Consciousness is a Precondition of Being
The title is from Jungs The Undiscovered Self, p. 48.
I think Carl is paraphrasing Descartes. Like Descartes, it appears he has it ontologically backwards.
Why consciousness is given such primacy is puzzling at times, especially if you take a serious look at how we live as human beings in our daily lives.
Opposed to all this, Id argue that being is the precondition for consciousness just as living is the precondition to being awake. Were not always awake and were not always conscious.
Strange that Jung of all people accepts such a standard metaphysical view.
I think Carl is paraphrasing Descartes. Like Descartes, it appears he has it ontologically backwards.
Why consciousness is given such primacy is puzzling at times, especially if you take a serious look at how we live as human beings in our daily lives.
Opposed to all this, Id argue that being is the precondition for consciousness just as living is the precondition to being awake. Were not always awake and were not always conscious.
Strange that Jung of all people accepts such a standard metaphysical view.
Comments (249)
:up: If being is interpreted as existence I agree. If being is the nature of a person, I might argue that that essence must involve consciousness.
Sounds about right.
Well wakefulness ceases anyway. The self is too loaded a term to say anything useful about, in my view.
Quoting jgill
Yeah although now I realize Jung may have meant being in the sense of being a human. But it doesnt look that way.
So - is not consciousness invariably associated with beings? Isn't consciousness a fundamental attribute of beings, generally? (as jgill suggests) A non-conscious being is not actually 'a being' but an object or a thing. So consciousness is intrinsic to being, isn't it? I'm tempted to say that to be, is to be conscious.
Plenty of pedantry to be found on this topic.
I don't know what Jung meant when he wrote that consciousness comes before being, but I have some idea what Lao Tzu meant. The Tao, the primal oneness, comes before distinctions are made. Naming, which I take to mean consciousness, is what breaks the Tao up into what we see in our everyday world. Language is what people use to make distinctions. If there was no one around to call an apple an apple, it wouldn't exist as a separate object, only as part of the inseparable whole. Naming, consciousness, brings things into existence.
Of course, this is a metaphysical position, not a factual or scientific one. To me, it makes sense to say that anything that hasn't been observed by a conscious entity does not exist. Many people don't, or can't, see the sense in that.
So while sleeping or comatose, a person is just a "thing", and not a "being", like a sofa or toilet?
Quoting Mikie
Idealists (i.e. spiritualists) like Jung just ignore Sartre's pre-cogito maxim "existence preceeds essence".
Does it count that I once dreamt I was a toilet?
Possibly. :sweat:
It would be prudent to avoid that presumption.
Quoting Joshs
I hope you awoke flush with happiness.
Quoting Banno
We may want to include the idea that existence and being point to the same concept, that of becoming as difference.
And likewise also prudent to dismiss your statement about a "non-conscious being" which implies such a presumption.
Quoting Joshs
Explain how this "idea" follows from a distinction of "existence and being".
Any dictionary you look at will use being and existence as synonyms for each other. If you don't think they're the same, what is the difference?
Quoting T Clark
I'll leave that question for you, @Joshs.
Yes! Another omnibus consciousness thread. They're like lantana.
Too obscure a reference for our foreign chums?
When I was a kid I had a job pulling lantana with a chain on a tractor. Several times I was nearly killed. Nasty stuff.
More to the point, CS Peirce differentiated existence and reality. He said that existence is a binary property that can be ascribed to any concept or entity, depending on whether or not it satisfies certain logical criteria. For example, we might say that unicorns do not exist, because they fail to meet certain logical criteria for existence, such as being observable or verifiable in some way.
On the other hand, Peirce argued that reality is a far more complex and multifaceted concept that encompasses both the logical properties of existence as well as the broader metaphysical properties of being. Reality includes not only the things that exist, but also their relations, connections, and interactions with one another, and such things as probablities and possibilities. There is, for example, a real realm of possibility, but none of its inventory actually exists. But there are other things outside the realm of possibility.
Finally there are things like numbers, logical principles, scientific laws, and the like. In what sense do they exist? They can only be grasped by a rational intellect, but they're nevertheless real. So that's another kind of distinction that could be made.
Why would that matter? Would consciousness being more essential make more sense if we lived a different way?
I can see the argument for consciousness being primary. If you think of it psychologically, consciousness, as sensation, is prior to the abstraction of being and of the recognition of the external world as external.
"Being" presupposes non-being, it's an incoherent concept otherwise, but consciousness as simply sensation precedes any such distinctions.
[Quote]
So while sleeping or comatose, a person is just a "thing", and not a "being", like a sofa or toilet?[/quote]
Try treating them as either and they'll quickly disabuse you of the idea that they aren't conscious.
Right, and possibility is plenty efficient. The presence of unrealized possible states is what defines the entropy of a system, thermodynamics, the entire idea of phase space. It's essential for calculating the heat capacity of metals, etc.
As I am extremely influenced by Jung, I have thought about his understanding of consciousness a lot in relation to various thread discussions. It appears to me that there are ambiguities in his writings, which mean that his perspective can be interpreted in various ways. For example, recently I was reading, 'Philosophy: 100 Thinkers', by Philip Stokes, who listed Jung in the section on the materialists. However, in the discussion, Stokes acknowledged the way in which Jung incorporated a form of mysticism going back to the Greeks.
Part of the complexity of his perspective is that he starts from the assumptions of psychoanalysis drawn from Freud, which emerge from humanism and naturalism but he blends in so much from the various writers he has read. In a way, he rejects the supernatural by speaking of the collective unconscious as a natural source, but he does, at the same time, delve into metaphysics, including Kant. He sees archetypes as imminent in nature, but there is some parallel with the ideas of Plato. In doing so, he does come up with an understanding of mind which leans towards idealism, especially as he draws upon ideas in Eastern philosophy.
I wonder if you mean the same thing I did when I said making a distinction is what separates the undivided oneness into the things we know in the world.
This person would not stop being a person to others. It is a commonplace that we live in a social reality. If you ask whether the person is still a person to themselves when they are not conscious, I don't think the question makes any sense. I don't think anything is anything to an unconscious person. Isn't that what unconsciousness means?
I don't think anyone commented on this. Maybe I missed it. I wish I'd thought of it.
Quoting Wayfarer
In the southern US, there is a plant called kudzu which behaves in a similar fashion. It was brought in from Asia to help stop erosion. It works very well for that. If you drive along roads in Georgia or South Carolina, you'll see it completely covering trees and abandoned buildings. Once it gets started, it's hard to stop and overpowers native plants.
Would Lao Tzu say what he calls "existence" or "being" are the same things you and Peirce call "reality." That creation of the "complex and multifaceted concept that encompasses both the logical properties of existence as well as the broader metaphysical properties of being," is the process that brings things into existence.
In accordance with general usage I see no reason to think that 'being' is not synonymous with 'existence' and 'beings' is not synonymous with 'existents'.
Quoting T Clark
I noticed it but did not wish I had thought of it. I think it is best to leave bad jokes, like sleeping drunks, undisturbed.
Quoting Joshs
by trying to point out a philosophical distinction between 'being' and 'existence'.
But, getting back to the OP, on reflection, I agree with what Jung is trying to say. Elsewhere in the title he says 'without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists for us only insofar as it is consciously reflected by a psyche' - a point I have been arguing for in another thread.
I think that The Undiscovered Self is a Jung essay I must get hold of. From the Introduction:
Quoting The Undiscovered Self
:pray:
[quote=Carl Jung] What is more, most of the natural sciences try to represent the results of their investigations as though these had come into existence without mans intervention, in such a way that the collaboration of the psyche an indispensable factor remains invisible. (An exception to this is modern physics, which recognizes that the observed is not independent of the observer.) So in this respect, too, science conveys a picture of the world from which a real human psyche appears to be excluded the very antithesis of the humanities.[/quote]
:100: :clap:
I agree, and this is not the question I've asked.
I also considered that the person we are discussing is still a person to others, even if the person is unconscious. I assume you don't mean that either. I guess I don't understand the question you were asking.
This is what Wayfarer wrote.
Quoting Wayfarer
I guess I don't see the difference between "beings" and "things." Maybe that's not right. Maybe I just don't think the distinction is useful here. As I see it, consciousness brings all the differentiated aspects of the world into being, existence. In that context, we are just as much things as apples and hand grenades.
I think making the distinction between beings and things is part of a different discussion which can't take place until all the things, including us, are brought into existence. In that different context, the distinction makes more sense. Mixing them together doesn't work.
Beings have the capacity for experience - often the adjective 'sentient' is also added. Inanimate objects do not. In fact it suggests what I think is a pretty succinct definition for consciousness, i.e. 'the capacity for experience'.
Quoting T Clark
Customarily, the subject matter of ontology, which is suggested by the thread title.
As Ive stated many times before, Im not using being in the sense of sentient beings. Beings, in my usage, means things, or entities. Its anything whatsoever.
[quote=Jung]Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being.[/quote]
(Emphasis in original). I don't know if he's expressing a 'standard metaphysical view'.
I think the being/thing equivalence I am discussing is ontological while the being/thing distinction you are discussing is ethical.
I guess you probably find it annoying or condescending when people challenge you on this, and I dont want to be annoying or condescending, but it is rather rude (not very rude, just slightly rude) of you to ignore peoples helpful corrections for literally years (granted, not everyones comments about it have been made in a good-natured spirit of mutual philosophical exploration, but thats another matter).
The term being, referring to an individual, has a standard philosophical sense, meaning something which is.
(I avoided reference to existence and objects in that definition but I cant very easily avoid the thing, just because of the way language worksI suppose you could take something here to mean an individual or particular)
Your refusal to use the term in that way, if it has substance to it, must be something like the following: if the term etymologically derives from a first-person utterance, like I am, we model our notion of being on what it is to be conscious, without even knowing it. Therefore, we should say that only conscious beings are beings at all, to reveal and emphasize the centrality of consciousness to being.
Thats the strongest I can make your position on this. But I think it still fails to justify the way youre using the term, because you rarely make it clear that you are using it in your own technical way. You will just say, for example, that inanimate things are not beings, to people who are using being to mean anything, animate and inanimate, which is. And they are in line with standard philosophical usage, not you.
Or are you saying that only consciousnesses are, whereas inanimate objects merely exist? I doubt you want to go down that route. I think you probably agree that inanimate things are, even though this is plainly, linguistically, in contradiction to your wish to restrict being to animate individuals.
The thing is, you dont even have to stick to your non-standard terminology to carry the same point. I mean, you can say that consciousness is essential to being in some way without misusing the term. Your position on ontology doesnt depend on your eccentric use of being.
Ive said the following before and I think you might have taken it as insulting or dismissive, but I still suspect there is something in it. Being colloquially is in fact used in the way you want to use it in philosophy: the being from another world, for example. I havent looked into the history of this usage, but I suspect it comes from our use of human being, which allowed people to imagine non-human consciousnesses, which thereby became non-human beings. Thats fair enough, but it just isnt the way that its used in philosophy.
If youre saying it should be, thats also fair enough, but it doesnt entitle you to contradict others who are using it in the traditional philosophical sense.
And that is my final statement on the matter! :grin:
I think it's a fair analysis. It's not that I find it annoying, but I'm at a loss that the distinction accorded to beings as distinct from things seems to me Ontology 101, and conversely, the denial of that distinction seems Materialism 101, as to me, treating humans (and sentient beings generally) as objects is one of the symptoms of the dehumanising effects of materialism (as Jung might also say).
