Bernard Gerts answer to the question But what makes it moral?
For over 20 years, the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has listed Bernard Gerts criterion for what is morally normative (what we ought and ought not to do) which is often what people mean when asking "But what makes it moral?"
the term morality can be used normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.
Gerts definition of what is morally normative has four characteristics I find admirable:
1) It assumes no moral premise (entails no specific moral theory)
2) There is no spooky reference to mysterious imperative oughts.
3) It is independent of the moral theory being tested for normativity.
4) It offers a simple criterion for answering But what makes it moral?.
But could there be any moral code or principle that all rational people would put forward?
What about people who are rational, but ignorant of relevant information that others know? What about people who suffer from delusions but are otherwise rational? It seems unlikely people in these two groups could ever agree on a code of conduct to advocate.
Gert provides a way out of these problems (and others) by including the phrase given specified conditions.
Could we add enough specified conditions to make the normativity criterion meaningless? Of course, but why do that? To make the normativity claim as strong as possible, we would want the special conditions to be the minimum necessary.
For example, we could impose the special conditions that all rational persons whose opinion was being considered were well-informed and mentally normal.
Assume all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people advocated for the same moral code or moral principle despite their individually diverse personal goals and goals for their societies. This remarkable result would seem to be an excellent justification for normativity claims.
Does anyone have an alternate criterion for what is morally normative that they prefer?
the term morality can be used normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.
Gerts definition of what is morally normative has four characteristics I find admirable:
1) It assumes no moral premise (entails no specific moral theory)
2) There is no spooky reference to mysterious imperative oughts.
3) It is independent of the moral theory being tested for normativity.
4) It offers a simple criterion for answering But what makes it moral?.
But could there be any moral code or principle that all rational people would put forward?
What about people who are rational, but ignorant of relevant information that others know? What about people who suffer from delusions but are otherwise rational? It seems unlikely people in these two groups could ever agree on a code of conduct to advocate.
Gert provides a way out of these problems (and others) by including the phrase given specified conditions.
Could we add enough specified conditions to make the normativity criterion meaningless? Of course, but why do that? To make the normativity claim as strong as possible, we would want the special conditions to be the minimum necessary.
For example, we could impose the special conditions that all rational persons whose opinion was being considered were well-informed and mentally normal.
Assume all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people advocated for the same moral code or moral principle despite their individually diverse personal goals and goals for their societies. This remarkable result would seem to be an excellent justification for normativity claims.
Does anyone have an alternate criterion for what is morally normative that they prefer?
Comments (72)
But then, I wonder.... How rational are religious people? It's all very well to say "no spooky oughts", but that is not how the religious regard the edicts and contradicts of their deities. Where's the consensus on 'spooky'?
So, if you try ....
when we try ....
to rally a community around a rational moral decision about abortion, assisted suicide, gender reassignment or even equal marriage, we always have to deal with people who present as rational - except in their moral belief.
Sure, I'll bite ...
Quoting 180 Proof
... excerpt from an old post (click on my handle if you're interested in (some of) my reasoning for the above).
I think morality as we now think about it has religious connotations and is about moral ought's and things we should do to be a good person or get into heaven or have good karma
Without teleology(objective purposes/meaning|) or inbuilt moral rules then peoples goals are subjective and personal preferences. I don't think you can objectify personal preferences and claim your goals or values are superior to some one else's.
I think the idea rationality is also a value judgement and teleological. It implies that we ought to think in a certain way and draw certain conclusions. Such if I don't like the cold I should wear a jumper.
I don't think facts about the world or reality have the power to compel us to act.
As Judged by whom?
Is it irrational to oppose all of the above?
Exactly my point!
Quoting Vera Mont
To what extent can religious people be rational about their religion-based moral beliefs?
Consider:
A person who delusionally interprets their religious experiences, even including conversations with gods, as real could rationally hold that their religions moral beliefs are true, must be advocated, and enforced regardless of information to the contrary.
Also, a mentally normal person who is poorly informed could believe that gods are the only sources of morality and, therefore, rationally hold that their religions moral beliefs are true, must be advocated, and enforced.
So, we might ask:
To what extent can well-informed, mentally normal, religious people be rational about their religion-based moral beliefs?
Such a religious person could understand that morality exists independently of religion. Then if they have their doubts about the morality of a religious moral norm, or if they come into conflict with people about if those moral norms should be advocated, they may be able to enter rational discussions about those moral norms.
They may be able to rationally discuss those norms to the extent they understand that morality exists independently of religion.
I very much doubt that. If it didn't set out moral precepts, what good would a religion be?
I believe that many religious people can discuss a wide range of subjects rationally, learn the facts and weigh the other person's arguments - except in regard to the tenets of their faith, which is simply not open to question. When/if the central authority of that church issues a ruling on some hitherto forbidden topic, some will change their position - and some will reject the renegade pontiff.
In my experience, it is not unusual for religious people to be able to think rationally about morality. Examples include changing minds within the Episcopalian church about the morality of gay marriage, abortion, women in the priesthood, and homosexuality.
Religions have continuously refined their moralities regarding whatever moral norms become offensive. Read the Old Testament for some strikingly evil things commanded by God. Most of that load of nonsense has been abandoned. It was done so by religious people thinking rationally.
Are all religious people so flexible? No, of course not.
Defining morality is only one function of religion. Religions also provide supportive communities, purpose in life, and the comfort of thinking a supernatural being is looking after you. Those are the more powerful reasons religion exists. Not having a monopoly on morality does not prohibit those functions from maintaining religion.
I agree. Only habits embodied facts / dispositions can do that; thus, practice virtues rather than follow rules (norms).
Yes, from the top down, as I said. If the pope or synod or whoever the authority is, hands down a ruling that pork is all right to eat after all, witches don't have to be burned anymore and it's okay to see women's hair, some of the faithful will welcome it ('bout time, Prelate!) and some will accept it readily (Yeah, okay, makes sense.) some will accept it after much soul-searching (But on the other hand... well, if his holiness says I shouldn't beat them up anymore... I guess...) and some will reject the decision. Maybe even form a splinter group that claims to be the true faith, clinging to the old ways. If the accepting faction is in the majority - which it usually is, once the church is out of step with secular society - the new rules gradually become the mainstream rules --- until they need updating again, when a whole new hornet's nest is stirred up.
