accept.
Would you at least agree that this scenario demonstrates how your methodology affords no help in some scenarios?
The bridge between them cannot be made (according to you) and so you have to arbitrarily pick which hierarchy to use.
Bob
Yes, this is correct.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm not quite sure what you mean by extending it to applicable knowledge, but I'll state what I see. We know that definitions are fully within our own choice. Of course, once we accept those definitions, then we must apply them. But the standard for applied knowledge does not change. You are simply using a definition in one scenario, then a different definition in another. Also understand that we're talking about inductions here. You won't know the outcome until you apply the induction itself. After you establish the identities in front of you, the hierarchy helps you organize your beliefs that you could apply, and which belief out of those inductions seems most rational to take.
Quoting Bob Ross
First, the arbitrary decision of how you define identities is not a rule of the hierarchy, that's simply our capability as identifying minds that can discretely experience. The hierarchy arises from this knowledge, not the other way around.
If you think about it carefully, you'll realize the hierarchy is a stable way to evaluate the immense freedom of the human minds ability to identify. Recall that one such action that shapes the identities we choose is how useful they are to us. Same with things such as avoiding death or harm. Identities that have too few properties, or evaluate something as non-essential when it is essential to a person's benefit will not be very good identities to have.
The hierarchy's rules apply no matter what identities you ultimately decide on in the end. Further, understanding that the hierarchy means you need to consider all of the properties, may allow you to catch that you haven't fully explored an induction. If I start looking for a pattern of X, Y, and Z, then realize my probability I was holding only involved X and Y, I can then consciously realize that I should be looking for a probability of X, Y, and Z if I can.
This is immensely useful. Again, to my mind there is no other method in philosophy that can measure inductions in such a way.
Quoting Bob Ross
And yet did you not come to a rational conclusion? Using less essential properties in you inductions results in broader outcomes. If I go through a forest and say, "All wood like plants with leaves are trees," its going to be very easy to point out trees. If I introduce other properties that divide trees into types, or bushes and other plants, its going to be much more difficult for me to point out specific trees, but I will be more discerning in my findings.
Taking the probability in the first case ignores every single other property of the box besides the fact its a box and has air or not. After pulling literally two billion boxes and noticing there was a 100% match of design to air or not air, it seems silly not to consider it. You're still hung up on comparing that pattern to the probability though. You can't because you're not considering the same properties in both instances. It doesn't work that way. Stop it Bob. :D
The two can coexist as separate sets in your mind. We do this every day. Genuinely, what is wrong with holding the probability of 49/51 for boxes with air and out air, then also considering there is a pattern where X and Y are considered? The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.
The fact that people can misunderstand, misuse, or make mistakes in applying a methodology is not a critique on the methodology. Do we discount algebra because it takes some time to learn or master? No.
Quoting Bob Ross
No. The scenario was fine, you just misunderstood and misapplied the hierarchy. It had been a while for both of us, so no worry! The puzzle for me was in explaining the answer in a way that was clear. The example allowed me to show you how to apply the hierarchy, demonstrate to you the decisions you have available to you, and come to a rational outcome. That's pretty useful. Now is the hierarchy useful in places its not meant to apply to? Of course. Its a tool, and like any tool it has its places where its shines the best and places where it reaches its limitations. But I see nothing here which show a contradiction within the hierarchies claims, or has broken it in any way.
Hello Philosophim,
I see what you are saying, but the problem is that there is not means of determining the cogency when comparing:
According to the entirety of your methodology (and not just the hierarchy), there is no justification for this claim you have made here. You cant say it is less cogent, even when it seems obvious that it is, for a person to say no it doesnt seem silly to just go off of the probability. Without a clear criteria in your view, the vast majority of scenarios end up bottoming out at this kind of stalemate (because the hierarchy is unapplicable to the situation).
I totally am (; I mean:
You cant say this if you generated two separate, uncomparable hierarchies and there is nothing else in the methodology that determines cogency of inductions! Philosophim, you are admitting it is more cogent and that theres absolutely no justification in your methodology for knowing that!
I 100% agree with you that it is most rational, but the problem in your view is you cannot justify it.
Lets make the danger in having no means of determining cogency of the inductions more clear in this scenario: imagine that if you guess incorrectly they kill you. Now, we both agree that the obviously more cogent and rational move is to bet it is a BWA; but imagine theres a third participant, Jimmy, who isnt too bright. He goes off of the probability. Now, he isnt misapplying your methodology by choosing to go off of the probability: he carefully and meticulously outlines the hierarchies involved in the context just like you, and realized (just like you) that he cannot compare them and is at a stalemate. He decides that he will use the probability.
We are both witnessing this irrational decision, and we want to help Jimmy not make a collosally dangerous mistake here in his reasoning; but, according to your methodology, what are we to cite as his mistake in his reasoning? What is it philosophim?!? Absolutely nothing. He did everything by the books.
But, Philosophim, Jimmy isnt misapplying your methodologyit just doesnt afford an answer to what is the most rational and cogent decision between the inductions! The mistake is in the lack of usefulness of the methodology, not Jimmys application of it!
What justification would you give to Jimmy to try and save him?
Bob
Well, no, there's a clear criteria. You go for what is most cogent in the property situation you have. Taken another way Bob, if you know the probability of the boxes for X/Y was 25/75, but you've also randomly pulled 50/50 on your boxes so far, its more cogent to go with the probability. Again, the issue is you're taking two different inductions with two different identities when the hierarchy is used for two different inductions with the same identities.
Quoting Bob Ross
I think you missed what I did then. I didn't compare the two different property setups, I simply overlapped them. I've said it several times now, but its worth repeating. The probability in the first case is regarding an identity with less essential properties than the second case. So I can very easily say, "All boxes have a 49/51% chance for air/not air". Since the probability does not consider X/Y pattern, it does not tell us the probability of air/not air for an X/Y pattern. So if we disregard the X/Y, we hold that probability. To help me to see if I'm communicating this correctly, what is the problem with this notion alone? Isolate this point from all other points and tell me where you think this is flawed.
Take the above, and just realize that when you include the X/Y properties, the highest induction you can make is a pattern. You don't have a known probability on the X/Y properties. So when you refer to the boxes as "just boxes", the most cogent thing is to take the 49/51 split. When you refer to the boxes as having a X/Y distinction, you take the pattern as you have no known probability with the X/Y distinction.
You seem very hung up on this idea that a probability is always more cogent then a lower portion of the hierarchy no matter the circumstance of context. To my mind, I've never intended to imply that. Its always been within contextual identities. I don't know how else to communicate this to you. But any claim to the contrary is again, a straw man.
Quoting Bob Ross
First, the risk of outcome does not change what is more cogent within the hierarchy. Second, I'm going to change the odds for a bit because we need to get you off this idea that the odds being miniscule make a difference. We'll make them miniscule when its all over, but for now, we'll say a air/no air is 25/75. What is rational is always rational. We simply decide to go with the less rational alternative sometimes due to how much it might cost us to be rational such as time/effort, and risk of reward/punishment, but this does not change what is rational in the hierarchy.
If Jimmy did a meticulous comparison, he would have a choice not in going against the hierarchy, but in determining the essential properties he considers in regards to the box. Does he include the X/Y design as part of his potential identification of whether the box has air or not? Let say Jimmy's not very smart and doesn't see a correlation of the X/Y pattern with air/not air. Jimmy has two options then.
1. Don't use the hierarchy
So Jimmy just guesses. Is that more rational than using the 25/75? No, I think we both agree on this.
2. Use the hierarchy
Jimmy guesses "not air". He may be wrong, but it was the most rational choice.
Ok, now lets do the miniscule odds. Its not much more rational in this case, but its still the most rational to use the hierarchy. The difference in odds, no matter how miniscule, does not change the outcome. if X > Y, its always greater than Y and therefore the most rational choice. This is proven and really not debatable.
Now Jimmy includes the X/Y pattern. He knows both the probability without the X/Y, but also the pattern with the X/Y. He pulls an X. Since he does not have a probability which concerns am X/Y correlation, the most cogent induction he has when including the X/Y is the pattern. Therefore, according to the hierarchy, he would choose that the X had air.
We're going to change this example up a bit more however to make things more clear. Now we're going to include two new pieces of information. First, we have the total number of boxes at 100. Second, Jimmy has pulled 10 boxes. Third, Jimmy has pulled 3 X's, and 7 Y's. Fourth, the question is now, "Will Jimmy's next box he pull have air or not?"
While the pattern for X/Y's still holds, in this question, Jimmy can't see the pattern ahead of time. The X/Y consideration has been removed. So what's the most cogent thing for him to do? Take the probability without considering the X/Y pattern. So the most rational choice would be "air". And if Jimmy were then also asked, "What pattern do you think the box is going to be?" he would reply, "X", because now the X/Y pattern is pertinent and he still doesn't have the odds for what the X/Y air/no air outcome would be.
I'm not sure I can make it more clear at this point. Just to let you know, I do not need the hierarchy to be right. I've worked on this for years, and have many, many times realized I was wrong or illogical in my claims here, so being wrong again is simply an opportunity for me to refine it better, or try a new approach. What I need is something logical, of which I have failed at countless times before. :) So trust me, I'm as interested in thinking about this critically as you are.
But try as well to be as critical to your own argument too. You keep misunderstanding the hierarchy. If you need a refresher, just post what you believe the hierarchy entails and I can agree/correct points so that way we're on the same page. I want to find whether the hierarchy holds, not keep clarifying what the hierarchy is. I think a major problem is you're taking a more complex problem without understanding the fundamentals of a basic problem. The complex problem is simply the application of the basics to a reasonable conclusion. Try to take your critiques of the complex problem and apply them to a simple problem first and maybe that will bring clarity in either understanding the hierarchy, or showing me if there is a flaw.
I look forward to hearing your replies Bob.
Hello Philosophim,
Let try to clarify what I am understanding you to be saying and then explicate the problem I am bringing up; because I think I am agreeing with you more than you might be realizing.
You are saying that in this scenario the two inductions (i.e., a probability and pattern) are within separate inductive hierarchies because they do not use the same essential properties (i.e., what I call relevant factors). Thusly, they cannot be compared to each other. It would look like this:
Hierarchy 1 (H1): probability
Hierarchy 2 (H2): pattern
In the scenario, there are no other inductions that use the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors) and since there are only two given the two hierarchies only contain one induction; which entails that within each hierarchy each induction is by default the most cogent to hold.
I agree with you here (in terms of what I just explained) and correct me if I am getting it wrong.
Now, perhaps to explicate this clearer, I am going to distinguish comparing inductions from comparing hierarchies. We both agree that both inductions are within their own hierarchies and thusly cannot be compared; however, I am talking about comparing hierarchies.
In the scenario, which lets say is context S, there are two hierarchies, H1 and H2. Although you cant compare the inductions, you have to compare the hierarchies to decide which is most cogent to go with (because it is a dilemma: either use the probability or the patterntheres no other option). Now, if we are to claim that in S H2 is more cogent than H1 (and thusly go with the pattern), then there must be some sort of criteria we used to compare H2 to H1 in S. If not, then we cannot claim either is more or less cogent to each other and, consequently, cannot claim that using the pattern is more or less cogent than the probability and if that is the case, then it is an arbitrary decision between using H2 over H1.
Now, the actual crux of determining the cogency, because otherwise it is arbitrary, is comparing H2 to H1 in S. If that is the case, then the hierarchy analysis that you keep giving, which would apply to H2 and H1, isn't doing any actual work in evaluating in S what is the most cogent decision to make. Do you see what I mean?
I dont have a problem with it, because you are just separating them out into different hierarchies, but then that is where the issue I am talking about arises (as explicated above).
You can say there is a probability and a pattern and they dont use the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors), but you still cant evaluate which is more cogent to use in S because you cant compare H2 to H1 without it being arbitrary (so far) under your view.
To clarify, now that you clarified that you are separating them into different hierarchies, I am saying that H2 is more cogent than H1 in S.
I understand that within H1, for example, if there was a pattern and a probability, then the probability is more cogent in H1: but youve now expanded this into multiple hierarchies.
It makes a difference when you are comparing hierarchies: H2 to H1. All you are noting here is that within H2 or H1 the miniscule odds do not matter.
You seem to try to resolve this issue I am talking about by just leaving it up to the person, but I am saying that it actually is more cogent to use H2 instead of H1 in S. Jimmy can disregard the pattern all he wants, and he would still be making an irrational decision.
I think all your scenarios with Jimmy missed the point, because you are just, again, elaborating on what is most cogent in a hierarchy while missing the point that you have two equally cogent hierarchies according to your position: you cant claim, without further proof or elaboration, that H2 is more cogent than H1 in S. I am trying to see if you think it is an arbitrary choice (i.e., left up to the person to decide) or if you think it is actually more cogent to choose H2 over H1 in S.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Yes, that's right.
Quoting Bob Ross
Ok, I think I see your issue now. Your issue is not with the hierarchy. Your issue is you are attributing what people decide as distinctive knowledge, and questioning what level of detail people should choose. The hierarchy does not make any such claims. It does not say, "Taking only A/B is more cogent then considering A/B and X/Y." As I thought, you're lumping too much together instead of seeing all the parts as separate first. The solution to understand this is to first stop looking at the hierarchy entirely and go back to our understanding of distinctive knowledge.
If you recall, there is no limit to what we can distinctively know, or how we choose to identify existences. If I want, I can say a tree is a plant made of wood and leaves. Or I could say a tree is what fits to the level of detail that a botanist would consider. Of course the question we can ask next is, "What should I use?"
The answer I gave in the paper was, "Whatever outcomes would best fit your context." The more detailed the identity, the more time and effort it takes to verify that what you are looking at is applicably known as that identity. If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.
In less risky circumstances, you may not care about there being further details to a tree then leaves and wood. Its not like a more detailed botanical explanation is going to affect your life in any way. Why waste time using such an identity when it benefits you in no way?
Notice how none of these questions have anything to do with the hierarchy. If you go back to the hierarchy now, you'll understand that your question is not about the hierarchy, its about determining what would be best, to include more or less details in your assessment of the situation. The hierarchy of inductions in and of itself does not evaluate the effort or risk to yourself in deciding how many attributes you should or should not include in your identity. What it can do however, is help you determine the most rational course of action if you limit the question appropriately.
Quoting Bob Ross
If you mean the hierarchy isn't doing the work in telling you whether H1 or H2 is more cogent to pick, you're right. The hierarchy rules do not tell you what set of distinctive properties you should pick without context. That's an entirely separate discussion, which of course we can have.
So I'm going to put the issue back to you. Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1? Can you do so within the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge? Can you use the hierarchy of inductions correctly to do so? And if not, that's ok, Its more of a check to see if you understand. I'll add my own agreements or critiques after I see yours.
Hello Philosophim,
I think you are understanding where my problem with your methodology lies (and what it is); and I think you are conceding that it doesnt give an actually account of which hierarchy is most cogentwhich, to me, is a major problem. For the applicability of your induction hierarchy itself is miniscule in the practical world: very (and I mean very) rarely does the possible inductions use the same exact relevant factors (i.e., essential properties); and, consequently, your hierarchy, and methodology in general (since it doesnt account for a viable solution comparing them), is only applicable to one piece of sand in an entire beach. Sure, we can dissect that one particular piece of sand and understand the cogency hierarchy within that oddly specific scenario, but it isnt relevant to the other millions of particles of sand. In order for a epistemic methodology to be viable, I would argue, it must, at the very least, be able to provide what is most cogent to hold generally in the vast majority of casesnot a small minority.
I wouldnt count it is valid to shift the determination of cogency to distinctive knowledge; thats like me saying that people can choose what level of detail to use when it comes the hierarchy itselfe.g., I choose to exclude probabilities, so I choose this possibility. No, we both agree there is actually something most cogent to choose within each hierarchy: I dont get to shift that into distinctive knowledge. Likewise, there is something most cogent in relation to the hierarchies we generate for the scenario: I dont get to shift that into my distinctive knowledge. Just like how I dont get to distinctively say well, I just dont find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time, I dont get to distinctively say well, I just dont find the designs relevant in this case, so I am going to go with the probability of 51% that it is a BWOA. Epistemology doesnt leave these kinds of cogency decisions up to the user to arbitrarily decide.
To clarify, this means that the crux of the cogency determination in the vast majority of cases is left up the person to arbitrarily decide for themselves; which renders the scope of your methodology to only oddly specific examples. Again, we normally do not face possible inductions that use the exact same relevant factorsthe real world doesnt work like that.
You arent giving a general account of what is most cogent: you are just saying that the person can do whatever they want, and thats what is most cogent. I am not saying you have to have an incredibly oddly detailed equation for determining cogencybut you should have a general account.
For example, I actually think that the best criteria of knowledge is a justified belief, and the factors for justification are: internal coherence, external coherence, parsimony, logical consistency, reliability of supporting data, intellectual seemings, and explanatory power. These are NOT super specific criteria, but I am not saying you do you, and thats whats most cogent: epistemologies are supposed to give general guidelines for how to acquire knowledge, but yours seems to revolve around a very miniscule scenario where the inductions have the exact same relevant factors.
For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; but I understand you do not see it that way, so I am conveying my point in the form of comparing hierarchies.
I am not going to answer this yet, because that is what I was originally asking you and you still havent answered. So far, all I am understanding you to say is that your methodology doesnt tell them what to do (i.e., whatever fits best for you in the context).
I dont use your exact epistemology, so that is why I am asking you for clarification; but I can attempt an answer (after yours) of a potential solution under your epistemology by my lights.
Bob
The theory is a foundation. Does it work consistently and logically for what it does? Yes. The fact that its a screwdriver and not a hammer isn't really a critique of the theory.
Quoting Bob Ross
That's just an opinion and not really an argument Bob. No one has ever used the hierarchy before, so they haven't had to think in terms of it. Its not difficult to start thinking using the hierarchy to compare different inductions. Just as a start, it solves many problems in epistemology that have to do with induction.
Quoting Bob Ross
But you should. The hierarchy is built off of the consequences of distinctive and applicable knowledge, not the other way around. If A => B => C, you shouldn't criticize that C doesn't lead to A. I'm letting you know that your critique is a misunderstanding of what relies on what. Distinctive knowledge does not rely on the hierarchy. The hierarchy relies on distinctive knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
The reason why you don't get to do this is if you also add, "When I'm using the hierarchy of induction." If you're not using the hierarchy of induction you get to do this as there is no other objective measurement to decide what induction is more cogent than another.
Quoting Bob Ross
Why not Bob? Its been logically concluded that a person can create whatever distinctive knowledge they want. There is no rule within nature that necessitates what a person must consider distinctive. Now there are arguments and situations that we can break down to try to convince a person to take on certain properties.
In fact, I've been trying to do that during our conversation. Notice how I stated earlier that you weren't addressing the hierarchy correctly. You had a different distinctive notion than I did. If you don't want to accept the distinctive notion that I'm putting forward, what can I do about it? Nothing. I can show you why its rational and consistent to do so. I can note that if you don't accept the definition I'm putting forward, not because its a contradiction, but because you don't like what it entails, that your critiques will be straw men arguments and we'll go nowhere. But ultimately, that decision is on you right?
Quoting Bob Ross
No, I've noted that with individuals, they are free to choose whatever distinctive knowledge they like. But there are risks and consequences for doing so as I mentioned in my last post.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, I'm not saying that at all. I'm noting that there are reasons why we limit the distinctive considerations in our choices. This wasn't a hierarchy point about cogency, just a discussion about why we find certain things distinctive. If I was unclear about that, my apologies.
Quoting Bob Ross
But you're not arguing for it. You're not showing or proving it Bob. That's just a statement. Its why I asked you
I get the feeling that you're more interested in simply not accepting the hierarchy then you are in demonstrating why. That's why I asked you. I'm trying to get some reasoning from you, as well as get you back into thinking about the theory instead of insisting things about the theory. As of now, I'm not seeing anything but critiques on the idea that it doesn't do more than it does, that it should do more than it does, or that it does more than it does. I'm asking you to understand the actual theory, and critique the theory from within that understanding. So try to answer the question first. I'm not trying to trap you, I'm trying to see if you understand all of the terms correctly, and also get a better insight into why you're making the claims that you are.
I definitely have an answer for you, but I feel that too much of these discussions has been going back to whether you understand the actual theory as defined instead of whether the theory is flawed or illogical. Hope the week is going well for you Bob, I'll catch your reply later!
Hello Philosophims,
You are confusing what a person can do with what they should do epistemically. It doesnt matter if a person can act irrationally: it is still irrational because it isnt what they should be doing. What they should be doing, is exactly what the epistemic theory is supposed to furnish us with.
Which leads me to:
You are confusing what is most cogent to do with our expounding of it (to ourselves). Distinctive knowledge us just out ability to discretely parcel reality: it doesnt tell us in itself what is most cogent to hold nor what is even most cogent to parcel. The epistemic theory is supposed to attempt to get at what in reality, beyond our mere distinctive knowledge, is most cogent to do.
Philosophim, conceptualizing and abstracting what one thinks is most cogent to do is useless if it is not closely married to reality, which is what furnishes us with what actually is most cogent to do. If I want to survive and theres a bear coming at me, then there is actually a best sequence of counter moves to maximize my chances of getting out aliveand my decisions in terms of what to distinctively classify and parcel could go against that most cogent sequence of events.
If you are claiming that the hierarchy is contingent on the distinctive knowledge, then thats another area of dispute us.
Just because we have to use our discrete experiences to get at reality, that does not entail that what is most cogent is contingent on our discrete experiences (nor knowledge that we distinctively derive therefrom).
I know you have expounded this before, but can you briefly give a couple examples (so I can re-evaluate them)? I honestly dont think it applies to most situations. Take a simple example that is analogous to the scenario which I gave you before: is my dog in the other room?
Lets say I know there is a 50% chance that he is in the room and that I am outside of the room (with the door closed). The probability was calculated by a person who, with me not looking our hearing anything, flipped a fair coin and if it is heads will put my dog in the room (and if tails, wont).
Now, to make this analogous and render your hierarchy useless to this situation, I am allowed to, after the coin flipping and placing of the dog (or not placing of the dog) is finished, stand outside of the room with the door closed. I clearly hear a dog barking in that room and, to put the icing on the cake, my dogs bark matches that bark exactly (as I have experienced it for 60 years). This is another situation where the probability and possibility do not use the same relevant factors and, consequently, your epistemology is useless for figuring out what the most cogent thing is to do (regardless of the fact that it can calculate what is most cogent within the two hierarchies).
This is true of vast majority of situations, including possibility vs. possibility (which can also have two which use different relevant factors), possibility vs. plausibility, etc.--I can keep adding example after example if you would like.
This is irrelevant to what I was saying: just because I can decide to not use the hierarchy that does not entail that I am determining the most cogent solution. What I can epistemically do is different from what I should epistemically do. If I reject the hierarchy in a situation where it is clearly applicable in favor of something less formidable, then I am being less cogent. I dont get to just say well, you cant complain because it is my distinctive knowledge.
You cant say there are more risks in choosing A over B if you cant determine A as a more cogent option than B: those claims go hand-in-hand. If theres more risk in being wrong, then I would imagine that actually factors into the cogency of the decision.
I was just clarifying the record: I am not going to derail into that right now. I would much rather you just answer the question. My statement here is irrelevant to the question:
I am asking that within the context that we have two hierarchies, H2 and H1, in context S and that is it: there is no over-arching hierarchy at play here. I think I made the question very clear. So, does your epistemology account for a method of determining the cogency of the hierarchies or not?
I am refraining from derailing into why I think H2 and H1 in S are within a over-arching hierarchy, H3, because my critique here applies either way: it doesnt matter. Forget about that for now.
In the question I asked, I am granting the hierarchy itself is stable and legitimate: the critique is of the comparison of hierarchies themselves.
I think my question is very clear, and I am not going to speculate at trying to provide potential solutions to your theory if you already have a solution. The critique is of your theory, now it is time for you to rebut it or concede it.
I already stated in the context of the question that the hierarchies are legitimate: its the comparison of hierarchies I am asking about. Imagine, perhaps if it helps, that I dont have a solution to provide you: so what? If I dont have a solution, then it doesnt change the fact that either you do or you have to concede that your epistemology fails in this regard.
You too my friend! (:
Bob
Quoting Bob Ross
I am not confusing that. I am not saying what a person should do, you are. You are saying they are acting irrationally, and I'm still waiting for why from you. The conclusion that we can create whatever distinctive knowledge we want within our personal subjective context does not make any claims to what distinctive knowledge is more rational than another.
Now, I welcome a discussion about rational choices in distinctive knowledge. I've dabbled in a few non-hierarchy reasons why we should consider having certain distinctive knowledge over others that don't involve the hierarchy. If you want to involve the hierarchy, you can apply it to the question of when you make a distinctive induction. But, you must first understand the core tenants of distinctive knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
I am not confusing anything here. I've been trying to tell you you're barking up the wrong tree! Yes, you are correct that distinctive knowledge alone does not tell us what is more cogent to hold or parcel. I've been noting this the entire time.
Quoting Bob Ross
Correct. With distinctive knowledge, we apply that to the world. When we reach the limits of applicable knowledge, we use the hierarchy. Recall that the hierarchy is based off of how far away our inductions are from applicable knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
Correct, that's what the hierarchy does.
Quoting Bob Ross
I think you're confusing inductions with knowledge. I generally use cogency as a means of evaluating inductions. Knowledge is a rationally deduced match of our identities with reality. If we know the best sequence of counter moves, we're not talking about induction anymore. Induction happens when we lack the full knowledge of a situation and must make a guess at outcomes. At that point, we can evaluate our inductive choices and pick the one that is most cogent using the hierarchy.
Quoting Bob Ross
First, you didn't use the same properties in each case. Did we evaluate the coin flip if the dog barked in the first probability? No. So you can't compare the probability to the second situation where we ARE considering the dog barking for our belief.
This part alone should have been obvious to you if you've been listening to me, and you should have easily predicted how I would respond. You're smart as a whip Bob, but I think you're still in attack mode, not discussion mode, and you're not thinking through it correctly here. Relax and try to understand first. You don't have a need for this theory to be wrong right? We have a need to get to the truth of the matter, whether the theory is wrong or right.
First, because this argument isn't really any different than the box argument, what do you think is more rational to choose here? Then, why?
Quoting Bob Ross
Its completely relevant to what you were initially saying. You said you were able to just decide willy nilly what distinctive knowledge you held. Which is fine. But you can't if you hold that you are applying to a particular distinctive knowledge, that of the heirarchy. While you can choose what personal distinctive knowledge you hold, if you agree to accept someone else's distinctive knowledge, you're stuck. That has nothing to do with the most cogent solution.
Quoting Bob Ross
I did answer the question. The answer is, please justify your statement by showing me why you think that, not simply stating that you think that. Asking you to provide a reason for your statement when asked is a sensible and standard response. Let me understand your reasoning so I can answer your question. I can take a stab at trying to figure out your reasoning, but if I miss it, we'll be right back here again.
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, you did not make that clear. You claim that it is more rational to pick H2. It seems to be a crux of your argument against the hierarchies inadequacy, so I want to know what justification you have for making that claim. Give me justification so that I understand where you are coming from. Only then can I adequately understand your claim and answer it.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, its not clear, that's why I'm asking you to give your rationale! Also, lets not put ultimatums like "rebut or concede". Lets not make the discussion one sided, please address my points so that I can better address yours.
Quoting Bob Ross
If you agree with me, then you understand that the hierarchy is a rational comparison of inductions over the same identity set. You are claiming that because it does not claim to have a rational comparison between identity sets, that its somehow broken. That's a straw man. You're saying because the hierarchy is not claiming to be something it isn't, that its wrong. That's just not logical Bob. We can of course question what identity set would be more rational to choose, but that does not invalidate what the hierarchy does.
Hello Philosophim,
You too!
Fair enough: I will re-read the OP and the papers (from the previous discussion board); however, I feel as though I am asking a very clear question that doesnt require re-reading the paper, so I am going to ask again but with as much clarity as I possibly can.
We both agreed that it is more cogent to pick H2 over H1 in S, so I was asking you why it would be more cogent under your view. An answer to that question is not to throw the question back at me: it doesnt matter why I think it is more cogent: you said it was here:
If you think it is more rational, then I can ask why under your view is it more rational?. You, then, cannot simply respond with why do you, bob, think it is more rational?.
So, let me start over with the question and ask:
Do you think it is more cogent to pick H1, H2, or neither (are more cogent) in S?
If you answer one over the other, then I am asking a follow up question of:
Under your view, what makes one more cogent over the other?
Correct me if I am wrong, but we have discussed well enough for me to get an answer to those: we both agree that the cogency criteria within the hierarchies (H2 and H1) work perfectly fine, but is there any criteria in place to compare those hierarchies themselves?
I think the aspect of the papers you are saying I am forgetting pertains to the claims I made about distinctive knowledge, but that is irrelevant to whether you can briefly answer those questions.