'To be' has various meanings - it can mean 'anything that is' or 'anything that has existence'. But in this case, and considering the context of the quote, I was referring to what is designated as 'a being'. That is a different case of the use of the word 'being' to the general sense of 'anything that exists'. When we talk of 'a being' as a noun then we're designating the subject of that sentence as 'a being'. And of course, beings and things both exist, but that is not the point at issue.
And no, I don't think that inanimate objects are individuals - unless you're including artefacts, which are, of course, manufactured by individuals. I suppose you could refer to an individual tree, or mountain, or river, but I don't know what special significance that has. I don't think you would refer to trees, mountains or rivers as beings, would you? Perhaps if you held to some form of folk religion you might.
But then, also consider the origin of the original post. The preceding sentence is
So in this sense 'being' does have a meaning which is not conveyed by 'the sum of everything that exists', as Jung is more or less arguing for an idealist philosophy. (Furthermore, I think this is deeply connected to why humans are called 'beings'.) I've read quite a bit of that text in the intervening hours, and he has a bit more to say on it, but overall it's about the dangers to individuation posed by mass culture and mass political and religious movements - rather similar in tone to Erich Fromm's 'Escape from Freedom' which must have been published around the same time.
Quoting Wayfarer
Thats the point: yes, I would, and thats how its always been used in philosophy. It doesnt commit one to materialism.
Can you point to a specific example?
I'm only claiming that beings are subjects of experience, whereas things are not. I don't even know how this is contestable or why there's an argument about it. Even the chatbots get it.
[quote=ChatGPT]Q: What is the difference between things and beings?
A: Things refer to inanimate objects, physical entities, or concepts that lack life or consciousness. They can include tangible objects such as rocks, buildings, and machines, as well as intangible concepts such as ideas, theories, and laws.
On the other hand, beings refer to living entities, whether they are animals, humans, or other organisms, that possess consciousness and the ability to think, feel, and act. Beings can experience emotions, make choices, and interact with the world around them.
In summary, the main difference between things and beings is that things are inanimate and lack life and consciousness, while beings are living entities that possess consciousness and the ability to think, feel, and act.[/quote]
As I say, thats because its the everyday, likely modern, usage. In philosophy, anything which can be said to be is a being.
How to understand the being of beings is maybe a different matter again.
[quote=Charles Kahn]These remarks are intended to render plausible my claim that, for the philosophical usage of the verb, the most fundamental value of 'einai' when used alone
(without predicates) is not 'to exist' but 'to be so' or 'to be the case'....
.... This intrinsically stable and lasting character of Being in Greek - which makes it so appropriate as the object of knowing and the correlative of truth - distinguishes it in a radical way from our modern notion of existence...The connotations of enduring stability which are inseparable from the meaning of 'einai' thus serve to distinguish the Greek concept of being from certain features of our modern notion of existence. [/quote]
That's why I avoided anything to do with existence in my analysis above.
But you can go against modern philosophy on this and yet use "being" to refer to anything. It still means anything which can be said to be.
How so? I had argued that the meaning of being as understood in ontology (derived from the Greek 'to be') is different to our usage of the verb 'to exist', and that is what Kahn says. (Although if rocks could talk, maybe they'd say something different.)
And again, anything that exists can be said to be, but that does not exhaust the meaning of being.
Over and definitely out :wink:
So anything that exists is (also) a being.
... Subject-things
Object-things
Objects with subjects¹ (e.g. persons)
Objects without subjects² (i.e. things).
The term 'being' (Sein) seems superfluous and anachronistic. Anyway, I agree with @Jamal and no surprise disagree with @Wayfarer's usage. Consider Heidegger's anti-cartesian denotations:
Or if one prefers:
subject-beings¹
nonsubject-beings²
:up:
The headline "scientists discover beings from outside the solar system," implies alien life not meteors passing through our neighborhood. The common usage of the distinction is simply based on "does it have first person subjective experiences."
As for sleeping people, consciousness doesn't disappear with sleep. People have REM and deep sleep dreams, even if they can't remember them later. Someone having night terrors and trying to put out a non-existent fire in their bed is obviously conscious in some sense even though they are asleep in important other ways. Someone with sleep paralysis acts like an unmoving object even though they are awake and panicking.
Because the "Hard Problem," is indeed hard, I don't think there is actually a useful criteria for telling beings and objects apart with this everyday terminology.
I would also argue against the "terminator" hypothesis that persons (or beings) cease to exist at the moment of death. George Washington is still President Washington. We can meaningfully talk about dead Christians or dead Muslims in a terrorist attack. We can talk about the Austrian dead on the Isonzo even though the people are dead and Austrian Empire is no more.
Certain elements of identity survive a person's biological life. This only makes sense from a purely physical view. Most of the matter that encodes information about one's identity exists in the brains of other people, not the self. Identity is created by the interaction of self and environment, and is encoded more in the former than the latter. So death leaves most of the physical elements instantiating identity quite intact, and this is why propositions about the attitudes held by dead people can have truth values.
Quoting T Clark
In that case the Tao is being as a whole existence. The individuated beings (things) that we differentiate in perception have as much existence an anything else, as beings.
Quoting T Clark
It wouldnt exist as a linguistic entity but animals interact with apples all the time. They seem to differentiate between them and what we call rocks just fine.
I think hes repeating Descartes. Descartes dualistic ontology is fairly standard, Id say. Even on the forum.
Quoting Jamal
Thanks for putting the time in to write all this out in detail. Ive been down this road with Wayfarer too many times already. But youre quite right: by being I mean anything whatsoever; by a being I mean any particular entity whatsoever. I dont know how to be any clearer.
That's true, but when Hegel or Heidegger talk about "Being" they're just talking about existence, they aren't talking about consciousness.
We just need to clarify.
That's interesting. I'm definitely not a substance dualist. I don't think @Wayfarer is, he's an non-dualist, although he might not identify as a monist exactly. Bartricks definitely did seem like a substance dualist. So is @Hanover I think. I can't think of any others off the top of my head. Maybe a few of the overtly religious members. But I'd say generally substance dualism is very non-standard, even on the forum, for good reason.
All of this seems confused. Consciousness is not simply sensation, and being is not simply an abstraction any more than life is an abstraction. But if it is, then sos consciousness and sensation.
Merely proclaiming that consciousness = sensation, and sensation is prior to all abstractions, is only shifting definitions. Besides, one (or something) has to be before it senses anything whatever.
That being is incoherent has quite a history. Heidegger has useful things to say about it. Its a tricky term, but not at all incoherent. We use it and interpret it constantly, even if theres no agreed technical definition. Likewise energy isnt incoherent, although it has several definitions including a technical one in physics. I know what people mean when they say it in context, although if pressed it would be perhaps more difficult to pin down.
Like I said, this is thinking of it psychologically. My 11 month old son experiences sensation, he does not have any concept of being as such. Such a concept necessarily implies an understanding of non-being, the idea that one can meaningfully specify "that which does not exist." Otherwise "being" applies equally to all things and is contentless.
My friends' toddler children also seem to lack any sense of being as a concept. A similar thing seems to crop up when stroke victims describe their experiences. When I recall deep sleep dreams, they are generally in a strange way linguistic and repetitive, but also contentless.
Sensation is prior to other parts of consciousness because presumably infants in the womb, dogs, toads, etc. experience sensation. Being doesn't come into it in that a dog's sensation probably lacks any distinction between what it experiences and remembers experiencing and things' existence or non-existence "of themselves."
The whole concept of appearances versus reality requires that one have been fooled by their senses before. Otherwise, wouldn't the naive point of view be "what you see is what there is." Sort of how babies lack object permanence. How does a baby in the womb have a concept of what is and what is not? But they appear to have sensation.
Heidegger hammers this home in "What is Metaphysics.". The advantage of his account is that it doesn't position us in some unobtainable position beyond our own subjectivity.
Right. The dominant schema used for this issue has been to posit two distinct modes of being, the subjective and objective. The subjective is said to emerge from the objective.
In this view, objective being must preceed or be simultaneous with subjective being, as there can be no entity without objective being that has subjective being.
The main problem I see with this schema is that there is a strong tendency to describe the objective world in terms of what it would "look like" for a subjective observer that, contradictorily, lacks objective being. This is the "view from nowhere," "view from everywhere," or "God's eye view."
The problem with it is practical, not necessarily philosophical. For example, it took so long for physicists to propose an adequate solution for Maxwell's Demon because they kept uncritically positing a demon that can observe and store information in memory without possessing any physical/objective memory storage medium. This problem shows up everywhere when we talk about "fundemental differences/information" instead of relative indiscernibility based on which system is interacting with which other. Example: enzymes can generally not distinguish between a chemical composed of isotopes and one that is not. For their interactions, these differences do not exist.
IMO, there is something missing in this schema. It takes abstractions that exist as part of mental life to be more fundamental than the rest of mental life. However, these abstractions are just parts of mental life, formed from subjective observation and reasoning. A full explanation needs to also explain how the reasoning subject constructs the model and the bridge between the model of the objective that is an element of subjective life and the external world simpliciter. In general, I think this requires subsuming the subjective and objective into a larger whole, not one subsuming the other, as in physicalism and many forms of idealism.
However, assuming the primacy of one or the other is certainly pragmatically useful (see most models in the natural sciences, phenomenology, some aspects of psychology, etc.).
Okay, Carl, now tell us how you really feel.
The separation Jung is making here is surely worthy of being challenged. I brought it up to note that he explicitly acknowledges what he is departing from rather than making a replacement narrative.
Really? I thought we were right on target. Still, I think I said all I had to say anyway.
[Edit] I see @Mikie's later comment now.
Quoting Mikie
I think the difference you and I are having is a metaphysical not a factual one. There's no need for us to get into a back and forth, but here are two quotes from the Tao Te Ching that lay out my understanding of how Taoists see this. Both are from Ellen Marie Chen's translation. The ten thousand things represent the multiplicity of things, i.e. distinctions. Being applies to them. Non-being represents the Tao, the undivided unity.
Verse 1:
[i]Non-being, to name the origin of heaven and earth;
Being, to name the mother of ten thousand things.[/i]
Verse 40
[i]Returning is the movement of Tao.
Weak is the functioning of Tao.
Ten thousand things under heaven are born of being.
Being is born of non-being.[/i]
As I said, we don't have to take this any further. I don't want to distract from your discussion.
Phenomenology may appear to subsume the objective within the subjective, but it redefines subjective such that it becomes merely one pole of an indissociable interaction. It is this interaction which is primary, not a pre-constituted ideal subject.
But he is, and has a preontological understanding of being (a Heidegger phrase) or pre-theoretical concept of being. He may not have a great concept of life either. Doesnt mean hes not alive even from a psychological point of view.
Likewise we dont cease to be simply because we havent abstracted its meaning.
Its not a distraction, but I agree we dont have to continue on. Ill leave it by saying that I find Taoism fascinating, but am no expert on it. Appreciate the quotes.
Yeah maybe you can take it from here. Its not off topic, in my view, but wasnt what I wanted to get into the weeds about myself. I was more interested in those defending Jung.
He may claim hes departing from rationalism, although I dont get that from the text you cited but in any case, I think many people probably think theyre rebelling against Descartes in some way, but end up talking exactly like him when it comes down to it. Jung seems to be no exception. Appreciate the attempt maybe Im missing something.