What I have never heard a true believer say was : "Well, God was wrong about a lot of things, but I like going to church, so I'll just ignore the bits that don't make sense." They do it - they just don't say it.
[Quoting Mark S
Just the main one, without which the community would tear itself to bits, arguing over what's right and wrong, and nobody could be comforted.
That is not what I have observed, but I understand that it could be your experience.
It's an invitation to ad hom argue. Anyone who disagrees with me, given certain conditions, is irrational.
But furthermore, if the conditions were so weak as to allow the inclusion of all or most of the generally accepted canon of moral philosophers, then it would be clearly falsified as a matter of fact.
Hume's dictum is not really addressed:
[quote=Hume]It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.[/quote] Hence antinatalism. This is also why politics does not consist of a competition for power between the Good Party and the Bad Party, but between parties that rationally disagree about what ought to be done.
Is there anything more to this than an appeal to like-minded, (rather than rational,) people to go with the current moral zeitgeist and stop arguing?
In this situation we better maximise our understanding of moral behaviour by analogy/contrast between moral conduct/norms and non-moral conduct/norms. Here I can draft the main points:
Seems to me, in the context of the article, that Gert is not offering a definition of morality, but giving reasons why such a thing is bothersome. He is offering the observation that the term may be used either descriptively or normatively, in support of contending that this is part of the reason that no single definition will be applicable in all situations.
I don't see that he is offering a normative definition of "morality" at all. He's just pointing out that it can be use din this way.
In your experience, who else, aside from Gert, uses morally normative to refer to "a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.
I know of no one who uses it this way except people that refer to Gert as their source. Gert is providing a useful definition of morally normative.
Bernard Gert's original version was more direct:
Quoting web.archive.org
So I would not have taken the authors as providing an account of what one ought to do, as you seem to, but of what morality is. Hence the qualification added by Joshua Gert
Quoting Gert & Gert
They are not setting out what we ought to do, but how we use the word.
Where, in his wider literature, Bernard Gert does set out such a prescription, it is based on avoiding doing harm.
Here's a video you can watch to see what Bernard Gert actually thought about morality.
He does give a definition of morality (at 15:28) as "An informal public system applying to all
moral agents that has the goal of lessening of harm suffered by those who are protected by this system".
Indeed, given your other threads, you might find this definition of more use, even though he makes no direct reference to cooperation.
Thanks for bringing Bernard Gert to my attention. I quite like the idea that far more harm is done by people acting altruistically than out of self interest... and his rejection of act utilitarianism and correction of Kant's view of lies.
And his catch phase: "I'm a philosopher, so I don't know anything you don't know". Sweet.
Ultimately he settles for the ten commandments. Is that where you want to go?
Notice how he reflects on virtues towards the end. His lecture includes criticism of both utilitarianism and deontology, but not explicitly of virtue ethics.
Quoting Mark S
"Rational" here is intended in a very broad sense:
(Emphasis in the original.) So, basically, "rational" in the original formulation means anyone who "counts as a moral agent."
Quoting Banno
Well, that's what you generally find in overviews of philosophical topics, such as those in the SEP. You get into the weeds practically as soon as you set out (the very next subchapter in Gert's article on the definition of morality questions the very possibility of defining morality...) You leave with more questions than answers, which probably frustrates some people, but that's the way I like it.
Cheers. It's somewhat unsettling that the first half-dozen psts simply accepted 's misunderstanding.
It shouldn't happen here.
Guilty as charged. I usually barely skim posts with quotes attributed to or artcles about men or women I've never heard of such as Prof. Gert. The video of his lecture did pique my interest (and I reserved his book Common Morality surprise, surprise at a local public library) so thanks again, Banno, for pulling my coat.
Indeed, I might purchase it - potentially a counter to the more abstract stuff found in ethics.
All,
Nice video by Gert. Except for some quibbles, I agree with his points.
Are any of you wondering how Gerts morality can be so concrete?
He can be concrete because his subject in the video is what morality is the same subject as Morality As Cooperation Strategies (MACS). I dont hear him making direct claims about what morality we somehow imperatively ought to follow (the standard focus of traditional moral philosophy).
I hear him talking about what morality we rationally would advocate given what morality is.
Can we all agree that morality is something?
In the video, Gert asserts that
What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.
With the new insights from game theory in the last few decades, it would be more correct to say something like
What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.
This definition of what morality 'is' is empirically true, according to MACS. It explains all past and present cultural moral norms, no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange.
This definition does not tell us what is morally normative. For that, we can apply GERT's SEP definition of morally normative: the term morality can be used normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.
Gerts ten moral rules are standard cultural moral norms. Why these moral norms? MACS explains that they are all examples of rules advocating initiating reciprocity strategies. These are highly useful heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for MACS.
What does Gert say about when to not follow them?
He says: Moral Rules Require Impartiality - To be justified in violating a moral rule one must be willing for all to know they can break the rule in the same circumstances.
Fine, but what circumstances are those? MACS suggest that those circumstances are when following the rule will predictably not solve cooperation problems and may create them. And this criterion is just what is empirically observed when cultures condone abandoning moral norms.
I see MACS as illuminating and expanding on Gerts perspective, not contradicting it.
It is the same approach I take but starting from what I consider a more solid foundation than Gert's about what morality 'is'.
However, I had not seen the video lecture Banno provided.
In case others also prefer to read philosophical arguments rather than hear them, here are the slides and text I found of this lecture Gert gave elsewhere at about the same time. https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/001.htm
It's not clear in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gerts definition of morality. Can you give concrete example to clarify that?
Quoting Mark S
This formulation departs from the meta-ethical question of "what morality is". Stating that the goal of moral precepts is "lessening of harm" tells us what we imperatively ought to follow: we ought to lessen harm. It is morally good to lessen harm and morally bad to increase it.
As a nonexhaustive moral imperative, "lessen harm" is uncontroversional, but that doesn't make it any less of a moral imperative. Then making it the be-all, end-all of all morality means putting forward a moral theory (known as negative utilitarianism).
Quoting neomac
I see Gerts definition of What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal as a descriptive definition of morality, not a normative one.
He has not justified stating this as a normative (ought) claim as you (and perhaps others here) are interpreting it. As he argues in the SEP, any normative claim would be what all rational people would put forward - an argument he has not made.