I said this in the example:
The example wasnt demonstrating that the cogency criteria within the hierarchies is flawed: it was noting, just like with the box example, that there is no way to determine the most cogent thing to do in the situation because there are two hierarchies that cannot be compared.
I apologize if that is the case, but, as I showed above, I did not straw man your position and I did anticipate that response by purposely explicating that I am not claiming that in the example itself (as seen above). You just ignored or missed it in my response.
Again, forget about my claim that H2 and H1 are within an over-arching hierarchy: that is irrelevant right now. Forget that I said that and deal with what I am saying right now.
Agreed, that is a straw man. I am saying that because the two inductions do not use the same identity sets, I have, in the box and dog example, no way of determining which is more cogent to use because they are of two distinct hierarchies.
Right now, I am asking you why you think it is more cogent to pick H2 (which you said, and I quoted above, in a previous message) if you cant compare the hierarchies themselves (which is what you were also claiming). My rationale for why I think it is more cogent is irrelevant. For example, if I thought it was more cogent to pick H1 over H2, I could still validly ask why you think H2 is more cogent than H1 because it appears as though there is no way to determine this under your view.
But since you asked, I will tell you why I think H2 is better than H1 in the box example: I think that, in that situation, in a nutshell, that the overwhelming experiential correlation of the BWA with design X and design X exclusively on BWAs outweighs the 1% increased probability that it is a BWOA; and so I go with it being a BWA (and thusly not with the probability). Why do I think it outweighs the other? Just because, in this situation, because to go with the other option is to have to makeup unparsimoneous explanations of the situation: it is more parsimonious, all else being equal, to say yeah, thats probably a BWA.
Again, I am asking you why you think it is more cogent when, as far as I can tell, your epistemology affords no means of determining it. Is it an intellectual seeming to you? Is it because it is more parsimonious? Is it something else? You still have yet to answer!!!
Sorry, I am not trying to give you an ultimatum; but I feel as though you are avoiding the question (perhaps unintentionally or I am misunderstanding your response): Ive asked the same question now four or so times and you haven't answered nor have you demonstrated why my question is currently unanswerable. You say we need to clarify some things about how the methodology works (as I am misremembering), but you can still answer the question with the terms from your methodology and then note if my response confuses the terms. You havent even responded.
Perhaps, if the question is truly unanswerable, then please demonstrate why. If it is because I am misremembering something, then let me know what exactly (briefly). I dont see why you cant at least answer it within the schema of your methodology.
Are you not saying that the hierarchy is the most cogent means of determining which induction to hold when they have the same identity sets? If so, then you are telling them what they should do.
I am not going to respond to the distinctive knowledge stuff yet until after I re-read the essays. Plus, I think theres plenty for you to respond to herein already.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Oh, I think this was lost in communication then. I did not intend to say this. I noted in the circumstance where you take in A/B and X/Y then you should pick H2, as H1 does not have X/Y considerations. In the circumstances where you do not have the X/Y additional consideration, then H1. You have been claiming that H2 is more rational than H1, not myself.
Quoting Bob Ross
As you can see here I did not claim that H2 was more rational than H1, I noted we could simply overlap them. This is rational because in the case of A/B without an X/Y consideration, we do have knowledge that overall its a 49/51 split. That does no go away if we add the X/Y consideration and have no induction. If we add a X/Y consideration, we can then also consider that.
I think its the pattern that's made it confusing. Lets look at different probabilities instead.
H1 49/51% A or B
H2 A is 98 % X, B is 98% Y
In this case we have no pattern. We know both probabilities. These now overlap. If I pull a Box with an X, its likely an A, or air box. Further, if I did not know the next box I was going to pull, I would guess it was B, and also guess that it would be a Y box.
Now go back to our original example and you should see what I'm talking about. We simply overlap the inductions we do have depending on what properties we're considering for the outcome. In the case of H2, we don't have a probability, we only have a pattern.
Quoting Bob Ross
I keep telling you its not irrelevant, because I've already answered the question, told you it has to deal with distinctive knowledge, and you still seem to insist it doesn't. :) This is why I suggested you read the paper again, because you seemed to gloss right over this.
Quoting Bob Ross
I've already mentioned above that this is not the case.
Quoting Bob Ross
Thank you, this is what I was trying to understand. My overlap explanation and an understanding that we compare hierarchies within the same identity set should also be quite parsimonious. But regardless, parsimoneous is just something we want, it doesn't make it rational. There are plenty of unparsimoneous but highly rational things in this world. A desire is not a rational argument. If this is your only reasoning, then its really just an opinion. Lets examine my point about taking the identity sets into consideration, as well as cases of overlap, and you can see the rationale of the hierarchy, as well as the rationale of overlap.
Quoting Bob Ross
I have responded, I just think we both didn't quite understand that each had responded. Hopefully this answers your question now. If not, I'll follow up.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, I am not saying which identity sets a person should choose. You keep accidently blending what one distinctively knows vs the hierarchy, which relies on what distinctive knowledge one knows and uses. The hierarchy at its base is say claiming that one set of distinctive knowledge identities is more rational to hold then another. That is a separate question that must be asked of the distinctive knowledge sets themselves. Which if you understand this part, we can go into next.
To sum:
1. You create an identity set with distinctive knowledge and its applications.
Set 1 A/B box
Set 2 A/B Box and X/Y design
Your choice of set, is not the hierarchy. I'm going to repeat this again, because its been missed several times. Your choice of set, is not the hierarchy.
You then create inductions considering that distinctive knowledge and applications. You can compare though a hierarchy of inductions created from that set.
If you combine two sets together and their hierarchies, you cannot use the hierarchy betwixt the two sets, but you can overlap, or switch between the sets as the set you use changes based on your circumstances.
Example:
Take Set 1 when X and Y are not considered. Take Set 2 when X and Y are considered. Thus if I'm asked to guess which air box will come out next, I only need set one. If I'm asked to guess which air and design box will come out next, I can overlap the two.
I hope this clears it up.
Hello Philosophim,
I appreciate the elaboration: I see more clearly now what you are and are not saying. I want to say it back to you so as to confirm that I am getting it right:
You are claiming that the two sets, H1 and H2, can only be evaluated as more or less cogent than one another insofar as you know which factors are being considered relevant (e.g., if X/Y and A/B, then go with A; if just A/B, then go with B; etc.); but, most importantly, the person can decide which factors are relevant, being distinctive knowledge, and thusly it is not more or less rational (i.e., cogent) to use factors X/Y and A/B (or to just use A/B, or just X/Y). Is this correct?
After re-reading the OP and essays, I think I have finally pinned down my disagreement here (assuming my above summary is accurate): the relevant factors of the actual situation are not themselves distinctive knowledge but, rather, are applicable knowledge. In your essays and OP, you never discuss relevant factors of a context (i.e., situation) in the manner that I am talking about but, rather, essential properties: the latter being what is essential to the identity of an entity, whereas the former is what is essential to the consideration of the resolution to a dilemma within a context. My creation of distinctions plays no role in what is relevant to figuring out the best solution to a problem within a context: the relevant factors are any factors (i.e., bits of information) within the context that could affect the decision.
So, if I say that what is essential (i.e., relevant) to determining whether my dog is in that room or not is only the probability, that tells me nothing in-itself about what the actual set of relevant factors are to determining whether my dog is in that room or not in reality: I have to apply a test to figure that out, which is, by definition, applicable knowledge.
My distinctive knowledge of what the relevant factors are, which is just my ability to cognitively enumerate different options and single out different entities, is really an asserted hypothesis of what they actually are; and I can only confirm this by application of a test.
So far, you keep insisting that which set one will use is utterly determined by which factors are considered relevant, and the determination of what is relevant is merely distinctivenot applicable. However, this is wrong: there are an actual set of relevant factors to whether my dog is in that room and it is unconditioned by my distinctive knowledge of it.
The problem is that you dont get to decide what to consider in the context: the relevant factors are there in reality within that context. In the box example, the designs and the probability are relevant factors. All you are noting is the enumeration of which are more cogent depending on what they consider as relevant, but I am saying they dont get to choose that part.
Yes, this is fine; but there is an actual most cogent set to choose (over the others).
To be rational, is to be parsimonious, logically consistent, to assess the reliability of the evidence, to be internally + externally coherent, and empirically adequateall to the best of ones ability. If I say that X is true and false, then I am thereby being irrational: however, if I say that X is true but do not realize that I am also implying it is false, then I am not thereby being irrational; if I say that I can explain the data with X and still insist on explaining it with X + Y, then I am thereby being irrational: however, if I explain it with X + Y as I do not realize I can explain it with just X, then I am not thereby being irrational; etc.
Also, as a side note, standards, which ground all reasoning and justification, are fundamentally grouned in wants (i.e., ought statements); but the idea is to try and hold what provides the best utility towards truth. Just because parsimony bottoms out at a want, which may be an intellectual seeming in this case, does not mean it cannot be a criteria for the standards of what being rational is. All of our epistemic imperatives (e.g., what we use to do science) and moral imperatives bottom out at wants. As a matter of fact, all of our reasoning does: our wills are what furnish us with our principles that we think we are obligated to use during our derivations.
Desires, ultimately, are what define what being rational is. Theres no way around that. That I am irrational for violating the law of noncontradiction is grounded in my desire that I ought to define being rational as including abiding by the LNC. That doesnt make my argument irrational.
Yes, that is what I have been asking about with the H2 and H1 in S question.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Also, to clarify my distinction between the essential properties of an identity of an entity and the relevant factors of resolving a dilemma within a context; it can be noted that both are essential properties: just not pertaining to the same thing. To say that I can decide what I think is essential to what this "entity" is does not mean that I can decide what is an essential factor to assessing the entire situation. For example, a essential factor of assessment of a context can be an accidental property of an entity within the context, and an essential property of an entity within the context can be irrelevant to one's assessment. I can choose what I use to identify an entity within the context, but I don't get to choose what is relevant to assessing the dilemma within that context.
Bob
Quoting Bob Ross
I am not saying that, but this is close. I am not saying that H1 or H2 is more cogent. I am not applying the hierarchy to whether I should chose H1 or H2. I am saying that we use H1 or H2 based on the properties we are evaluating as essential within the justification of our inductions.
Your question seems to be, "Which identity set should I use?" This question is important, but I needed you to understand that it is not a hierarchy question. The hierarchy does not care why you picked H1 or H2. All it notes is that when you are within H1 or H2, you can compare inductions as I've noted. This is not a flaw or a lack of the hierarchy. This is just a logically concluded set of rules.
Quoting Bob Ross
I am saying the hierarchy does not involve making any claim to the rationality of the distinctive properties a person chooses. Once you are deciding to use the hierarchy, you have already decided on the distinctive properties you are applying in the induction. Now, that doesn't mean that we cannot have a separate discussion about which properties should be essential. It also doesn't mean that we cannot come to a rational conclusion about what properties would be best. But it is not something that the hierarchy itself cares about.
Second, I think the other confusion you have is you keep crossing applicable knowledge with inductions. Inductions can always be wrong. Always. They are at best rational, at worst, irrational. There is the decision as to which induction is best before application. To test an induction, it must be applied. This is why your distinctive knowledge set is prioritized over your applicable knowledge in choosing a set to apply the hierarchy. Within the hierarchy, we use our applicable knowledge of that distinctive knowledge set to determine the most cogent induction. Let me give you an example.
Distinctively, I consider A/B, air box and no air box, to be the only essential properties I care about. I applicably know the probability is 49/51%. I applicably know I have a pattern of 50%. Then I invent a plausibility that there is a box that breaks physics, and has half air, and not half air.
Recall that the hierarchy is based on its distance from applicable knowledge within the distinctions chosen. I applicably know the probability. I don't distinctively know the probability. I applicably know the pattern. I don't distinctively know the pattern. Finally, I don't applicably know that I can get a box that has half air, and not half air. So if I choose an induction, whether I'm going to get an A or B box next, I have to choose an induction that strays away the least from the applicable knowledge that I have. In this case, its the probability.
Quoting Bob Ross
So then, the relevant factors of the identity set are the distinctive knowledge that you see as essential. The relevant factors within the hierarchy are your applicable knowledge involving those distinctions. And the closer your inductions to the applicable knowledge that you have, the higher up the hierarchy those inductions are.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes.
Quoting Bob Ross
You'll need to prove that you cannot choose your essential properties. Bob, hypothetically what if there was a color difference of red and green on A and B boxes, but the person having to make the induction is color blind? Or, lets say the person just doesn't put it together that there's a design pattern correlation between A and B? Can they consider those properties?
Further, what if there are an essential set of properties that could tell whether a box was an air box or not without opening the box, but it took 2 hours of examination to figure it out? If I only had 3 hours to sort ten boxes, and being slightly off was ok, wouldn't it be smarter to use the probability instead?
And here we can finally ramp off of inductions, and go back to the real question that you're asking: "If I have an option to make a property essential to an identity, when should I?" This is not a hierarchy question. I repeat, this is not a hierarchy question. At this point, we must leave inductions behind and focus on this question alone. If you finally realize these are two separate questions, then we can drop the hierarchy at this point and focus on this major question.
If you recall, I only briefly touched upon this in the original paper. There was enough to cover as it was, and I had to cut considerations somewhere. I'll start now.
First, we need to revisit a point you made earlier that I agreed with. Distinctive knowledge must be applied to make any real assertions about reality. We'll go back to the sheep and goat example. If I say that a sheep has magical powers as an essential property, until I can actually applicably know a creature that has magical powers, my distinctive knowledge does not apply to reality.
Second, useful distinctive knowledge allows us applicable knowledge of reality that gives us what we need to survive. If your distinctive knowledge set leads to death or unnecessary harm to yourself or others, then we can rationally conclude this is not a great distinctive knowledge set. If you are dead or harmed, you are unable to exist, or diminished. I think we can both agree this is a rationale pretty much everyone in society would agree with.
Third, useful personal distinctive knowledge is that which makes our life better in having it as an option for application. Lets say there's an herb in the wild that tastes wonderful. By sight alone, its indistinguishable from an herb that tastes bitter. However, a person with a keen sense of smell can note that the tasty herb smells pleasant, while the bitter herbs smell acrid. Having and using these properties is more beneficial to a person trying to get rid of a tasty meal then not having them.
"Usefulness" of distinctive knowledge can be broken down into a few categories (and I'm sure you can think of more):
a. Reward for being correct in the application.
b. Time/effort invested in the application (aka. Ease of use)
Fourth, useful distinctive knowledge is based on our ability to apply it. If I cannot see but only hear something, the distinctive knowledge of sight cannot be used. If I require a tool to apply distinctive knowledge, like a scale for pounds for example, but I don't have a scale, its not useful at that time.
I'll leave those as a start. Let me quickly address your last points on rationality.
Quoting Bob Ross
But you didn't demonstrate logical consistency. If you want to equate parsimonious with rationality, you have to demonstrate that rationality. As it was, your claim is its rational because its "rational".
Quoting Bob Ross
Your desire has nothing to do with it. The law of non-contradiction is a distinctive bit of knowledge that when applied to reality, has always been confirmed. What is rational is to create applicable identities which assess reality correctly. We know this if reality does not contradict these applications. Our desires to not change this. Sorry Bob, but I'm not going to accept any idea that our feelings or desires are the underpinnings of rationality, at least without a deeper argument into why.
Hello Philosophim,
Good! I am glad to hear that!
You are saying that, as far as I am understanding, the hierarchy which is more cogent is dependent on what essential properties the person uses; so you are indirectly speaking to which is more or less cogent in that sense.
Agreed.
I just want to clarify that the determination of which relevant factors to use in the context is a comparison of the hierarchies. You are still comparing the hierarchies, and you must to make a decision; however, you are noting that you are not applying the rules of your induction hierarchy to the comparison of the hierarchies themselves, which is fine.
My question, is which induction do you think, in totality of your analysis of the situation, is most cogent to hold in the box scenario?
Your answer seems to be contingent on the relevant factors used in the situation, and it seems as though you may have a criteria for deciphering which is more cogent to include (in terms of relevant factors). Perhaps now you can answer the original question (above)?
That is fine; my original question seems to boil down to what makes a factor relevant; but I want to clarify that I am not talking about properties but, rather, relevant factors. What is relevant to determining what to induce is not a property of an induction nor of an entity within the scenario; but, rather, merely an identified relevant factor of that situation.
A property is an attribute that a thing has, whereas a factor is a piece of information that is relevant to the question at hand.
For example, a property of the induction to pick BWA (in the box scenario) could be that it affirms (or utilizes) the relevant fact of the designs; whereas, the relevant factor of their being a correlation of designs is exactly that despite if it is used in an induction (and consequently if it is a property of any induction made).
I was slightly wrong last time I explicated this, so let me clarify: the essential properties factor into what is a relevant factor, but it is not the sole consideration. If in the box scenario you disputed that the boxes which you saw a billion times were actually boxes (due to a difference in what we both considered the essential properties of a box) then will nullify certain aspects as relevant factors to determining if this selected box has air in it. However, I must stress, that the scenario I gave eliminates this possibility of dispute because the essential properties are stipulated from the beginning. So any dispute between what is a relevant factor to determining if the box has air in it is going to stem from something other than essential property disputes of the identity of entities.
I will say it again: an accidental property of an entity within a context can be a relevant factor: not just essential properties. The essence of a thing is just the properties that it cannot exist without; in the box scenario, the designs are not essential properties but are relevant factors to the scenario nonetheless.
Also, relevant factors are determined by the stipulations of the scenario (i.e., the context), and so some can outweigh others. For example:
You have just added a new stipulation (to the others I already gave) to the scenario which changes it. The time limit stipulation will affect what is a relevant factor for inducing a conclusion within the context: you just changed the context.
Again, you have just changed the context is all. In this scenario, it would depend on if they still trusted the heavy correlation between the designs and the box types. Is someone they trust with their life tagging along with them when they experience the box correlation a billion times (to let them know which one was which)? Anyways, this is all irrelevant to the scenario I gave you.
The relevant factors in the scenario do not change, and the design patter is one of them. It is a relevant factor because it can affect the conclusion (and in this case, quite heavily).
I think we may have veered off from the original scenario and I think it is time we revisited it: I am not asking how one should determine the essential properties of an entityI am asking how you are determining, in the scenario, which factors are relevant. The essential properties of the boxes are already given to you as a stipulation. Its assuming you actually agree that you experienced a billion times a box with design X/Y. Expounding on how we determine what a box is is outside of the scope of the scenario.
My point is that you dont get to choose what is relevant to determining what induction to use in this scenario apart from what essential properties you use to determine what the things are within it (and that part I left out before). In the scenario, the essential properties of the boxes are already given.
I think this is wrong: although it is not a hierarchy question in the sense that it bears to relevance to the induction hierarchy criteria, it is nonetheless a comparison of the inductions indirectly based off of the comparison of relevant factors. The minute you decide to go with the pattern you have chosen that induction over the other one by means of comparing the relevant factors and determining that you ought to include the designs in there. You havent completely left the inductions behind at this point: you determining the relevant factors to compare them (and, yes, I know that it will not be a comparison in the sense of the induction hierarchy).
I dont have a problem with this; but I am failing to see where I made these errors of crossing applicable knowledge with inductions.
As said above, I am not talking about relevant factors of an identity set: that is just another way of saying essential properties of an entity. I am talking about the factors that are relevant to formulating an induction within the context: these are not the same thing.
You applicably know the pattern and the probability in the box scenario, and I am saying that using the pattern is more cogent: you are saying you cant say whether it is more cogent or not unless I give you what relevant factors the person decides to use.
I would like you to, in light of these criteria you gave, tell me which induction within the box scenario is more cogent to use; and no I am not asking you to compare them within your induction hierarchy criteria because we already agreed that they are in two separate hierarchies and cannot be compared in that manner.
What do you mean? I said that logical consistency is a criteria of being rational: that is a logically consistent position because there is no logical contradiction in claiming that.
I am saying it is analogous to logical consistency (as well as others); and it is what I mean when I say someone is rational or irrational. If you have a different definition, then I am all ears.
The first underlined portion is false: we have never confirmed via an empirical test that the law of non-contradiction is true; secondly, with respect to the second underlined portion, that is circular logic: you are saying that LNC is true because it does not contradict reality which, in turn, presupposes that a law cannot both be true and false of realitywhich is the LNC and that premise is what you were supposed to prove in the onset. You basically just said LNC is true because LNC.
Desires do not change what is in reality; but it does affect what we come to claim to know about reality. If a proposition cannot be both true and false, then that is either true or false irregardless of what we both desire; however, if either of us claim either way, then our claims will bottom out at desires. This is humes guillotine at work here.
Likewise, rationality is different than LNC insofar as it is something that does NOT exist in the world beyond our wills: it is utterly dependent on what we think we ought to be doingand obligations are not objective.
For now this is really an offshoot of our conversation, so I will refrain from going too deep into it for now.
Bob
No, I am not. You keep inserting these words in my claims, and I'm not doing that. To be clear, we're talking about hierarchy sets, H1, and H2. We are not talking about the hierarchy itself. Why do H1 and H2 come about? Because of the distinctive knowledge held to create those sets of inductions. The question is not about comparing the H1 and H2 set then, its about deciding what essential properties you're going to use in your inductions. So we don't compare hierarchy sets. We decide what essential properties we're going to use, then that leads to us into a place where we can make comparisons of our inductions. You've just got the emphasis on the wrong place. The emphasis is not on the inductions, its on the distinctive knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
No. This is wrong. You're not comparing the hierarchies to determine which essential properties to use. You determine the essential properties you will use, then create inductions. You can't make inductions without first having distinctive knowledge to justify them. What distinctive knowledge should we choose when we have a question of the properties involved? As noted, I listed several considerations that lead to useful distinctive knowledge. It depends on a great many contextual factors, so its not a blanket, "This is always better" situation.
Now, and hopefully this doesn't confuse you, you could decide to take H1 and H2, compare them, and then use that as a factor in deciding what essential properties you use. There's nothing preventing that. But this is not a hierarchy decision, this is a decision in what essential properties to use after you've established two sets of distinctive knowledge, and inductions relative to each set.
Basically:
Distinctive1 => inductions 1
Distinctive2 => inductions 2
1 or 2? You pick 1 because you like that pattern in set 2. You like set 2 because of the confirmation bias of the pattern, and perhaps because you believe considering the X/Y distinction is smarter. This isn't really rational justification, its just your justification for picking Distinctive set 2.
But as I've noted, we can consider much more than the inductions. As I've mentioned, we can consider the personal or social benefit of a proper guess, time, effort, etc. And of course, you could disregard all of this and just decide to use a set of essential properties without any rationale at all. Its your choice. What you seem to imply is that there is something in the hierarchy that is the end all be all of rationality that shows one set to be more rational than another. There is not.
Quoting Bob Ross
So again, we're not comparing the induction sets. We're comparing what essential properties we wish to use in our distinctive knowledge application. Its all about what you decide are the essential properties involved in your induction.
quote="Bob Ross;819588"]My point is that you dont get to choose what is relevant to determining what induction to use in this scenario apart from what essential properties you use to determine what the things are within it[/quote]
That's the exact point I've been making all along.
Quoting Bob Ross
I already addressed this in an earlier post. I do not have a term "relevant factors" in my theory. I noted the term was ok as long as you understood it was a synonym for "essential properties in consideration of the induction". If you use it in any other way, that's not anything I'm claiming in my theory.
Quoting Bob Ross
This translates to, "An accidental property of an entity within a context can be an essential property involved in forming an induction."
Thus in the first case of only considering A/B on the box, the X and Y properties are accidental, but also non-essential for the formation of the inductions we compare. In the second case, you've elevated X and Y as essential to the formation of the inductions we compare. X and Y have become essential to the identity of whether the box has air or not in your mind by the inductions you've created. As these are two sets of essential properties for the formation of these inductions, we cannot compare the two sets using the hierarchy.
Quoting Bob Ross
So translating this then "The identity we create is just the properties that it cannot exist without. In the first box scenario, the designs of X and Y are not essential properties to a box existing. In the second scenario, they are also non-essential properties to the box simply existing. But in the second scenario, they become essential properties in determining inductions for whether that box also has air inside it or not."
Quoting Bob Ross
Translating this again: "I am asking how you are determining, in the scenario, which essential properties are necessary for the set of inductions". Hopefully this is clear by now. Whatever you involve in creating your inductions, are essential properties for that formation of that induction. If you include X/Y, it doesn't matter if it is an accidental property that a box can have regardless of whether it has air in it or not. It becomes an essential property in an induction about whether that X/Y pattern determines whether the box has air in it or not.
At that point you are claiming X/Y is involved with not just a box, but whether a box has air in it or not. Thus you have changed the distinctive knowledge of, "A box with air" being essentially tied to the design on the box. The X/Y are accidental on just a box. But when you now tie them in with the identity of having air or not, they are now an essential property of whether the box has air or not. Its an entirely different identity set to just looking at a box to see if it has air, then looking at a box and including its design as a consideration of whether it has air.
Quoting Bob Ross
I already did, but if it was misunderstood I'll state it again. In this very specific scenario you originally mentioned, overlapping the two is ideal. As I noted earlier, I even changed the odds to avoid bias. Lets say its 25/75 for air no air, and X is always air, Y is always no air. I can both hold that there is a 25% chance of getting an A box, and observe the pattern that A boxes so far have always had an X design. I could consider the X design relevant to whether the box has air with this pattern, but I don't have a probability that includes the X/Y design. So the most cogent induction I have when including the X/Y designs as essential to my inductions is the pattern.
What I don't have an answer for you, is whether you should use a distinctive knowledge set where X/Y is irrelevant to whether the box has air or not, vs where it is. There's not enough information on that alone in this limited thought experiment to determine an answer as more than an opinion. Change the set and context and we have to re-evaluate which distinctive knowledge set would be more rationale to take, or if there is no answer for that specific scenario.
Quoting Bob Ross
I agree! We have enough to talk about right now. Lets focus on this part first and if we need to revisit rationality, we will. What I will note is that your claim that H2 is more rational to choose than H1 has only provided a confirmation bias justification. Until more is given, that tells me that you do not have a rationale that H2 is more cogent to pick then H1.
The fourth is coming up btw! I don't know if you're American, but happy 4th regardless!
Hello Philosophim,
I wasnt saying you use that term in your methodology, but there is no (as of yet) 1:1 term mapping that gets at what I am talking about within your theory. Hence, I agree with a lot of what you said within your terms of essential property of formulating inductions, but:
There is a difference between claiming that (1) whatever factors are utilized to formulate a particular induction are essential properties thereof and (2) a property is essential to the formulation of inductions within the context in general. We can say, in the box scenario, that the X/Y pattern is essential to the formulation of the pattern induction; but we cannot say that it is essential to the formulation of possible inductions within the context (S). I am not saying that the X/Y pattern is an essential property of the formulation of inductions in S but, rather, that the pattern induction should be used because the relevant factor of the pattern outweighs, in S, the relevant factors of the probability induction (viz., the properties which are of, and are necessary for formulating the specific induction, the pattern induction are better than the properties of the probability induction).
You are comparing H1 and H2 via your analysis of determining which relevant factors to useviz., you are comparing the essential properties of the inductions themselves and determining which ones outweigh the other ones; I dont see how you can say you are not comparing inductions. However, I get that your comparison criteria doesnt apply here.
Correct. Because by comparing you are using it in a narrow sense of the criteria you use to compare inductions which have the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors); but a comparison, in the normal sense of the word, is when one analyzes one thing juxtaposed to anotherand that is exactly what one has to do to determine which induction to use in the scenario (by means of comparing relevant factors: essential properties of the inductions themselves).
No, because, again, you are talking about the comparison of inductions which have the same essential properties when you say hierarchy: I am saying that, when comparing inductions which do not have the same essential properties, there is a most cogent and least cogent option (assuming there are at least two). There is a most rational and least rational pick: it is not arbitrary like you are claiming. Which leads me to:
Just because changing the context affects which relevant factors are most pertinent (and cogent), does not entail that there isnt an actually most cogent induction to hold. I agree that it is tough decisions, but I specifically chose a scenario where it is obvious (to me) which is the more rational decision.
They are not an essential property of whether the box has air or not: they are essential to the formulated induction that proposes that it has air in it or not. The former is to claim it is an essential property of the identity of the boxes, and the latter is to use an accidental property to infer the identity of the boxes.
And here is the crux: how, philosophim, is it more ideal if it isnt more or less rational?
Again, how is it most cogent if someone can equally cogently not include the designs as essential to their inductions? By my lights, you cannot say that one is more or less cogent than the other as essential to ones inductions if it is not more cogent to include or not include it as essential to ones inductions: you have now claimed both of these.
For example:
And:
I dont think you can coherently have both here (but correct me if I am wrong).
This is irrelevant to what I have been saying: we are talking about a specific scenario. I agree that if you change the scenario we have to re-evaluate which is most cogent; but that doesnt change in the slightest that there is a most cogent solution.