The bolded part would be an exit from philosophy into mysticism a la Wittgenstein. Right?
I meant to say he is departing from the domain of rationalist explanation but not negating them. He rejects Nietzsche's rejection of 'laws of nature', for instance. So, Jung does talk like Descartes in many registers but is exploring what is underneath him at the same time.
Jung cannot speak of 'psychologists in disguise' without philosophers who aren't doing that. Perhaps he is trying to have his cake and eat it too.
:up: This point is also made in The Hidden Self:
This is why a lot of what is paraded around by the media prophets of scientism as secular humanism is anything but humanistic. (It's also why books about 'quantum consciousness' have come into existence.)
[quote=""Paine;786157"]The victory of Hegel over Kant dealt the gravest blow to reason and to the further development of the German and, ultimately, of the European mind, all the more dangerous as Hegel was a psychologist in disguise who projected great truths out of the subjective sphere into a cosmos he himself had created - Jung, On the Nature of the Psyche, 358[/quote]
I have read some articles suggesting that Kant and Schopenhauer anticipate Freud's discovery of the unconscious - which seems fairly obvious when you think about it. For Kant, much of what we think we know is determined by categorial structures that lie beneath the threshold of conscious awareness. For Schopenhauer, transcendence can be sought through art as a symbolic form of the Sublime. Whereas Hegel attempts to explain everything, to make it all explicit, but in so doing, 'projected great truths out of the subjective sphere into a cosmos he himself had created.' It seems a sound analysis to me.
The differentiation of Being and things is also explicit in Heidegger:
[quote=Heidegger's Ways of Being;https://philosophynow.org/issues/125/Heideggers_Ways_of_Being]The formidable task that Heidegger sets himself in Being and Time is to respond to the question What is Being? This Question of Being has a long heritage in the Western philosophical tradition, but for Heidegger, to merely ask what is Being? is problematic, as that emphasis tends to objectify Being as a thing' that is to say, it separates off Being (whatever it is) from the questioner of Being. [/quote]
Bolds added. I see the effort to equate being with the simply existent as an attempt to short-circuit the whole question of 'the meaning of being'.
Quoting bert1
There is a theme in the perennial philosophies, 'nature knows herself in the human' - the 'human as microcosm' of the Hermetics, the 'primordial human' of the Rg Veda. I think this is much nearer Jung's point. The various creation mythologies can then be read as a symbolic representation of the emergence of intentionality ('breathes life into clay'). The mistake of materialism is to assume that this is consequential rather than causal.
I say that beings are subjects of experience, which is a simple fact. As for the various meanings of the verb 'to be', it's a different matter, but it's not relevant to the question implied in the OP.
Yes, Kant and Schopenhauer presented an underlying scaffold that undergirds conscious experience. On the other hand, they would have shot beer through their nostrils if told there was a collective unconscious.
I think there is a truth in Jung's criticism of Hegel. With some aspects of Jung's psychology, I wonder if he is not guilty of the same charge. I also wonder if there is a way to see that Hegel established a framework that permits the logos of Jung. The master's appentice.....
That is an interesting idea. I feel it is incumbent upon you to compare them side by side. Otherwise, my response would be a rebuttal in search of a thesis.
At the very least, would you accept the idea is completely foreign to Kant?
So "simple" that you can demonstrate this and yet haven't bothered to why? Just because you keep saying it doesn't make your definition a "fact". :roll:
It's certainly not articulated by Kant, I would agree with that. But then, if you adapt the idea of the collective unconscious, it's not difficult to see, for example, mythologies as being an expression of it.
As a naturalist I find that B is most consistent internally as well as with all that we know scientifically publicly so for about narure.
Quoting Wayfarer
I don't get it. Words can mean different things in different contexts. Using "being" in reference to a sentient or conscious entity, e.g. human being, is perfectly reasonable in philosophy or everyday speech. Whether or not that particular usage is relevant to this particular discussion is another matter.
Of course. But what I keep trying, and failing, to explain to you, is basically summarised by this point that I've already posted, from Jung, in the essay we're discussing:
Most naturalism falls into this trap - it thinks that 'the universe' would exist just as it is, were there no subject to experience it. But it doesn't see the way in which 'the subject' actually brings the Universe into being through providing the perspective within which the very ideas of 'existence' and 'non-existence' are meaningful in the first place. 'Materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets himself', said Schopenhauer. This is why I keep saying that the naturalist view depends on the framework of conscious experience within which it is formulated and which precedes it, but then it pretends that it is seeing reality as it is, as if it has entirely cut off the subjective, rather than just bracketing it out. This is 'the blind spot of science'.
[hide="Reveal"]Quoting The Blind Spot of Science[/hide]
What is needed is a change of perspective, something like a gestalt shift, which is more than a matter of propositional knowledge.
Quoting T Clark
Of course. That's what I've said. 'A being' is a subject of experience. The verb 'to be' has many other meanings, including 'whatever exists'. That is the sense in which Mikie and Jamal believe it should be used, but I'm saying it is not adequate to interpret the meaning of the word 'being' as is used in the quotation from Carl Jung.
Looks like I failed again.
You're using the word in the common modern way in conversations about metaphysics, where others are using it in the traditional philosophical sense. This causes confusion. You are not entitled to say to people in a philosophical conversation that, hey, by the way, trees are not beings because they are not subjects of experience.
Imagine joining a zoology forum and saying, "in my opinion, the word 'primate' refers only to apes."
Maybe an even better analogy would be to say, "in my opinion, the word 'animal' refers only to mammals."
Quoting Wayfarer
Use it how you like, but make it clear if you're not using it in the way it's used in traditional metaphysics.
Whereas you are?
Quoting Jamal
I don't understand your point.
So you can't even honestly reply without a wall of quoted texts to this poll . Pathetic. :shade:
:up:
@universeness @ucarr
Quoting Jamal
I was showing that when philosophers say that everything that can be said to be is a being (which should be obvious), they are not advancing a metaphysical view. They can equally say that rocks and other non-human beings are conscious as say that all beings are material or whatever. It's neutral.
This discussion has really gone off the deep end. Arguments about definitions are almost universal here on the forum. The definition of "being" that @Wayfarer is using can be perfectly reasonable in both everyday and philosophical discussions, depending on context. I admit he looks at things differently than I generally do, but I see things differently from many people here. I don't understand why you've being so aggressive.
Yes, I agree.
The problem is that his use is often not in fact reasonable in context. I've demonstrated this in my posts. You might be interested in reading them.
Aristotle, Aquinas, Heidegger, and many others use the term to mean anything that is, i.e., anything that can be said to be. Nobody has to follow them in this usage, of course, but @Wayfarer actually attempts to correct people who use the word in this traditional way, by saying that, actually, only sentient individuals are beings.
Can you see the problem? Can you see that if you say to Aristotle "hey, actually only sentient individuals are beings", you're not making a philosophical point, but just refusing to use Aristotle's terminology and expressing your refusal in a misleadingly substantive statement?
I forgot to respond to this. I don't think I've been aggressive. If you look at all my posts here you'll see I've been polite. I have argued forcefully, that's all. If I'm wrong about that please let me know; I don't want to come across as aggressive.
He also differentiated notions of existence.
Existentiell and existential are key terms in Martin Heidegger's early philosophy. Existentiell refers to the aspects of the world which are identifiable as particular delimited questions or issues, whereas existential refers to Being as such, which permeates all things, so to speak, and can not be delimited in such a way as to be susceptible to factual knowledge. In general it can be said that "existentiell" refers to a "what", a materially describable reality, whereas "existential" refers to structures inherent in any possible world. In other words, the term "existentiell" refers to an ontic determination, whereas "existential" refers to an ontological determination.[1]
From here
You say "The differentiation of Being and things is also explicit in Heidegger. Note you didn't say that "the differentiation of beings and things is also explicit in Heidegger". You could have correctly said 'the differentiation of existence and existents is also explicit in Heidegger". I keep pointing this out to you ad nauseum and you always just ignore it, presumably because it doesn't suit you to acknowledge a counterpoint you cannot address reasonably.
All things that are, conceptually speaking, are be-ings just as long as they continue to be. There are sentient beings and insentient beings, just as there are sentient existents and insentient existents or sentient things and insentient things.
Myths are an essential element of Jung's concept. Thinking about them near Kant reminds me of how staunchly Kant opposed superstition.(exept, of course, the mystery of his personal belief) The interest Jung took in Alchemy would be close to dark magic from that perspective.
One of things I find interesting in Jung is that some portion of the 'scientific method' has a parent people are uncomfortable talking about.
Yes, astronomy may have begun as astrology, and chemistry as alchemy. But that would not seem to be surprising or anything to feel uncomfortable about.
Unless you believed that those beginnings implied influences that were deemed demonic afterwards.
Yes, I think this is worth pointing out clearly like this. It's confusing otherwise.
:ok: Fair enough, although that would not seem to be a likely view of the modern materialist.
To repeat my point for anyone interested: a being in pre- and non-analytic philosophy is anything that isanything that can be said to be.
This is not an attack on any worldview or ontological claim; it is information.
I don't think so. He was just drawing out the psychology inherent in esotericism. Check out "The Stone Speaks.". It's all about the astrological symbol of Mercury and the image of the Hermit. Fascinating stuff.
:up:
Is that how Kant would have looked at it? That was my question.
Your observation made by Jung is interesting.
Incidentally, the reason I said "pre- and non-analytic" is that in analytic philosophy, being has pretty much been replaced by existence. What is important about this for my purpose here is nothing to do with the fact that the difference between being and existence has been denied, but simply that most analytic philosophers don't talk about being or beings any more, and if they do use the term "beings" they're probably just as likely to use it in the popular modern sense as the traditional sense.
I love it when I reply to myself.
Kant would have to travel to the early 20th Century to understand Jung's interest in alchemy. Spiritualism was really popular throughout the US and Europe. People were fascinated with contacting the dead and using magic.
Jung treated astrology as if it was a blueprint for the psyche. I was reading something by Jung one time and it occurred to me that he was a product of his times. And then he actually said that! It blew my mind that he knew that about himself. How aware are we that the world we see is shaped by our times?
I hadn't been following this discussion closely, but when things got lively, I went back and read the relevant posts, including yours. Words mean different things to different people in different places at different times in different contexts, especially important words like "to be" and related words. If you look at definitions of "being", a person or other living thing is one of them.
Both of you seem to be making reasonable arguments. Your usage is more in line with the way I normally see things in a philosophical context. What I'm not certain about is how Jung fits into all of this. He was included in the OP. I don't know much about his beliefs. He seems like something of a mystic. That made me think that what @Wayfarer was saying was consistent with how Jung saw things. I don't know enough to judge.
When I said you were being aggressive, I didn't mean you were being impolite. I tend to be pretty aggressive sometimes. I'm just not used to seeing that from you. You're supposed to be nicer than I am.
That's a fair point. I confess I'm not interested in the OP and that I'm carrying on a conversation I've been having with @Wayfarer for many years. I suppose I've derailed the thread. We'll see what @Mikie does about it :razz:
Quoting T Clark
How little you know, TC. I took a break from robust philosophical debate for five or six years, and now I'm back.
Honestly though, I don't see where I've been aggressive. Muscular, perhaps.