For example, the definition includes the phrase by those protected by the system. Consider the moral norm: slaves must obey their masters. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then this repulsive moral norm would be included under Gerts definition of what morality is. This makes no sense to modern sensibilities as a normative claim but is sensible as a claim about what is descriptively moral.
Also, Gerts claim that Morality is an informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal appears to be based on Gerts carefully considered, armchair observations and intuitions. The modern science of morality says he is close, but not quite right, about what morality is.
My suggested revision, An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal more accurately reflects what science tells us of moralitys function the principal reason what we call descriptively moral behavior exists.
That said, I am frustrated by Gerts ambiguity in his lecture about whether he means the definition to be descriptive (the only way I can make sense of it) or normative (which he has not justified).
Perhaps Gert did intend it as a normative claim. Then I would argue it cannot be justified as what all rational people would put forward (advocate).
Quoting SophistiCat
You did not ask a question, but I will try to clarify what I have said that is relevant.
As you know, what morality descriptively is and what morality normatively is are separate questions. In traditional moral philosophy, an extreme version of this idea is that science has nothing to offer moral philosophy, implying that what is descriptively moral is irrelevant to what is normatively moral.
Gert contradicts this view by claiming that the "lessening of harm" component of what is descriptively moral (a subject within science's what 'is' domain) is also normatively moral by his criterion what all rational people would put forward.
My proposed Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) follows Gerts line of thinking by arguing that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies that exist because they produced benefits and reduced harm for our ancestors.
Since MACS only describes moral means (solving cooperation problems and not creating them), it is complimentary to consequentialism whether those consequences maximize happiness or minimize harm as Gert prefers.
Hence, I see MACS as illuminating and providing a stronger foundation in descriptive morality for Gerts negative utilitarianism.
Quoting Banno
That part I dont get at all. Since when is going to war altruistic? People go to war because theyre sociopaths or because their leaders are assholes.
Quoting Mark S
To me, Gerts definition of morality is descriptive. What I think Gert takes to be a normative definition of morality is the set of rules and ideals he discussed later in his lecture.
Quoting Mark S
Both your descriptive definition of morality and Gerts descriptive definition of morality can account for the fact that slaves must obey their masters can be taken as a moral rule. Cant they? If so, this example doesnt show us in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gerts definition of morality.
Quoting Mark S
In what sense its more accurate about the function of morality? Talking about cooperation seems to me a way to suggest that there are different ways in which morality can be implemented depending on the cooperation strategy (which must be specified and be correlated to other factors, e.g. material conditions of existence, demographic dynamics, environmental conditions, technological advancement). But the most general notion of cooperation itself can be formulated entirely in Gerts descriptive moral terminology. So adding it to Gerts general definition doesnt bring anything to it. In other words, allusions to cooperation strategies should be part of a lower level wrt Gerts general descriptive definition of morality and a more oriented toward an empirical investigation.
No, he does not. Nowhere does Gert claim that the imperative of lessening of harm is (a) descriptively moral and (b) scientifically justified.
Also, I disagree that for something to even be recognized as a moral code, it has to be acceptable by all moral agents ("rational people"). That is much too restrictive for a definition. It would mean that any rule that may not be universally endorsed is "not even wrong": it does not belong to the category of things that could be morally right or wrong, and if you use it in such a way, your interlocutors would not understand you. (Or worse yet, one would have to disqualify all dissenters as moral agents!) That is clearly not the case. Rational people can have moral (as opposed to merely definitional) disagreements.
In putting forward the normative definition of morality as "the behavioral code that... all rational persons, under certain specified conditions, would endorse," Gert identifies those who accept it with moral realists, and those who think that no code would meet this definition with moral skeptics. I don't think that is right either. A moral realist is not necessarily committed to the principle that all universal ethical truths are uncontroversial.
Right!
Quoting neomac
Yes, slaves must obey their masters has too often been a cultural moral norm enforced by an ingroup to exploit an outgroup.
The reason that "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gerts definition of what is descriptively moral is that 1) it adds explanatory power, particularly for marker norms such as working on the sabbath deserves death and homosexuality is evil, and 2) it directly follows from the ultimate source of morality - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.
Without "increasing the benefits of cooperation" you cant say you have a definition of what is descriptively moral that explains past and present moral norms. And you cant link cultural moral norms to their ultimate source - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.
Quoting neomac
As I described above, adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" is necessary for a descriptive definition of moral means that applies (as a claimed empirical truth) to all past and present cultural moral norms. That cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is the highest level claim we can make about moral 'means'.
Quoting SophistiCat
You are correct that Gert does not mention science. My parenthetical (a subject within science's what 'is' domain) was meant to be my own clarifying comment. I should not have included it.
Are you thinking An informal public system applying to all moral agents that has the goal of lessening of harm suffered by those who are protected by this system can be a definition of what is normative?
This definition includes the phrase by those protected by the system. Consider the moral norm: slaves must obey their masters. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then the exploitation of slaves with the goal of lessening harm to their masters will be consistent with the definition. This makes sense if the definition is what is descriptively moral as I understand Gert to the saying. But thinking it is a definition of what is normative would be offensive to modern ears, right?
Quoting SophistiCat
I understand your concern about all rational people advocating for a moral claim as criterion for normativity. I dont share that concern for the normativity by Gerts criterion (or something close to it) of Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) regarding moral means due to its basis in objective science.
But no problem, you dont like Gerts criterion for normativity. What criterion do you prefer?
But perhaps your preference might be better discussed in a fresh thread? Id like to keep the focus of this thread on Gerts perspective.
These are just claims, where is the argument to support them?
Consider:
(A) slaves must obey their masters
(B) working on the sabbath deserves death
(C) homosexuality is evil.
(BGD) Gert's definition: What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal
(MSD) your definition: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal (which looks like BGD plus "increasing the benefits of cooperation" clause)
If A, B, C can be explained by both BGD and MSD then how is MSD more accurate than BGD and not just more redundant wrt BGD?
To support your claims you should be able to provide an example X historically considered as moral that BGD does NOT classifies as moral while MSD classifies as moral, AND/OR an example Y historically considered as non-moral that BGD classifies as moral while MSD does NOT classify as moral.