I dont see how it is confirmation bias at all. We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesnt exist in reality apart from our wills/minds.
Happy fourth to you as well my friend!
Bob
First: My points
1. The hierarchy of induction allows a rational way of comparing inductions based on their distance from what is and can be applicably known. You know how this works from the paper, so no need to repeat it here.
2. In detail, the inductions compared must involve the same essential properties used to construct the induction. Thus comparing an induction about a space ship to an induction about a sun is pointless.
3. Because we can have different distinctive knowledge sets, we could create a different set of inductions to compare within each knowledge set. Once you choose your distinctive knowledge set, you then look within the hierarchy that results within that distinctive knowledge set to choose the most rational induction.
4. This leaves the question, "What is the most rational distinctive knowledge set to hold?" I've put forward several discussion points, but this will have to wait as we must first address the one point you hold that prevents us from doing so.
Second: Your point
1. You claim that I can somehow cross compare inductions despite the essential properties needed to make the inductions being different. You do this as follows:
You take an identity, then have non-essential properties about that identity, an air box. Second, you then use a non-essential property of the previous identity as part of an induction about the air box. I point out that it may be non-essential in your original identity, but now it is essential to you needing to make the induction. You disagree by saying "relevant properties" are different.
My counterpoint:
I've informed you that the only definition I will accept for relevant properties is "essential properties for the formation of the induction", as adding any knew vocabulary or concepts apart from this would not be addressing the hierarchy, but something else.
I have not seen any justification from your end that we should view "relevant properties" as anything different than I've noted. As such, for this point only, we are going to drop the phrasing "relevant properties" and examine only the vocabulary I've introduced. This is the only way to ensure that you are discussing the theory, and not something else. I claim X and Y are essential to the inductions conclusions in the second case. You can prove me wrong by doing the following:
Demonstrate how you can create the induction pattern that involves X and Y without using X and Y. If X and Y are accidental or secondary to the induction, then they are not needed for the formation of the induction. If you cannot, then we both agree that this is the conclusion going forward. If you then wish to add a claim that we should consider a new term called "relevant properties", please break down exactly what that is, and show why it is different from the argument which uses essential and non-essential properties. But prior to this, this one major point must be decided one way or another.
One last note:
Quoting Bob Ross
If this statement is correct, then the discussion is over. I believe my point is more rational, you believe your point is more rational, and there's nothing that either can ever do. Therefore its pointless to even discuss it. Its the ultimate, get out of argument card Bob. :) If you insist this point is true, then its been a good discussion, and we'll have to chat another time. If however you want to discuss within the confines of the theory, I've proposed what is rational within the theory, and you'll have to provide more than you have so far for your justifications.
Hello Philosophim,
I appreciate you summarizing our differences; but if that summary of my position is truly what you think I am claiming, then, with all due respect, I dont think you are understanding what I am claiming at all. Thusly, I am going to summarize my points hereon so you can address them and I will respond thereafter to some of the points you made.
I am saying (in order of importance):
1. That one has to compare the inductions in the box scenario or leave it up to an arbitrary decision. (by comparison, I do not strictly mean the utilization of your concept of an induction hierarchy); and
2. That relevant factors of a situation for resolving a dilemma are not necessarily essential properties of any induction: the former is a piece of information that could affect the conclusion, whereas the latter is a property that a formulated induction cannot exist without. A relevant factor (of the situation ) can never end up being formulated into an induction and an induction can have essential properties which are not relevant factors (of the situation ); and
3. The relevant factors of a situation are not distinctive knowledge, they are applicable knowledge. One can formulate distinctive knowledge about the relevant factors, but there are necessarily a set of relevant factors to the situation irregardless of what one distinctively claims to know; and
4. That because you have only provided a method of determining cogency of inductions within your concept of a hierarchy induction (and have adamantly asserted that we cannot determine cogency otherwise), I am left to conclude that the applicability of your epistemology to decipher what is most cogent to believe is severely wantingas the vast majority of practical and theoretical situations force the person to compare two inductions that have different essential properties. This is not a dig at the induction hierarchy itself, as it does what it purports to dobut it isnt applicable to the vast majority of situations which is a problem if you are trying to explicate a system of acquiring knowledge (and beliefs) in the most rational manner possible in the majority of situations; and
5. That I have provided a clear and concise definition of rationality (i.e., to be, to the best of ones ability, logically consistent, internally/externally coherent, empirically adequate, considerate of credence, considerate of explanatory power, parsimonious, a person that goes with intellectual seemings, and a person that goes with their immediate apprehensions) but you have not. I have provided a concept whereas, this whole time and within your papers, you are working with a notion.
6. Although I havent mentioned this yet, noting essential properties of an induction is trivial: if an essential property of an induction is a property which the induction cannot exist without, then every property of the induction is an essential property because even changing one property transforms the induction into a different induction; and if that is the case, then there are no inductions which have the same essential properties. This is because you at not noting what is essential to what an induction is (i.e., the essence of the concept of an induction), but, rather, what is essential to the formulation of a particular induction. Just something to think about.
Now let me address some points in your response that caught my eye.
I agree: I dont think either of us will argue in bad faith.
In terms of your points:
#1: This is true, but doesnt negate any of my critiques above. Likewise, with respect to my #4, you havent defined what rationality even is. I agree with you that it is rational, but I am interpreting it as my definition because you havent provided one.
#2: This is also true, and also doesnt negate any of my critiques above. You induction hierarchy is a concept that can be used to decipher what is most cogent in certain situations; and one just stipulation of the situation is that the inductions have to have the same essential properties.
#3:
We can create different distinctive sets and different inductions; but there are a set of relevant factors to the situation and there are better inductions to formulate with those relevant factors than others.
This is unapplicable to the vast majority of practical and theoretical situations because inductions typically do not have the same essential properties (and, as I said above, noting the essential properties of a particular induction, when not referring to the essence of an induction in general, is trivial and makes it unique to every other possible induction).
#4:
What is most rational to distinctively hold is what corresponds best to reality.
And to your point that is supposed to be my point:
A relevant factor is a piece of information that impacts ones formulation of possible inductions in the scenario; whereas an essential property of an induction is a property that if removed which change the induction into a different induction. As noted above, noting the essence of an induction is not the same thing as noting the essential properties of a particular induction: the latter leads to your hierarchy being unapplicable to every scenario (because all inductions are unique with that regard) and the former irrelevant to the properties or relevant factors of the situation (as it only outlines abstractly what makes an induction, at its core, an induction). Relevant factors, likewise, arent being argued as being a factor that one should use in all their possible inductions to choose from (so they arent essential to every induction) but rather are used to formulate possible inductions and then each induction is weighed against one another.
This demonstrates, with all due respect, a lack of understanding of what I am saying. Obviously, if I formulate an induction with X and Y, then removing them from the formulation changes the induction to a different one. Again, a induction being a probability and another being a possibility likewise would be, under your definition here, essential properties which one has and the other doesnt; so they dont have the same essential properties. Likewise, if you mean the essence of an induction, that is just what makes an induction an induction at it core which would not have anything do with being a probability, using designs, etc.
To be charitable, I am interpreting you to be claiming not that the induction literally have to have the same essential properties but, rather, that they need to be the exact same inductions apart from their type (e.g., a probability, a possibility, a speculation, etc.).
This is clear straw man. We can both explicate what we think rationality should be and see where it goes from there. You havent even defined it yet.
Again, straw man. I am not saying that well, I want it to be that, so I am not going to hear what you think it should be. Thats nonsense. I am saying that, fundamentally, how we define rationality is dependent on our obligation (as it is literally a definition about how we ought to behave), and obligations are subjective; so it will bottom out at a desire (because of Humes guillotine). That doesnt mean we cant discuss it just like morals. Are you a moral realist?
But you havent proposed what rationality is; just examples of it.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Quoting Bob Ross
And I've informed you that not only do we not have to compare the inductions between the hierarchy sets, we logically can't justify doing so. Since the distinctive knowledge identities are not the same, we're comparing inductions between two sets of identities. While you note that it is arbitrary, I note that it does not have to be. We can reason why we should choose certain knowledge sets over others, and I've set different scenarios to demonstrate this.
In the box example, I noted that if the question was, "Will you pull a box with air next?" the X/Y properties are pointless, so we just go with the A/B set and use the probability. If you ask, "Is the Box with an X design filled with air?" we use the pattern because we do not have a probability within the A/B X/Y set.
Quoting Bob Ross
I agree. This truly is the core of rationality without any extra detail. Just to specify a tad more, I would say it is that which is not contradicted by reality. Almost a semantic difference, but we are in agreement here. The problem when asking this question with distinctive knowledge sets is we won't know what will be contradicted by reality until we apply it.
This is why distinctive knowledge which is applicably known together is the complete picture of knowledge. When we need to make a prediction where we do not yet know the outcome, we need to make an induction. The most rational induction is of course that which has the least distance from our distinctive knowledge that has been applicably confirmed.
Quoting Bob Ross
Quoting Bob Ross
Ah, ok! This clears this up a little bit. If you recall, applicable knowledge of our distinctive knowledge set is how we determine the cogency of the induction. An induction is not an applicable knowledge claim. An induction means you do not know the applicable conclusion. As such, you can only judge the rationality of the induction based on the distinctive knowledge set, and the applicable knowledge within that distinctive knowledge set.
If you already know the outcome, its not an induction anymore, its applicable knowledge of what happened. So we can say, "Induction Z (a plausibility compared to a probability for example) was the one that lead to the correct outcome," but in no way can we say it was rational to pick the Z plausibility when compared to a probability in the identity set when you didn't now what the outcome would be. If you are saying that the outcome of the induction is a relevant factor, it is not. Otherwise, I still do not see what a relevant factor is that necessitates its introduction from the vocabulary I've used.
As such, I'm going to ask you to drop the "relevant factors" and just communicate using the basic terminology we've already established. When there is debate on specifics, larger abstracts must be dropped for smaller abstracts to help us nail the points down. I don't think I quite understand what relevant factors are, and as such they are muddying the conversation. As the person who's established the theory, I want to see a contradiction or a lack using the terms involved first. If you can do so, then we can discuss trying to figure out what is missing. There shouldn't be anything that cannot be communicated through the vocabulary I've already introduced, and using a phrase that I have not introduced feels like its hiding something, whether intentional or not.
Quoting Bob Ross
And I've informed you that you're looking at it incorrectly. You compare the distinctive knowledge sets, not the inductions. You're doing it in the wrong order, and there's no reason to do so. Putting the cart before the horse I think they say! So you are incorrect that it does not apply to many cases. Your argument essentially boils down to this:
You: People want to compare inductions across different distinctive knowledge sets.
Me: Can't do that. Its incorrect thinking. If they want to think correctly, they need to look at the distinctive knowledge sets.
You But I don't want to. (I'm poking fun a little bit, I just don't see anything else in your argument so far)
Now, maybe there is a reason to compare the inductions without comparing the distinctive knowledge sets, but I've seen no reason why we should. The theory I've presented here doesn't claim we should. The theory has a logical solution to the problem you've proposed, to look at the distinctive knowledge sets and compare those instead. So I see no lack on my part.
By analogy, you're trying to use multiplication to solve a problem when you need to look to the base, addition, to do so. If I can show you how to solve the problem through addition, because you can't through multiplication, that doesn't make multiplication useless. So unless there's a very good reason that you can give that allows us to compare different hierarchy sets alone, I'm just not seeing why we should.
Quoting Bob Ross
And I have not disagreed. As noted earlier, I also agree that what is rational at its core is that which is not contradicted by reality. My theory is rational. Its not this definition I have a problem with. Its that your argument in claiming H2 is more rational to use then H1 has not been demonstrated with any rational argument beyond confirmation bias. That we'll need.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes! This is why it has been odd to me that I've had to clarify this repeatedly. I feel like we've been talking past one another on this.
Quoting Bob Ross
Please explain what you mean by this. By my example below:
Probability of A with X and B with Y is Z%
Pattern of A with X and B with Y predicts the next pull will be an AX
Plausibility of A with Y will be pulled next time, even though it hasn't happened yet.
How is that not a set of three different types of inductions that use the same essential properties to create those inductions? I feel this is the main source of our disagreement, and I feel either I or you keep missing something here when we address it. I feel if we can resolve this, the conversation can move forward.
Quoting Bob Ross
To clarify again, a distinctive knowledge set happens first. The applicable knowledge involving that distinctive knowledge set is what determines the type of induction.
Quoting Bob Ross
I think its not a straw man. This is what I think I ought to be doing epistemically, and does not exist apart from my will/mind. So if you're right, I'm right. If you say I'm wrong, then you're wrong. Its really not a very good argument Bob.
Quoting Bob Ross
The problem is you're saying its subjective, then asserting it can't be a certain way. If its fully subjective, then I subjectively believe you're wrong, and you have to agree with me to keep your proposal. Something which is fully subjective cannot be wrong if the subject says its right. To say I'm wrong is to claim something objective, and defeat your own statement.
Example: I ought to behave in a way that demonstrates your idea of rationality is wrong. This is my desire. Therefore it is rational that you're wrong. But then you're right! But then you're not. Its just a contradiction Bob and doesn't hold up in any serious discussion. When you've introduced an argument for rationality, that by its own argument, allows everyone to say its wrong; that's an argument that just doesn't work. Reality is the objective arbiter of rationality, and the reality is, your argument leads to contradicting itself.
As for morality, I may one day post my thoughts on it. Its a little more complicated then something as simple as moral realism. You have to have knowledge before you can know morality. So we'll have to finish this up first. :)
Hello Philosophim,
I am saying that choosing between knowledge sets is a comparison. The moment you decide, by analysis within or without the induction hierarchy, that this induction is a better pick than that one, you have thereby compared and evaluated them. I dont think you can coherently claim to never compare the inductions if you are likewise claiming that you can determine which is better based of of analysis of the distinctive knowledge sets.
Why is rationality that which is not contradicted by reality? Why cannot not be to be illogical? I dont think you can justify this without it bottoming out at a desire: the desire to obtain and abide by that which most closely aligns with reality.
I cant because there is no term for it. They arent essential properties necessarily of anything.
Theres not logical contradiction: theres just no term currently mapped to what I mean by relevant factors. All I can do is explicate again what I mean by a relevant factor and if you think there is a term that fits in your theory then please let me know: it is a piece of information that is relevant to formulating the set of possible inductions one could use to resolve the dilemma. I must repeat: they are not distinctive knowledge. I can have distinctive knowledge of what I may guess are the relevant factors (if I do not have applicable knowledge of them); but the relevant factors are what actually are, in reality, relevant to the formulation of inductions pertaining to the context and the dilemma therein. I dont know of any term in your theory that means that: please let me know if there is.
What do you mean by distinctive knowledge sets? You said inductions are distinctive knowledge, and the sets (hierarchies) of inductions are also distinctive knowledge; so when you compare the hierarchies (sets) themselves, you are doing so to compare the inductions within different hierarchies to determine which one to use. That is a comparison.
I am saying:
1. When you look at the distinctive knowledge sets [(hierarchies)], you are thereby comparing the inductions. A comparison is not limited to comparing within the hierarchies, but the criteria that you are using to compare within may not (and in this case are not) applicable to comparing the sets themselves; and
2. If you say that one is better than the other, even by analyzing the sets, then one can deduce that you compared them; because you cant determine something is better than another without comparison: thats what a comparison is.
I get that you are just joking a bit with that last alleged rebuttal of mine but, with all due respect, it demonstrates to me that you do not understand in the slightest what I am saying (and perhaps I am just not explaining it well enough).
You compare the sets to compare the inductions. The end goal is to pick an induction and if there are two in different sets then you compare the sets to compare them.
The lack of applicability is if you actually cant compare the inductions, which I dont think you are truly saying (although you keep saying it). If you cant compare them, then you cant say one set is more rational to hold than another and, in turn, that one induction (within one set) is more rational than another (in another set). At that point, you theory is effectively useless.
P1 is not an induction itself: a probability is a deduction itself and the induction is the inference made utilizing it. So P1 should really be the next pick is a A with X because there is a Z% chance of it happening: I am going to call this rP1 (revised-P1). rP1 has an essential property of Z% chance of getting an A with X, which neither the pattern nor plausibility can ever have.
Without the utilization of Z%, rP1 is not longer rP1: it is another probability. Thats why I said talking about essential properties of particular inductions is trivial and useless.
Likewise, P2 has an essential property of the pattern (as, again, the patter itself is not the induction, the inference made about ite.g., I will pull an A with X because of this pattern), and the probability, rP1 can never have that property. Without the pattern, the induction is not longer that induction: it is something else.
Same thing with the P3.
Now, the only other option when speaking about essential properties is the essence of a general class of things and, in this case, the essential properties of an induction (i.e., what makes an induction, at its core, an induction?)--and that affords no foreseeable use to your argument.
I think you are thinking that the essential properties of the inductions are the A with X and B with Y, but thats just plainly false. Firstly, the inductions themselves are not the patterns nor probabilities; and, secondly, if we are talking about the essential properties of a particular induction (which is what you were talking about), then every property thereof is essential (because without even one property it would not longer be that exact induction). The only time accidental properties emerge is if you are talking about the essence of a thing, which pertains to formulating a general class that it is a member of; but if you are talking about what makes a particular thing that particular thingwell...thats every aspect of that particular thing!
If we have conflicting views on what rationality is, then I would be wrong relative to you and you to me. We arent both right. Propositions that are subjective are indexical.
Because, again, subjective judgments are indexical: I think killing babies is wrong could true for me and false for you (or vice-versa) (or true/false for both of us). If it is true for me and false for you, then I can still say you are wrong for killing a baby because I think killing babies is wrong.
I dont have to agree that we are both right: I have to agree that relative to me you are wrong and relative to you you are right.
Sort of. The problem is that we tend to psycho-analyze ourselves rather poorly. Just because I say I think killing babies is wrong that does not thereby make it true that I think killing babies I wrong. Subjective judgments are reflections of our psyche and usually at its deepest core, which we dont control in any colloquial sense of the term. I can absolutely formulate a false belief about a subjective judgment that I hold (or dont hold).
This just pushes the more important question back of what you think rationality is, as you are implicitly using it by saying that you demonstrate that my idea of rationality is wrong. If by this you are just noting that it is possible for rational is X to be false for you and true for me (and that there is nothing objective to decipher which is right), then, yeah, thats true. However, people tend to have productive conversations nonetheless (about morality and the like) because most of the time they have false or partly inaccurate beliefs about what they will as right or wrong; and, therefore, conversing about it with other people can change their mind as they are forced to dive deeper into what they think is right or wrong (which, again, is just to say that they have to dive deeper into their own psyche to determine what they truly are obligated to). Its not as simple, philosophim, as saying to oneself I think X is wrong and then thinking they are absolutely right about that because it is subjective: they could be formulating a false belief about themselves.
There wasnt any logical contradiction in the example you gave. The proposition I want rationality to be X can be false for you and true for me. If you violate X, then I can thereby call you irrational and you would say you are still being rational (because it was false for you). Wheres the logical contradiction Philosophim?
Heres a big difference between us: I think obligations are more fundamental ontologically than reason and although, yes, we have to figure out how to know things first we necessarily utilize our obligations implicitly in formulating our epistemologies (at its core). Also, I am a moral anti-realist.
I asked this because if you are a moral realist then that is why we are disagreeing so adamantly on what rationality is, just like we could argue similarly about what good or better is: they all fall into the class of oughts.
Bob
As am I. But a knowledge set is the distinctive properties you are using at its base, not the inductions. The inductions rely on the base. You can compare inductions between the bases, but it always comes back to the bases in the end. I've noted there is no rational justification for comparing inductions between knowledge sets. So far you have not provided any either.
Quoting Bob Ross
Because illogical means irrational. The antonym of rationality doesn't explain what rationality is. Not being contradicted by reality is something objective and beyond human emotion the gives an applicable confirmation of the distinctive knowledge of "rational".
Quoting Bob Ross
Its not a desire, it starts with simple surviving. If you can't figure out what will kill you in reality, you're doing to die. Same with undue harm. That is the root of rationality. Rationality allows us to exist. We simply apply it beyond there to things that may not kill or harm us, but benefit us. This is not a subjective point, but objective. If I want something in reality, and I can identify it without contradiction, I can obtain with purpose and planning instead of chance.
Quoting Bob Ross
Then I see no argument and I believe this line is at an end. I do not understand nor see any justification for relevant factors. As it is a non-term that I see no application for, its not a point I cannot consider any longer.
Quoting Bob Ross
I think I've been clear. Its the distinctive knowledge set needed to form the induction.
Quoting Bob Ross
The end goal is not to pick an induction. The end goal is to pick a distinctive knowledge set that when applied, will give you a rational assessment of reality. Inductions within a hierarchy are a consequence of what set you choose, and the applicable knowledge you have with that distinctive knowledge set, not the other way around. I've said this enough at this point, and I'm still not seeing any viable objection besides an insistence that you want it to be the other way around. If nothing more is added I think this point needs no more consideration.
Quoting Bob Ross
Bob, I've been as clear at this point as I can. I've been saying I have no rational justification to compare inductions between hierarchy sets. I've asked you several times to give me a rational justification to compare inductions between distinctive knowledge sets. You just keep repeating yourself without providing this asked for justification. At this point, your critique is useless. I've tried to drill into it as much as I can to see if there's anything to your point. Mere disagreement or doubt is not an argument, so there is nothing more to be said here either.
Quoting Bob Ross
Bob, I read this a few times and I could not understand what you were trying to say at all. Please see if a second pass can make this more clear.
Quoting Bob Ross
Of course a probability and a pattern are an induction. They are noting that we predict something will happen next before we have applicable knowledge of what will happen. When we say something has X% chance of being, we are saying we don't know the actual outcome, we're just making a prediction based on the rational of what we applicably know. You can applicably know of a probability or pattern, but the probability or pattern is an induction. This is basic English, so I think you're trying to stretch far too hard to make your point. That's an indicator your point isn't based on a solid rationale Bob.
Quoting Bob Ross
We are talking about the essential distinctive properties that are needed to make that induction. Then we examine what we applicably know in that distinctive set to determine whether we have a probability, possibility etc. So yes, you are absolutely correct that there are no accidental properties needed to form an induction. That could make it confusing as saying essential properties would be redundant.
To be clearer then:
I have a set of distinctive properties I consider important to a decision.
I have applicable knowledge based on those properties.
Inductions I make considering that full distinctive property set are then evaluated into a hierarchy based on the applicable knowledge I have of that full distinctive knowledge set.
Quoting Bob Ross
Then again, the discussion is over. What's the point? I can just say you're wrong and I'm correct under your statement. When your point allows a contradiction of your point to stand, that's reality contradicting your point.
Its just like these statements, "Nothing is true." Is that a true statement? "Everything is relative." Is this certain? "Rationality is subjective". Then subjectively I can state that statement is irrational. Statements like this can be tempting because of the problems you think they can solve. They always cause the biggest problem of all however, in the fact that they are so easily contradicted and dismissed.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes. And under your statement, I can. That's why it leads to a paradox, a contradiction, etc.
Quoting Bob Ross
No. People who hold this view do not have productive conversations. They are often dismissed as irrational, and people generally don't listen to further arguments they say. I know how rational you are Bob, so of course I don't.
I've been formerly trained in philosophy and have been around some incredibly intelligent, learned, and capable people. Every single one of them would dismantle your point without a second thought. I don't say this to be mean or imply that I hold special knowledge or pedigree. I'll be the first to say its the arguments that count in the end, and nothing else. I say this because you are insisting on holding onto an irrational argument, and if a person holds onto an irrational argument despite seeing it is irrational, the appeal must be to better people than myself. I don't want you to fall into this logic trap that a lot of early philosophers can fall into. You are far better than that Bob, and I want to see more people in awe of your persuasive prowess and insight! Your statement on rationality is a well tread and thoroughly debunked idea in any serious circle of thought, and I highly encourage that you think deeply on it before continuing to hold it.
As for my part, I'm not going to consider it anymore in this conversation. If you insist on holding that position of rationality, that is of course your choice. I see nothing more to explore here.
Hello Philosophim,
I think we both see that certain aspects of our conversation do not seem to be progressing, so I am going to the parts that I think we can still as of yet further the discussion.
We are saying the same thing here: since you conceptually structure your epistemology where there are hierarchies and then comparisons of the distinctive sets, it just sounds like you arent cross-comparing inductions that are not in the same hierarchies; however, in a more broad sense, you are comparing the inductions by comparing the hierarchies because those bases you speak of are what decide the properties of the inductions themselvesso you are comparing the properties of the inductions via those structures. I dont see any real disagreement here.
They are not antonyms: to be illogical is to hold logical contradictions as true, and to be rational is, well, I already defined that before. Being logically consistent is not enough to be rational (in the sense I mean it) nor does it equate to living in accordance with reality (or staying closely married to reality); nor does it get you to your idea of trying to not to contradict reality. A contradiction of reality is not a logical contradiction: the latter pertains to the form of the argument and never the contentviz., to say something contradicted reality is to affirm something about the content and pertains nothing to the form of the argument itself. This is why it is not illogical to say that hair is short and long whereas hair is green and not green is, even though most people, who are not immersed in formal logic, would think that both are logical contradictions. In formal logic, there is nothing logically contradictory with saying ?x (Hair[x] ^ Short[x] ^ Long[x]). It is incoherent with what most would consider true of reality (viz., once one realizes what is meant by the property of Short and Long it becomes clear both cannot cohere), but it is not illogical. I think you may be thinking about logic more loosely than I am; and perhaps all you mean is that to be rational is to be coherent, to the best of ones ability, with reality.
To me, your second sentence here is a just a more complicated way of saying that the end goal is to pick an induction. When we try to get the most rational assessment of reality when we cannot deduce what to do, then we are necessarily trying to choose the best induction to use.
I was saying essentially this:
1. The probability of is Z% is not an induction.
2. An inference which is not deduced from #1 but utilizes #1 is an induction.
3. #2 is an induction which has the essential property, to it as a particular induction, of #1.
4. The pattern of is not an induction (or at least not the one in question).
5. An inference which is not deduced from #4 but utilizes #4 is an induction (that is in question here).
6. #5 is an induction which has an essential property, to it as a particular induction, of #4.
7. Therefore, #6 and #3 do not have the same essential properties (even in virtue of just their utilization of pattern vs. probability).
If you really want to say that only inductions with the same essential properties can be compared, then you cannot mean by essential property that which was essential to the formulation of the induction while claiming that there are inductions which have the same essential properties (because, as shown above, just one induction using a probability vs. pattern makes them have different essential properties)(and, furthermore, every property would be essential to each induction, so only the exact same induction, to the T, would equate to an induction which equal essential properties).
I dont think your argument works here. You will have to clarify what you mean by essential properties of an induction within the context of only inductions with the same essential properties can be compared.
If by it you mean:
Then, as shown above, no induction which is not completely identical to another can be compared, which is clearly not what you are trying to argue for.
This is not the same thing as an essential property to the formulation of an induction that you were arguing before! This is a relevant factor! This is what I have been trying to get you to see: theres no term for what you just described there in your epistemology.
What I outlined is nothing like that statement. Please demonstrate the logical contradiction in holding that imperatives are indexical. You still havent demonstrated it.
Theres no logical contradiction in you saying that I am wrong relative to what you think is rationality. Philosophim, if you truly think it is illogical, then please demonstrate the logical contradiction. I want you to demonstrate that my claim leads to (p ^ !p).
You disagreeing with me, relative to what you think is rationality, is not a contradiction of my point: it agrees with it. I contradiction is not the same thing as a disagreement; and, also, by reality contradicting my point I am assuming you mean that reality is incoherent with my point (and not that there is a logical contradiction in it). To that, I also dont see what you are saying is incoherent about it: please demonstrate, if you cannot expose a logical contradiction, what is incoherent (with respect to reality) with my position.
Philosophim, I am not interested in comparing our (or others) egos or credentials; but, since you brought it up, I have studied metaethics in depth, so I know for a fact that moral anti-realism is not an irrational position nor has moral realism thoroughly debunked it. The fact of the matter is that there are rational and good arguments on both sides. There have been many great philosophers that have been one, and many the other.
I have no problem with your adamant support for moral realism here (which, as I was saying before, is the crux of our dispute about rationality); but to say that your prominent opponents (even in the literature itself) are all irrational and that anyone who is serious can debunk them in a heart beat is a straw man, inaccurate, borderline dogmatic, and unproductive to think.
With that being said, I want to clarify one thing about rationality: I sometimes get the impression, after hearing what you think rationality is, that you may be under the impression that I am saying we can subjectively makeup what corresponds best with realityand I am NOT saying that. I am saying that imperatives are hypothetical and never categorical (viz., subjective and never objective). For example, if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not; however, whether I should be healthy or not is not grounded in objectivityit is subjective. Likewise, to say one is irrational if they smoke and think that they should be healthy is to argue that:
P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.