I agree. It's simply a robust exchange of views. And I acknowledge that my philosophical approach rubs a lot of people up the wrong way.
Quoting Jamal
What I said was that 'beings are subjects of experience'. That, of course, is not the only meaning of 'being' or 'to be', which is not and has never been at issue. You and I and the cat on the mat and the tree and the rock are all existents - we all exist. But the cat and you and I are also subjects of experience, and it's a difference that makes a difference.
The starting point of this whole debate was years ago, when I opined that the noun 'ontology' ought not to be understood simply as 'the classification of what exists'. That, I said, was properly the domain of the natural sciences, whereas ontology was originally conceived strictly as 'the meaning of "being"', while noting in passing that a source I had found (no longer extant) said that the etymology of the term 'ontology' was derived from the first-person participle of the verb 'to be' - which is 'I am'. I took that to mean that it refers to an exploration of the meaning of being, in terms different to those accepted by the natural sciences, which naturally pursues science along objective criteria. This is what provoked an (one could only say) hysterical denunciation from a former member here. I was then sent the Charles Kahn article The Greek Verb To Be and the Problem of Being, which, as I already showed, clearly demonstrates that 'ontology' as classically understood embraced a wider range of meanings than the modern notion of 'to exist'. And the fact that this is no longer understood by analytical philosophers is no credit to them, simply a reflection of the zeitgeist.
Quoting Janus
Sure. I accept that. I've never claimed any expertise in Heidegger, but 180 brought it up. I know that he placed humans in a priviledged position regarding Dasein and I think he would differentiate sentient beings from things. (I'm reading up on What Is a Thing but I must admit hesitancy about Heidegger due to his nazism.)
I think his Nazism was a mistake that he soon recognized and he may have been too proud to acknowledge that it was a mistake. That said, his philosophy, being apolitical, is what it is is regardless of his politics.
Heidegger does think that being depends on Dasein, in the sense that it is we who see all things, both sentient and insentient, as be-ings. Note that Dasein means "being there" or "there being", and denotes, at least in Heidegger's usage, the awareness of be-ing, so Dasein is "the being for whom its being is an issue for it": a self-reflective being.
Sure, but that's not the issue here.
Quoting Wayfarer
I've already agreed that being and existence are different concepts. Again, that doesn't support your attempt to restrict the use of "beings". And I'm aware that ontology is about being rather than existence. Can you explain why you think this is relevant? A being to Aristotle is whatever can be said to be. What is your reason for telling him he is wrong? (As you have told people here many times)
I've tried to explain that our differing uses of the word are independent of metaphysical views.
In the end, I and even the vitriolic ex-member you mentionedwho you'll admit was very well-readare giving you information. It feels weird to have to argue for it and to be asked to prove it.
WAYFARER: I'm going to the capital of Canada next week!
JAMAL: Cool! Ottawa is nice this time of year
WAYFARER: No, I'm going to Toronto
JAMAL: But the capital of Canada is Ottawa
WAYFARER: Citations please!
Quoting Jamal
That is only what I tried to argue in the first place!
Quoting Jamal
I don't think I've done that, anywhere. That snippet you provided about Aristotle claims that his books of the Metaphysics are 'among the most difficult' in the Western corpus, but then, the belief is now that all this is superseded, Aristotelian metaphysics is the preserve of churchmen and academics. It is in that context that I made the point about the difference between the classical and modern understanding of the question of the nature of being. The modern understanding is that this is largely a scientific matter, as some contributors here have already asserted.
I don't recall telling anyone that they're wrong, but I will continue to argue that eliding the distinction between beings and things results in treating humans (and other sentient beings) as objects, and that this is deeply embedded in our way of thinking. (So saying that trees are beings might be a step in the right direction, although it would have major ramifications for the forestry industry!) This is very much one of the themes in The Hidden Self. There is a lot of critical commentary on the 'objectification' of humans by science, which brackets out the fundamentally subjective dimension of existence.
Well no, what I have been responding to is your claim that beings are subjects of experience, that things which are not subjects of experience are not beings. The difference between being and existence is an independent issue.
Quoting Wayfarer
Quoting Wayfarer
I think you've done it many times. Are you going to force me to go and look? You have said to people, for example, that inanimate things are not beings, in conversations about metaphysics, where "beings" standardly refers to anything which can be said to be.
If there were an antisemitic painter for example, whose paintings had nothing to do with antisemitism, would that have any bearing on their value or lack of value as paintings? I would say not.
In any case, there is no fact of the matter as to whether his philosophy should be considered in that light or not; it is a matter of personal choice.
I will henceforth agree that anything that exists can be called an existent or an existing thing and that of anything that exists that it can be said to be. I'll add that as a caveat in all such discussions. Would that help?
Physicalists and such people reduce the difference between sentient individuals (e.g., humans) and non-sentient individuals (e.g., trees) to a difference in degree, rejecting the idea that they are different in kind. In parallel with this, being has been rejected in favour of existence. Therefore to use "beings", which commonly these days refers to subjects of experience rather than inanimate things, to refer to the latter, is to support the physicalist reduction of the difference between subjects and objects.
This seems to me a simple misunderstanding. To say that inanimate things are beings is not in fact to say anything at all about subjectivity, when the word is being used in the traditional philosophical sense.
Only if you take the next step, the one that follows: accept that traditionally in philosophy, anything that can be said to be is a being.
They are different words, obviously. But in common usage the basic concepts to be and to exist seem to be more or less synonymous. 'To exist' does seem to carry the implicit notion of standing out, whereas "to be", perhaps not so much, but this has nothing to do with being, or existing as, a conscious entity, being or existent. :wink:
Quoting Jamal
Case in point.
There's a difference in pre-modern philosophy, which is what @Wayfarer is getting at. Something like... existence partakes of being, the latter being more fundamental. I only mentioned it because Wayfarer keeps bringing it up.
That is an oversimplification. It is an axiom of materialism that there is only one substance, in the philosophical sense, which is matter (nowadays matter-energy). It is assumed by many whether they consciously articulate it or not. Accordingly, there can be no ontological distinction between things and beings, as an ontological distinction would mean a different kind of being, which materialism can't allow. (For further elaboration I'll refer back to the article linked in this post.)
Quoting Jamal
That is one I will need a citation for.
Notice in the Brittannica snippet you cited:
"For Aristotle, being is whatever is anything whatever. Whenever Aristotle explains the meaning of being, he does so by explaining the sense of the Greek verb to be. Being contains whatever items can be the subjects of true propositions containing the word is, whether "
The reference here is not to *a* being, but to being. Is there a citation where Aristotle refers to anything inanimate as 'a being'?
The Brittanica article that contains the quote from Aristotle, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Being
is quite a good jumping-off point for the history of the idea in philosophy.
Still on mobile so it's a hassle.
But I do rather resent being asked for citations. You've been given this information numerous times, often by very knowledgeable people. Is it fair to reject it until they can prove it with quotations? Don't you want to go and check by yourself? I'm not mistaken here, just go and look.
But sure, I might be able to get some stuff together tomorrow.
Don't worry about it, then. A sentence would do, anything you can think of where a classical philosophy text refers to inanimate objects as 'beings'.
Surely it is not an important issue anyway since the difference between sentient and insentient beings is not in question.
Yes indeed. In this thread I believe Wayfarer is saying that Jungs use of being is more in line with sentience, but I still dont see how. In that case Jung would be arguing that consciousness is a precondition of sentience a rather odd thing to say.
Quoting Janus
Yes.
Quoting Jamal
I cant do shit yet. But Im working on a mutiny.
This is comical.
Do you really doubt this claim? Are you implying that Aristotle wouldnt say that a rock is a being?
Rocks are beings. Are rocks sentient beings, like human beings? No.
Flowers are beings. Bachs fugues are beings. Numbers are beings. Parachutes are beings.
At least according to what I and traditional ontology mean. You seem to understand this. But if you do, then whats the problem here?
Do you have the quote? I pulled up page 48 in my copy, but strangely it wasn't there. :chin:
Yeah, its from my book. But Im not at home right now. I can get you the print edition and whatnot.
No worries, was being a bit cheeky but also serious; I can of course dig around myself, and better yet get context. don't sweat it.
:roll:
'Materiality' corresponds to embodied change and 'immateriality' (e.g. idealism) to disembodied change. Yes, the latter doesn't make sense and the former seems (too) reductive / mechanical. Nonetheless, insofar as there are 'subjectivities', at minimum they are material persons embodied self-referential phenomenal systems and not ghosts, Wayfarer. Speculations, or paradigms, which include ghosts (i.e. disembodied "minds") are more conceptually incoherent and inexplicable than no matter how incomplete (e.g. eliminative) those which do not. Nothing you have written here (or elsewhere) not ad infinitum appeals to authority citations persuasively challenges my preceding statement. A non-fallacious counterpoint in your own words, sir, would be a refreshing, and no doubt edifying, welcomed change in your m.o. :clap:
Surrounding page 48 for me is Chapter III: The Position of the West on the Question of Religion.
If you look at just about any dictionary, one of the definitions of "being" will be "a living thing." My point is not that @Wayfarer is right in this instance, only that his use of the word "being" is not unreasonable.
You started this thing. All of this is your fault.
This is one of the reasons I like Kindle so much. Yes, yes, I know. You like the sensual feel of turning the pages of a real book.
By dig around I just meant search for his quote from nearby in the text.
But yes, I did that physically, sensually, and I loved the experience, but I found nothing. But I trust I missed it.
So how does this stack up against Jungs idea that the thread is opened with? Doesnt this imply that Jung is saying that consciousness is a precondition for the existence of rocks? Is that what you think he means?
If Im following right, basically that it devalues sentience, which is kind of ironic because Buddhists are intent on extinguishing sentience.
I was just teasing you for your endearing technophobia.
The passage from which the thread title is extracted, is as follows:
[quote=Carl Jung]Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being.[/quote]
Straw poll: who else participating in this thread accepts that rocks are beings?
(It seems we might be being infiltrated by panpsychists ;-) )
You should tell that to all those Buddhist activists who go around liberating caged animals.
I vote "question is unclear".
Liberating caged beings in order to eliminate their suffering is not the same as extinguishing sentience altogether which would be the ultimate elimination of suffering. But then you would have to find a way of extinguishing sentience which didn't involve any suffering I guess. :chin:
Quoting T Clark
I agree that it is not unreasonable to use the word that way, but he could just add the word sentient and achieve exactly the same effect for his argument without drawing all the criticism for denying that any other usage is allowable.
I do, but coming from a panpsychist that doesn't help does it?
But even if rocks weren't conscious (which they most definitely are) I'd still say they are beings, sorry. But I know what you mean, 'being' often is used they way you use it. In philosophy I'd say 'things that exist = beings.'
Consciousness [hide=*](self modifying embodiment?)[/hide] is a precondition for the conceptualisation of being. IE, consciousness is prior to being in the order of knowing.
Being is a precondition of consciousness in the order of events. There needs to be something at all before any being can be considered conscious. IE, being is prior to consciousness in the order of events. Or, if you will, being itself.
Is there being before becoming? Is there identity before difference?
Is there egg before chicken?
Yes, according to Deleuze.
That doesn't mention chickens. Consider:
"The world is an egg, but the egg itself is a theatre: a
staged theatre in which the chickens dominate the actors, the spaces dominate the chickens and the Ideas dominate the spaces."
And Hegel.