If you can't provide any such cases then your general definition is simply redundant, and the allusion to cooperation strategies (partnership, dominance, marker norms) belongs to a deeper level of analysis or empirical investigation (for comparison take 2 definitions of "human beings" as "rational animals" or as "rational animals with sexual organs").
BTW can you clarify better what "marker norms" means and why it is to be distinguished from dominance and partnership norms?
Quoting neomac
Humm
How does Gerts definition of what is descriptively moral based on lessening of harms explain, as you claim:
(A) slaves must obey their masters
(B) working on the sabbath deserves death
(C) homosexuality is evil.
I dont see that it can. My "Morality As Cooperation Strategies" (MACS) definition of what is descriptively moral does explain them because it includes cooperation strategies. It explains them as marker and domination strategies, strategies for increasing the benefits of cooperation in ingroups at the expense (always for domination norms and sometimes for marker norms) of outgroups.
Quoting neomac
I have described marker strategies as:
Marker moral norms Markers of membership in and commitment to a more cooperative ingroup. Preferentially cooperating with members of an ingroup can reduce the chances of being exploited and thereby increase the benefits of cooperation. These markers include eating shrimp is an abomination, masturbation is immoral, and other food and sex taboos.
I can add that these markers of membership and commitment to an ingroup are parts of indirect reciprocity. By limiting the number of people deemed worthy of cooperating with, the chances of being exploited are reduced and the potential benefits of cooperation increased for members of the ingroup.
As to how marker strategies differ from partnership and domination moral norms, see
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13929/what-if-cultural-moral-norms-track-cooperation-strategies/p1
Briefly, partnership moral norms such as the ten rules proposed by Gert, are ingroup norms where all people are assumed worthy of full moral regard.
Domination moral norms such as "slaves must obey their masters" and "women must be submissive to men" are examples of ingroups (men or slave owners) cooperatively enforcing the exploitation of outgroups (slaves and women).
My points are 2: one is about explanation, the other about generality.
1. Gert's descriptive definition of morality is : What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal
As I understand it, the definition itself in this formulation doesn't specify any strong rationality requirement nor how wide is the group of the people protected by the moral system. So if A, B, C are forms of lessening the harms of a certain group that is protected by the moral system, then these are moral rules that satisfy the definition offered by Gert. In case A the group would be the masters, in case B the group would be all those who need to rest at least once a week, in case C the group could be e.g. all those (as the politicians) would benefit from a demographic growth through etherosexual mating or by limiting the transmissibility of certain sexual diseases or by limiting naturally repugnant sexual behavior (and religious beliefs might have "irrationally" strengthen this belief)
2. Gert's descriptive definition of morality can account for all moral rules (like A, B, C) your definition can account for then your definition is redundant wrt Gert's definition, because talking about "cooperative strategies" doesn't add anything valuable to the general definition, other then alluding to something that is more specific than required by a minimal general definition (for comparison take 2 definitions of "human beings" as "rational animals" or as "rational animals with sexual organs").
The added increasing the benefits of cooperation defines the means by which harm is to be lessened - cooperation. That knowledge is needed to accurately encompass what morality descriptively is. Morality descriptively is NOT simply lessening harm as Gerts version implies. Morality descriptively is lessening harm by increasing the benefits of cooperation.
I prefer Hegel's definition in the Philosophy of Right. For Hegel, morality is the abstract understanding of "the good," held by rational subjects. Morality is not particular, nor should we try to make it drive particular actions by invoking universal moral laws about how all people should act given X.
He uses the term "ethical life" to describe how one lives morally in a specific role at a specific time. I like this differentiation because it is able to take account of differences in customs and situations. Right action depends on where and when you are and who you are. What is required of a fire fighter is different from what is required of a mechanic during a fire. Duties and responsibilities are key elements in morality and they are particular to an individual.
Part of the goal of ethical life is happiness. This must be the case as a rational subject wouldn't choose that life otherwise.
Rationality drives morality in Hegel, but his theory is also able to account for the fact that what is considered moral by most, presumably rational, people changes dramatically over time. Morality expresses itself as a dynamic historical process , progressing as internal contradictions in a society are resolved. Focusing purely on a universal morality, as opposed to this "ethical life" leads to falling into the is/ought trap.
The ethics of any time are emergent, they don't come from the "rational individual." The society is the substance, the individuals are its accidents. Because human beings are rational, society progresses towards human freedom, but they still act within society.
For a simple example, "all rational people" might not agree on any number of customs where one individual has to do something to show respect in some symbolic way to another. But it might be moral in some situations to avoid needlessly offending someone. Moreover, depending on your specific role, you response to the same situations should be different. A police officer and a priest shouldn't necessarily respond to some situations the same way.
No doubt, some of the customs we take for granted today will one day be seen as cancel worthy in the future by rational people.
Yet I didn't see how you can prove that the definition you suggest is an improvement. You are simply making claims not proving a point. For example, is it possible to have an informal public system applicable to human beings that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal, but it decreases the benefits of cooperation? If it's not possible, then you definition is just redundant.
Besides the more I think of your definition and the less I find it clear. I think cooperative behavior can be found also in animals. The partnership, dominance and marker proto-rules (or patterns of behavior) can be found also in the animal world. Am I wrong? If so and animals showing cooperative behavior are not moral agents, then cooperative behavior must be conceptually decoupled from morality. Now, if morality increases the benefits of cooperation, there must be something in "morality" that can not be reduced to those patterns of behavior constituting cooperation the increases the benefits from such patterns.
Quoting neomac
I hear you complain that my definition of what is descriptively moral is not normatively moral. Perhaps you are confusing what is descriptively moral with what is normatively moral?
What do you understand descriptively moral and normatively moral to refer to?
Id like to keep this thread focused on the cultural usefulness of Gerts approach to normativity and what is moral.
But perhaps some contrast with Hegel can usefully illuminate Gerts approach. Ill respond specifically to what you have said about Hegel.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The question What is good? has no definitive answers, rational or otherwise, so far as I know. Of course, you could simply prefer Hegels definition of good and advocate it on that basis. Your preference may not make it culturally useful however because it has no objective basis. Having no objective basis means it is unlikely to be universally shared and therefore less useful than moralities that have a objective basis. Your preference alone is not necessarily a culturally useful basis for a morality.