P2: To smoke and think that one should be healthy is to hold incoherent beliefs.
C: Therefore, to smoke and think one should be healthy is to be irrational.
But whence does this obligation in P1 arise? If it is not from a categorical imperative (ultimately), then it is merely hypothetical and thusly irrationality is grounded in subjectivity.
To refute this, all you have to do is provide the categorical imperative that you are deriving rationality from (i.e., deriving that if someone is incoherent with reality then they should be considered irrational). If you cant, then, I am sorry, but you are wrong.
Bob
Inductions derive from the distinctive property sets we create. The set of inductions I can form when considering only A and B are potentially different when considering the full property sets of A, B, X, and Y. I've pointed out that comparing a derivation is not the goal, its comparing the base that we start with that is the goal. This is not the same thing as comparing the inductions between the sets, and if anyone were to use the theory in such a way I would inform them this was incorrect. The theory give no rational argument to do so, so therefore it is not part of the theory as the proper way to organize and compare inductions in a rational manner.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, as long as you realize its the induction of picking a distinctive knowledge set. What is important is not to compare the inductions that you can form with the distinctive knowledge set, as inductions themselves are unknowns. Perhaps this is what you need to finally see why we're not comparing the derived inductions, but must compare the distinctive knowledge sets first. If you're looking to the derived inductions to establish an induction upon which that derived induction would form, this is trying to rationalize an induction by an induction and very low on cogency. Its much more rational to establish a justification for the base induction before deriving from it. Do you understand now why we it is less cogent to use the derived inductions as a reason to pick our initial induction of our distinctive knowledge set?
What is illogical is one way you can be irrational. That does not explain or define what rationality is. That was my only intended point. I also noted that I was fine with your general identification of rationality. The main point stands that despite the definitions, you have not given anything rational that explains why H2 should be picked over H1.
Quoting Bob Ross
A probability is an induction Bob. When I say I have a 4/52 chance of pulling a jack, that's because we don't know the outcome of the card. We've deduced the induction, but deducing an induction does not make the induction not an induction. If you mean its not an induction until we decide to believe it or not, that doesn't work either. That's choosing an induction to believe in.
One thing I will clear up in case this is causing confusion is that "pattern" as an induction is not the same as a pattern itself as a noun. The capture of the pattern as a noun is the applicable knowledge one has when repeating the same steps and counting the number of times an outcome occurs. The number of outcomes alone is not an induction, this is applicable knowledge of results. This applicable knowledge allows us to make an induction I've been calling a pattern, that repeated results that favor a particular outcome means we believe that particular outcome will occur again. To avoid this confusion going forward (and until I can think of a better term :) ) lets call the induction of a pattern "patterning".
Quoting Bob Ross
No, I've attempted to note this over several posts. Lets go back to cards instead of boxes because you might be misunderstanding this.
Distinctive knowledge set 1: Face and number cards in a deck of 52 cards. Each face and number card has four suits. I do not include the particular type of suit.
Applicable knowledge: I have applicable knowledge that there is deck of 52 cards with this setup. I've pulled three cards, and its been a jack 3 times in a row. I have no applicable knowledge as to what the next card is in the deck after its shuffled.
Inductions:
a. Probability of pulling a jack out is 4/52
b. Patterning that I will pull a jack again.
Distinctive knowledge set 2: Face and number cards in a deck of 52 cards. Each face and number card has four suits. The four suits are hearts, diamonds, spades, and clovers. (The new properties for the inductions)
Inductions:
a. Probability of pulling a jack of hearts out is 1/52
b. Patterning that I will pull a jack of hearts out again.
As you can see, the difference between both sets is the distinctive knowledge set used with the applicable knowledge using that set, to set up different types of inductions. We were able to use the same distinctive knowledge set to create different inductions within it based on our applicable knowledge. Please use this example specifically to point out issues. I think your problem is you're missing the fact that that applicable knowledge, or lack thereof, is what allows us to make different inductions within the distinctive knowledge set. But the distinctive properties used to make the inductions do not change themselves.
Quoting Bob Ross
Agreed, I am not interested in comparing either. I hesitated to even post it as I was unsure of your level of development and education in philosophy. The intent was to persuade you to re-examine the idea carefully, but I see that was not the way to do so. I made a bad judgement call, so my apologies and I will never use an appeal to authority again in our discussions.
Quoting Bob Ross
I did not say I supported moral realism, nor was I debunking anyone who opposes moral realism. That's the straw man here Bob. I was noting that your position was what was easily debunked. Perhaps you intended some implicit references that I did not see within your points read as is. As is, the point you are making is easily refuted.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is incorrect. Lets say not debate the statements validity, lets assume that it is true. Lets also make it so that it fits with what you are intending to convey. Because technically I could decide not to smoke, but get sick for example.
True: Smoking leads to poor health.
Resolution: If I want to be in good health, I should not smoke.
This is an objective statement that has nothing to do with your subjective opinion on the matter. If you stated, "I think I'll retain good health while smoking, this is simply untrue."
Deciding to smoke or not smoke is a decision. Rationally you should choose not to smoke if you want to retain good health. But you don't have to be rational. You could be emotional. You have a subjective choice, but that subjective choice may or may not be rational.
Quoting Bob Ross
P1 is not an assertion because of "should". That's just an ambiguous sentence. A proper claim for logic is "One who is incoherent in their beliefs IS considered irrational, or even IS NO considered irrational. "Should" leaves the point incomplete. Why should it? Why should it not? What does should even mean? Does that mean the outcome is still uncertain?
P2, should should be "will". P2 is an affirmation of a future action. Should doesn't really communicate this clearly.
The refutation is not the argument, but the nature of the words and premises. They aren't clear. Unclear premises are allowed to be rejected in any logical discussion because they are open to interpretation by each subject and are the root of many logical fallacies.
But not to detract from your point as I saw it:
Quoting Bob Ross
This translates directly to this:
Each person subjectively decides what rationality means. Because of this, there is no objective rationality, or something which is rational apart from our subjective experience.
Maybe you didn't intend that, but from the reading of that sentence alone, what I've noted is equivalent. Thus my conclusion:
Since the above is the case, I can subjectively conclude that there is an objective rationality apart from our subjective experiences. Since your proposal necessarily lets me hold a contradiction (a negation of your point that you cannot refute) your proposal is not true.
Hello Philosophim,
Absolutely no worries my friend! I think, with all due respect, that we are completely speaking past each other on this dispute about rationality. Likewise:
I apologize, as you never actually said you supported moral realism; however, in the interpretation of your contentions with my view on rationalism, they are only work if you are claiming to be a normative realist at a minimumthats why I said that; but I should have asked first.
To try and clear things up, I think that by rationality you are simply referring to something toto genere from what I mean. I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are referring to the act (or lack thereof) of corresponding to reality in ones assertionswhich I call (more or less) truth and not rationality. Within that interpretation of our dispute, I think you are noting that truth is not relative (which I agree with) but are semantically associating it with rationality. I am associating rationality with an act which is in accordance with ones primitive epistemic standards, which inevitably are norms (and norms are either categorical or hypothetical).
With that in mind:
Wanting to be in good health and being obligated to be in good health are both norms; and I completely agree with you here as it is exactly what I said:
Your resolution section is the exact same thing I said but you substituted should for want, and , since they are both normative statements, it doesnt matter: normative statements are subjective.
When I said this is true regardless... I was agreeing with you that smoking leads to poor health and so if I should be healthy, then it logically follows that I should not smoke; and this is not subjective.
And heres where I think you are saying more than just that truth is absolute: you are saying that what defines a person as rational is the epistemic norm that they should try to correspond with reality. This is a normative statement which, as I said before, you cannot prove is objective.
I am sorry, but this is just a blatant straw man. Firstly, assertions which contain obligations (such as should) are assertions. I can assert that I should eat food in 5 minutes--you cant say that isnt an assertion. Secondly, P1 is not ambiguous at all: it is the claim that one who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational--it doesnt get any clearer than that. The person is saying, apart from what is the case, that what should be the case is that . . Thirdly, I purposely made the premises have oughts in them: you cant just arbitrarily change them to descriptive statements. If you want to do that and it not be considered irrelevant to the conversation, then you must demonstrate that rationality is objectivethen you can claim they are descriptive statements. I am saying rationality is just epistemic norms, which are prescriptive statements.
To be charitable, I think you are noting that truth is absolute and objective; and from that interpretation, I would agree that one can demonstrate that. So, it would be fair to say that P1 is either true or false, and that is objectively so; however, to claim someone is irrational or rational is to posit that they should be epistemically doing something else: it is not a descriptive statement. In other words, within your terms, you could claim that a person that holds a contradiction is not holding something which is objectively true, but not that they are irrational for it. These are two different claims.
If you are confused by what the premises are saying, then it is on you to ask for clarification: you dont get to just dismiss the argument because you dont understand what the premises are claiming. I find them to be very, very clear.
Correct! But .:
NO. I am saying that in truth there is nothing it is to be irrational or rational apart from ones (or our) epistemic standards (which are normative statements) and so to claim that there is an objective standard of rationality is to, from my point of view, hold a false belief; BUT, I cannot say they are objectively irrational for holding it.
I do not let you hold a contradiction as true: I let you hold that you are not objectively irrational for holding a contradiction as true (although it is false).
Now on to the distinctive sets!
No! The 4/52 chance of pulling a jack is not an induction: that is a deduction. I know there are 4 jacks and 52 cards, and I can analytically deduce the probability of pulling a jack. This is not the same claim as building off of that probability to say that I will pull a jack next time because there is a 4/52 chance of getting it: thats the induction. Probabilities are absolutely never inductions themselves: they are mathematically deduced from what is already known.
You have not deduced an induction when you claim that I will pick a jack because there is a 4/52 chance of getting it: you have used deduction knowledge to formulate an induction. If you think that you can deduce that induction (or something similar), then provide the syllogism.
An induction is a form of argumentation where the premises do not necessitate the conclusion: the 4/52 chance is purely a deduction, and the induction is built off of it but is not deduced from it. I cannot provide a syllogism that absolutely entails the 4/52 deduced chance with the claim that I will pull a jack next time (and, thusly, it is not deduced).
Please outline exactly what the essential properties are that you keep referring to in this example. By my lights, it is not what is essential to the formulation of the inductions; so I am confused what you mean by essential properties of the inductions.
For example, in your example #1, you didnt use the same properties nor some essential set to formulate the patterning and probability based inductions. Is it supposed to be what is essential to the scenario given?
What I am saying is that we create distinctive property sets, but there are, in reality, relevant factors to the situation. Period. It isnt distinctive knowledge itself.
Correct. That is why I am bringing up relevant factors, because that is what you are describing here: you arent depicting any sort of essential properties.
I already have. But I think we need to keep on track with the other points and resolve some things before revisiting this part.
Bob
Also the differences between the forms of induction are just splitting hairs than any actual distinction between them, apart from irrationality.
I found your split between knowledge and truth iffy at best. Knowledge does capture the truth at times but not always.
And my usual final question, whats the point here?
Yes, we may be at an impasse at this point simply due to differences in definitions. If we can't agree on those, there's really nothing we can debate over. As I've noted, what we choose as distinctive knowledge is up to us as individuals. We can attempt to persuade one another, but at the end of the day, the choice is in our own hands. Whatever you choose Bob, the discussion has been good until now.
Quoting Bob Ross
To clarify, it is the processing and thoughts which do not lead to a contradiction from reality that I consider rational. Something rational may not be true, as someone simply hasn't encountered that which in reality would contradict their reasoning yet. At that point, holding onto the original statement would be considered irrational, while a rational individual would amend or eliminate their identities and thoughts which now lead to a contradiction.
Quoting Bob Ross
The above statements do not consider whether you should want to be, or are obligated to be in good health. This is not a subjective argument. It is objectively the case that if you want to be in good health, you should not smoke.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is why I do not use broad generic philosophy terms as absolutes in detailed argumentation. The debate then shifts from the actual idea to the debate of about a generic term. We'll debate whether this or that statement is actually normative, and whether there will be exceptions to normative, and does context change whether its normative and we don't actually debate the point. Show me why the statements are subjective after I've demonstrated they are objective. "They're normative" is not a good enough answer. If you don't want to do that, its fine. But if you don't want to, I don't want to go down that rabbit hole of time and effort.
Quoting Bob Ross
Correct, a wrong term on my part. What I meant to say was that this was not an unambiguous assertion. My problem is "should" in this instance is ambiguous. If you say,
My first question is, "Why?" Does "should" mean, "But they could also not be?" Its a poor word for a specific argument. A well constructed set of statements avoids all ambiguity where possible. One who is incoherent in their beliefs "is" or "is not" or even "is or is not" irrational is a clear and unambiguous statement. I'm not going to consider an ambiguous statement as anything valid. Please try to remove the ambiguity and create an example that demonstrates why rationality is always subjective and therefore never objective.
Quoting Bob Ross
Let me translate that first sentence. "I am saying in truth (objectively) that what is rational does not exist apart from our subjective standards. Therefore if you hold there is a truth (something objective), you hold a false belief.
This is just word play and spinning in circles Bob. If rationality is subjective, I can tell you, by my subjective rationality, that its objective. And according to you, I'm being rational. Meaning I can come up with a rational conclusion that contradicts your conclusion, and somehow we're both right. I'm done with this. I feel like you're arguing for the sake of argument at this point and its fully distracted from the debate at hand. I don't care what you hold at this point, because according to you, we're both right. You can't even objectively say I'm irrational for saying so. Therefor the debate is over. Believe what you want, its lets me believe what I want too. :)
Quoting Bob Ross
If we're debating what an induction is, then I'm satisfied that my theory has held up. No one in any normal setting is going to debate this. This is so far from a debate about the theory at this point, its just a rabbit hole. If you have to go this far Bob, you don't have a good point.
Quoting Bob Ross
Bob, I'm tired of re-explaining this. At this point I just feel like you're arguing to argue. Re-read it. I've posted this countless times and if you can't understand it, I don't care anymore. I'm putting in a lot of work here to make careful examples, and I'm not feeling like you're putting the same effort back. Please consult the example and try to work through it. Show me where the example lacks as you try to reason through it, just don't ask me a generic question without an example.
Quoting Bob Ross
I've asked you to stop using this term. If you can't respect that, there's nothing more to discuss.
Quoting Bob Ross
Beyond confirmation bias? You haven't. Almost every time you've claimed I haven't given an example, I've taken the time and effort to repeat it to you or reference it in some way. You are not doing me this favor back. As such, I'm going to keep believing that you haven't given me a rational argument to explain why H2 should be picked over H1.
Looking back over this, I think we're about done Bob. The original argument was whether you could compare between hierarchy sets. I've said no and presented reasons why. Giving my best to understand your points, I do not find them enough to counter what I've noted. Further, we're getting into redefining basic terms and introducing all odd manner of arguments that its not even the original subject anymore. If you disagree, that's fine by me at this point. I beginning to feel like if I said the moon was in space you would argue it wasn't somehow, and when I've gotten to point in discussion like that with good people, I know its time to end it. Feel free to redefine your last terms, but if its just more of the same or goes too off base, I'm just going to let you have the last word.
Hello Philosophim,
It sounds like you would like to terminate the discussion, so, out of respect, I am going to refrain from responding to your points and let you have the last word.
As always, I hope you have a wonderful day and cannot wait to hear what else you have to say on this forum!
Bob
Let me repost this section.
Quoting Philosophim
That's the claim. If you believe its incorrect, why?
Quoting Darkneos
This is fair as I paired this down a bit. The difference between each type of induction is how many steps it is from what is applicably known.
When you know the entire composition of a deck of cards and that it will be shuffled without intent, the next immediate induction you can make is that a Jack has a 4/52 chance of being drawn. There's nothing in between right?
Now look at possibilities. I've seen a jack drawn before. I believe its possible that it will be drawn on the next pull. But its less rational of an induction then utilizing the applied knowledge of the card counts, the suits, and the face. Something being possible only indicates that it was applicably known once. It has no bearing on whether it will happen again.
This allows me a set way to compare two inductions and determine which one is more rational to hold. I'ld say that's pretty useful right?
Quoting Darkneos
Could you specify what was iffy? Let me sum what the difference was.
Truth: What exist in reality.
Knowledge: A set of identities which when applied as matching with reality, are not contradicted by reality.
The point here is that knowledge can never "know" that what it holds is truth. All it can know is that what it currently holds has not been contradicted by reality.
As an example to this abstract, distinctively and applicably known physics from the 1700's is not the same as physics from today. There were certain identities in physics that when applied with the tools available, were not contradicted by reality. However, eventually certain contradictions were found such as with orbiting large bodies. What was applicably know for small bodies could no longer be applied to planets. Eventually relativity came along. Today, we distinctively and applicably know things in science that in 100 years, may no longer stand.
What was the problem you were thinking this missed?
Quoting Darkneos
A fantastic question, perhaps the best one. I find epistemology to be one of the core unsolved questions of philosophy, and the most important one. "How do we know what we know," is incredibly important before any serious discussion can occur. Being able to identity what another person distinctively and applicably knows is immensely valuable in debating another person. If you see that the conflict is merely over the distinctive differences in identities, you can refocus energy and efforts on that instead of the applicable.
As well, to my knowledge there is no theory in epistemology at this point in history which allows us a reasoned way to compare inductions and ascertain that one is more cogent than another in a particular situation. Intuitively we feel this, but no one has ever actively given an objective means to do so. Sometimes this is called "The problem of induction". The theory here gives a solution to this problem.
Thanks Bob! I appreciate it, I just felt like both of us were getting nowhere with each other at that point. Have a great day as well, I look forward as well to the next ideas you bring to the forums!
Mostly from some forms of eastern philosophy and some branches of non dualism that don't create identity from experience. This also assumes you know the state of the minds of others and just assume people do this. On could also un knowingly be able to experience discretely and yet not be able to comprehend the idea of it, I would cite animals as this case (at least I assume from their behaviors). So this act of creation is more an assumption than a fact of living things, or in this case humans.
Quoting Philosophim
I guess that probability is more a likelihood within a known quantity like a deck. Possible is if it can happen. Plausible is more like a maybe it COULD be. I'm still not sure how one is more useful than the other though.
Quoting Philosophim
I guess I have a more loose version of truth. For me truth is what IS and what comports with reality and evidence. Because one can "know" something and it be false (flat earth, autism and vaccines). It's why I said that knowledge sometimes yields truth. But I wouldn't exactly say that just because it doesn't know what it's got it has nothing, just that it might be so and not be aware of it.
Science I wouldn't really use as an example as it's designed to be a constantly evolving process, and even then it's complex. Like classical and quantum physics. It's not that classical is "Wrong" per se, just useful at our level of complexity (and that it is if you see what we've done with it). But in terms of reality as it is then the quantum world is where it's at, maybe.
Quoting Philosophim
I guess I never really give much thought as to how I know what I know because in the past I tend to spiral into some radical skepticism where I know nothing and end up catatonic. I usually operate on what works and so far it seems to be the case.
While "how do we know what we know" is a nice question to ask, at some point we have to realize that everything ends in some irrational position, according to the Munchausen Trilemma. I think there was a thread on here called On Knowing that seems to illustrate my point.
I think a youtube video I saw put it well: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h2Vx9qoLzFs&t=185s&ab_channel=ExtraHistory
"When you drill all the way down, you'll find something you're just gonna have to believe".
Its not an assumption, its a proof if anyone can grasp the concept. If you can't discretely experience, then you can't differentiate between the letters, words, and sentences you read. In communicating with each other, we've already proven we discretely experience. To even doubt the idea that you discretely experience means that you have experience, and that you can view it as parts like words and concepts. Its proof by contradiction.
Quoting Darkneos
We can also prove that animals discretely experience. As long as they consistently model behavior beyond random chance that shows they can identify something, they do. Does this mean they can every comprehend what they're doing in a meta analysis like we can? Not necessarily. But, this theory of knowledge can easily be applied to any discretely experiencing thing, not merely humans.
Quoting Darkneos
Here's an example.
Probability: The chance of winning a lottery ticket is 1 out of 10,000,000.
Possibility: People have won the lottery before, so its possible I could win.
Plausible: God will intervene and make the next ticket I purchase a winning ticket.
If I was discussing with someone else, or even analyzing these myself, I might be very tempted to want one of these inductions over the other. But, if I understand what's most rational, whatever I or anyone else may feel, its most rational to make my decision using the probability. The most rational conclusion is not to buy a ticket, and put the money to some better use.
Quoting Darkneos
I agree. I was just clarifying from the paper's viewpoint for some very specific critiques someone could have, but what you are saying seems fine to me.
Quoting Darkneos
If this is a theory of knowledge, it should work everywhere including science. Context is of course important as well. To continue with the example earlier, Newton's laws were still sound when we used them for small bodies. Once relativity was found out, we also could reduce it down to Newton's laws at small bodies. This allowed us to use a simpler equation and set of identities at one level, and the more complex set of equations and identities at another.
Quoting Darkneos
Agreed, but this theory defeats radical skepticism. There is a base of distinctive knowledge, and everything builds up from that. Further, you can take the vocabulary within the theory, apply it to itself from the beginning, and it still holds strong. If you would like, put forward some radical skepticism ideas and I will post how the theory solves the issue.
Quoting Darkneos
As I've noted, my theory starts with a proof by contradiction. To be able to If we couldn't discretely experience, then we could not understand the concept of discrete experience. Because we do understand the concept, we discretely experience. Since this is neither circular, dogmatic, or regressive, I've refuted the Manchausen Trilemma.
Lets go one farther using the hierarchy of induction. The M Trilemma states that all ideas will end in an irrational position.
We don't applicably know this as we have not applied the M Trilemma to all ideas. Therefore this is an induction.
We don't have a probability as we don't have enough applicable knowledge to establish one.
We do know that some ideas have ended by resting on a circular, dogmatic, or regressive idea, we do know its possible for this to happen to ideas.
Its plausible that all ideas fall to the M Trilemma.
Since we know it is possible that some fall to the M Trilemma, but the claim that it applies to all is a plausibility, it is more rational to hold onto the possibility and dismiss the plausibility if we decide to settle on a belief. So the more rational induction to hold is that it is possible that ideas can end up falling to the M Trillemma. The induction that all will, is less cogent, and therefore can be dismissed in any rational discussion.
Well no, we haven't proven a "we" here, just assumed. Again you're still making an assumption based on your own experience, but you could just be talking to yourself (a la figments of imagination and all that). I can have experience, supposedly, but that doesn't mean I am viewing it as parts and words and concepts. You're assuming too much.
Quoting Philosophim
Nope, we can't prove animals discretely experience, we can only infer that based on behavior. Also calling it theory of knowledge is a stretch, you're kinda anthropomorphizing here.
Quoting Philosophim
Why is it most rational to take your position of probability? Depending on the person it might be more rational to believe god will do it. Something being rational doesn't mean right or true necessarily. This is just another assumption.
Quoting Philosophim
Well no, you can have different theories of knowledge like science does where different ones apply to different levels of reality. That's why quantum physics was such an upset.
Quoting Philosophim
You haven't really shown it has defeated radical skepticism, I keep saying you're making a bunch of assumptions. Even the fact I experience isn't certain, I could be wrong in some wacky and EXTREMELY paradoxical or whatever way. You still haven't even gotten past the existence of an experiencer or an I (and Eastern philosophy has some strong challenges to both). You pretty much have to take axioms like everyone else.
Quoting Philosophim
Well no, we don't understand the concept of discretely experience, again this is just a you thing. Get out of your own head. It is very much circular.
Lastly it's not really induction that all will, it's just a fact. Everything is built on language that only makes sense in a social setting and that we made up to be self referential in order to talk to each other. So off the bat you're on shaky ground. For your theory to even get off the ground it has to take things as a given, just like everything else. Chiefly the axioms listed in the video I posted, faith in your observations and that you can know things. We take these for granted a lot of the time.
You haven't really gotten around it.
Yes, because you answered my question. To answer my question you would have had to read. If you read, then you're able to part existence out. Can you differentiate between letters? Then you discretely experience. Your very denial that you discretely experience leads to a contradiction, therefore you discretely experience.
Now, its plausible that you as a discrete experiencer doesn't exist, and its all a figment in my head. Except I've never actually applicably known a situation where this has happened to me before. So for me, its not possible. I have applicably known other people who type things online, so it is possible you are another person that types things online. As what is possible is the more rational induction, I choose to stick with what I know is possible, and not plausible. I'm not stating that I applicably know you exist, that I cannot prove. What I can prove is that I did not type the letters in your reply, and that the only way something was able to, is if it discretely experienced.
Quoting Darkneos
You may not realize how basic discrete experience is. Words are discrete experiences, but you have discrete experiences without words. Experience is the sum total of all the sights sounds, thoughts etc that stream into us. Discrete experience is the ability to focus on one or more combinations out of the noise. Something that did not discretely experience would be incapable of doing this, and just be a mess of input without any processing. We don't infer that animals discretely experience, we can test them by seeing if they have intention and attention, then attempting to divert that attention and intention.
Example: As a very basic test, put an animal in a room. Have an open exit. See if the animal ever tries to leave. A non-discrete experiencer would not be able to recognize there is an exit just like a camera cannot recognize anything about the picture it is taking.
Quoting Darkneos
The hierarchy of induction is built up through the rational arguments for distinctive and applicable knowledge. Do you agree the arguments for distinctive and applicable knowledge are sound? If not, we'll need to go there first as the hierarchy of inductions relies on this. Rationality is not a desire, its a consequence of how far removed from applicable knowledge an induction is.
Depending on a person's context, yes, it might be more rational to believe God will do it. But they must applicably prove so within their context. Do they have distinctive knowledge of a God that's non-synonymous with another identity? Have they ever applicably known this God? Have they applicably known God to change a lottery ticket before? If not, then its merely a plausibility. Compared to the known probability, its still more rational for them to choose the probability.
Also, we can evaluate other people as being rational, as being rational is objective. I can ask a person all of these questions, and if they give answers that do not align with actually applicably knowing these questions, then we can tell them they did not actually applicably know, and were not being rational. Their feelings or disagreement is moot.
Of course, if they have applicable knowledge of a God that fits their distinctive knowledge, its still at best a possibility. Meaning that the known odds still make it more rational to choose the odds then believe God will change the ticket.
Quoting Darkneos
Instead of reality, I note it as context. Reality is just what it is. I cut this portion out of the rewrite, but it appears most of your questions actually apply to this section here. https://docs.google.com/document/d/14_KGMPbO2e_z8icrjuTmxVwGLxxUA0B_CqNT-lF6SXo/edit?pli=1
Its only a few double spaced pages, but it addresses the questions you've been asking. I may post this in the reserved post I made as optional reading.
Quoting Darkneos
If you can disprove that people discretely experience, then yes, I will just have an assumption. Until then, its both distinctively and applicably known. If you discretely experience, then of course you experience. Being able to doubt or invent a plausibility such as, "What if I don't actually experience?" is fine. But if you've experienced at least once, which you would need to even ask the question, then its possible that you experience. So once again possibility is more cogent than plausibility, and the plausible question can be dismissed as a less rational induction to believe and explore.
Also, while there may have been assumptions made to think through the theory, I can go back to each assumption and apply the theory to it. Many theories of knowledge fail when this is done. Mine doesn't. If you think it does, please demonstrate where it does.
Quoting Darkneos
I meant if you understand the arguments that lead to proving that you discretely experience. From my point, if you don't understand the argument, it still makes you a discrete experiencer.
Here's the point which needs to be countered:
Discrete experience is the ability to part and parcel the full set of experience you have. Discrete experience allows us to observe parts of experience. Go back to the camera which merely splashes light on a piece of paper versus that which can interpret sections such as a sun, a field, and a sheep on the paper. As a very simple point, can you see a difference between letters and words? Can you ignore the letter and simply focus on a black piece on your screen? That's discrete experience.
Can you understand concepts apart from the totality of what you experience? That's discrete experience. Because I can form this concept in my head, and I find that simply challenging the idea, "I don't discretely experience" necessitates that I discretely experience, I have a claim that cannot be contradicted by reality. Thus, my first set of distinctive knowledge. This is not an assumption or circular. The very negation of it proves that it must be.
And example of a circular argument is, "The bible tells me God is real. God tells me the bible is truth. Therefore God is real." This cannot be proven by contradiction. If I state, "The bible isn't true" we have a situation in which God doesn't have to be real. The negation does not create a contradiction. I do not see this with discrete experience.
Quoting Darkneos
No, that is an induction. Has every single idea been proven to devolve into the M Trilemma? Of course not. Feel free to prove it if so. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily occur from the premises. If you have not proven that all ideas devolve into the M Trilemma, then it is an induction.
Quoting Darkneos
I agree within a social context. The paper starts with a single context for a good reason. We must first have an understanding of knowledge as individuals, then it evolves into knowledge between more than one person. We can address this more once you read the section I posted.