Quoting bert1
Sounds a like a scene in Pink Flamingos
Quoting Jamal
Quoting Wayfarer
?? ???? (ta onta) is what appears in ancient Greek philosophy. It's the plural form of the participle of the verb to be and it means things that are, or, to say exactly the same in a different way, beings.
In English versions of Aristotle it has been translated in different ways, often avoiding beings and opting instead for things that are. The Loeb Classical Library notes that it avoids "beings" while at the same time acknowledging that it is a standard translation, that it has the same sense.
[quote=Early Greek Philosophy, Volume I: Introductory and Reference Materials]The plural neuter form of the participle, ta onta, occurs frequently to indicate things, things that are, beings (but we have tended to avoid the translation 'beings')[/quote]
I don't know the reason for the general avoidance of "beings" in translations of Aristotle, but it could be the prevalence of the more modern use, which restricts it to sentient things (subjects of experience if you prefer). This is reasonable in a translation that aims to avoid confusing non-specialists, but it doesn't invalidate the use of "beings" generally in philosophy (to mean "things that are"). At least, it hasn't stopped scholars from continuing to use it.
The main point is that ?? ???? can interchangeably be translated as "things that are" or "beings". In philosophy they usually mean the same.
Aristotle deals with ?? ???? in his Categories and Metaphysics. In those works, ?? ???? is plainly not restricted to sentient individuals or subjects of experience (it can't be, because of what it means).
But to avoid translation issues I won't quote Aristotle directly. Following are quotations from a fairly small and random sample of articles in the search results for the term "beings" on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, showing that it's commonly used in philosophy to mean ?? ???? or "things that are" or "things that can be said to be", especially when the subject under discussion is traditional metaphysics. Many of the quotations are from scholars of ancient and medieval philosophy.
[quote=SEP: Aristotle's Metaphysics;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/]The Categories begins with a strikingly general and exhaustive account of the things there are (ta onta)beings. According to this account, beings can be divided into ten distinct categories. (Although Aristotle never says so, it is tempting to suppose that these categories are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the things there are.) They include substance, quality, quantity, and relation, among others. Of these categories of beings, it is the first, substance (ousia), to which Aristotle gives a privileged position.[/quote]
[quote=SEP: Ramon Llull;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/llull/]The correlatives form, therefore, a complex structure that is reproduced throughout the ladder and in each one of the beings, from God to a stone, to ontologically explain the continuity among all beings. In each one of them, the chain of the whole of creation is reproduced.[/quote]
[quote=SEP: Aristotle;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle]Aristotle announces that there is nonetheless a science of being qua being (Met. iv 4), first philosophy, which takes as its subject matter beings insofar as they are beings and thus considers all and only those features pertaining to beings as suchto beings, that is, not insofar as they are mathematical or physical or human beings, but insofar as they are beings, full stop.[/quote]
[quote=SEP: Martin Heidegger;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/]On Heidegger's interpretation (see Sheehan 1975), Aristotle holds that since every meaningful appearance of beings involves an event in which a human being takes a being asas, say, a ship in which one can sail or as a god that one should respectwhat unites all the different modes of Being is that they realize some form of presence (present-ness) to human beings.
[...]
The foregoing considerations bring an important question to the fore: what, according to Heidegger, is so special about human beings as such? Here there are broadly speaking two routes that one might take through the text of Being and Time. The first unfolds as follows. If we look around at beings in generalfrom particles to planets, ants to apesit is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be.
[...]
Moreover, if science may sometimes operate with a sense of awe and wonder in the face of beings, it may point the way beyond the technological clearing, an effect that, as we shall see later, Heidegger thinks is achieved principally by some great art.
By revealing beings as no more than the measurable and the manipulable, technology ultimately reduces beings to not-beings.
[/quote]
[quote=SEP: Aristotles Metaphysics;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/]Aristotles study does not concern some recondite subject matter known as being qua being. Rather it is a study of being, or better, of beingsof things that can be said to bethat studies them in a particular way: as beings, in so far as they are beings.
Of course, first philosophy is not the only field of inquiry to study beings. Natural science and mathematics also study beings, but in different ways, under different aspects. The natural scientist studies them as things that are subject to the laws of nature, as things that move and undergo change. That is, the natural scientist studies things qua movable (i.e., in so far as they are subject to change). The mathematician studies things qua countable and measurable. The metaphysician, on the other hand, studies them in a more general and abstract wayqua beings. So first philosophy studies the causes and principles of beings qua beings.[/quote]
[quote=SEP: Thomas Aquinas;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/]It is not easy to think about Gods relationship to the created world, because without such a world there can be neither space nor time. Not space, because space is nothing more than the existence of bodies, where bodies are beings that possess parts outside of parts, and so constitute the three-dimensional extension that we think of as space.[/quote]
[quote=SEP: Aristotles Categories;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-categories/]Similarly, according to Aristotle, things in the world are not beings because they stand under some genus, being, but rather because they all stand in a relation to the primary being, which in the Categories he says is substance. This explains in part why he says in the Metaphysics that in order to study being one must study substance.[/quote]
[quote=SEP: Christian Wolff;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wolff-christian/]Recall that for Wolff a being in the most general sense is any possible thing. [...]
Wolff explains:
"A being is called composed which is made up of many parts distinct from each other. The parts of which a composite being is composed constitute a composite through the link which makes the many parts taken together a unit of a definite kind."
In one respect, simple beings and composite beings are not simply two different species of beings. It is not the case, for example, that within the realm of all possible things simple beings exist separate from, and in addition to, composite beings.
[/quote]
[quote=SEP: Postmodernism;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism/]Heidegger sees modern technology as the fulfillment of Western metaphysics, which he characterizes as the metaphysics of presence. From the time of the earliest philosophers, but definitively with Plato, says Heidegger, Western thought has conceived of being as the presence of beings, which in the modern world has come to mean the availability of beings for use. In fact, as he writes in Being and Time, the presence of beings tends to disappear into the transparency of their usefulness as things ready-to-hand.[/quote]
[quote=SEP: Platos Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-metaphysics/]Forms are marked as auto kath auto beings, beings that are what they are in virtue of themselves.[/quote]
There are pages and pages of this, but I have other sources aside from the SEP if you need them.
These are all relevant citations, but I'm afraid that they don't prove the contention that no distinction is made in philosophy between 'beings' and 'things'.
Quoting Jamal
Probably for the reasons that I have given.
Quoting SEP: Aristotles Metaphysics
Note the distinction here between 'things' subject to the laws of nature and 'beings' in a more general sense. What has been translated as 'substantia' in Latin, and thence 'substance' in English, was 'ouisia' in Aristotle. So the metaphysican studies 'the being' of things, how they 'come to be'. (This is the substance of The Greek Verb to Be and the Meaning of Being by Kahn, although he mainly concentrates on Aristotle's predecessors.)
Quoting SEP: Ramon Llull
This is a reference to 'the Great Chain of Being'. In that chain, each step represents an ontological level or plane of being. Minerals and inorganic matter at the bottom is, in this scheme, the least real, then ascending through vegetable, animal, human, angels, and God.
This is generally considered archaic in modern philosophy. According to materialism only the bottom rung (matter-energy) is considered real, with everything else derived from it by some unexplained power (usually generally designated under the heading of 'evolution'). My general view is that the whole notion the vertical dimension of Being was abandoned in the advent of modernity, which is why the distinctions of different levels of being, and the distinction between things and beings, is no longer intelligible.
I agree. I have not been arguing for that position. I have been demonstrating that "beings" is commonly used in philosophy to mean that which can be said to be, or that which is, therefore that you are not justified in saying that beings, to be beings, must be subjects of experience.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, in the very same sentence I said it was probably because your favoured sense of "beings" is now widespread.
Quoting Wayfarer
Agreed. I don't see how that affects my point though.
Quoting Wayfarer
I see where you're coming from, but my point still stands (and stands well-supported now I think).
Well, we'll just have to agree to disagree on that, but it's been good discussion.
I think the materials you cited locate the source of the debate, which is in the rejection of 'levels of being', don't you think?
(I'm going to be scarce for a few days due to work stuff.)
I've enjoyed it too, but your position simply can't be maintained. You asked for citations and I provided them. Are you saying that the quotations do not show that it's normal, standard, conventional, and traditional that "beings" in philosophy are whatever can be said to be?
Or are you saying that the authors of the quoted articles are misusing the term? Or are you instead saying that those quotations are a misrepresentative selection?
None of them directly refer to inanimate things as beings. They're discussions of 'the nature of being' in which context everything is subsumed under the heading 'beings', in the sense of 'things that exist'. But none of them equivocate 'beings' and 'inanimate things'. In fact you even acknowledge it:
Quoting Jamal
I'm saying that this is the reason!. And even supporting it with another of your citations about 'the great chain of being' which provides the basis for the ancient and medieval distinction between non-living and living of various degrees (vegetative, animal, human). You won't find anything in there to support the contention of rocks being conscious. (It is of course a truism that the whole idea of the great chain of being is now considered thoroughly obsolete in modern philosophy, but there's where the distinction originates.)
Please consider the quote in the original post again:
[quote=Carl Jung] Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being.[/quote]
My question was an attempt to spell out why Jung would say this. I was attempting to interpret the OP. As I asked already, does Jung mean by this that consciousness is a pre-condition for the existence of rocks? I think that it is clearly an absurd suggestion. So what does he mean 'consciousness is a pre-condition of being'? I was trying to elucidate the philosophical implication of the term human being in response to the use of 'being' in this quotation. And so far, I don't think any light has been cast on that whatever.
(Now, I really do have to log out for at least the working day, I have major work commitments. And I'm really not being stubborn, but I refuse to admit to an error that I haven't made.)
That is patently untrue. I suggest you read them again. Those that don't name inanimate beings explicitly--and there are two or three which do--directly entail that meaning.
Quoting Wayfarer
This demonstrates that you are still misunderstanding my point, quite radically. I don't know why you think I was trying to show that rocks are conscious, or that I was trying to show that philosophers thought so. Or is that not what you are saying?
Quoting Wayfarer
I have led the horse to water--you're the horse in this metaphor--in a golden carriage furnished with soft bedding and silks, carried on the backs of my loyal servants, to a crystal-clear pond of the sweetest purest water in the land, and still you do not drink!
Well, it's been fun trying.
I think what you say is clearly an absurd suggestion is precisely what Jung means. Without consciousness to disclose it, being would be "blind", hidden; nothing would appear. That's why he states the caveat "practically speaking".
SUBTOPIC: What is "Consciousness?" 'vs' What is "Being?"
?? T Clark, 180 Proof, Wayfarer, et al,
Consciousness
Being
Most Respectfully,
R
Philosophically speaking, they are.
Seeing as you sourced ChatGPT, I asked it for the philosophical definition of "being":
"Being is a philosophical term that is often used to describe the state or quality of existing or existing in a particular way. It is a broad concept that encompasses everything that exists, both tangible and intangible. Being involves the physical and the metaphysical, the natural and the spiritual, and the present and the future. Being can also refer to a philosophical state or condition of something or someone, such as the state of being alive, being conscious, or having a particular identity."
Or read:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontic
Yes.
Rocks are part of the world, right? So no world, no rocks.
Rocks are not conscious, but they are still things they are still beings in that sense. They have existence, they are. They show up in the world for a human being to perceive and label r-o-c-k.