In contrast, Gert focuses on what he sees morality is. And then, as I understand him, Gert claims, based on what morality 'is', that lessening harm is objectively moral based on it being what all rational persons would advocate. Gerts approach (with its stated limits) has the advantage over Hegels in that it is claimed to meet (again as I understand him) his criterion for normativity what all rational persons would advocate.
The modern science of morality (which studies the origin and function of our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms) has moved beyond Gerts understanding of what morality is. As I argue elsewhere, we can still follow Gerts general approach using the science-enhanced understanding of what morality is to define a morality that all rational people will even more strongly advocate.
Yeah, I only meant to contrast here. The problem with the "objective" frame is that human reasoning is deeply embed in culture.
Think about therapy aimed at my "curing" homosexuality. Presumably rational people embraced that earlier. Generations of rational scholars and philosophers embraced slavery and serfdom because that's the system they were used to.
"How else do we get the crops in, avoid famines, and stave off foreign invasion?" even has a rationalist, pragmatist ring to it, and is arguably true for the earliest states in the chaotic Bronze Age period.
I would argue that there clearly is not an objective morality accessible to all with reason. Appeals to this ahistorical objectivity are thus "ought" claims.
Hegel acknowledges this problem. Roman law legalized slavery and made wives and children property of the male head of household. This represents an internal contradiction that will be resolved historically. It is a contradiction because the state and law itself exists to promote human freedom; that is their raison d'etre. They are intersubjective reason as historical process.
Preferences have to be suitable for grounding morality. Humans must be essentially rational and the world must be rational for an understandable morality to exist. Gert's system also presupposes this, but it leaves our top crucial facts. First, that morality evolves as a historical process. Second, that rationality is instantiated at higher levels of emergence than the individual, in the state and in civil society. Example: game theory and emergent processes in economics.
Morality cannot exist sans culture or sans the preferences of a given people with a given era. It never has.
As I understand it, Gert's "descriptive" notion of morality tries to capture what would characterize normative systems as "moral" cross-culturally, independently from the geographic or historical latitude, in short rules/ideals protecting a group from harm is what counts as moral [1].
Gert's normative notion of morality requires that these rules/ideals be acceptable by all rational agents. He identified 10 rules (and 4 ideals, if I remember correctly) that satisfy this normative constraint (they do not seem to include e.g. rules against cannibalism or prostitution but they seem to exclude rules about human sacrifice or slavery).
Gerts doesnt need to talk about cooperation strategies (domination, partnership, marker) because he is not interested in classifying systems that satisfy his descriptive definition of morality. This classificatory task belongs to a lower level of analysis (which I guess would be a preliminary step to morally profile societies of different geographic and historical latitude and correlate such profiles with other social/natural factors).
The reference to cooperative strategies is not only a further classificatory task wrt the general descriptive definition of morality offered by Gert, but it suggests a whole different research program, namely one that tries to connect pre-human pro-social behaviour and human morality. Indeed the cooperative behaviour is present in some natural form also in certain non-human animals. So morality would be an upgrade of these pro-social animal dispositions. The problem is again if this is just matter of degrees or there is something emergent in the moral dimension. In both cases one might take morality as an improvement of such pro-social animal dispositions, yet one would need to specify in what sense morality constitutes an improvement (e.g. in what sense circumcision - which animals do not have - is a marker rule that improves the benefits of cooperation?)
Conclusion, even if I see why you might be interested in integrating Gerts definition with a reference to cooperative strategies, I dont think it would be an improvement, because Gerts definition belongs to a greater level of abstraction (once again compare rational animal and rational animal with genital organs) and results from a philosophical investigation about the notion of human morality (independently from its continuity wrt animal behaviour).
[1] notice that the notion of "moral agents" in Gert's descriptive definition of morality risks to make the definition circular.
Do you mean include rules about human sacrifice and slavery?
If you really thought human sacrifice meant the difference between famine and a good harvest, isn't human sacrifice rational? There it is merely an information constraint that changes the nature of such a behavior.
We might abhor slavery, but military conscription, a form of temporary bondage, is seen as essential to virtually all states.
I was referring to Gert's 10 rules that all moral agents would follow (it looks like the first 5 should be taken to be the most evident to him): https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm
Plus 5 five ideals (which however are supererogatory): https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/008.htm
As I understand them, they would exclude slavery and human sacrifice at least by default, because all rational human beings would find unacceptable a moral system where human sacrifice or slavery would be permitted. I guess that this conclusion follows from assuming that rational people want to avoid harm by default (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/002.htm, https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/003.htm) and impartiality (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/007.htm). Rational people wouldnt find acceptable a moral system that would permit anybody to enslave or sacrifice them by default. However there might be ad hoc social rules that may specify under which exceptional circumstances moral rules would need to be rationally integrated with other rules.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Two comments:
1. As far as I understand Gerts normative definition of morality, only a subset of social rules can be considered rationally moral and such rules apply to the default behaviour (which doesnt exclude exceptions). The acceptability of human sacrifice practices can not be dictated by rational moral rules in that sense. Maybe there are religious or pagan social rules that govern human behaviour in exceptional cases but it's not up to morality to determine such cases and their rationality remains to be established depending on the circumstances. On the other side prostitution as a free choice is not excluded by default by those 10 moral rules. Other religious or legal rules might however exclude it as an unacceptable behavior.
2. As far as Im concerned, I wouldnt be so quick in calling some behaviour rational just because it may look functional to the survival of the individual or the community. I dont know enough relevant details about human sacrifice practices but Im not sure that human beings adopted or preserved such practices as the result of some conscious effective calculation that would make look their behaviour rational (e.g. addressing the problem of famines which may be more plausible in case the ritual increased the availability of food by reducing the demand of food within the community and/or by allowing cannibalism) and not just an evolutionary unintended consequence of some traditionalist cultural imprint.
This is where I see the "no true Scotsman," 20/20 hindsight problem coming in. It's easy to say now that all sorts of prior norms were irrational. However, if that was the case, that history is filled with generation after generation of human beings embracing irrational norms, why is it that we think we now have the ability to determine such norms? Where did this new found rationality come from?
I'd imagine plenty of current behaviors, e.g., our treatment of psychiatric drugs with massive systemic side effects whose mechanism of action is extremely poorly understood, or the industrial production of conscious animals for consumption will someday fit into the human sacrifice bucket of things future philosophers will say rational people wouldn't agree to. Which of course leaves the question: "then why did people follow those norms?"