Quoting Darkneos
No, I do not assume faith in my observations or even that I can know things. I build that up from assumptions, yes. But then I try to disprove those assumptions afterward. The thing about the theory is once you understand it, you can apply it to every single one of the prior assumptions. Starting with assumptions is not illogical as long as you can go back and prove those assumptions must be. The M Trilemma in specific is about claiming that all ideas devolve into one of three fallacies, circular, dogmatic, or regressive. You've made a claim that the argument is circular, but you have not proven so. If you can prove that the theory devolves into one of those 3, then you would be correct. Can you do so?
Good comments Darkneos!
Nope. Still doesnt mean I discretely experience. I could just be a bot after all, or just smacking the keys and yielding this. Can I know the letters, maybe, you dont know that. My denial doesnt lead to a contradiction, its more like youre just really wanting to be what is a maybe to be a certainty. Its not proof by contradiction, its wishful thinking at best.
Quoting Philosophim
Youve obviously never seen an animal trying to leave.
Quoting Philosophim
They dont have to prove anything. Your questions aren the right ones either. Being rational isnt objective though, its subjective. Maybe to you they arent rational because YOUR questions arent satisfied but that doesnt mean anything besides you being upset about it.
Quoting Philosophim
Id argue yes since all ideas eventually have to start from axioms without exception. There is no branch of philosophy without axioms.
Quoting Philosophim
This is still circular as its just operating on the definition you say it is. You have a claim that can be contradicted by reality because all youre doing is just saying that you do this, you havent shown that you do. Its all just words. Also Im pretty sure monks in Buddhism dont discretely experience either and Buddhism seems to be against such a view of the world calling it illusion.
Try as you might its still an assumption you are making rooted in the faith of your senses.
Quoting Philosophim
Yours still doesnt make it past the starting block. Its not know other people experience, you just assume that. You cant even know if you do, its just assumed. Nothing you have said so far shows me that you or I do, not even me replying to you.
You do, we all do, because without that ground faith nothing else is possible same with that you can know things. You cannot prove these assumptions must be without being circular, like using sensation to prove sensation.
I've never encountered a bot with your level of sophistication. Its plausible, but that doesn't outweigh the possibility you're a person. Same with the random slapping of keys. Probability wise, I already know that's nigh impossible, so this argument doesn't work either. So its most rational for me to believe you're a human being. So no, your arguments aren't enough. The fact that you typed, "I don't discretely experience", means you do. Since the inductions failed, try to look at the argument as it is and see if you can refute it.
Quoting Darkneos
I have. That isn't really considering the points or a refutation.
Quoting Darkneos
They do if they are to claim they are being rational under this theory.
Quoting Darkneos
Is this an objectively rational conclusion? Claiming rationality is subjective contradicts itself. At that point I can claim from my subjective viewpoint that rationality is objective. And to hold onto your claim, you have to agree with me. Holding onto a claim which leads to a paradox or contradiction is of course, not objectively rational.
Quoting Darkneos
No, they simply aren't rational under the theory. Its like someone saying 2+2=5. They can believe it all they want, it doesn't mean that they've objectively solved the math problem correctly.
Quoting Darkneos
The M Trilemma issue has nothing to do with axioms. You also did not address my point where I noted the axioms I start with can be tested with the final theory and confirmed. I invite you to try to use the theory and find one of the three logical fallacies that is what the M Trilemma notes.
Quoting Darkneos
No, this is not circular. If you re-read the section I apply this notion of discrete experience to reality. Its my own reality. Again, if you are a human replying to me, you do the same. If you are able to read these words, you're able to see the black on the screen as something which you can ascribe an identity to. Your ability to make any sense of it requires you to discretely experience those words as something separate from the white nearby. You cannot deny that you do this. For to even attempt to deny that you do this, means you must have discretely experienced a concept that you're trying to deny.
Quoting Darkneos
Its not an assumption, its an inescapable reality.
Quoting Darkneos
That's not a circular argument. If I have the definition of a dog, find a dog and demonstrate that the thing is a dog, that's not a circular argument. Same with sensation.
My point is that animals will try to leave but don't see there is an exit, I've seen it many times before (in fact I have to catch them and put them out otherwise they just fly around). Not to mention it's still an assumption you are making.
Quoting Philosophim
That is circular though because you're pretty much saying a dog is a dog.
Quoting Philosophim
Except it isn't as I have said and shown.
Quoting Philosophim
Again no it doesn't mean that, this is just you trying to force your definition on reality.
Quoting Philosophim
Not really, axioms can't be tested, they have to be taken as true in order to get off the ground. Trying to prove the axioms is akin to assuming the conclusion.
Quoting Philosophim
"under the theory" which is pretty much just saying "according to me". They have solved the math problem correctly if according to them 2+2=5. We agree that 2+2=4 but if someone doesn't you can't really convince them otherwise.
Quoting Philosophim
Again, according to you.
Quoting Philosophim
Well, no. You know none of these things, these are all just assumptions you are taking on. There is no reason to think that this is a human being after all if you break it down. Typing "i don't discretely experience" is evidence enough that I don't unless you're claiming to have knowledge of the inside of my mind and subjective experience to verify this, which you can't.
Like I keep saying, your theory fails before it gets off the ground. You can't see (or won't admit) the things you take on faith in order to get it to work.
Even your starting chain of "I discretely experience" is little more than an axiom. It doesn't demonstrate and I or experiencer or that you break things apart as you say you do. I can't get inside your head to confirm it so it's just something I have to take your word for.
Try as you might your theory falls to strong skepticism.
Oh, I don't mean like a human. If that test isn't satisfactory to you, the test is just to see if an animal can separate X from Y. Food vs not food would probably have been a better example.
Quoting Darkneos
No, because if I find a cat and try to say its a dog, I'm wrong. If I claim something is a dog, I must prove its a dog. Matching identities to objects is not a circular argument.
Quoting Darkneos
You'll need to prove that, not just say it. I have given an argument in the paper that is far more than that, and your statement shows me you're not referencing the actual argument. If you want to argue against some generic idea of what you think I'm saying, that's fine, but its not going to be anything valid against the actual paper.
Quoting Darkneos
Right, you assume axioms to be true to start. In logic you might start off with A => B, then assume A. Of course, if later in your logic you show that A cannot be assumed, the argument fails. My point is that my initial assumptions are consistent within the later discoveries of the theory. Did you try? Go back to the original axioms now that you understand the theory and see if you can or cannot. Having an opinion is fine, but I'm asking you to do more at this point if I'm going to take the point into consideration.
Quoting Darkneos
If you're going to dismiss the theory without going over the points and showing why they're wrong, then of course there's nothing to talk about. I'm asking for serious approaches, not dismissals. No, according to the theory 2+2=5 would be wrong. If you're going to not try, then that's fine, I'll just let the conversation end. If you want the potential at actually exploring a theory of knowledge that could be useful in your own life, lets be more serious.
Quoting Darkneos
No, according to the paper. I asked you to bring radical skepticism, not teenage angst. :)
Quoting Darkneos
I don't have to see inside of your mind to verify this. If you want to take the conversation seriously, please re-read to understand what discrete experience is, and the proof for why it is also applicably known.
Quoting Darkneos
No, this is just lazy analysis Darkneos. Which look, if you're not interested in addressing the actual argument, that's fine. I don't care about convincing you. I care about having a discussion over the paper. If you're just going to blanket state that everything I've done is an opinionated assertion without demonstrating that you understand the vocabulary of the argument or the reasoning, then this is just removing yourself from the discussion, not skepticism.
you don't prove something is a dog so much as say it is one. Matching IDs to objects is circular because it all comes down to saying it is that "because I said so". Which is fine, I mean that's what definitions are.
Quoting Philosophim
Because it is and all you're really doing is just asserting that it isn't. And I don't know how much I can repeat that point for you to understand it.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't have to reread it, that's why I said what I said.
Quoting Philosophim
Your theory is just your say so. This is a serious approach and you just keep reasserting your points like they've been shown to be the case. I still don't know if there is an "I" that is experiencing anything. Just like Descartes you assume the conclusion. You're reasoning follows only if you get past the starting point , so far you just insist otherwise. Your theory still requires the same leap of faith every philosophy starts off on. That's the point of axioms, you can never prove them and yet without them you get nothing.
Quoting Philosophim
See my previous statement.
Did you read the paper or just a summary Darkneos?
Quoting Darkneos
I understand your opinion, you just haven't proved your opinion. Which is fine. If you're not interested, we'll call the conversation done and we'll chat over something else some other time.
Quoting Darkneos
You do if you're going to critique the theory. I see you're not referencing the paper's ideas, just a general opinion. I'm not interested in general opinions, but someone who's willing to discuss the paper's ideas seriously.
Quoting Darkneos
I'm just repeating the point in hopes you'll understand it or see where you could critique it. Your note that I'm just saying so, is just saying so. You haven't been able to overcome the proof by contradiction, so I'm not going to take your opinion as anything more than that.
Looks like we're about done here Darkneos, thanks for the initial curiosity.
I did read it, but in the end it still feels like the "I" is being assumed there.
Quoting Philosophim
Hello again @Philosophim,
my take on self-understanding is more based on intuition, and as such I have had a keen interest in differentiation, questioning and reflecting upon our 'experiences, evaluations and judgements'. Instead of neuroscience, I have read psychology, social sciences, and consequently done a lot of interrelational and intrarelational work, as well as looked at concepts like having inner "parts", how different cognitive functions might affect what/how we see, and also the biological aspects of our consciousness. 'We' "are" a lot of different fungi, bacteria, virus and parasites, after all.
I do believe that there is a place for what I care about in the theory you have devised, but I must admit that I find it quite the daunting task to combine the two outlooks, or to just push them a tiny bit closer to each other.
So, instead of waiting way longer till I circle back, I wanted to at least try my hand at something. And instead of a big and filling response, what if it is more of a dialectic process where we sharpen things and cooperate to see if there is any way to bridge the gap?
I'll start with this one:
1. Quoting Philosophim
In the first paragraph, I want to recognize that there was a time the 'I' felt indistinguishable from the rest, for example when we were children. And if we add in the time we were a fetus, and even the history and time before that; all the forces that have shaped our DNA to be what it is, to the positions of the planets in our Solar system and the building blocks of our bodies, to me it makes sense to acknowledge this. The measurable 'time' when we felt 'indistinguishable' from the rest, is a much bigger part of our history than the time of the conscious, self-recognized thinker.
Your claim works well as it is, so why 'complicate it'? Well, like I postulate, our 'lives' have been spent mostly as simple consciousnesses or impulses. And so I wonder if this basic tenant of these two experiences would do better if contrasted with their opposites: The 'simple, interconnected subconscious' and the 'indistinguishable whole'.
I do not argue against these experiences being 'personal', just that these 'experiences' might not be directed and differentiated in the same way as with the 'discretely experiencer'.
Damn, I feel a bit overwhelmed already... How did you do this? :)
Somehow I see that there could be an 'indiscrete experience' as a complementary piece here. And this circles back to what I said about the category "irrational". I guess the reason is that the most 'out there' beliefs, border or cross the border to the 'indiscrete experience'. When they bleed into our conscious mind, they aren't fully 'translated', so to speak.
To me it seems to fit better to look at the irrational beliefs as echos of unconscious 'beliefs'. And even when they are seemingly erroneously or 'irrationally' applied in the discrete experience realm of reality, that is also not the realm of reality they are usually applied to, and as such to understand them would need a different set of parameters and procedures to be able to accrue useful knowledge.
I'll stop here for now. Understanding how hard this is by how long I have used to be able to write these scarce sentences, I further appreciate and am humbled by the work you have put into your original post. Even when it is not my modus operandi, I still want to see if maybe I can contribute something, even when it might be more on the sporadic side.
Let me know how this lands with you.
Kindly,
Caerulea-Lawrence
My apologies again that I missed this! For whatever reason, I seem to miss your replies. If you're still around, I'll do my best to give some meaningful conversation back.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
True. I believe what you're talking about is the "Emergence of the I". At the end of the day we are at its most basic, a combination of matter and energy like everything else in the universe. And yet, with a certain combination, an ability to discretely experience, and "I" emerges. If this "I" did not exist, the matter and energy of the universe would still be. But "I" would not exist. Being an "I" is a pre-requisite for knowledge, so we cannot know what things are like before the "I" exists.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
No, this is not a complication. This is seeking, questioning, and exploring! As I noted, we discretely experience. We do not know why. This is necessary to understand what the I is, and how it can know. What you're asking is, "What makes up the I? How does the I function?" As much as I would love intuition to have the answer, it is neuroscience that will answer this.
Think of a car for example. You don't need to know how a car works to use it if its functioning properly. With experience and intuition, you can learn to drive it in new and masterful ways. But no amount of intuition can tell us how the car works itself. It can't teach us that combustion generates a magnetic field which rotates the drive shaft. We can even study our car and get a general idea of how it works, but we won't really understand it fully without breaking it down, testing, and studying in depth.
It is not that your questions are invalid or uninteresting. It is that your questions cannot currently be answered by philosophy. We can speculate, and have fun doing so, but without the underlying science of the brain, its all hypotheses. This paper attempts not to speculate, but to answer. And in regards to the "I", I think its done well. That being said, I can most certainly speculate with you and see if we can come up with outlooks that fit within our sensibilities and wonder at the world!
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
This is fantastic. Yes, to conclude an irrational belief there must be something else besides logic at work. If you applicably know your belief is incorrect, but insist on it, you are being driven by something else unconscious. Lets speculate as to what that can be, and if it is useful to us.
One of the things I did not have space to cover was that all four types of inductions, including irrational ones, are all useful tools. Probability is useful for predicting odds of known outcomes. Possibility is essential for us to believe that the world will continue as we know it in the next tick of experience. Plausibility incites our wonder and curiosity about the world to discover new things. But what about irrational inductions?
Recall that knowledge, whether distinct or applicable, must be deductive. Lets break down two useful terms of deductions. Validity and soundness. Validity is a deduction that is correct in form.
A necessarily leads to B. Assume that you have A. Therefore deductively, you have B. This is valid.
Soundness is when all of the premises and conclusions of your deduction are true. Take our valid argument above, but discover that while we applicably knew that A existed, new information shows us that we were mistaken. Therefore the deduction might have been valid, but not sound.
One can hold applicable knowledge that is valid, and seems to be sound. Yet there is an old question in epistemology, "How do I know, that what I know, is actually true?" The answer is, "You can't". Meaning that we can hold a deduction that is both valid and appears to be sound from everything we can observe, but in the end is false.
This is where irrational beliefs come into play. While our conscious mind may see that certain claims seem valid and sound, there may be something in our unconscious that we are processing that cannot quite be verbalized. The ability to not be completely bound to logic in these cases, can be quite useful. As always, inductive beliefs carry an element of risk to them, and if used irresponsibly or unintelligently, can be detrimental. But used responsibly, they can be incredible boons.
For instance, lets think about someone in a precarious situation. Everyone in their life has declared them to be worthless. They've been abused, mistreated, and miserable. This is what they applicably know. The probability they will continue to be abused is near 99%. The possibility is there. The plausibility is there. The idea that life could get better with the information they have is completely irrational. And yet in this case, this is the belief that will save them.
The encapsulation of knowledge and an inductive hierarchy does not address morality. Morality being what we "should" do, despite what we know. I have not yet written my take on morality, but it is nearing the time. I hope this was something to think about that also addressed your idea!
I read through your first two posts. I'm afraid I am skeptical of your account of inductive reasoning, or at least it doesn't seem to fit well with the way I see my cognitive processes working. I'm more inclined to view things along the lines of this article:
https://evolvingthoughts.net/2013/01/27/pattern-recognition-neither-deduction-nor-induction
By two posts, did you mean the two posts of the actual argument, or the first post on how to approach the argument and the first post of the argument? This is important because the topic of induction is the last post of the argument and essential to read if you have issues with induction.
Quoting wonderer1
As noted in the intro, that is not how to approach a paper like this. Its ok to have an intuition or feeling of disagreement, but you need to post what specifically is wrong in the writing of the paper, and some logic or argument as to why what I've expressed is wrong. From you statement, I don't know specifically what your issue is with my notion of inductive reasoning, as I do not even use the phrase "inductive reasoning". Is it that you have an issue with what I've written, or simply misinterpreted what I've written? I can't tell unless you point it out clearly.
I read the article you linked and did not see how this applied to the argument. Again, point out the idea that you disagree with so that way I know specifically what the issue is, and how you're interpreting it. Then contrast this with a point in the article so I can see where you believe another approach would work better.
Good. So, to clarify something first - I'm not looking for anything un-philosophical. I might use words, expression, jargon and terminology from elsewhere, and talk about that - But in your reply you said 'this isn't philosphy'.
To that I hope you can remind yourself in our interactions that 'nothing' of what I'm looking for 'is/should' be outside the realm of Philosophy. It is about piecing together something that I believe is, or should be there, either as bits and pieces; or we will simply have to indiscretely experience some knowledge about it.
So if something I write or say isn't quite meaningful, remember that I am not trying to bridge a gap between philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, social sciences etc. Yes, this complementary way of looking at things should be able to help with understanding things, but it is more of a general pursuit, than a 'theory of everything'. And it must compliment your model, and not diverge from it.
Since I'm not well-versed in philosophy, I went to the library and looked up some of the famous problems or questions in Philosophy, to see if I could come closer to understanding my own intuitions about this.
There is of course so much more I could delve into, but to me it's a start, and I wanted, again, to reply to you before weighing everything too much. I'm better at solving singular problems - I have a hunch, and will find it if I have enough materials before me.
From reading the very short introduction to many famous problems, there were several that seemed relevant.
Sorites Paradox,, Hume's problem of induction, Karl Poppers critique of Freud/psychoanalysis, Thomas Kuhn's paradigms, Ship of Theseus, Platos Allegory of the Cave, Hegel's Dialectics and a quote from the Bible for good measure. (Luke 11;47-52)
Of course, I have only skimmed this, but they all seem to point at the same things - I just struggle to spell it out - even when to me it is 'obvious'. As I might have mentioned before, intuition 'feels' like that, and so when I am right about certain things over time - I increase my trust in my intuition, even when I haven't been able to explain how it works directly.
I'll do my best here, but it is of course not exhaustive enough to fit perfectly, but here goes.
First and foremost, all the pieces above are mutually connected. There are of course many, many more, too.
Sorites Paradox. To me it speaks to the point that things can 'read' in two different directions. The first one, that a heap can become smaller/bigger, the second that a single grain of sand can point towards the existence of a heap.
Hume's problem is relevant in that I like the word infer. I believe this is very relevant somehow for what we are looking at with intuition/indiscrete experience. I just don't think focusing on 'why/how' we can infer something is that relevant.
Karl Poppers Falsification. Especially how he distanced himself from Psychoanalysis. To me, this is a very, very important thing. Karl Popper didn't find a way to better explain human actions - he did something that I find curiously reductionist - namely to dismiss the thought process of Adler, and brand it as unscientific.
Which I find quite sad, in a way. I hope we might have more luck bridging the gap than they did.
Thomas Kuhn's paradigms. There is a bit of a paradox in this. To me it seems like Thomas Kuhn is talking about 'paradigms' as only applying in Science. Similar to Popper, I find this curious. The theory of spiral dynamics, I would argue, at least doesn't look at knowledge through such a reductionist lens as such. But it is still relevant here. The point is that 'Knowledge' is not one, linear thing. It isn't like measuring a tree with a ruler, and when you got every spec, you know 'everything' about the tree. You will never understand photosynthesis from measuring the leaves - but you might 'infer' that there is something going beyond your current paradigm of Measurement.
Ship of Theseus. I'm not sure why I added this. I believe it is relevant, but not why quite yet.
Plato's allegory of the cave. Now, this allegory is simple, in that it only talks about one 'type' of cave, a binary choice of being 'blind' or 'seeing' freely. When I first heard about Plato's cave, it was presented in the context of 'Knowing what is true'. That all knowledge we humans have, might simply be shadows on the wall. In other words, not the 'truth'.
A similar example down this lane is the brain in the vat.. It is presented as an 'either/or' of truth.
But, as might be seen in Hegel's Dialectics, progress it is more of a process towards sophistication, than finding the 'one' door to 'omniscience'. It is a step-by-step process that gradually includes and solves paradoxes and inconsistencies, to reach a higher level of complexity.
Luke 11:47-52. Jesus compares the current situation he is in, with that of the Prophets. The Pharisees are the ones doing 'real science', but he points out the paradigmatic irony that even whilst they are honoring the old Prophets by building them graves - they are themselves acting in the exact same ways that killed the Prophets in the first place.
Now, I guess I need to clarify some things. Firstly, paradigms are interesting, but the model I'm looking at should match yours, and not try to 'understand' progress in general. At the same time, the ability to infer seems to link with making the kinds of discoveries and asking the kinds of questions that might lead to this kind of progress.
Thirdly, there are abilities that seem to match more with applying the current worldview to further its use.
One side cares about increase in complexity - to elevate the possible venues of things/ways to explore and see the world. The other cares about increasing the amount of knowledge that is gained through applying the methodology rigorously.
This has implications for the model. I found what you wrote very fascinating, but also incredibly hard to read. And you also seem to 'misunderstand' me to such a degree, that I wonder if you are able to see me as someone who actually does something very similar to you, in a very rigorous manner, but through a process I might call Indiscrete experience/Inferring.
One interesting thing about Jesus and Platon's cave is 'why would they try to change people's minds?' However, when we look at the interactions, at least between Jesus and the Pharisees, it doesn't look like he understood that they didn't 'get it'. If one person went out of the cave, and had their life changed, why 'wouldn't' the second one do it once told about it? But it seems neither of them were aware of the Typical Mind Fallacy
To me, this is more of a question of inferring, than deduction or induction. It is of course possible to induct in these instances, but you need some kind of 'weighing' process. Similarly to how you gain distinctive knowledge and applicable knowledge through different kinds of actions, the same should be true for the complementary piece I intuit.
You say that in philosophy you can't know if something is true, and I agree with that. But in the inferring realm, it doesn't matter if things are 'true'. What is important is if they are more 'complete' and 'complex'. That means that people might be right about things, right about there being something like a God - but their description is less complete and complex than someone describing a view that can incorporate different beliefs, and so on.
The brain in the vat might be seen like a binary choice, but it is less complete and complex than a view that incorporates the possibility that we are real and imaginary simultaneously, for example.
I'll stop here for now. It is hard to stay coherent, and focus on things. Maybe it would have been better if we texted/chatted, but I'm not sure. Delving into this is hard - not because I am unsure of the direction, but simply because 'pointing at' inference is like trying to freeze time. You might show a person in the Cave 1000 pictures, but similarly to Zenos Paradoxes, you can't, you explain 'movement', 'time' and 'space' from the pictures alone? There is no movement, you can't 'see' time and there is no space (it is 2D).
I know that I am doing something that works, and points to reality, and that gains me knowledge - I just find it incredibly elusive - and it doesn't help that there seems to be this odd rift between intuition and 'science'. That really needs to go.
Hopefully you can bounce off this somehow.
Kindly,
Caerulea-Lawrence
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
Three things: ability to parcel; the totality of experience; as one chooses.
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
This is pivotal to the argument so I am adding support here. You are basically saying there is discreet experience. And such a thing entails knowing identities, it entails identifying with discretion. Before one can have a discreet experience, one must identify; or, before one can identify, one must have a discreet experience; now take the before out of it, and see that discreet experience is a product of reality (experience) being known in identity (the discreet). Or just there is discreet experience. This is pivotal, because it purports to unify our knowledge of experience over here in the experience of being me, with reality, over there, that any mind would have to see. Logically, this unifies the deductive with the inductive; or better said, we can induce there is discreet experience and we can deduce there is discreet experience.
Quoting Philosophim
When I am remembering, recalling, I can say this is like I am recalling a memory, but then now I have created a memory as discreet from remembering and recalling. But remembering and recalling are mysterious in the first place, so to carve out a discreet memory away from this mystery and use this memory as an ontologically discreet object treacherous. We have to speak about memory. It is deeply unified with knowing and discreet experience, but I dont think we need to go here.
Quoting Philosophim
You made the distinctions out of your experience of the new shep. Then detach them from experience and call them the known. Then you create an issue out of the gap you just created by detaching knowledge, where you say I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality.
This is a lot. You have a discreet experience, your knowledge of that experience, and you have correctly matching. Or you have the identities, you have without contradiction, and reality.
This is Aristotle and Descartes. Want to see where it goes.
Quoting Philosophim
This quote is essential. Its why Aristotle came to the law of non-contradiction instead of there is discreet experience as fundamental. You are playing in the same playground here.
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
This argument would almost be better without premise 4, because premise 4 introduces a gap between discreet experience and reality. This is a second gap. You already had a gap between discreet experience and all of the created essential properties. You can unify your discreet experience to your knowledge, bridge that gap, but this diesnt necessitate (by deduction) that youve bridged the gap between discreet experience and reality. So I think you would be better to take reality out of it, or admit that discreet experience is reality; reality produces the discreet experiences you create into essential properties. But maybe you dispense with reality where you include it as not directly or indirectly, meaning there is no need to put a gap between experience and reality whether you look for contradiction (directly) or are forced into initially invisible contradiction(indirectly) because neither appears anyway.
Quoting Philosophim
The choice. So you have experience, with discretion yielding known essential properties. The choice is why there is a gap between experience and reality. We create a gap between experience and the essential properties we make of it for sake of knowing these discreet experiences, but because we have to chose the properties or carve them out of the field as a shep ourselves, we can make wrong choices that may or may not allow my knowledge to map through the experience Ive carved directly to the reality Ive experienced.
I agree with all of the moving parts you identify. I agree with the way your are talking about them. I think you are clearly describing how experience works, how we know. I see this as a phenomenology, and maps a bit to Hegel, as well as Aristotle.
Quoting Philosophim
This quote is about evaluating induction. You evaluate induction against other inductions. You dont evaluate induction against what can be deduced within one induction (cogent within).
I like it.
Probability to possibility to plausibility - needed distinctions.
Irrational belief. I get the object you have identified. I see it discreetly, to borrow a phrase, from the others. And as I said I like the overall method of evaluating induction this way. But I think there is a much smaller space between probable, possible and plausible, than compared the space between all three and the irrational. There is a similar discreet experience that leads to judgements among probable and merely plausible inductions, and rationality needed to make the distinctions. Once you introduce the irrational, even though it is tied to belief through knowledge of a discreet experience, I find new substance is distinguished that might threaten the whole method. Irrationality has to be dealt with, but it might not be containable, identifiable, discreet enough, to be dealt with like the others.
But Im just trying to give you something to think about as you have done for me. Some great lines Ive quoted in there. Thanks for sharing this.
Quoting Fire Ologist
A great assessment. The next step after this is to ask, "What is doing the discrete experiencing?" And the answer is, "The I".
Quoting Fire Ologist
Interesting! I was unaware. I have found that this area of knowledge is shared by many other epistemological philosophies. There's a very similar level of conclusion which then takes off in different directions.
Quoting Fire Ologist
It is not necessarily that there is a gap between discrete experience and reality. The discrete experience you have is real. The gap is whether your judgement that your discrete experience represents more than the experience itself. So for example, its real that if I'm hallucinating, I'm seeing a pink elephant. What's questionable is whether that discrete experience is an accurate representation of reality without contradiction. Its taking the step beyond the experience to say, "But if I fully apply the totality of what a pink elephant entails, will I find its still a pink elephant?"
This is what separates a full deduction, from a partial induction. Honestly, we make very few deductions in our day to day as doing so would be woefully inefficient. But we have to determine what a fully applied aspect of knowledge entails first before we can more accurately assess inductions.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Correct. And its never claimed that we do. That's why applied knowledge is not an affirmation. It is a test of avoiding contradiction. Thus if I am a person in the middle ages I can look up at the sky and I applicably know that the Sun rotates around the Earth. For me to say the Earth rotates around the sun would be a contradiction, just look at it! Later when knew information enters in, the previous deduction no longer applies. I applicably knew as a person ignorant of astronomy that the Sun rotated around the Earth. With knew information, I now applicably know the Earth rotates around the Sun.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Thank you, I am humbled by such agreement.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Here is a simple breakdown.
Probability - an induction based off of applied knowledge and logical limitations. I know there are 52 cards, and four of them are jacks. I do not know what the result of a random shuffle will be. Logically, its a 4/52 probability that I'll draw a jack if we keep repeating this over time. This is applicably confirmed over time.
Possibility - an induction based off of applicably knowing that 'x' at least one time. No one has ever discovered a unicorn, therefore it is not a possibility. I have applicably known a horse, therefore its possible to applicably know one again. However the likelihood and frequency of expected experience is unknown.
Plausibility - A combination of distinctive knowledge that has no outright logical denial that it could be applied. It has either not been applied yet, or cannot be applied by its definitions. For example, a unicorn as a horse with a horn on its head, no magic. It doesn't seem like there's anything which would deny that this could happen, but no one has ever applicably known such a creature to exist. So a unicorn defined in this way is not possible, only plausible.