Beings are things. Beings is not reserved strictly for sentient beings. It can be, sure, but thats not the common usage in ontology.
:100: Unfortunately, @Wayfarer seems acutely alleergic to contrary evidence.
Quoting bert1
:up:
Yes, e.g. from the link above the terms are used interchangeably:
"In more nuance, it means that which concerns particular, individuated beings rather than their modes of being; the present, actual thing in relation to the virtual, generalized dimension which makes that thing what it "is"."
A counter-intuituive use it can be argued, but that's philosophy.
So you agree then that the world is created by consciousness.
But as for the simple distinction between beings and things, I was returned this result:
[quote=ChatGPT]Q: What is the difference between things and beings?
A: Things refer to inanimate objects, physical entities, or concepts that lack life or consciousness. They can include tangible objects such as rocks, buildings, and machines, as well as intangible concepts such as ideas, theories, and laws.
On the other hand, beings refer to living entities, whether they are animals, humans, or other organisms, that possess consciousness and the ability to think, feel, and act. Beings can experience emotions, make choices, and interact with the world around them.
In summary, the main difference between things and beings is that things are inanimate and lack life and consciousness, while beings are living entities that possess consciousness and the ability to think, feel, and act.[/quote]
Which I take to be the regular meanings of the terms - 'language being use', and all that. And the further claim that this distinction in common language reflects an intuition which maybe no longer so obvious in current culture (and is being completely ignored in the foregoing discussion).
Quoting Janus
:up: Agree. So - can you see how I am trying to relate this to the designation of humans as 'beings'? i.e. that the human psyche is indispensable to the disclosure of being. So would such a state of 'blindness', to press the metaphor, even be 'a state of being'? Would one refer to 'the state of being' of the early universe? I think not.
As also evidenced in this passage:
[quote=Carl Jung, The Hidden Self]What is more, most of the natural sciences try to represent the results of their investigations as though these had come into existence without mans intervention, in such a way that the collaboration of the psyche an indispensable factor remains invisible. (An exception to this is modern physics, which recognizes that the observed is not independent of the observer.) So in this respect, too, science conveys a picture of the world from which a real human psyche appears to be excluded the very antithesis of the humanities.[/quote]
Two questions about this: in what sense is the psyche (what Aristotle would call 'the soul') an 'indispensable factor', and why does he cite 'modern physics' as an exception?
Except, apparently, when the use is by authors on the SEP or on that Wikipedia page that @Baden cited (and later quoted). Could there perhaps be two uses, one in philosophy and one in popular culture and everyday life?
Even in philosophy "a being" usually refers to a person of some kind. It's the capitalized Being that Wayf has mistakenly read to mean consciousness. The occasional off the wall misreading of this it that philosopher gets thrown in.
Depends on what we mean by world, of course. If we restrict world to linguistic, perceptual or abstract entities, then sure. But he says consciousness is a precondition of being. If by being he means the world of aforementioned entities, then sure. But Im not convinced of this.
I think hes taking an idealist view, basically.
Were citing ChatGBT now? Have you really been reduced to this? :wink:
That seems to be the only interesting part of his claim.
Finally. This is all I was getting at.
No, thats not true, unless you mean a human being.
I just want to note, in case there is any doubt about it, that this has nothing to do with why I have been telling you that "beings" in philosophy refers to whatever can be said to be; it is not why @Baden, @Mikie and others have told you the same; and it is not why philosophers use it like that. The term is neutral on the difference between subjects of experience and (other) things, and is most often associated with some kind of assertion of difference. For example, Aristotle distinguishes between rational and non-rational beings, and between living and non-living beings.
Or take part of that quotation about Heidegger:
(I bolded that part because you missed it last time around)
Here you can see that the philosophical use of "beings"the one that I've demonstrated is conventionalis consistent with an assertion of a fundamental ontological difference.
The reason is that saying of individuals/particulars/things that they are is not saying much at all.* It's a starting point. It is precisely because "beings" does not say anything about the properties of or differences between the individuals referred to that it is used.
"Beings" is how philosophers refer to those individuals (I want to use "things" here but I fear you would get the wrong idea) that can be said to be, including those which are animate and inanimate. The only other way of doing this very useful thing is to say "things that are," which has the same meaning; or many philosophers would bring in existence these days, because they have collapsed the differenceif you want to avoid that issue you'll avoid "existents" or "entities".
* Of course, from another angle, when enquiring into the meaning of being, it's saying a lot, and precisely what it's saying is the issue
Or divine being. I don't know of any cases where "a being" isn't a person.
Yep, good point.
Quoting frank
See my quotations from the SEP. It's the philosophical standard.*
In philosophy there are human beings, divine beings, non-living beings, inanimate beings, possible beings, and so on. You agreed with me on this a page or two ago.
*EDIT: I mean it's the philosophical standard to use it to refer to things that are, whether they are persons or not
Oh. Ok. I didn't see that post. I could probably do a long list of philosophical citations where "a being" means a person. I guess it comes down to context.
Not even just philosophy. Here's the (great) online etymology dictionary.
https://www.etymonline.com/word/being
I'm left quite baffled by this discussion. I'm pretty sure even the occasional modern use of 'being' as 'living entity/person' is derived post hoc from the adjunct of 'being' to 'human being', by contraction to just 'human' or just 'being'.
What's going on here is the battle between 'being' as entity and 'being' as person is being fought as a proxy for the battle for primacy between phenomenological existence and material matter as the proper subject of ontology.
Yes, there are many of those too. When the context is Western metaphysics, the use I've been arguing for seems to be the main one, and it's the minimal, most neutral sense, in line with the grammatical basics: a being is what can be said to be.
Yes, that was my conjecture too. I'm also guessing it's been strengthened by popular culture, e.g., "the being from another world." I also noticed, while doing my SEP trawl, that many of the articles on Eastern philosophy use it like this.
Note that Heidegger singles out 'human beings', because they alone are able to encounter the question of 'what it means to be'. No other beings - particles and planets, ants and apes - are able to do this. To all intents, that is the same distinction I was seeking to make.
Quoting Isaac
Close. Originally the starting point of the debate was my claim that the term 'ontology' refers to 'the meaning of being', and not to 'the analysis of what exists'. (I'm quite aware, for example, that ontology is used in computer networks for the classification of the various kinds of devices that comprise it. I'm sure, though I don't know for certain, there are many other scientific ontologies as well.)
I claimed that 'ontology' was originally derived from the first-person participle of being - which is 'I am'. This is the claim which a former mod took strong exception to as an 'eccentric' or 'idiosyncratic' definition. Fair enough with respect to the 'first person case', but it is a fact that 'ontology' is derived from the Greek verb 'to be', and, as Charles Kahn's analysis shows, it has a different (and much broader) set of meanings to 'to exist'.
The philosophical point of that, is that the natural sciences, which are concerned with 'what exists', are not concerned with 'the meaning of being' in the philosophical sense. (Which is not a slight to the natural sciences, only a matter of demarcation.)
Oh. Ok. Thanks
Yes, that was precisely my point. I thought I'd made that clear. To use "beings" to refer to anything which can be said to be, whether animate or not, is consistent with a fundamental difference between human beings and other beings, or between subjects of experience and things that are not subjects of experience.
I explicitly chose that quote for exactly the reason you've pointed out. It supports my central point.
Absolutely!
Quoting Jamal
So, how can using the same word for both 'subjects' and 'non-subjects' be 'consistent with a fundamental difference'. If it's the same word, and refers to both classes, then how can it convey 'a fundamental difference'? Or did you mean to write, 'is consistent with there being no fundamental difference between...'
No I did write it as I meant to.
Maybe this sums it up: It's consistent with a fundamental difference, but it does not convey any such difference. It's neutral. It is also consistent with there being no fundamental difference.
Does that make sense?
But you can say there is a difference between being and existence and also say that anything that can be said to be is a being. Probably many of the philosophers mentioned in my citations would have upheld that difference. For example, I think some philosophers have said that possible beings might or might not exist, i.e., they are, but they don't always exist. Heidegger has a different distinction that I'm not clear about (in line with ontological vs ontic, I'm guessing). Others will have different distinctions again. All of them, however, go along with beings as anything that can be said to be.
I forgot to mention: I have not committed myself to that.
In my lexicon, they don't exist, but they're real - real in the same way that, say, scientific principles and constraints and logical laws are real. In casual speech to say such things as the law of the excluded middle exist is OK, but when you ask 'in what sense does it exist?' you realise it is not a sensable phenomena, but a law of thought. It does not exist qua phenomenon but is real nonetheless, as are countless other such principles, laws, and so on - they are the constituents of rational discourse (something like Popper's world three.) This is why I've become interested in universals and Platonic realism - that there really are universal structures of reason which the mind alone can access, but doesn't create from itself (per Augustine and Intelligible Objects. )
Yes, this seems similar to existents vs beings.
Otherwise, I have to admit that I didn't enter this discussion in a spirit of metaphysical enquiry; I was just trying to sort out a terminological confusion that was disguising itself as a substantial philosophical difference (I think this is similar to the point that @Isaac made above).
Or is it the other way around: a substantial philosophical difference disguised as a terminological debate? Now I'm confused.
Anyway, my own properly philosophical interests right now are the non-metaphysical metaphysics of Theodor Adorno, which doesn't leave much mental room.
I did find it odd that you rejected precisely the usage that was common in the kind of Western philosophy you seem to have most affinity for: traditional metaphysics. I felt like I could show you this, so that's why I intervened.
Even if the debate has been skating over the real issues, it's still been good. :up:
That's interesting, introducing the possibility, perhaps, of translation issues muddying the water?
Quoting Wayfarer
So, can I assume that, by exclusion, you'd contend that philosophy isn't concerned with the question of what exists? Or, if it is, then the domain for that enquiry is not ontology, but rather... what?
Something existent absent anything to confirm its existence is very problematic. We tend to say existence just is. We can say that after the fact.
I agree with such statements with qualifications. For if we never arose, we could not say that planets or rocks existed, for these, as planets and rocks, depend on our concepts. Another creature might bundle together different properties under the concept of existence.
Aristotle has got your back:
It is also worth inquiring how time is related to the soul and why time is thought to exist in everything, on the earth and on the sea and in the heaven. Is it not in view of the fact that it is an attribute or a possession of a motion, by being a number (of a motion), and the fact that all these things are movable? For all of them are in a place, and time is simultaneous with a motion whether with respect to potentiality or with respect to actuality.
One might also raise the problem of whether time would exist not if no soul existed; for, if no one can exist to do the numbering, no thing can be numbered. So if nothing can do the numbering except a soul or the intellect of a soul, no time can exist without the existence of soul, unless it be that which when existing, time exists, that is if a motion can exist without a soul. As for the prior and the posterior, they exist in motion; and they are time qua being numerable.
Physics, 223a15, translated by HG Apostle
We look for the Nous against the background of where we cannot find it. We stick out like a sore thumb.
I did not know about this quote. I have to read up on Aristotle, a bit embarrassed to admit I know very, very little of his thought.
Thanks for sharing.
Thank you. He still is kicking my ass.
I did not bring him up as a rebuttal to any thesis here but only to note that Aristotle is not keeping the peas from touching the meat the way Kant likes his supper.
[quote=Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma] The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time loses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe. So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. (Cosmologist Andrei) Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness[/quote]
Hah! Yeah - that's one of the reasons I have been hesitant to read him, he's quite difficult to read. There's plenty of good philosophy that is written - if not clearly, then at least much better. But there are exceptions like Aristotle and Kant.