This is a problem for "harm" based moralities too. To be sure, we can posit and idealized world where agents agree to follow moral principles before they enter the world, perhaps from behind some "viel of ignorance." And in such a world things would be much better, provided people actually follow the rules. But of course, collective action problems and externalities exist because the logic of some systems is that one agent can benefit from cheating on a norm, while the norm is unlikely to collapse from just a handful of agents cheating, making the cheaters net beneficiaries of cheating.
More to the point, in the real world, people carry out terrorist attacks. One country invades another. The whole point of the military, its duty, is specifically to cause the appropriate amount of harm to any invader to get them to leave.
But I'm not denying the possibility of rationally justifying some past practice in certain circumstances, yet such possibility doesn't imply that the rational justification was what led people to adopt that practice. Many behavioral dispositions are acquired by individuals since they were children before any actual pros/cons calculation rationally justifying that behavior could take place. And also in our adult life we may show a significant degree of gregarious behavior that encourages conformity to some common pattern of behavior without there being any conscious calculation of pros/cons at the origin of that collective behavior (which is also what could explain social reluctance to change behavior as soon as circumstances rationally require it). All I'm saying is that we shouldn't confuse rationality with a posteriori rationalizations. Said that, I didn't mean to exclude that certain now morally questionable practices (like the alleged practice of infanticide in ancient Greece) were grounded on plausible reasons and widely accepted for those reasons.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think this would be a more charitable understanding of what Gert's normative definition of morality might assume. However "idealized" Gert's assumptions are, yet they may explain why we might be inclined to consider those 10 moral rules as plausibly universally acceptable by rational individuals. Besides those practices like infanticide or human sacrifices do not necessarily question Gert's normative definition of morality, instead they simply suggest the existence of extreme social or environmental conditions that would allow individual to exceptionally but rationally derogate to default rational moral rules.
Quoting neomac
Right, but referring to normative systems rather than something like cultural moralities could lead to confusion about when a system is normative when it would be advocated by all rational people.
Also, being cross-culturally moral does not necessarily imply something is normative. Being cross-culturally moral only suggests that something is a good candidate for what is normative.
I interpret Gert to be saying as a descriptive claim about all cultural morality:
What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.
This only becomes normative if it is what all rational people would advocate as I understand Gerts arguments.
Quoting neomac
But Gert is not advocating these 10 rules as moral absolutes. Rather, they are heuristics (usually reliable, but fallible rules of thumb) for the goal of lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system. And human sacrifice or slavery would violate that moral behavior goal.
Quoting neomac
Am I correct in taking your understanding of
An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.
to be the claimed negative-utilitarianism goal of moral behavior?
In this case, I agree that adding the phrase increasing the benefits of cooperation and does not make sense.
I have been thinking of Gerts above claim as a claim about moral means (lessening of harms) not moral ends (the negative-utilitarianism goal of moral behavior). Your interpretation seems more likely.
Thanks for persisting in your objection.
Upon reflection, I think this definition might be simply too loose.
If you assume people are generally rational, then it collapses into historicism, i.e., conventional morality at time X was rational given the information constraints of the era. If you don't allow information constraints to play a central role it becomes deontological morality with less punch.
I would like to say things like: "slavery was wrong even though the people of eras that embraced it were constrained by historical conditions."
But I should also like to say, "morality isn't groundless because rationality is part of the essence of man, and so exists at all periods," and that people who embraced their epochs' flawed morality were nonetheless rational.
And as a bonus, I would like a theory that explains the progression of morality and growing 'circles of inclusion," in moral calculus, from the self, to family, to the clan, to the state, to the species, to all life. That is, why humans kill each other vastly lower rates than in the past (or in existent pre-state societies), why freedom has advanced (the end of slavery and serfdom, the emancipation of the Jews and later women). In other words, the icing on the cake would be a teleological explanation.
Interesting topic.
I have a question regarding moral codes: Aren't or shouldn't they be based on some theory or ethics system and/or fundamental principles regarding the nature of ethics ? (I prefer this term in general over "morality", but I use both words "moral" and "ethical" according to language requirements.)
I believe that even normative ethics, which refer to a practical view of the subject, are based on some fundamental principles. A moral code and the principles that are involved in it cannot be built out of opinions or beliefs. These change not only from culture to culture, but within the cultures themselves as well as with time and ever changing conditions in life.
A moral code consists of principles that determine the morality of an action. It doesn't answer the big question of what is considered ethical. And to answer that, one must find the root, the fundamental principle that describes and determines and defines ethics, independently of culture and changing conditions in life. Otherwise, a moral code is reduced to a set of principles that people must just follow. Take for example "The Ten Commandments". "Thou shalt not kill". Why? "Thou shalt not commit adultery". Why? An answer "Because it is bad" can easily create a circularity: "Why i is bad?" -> "Because it is said in the "The Ten Commandments". See what I mean?
So, only when you have a fundamental principle that determines and defines ethics, what is considered ethical etc., only then you can create a moral code based on that fundamental principle. Then, all the "why"s can be easily answered by just referring to the fundamental principle.
Now, what can be such a fundamental principle?
I will be glad to expand my comment and answer this, if what I described makes sense. (Otherwise, it will be useless, of course.)
Quoting Mark S.
All right, we can distinguish cultural moralities from normative system in Gerts sense to avoid terminological confusions. But my point was really about the fact that cultural moralities and the normative system in Gerts sense are both normative in the sense of being standards for guiding and assessing practical behaviour.
Quoting Mark S
Right and I didnt affirm anywhere that those 10 rules are absolute as opposed to conditional. Indeed, when Gerts talk about rationality in the moral context hes always specifying a unless condition (Insofar as people are acting rationally, they all avoid the harms unless they have an adequate reason not to avoid them. https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/003.htm). Here Gert is even more explicit about this [I]it is important to use these rules as moral guides, it would be disastrous to regard them as absolute, that is, to hold that it is always immoral to break any of these rules no matter what the circumstances were. [/I] (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm)
Yet I wouldnt call them heuristics or fallible rules of thumb because these are more epistemic than moral notions. I prefer to talk about them in terms of default social norms, that may be exceptionally reconsidered depending on some compelling circumstances.