And you are right, the gap is a little large. I'll introduce another term to see what you think.
Faith - A combination of distinctive knowledge that has no outright logical denial that it could be applied. However, upon application, it is found to be false. This is often applied to religion, but this can also be applied to faith in oneself. We can experience a moment of reality that is at odds with our own view of ourselves, yet persist in the belief that the view of ourself still stands.
Irrational - a combination of distinctive knowledge that does not make any logical sense, and once applied and found to be false. Despite this, a person still holds it to be true. For example, a mother believes her son did not commit a crime, despite her knowing her sons troubled past, they're being at the scene of the crime, and eyewitnesses. It is found undeniably that the son committed the crime. Yet the mother persists in believing he didn't commit it. This is a step beyond faith into outright delusion.
Thank you Fire Ologist, it is one of the greatest compliments you can give to tell me that my paper gave you something to think about. I appreciate your feedback and will think about it further.
My interpretation of your paper is that you have outlined the mechanism for categorisation, applied that categorisation to modes of perception, and organised that categorisation into a hierarchy.
As far as the process is concerned, it seems very reasonable to me. I can see and understand the reasoning behind each step.
Categorisation is a powerful tool. But...
Difference does not imply (hard) distinction.
There are infinite (unlimited) possible categorisations
When spring cleaning and deciding what to throw out you could categorise by one of:
1. Least used in the last year.
2. Least sentimental value.
3. Least functional.
4. ...
You can combine these categories to create a hierarchy. There are infinite (unlimited) hierarchies.
You have chosen a set of categories and placed them in a hierarchy that produces the result you want.
Any conclusions you draw are observations about the categories and hierarchies you have chosen; not conclusions about the individual members.
You may feel that the prejudices that guided you in choosing your categories are justified. Your intuition may be right.
As it stands, all you are saying is "Given my prejudices: my prejudices".
Your prejudices could well be accurate. They are formed as a consequence of your experiences; it isn't like they are completely without foundation.
The trouble is that you are assuming your prejudices and then trying to communicate.
For example, it is obvious to you that there are distinctions. This existence of distinctions doesn't need to be justified or proven: they are right there! Just look! How are we looking at the same world and not instantly agreeing on this!? If I could just force people to understand these words in the way that I understand them...
Edge Cases
Every possible category has edge cases.
When you built your categories you had in mind clear examples that illustrated the nature of the category. A clear vision of an objective, unambiguous scale of thought and perception that everyone could readily see and agree on; that would lead to a renaissance of rational discourse inside a rational framework. (or something like that).
In practice it seems that everyone is going to extremes to define every word in the most perverse manner possible and then using those perverse interpretations to twist your straightforward statements into a knot of incomprehensibility. Suddenly everything is an exception or an edge case and you have to take a step back to even remember what your point was in the first place.
If only someone would invent a rigorous formal language that always held a fixed interpretation for every viewer.
Early Set Theory ran into trouble because some pedantic bastard found an edge case that destroyed the theory. The fix involves everyone agreeing not to do the thing, because if you do the thing everything breaks. So don't do the thing. (Russell's Paradox).
The point being that you are not the first.
The definition of madness is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results
The first (implicit) lesson from philosophy is: If you think you have resolved the problems of communication; you've made a mistake.
Communication itself works (more or less). But when you try to nail it down it squirts out from underneath the nail and leaves a nasty odour behind.
99.9% of theoretical mathematics is an effort to nail down unambiguous meaning. And that effort has been wasted.
Based on your guide to rationality, is it better to ignore the last two millennia of attempts to codify a universal language that is understood equally by all; or should we question why it seems so hard?
The Delusion of a Shared Universe (Why is it so hard?)
The concept of an objective universe is that there is a single, definite, objective universe that is the same for everyone. Given this assumption it seems rational to assume that descriptions of that universe should be the same for everyone.
This is wrong.
On a trivial level, two people regarding the Mona Lisa in the Louvre Museum see different things. One is standing a little to the left of the other and is a little shorter. One has only just arrived from a dazzling bright summer day and their eyesight is still adjusting to the relative dimness indoors. Each has a (slightly) different perception to the other.
In general relativity, two observers in different inertial frames disagree on whether two events are simultaneous or not. They each have accurate measuring equipment and accurately observe the same pair of events. One observes that the events happened simultaneously. The other observes that there was a measurable period of time between the two events.
In Newtonian Mechanics, all observers would observe two simultaneous events as being simultaneous.
In Relativity, two distinct observers will make distinct measurements. A Relativistic universe is fundamentally not an objective universe.
The rich man's perception of poverty bear's little resemblance to the poor man's. Someone who has lived in an abusive environment all their life has no knowledge of any other way to live.
A long, cold drink after being stuck in traffic for four hours with no air conditioning, in the middle of a Florida summer, and you've been contemplating whether it is worth drinking your own pee or if the windscreen washer fluid reservoir is drinkable... is a viscerally different experience to your normal morning cup of generic beverage.
Enough Similarity to be misleading
After a little back and forth we can all agree that 'up' is the direction away from the centre of mass of the Earth.
This could give the impression that 'up' is an objective concept. An idea that is accessible by everyone but ultimately independent of any single person. In actuality, each person has a set of experiences that they associate with the word 'up'. Each and every time a person reads the word 'up' they interpret it based on the sum total of their experiences.
As a rough approximation, it sometimes works to assume that the meaning of words exists outside of people. Common events create an aggregate average experience that might appear universal.
The rarer an event or the more closely examined an event; the less the average experience has any relevance.
First steps
Do you recognise the pattern where you have what seems like a solid, clear idea in your head but the harder you try to set that idea down in unambiguous terms that everyone should understand... the more it slips through your fingers?
I think this pattern is the major motivation behind Axiomatic Mathematics.
I think this pattern is reflected in many (possibly most) philosophical arguments.
A good first step might be to stop repeating the same thing over and over again because all those previous times they just weren't trying hard enough... and realise this is information about the nature of the universe.
Facetious
Of course people have felt that communication is flawed and thought about the problem.
If all that was needed was a slight tweaking of existing concepts the problem would have been solved long ago.
Going all the way back to first principles is daunting. Especially when it isn't clear what those first principles would even be.
On the other hand, I can see that you you put a lot of work into communicating your ideas and... it shouldn't be this hard.
Fortunately I'm available to tell you that it is so hard because you are trying to describe a relativistic universe in objective terms. This is impossible.
Describing a relativistic universe in relativistic (subjective) terms is trivial in comparison.
I appreciate the read and compliment!
Let me address the topic that you pointed out directly and accurately.
Quoting Treatid
True. We can create infinite distinctive knowledge. But can we accurately apply them? And if we do, are they useful to us for that particular situation? Taken within the solo context of the paper, this is a description, not a criticism. As long as we can applicably know whatever categorization we create, its objective knowledge.
However, if we include the context of one other person, we suddenly have new challenges. This original post did not address how social context works, as it was a long enough paper as it is. I will post the rest for you in the follow up in the "Reserved for further posts here", as I wasn't sure if readers were going to get that far into it.
Summary:
Social communication requires context, both distinctively, and applicably. The first thing which must be established before communication can occur is to find an agreement of essential properties within a definition. The essential properties of a 'tree' for a casual person may be very different than for a botanist for example. Once the properties are agreed upon by both parties, then applicable knowledge can begin.
So: A tall bush may be applicably known as a 'tall tree' by a group of average people, but that same tall tree is applicably known as "Bushicus tallimax" by botanists.
How do we agree what definitions to use? Through a combination of several factors.
1. Efficiency (Energy and time spent per result)
2. Effectiveness (How useful is it to us. Why do I care that that tree is a bush if I'm not a botanist?)
3. Danger in failure or loss of success (That bear is not friendly. I failed to identify this particular tree can cure cancer)
And of course, once you have established contextual definitions, the group could try for applicable knowledge or use the inductive hierarchy in application. I'm sure you can come up with more on your own as you seem to understand the underlying issues of the topic well. If you read the second part and feel like that did not adequately answer your points, please point them out again and I will address them.
I do not know how I missed your post again. If you're still around, let me know, I will reply to your points!
Could you define 'distinct' for me, please?
Everything I see is connected. Connection seems to me to be one of the fundamental properties of the universe.
This means that everything is an aspect of a single connected whole.
Your use of 'distinct' gives me the impression that you think we can chop off bits of the universe and consider them in isolation.
The idea of 'hard distinction' makes no sense to me. The things we experience are part of the universe. Saying they are not connected appears counter-factual to me.
I do, of course, agree that there are observable differences. Indeed, 'difference' is another fundamental property of the universe.
Given these two fundamental properties, they must both be aspects of the same thing.
So, I see difference and connection as intimately connected concepts that cannot be separated. Each one is part of and requires the other.
Beyond this, I think that every concept we hold is defined by its connection to all the other concepts. The connections a concept has IS the concept.
Remove those connections to other concepts and you are left with nothing.
As it stands, your references to distinctions run counter to my direct experience. Or I don't understand your concept of distinction.
Hi and thanks for reaching out again,
seems I forgot to add @Philosophim to my last message, sorry about that too. *it is what it is, I guess.*
It is fine that it has taken some time, as it isn't really something that is easy to grasp in any way. When I reread my post, and I think about the system you have created, I still notice the hesitation in me, like a hindrance to clarity, simplicity and understanding - so how do I describe it?
In a way, instead of going from 'everything' to 'something', inference is creating a self-evolving association network. And the problem that stumps me even now, but that I am more able to express, is how to put to words a system which, the second you describe it as something, will add that association to its network, which in turn will change, morph and self-reference the system you are trying to describe?
So in a way I want to supersede intuition, but I'm not able to. I am not able to fully understand intuition and inference, as it evolves side-by-side with my own understanding. Which is also one part of what is so fascinating about what you wrote, that it is in some way fixed, but also stable. Whereas in my view there are only various 'tiers' of associations - varying in complexity, intensity and connections - but I find this explanation, even though it does fit to a certain extent - and could work as a starting point - to still be wholly unsatisfactory.
I'll do take kindly to your input on this, if you have any - and I don't mind things taking a lot of time. I am just assuming getting anywhere on this will take a while, and I am not in a hurry.
Kindly,
Caerulea-Lawrence
Something distinct is a discrete experience clearly defined. There is nothing wrong with seeing connections. But connections come from blending discrete experiences together, and are themselves distinctions.
You cannot say, "This and that are connected" without both "this" and "that". What we tend to do in connections is have less emphasis on the individual parts, and instead focus on the new distinction that's formed. A very simple example of this is addition in math. You take two 'ones', and create a new connection or group that we call 'two'. When the connections are small and easily identifiable, we more clearly see the parts that make the connections. When they are numerous and complex like a clock, we may ignore or even hide the complexity underneath to focus on the subject of telling time.
But the ability to focus on the connection and de-emphasize the parts, does not negate the parts themselves.
Quoting Treatid
All things can be connected based on our ability to group things together. But they also don't have to be. Connections are built from distinctions, and are simply a complex distinction itself. Skateboard, wheel, plastic, molecule. These things are all parts of a skateboard that are connected, but at any moment, we could disconnect them if we so chose.
Quoting Treatid
Yes. Read the words in this sentence. Think about each word. Now each letter. Now each pixel. Now as a group. You can part and parcel the universe as you see fit. That is our power as observant beings, the ability to discretely experience.
Quoting Treatid
A hard distinction is something we can create in our experience. It depends on how you're defining the phrase, 'hard distinction'. If you create a definition that's impossible to experience, then of course the phrase is useless. If you create a definition that is possible to experience, then it is useful.
Quoting Treatid
No argument from me. To know that something is 'different' it must be evaluated in relation to 'something else'. We create discrete experiences, and compare them to one another. Thus we have the ability to both create discrete experiences, and relate discrete experiences.
Quoting Treatid
To have a discrete experience, you must experience like being in a sea. To take a discrete is to remove the surrounding existence from the discrete. Then, we can observe how the discrete behaves within the rest of existence. Adding more discrete existences allows us to observe them in relation to each other in a more specified way. Greater discrete existences up to a point help us navigate the world in a way that allows us to live. "This" is food. "That" will kill you. And so on.
Quoting Treatid
Do they still at this point?
I see your arguments and they seem well formed given your assumptions. We have enough commonality that we are clearly drawing from similar enough experiences to communicate.
I can see how it would be annoying if you felt I was derailing your thread with my pet theory. Tell me to bugger off if you feel like it.
However, I'm not just nitpicking in order to find a hook. I have some sense of what you are trying to do in presenting a framework of thought and communication. I think others have made similar efforts before and met with lacklustre success because you are (mistakenly) assuming a fundamentally objective universe.
As such, I suggest steering the discussion towards the question of whether it is, in principle, possible for two Cooperative participants to arrive at a definite solution.
Onwards
My disagreement is with your fundamental perception of discreteness.
In the above quote you state that "this" and "that" are requirements for a connection to exist.
I disagree. I think that "this" and "that" are illusions created by the connection.
It is the relationships between 'Left' and 'Right' that define each of them. Similarly with 'Hot' and 'Cold', 'Tall' and 'Short', ....
Distance, time and velocity are meaningless terms without their relationships to each other. We measure time via periodic movement in space.
These examples won't convince you. I'm not trying to convince you (yet).
What I'm interested in is whether you can imagine a relationship centred reality as distinct from your current perception of an object centred reality?
Can you imagine the possibility of some other universe existing with only relationships? Are objects a requirement for a universe to exist?
For my part, I can see your assumption of the primacy of objects over relationships. I'm not in doubt about what it is you believe. I disagree with it.
What type of argument would you present given that we disagree over the indirect part of perception?
We both agree that we directly experience Sensory Data. You perceive that Sensory Data as having been caused by objects (hence you have indirect perception of objects). I perceive Sensory Data and more Sensory Data.
What reason can you give me to believe your indirect perception of objects is an accurate representation of reality?
Quoting Treatid
I wonder if youre familiar with Wilfred Sellarss Myth of the Given? It states that there is no non-conceptual perception of sense data, which means that we filter that data through linguistic schemes. Furthermore those schemes are not given a priori as with Kants categories. So it doesnt matter whether were talking about seeing object and their relations or just relations of relations, the epistemic meaning of the sense data we perceive is dependent on the nature of our conceptual schemes. Do you agree with this?
Just to make sure I follow you here. You make three distinctions:
1. Sense data
2. Epistemic meaning
3. Conceptual schemes
Correct?
Pretty much
Ok, but in order to make a disagreement, isnt it that illusion being made discrete from this connection? You still have this and that. You still make a distinction.
This illusion is only here in distinction from some other that (which other can be an illusion as well, or anything, as in comparison to this particular illusion, the other need only be a that.)
An illusion is all the content one needs to have a one, or a this, but now so be it, there is this content just as well.
And I agree that this or that can be illusions, or just false, as if there is no truth, just like the connection between this and that can be an illusion. I just think these are the predicaments of epistemology. We never stop seeing this and therefore that as well.
We have a more simple, more immediate need for this and that not just to be logical, not just to think at all. We wouldnt think of this or that in the first place without a distinction to be made and that distinction being made. We now think, because epistemology has made us all amateur skeptics, that therefore, all thought, all metaphysics, like fantasy, is illusion, like the distinctions and the connections, never was nor will be; but even still, we think this, as opposed to thinking that.
When we are thinking, we are the distinctions, this is true; but we are still really thinking, because thinking really is a distinct way of being in a world of other distinctions like flying or swimming. Birds make nests, we construct philosophical critiques. Experience is as real as the experience-able.
The distinctions we construct are as real as we are real distinction constructors. Like stems making flowers and thorns, we use words to say this is not that at all times.
Quoting Treatid
I imagine this world, this universe, is one where relationships cannot be without their objects, AND where objects cannot be without their relationships, AND neither can take primacy because neither ever is where the other is not equally present. Identity and relation are equally fixed and in motion as both cause and have the effect of the other.
Paradox is. So I dont agree that objects take primacy over relationships. Just as I dont agree relationship is the real basis.
These can be boiled down to stillness and motion. The stillness of objects is sustained against the motion of relationships. Motion is as ubiquitous as the stillness it moves against and neither objects nor stillness nor relationships nor motion is first, or last, or the essence, or the true being. Because they are all at once in the paradox, which is the being, the substance, the related ones.
Thank you! Yes, I agree that we're both observing and thinking along the same lines, but with different viewpoints.
Quoting Treatid
No, your contribution is more than fine. We are here to explore the topic, and your polite and passionate viewpoint are valuable.
Quoting Treatid
Let me clarify. You'll notice in the paper I do not use the words "objectivity" or "subjectivity". We did have another conversation going in another thread, and that might have been crossed here (no worry). Let me see if I can summarize the points again.
--Summary begin
The point is to create a foundation of knowledge. Not a foundation of truth. If you recall I never claim "This is true." Knowledge and truth are not the same thing. Truth is what is. Knowledge is a logical attempt at trying to ascertain that truth, but cannot prove that it does indeed hold the truth. What is more important than subjectivity or objectivity are deduction and induction.
The initial build up is demonstrating that an individual can deduce they discretely experience. What you discretely experience, is what you experience. See a pink elephant in the room? That is what you see. It is not an attempt to claim, "Everybody else see that too." or "It is true that there is an actual pink elephant dancing in my room and causing a mess".
Combined with the ability to discretely experience, we have memory, and the ability to recall that experience, and subdivide discrete experience. So I see an elephant as a whole, but also that its pink as a subdivision. This experience and memory is distinctive knowledge.
But individuals go one step further. We try to apply that memory to a future discrete experience and claim that our memory matches what the new discrete experience is. This is applying our memories and identities. And this application has a chance of being wrong. Recall or reread the goat and sheep example I gave. An attempt to claim that one's distinctive knowledge applies to the new discrete experience is a belief. Distinctive knowledge which can be applied without contradiction is applied knowledge. That which is contradicted is an incorrect belief. That which cannot be quite ascertained, but can be induced based on previous knowledge is an induction, and can be placed in a hierarchy to measure cogency of that induction.
--Summary end
As you see, I don't assume an objective universe. I don't assume that knowledge represents the truth. I note that its a tool, and the most reasonable tool we have to understand the universe. It could very well be that the universe is not objective. There's no reason that the rules of physics need to stay the same tomorrow. But this theory of knowledge does not care. It can adapt to that.
Quoting Treatid
As long as you understand the former, we can build upon that to discover the later. And your criticism here is on point: I did not address knowledge between more than one person, only knowledge of the self in the original paper due to not wanting to overburden the reader.
My apologies if this will be a little long to get to your point, but its important to understand the whole theory. The identity we'll be using when two people interact with each other is context. You can have distinctive context, and applicable context.
Distinctive context is what each person's distinctive knowledge entails. A botanist and a generalist are walking along in the woods and spy a tree-like plant. The botanist has two competing definitions "treeicus shorticus" and "bushimus maximus". The generalist has the definition of "tree" and "bush". The botanist has very particular essential attributes while the generalist has "trees are tall, bushes are short".
Before any applicable beliefs are made, we can see that their definitions are different. If they do not communicate and agree upon these definitions, they will come to very different applicable conclusions. Both would applicably know the treelike plant as different things, and would be correct within their own distinctive contexts. To agree on application, they both must come to an agreement on distinctive contexts first.
So they hash it out, like we are on the definition of what a discrete experience is. It could be that the botanist and generalist cannot agree. The generalist finds the nitpicky distinction useless to their own life, so just keeps calling it a bush. Perhaps the botanist will relent and note, "Since we're not in a lab, it doesn't matter. Call it a bush if you want. But if you're ever in a botanist convention, remember that its actually "treeicus shorticus" so you don't embarrass yourself. Or maybe the generalist is curious, finds the nitpickiness fascinating, and desires to add the botanists context to their applicable reference material.
It is always a choice. That choice may be based on several things. Time and effort needed to confirm and use the terminology based on the perceived benefit is a high priority for most people. Risk of loss if one uses a poor term is another. But in many cases, terms are going to be very middle ground for most people, and they'll find the most efficient term that works in most general cases.
So then, back to your points.
Quoting Treatid
What I am pointing out is primacy. A connection by definition is a relation between two things correct? So one cannot have a connection without the concept of two things. But to your point, can one have two things without the ability to relate? As I noted earlier, to have a discrete experience within existence, one must separate 'this' experience from 'that' sea of existence around us. So as a fundamental, we can say that for one thing to be discretely experienced, it must be in relation to what is not being discretely experienced. I don't know if I would call it a relationship, but I can see that fitting what you're going for.
As to the primacy of how a discrete experience is formed, its not that important to me for the following reason. The process of correct application is still the same. Back to the tree/bush example! No matter what the two agree on in the end, once they do agree on it, they can apply it. If they go with the botanist's definition, they pour over the plant for an hour and determine conclusively that it is in fact a "treeicus shorticus". If they use the generalists' term, they determine conclusively in five seconds that its a bush.
So to with our discussion of detailing discrete experience. If you discretely experience something and feel that every part of that discrete experience is a relationship with another experience, that's fine. That's your definition. Now the question is a matter of application. Can you consistently apply that definition repeatedly as you got about your day with minimal induction? How much time does it take you to applicably know it? How useful is it to you in relation to viewing something as an object? Is your definition more useful than others, and are others willing to enter into your distinctive context?
Its a tool, not an expression of truth. Tools are judged on their simplicity, usefulness, consistency, and ease of use. My point will be that your use of relationships comes in handy in particular contexts where the identifies essential properties are the relationships. We may have a general wrench, but maybe we need a slightly altered wrench for a different job.
Quoting Treatid
In this instance, these discrete experiences cannot be divorced from relationships, as they are the discrete experiences of relationships themselves.
But if we think in terms of abstracts like "The number one" which is merely the abstract idea of what a discrete experience is, does bringing relationships into it help us with math? Not so much. So here it seems unimportant, and we don't bring that property in as it doesn't serve us in our applicable needs.
Quoting Treatid
As you can see, yes. That is one of many contexts we can think in.
Quoting Treatid
Hopefully you'll see now my point was more that we need the fundamental ability to create a 'this' and a 'that'. We're nitpicking on whether this is a fundamental relationship, or a fundamental object that becomes a relationship, but we don't seem to be disagreeing on the fundamentality of discrete experience and its application. (Feel free to disagree :) )
Quoting Treatid
No, I actually don't claim that in the paper. You probably understand this now after reading the above.
Quoting Treatid
Like any application of distinctive knowledge, I must demonstrate that its application is not contradicted by reality. So if I believe that eating fresh apples will not kill me, and I eat fresh apples without dying, then I applicably know eating fresh applies will not kill me. Feel free to create a set of definitions that do not require there to be objects. Nothing is stopping you distinctively. The question will be its applicability. Can you create a system that is easy to understand, apply, consistent, and helps people better understand and interact with the world then a system that relies more on objects? Is your system of relations always good, or is it only sometimes good based on context?
My point is that we can invent an infinite number of distinctive ways of viewing and analyzing the world. The proof comes in its application. I hope this lengthy reply answered your questions and added a little more clarity to my points. Let me know what you think!
Glad I can finally get to replying to your post! First, there is a lot to cover, so I'll post a few answers at a time.
Sorites paradox: When does a heap become a heap?
What we have to understand here is that the word 'heap' is a purely cultural word. It was not invented with any particular amount of grains of sand in mind, only a 'feeling'. As long as two people share that feeling when looking at a pile of sand, they'll both agree its a 'heap'. If one person doesn't feel its a heap, there will be disagreement. The disagreement cannot be boiled down to explicit grains of sand however, but the personal applied feeling of the observed mass.
The problem here is attributing more to the identity than it ever had to begin with. So there is no paradox. Its just a word that is based on a cultural agreement of emotion. Not all distinctive knowledge is precise. We just can't expect precise application out of them.
Hume's problem
If you're referring to the problem of induction, the reasoning which leads to the inductive hierarchy takes care of that.
Karl Poppers Falsification This theory of knowledge is consistent with the idea of falsification. For something to be applied, there must be a scenario that we can imagine if it is misapplied.
Falsification is often misunderstood. It does not mean that, "X is false" or "Its possible that X is false." Its "There is a reasonable imagined possibility where X is false, and we can test it." Lets use an example of a unicorn that is falsifiable, vs one that is not falsifiable.
Non-falsifiable Unicorn - This unicorn has magical powers that hide itself from all detection. They will never let themselves be detected by humans, and will always use their magic to hide themselves from any detectable means.
As you can see, we cannot imagine a scenario to test in which this could be false. No matter our detection results, it will always be an affirmation of the unicorn's existence. There is no imagined scenario that we can test in which the unicorns' existence can be false. As I note in the paper, this would be an inapplicable plausibility, which is just one step above an irrational induction in the hierarchy.
Falsifiable Unicorn - This unicorn has magical powers that make it invisible. However, it cannot hide anything else. You can still hear it, it leaves footprints, etc.
As you can see, we can imagine a testable scenario in which this is false. Can we find horse-like footprints that lead to discovering an invisible creature? If we can't, then the claim is false. This is an applicable plausibility, which is essentially a testable hypothesis.
Thomas Kuhn's paradigms To easily sum his point: Science has a paradigm that remains constant before going through a paradigm shift when current theories cant explain some phenomenon, and someone proposes a new theory.
This is completely consistent with the knowledge theory proposed here. As we create distinctive knowledge and applicably test it, we are constantly looking to see if the application is contradicted by reality. If it is not, then we assume it to be applicable knowledge, and we can build upon it. For example, lets say we applicably know that the Sun rotates around the Earth. After all, its obvious if we look up at the sky. We build a system of astronomy based on this.
One day, a person discovers that the Earth actually rotates around the Sun! This mind blowing discovery upends everything that was built upon the idea that the Sun rotated around the Earth. We have to go back to this new applicable base, and build from here. It doesn't mean that our previous applicable knowledge wasn't knowledge. For at the time, there was no other reasonable conclusion that could be made. But a reasonable conclusion of today may not be a reasonable conclusion of tomorrow. What we applicably know is a tool that could be invalidated with new information, but it does not invalidate the process of creating and applying distinctive knowledge applicably to reality.
Ship of Theseus Theseus buys a ship, and overtime replaces every piece of the ship due to repairs. At this point, is it still Theseus' ship? Ah, a great example! I have written about this before, it was just had to be cut out to make the original post more manageable.
This thought experiment is not so much one of application, but of how we define the ship. If we define his ship purely by its physical makeup, how detailed should that be? Is it based on the atomic makeup? Because that changes as soon as he buys the ship. So it can't be that detailed, even if we do base it purely on the physical makeup. Is it based on the replacement of one plank? Most would say no. So what is it based on?
Cultural ownership. We agree that there are certain identifiers that indicate ownership. Maybe there's a serial number. A great modern day analogy to this are software licenses. When you purchase software, you are copying from a base software implementation. But it doesn't have to remain a copy. As you save or make alterations to it, its still your program because you have a stable identifier, the license key.
The point though, is because it is cultural, there is no hard and fast rule. We can extend the initial Theseus ship example further. Over the years, Theseus replaces all of his parts, but keeps the old parts in a pile. Someone else comes along and uses all of his original parts to build the ship again. Is the ship of the old parts Theseus ship too? Again, this depends on the culture. Are abandoned old parts owned? Is ownership of something based on who builds it? It is how society that defines it that determines the answer.
Plato's allegory of the cave People in a cave look at the shadows on the wall based on a fire they behind them that they cannot see, and believe the shadows are reality. Looking behind reveals a different truth.
I believe this is covered by my remarks on Kuhn's paradigms. If you need me to go further into it, I will.
Brain in a vat Everything you experience seems real, but in reality its all in your head. The reality is you are a brain in a vat and no nothing of reality outside of your thoughts.
As you can start to glean by now, this is also answered by the theory. Applicable knowledge is what cannot be contradicted. The theory that we are brains in a vat is an inapplicable plausibility. It is impossible to apply, therefore an induction very low on the hierarchy. As such, while it is fun to think about, it is no better than an inapplicably plausible unicorn.
I'm not too familiar with the biblical reference, so I'll pass for now. I think we have enough for now to tackle your other points.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
We are two people with different outlooks in the world. Hopefully through discussion we'll reach a common understanding. Please don't take my disagreement or my viewpoint as looking down or disrespecting yours. You are obviously an intelligent person trying to communicate a world view you see very clearly. Most people think it is simple to convey this experience to others until you have to write it down in a cohesive way. Its much more difficult then we expect!
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
This is a question that I have addressed in the past, but never tackled in depth because most people never had the understanding of the base discussion to get this far. This is more theory then, "I have the answer," as I believe we would need to test this to confirm it.
The human brain is amazing not just for its intelligence, but its efficiency. A computer can do more processing for example, but its energy cost shoots through the roof. The fact we can think at the level we do without overheating ourselves or using more energy than we do, cannot be beat. Its easy to forget, but we thinking things that had to evolve in a world where danger and scarcity once existed at much greater levels.