Thankfully not too many. But yeah, he's worth it, probably secondary sources can help with vocab and orientation.
Yet Heidegger uses Dasein, not Sein, to distinguish 'humans' from 'mere beings' (i.e. Seiendes) as pointed out here on p. 2 of this thread. So unless you're disputing the very authority you have appealed to, Wayf, concede the point that the contemporary philosophical "distinction" is between Dasein and beings, n o t "beings and things". :roll:
But note that distinguishing sentient, conscious, or rational beings from those which are not is certainly not considered eccentric by everyone at TPF.
In any case, @Fooloso4 kindly sent me the IEP link on Aristotle's Metaphysics. I noticed this passage, which seems relevant, in light of the mention of Aristotle earlier in the thread:
Quoting IEP
Which kind of, sort of, also support's Jung's idea.
[quote=Heidegger]If we look around at beings in generalfrom particles to planets, ants to apesit is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be.[/quote]
So there's regardless an ontological distinction accorded to humanity (acknowledging that his use of the terminology of ontology is very complex).
But Ive been reading that IEP article and cant see the justification for To be is to be alive; all other being is borrowed being. Im not saying its untrue (or true), only that Im trying to see the reasoning in the article and cant. Your comment here sheds light on it, but its still obscure to me.
Quoting IEP
Reading further into it, 'forms' are obviously central to it. But there is a passage further in the article germane to the differentiation of living and non-living:
* Which I think is probably the author. When I first started reading this article I thought it very idiosyncratic, but now I'm starting to warm to it.
The first of the quoted passages is about the distinction between living and non-living, which was subject of discussion earlier in this thread. Here is a passage on the ontological distinction between beings and things:
[quote=Eric D Perl Thinking Being - Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition]
This identification of soul as form and 'whatness' in a living thing implies continuity as well as profound difference between living and non-living things. All things, even inanimate ones, must have some form, or they would not be anything at all. But living things have a distinctive and superior kind of form, called soul. For a living thing is far more integrated, more one whole, than a non-living thing. The unity, and hence the identity and the being, of a non-living thing is little more than the contiguity of its parts. If a rock, for example, is divided, we simply have two smaller rocks. In a living thing, on the other hand, the members of its body constitute an organic whole, such that each part both conditions and is conditioned by the other parts and the whole. A living thing is thus one being to a far greater extent than a non-living thing. It evinces a higher degree of unity, of integration, of formal identity, and its soul is this very integration of its parts into one whole. As such the soul is the reality of the living thing, that in virtue of which it is what it is and so is a being: For the reality is the cause of being to all things, and to live, for living things, is to be, and the soul is the cause and principle of these (De An. ?.4, 415b1314). Life in living things, then, is not a character superadded to their mere being. Rather, life is their being, the higher, more intense mode of being proper to living things as distinct from others.
The distinction between living and non-living things is therefore not a mere horizontal distinction, as if all things are equally beings, of which some are living and others are not. It is rather a vertical or hierarchical distinction: a living thing is more a being than a non-living thing, in that it is more integrated, more a whole, more one thing. (p110)
For Aristotle, the hierarchical ordering of the different kinds of beings is based on the extent to which form predominates over matter in each. Non-living things have the lowest degree of form, of unifying selfhood, of activity that proceeds from themselves. Although they have some form, some nature, some behaviors of their own, without which they would be nothing at all, they come closer than all other things to being purely material, purely passive. A living thing, characterized by organic unity and the ability to nourish, maintain, and reproduce itself, is far more one, more active, exhibits a far higher degree of formal identity. A sentient living thing, an animal, exercises not only these life-functions but also consciousness, which, as the capacity to receive forms without matter, is a still higher degree of formality, of immateriality. A human being, in turn, has not only life and sense but the capacity for the wholly immaterial activity of intellection, which has as its content, and thus is one with, purely immaterial ideas. (p117)[/quote]
This 'vertical distinction' is generally absent in modern culture, which was the point I was pressing in making the distinction between beings and things in the first place. That is an ontological distinction which I say is lost to materialism and much of modern culture as a matter of definition. (The question arises whether it is inherently at odds with liberalism.)
In the context of Platonism it was a matter of course that intellect (nous) is higher than matter, which was to become the basis of the scala naturae, the great chain of being. This provides the qualitative or vertical dimension. Matter as such is at the lowest level - in the absence of form or idea, is next to nothing. A material particular can only be said to be insofar as it has a form, and the form is not something material, but is 'impressed' upon matter 'as a seal upon wax' in Aristotle's imagery.
But neither is soul or idea an immaterial thing or the oxymoronic 'immaterial substance' of post-Cartesian philosophy. In the chapter on Plato, Perl articulates the origin of 'eidos' as being 'the look' or 'the what-it-is-ness' of a particular being. The form is emphatically not another kind of thing, it is not an 'inhabitant' of a supposed 'ethereal Platonic realm' which is the way that it is almost universally misinterpreted. I suggest this misapprehension dominates because of the cultural impact of empiricism, that only things exist, things which exist in time and space. Seeing through that requires a different kind of seeing, and that 'seeing' is the subject of metaphysics (again, largely extinct outside of Catholic philosophy in today's culture, as one of the last preserves of metaphysics).
Here Perl demonstrates the falsehood of the usual way of thinking about the forms:
[quote=Eric D Perl Thinking Being, p31 ff] Is there such a thing as health? Of course there is. Can you see it? Of course not. This does not mean that the forms are occult entities floating somewhere else in another world, a Platonic heaven. It simply says that the intelligible identities which are the reality, the whatness, of things are not themselves physical things to be perceived by the senses, but must be grasped by thought. If, taking any of these examplessay, justice, health, or strengthwe ask, How big is it? What color is it? How much does it weigh? we are obviously asking the wrong kind of question. Forms are ideas, not in the sense of concepts or abstractions, but in that they are realities apprehended by thought rather than by sense. They are thus separate in that they are not additional members of the world of sensible things, but are known by a different mode of awareness. But this does not mean that they are located elsewhere, or that they are not, as Plato says, the very intelligible contents, the truth and reality of sensible things.
It is in this sense, too, that Platos references to the forms as patterns or paradigms, of which instances are images, must be understood. All too often, paradigm is taken to mean model to be copied. The following has been offered as an example of this meaning of ?????????? (parádeigma) in classical Greek: [T]he architect of a temple requiring, say, twenty-four Corinthian capitals would have one made to his own specifications, then instruct his masons to produce twenty-three more just like it. Such a model is itself one of the instances: when we have the original and the twenty-three copies, we have twenty-four capitals of the same kind. It is the interpretation of forms as paradigms in this sense that leads to the third man argument by regarding the form as another instance and the remaining instances as copies of the form. This interpretation of Platos paradigmatism reflects a pictorial imagination of the forms as, so to speak, higher-order sensibles located in another world, rather than as the very intelligible identities, the whatnesses, of sensible things.
But forms cannot be paradigms in this sense. Just as the intelligible look that is common to many things of the same kind, a form, as we have seen, is not an additional thing of that kind. Likewise, it makes no sense to say that a body, a physical, sensible thing, is a copy, in the sense of a replica or duplicate, of an intelligible idea. Indeed, Plato expressly distinguishes between a copy and an image: Would there be two things, that is, Cratylus and an image of Cratylus, if some God copied not only your color and shape, as painters do, but also all the things you haveif he set such other things beside you? Would such then be Cratylus and an image of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses?Two Cratyluses, it seems to me, Socrates. He then remarks, Do you not perceive how far images fall short of having the same features [?? ????, tá aftá] as the things of which they are images? (Crat. 432b5c6, d13). An image, in Platos terms, then, is not another thing of the same kind as the paradigm, having characteristics in common with it. But ??????????/parádeigma need not mean model in this sense. It can also mean plan, design, pattern, and it is in this sense that Plato refers to the forms as paradigms. To take the same example, the architect, instead of giving the masons a model capital and instructing them to produce twenty-three more, could give them instead a plan, a diagram, or even simply a set of specifications, and instruct them to produce twenty-four such capitals. In this case the paradigm is the pattern, the design, the set of specifications, which is not itself a capital at all. The true paradigm, indeed, is the architects idea, of which the written diagram or specifications are merely a symbolic representation.[/quote]
Perl has considerably more to say on the subject, detailing how Plato modifies Parmenides' uncompromising duality between being and non-being to argue that particulars are beings insofar as they have form - otherwise they would be nothing at all. So particulars are 'in between' being and non-being, not truly real, as are forms, but neither simply non-existent. Particulars are real insofar as they 'participlate in' or instantiate forms or ideas:
[quote=ibid]If we reflect on the notion of appearance, it ceases to be obvious that there is no middle road, no intermediate between being and non-being. An appearance of a thingfor example, a reflection, as an appearance of that which is reflectedis not the thing itself, nor is it another thing, additional to the thing itself. When Socrates stands before a mirror, making a reflection, the reflection is neither a second Socrates nor another, additional person: there remains only one Socrates, one man. But neither is the reflection, what is seen in the mirror, simply nothing, and to see it is not to see nothing at all, or to suffer a hallucination. Appearance is not the same as illusion. It is coherent, in accord with ordinary usage, and in a significant sense true, to say, I see Socrates in the mirror, while realizing at the same time that I am not looking at Socrates himself at all. To see the reflection is both to see Socrates, as he appears here, and not to see Socrates, himself by himself. Thus what is seen in seeing the reflection or appearance, both is and is not the real thing. And this is precisely how Plato characterizes the in between status of the sensible, as that which is opined rather than intellectually known: We said earlier, then, if something should appear [??????] such that it at once is and is not, this would be such as to lie in between that which purely is and that which altogether is not, and neither knowledge nor ignorance would be concerned with it, but that which we say is in between ignorance and knowledge (Rep. 478d59). We should note the characteristically Platonic pun: that which appears, or as we might say turns up, in between being and non-being, is, precisely, appearance itself. Sensible instances, therefore, as the multiple, differentiated appearances, given to sense, of the unitary forms that are apprehended by intellect, are neither reality itself by itself, the intelligible, nor simply nothing, but in between.[/quote]
Given that, the idea of the 'separateness' of the realm of forms from the material realm is pointing to different levels of understanding, again, not to an 'ethereal Platonic realm':
[quote=ibid]Knowledge and opinion, then, as distinct modes of awareness, are not directed toward two different sets of objects, of which one is completely real and the other, incomprehensibly, less than completely real and yet not nothing. Rather, they are higher and lower ways in which reality may be apprehended. Opinion, the mode of apprehension correlated to appearance as distinct from reality itself by itself, thus lies in between knowledge and ignorance. Here again, unlike Parmenides, Plato carefully distinguishes between ignorance, a total failure to apprehend reality at all, and opinion, an apprehension of reality as it appears and hence an imperfect apprehension of reality. The distinction between knowledge and opinion, therefore, unlike that between knowledge and ignorance, is not a simple opposition, but is rather a distinction between the perfect and therefore paradigmatic apprehension of reality, and a less perfect apprehension of reality. Opinion is thus analogous to seeing reality in a mirror, rather than to not seeing it at all, and sensible things, as what is given to this mode of apprehension, are analogous to reflections, neither reality itself nor simply nothing. ....