Quoting Mark S
No, thats not my understanding. Gerts made his point against utilitarianism in his slides (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm): [I]This is where it is important to recognize that morality is for fallible biased people. Failure to realize this is what is responsible for many of the weird views about morality that have been put forward by philosophers. The only weird view that I will mention is what is known as act utilitarianism or act consequentialism. I mention this view because it is a view that initially sounds very plausible and that many people claim to accept because they fail to realize that morality governs behavior between fallible biased beings. Morality is not for impartial omniscient beings. Taking act utilitarianism or act consequentialism as a moral guide would require people to do that act which they regard as having the best overall consequences, that is, what they regard the best balance of less harms and more benefits than any other act. (Of course, other people may have a different view of what counts as the best overall consequences.) On this view, moral rules have no significance, people should simply act to achieve the best consequences and pay no attention to whether their actions involve deception, breaking a promise, cheating, disobeying a law or neglecting their duty. Just imagine what life would be like if everyone did what they thought was best and paid no attention to whether they were violating any of the moral rules. It would be a disaster.[/I]
Quoting Mark S
Even though I dont think we can take Gerts 10 rules as a case of utilitarianism, yet I think they are more about collective ends than means to achieve them.
Gert's assumption is somehow different from what you suggest: "This is where it is important to recognize that morality is for fallible biased people. Failure to realize this is what is responsible for many of the weird views about morality that have been put forward by philosophers. The only weird view that I will mention is what is known as act utilitarianism or act consequentialism. I mention this view because it is a view that initially sounds very plausible and that many people claim to accept because they fail to realize that morality governs behavior between fallible biased beings. Morality is not for impartial omniscient beings". Source: https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I hope we can agree that:
Cultural moral codes have existed quite comfortably for all of history without a unified theory or fundamental principles.
The theories or principles you refer to are moral philosophys answers to the big ethical questions What is good?, How should I live?, and What are my obligations? Proposed answers include positive and negative utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and Kantianism.
Then, Gerts approach and my Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) differ in that, rather than answering the above broad ethical questions, we both take on the simpler task of understanding the function of past and present cultural moral norms.
I understand Gert to be proposing that the function (the principle reason they exist) of cultural moral norms is lessening suffering. He sees lessening suffering as the goal of moral norms - the defining principle for what is moral based on the goal of moral behavior.
MACS proposes that the function (the principle reason they exist) of all cultural moral norms is solving cooperation problems. I see solving cooperation problems as the means by which moral norms enable people to accomplish whatever goals they agree on, one of which could be lessening suffering. Solving cooperation problems is the defining principle for what means are moral. In contrast to Gerts proposal, MACS is silent about what ends (goals) are moral.
Then Gert proposes a useful definition of what is normative which I interpret as what all well-informed, mentally normal (not delusional), rational people would advocate.
Gert and MACS provide two perspectives on the function of moral norms. Both have something to contribute to understanding what is morally normative.
Of course. I didn't deny that and no one should. They still work today for a lot --if not most-- places.
Quoting Mark S
Not exactly. These are general questions referring to living prototypes, which can well be answered by moral codes, religious rules and dictates, etc.
The fundamental pronciple I'm talking about refers to a general behavior. When one has adopted such a principle, one lives accordingly. One has no questions such as the above. And, if some situation produces a dilemma as to how one should, one can stiil resort to that f.p. to choose the best action, i.e. the action that is more ethical in such a situation. One can also resort to a code of ethics (a creed), which hase been created, based on and developed according to that f.p.
Quoting Mark S
I don't like "isms" much ... They restrict one's beliefs or undestanding of life and the world within a certain system or frame of reference.
Quoting Mark S
A f.p. is independent of cultural elements, as I already said.
It can explain and support the behaviour and moral values of the primitive tribes -- even cannibals-- as well as those of the civilized people.
Quoting Mark S
I undestand this. This is one of the main "functions" of all religions.
Quoting Mark S
This is a noble thought referring to a noble purpose.
Quoting Mark S
I see. It makes sense.
Humm I dont get what you mean by more epistemic than moral notions.
I do know, empirically and independently of any of Gerts claims, that the ten moral norms are fallible heuristics for reciprocity strategies. So at least we agree they are not moral absolutes.
But if they are not moral absolutes, in what circumstances would following them be immoral? The heuristics for solving cooperation problems perspective provides a simple answer. It would be immoral to follow them when doing so is more likely to create rather than solve cooperation problems.
When would you say it would be immoral to follow Gert's ten moral norms?
Quoting neomac
I agree that Gerts 10 rules have no necessary connection to moral goals such as utilitarianism. But that is because they are moral norms about behaviors (moral means), not moral ends (goals). They are collective in the sense of rules advocated in the group that solve cooperation problems.
Take this to a grander scale such as geopolitics.
The cooperation between Russia and US on the non use of nuclear weapons ensures each others survival. So the cooperation that is taking place is for the sake of self-preservation.
In other non live or die scenarios such as the above cooperation is done for the self or even selfish interests of each party.
There is nothing inherently moral about capitalism.
- O.I.L Slick
Why in the aspect of ordering principles such as 'morality' do you need the strict dogmas and governance by formal religion over the social concerns of society. How can you accord uneducated opinions of those demanding ultimate freedom of the individual and hold a coherent argument that society will achieve its necessary ends through its own self ordering.
I didn't think this objection through. The point is that rules of thumbs and heuristics are meant to spare us cognitive load in our decision making. When a problem is too complicated for us to process an optimal solution, then we rely on rules of thumbs and heuristics to approximate that solution. So we have to be able to define the decision problem before talking about heuristics and rules of thumbs. Gerts rules (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm) may be seen as an answer to the question: what is default behavior that would more likely lessen the harms of all those who commit to them? In this case those rules would be more rule of thumbs. Gert's assumption that "morality is for fallible biased people" could support that reading. My impression however is that Gert's argument is stronger because he wants to talk in terms of rationality and not just make an empirical general claim approximately true.
Anyways, I think that Gert is having in mind a different problem from yours: he is not formulating his notion of morality as a function of solving cooperation problems, and related heuristics as you suggested (partnership, domination, marker principles).