This means we are not innately beings who are situated to think deeply about new experiences, or reorganize thought patterns. Doing so is inefficient. Thinking heavily about something takes concentration, energy, and time. Reprocessing your entire structure of thinking is even more difficult. So when we think about human intelligence, we shouldn't that its a font of reason, but a font of efficient processing.
So then, what does an efficient thinker focus on? Getting a result with as little thought as possible. Too little thought, and you fail to understand the situation and make a potentially lethal or tragic mistake. Too much thought, and you spend an inordinate amount of time and energy on a situation and are isolated from social groups, starve, or miss the window to act.
As such, humans are not wired for excellence, or the ideal. We are wires for, "Just enough". As a quick aside, doing more than "Just enough" is an expression of status. To do more than "Just enough" you must have excessive resources, be remarkably more efficient than others, or in a place of immense privilege. To spend time on inefficient matters and demonstrate mastery over them is an expression of one's status in society.
So then back to your point. One person has a paradigm, or set of distinctive and applicable knowledge that works for their life. They come across another person or group of people that a set of distinctive and applicable knowledge that works for their context. Why should one bother with the other paradigm?
My hypothesis is its about cost vs benefit. Maybe paradigm A is more accurate, but less efficient. Despite being more accurate, it doesn't provide much more benefit than paradigm B which is much more efficient. So society uses paradigm A in special circumstances where more accuracy is needed for a substantial benefit, vs usually using paradigm B for most other cases.
Religion is a great example of this. An atheist might have proof that there is no God, and go to a religion to persuade them to abandon their faith. The atheist may have a more accurate and cohesive world view. But what does the religious group gain? As it is now, they have group cohesion, and a community that cares about one another. They have a higher purpose that motivates them to volunteer and try to make the world a better place. The simple view motivates them and helps them when they're sad and down.
If they decided to take the atheistic standpoint, sure, it might be more accurate. But at what cost? A loss of community and purpose? A loss of motivation to care about others? People do not fight for the truth. They fight for the good that a certain viewpoint provides for their lives. If reality lets them have this viewpoint and benefits with few contradictions, why change?
Perhaps this is part of the 'intuition' you speak about. It is a mistake to think that our thought processes are for logic and truth. They are for efficient benefits to ourselves and society. And sometimes we can't voice that, but its there, under the surface.
I'll let this rest for now. What do you think about the topics? is starting to touch the surface of what you're thinking about, or is there another direction we need to go? I appreciate your thoughts.
Beautiful. I would be interested in an expansion of your concept of 'paradox'. Context makes it appear relevant and I can see several ways in which our understanding of our own existence and communication could evoke chicken and egg notions of precedence.
Otherwise, you point is well made and taken.
Quoting Joshs
I haven't previously come across Wilfred Sellars. I've has a quick dash through some summaries and added him to my reading list.
I strongly agree that perception and thought are intimately connected.
For the rest, I'm concerned you are asking me if I'm still beating my wife. In reading the question I have the feeling I'm being asked to agree to a conceptual framework.
Specifically, I think that everything is an aspect of a singular whole. I can perceive differences between senses, thought and language, and in a casual conversation I'd readily accept the distinctions. But in the midst of constructing philosophical foundations I'm much more reluctant to make an implicit agreement that epistemic knowledge is not just an aspect of conceptual schemas.
Further, I think language is primarily proscribed by the nature of the universe. While there are cultural influences, the core mechanism of language is not culturally dependent. In practise, almost nobody uses formal logic in everyday conversation.
As such, I question the premise that particular conceptions of how language function have a significant impact compared with the actual mechanisms of language.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm liking your approach the more I play/argue with it. My specific argument regarding objects/relationships is misguided. More details below but as a gist - I still feel there are hidden assumptions in your statements that run the risk of invalidating parts.
Course correction
Mistaken assumption
It is widely assumed that it is possible to describe an object.
This is wrong. It is a futile effort.
The Integer 1
The integer 1 has a set of relationships with the integer 2. Likewise for 3, 4, one million, -69, an apple,...
All these relationships form a pattern. This pattern is our conception of what the integer 1 is.
With many interconnected relationships we have a compelling sense of what something is.
If we were to remove each relationship to get to the essence of 1... we would eventually find we are left with nothing.
The integer 1 is the set of relationships it has with everything else. The integer 1 outside our universe with no relationships to anything is indistinguishable from nothingness.
Descriptions
A description is a network of relationships.
The mechanism of language is to build a network of relationships.
Essence
The typical process for finding the essence of meaning, significance, etc; is to strip away all the miscellaneous chaff until we are left with the essential core of the thing we are examining.
This is why this mistaken assumption is so devastating to the pursuit of knowledge.
Every philosophical, mathematical and physical discussion that tries to get to the core of a matter by stripping away all the extraneous concepts, assumptions and frippery is dooming itself to futility.
This is my argument
The assumption that meaning, significance or what have you, is an essential quality of a thing is the single greatest mistake of modern thought.
The significance of a thing is the sum total of its relationships with everything else. Remove the relationships and you have nothing.
Quoting Fire Ologist
I would hate to put words in your mouth - but your post screams to me that you already see this. You already know that every "this" needs all those "thats" in order to have significance.
Is it true?
Is language the process of creating relationships? Yes.
Read a dictionary. Examine those definitions. A simple empirical verification.
For a really fun time, consider the equations of Quantum Mechanics. An equation is a network of relationships.
Every mathematical equation is a little (or large) network of relationships.
It doesn't matter what the essence of the integer 1 is. It was never relevant. What we manipulate and use is the network of relationships.
??I appreciate the extensive elaboration on the various philosophical problems I mentioned. I wont delve into them too much, just want to give a thanks for the thought and effort, and say that it was a useful read.??
Quoting Philosophim
?No worries, words and feelings wont hinder me in diving deep. It is true that I am much more skilled at other ways of understanding and knowledge than methodical conveyance of my experience, but I find these interactions with you useful.
???Quoting Philosophim?
These are some very good points, so Ill just go directly into bouncing off them.?? Despite the apparent success of our intelligence, and the importance of efficiency, I believe focusing on that might conflate cause and effect. We dont have intelligence because it is necessary, we have intelligence as it coincides with the survival and procreation in the specific niche we humans fill. ?Im not saying that as an expert at evolutionary biology, it is just that if you look at your argument, viruses, bacteria, amoeba and parasites achieve the same goals; survival and procreation, as us humans, despite having far, far lower intelligence. In a way, for what they achieve, they are miles ahead of us in efficiency, but they do not beat us at complexity in organization.
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
??Ill try to weave this together as best I can. To bring back the word you talked about in your elaborations from earlier, culture( as a contrast to natural and reality). But, to modern humans, our reality is now influenced heavily by other humans. And so, reducing culture to being only something abstract, I believe, will might make it harder to understand why there are paradigms, and what role they play.?? The thing is, some people Do fight for the truth, despite the cost to their own lives. Humans as a species is very diverse, and I do not believe cost vs benefit alone fits the diversity we see in paradigms. ?What I believe fits better is that we are born with a predisposition to different paradigms, and are drawn to them like moths to the flame.
I find your description of efficiency very relevant too. Efficiency is the metric by which you measure success by, but What success Is, in other words, what you measure, is defined by your paradigm. ?So why do we have different paradigms when you can be perfectly happy in a small hunter-gatherer family, or in a bigger tribe? And if the explanation is «We developed new paradigms to make sense of problems that no longer made sense with the explanations available», doesnt the argument itself clash with reality. «We» have also worked tirelessly to avoid changing paradigms, to fight against it, to go so far as to murder, imprison or silence those that think differently. Moreover «we» still live and die as hunter-gatherers. ?One view of paradigms is a kind of trait that differentiates humans in what specific problems they see, try to fix, with which tools, how, why and with whom. ??
?
?Knowledge-generation and creation itself doesnt seem random, and paradigms are the overaching theme that fill in part of the void of why people consistently choose different types of inductions when it comes to some part of reality/culture, but do not apply that elsewhere. And abundance of resources does explain how people are able to focus so much energy on that, but abundance in itself doesnt lead to paradigm-creation, or to people choosing a new paradigm. There are other forces at play.
??Seems like we are diverging from the original point you have made about Knowledge and Induction. This is something I see as the backdrop to your method, and why it works much more specifically than I would prefer it to. And I'm not that much closer to inference, either. Maybe it is because it is a 'relational' method, and fuels on interaction with others, and not on introspection or reflection alone. Hm, that is an important point. Will add it to my repository.
How does this land with you/comes up in you?
If I understand what you're saying, I agree. I once sat down and asked myself, "If this is correct, what would knowing the truth be?" I realized the only way to know truth, which is what is real, would be to have observed and experienced something from all possible perspectives and viewpoints, and an understanding of all conclusions which did not contradict themselves (as well possibly the ones that do!).
It is an absolutely impossible endeavor.
Quoting Treatid
Also very true. The knowledge system I've proposed here is not limited to linguistic thought. If I had a image, or even a feeling about a specific situation, that can be logged as a memory which then is applied in the future.
For example, the emotion of 'dread'. While we might be able to objectively ascertain that people experiencing dread have some common physical tells, that doesn't mean it describes the individual feeling the person is experiencing. While an individual can know if they're experiencing dread by the emotions they are currently having, being able to know if another person is experiencing that same emotion, despite physical tells, is only available to that specific person. We cannot experience what another experiences.
We can get around this in some ways through creating distinctive and applicable contexts. For example, if someone is blind, we cannot use the word, "See" in the same way. Telling a blind person, "Do you see the point?" will have a difference concept. We don't mean "visually observe", but mean, "Understand".
Two people who lift weights in a gym may have a different conceptions of weak. A person who regularly benches 200 pounds may believe a bench of 150 is weak for them. A person who regularly benches 100 pounds may believe someone who benches 150 is strong relative to them. They generally solve this discrepancy when talking to each other by entering into a common context. For example, the weak person, who is friends with the strong, may make a joke about how the strong person is being a wimp for only lifting 180 pounds that day, encouraging them to lift more. The strong person may yell excitedly and get hyped that the weak person is pushing past what they normally do and lifts 110 pounds that day.
Quoting Treatid
It depends on your definition of 'describe'. If I describe a lemon as a yellowish sour fruit, its a description is it not?" When we say that things are impossible, we have to be very specific as you also realize that language and meaning can be very indefinite unless we make it so.
Quoting Treatid
That is one way to describe it, but I can describe a scenario that counters that. The integer "1" is really a representation of our ability to discretely experience. "One field of grass. One blade of grass. One piece of grass." We can discretely experience anything. Not just parts but everything. The discrete experience of "Existence". A sensation in which there is nothing else but the experience itself. No breakdowns, no parts, no relation. It is within this that relation forms when we create parts. But the experience of the whole, of being itself, is one without relation.
Quoting Treatid
I agree that between more than one person, a description is a network of relationships. It is because we are establishing a common ground between our individual experiences to establish a base of distinctive knowledge and application (context) that we can reasonably and logically apply with each other.
Quoting Treatid
Who determines what is extraneous, an assumption, or frippery? Between one group of people, certain aspects may be important, while between another group of people, it is not. But what is deemed frippery is dismissed within logical language in both groups A and B, even if they have different views of what is not important. The only hard counters are if there is contradictions that result when each group's contextual distinctive context is applied to reality.
Example: Group A believes that goats can only have brown hair, and white haired 'goats' are sheep.
Group B believes that goats can only have white hair, and that brown haired 'goats' are sheep.
The contradiction comes into play if group A and B meet each other. They can either say the other's contexts are wrong, change their contexts to adapt to each other, or form an entirely new C context that they only use when talking between the groups, but reverting back to A or B when with 'their people'.
What you've missed is that we are the one's who determine was is essential and non-essential in the definitions that we create. So its not impossible to make a description. Its not impossible to create words that strip away other observations until there is a central core. We just have to agree what is essential and non-essential when establishing context and conversation.
Quoting Treatid
The mistake is to think that one group's idea of what is the essential quality of a thing is that it is true. Ignoring the relationships between people, society, and history to create a context is wrong. But it is also wrong to think that we cannot apply such things logically after established. We may have a society that has established that houses made of paper are the strongest houses until another person introduces the concept and application of a brick house. Societal contexts can only reasonably hold if reality does not contradict them.
Remove the relationships, and what you've removed is societal context. But you have not removed yourself or the logic that any memory you apply has the plausibility of being contradicted by reality.
So, well said and stated! I agree with a lot of your initial premises, but I'm tweaking them within the bounds of the theory to demonstrate that we can come to different conclusion that still allow us logical arguments, and 'objective' measurements despite our relationships.
You're welcome! And I got the alert that you replied this time. :D
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Very true. It has been argued that our intelligence evolved out of our social nature. The understanding of complex and dynamic situations has spilled into other areas of our brains allowing us to analyze complex relationships outside of social situations.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
I don't disagree with your assessment. I think its an equally valid viewpoint. I could sit here and say, "Yes, but fulfilling that predisposition is for their personal benefit," but that's unnecessary. There is a compulsion among individuals and groups that certain viewpoints of the world this fit our outlook better. And I do believe some outlooks are better by fact, only because they lead to less contradictions and overall benefits for the society. A society that relies on logic, science, and fairness is going to be better off than a society that relies more on wishful thinking, superstition, and abuse of others.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
I believe that is one reason people change paradigms, but there can be others. I find religion to be an interesting paradigm that can persist in the modern day world. While religions often have logical holes or contradictions purely from a rational viewpoint, as I've mentioned earlier, they provide a sense of community, purpose, and guide that are often invaluable and not easily replaced by abandoning the precepts. Even though the modern day world can explain multiple things in ways that do no require divinity, a divine interpretation of the world can largely co-exist beside it in a truce of sorts if societal rules are established properly. Separation of church and state for example.
I believe the greatest motivator is, to your point, a paradigm that fits within what an individual or group is most inclined towards. As long as reality does not outright contradict the goals of the group, it is acceptable and often times protected from outside criticism.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
No, I believe we are building upon it into the next steps. I wrote a follow up on the third post that includes societal context if you have not read it yet. The original post did not include societal context, as the initial post about the knowledge process of a singular individual is enough to wrap one's head around initially. If you haven't read that section yet, feel free as it might help with the current subject matter we're discussing at this moment. Fantastic points and thought Caerulea!
Impossible to reach omniscience - yes. But partial understanding is better than no understanding.
We are agreeing with each other so hard here it makes me wonder how we can possibly diverge elsewhere.
Yes - truth/knowledge is the full understanding of all possible contexts. We can endeavour to approach this limit knowing we will never reach it but can come arbitrarily close.
Quoting Philosophim
Again - so much yes.
Except I would cast the net much wider. Do other people experience the colour 'red' in the way that you do? This is standard philosophical fare.
I want to take it further. Apply this to everything. Your perception of the world is rooted in your experience of the world.
I think your description of 'Dread' applies to every concept that we can feel, experience or think.
Rain is a common experience and by sharing our experiences we come to regard the experience of rain as being objective - something that everyone experiences in the same way. However your description of 'dread' applies to my experience of 'rain'.
You've talked about taking shortcuts where we don't want to build everything from first principles just to say hello to the neighbour...
Shortcuts are fine, even necessary, but they are a convenient approximation.
When doing a deep dive into philosophical knowledge we are liable to find ourselves led astray if we rely on the shortcuts as being fundamental in, and of, themselves.
Quoting Philosophim
Yeppity yep.
Quoting Philosophim
Here we part ways.
You purport to demonstrate that we consider '1' discretely.
I'm looking at your description and seeing you describe '1' using a bunch of explicit and implicit relationships.
"A blade of grass" is very different to "A field of grass".
Scenario
You sit down to read a book. The first page contains the word 'one':
"one"
And that is it. That is the entire book.
You understand 'one'. The word has some meaning for you. But simple stating the word 'one' doesn't expand your knowledge. No new information has been conveyed.
To convey information you must put that 'one' into some context - some set of relationships with other words.
Moreover
Compare your argument here with the first paragraph of your post.
As I read these two sections I see a disconnect. You are contradicting yourself. You are arguing two distinct contradictory positions. In the first paragraph you argue for the importance of context, in the latter paragraph you are arguing that we can consider things without context.
Society's mistake
I strongly suspect that this inconsistency is systemic.
Everyone knows that context is important to understanding a given sentence. At the same time, everyone knows that there is a fixed definition of the words they are using and "you are using the wrong definition".
The idea of meaning being dependent on context isn't new or surprising in any way.
And then we have everyone from philosophy through mathematics to physics arguing that there are inherent truths independent of context.
Agreement
Your first paragraph is a beautiful statement of understanding.
You obviously understand that full knowledge (truth) requires all the contexts.
This is my proposal. This is where I think we can make progress as philosophers and as humans. This is where the pursuit of knowledge lies. This is the path to all possible understanding. True, we can't reach the limit - but we can approach that limit.
The flip side
Despite this clear understanding, Everybody and their dog suddenly starts insisting that knowledge, truth, meaning, ... are inherent properties independent of context.
This isn't a rational position. It is a direct contradiction of our direct experience of the importance of context.
Even after making the clearest statement of meaning/truth/significance I have ever seen; you flip around to arguing for inherent meaning just a few paragraphs later.
It is a potentially fascinating study to see why the myth of a reductive approach to knowledge persists despite the direct evidence of the importance of context. However, my immediate goal is to make this inconsistency explicit.
Reductive vs Expansive
I'm picking on your inconsistency; but that inconsistency is representative of the entirety of modern thought. The reductive approach to knowledge is exactly the wrong direction.
Read your first paragraph and bask in its glory. Greater knowledge, understanding, truth, ... comes through greater inclusion.
Each piece of context you remove takes you further away from knowledge. Every extra piece of context takes you closer to knowledge.
You have defined what knowledge is. Commit to that definition. Be consistent in your use of that definition.
Quoting Treatid
Im wondering how far youre willing to push the role of context in relation to the progress of knowledge. Id like to we you push it to the limit. That means socorros g he idea that knowledge is the matching of our concepts to a world independent of our schemes. Context is critical because both we and our world are in continual motion. We have a system of constructs that are organized hierarchically into subordinate and superordinate aspects such that most new events are easily subsumed by our system without causing any crisis of inconsistency. When we embrace new events by effectively anticipating them, our system doesnt remain unchanged but is subtly changed as a whole by the novel aspects of what it encounters. The world as I perceive it is already shaped by my construct system, so it is not the same objective world for everybody. What appears consistent or inconsistent, true false , harmonious or contradictory, is not the result of a conversation between subjects and a recalcitrant, independent reality, but a reciprocation in which the subjective and the objective poles are inextricably responsive to, and mutually dependent on each other.
Likely its in our definition differences. Even if we use similar words, there may be personal context to those words that results in us drawing different conclusions. The most important thing to find agreement on in a discussion like this is the definitions themselves. We are two different minds with unique backgrounds coming together. It takes some time to learn what each other intends by our words.
Quoting Treatid
Within our own personal context, this is true. I can never know what its like to be another person. That doesn't mean I can't conclude other people exist, or that they and I cannot come to a common understanding of the way we both experience the world. Coming to a common understanding requires finding the things which are uncontroversial between us, while generally dismissing the rest as non-essential variety.
Quoting Treatid
Again, it all comes down to contexts. What is the context of rain that is personal to you vs personal to me? I'm sure when I envision rain I have a different memory then you. So we likely can't relate on that context. But we can find common ground. Water percipitates in the clouds and falls to the ground. You and I both understand what that means. We can apply that definition to reality. If we did it together, maybe we would share some more common emotions like both finding the rain cool. Or maybe you would find it hot, I would find it cold, and we would get a good laugh out of it.
That is why society builds certain rules of measurement that do not rely on personal experience. They are abstracts. Meters for length. Liters for volume. Words that fit both an efficient general sense like 'tree', and more descriptive and specific words like Sycamore.
Quoting Treatid
Perfectly correct. For the build up of knowledge specifically, I noted specific rules to follow. And in cases where knowledge is not possible, or in the quest to build up knowledge, we have a hierarchy of inductions we can follow for cogent thinking. If you feel I'm not being specific enough or taking a short cut where its not needed, feel free to point it out! I will get as detailed and specific as needed.
Quoting Treatid
Right, I've already noted there is nothing against defining something in relation to another discrete experience. The point I have tried to make is that one can have the discrete experience of everything. What allows us to create relations is memory. I have to remember that I focused on something else just a few seconds ago to compare. I think that's where I've missed the mark in what I've been trying to communicate. Discrete experience is the act of simple focus. We need memory of our discrete experiences to form and process relationships.
Quoting Treatid
But first comes 'the book'. The focus. With memory, we can create comparisons. With memory we can relate. With memory, we can create words to recall and apply later.
Quoting Treatid
What I am doing is trying to break down complex concepts into more simple and easier to comprehend ideas. People think better when you can get down to fine grained foundations, and build on top of them. So we have discrete experience + memory + comparison between memories = relationships. If everything is a relationship, then what do we call a thinking thing that can discretely experience, but has no memory of it? A camera taking a snapshot and processing it to paper without ever knowing any relation to what it is doing.
Quoting Treatid
It depends again on what they mean by context. Oftentimes context is applied to 'subjective context'. But there is 'objective context' as well. People are oftentimes efficient in language, and leave lots of implicit implications in which get lost as they filter out into the general population, or even over time. Its our job as philosophers and thinkers to bring it back every so often. :)
If you doubt that there is an objective context, how is it that almost all human beings of a particular intelligence are able to learn that 1+1 = 2? How do we all learn that if we stop breathing, we'll die? I do not deny that there are contexts formed between every single person and subgroup you meet. But their existence co-exists within a created objective context of measurement and identification of reality. It does not undermine it, even if it wants to.
Quoting Treatid
100% agree! I hope you understand that while I may have some counter points to consider, it does not mean I am not considering your viewpoint carefully. It is refreshing to have a conversation with someone who is interested in a good discussion.
Quoting Treatid
Hm, I did not intend to imply there was inherent meaning. There are contexts that apply beyond our individual subjective viewpoints that are the collective context of rational agents. And many times when communicating with one another, we need certain clear and fixed essential commonalities to those words or phrases, or else we will, "miss the mark" if you get my meaning.
We are not really disagreeing much, if at all, in the big picture. The purpose of the paper is to take that common picture that we see, and put it into words that can be communicated effectively and consistently to several people. I know there are several people who believe both in parts and relationships. Does a break down of the act of discrete experience, memory, and the interplay between them forming relationships make it more palatable to you? It may not perfectly coincide, but do you think it can be more easily communicated to others who don't think like us? The world is full of people who found out knowledge, but were unable to communicate it in a way that a majority could agree with and use effectively.
Quoting Treatid
I agree with you, but one minor detail. "It takes us closer to complete knowledge". To build, we must start with a basic definition of knowledge in the barest sense. Something you may not have considered yet, is the theory I've proposed here can potentially be applied to non-human intellects. Dogs, computers, the process would be the same. Thus something could be said to applicably know X within its context, while if one has been challenged through multiple contexts, one can only applicably know Y.
Great conversation!
I feel there isn't (or shouldn't be) a choice. The significance of context is readily observed and widely acknowledged. It isn't a new insight.
Any rational viewpoint has to incorporate the role of context.
A half truth is (colloquially) a lie. Half accepting the significance of context is a denial of direct experience.
So - yes - to the limit.
Quoting Joshs
More context please. I'm not sure what this is referencing.
Quoting Joshs
I'm somewhat allergic to the mere suggestion of 'objective' as I perceive it to be commonly bound to hidden/obscured impossible assumptions. But beyond that - yes, absolutely.
(I'm expanding the point - not arguing with you)
We are that which interacts. Interaction is a two way process. The act of observation changes us - and changes that which is observed.
Possible/impossible
We can describe our experiences with respect to our other experiences. We understand joy with comparison to misery (and contentment, ennui, pride, shame,...).
It is impossible to describe anything absent our experiences.
A connected universe directly impacts what knowledge is.
The mathematical attempt to create a universal language free of individual bias is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of existence.
It is an impossible task.
Knowledge and understanding aren't fixed points. They are a continuous active process. Your (everyone's) engagement with the universe is a critical part of the process.
Agreement
I agree with what you are saying but I want to keep pushing these to its ultimate conclusion.
Context has significant real world implications.
When we take context seriously we see that the explanation for large parts of mathematics isn't even wrong. The idea of understanding and significance separated from an individuals interactions is meaningless.
The effort invested in seeking objective truths (independent of context) is wasted.
So much agreement - but the devil is in the details
Quoting Philosophim
Definitions
Quoting Philosophim
A statement is a piece of universe describing another piece of universe.
In a closed system (like the universe) all definitions are circular. That is A --> B --> A.
Which is to say that according to the common conception of 'definition' there are no definitions.
We can describe A in terms of B. We can describe B in terms of A. That's it. That is the complete list of things we can do with language.
Everything else is an aspect of this mechanism of language.
Language works. We describe A in terms of B and B in terms of A and we've built society.
In the entire history of mankind there has never been a non-circular definition.
Or, more constructively, meaning is dependent on context.
Quoting Philosophim
Do they? You have evidence of this?
Quoting Joshs
Joshs describes how experiences (such as new ideas) are more easily digested when they largely align with our expectations for those experiences.
In this conception (which I agree with), the ease of assimilation is how closely new ideas fit within our existing framework.
Here the measure of complexity of a new idea is determined by our existing framework. A simple idea is one that can be easily incorporated into existing conceptions with minimal effort.
Contrariwise, An idea that subverts existing expectations is generally difficult to digest even when the foundation is as simple as "context matters" or "all definitions in a closed system are circular".
True! Even if there is disagreement, I enjoy reading your details.
Quoting Treatid
I agree with this.
Quoting Treatid
That's not quite correct. NM works at small bodies, but does not scale to large bodies. GR works with large bodies, and when you scale it down to small bodies, it results in NM. That may be irrelevant however, your point is really you seem to think I believe in chaos versus objective. If the example doesn't quite work, I still want to make sure I understand you point. If I don't quite understand it, please try again.
Quoting Treatid
This is also not true. We have Euclidean and non-Euclidean applications depending on what we're measuring. Just like big vs small bodies, the context of how and what we're measuring matters for the equation.
Quoting Treatid
No. If the definition of 1, +, =, and 2 are the same, the result is the same. We can change the definitive context of each of those symbols, so 1 would would translate to 3, and 2 would translate to 8. In which case yes, 1+1 != 2 because that would translate to 3+3=8. Once you have solidified your concepts, the application can be inductive or deductive. Yes, we can change the meaning of the symbols to whatever we want. But once we decide on them, there is a set logic that always follows.
Quoting Treatid
My theory escaped that circularity. You can start from the fact you discretely experience, and assign any of those discrete experiences as words in your memory. The base discrete experience is the foundation. It requires no further description. It is when we try to communicate these experiences with other people that we have to find common meaning somehow in symbols. Once common meaning can be established, then both of us can deductively conclude that 1+1=2 objectively.
Quoting Treatid
Again, we both have discrete experiences. We are both able to assign that personal experience to a common symbol for common ground. We could not communicate at all if we did not do this. And yet we're able to. You can't quite provide your discrete experience to me, and I can't quite provide my discrete experience to you, but we can come to a common enough ground to communicate the essential picture of the experience without the specific picture of the experience itself.
Quoting Treatid
I do. :) I was a high school math teacher for five years. This is one of the many techniques to teach something effectively to others. I currently program for a living and part of the best practices is to code in bite sized pieces for readability. I have an engineering friend that has shown me diagrams that break complex components into simple to digest pieces. There is a certain limit in how much information a human can hold at once in thoughts. We use 'grouping' to help this.
Try to memorize this number by single digits: 24777977
Now try to remember it by grouping it: 24-777-977 The second is much easier.
This is also what words are for. Grouping complex and detailed concepts into generalities. When I say "Physics" you don't think of the entirety of every physical law and formula. We break physics down into "theories" and "formulas". Too detailed, and you can't comprehend how it all fits together. Not enough detail and the generality seems obtuse and overly generalized.
Quoting Treatid
Agreed. This is because the human mind favors efficiency and 'good enough' over perfection. Sometimes that bites us down the road and I'm not immune to it. But what ensures the base of that framework in a rational sense versus an ideological sense? Rational frameworks can weather challenges that reality throws at it by adaptation. Ideological or emotional frameworks oftentimes have to go to great lengths to cover up its rational holes, because some framework is better than no framework at all.
That is why an idea can be unique and correct, but entirely rejected. One has to shape new discoveries in relation to the current framework so that there can be understanding. People will tentatively explore the new framework only if they see benefit. If those that adopt it start to see success, others will follow.
Bitesize isn't quite the same as simple - or at least, not the idea of simple I had in mind.
Talking is a complex physical, biological and mental process. To the extent that the existence of the universe is a pre-requisite for talking, it is a complex process albeit one we engage in frequently.