....If the levels of reality are levels of presentation and apprehension, then the many ascents in the dialogues, the images of going to the forms or true being, express not a passage from one world, one set of objects, to another, but rather, as Plato repeatedly indicates, the ascent of the soul, a psychic, cognitive ascent, from one mode of apprehension to another, and hence not from one reality to a different reality, but from appearance to reality.[/quote]
The concept of a vertical distinction between living and non-living things, and among living things themselves, conflicts with contemporary cultural and philosophical perspectives, particularly those grounded in natural science and liberalism. Naturalism, with its emphasis on physical processes as the fundamental reality, will usually reject such metaphysical distinctions. It tends to flatten the Aristotelian hierarchy into a horizontal plane where differences among entities are seen in terms of varying arrangements of matter rather than different degrees or kinds of being. It's also in conflict with liberalism. Liberalism, particularly in its political and social manifestations, emphasizes individual freedom, equality, and the separation of church and state (or the sacred and profane, more generally). This framework generally relegates questions of metaphysics, spirituality, and religion to the private sphere, treating them as matters of personal belief rather than public concern or objective truth. The liberal public square is thus shaped by a commitment to pluralism and secularism, which can obscure or sideline vertical distinctions of being that imply a universal order or hierarchy, especially those rooted in religious or metaphysical philosophy.
Ref: Eric D Perl: Thinking Being - Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition
Aristotle certainly put the active principle above the elements being acted upon. I am not aware of any passage that expresses a ratio of the sort Perl is putting forth.
Basically, consciousness isn't required for any kind of comprehension, until a 'decision' has to be made ABOUT the valuation of a physical feeling. Weird stuff, but i'm liking it.
Interesting. And the complexity of Heidegger's terminology notwithstanding, I agree.
However and on some level, being ontologically distinct by actually doing ontology strikes me as a no brainer. And there is no prize for being the only known species to do ontology.
As if Heidegger would know. :-)
That youre still going on about this is borderline insane.
A being is anything at all. It can also mean exclusively sentient beings. The latter is not whats used in ontology, whether Aristotle or Heidegger. Trees rocks and ideas are all beings.
:100: Yes, a being (even a nonbeing à la Meinong's "sosein") is whatever is not nothing.
I've presented arguments and citations in support, and in the face of nothing better than pointless ad hominems and incomprehension. The reason I re-opened the thread is because over February I read the first several chapters of Eric Perl's book Thinking Being, from which the quotes above are taken. And the fact that you don't recognise a distinction that I claim is largely forgotten is not an argument against it.
Quoting Mikie
Am I take to it you're pan-psychist?
Quoting Paine
In Aristotle form is prior to matter in everything. The "what-it-is", or "whatness" of a thing constitutes the thing's identity. The layering, or levels, referred to, mark the different types, from the most general to the most specific, right down to the particulars of the unique individual. So for instance, the layering of form in a particular individual such as the one identified as "Socrates" would include living being, animal, mammal, man, snub-nose, and all the various accidentals which make up this individual's unique identity.
What Aristotle argues in his Metaphysics is that the form of the thing (any thing, and every thing) must be prior in time to the material existence of the thing. This is because when a thing comes into being, it must be the thing which it is, and not something else, and that's known as the law of identity. And when it comes into existence, it necessarily has a form, which is an intelligible whatness. If the intelligible whatness, or form, did not predetermine the material existence of the thing, it would not necessarily be the thing which it is, producing a random unintelligible formlessness, or non-thing.
The "soul" provides a very good example of how the intelligible whatness, the form, precedes the material existence of the thing. A living body is a very special type of body with a very special type of organization. When that special type of body comes into being it must be organized in that special way. Therefore the form which determines this special type of organization must be prior to the material body, to ensure that when the material body comes into existence it has that special type of organization. Without the preceding form, "the soul", the special type of organization would not occur, and there would be no living body.
I think it was right to talk about Descartes in this thread, as long as we also see the limits of Descartes's reasoning. The beginning of Heidegger's Being and Time is, by the way, very much inspired by the cogito.
BUT what Hegel shows is that cogito is not only a thought of being, but the being of thought as well. So it is true that consciousness is a precondition of being, but it doesn't mean that there could be a consciouness without any beings to be conscious of. Of course, it's not a subject that can be summed up in a few sentences. (source: Brief Solutions to Philosophical Problems Using a Hegelian Method, Solution 1 and 2)
One thing is to say there are things which exist, independent of us, thus they are being or "existents." And this should be readily granted, unless one is an extreme version of a Berkeleyan idealist.
I think this becomes thorny when we specifically start to speak of extra-mental terms in mental terms, such as how can a rock exist absent our perception (and conception) of them? I don't think we have a clue. We are using foreign notions here.
It's the latter formulation which causes problems, as we attempt to use our concepts and apply them in a way that doesn't work.
But the topic of their needing to be something that exists in order to sustain consciousness, shouldn't be controversial.
But these topics are part of the bread and butter in philosophy.
In Whitehead's framework, consciousness emerges as a result of the interplay of various 'prehensions', and is not just a passive observer but an active participant in the creation of experience. This perspective breaks away from dualistic approaches that separate mind and matter, and instead emphasizes the interconnectedness and dynamic nature of the universe.
This seems to imply that 'feelings' or awareness of experience do not make a being conscious (or sentient, for that matter). It seems to imply, as does most of Process and Reality, that consciousness is not just secondary, but essentially unimportant in the development of an 'actual occasion' representing some individual animal body region of the world while being posited as fundamental in the process itself(qua "cosmic epoch" rather than qua an actual occasion(in an animal body - a person, for instance)), ...I can't quite get across this position, but Its interesting and might be cud to chew on for others.
Quoting Wayfarer
On the assumptionno matter how unbelievable and insultingthat you are not joking
You didnt complain of Heideggers panpsychism when you quoted him saying the same thing (beings in generalfrom particles to planets, ants to apes). As you do know, Mikie is using the term in the way thats conventional in metaphysics, going back thousands of years and still in use: that which is. It says nothing about consciousness, when used in the standard Western philosophical sense.
Whether there is a difference between beings and things is another matter. I think there is.
If you want to use the popular senseor the one used in some Eastern philosophyin the context of Western philosophy, say so openly, and make it clear when youre doing so.
That's basically the only point that was ever at issue in this argument. Didn't mean to be insulting, but I really don't think it makes sense to declare that anything that exists is 'a being'. Again, the noun term 'being' is customarily used for sentient creatures. Of course rocks exist, I spent many a happy hour as a child throwing them.
The only passage about Heidegger that I quoted in this thread was a snippet I found in a Philosophy Now article, to wit:
No, the point at issue was whether beings are all sentient or conscious. They are not. Only sentient or conscious beings are sentient or conscious. The reason you keep on confusing the issues is that you have not suspended judgement about whether inanimate objects are beings; the difference between beings and things, insofar as there is one (and I think there is) is not about sentience or consciousness.
Quoting Wayfarer
Whether you mean to be or not makes no difference. I carefully and politely showed you that you were wrong, and you stuck your fingers in your ears, because of what you want to be true.
Quoting Wayfarer
That is how it is used in philosophy, as I showed you, and as anyone with a familiarity with Western metaphysics ought to know.
Quoting Wayfarer
Ive tracked it down. You quoted me in this post and attributed the quotation to Heidegger, which I had clearly not attributed to Heidegger.
What is it about, then? And does it amount to an ontological distinction?
Good question!
I dont know, but the fact is that in certain contexts they mean different things. Although being and substance are related and sometimes coincide, the former can refer to a referent more fundamental than the latter. Substance tends to have a more specific meaning:
[quote=SEP;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/]This conception of substance derives from the intuitive notion of individual thing or object, which contrast mainly with properties and events.[/quote]
So in a process metaphysics, you have dynamic beings, as opposed to thingsor maybe things are seen as dynamic beings. In any case, I dont know about the ontological difference, but the words/concepts certainly can be different.
There is another example that came up in my reading the other day. In the paralogisms of pure reason in the CPR, Kant argues that the I think cannot be said to be a substance, though there is a logical or transcendental subject. I wondered if this was an example of being (transcendental subject) vs. thing (substantial immortal soul).
It is this distinction which I say has been occluded by the fact that physicalist ontology only allows for one kind of fundamental substance, namely, the physical, so it can't allow for an in-principle difference between beings and things, of the kind that Aristotlelian philosophy refers to here. (I was told that I was 'bordering on insanity' by one of the mods for bringing it up, speaking of insults.)
I'm quite happy to leave it at that, though.
Okay, so according to Aristotle, for living beings, living constitutes their being. I can go along with that. I dont know my Aristotle well enough to know if Perls interpretation is correct, to the effect that living beings are more beingy than non-living beings, but I can go along with that too if pushed. (It does not, of course, follow that rocks are not beings.)
Youre right that a distinction has been lost in the physicalist paradigm. This is because physicalism has no need for the general concept of being. But its crucial, I reckon, not to respond to physicalists by using being in a way that is equally as restrictive as their concept of existence. Its good to have a general notion that is uncommitted, and thats what being is. To stick to the grammatically basic meaning is to preserve the non-physicalist notion, even though it doesnt assertindeed, partly because it doesnt assertanything about consciousness.
I think @Mikie took you to be repeating your claim that the word being refers only to conscious referents. Perhaps he wasnt right about thatand calling you borderline insane was mildly badbut it was understandable, because in fact you have conflated the issues.
I don't think Perl portrays this very well, and he seems to oversimplify a very complex issue. The temporal continuity of material substance, which is what we tend to associate with the existence of an object with mass, is not well understood by human beings in general. The unity of a rock is far more complicated than simply an existence of smaller parts, with all the characteristics of the larger rock, consisting in a contiguous manner. That description could be called an ignorance.
Scientists have found multiple levels of unifying principles which dictate the possibilities of dividing a whole body with mass. These levels include molecular binding, chemical bonding, and the strong force of the atomic nucleus. Since the strong force is responsible for the existence of mass, in general, and it is not at all understood, statements like Perl's are not well founded.
Having said that, I do agree that the unity which constitutes a living being is quite different from the unity which constitutes an inanimate object, and this difference is mainly attributed by scientists to the organization of the parts. The chemical bonding of organic matter is extremely complex and unstable, and this allows for the capacity for all sorts of activities performed by the living being. However, since we do not understand the strong force which unites the mass of an atom's nucleus, and how this force relates to the forces of chemical bonding, we really have no understanding of the difference between the unity of a living thing and the unity of an inanimate thing.
It appears to me, that it is very possible, and likely, that the unity of the atomic nucleus which constitutes the existence of temporal mass, extends deeper than the unity which is associated with living beings. This would mean that mass in general is prior in time to life, and that would account for the reason why the activities of living beings is limited by mass, and free will is not unbounded. Accordingly, contrary to Perl's portrayal, the inanimate unity which constitutes the fundamental existence of mass, produces a deeper and more substantial "whole" than the "organic whole". And of course we observe this throughout the universe, whole's like the solar system, the galaxy, etc., which are far more substantial than the organic wholes found on earth.
Good lord.
Quoting Abhiram
No kidding. Ive only been discussing it at length for 5 years. So with all due respect, spare me.
Thank you. Thats been the point at issue all along. Ill only add that the term translated as soul in that passage, as something which characterises living beings, is the Greek psyche, which, of course, can also be translated as mind, depending on the context.