Quoting Mark S
Do not kill, do not cause pain, do not disable (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm) can be considered fallible in a practical sense if they are seen as instrumental to some further goal. You may want to say that they are instrumental to solve or support the solution of cooperation problems. If thats the case, there are 4 issues with that:
1 - maybe you explained that in your past posts and I missed it, but so far you didnt offer to me a concrete example where a cooperation problem would likely have no (suboptimal if not optimal) solutionunless we adopted Gerts moral rules.
2 - most importantly, cooperation is itself instrumental to some goals, which goals? If the answer is: reducing death, pain, disabilities, etc. of some people by some people engaged in the cooperation then we are back to Gerts rules. The payoff of the cooperative strategies will be defined as a function of death, pain, disabilities, liberties, etc. reducing the evils and/or increase the goods
3 - Gerts descriptive definition of morality suggests that also the normative definition of morality is focused on reducing evils (lessening of harms) and not increasing the goods (indeed do cause pleasure is missing among the rules). While the notion of cooperation is not focused on lessening the evils.
4 - Im not sure that Gerts 10 moral rules are necessary and sufficient conditions for a normative definition of morality. Indeed, Gert concedes that there are reasons for disagreement even if we accepted the 10 rules (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/010.htm). So Gerts 10 rules may not suffice to support the solution of cooperation problems.
Quoting Mark S
Imagine you have 2 parents with 10 kids, they can afford to provide each of them with minimal means of subsistence or kill five of them to let the other five have more than just minimal means of subsistence. Now consider 3 scenarios:
(A) Both parents agree on providing each kid with just minimal means of subsistence
(B) Both parents agree on killing 5 kids to let the other five have more than just minimal means of subsistence
(C) Parents disagree
In case A and B we do not have a cooperation problem between parents while in C we do, right? Yet I dont think A and B would be considered indifferently equally moral by Gerts standards, because in case B killing 5 kids would breach one of the first moral rules to increase the goods for the other 5. So in case C, those parents would find Gerts rules helpful in solving the disagreement they had prior to being exposed to Gerts rules. This kind of examples shows how Gerts rules contribute to the solution of cooperation games. Yet, if that is the case, Gerts rules will determine the strategy exposed in B as morally problematic where there is no cooperation problem.
Besides case C may be the consequence of exposing otherwise agreeing parents to Gerts rules. So Gerts rules can also cause cooperation problems like breaking a partnership that was given for granted (in real life compare to the moral implications in cases of religious/political conversion). Maybe we can say that Gert's rules may solve or contribute to solve cooperation problems, if Gert's rules are embraced by all actors involved in the cooperation problem.
Quoting Mark S
Im not yet sure if the distinction means/ends can really help us here. Can you give examples that illustrate the distinction between moral means and moral ends?
P.S. I'm giving answers based on a charitable understanding of Gert's position. I don't assume that my understanding is accurate nor I'm committed to Gert's position as I understand it.
Quoting neomac
I agree with your reading of Gert described here and why heuristics are so useful. And the ten rules are Gerts answer to what is default behavior that would more likely lessen the harms of all those who commit to them?
My arguments have been to illuminate Gerts moral insights rather than contradict them. That illumination starts with understanding the ten rules as advocacy for initiating or maintaining reciprocity strategies which are powerful means for solving cooperation problems. Solving cooperation problems is the default behavior most likely both to lessen harms (Gerts and negative utilitarianisms goal) and, as I argue, positive utilitarianism as well. The same 10 moral rules support both positive and negative utilitarianism equally well because the same cooperation problems must be solved.
Quoting neomac
As you describe it, the cooperation problem is just between the parents. But alternatives A), B), and C) could each be rational (depending on the parents' values) ONLY if the kids have no independent moral worth. If the kids have independent moral worth, then any of the options would be a cooperation problem for the kids plus the parents.
Quoting neomac
It is not Gert's moral rules that are key. They are just heuristics for solving cooperation problems. Examples of cooperation problems that cannot be solved without those strategies could be useful for presenting my case. A response would take at least 500 words. That might be better presented as a separate thread.
Quoting neomac
Cooperation is instrumental to obtaining whatever benefits of cooperation that people agree to pursue. I am not sure what you are asking here.
Quoting neomac
Cooperation is the best means we have for both reducing harms and increasing positive benefits (for both positive and negative utilitarianism).
Quoting neomac
I agree. The normativity of moral 'means' can be based on the normativity of morality as cooperation strategies, not Gert's ten rules. The normativity of moral 'ends' (such as positive or negative utilitarianism) may have no mind-independent answer (contrary to Gert's position). I have not seen the idea of separately judging the normativity for moral 'means" and moral 'ends'. I've been working on a thread on that topic and will post when it seems ready.
Quoting neomac
A charitable understanding of moral claims (how can a moral claim be interpreted as rational) is the more intellectually challenging approach and the one I also try to take. It is much easier to interpret moral claims in the dumbest way possible. The dumbest interpretation approach may be more likely to win arguments by the advocates for new ideas giving up in exhaustion and frustration. But in the end, the charitable approach is more likely to produce genuine progress in understanding morality. I hope you can take the charitable approach with me as well as with Gert.
Talking about Gerts views, I think that the label of utilitarianism is misleading. Utilitarianism to me implies a notion of good/harm as measurable parameters, ways to verify their increase/decrease, and the goal of maximise good or minimise harm over a collectivity. I dont think that is what Gerts has in mind because he argued against utilitarianism. I think that Gerts assumption that morality is for biased and non-omniscient beings suggests that good/bad may not be unbiasedly established nor predicted. Yet some default behaviour may exclude the worse for all rational individuals somehow logically. If all rational individuals intentionally act in a certain way by default, harm can not possibly result as intentional outcome by default. What will happen in concrete cases however it depends on the actual circumstances, and certain exceptional circumstances may be such that individuals can not act according to those default ways.
So wrt the case I suggested, the rationality of the parents dispositions shouldnt be assessed as a function of their actual and inevitably biased values nor as a function of future outcomes but as a function of default moral rules. Moral rules should dispense individuals from being guided by default by their biased preferences and predictive skills. This is my understanding of Gerts argument and 10 rules, although Im not sure its accurate.
Here you are stating that charity is an enabling factor. Church dogmatics and Virtue ethics have long understood the innate power of virtue as enabling. Or for the fact it has always been in the teachings.