As such - my point on this matter was that the perception of simplicity (i.e. starting from a minimal foundation) may be misguided. Specifically, we spend the first years of our lives learning to walk and talk and building a broad foundation of awareness of the basic mechanics of the universe.
I would argue that new knowledge is absorbed and integrated more rapidly the more of that foundation the new knowledge connects to. Ideal knowledge flow would involve wide kinaesthetic activation.
Problem Spaces
*discussion, not disagreement*
The more I interact with your ideas, the more familiar and relatable they become.
Generally, people don't immediately see the value in an argument. Rather, people integrate the components of an argument over time as they interact with it.
That is, a person starts in some initial state and incrementally approaches understanding.
A child doesn't understand arithmetic on first presentation but becomes incrementally more familiar with exposure.
This applies to Artificial Intelligence training too.
I'd argue that this incremental approach to solutions is a majority of human cognition.
There is, however, a known pitfall with this mechanism: Local maxima...
Maxima
A hill climbing algorithm can get stuck at a local maxima and never find the global maxima.
This is a common problem with training AI where the best fit finds a local maxima solution but misses the global maxima. In complex problem spaces there is no clear mechanism for determining whether the current solution is a local or global maxima.
Knowledge and Induction
In light of the above, what is your understanding of the process of cognition? Are your thought processes strictly logical? strictly asymptotic (approaching a solution incrementally)? A mixture? something else?
If relevant - what would you expect two disputants with different local maxima to a given problem to do?
That is a very nice compliment and I am humbled to see it. You have a keen and curious mind, and you've given me plenty to think on as well.
Quoting Treatid
Yes. I've thought about this a long time ago but never had anyone bring this aspect up before. That is because we create perfectly logical systems. What a perfectly logical system lacks is induction, and a variety of approaches towards the same problem. Since I thought of this, machine learning has introduced 'induction' and imperfect data into systems, and we have largely escaped the issue you note.
Here's a fun video on machine learning.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lu56xVlZ40M
But lets talk at the level of the theory as well. If you recall I labeled four classifications of induction, probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational. As a quick reminder
Probability-Predicted outcomes based on know limitations. A coin has 50/50 chance of one side on flip.
Possibility- What has happened once is believed to be able to happen again.
Plausibility-A pure untested imagined scenario then is not immediately contradicted by what we know. Maybe aliens exist a billion light years away.
Irrational - A belief that what is applicably known is wrong. 1+1=2, but I believe its really 3.
While plausibility and irrational beliefs are looked down upon in established systems, they are invaluable in discovering new systems of thought.
Plausibility is fairly obvious, as its essentially imagination and hypothesis. But irrationality is also incredibly useful in some circumstances. To break out of local maximum, sometimes you have to do something against the grain that everyone thinks is impossible.
In the life of a human, I can think of at least one example where irrational beliefs are useful. There may be times when one can no longer come up with plausible explorations. But an irrational exploration is essentially poking at the already establish system. Its a stress test of sorts. It can find holes in logic no one realized. You can't have the majority of your population being irrational, but having a few is useful.
And this leads to the next part that you may find more interesting. How a society tackles induction.
In general we have one algorithm run a program, and alter it slightly. It evolves from its previous data, and seeks a solution to it. But after a point it eliminates other explorations. What if we had multiple ai's running separately and tweaked the amount of 'inductive' decisions they made?
For example
AI 1: 100% logical decisions
AI 2: 98% logical, 1% probable decisions, 1% possible decisions.
AI 3: 96% logical, 1% probable, 1% possible, 1% irrational decisions.
It would be interesting to see where each AI ended up. Especially if we duplicated this experiment millions of times with the same AIs, and even different variations.
I view humanity as a whole as the biological variant of this experiment. We have potentially millions of humans looking at a problem with different levels of emphasis on deduction vs induction. The difference is we have more of an emphasis on the induction part then the logical decisions. That's because human intelligence is optimized for efficiency, and pure logical and verified deductive thought takes the most time out of all approaches.
So where do I fall? The reality is that we have a propensity to favor inductions, and at the lower end of the hierarchy in a lot of our thinking. We are emotional beings with bias, and our nature is to rationalize what gives us what we want while tending to disregard that which does not.
https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/when-it-comes-politics-youre-not-rational-you-think
What we find is both sides are equally biased in their own direction, Ditto said.
People are savvy at spotting bias in other peoples arguments, but they consistently fail to recognize bias in themselves."
As such, I try to use the hierarchy myself. I first favor strong facts and conclusions. Probabilities and possibilities are strong contenders. I try to avoid plausibilities as conclusions, only as possible avenues of exploration. And I constantly question if I'm wrong. Typically when I come up with an idea, I explore it, but then I try to disprove it myself. It wasn't easy at first, and it can still be tough when you have an idea you really like, but that habit is invaluable to cultivate. I work on not sinking into the trap of arrogance or hubris, and keep myself grounded that I am no better than any other human being. I try to listen to anyone no matter how new or inexperienced they might seem as insight can be found anywhere. As you noted, we all have a propensity for a local maximum, and it can be anyone who can break us out of it.
That being said, I'm still human. No matter how brilliant any human is, their intelligence was designed in the petri dish of evolution, not for optimal conclusive thinking. This is why I believe AI can be the next advancement of the human race. If we can get over our own biases, we can have something think inefficiently with massive amounts of electricity that can work at a logical level we can only dream of.
Anyway, a bit of my thoughts. Let me know what you think.
Fun video!
I like what you are putting down. This seems very reasonable to me.
However, I find myself unclear as to your distinction between deduction and induction.
Pattern Matching
Quoting Philosophim
I see pattern matching.
Where you describe sheep and goat parts, I would generalise these as shapes or patterns. We see a pattern and then later compare our memory of the pattern with new experiences to determine how we interpret the new experience. - just as you describe.
Perceiving, storing and comparing patterns is the subject of your first post.
Your second post covers inductions which I take to be a refinement of the pattern matching where you examine how well patterns match and create a hierarchy from exact matches (probable) through general similarity (possible) and vague correspondence (plausible), to stark disjunction (irrational).
This all seem eminently sensible to me.
However, you also refer to deduction and logic as preceding induction.
I think your description of induction is sufficient to cover all human knowledge exploration. And yet you appear to imply the existence of another mechanism that you haven't addressed.
Could you go into more detail regarding the mechanisms of deduction?
Certainly, there can be a lot of confusion around deduction vs induction as a context that often gets mistakenly applied to it is "truth". But deduction and induction have never meant to imply the truth of their conclusions. They imply the necessary logical outcome that results from a set of premises.
Before we get to matching memory, let me explain deduction and induction in their raw forms.
A conclusion has a set of what we call essential properties that define it. These are the properties that when fulfilled, we say, "This is 'that'". The number '2', is two one's grouped together. No other properties really matter. Whether the two things are candy, fruit, or cards, what is essential to the concept of '2', is the grouping of two ones.
1 + X = 2 If we solve for X, there is necessarily only one solution, X = 1. This is deduction in its simplest form.
I could also induce the solution. I could guess that X = 3. Of course if I added it, it would not be correct. And this is where the confusion about truth can come into play. We often say that x=1 is true, and in this case it is. But a deduction doesn't claim 1 is true, only that 1 is the only conclusion we can logically conclude.
In this case, our induction is wrong, but we could also induce X=1, without thinking about it at all. Again, X=1 is true, but it wasn't deduced, it was induced. Just as a deduction is not an assertion of truth or falsity of reality, an induction is not an assertion of truth or falsity of reality either.
Let me give a different example now to hammer this point home. In ancient times, many people deduced that the sun rotates around the Earth. One could have a person run around them as they stood still and see the phenomenon. What else could the conclusion be? And with those premises the only logical conclusion was that the sun must rotate around the Earth.
Of course, someone eventually added more premises to consider. What is the other person stood still and you spun slowly in place? Since we haven't risen into the sky ourselves, can we truly know if the rules are the same up there? These additional premises create a new logical problem that cannot deduce that the sun rotates around Earth. At that point, we don't have only one outcome, but potentially many.
If you remember the early part of the paper, I go over this phenomenon with a goat and a sheep. An individual has decided the essential properties of a sheep, and it turns out that all of those essential properties bleed into a goat. A sheep is an animal with curly hair and hooves. If the person does not recognize the different properties of a goat as essential, then they can deduce that a sheep and a goat are the same type of animal. They might do addendums like say, "A goat is a mountain sheep." Of course, other people could see the that some of the qualities of a goat are different enough from a sheep that it becomes an essential identifier, and a new concept is formed, "A goat".
Notice that there is no 'truth' as to where the form of the goat are the sheep represent some outside nebulous 'true' goat. There is only the distinctive knowledge of a defined goat or sheep, and premises that either necessarily lead to a conclusion, or premises that do not.
Since distinctive knowledge, or our ability to discretely experience and create identities can be whatever we want, induction and deduction do not have to apply to the creation of our terminology. I can create in my head the essential properties of a unicorn. I know it distinctively, but I have never applied it successfully to the world and deduced that any living creature matches the definition of a unicorn in my head.
But back to deduction and induction. Why use deduction over induction? Because of this scenario.
Lets say that my definitions accurately match reality fully. Nothing is contradicted by reality that is known and unknown. So lets us say that I have a quarter in my hand, and it is a quarter in reality. What method of thinking is most likely going to give me the knowledge that what I am holding is indeed a quarter? If the premises are all accurate to reality, and logic is simply a necessary consequence of what that means, then my deduction will be in line with the reality of the object being a quarter in my hand.
But what if I only induce its a quarter in my hand? The problem is, my conclusion that I can induce does not necessarily follow from the premises. I might induce its a spy object that looks like a quarter, even though the premises I have do not lead to that conclusion in any logical sense.
In short, deductions and inductions are tools. While both are dependent on the information that you have available to you, if the information available is complete enough that reality does not contradict it, the deduction will lead to the correct conclusion about reality every time, while the induction will not necessarily do so. Thus the most reasonable form of assessing reality is deduction, assuming our premises are not contradicted by reality.
So then, if we think on it further, we realize we need to deduce the hierarchy of inductions. We can't induce the hierarchy, because that means our conclusions don't necessarily follow from the premises. And if it the hierarchy is true, we can only have proper repeatable knowledge through deduction. Because deduction leads to the same result every time, where induction does not necessarily do so.
Thus, probability is a deduced induction. At its most basic, lets return to a world in which we have a goat and sheep defined, and the only essential difference between the two is the fact that goats have horns on their heads while sheep do not. You spy a curly haired animal that is walking away from you with its head down in a field. You see it has hooves. The only thing you can't see is its head. Because the only two possibilities from our premises is that it is either a sheep or a goat, we can deduce that we can induce that it is either a sheep or a goat. Thus the sentence, "I know it is either a sheep or a goat, and I choose to believe it is a goat."
And to clarify, we do not have other competing premises in this above situation. Like the initial deducers that concluded the sun rotated around the Earth, we have no other distinctive knowledge to compete. So no crazy ideas that its all an illusion, or a space monster, or anything else. Only that that to be a goat or a sheep is defined clearly as is, and there are no exceptions. As such, we deduce our limitations, and then can reasonably make an induction that it is either a goat or a sheep. This is why inductions rely on deductions and logic. A proper induction is a deduced set of limitations that allow us to make a guess within a more reasonable and limited range then pure random and wild beliefs.
Thus when I induce 1+X = 2 and X = 3, I'm pulling from the limited possibility that it must be a number. I'm not guess X = "Dennis" for example. :) I could guess this of course, but most people would think I was joking at best, irrational at worst.
I didn't get into memory per say, but if you understand the above, it should make the topic of memory more clear. After you think about what's said here and want to go into memory, feel free to post your thoughts and I'll cover that next if needed.
??Quoting Philosophim??
We both did great this time :)
??Quoting Philosophim
?Another way to look at paradigms is to look at timescale. How much of time can you imagine and see patterns and solutions for. As the timescale increases, so does complexity, and the complexity of social situations increases a lot as well.
Quoting Philosophim
Yes, you could argue that, and depending on your own paradigm might find it useful and good to do so. If you look at your last sentence, that are the kinds of value statement that usually differentiates paradigms. ?From my perspective, both societies work equally well. The first finds usefulness in dissolving some of their inner wishful thinking, replace superstition with science and abuse of others with fairness. The second relies on logic only if it helps their wishful thinking, adds superstition naturally to science and finds abuse of others a useful othering skill to have in a worldview that is more black or white.?? If we look at timescale, both societies survive and adapt, and to add in good/bad is a value-statement, not an absolute one. Of course, you might say that the later, more modern paradigm is "better", but that is an oversimplification. As many Green activists will tell you, our modern way of thinking/being is ushering in the next extinction event. Is it good to gamble the whole survival of countless species, even our own, and to name it progress and development and an absolute good??? But business as usual doesnt care about afterwards, as there is 'rational' faith in logic and rationality; and the sum of that - the market.
Quoting Philosophim
From a 'paradigmic' perspective, the goal of changing your paradigm is not to discard the past, but to integrate it in a way that lets both coexist in a more harmonious way. Usually this is not what happens, as integration of contrasts is hard and tumultuous. ??I see a lot of dangers in lack of integration of the past lessons, and I agree that religion's transition to science and modernity, has been a pretty brutal one. Still, from what I can gather, the modern paradigm is the one dominating, but that doesnt mean most people are truly in it.
Quoting Philosophim
??Thank you, I appreciate it.
Yes, I was not aware you had written a third post on this OP, which is in great part what made me take a while to finish my reply; as I wanted to at least mildly digest it. Still, even with the time added, my understanding is standing on very shaky legs. One reason being I am overwhelmed by the various permutations and contexts each of us have. When I elaborate on paradigms above, I guess that would fit with a certain propensity for understanding something from a certain vantage-point. A context informing and even changing language, sometimes from within, which reflexively changes how much distinctive agreement there is between people.
??Im not dismissing the application on the social context, I am trying to point out that paradigms are, possibly, more fixed deductive filters that either sort and organize communication and knowledge, or distorts and disorganizes. ?An example would be to look at language itself. For some people, words can be true, whilst to others, words are always relative, in that you add in context, meaning etc. These two groups will butt heads on many subjects, and will often feel they aren't 'speaking the same language'. A third would be the variant that not only sees the relative in written texts, but that also sees itself, the discrete experiencer, as part of various contexts, and therefore naturally adds in a self-understanding of itself in its understanding of others, a meta-self. ??To tie that together with the prior part about induction, each paradigm have certain parts of reality that, despite the continuous lack of applicable knowledge, continues to use the least probable way to gain more knowledge about that field, or when forced, reduces the findings to mesh with already known knowledge. Consistently.
Quoting Philosophim
?Whereas you here (third post) argue that the premise for using induction is hitting a roadblock, my argument is that the use of induction is reasonably fixed according to the given context/paradigm (further differentiated by culture, personality upbringing, genes etc.) and as such in any given paradigm there will be no further self-directed inquires into the lack of clear deductive beliefs. Within any given distinctive context there will be those that question it, but those are also the ones possibly changing paradigm, and seeing many things in a new light and gaining traction on the fields where there were a lack.
However, the 'dominant' paradigm will have an influence on most things, and so 'science/technology, and some type of market-capitalism' is something most paradigms will have to deal with somehow. This isn't what I would consider 'being' on a paradigm, it is a more forced shift in behavior of outward appearance to avoid, or elicit, certain benefits/risks, not from an adherence and self-governed understanding of the underlying principles governing the structures, as well as general agreement with the underlying focus.
This is more devil's advocate, but I hope you are able to make use of it and that it sparks a continued interest in exploring knowledge and induction.
Again, thanks for your replies and sincerity so far. This conversation does not fit the stereotypical experience of being on the internet, and I mean that in a very good way.
Deduction
I have a deck of cards containing one card - the jack of spades.
I draw one card. It is necessarily the jack of spades.
This is just induction.
I'm not seeing how deduction is different to induction.
In all cases, probabilities are based on current information applied to a given situation. Ignorance of the full context may cause any probability to be misjudged, including probabilities that are perceived to be certainties.
Induction
From over here, Induction and deduction appear to be identical (excepting that deductions are perceived to be certainties).
I have no problem with deduction being the same as induction - I'm just confused by the redundancy. I don't understand why you are describing the same thing twice and calling them different names.
Or I'm missing a critical difference...?
My apologies for the delay! I'm back and settled. You speak well and seem to understand the notion, so I'll only comment on a few points.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Well stated. While the theory above does give us a stable foundation to build off of, once we start looking beyond that base the amount that ca be built is stories high. The interesting thing, is we can build several types of buildings. Some may fit certain situations better than others. And in society that's what we find. Different cultures and subcultures with their own emphasis on truth vs relative, subjective vs objective.
They key for me is that it is fine that we have these multiple scaffolds. The part we should be doing is to define what it means to build something, and why we should build it based on the situation. Just like you want a bendable building in an earthquake, you might want a knowledge structure that is flexible when exploring new ideas and themes.
There is no 'one right way', because we are not computers that have infinite time and energy to truly establish, "X is applicably known." What is right is knowing the guidelines themselves. Knowing what a floor, walls, and ceiling are. This will let us create or improve upon contexts of different peoples based on people's needs and desires with some type of foundational rules.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Correct. Your understanding of this and of people is impressive! Just like any person can fish, any person can think. But the person who understands the rules of fishing is going to do better overall in the long term than an amateur who fishes for fun. Of course, the amateur may not care to do more than fishing for fun, and there is nothing we can, or should do, to change this. It is up to the professionals to push the boundaries of and refine the established rules of the game. Some of that leaks down and is emulated by people who only dabble into it. So I think those who want to take knowledge seriously should have a solid foundation to work with. How they use it is up to them and the needs of the people involved.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Correct. This is part of the context a person must consider when wishing to alter or impact other people's 'knowledge' sets.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Agreed! Its great to talk with a like mind who's interested in this subject matter and thinks deeply about it like you do. Great points!
I'm scratching my head here TreatId. This is not induction. Induction is the belief that the next card which is drawn will be the jack of spades. The outcome of that draw has nothing to do with your induction. An induction understands, "My conclusion is not necessarily true from the premises."
Once the card is drawn, that is the known outcome. Whether your induction was correct or incorrect does not counter the fact that based on what you knew before the card was drawn, your belief may, or may not have been correct.
Here is an example of a deduction. We have a normal deck of 52 cards. All 51 cards have been drawn. The only card that hasn't been drawn is the jack of spades. Therefore we can deduce that necessarily, the final card has to be the jack of spades. There is no other viable outcome with what we know.
Lets say unknown to us, someone switched the final card out, and its actually a joker. Our deduction was still a deduction, because there was no other outcome we could have drawn based on the evidence we have.
It may be that you're confusing 'truth' with 'logic and knowledge'. Truth is, "What is". "What is" does not care about our opinions, reasonings, etc. It simply is. Deduction and inductions are ways we attempt to ascertain 'what is'. Deduction in general gives us our best chance of actually figuring out what is, while induction is always less certain and thus more likely to be wrong.
Quoting Philosophim
?As you might have surmised so far, my approach to Knowledge is from the humanities, social work, psychology, more than philosophy. I 'acknowledge' social/individual hierarchies as similarly real to mountains and trees, as despite their relative nature, humans are themselves a big context for other humans and part of the world at large.?
My disagreement isn't with individuals/groups building using your foundation, but that the foundation doesn't seem as 'universally stable' as you make it sound, and it is also directly unwanted by many types of Knowledge structures.? This is to me a bit paradoxical.
Quoting Philosophim
?
And I like to add this quote, which you might remember:
Quoting Philosophim??
Is 'survival and desired goals' a neutral, all encompassing, by-all-agreed-upon purpose? From my perspective, and I hope this comes across in the right way, your values, your truths, are some I view as far from universally held. What we have in nature, and amongst humans, isn't only applicable knowledge and desired goals; it is the recurring question and decisions around whose survival, and for how long. ??If anything, humans and animals alike follow a rather peculiar impulse to diversify for the sake of 'something', but not for the inherent sake of Knowledge or complementary desired goals. At least this is how it looks to me.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm not saying there is a right way, necessarily. My thoughts on the matter are that many of our human 'ways' are incompatible with each other. ?An example would be how people generate applicable knowledge, not for survival and "desired goals", but for destruction and obliteration.
??Knowledge is therefore power, a good and a tool, and never neutral.
And, You might want a bendable building in an Earthquake, but what if the builder was cutting corners to save costs, and so your house falls down?
Quoting Philosophim
Not only do I think a lot of amateur fishers would disagree, a professional's opinion that fishing too much now will ruin fishing long-term, doesn't mean that 'Knowledge' gives you the power, right and justification to enforce your knowledge, does it?
Because isn't it circular reasoning, if you argue that Knowledge is for the sake of survival and desired goals, and therefore it is justified having a hierarchy based on who has the best knowledge? ??In other words, I question where the justification built into your model is based on.
Of course, you shortened the model, and maybe some of these axiomatic arguments were left out, and so now their absence means these questions prop up. Whatever it is, if you have an answer, I'd like to hear it.
Thanks for the compliments, appreciate the interactions.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Correct, what I am discussing is not an assertion of strongly backed or proven reason, but discussion. Everything I am saying at this point is open for debate, change, and amending. You are the first person I've conversed with so far that has ever gotten to this point of consideration within the theory, so this aspect has always been put on hold until someone got to this point. So definitely, lets think carefully about these points now. First, lets start from the idea of "What knowledge context is best?"
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Feel free to attack anything you see, do not hold back. No offense is taken from my view. The important thing isn't whether I'm right or not, its whether the theory holds or needs to be amended.
I believe what you are talking about is the moral use of the theory. Let me define morality so we're on the same page. Morality - "What ought to be." The theory in its basic formulation and understanding does not convey the 'moral use'. I think we can use the theory of knowledge to find out what morality is, and then use that morality as a guide to determine the best way to use knowledge. I have written another set of papers, less developed and definitely more open to potential flaws then this one here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1 where I propose the basis and possible reasoning for an objective morality.
I warn you, the first part is pretty clear, but people tend to get very lost on the second part, likely due to the math and its originalist view on demonstrating that morality applies even to objects. I don't mean to shy away from the topic here, but you may see more justification for my answer if you understand how I view morality.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
I agree. But because we are thinking animals, we can also assess if we should be doing something even if there is a cultural or emotional pressure. This is again, a moral issue.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Again, I agree with you. However, knowing the foundation gives a reasonable leg to stand on if you wish to challenge these power structures.
Let me give you an example. Lets say in a country, a religion is state enforced. If we apply our knowledge theory to the religion, it will certainly be found that the statements about its God are at best, plausible. Which leads to the question, "Should a nation base its rules off of what is plausible, or what is at the minimum, possible?" Because possibility is the minimum inductive belief that still contains some applicable knowledge at its core.
So we have a reasonable basis to question the government beyond an emotional one. It is not that reason will always be agreed with, but reason is a basis that holds despite our opinion of it. Having a solid basis of reasoning in any challenge may not overcome resistance, but definitely makes resistance more difficult to do.
Even if a culture or group claims they have knowledge, with a clear indication of what applicable knowledge is, one can more easily see through lies, deceptions, and faulty reasoning then if one is still uncertain themself as to what knowledge is.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
This again, is the morals of deciding to follow best practices, or cut corners for efficiency and short term gain. In this case, we fortunately have an answer. The house falling down due to shoddy practices causes real harm in the society. The builder may be sued, and society will pressure such people to follow best practices or suffer themselves through the law or cultural backlash. Properly built up knowledge should in theory, be as logically coexistent with reality as possible. When one lives in accordance with reality, they can see what is coming, and make decisions that have real predicted outcomes instead of chance. Such lives are usually more stable and productive over the long term.
Whether you agree with my determination of morality, to me this question begs us to have one. And an objective one, not subjective. It needs to have a set of premises that can be applicably known, and that will take more than an initial theory to work out. The only justification I'm making for the theory at the moment is that, "Its logically consistent, does not make exceptions for itself, and solves many pressing questions of knowledge as a tool." I am not purporting to say with anything more than "What I think" the best use of the knowledge theory is in any particular culture. For that, we need morality.
That doesn't seem "odd" at all. It, actually, should be SOP for anyone engaging in this sort of thing. You assess an idea on the same terms it was developed by means of, not other terms. This is exactly what I was talking about on my last comment on the "irrational belief" post. Everybody came to it with predefined terms and, instead of openly considering the possibility, immediately launched into why it's not a possibility. Why? Because the only terms they could think in are those that presuppose that belief can be rational. See the circle?
I read through the paper. Much of made sense, but I was left with a question:
Let's say that everything you said is absolutely true. This is what knowledge and induction are within "your self-context". What does this understanding enable you to do that you could not do without it?
Especially when it comes to knowledge, I routinely find myself asking that question when I read what people write about it, philosophers especially. It's like everyone assumes a theory of knowledge is important, and everyone acts like they're referring to the same fundamental thing when they use the term, even though they say very different stuff about its nature. But no one says what "it" is. I find that they don't distinguish between their theory of what knowledge is from the archetypical form of whatever makes it knowledge rather than brain farts. If it has no real-world referent, you can define it to be whatever you want, but then it's knowledge only in a solipsistic sense. If it has a real-world referent and one says it's JTB and another says it's pragmatic and another says it's procedural, they're all talking about "it", saying what "it" is like, how it's formed, how it works, etc. -- and this "it" is a reality that "knowledge" refers to, whatever "it" consists of. But to recognize what "knowledge" refers to, "it" must be recognizable by something besides the mere fact that we labeled it with some squiggly marks on a page or screen.
So, let's say you exactly described what "it" is, calling it "knowledge". What does the description do for us? What's the merit of the description, and for what purposes?
I appreciate the words. It is often frustrating dealing with some long time members of this forum. Many try to make it a social place for their own pecking order, and are more interested in shutting down discussion for ego's sake than the joy of thinking with a new person.
Quoting Millard J Melnyk
Excellent question. And your follow up points are sound.
Forgive me if I'm overly wordy here, but I'm not sure I can summarize it succinctly. Let us start at the base: survival. To survive at the most basic level of the world, you have to live with an awareness of the truth of the world as much as possible. If I imagine I can fly and jump off a cliff, reality meets my end. You might think that you can cut the fuzz off of that old apple and eat the rest, but the fungal roots that are too small to see might give you the gift of food poisoning later.
The constant interplay between deductive and inductive evaluations is a balance of accuracy vs effort and efficiency. If a bear is running at me in the woods, making the inductive leap of, "Its probably not going to be my friend," is the better call then pulling out a note pad, putting on your science glasses, and experimenting up close and personal to see if the bear is aggressive or friendly.
So at the basic level, its easy to see why we would want a methodology that gives us the best chance of ascertaining the reality around us. Realizing that sometimes our own distinctive knowledge, our vocabulary, outlook, and world view may limit us can allow us to re-examine our assumptions if our normal application of solving a problem is no longer working.
I think, but feel free to object, that its not much of a leap to see the value in being rational in terms of solving physical problems of the world. Physics gives us cell phones, proper throwing form for their body lets a football player optimize accuracy, and I want my mechanic to tell me the alternator is busted, not that gnomes have infested my car.
But lets move it up a bit. I'm in a comfortable society. I don't have to worry about food, water, or bears anymore. I do my job, I pay my bills, and I have a hobby of trying to prove to the world that the Earth is flat. My hobby doesn't really hurt me. It gets me scorn and side-eyes, but I still have my job, my family, and my life. I'm content. What reason do I have to be 'rational' in this particular area of my life?
Maybe I don't. Maybe I'm willing to incur all of the costs that come with holding the theory that the Earth is flat because of the alternative benefits you get from it. What can anyone say to such a person? This person has arrived at a place in their life where the accuracy, effort, and efficiency they apply to the problem is optimal for what they get out of it. I can from my viewpoint say, "They would be happier, better off, etc. realizing the rationality behind why the world is round and admitting that," but that's really MY experience isn't it? Another busy body telling the world how it should act purely because that would work for me personally.
If one could encapsulate and isolate one's rational processes to a trivial portion of their life, then who cares? Arguably its difficult for most people to to do so. Rationality becomes as habitual as irrationality and tends to spread to other areas of your life. So I think from a personal standpoint, one has a better chance of survival and pleasant life approaching the world with the best way of understanding it than not.
Now, all of this is for the 'personal-self-context'. This question becomes much more important when two personal contexts meet. While I might not be able to convince the person that believes the world is flat, that its actually roundish, if I have a method of rationality that can be objectively agreed upon, not simply subjectively, then I can have confidence that there is a correct answer in the discussion. Otherwise it all devolves into personal feelings. Which hey, animals have survived that way for years, and many of us humans do as well. :) But an objective way of being able to evaluate arguments and discussions is like having a screw driver for a screw. An objective approach to knowledge is a tool. You don't have to use the tool, and some may be satisfied just twisting it in themselves. But in many areas of life it will make it easier to 'get the job done' if you have it than not.
Alright, that's probably a good point to stop before this becomes a ramble. What do you think?