Refute that, non-materialists!
I know that everything I will present from 1 to 4 is debatable, but, for the sake of the argument, let's assume that we all agree that everything up to 4 is proven to be false.
Therefore, if I were a materialist.
1. Strong emergence - I would accept that it is logically impossible and that it is not pure materialism anyway.
2. Therefore, I would adopt weak emergence. That would force me to adopt the identity theory.
3. Type-Type Identity can be refuted by multiple realization.
4. So, the next step is to adopt Token-Type. Here the problem arises: depending on what we categorize an emotion?
4.1. The only way here is represented by functionalism, which can in turn be refuted by inverted qualia or multiple realization.
Unfortunately, I have noticed that most materialists stop here. But, if I were a materialist, I would go further and eliminate the notion of Type altogether.
There are no types of experiences, only experiences. Toothache and leg pain are classified as pains only because they are similar, so it is for language purpose, but in reality they are two different things. Similar does not mean identical, so:
1. We don't need the same physical structure - multiple realization solved.
Having no categories, but simply experiences, I don't need a justification for fitting an experience into a category, so:
2. I don't need to equate an experience with a function. There is no law of nature that prevents the existence of an experience without it fulfilling a specific purpose.
I realize that this position is very weak in terms of explanatory power, but I don't see any logical argument that invalidates this exact position. So feel free to hit me with counterarguments. Thank you!
Therefore, if I were a materialist.
1. Strong emergence - I would accept that it is logically impossible and that it is not pure materialism anyway.
2. Therefore, I would adopt weak emergence. That would force me to adopt the identity theory.
3. Type-Type Identity can be refuted by multiple realization.
4. So, the next step is to adopt Token-Type. Here the problem arises: depending on what we categorize an emotion?
4.1. The only way here is represented by functionalism, which can in turn be refuted by inverted qualia or multiple realization.
Unfortunately, I have noticed that most materialists stop here. But, if I were a materialist, I would go further and eliminate the notion of Type altogether.
There are no types of experiences, only experiences. Toothache and leg pain are classified as pains only because they are similar, so it is for language purpose, but in reality they are two different things. Similar does not mean identical, so:
1. We don't need the same physical structure - multiple realization solved.
Having no categories, but simply experiences, I don't need a justification for fitting an experience into a category, so:
2. I don't need to equate an experience with a function. There is no law of nature that prevents the existence of an experience without it fulfilling a specific purpose.
I realize that this position is very weak in terms of explanatory power, but I don't see any logical argument that invalidates this exact position. So feel free to hit me with counterarguments. Thank you!
Comments (34)
Almost 4am here. Zzzzzz :yawn:
1. I don't know what emergence is, and also don't know what strong emergence is.
2. I don't know what weak emergence is. I don't know what identity theory is.
3. I don't know what type-type identity is.
4. I don't know what Token-Type is.
Since all these are false, or assumed to be false theories, Quoting Eugen, I can just ignore them altogether.
Eliminating the notion of Type altogether helps as well, since I have no clue what the notion of Type does.
So far your theory has a lot of things mentioned which you ask us to ignore. Why list them in the first place then?
You then eliminate the need for physical structure. Then you eliminat th e need to justify the experience to fit in a category.
Quoting Eugen
What remains?
I am unable to see a statement or a proposition.
You kept eliminating stuff I don't understand. It does not matter that I don't understand what you mean, since they are eliminated.
But you fail to state what remains after the process of elimination. There is no counter-argument to form, since you made no argument.
If I started as a Materialist, this would lead me into becoming a Physicalist, and eventually a Panprotopsychist.
I would have thought that to be a Materialist means rejecting the notion of a type. A Conceptualist would accept the existence of types in the mind, but I don't think that a Materialist would be a Conceptualist.
Quoting Eugen
As an aside, an "experience" as a concept is a type.
Ok... elaborate a bit please, it looks like you're saying something there
So there's a weak emergence, but none of the experiences are the same. Even within the same person, because the physical structure is always changing.
Seems a weird space to think through -- I certainly feel a lot more coherency than that. At least a before, a now, and a later: all three tenses sit within an experience.
Now, if language were to fulfill the functional aspect then totally possible. It just feels somewhat like Hume's conclusion on the skepticism of causation -- I see how we got here, but aren't we confused now?
Intellectually, my belief is that of Neutral Monism, where reality consists of elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time. Consciousness may be explained by Panprotopsychism. However, the unity of consciousness, the neural binding problem, Kant's unity of apperception remains beyond comprehension, and must remain what McGinn called Mysterianism.
On the one hand I cannot believe in Conceptualism but on the other hand I know Conceptualism is true.
As an "experience" is a concept, and therefore a type, perhaps the wording should be "there are no experiences, only tokens of experiences", though I know what you meant, which is the main thing.
Would it be fair to classify what you've put forth as a sort of austere nominalism? I.e., pain is just "a name for certain types of experience."
I think the problem with that sort of nominalism is that it bleeds into ontological nominalism. So, the experience of seeing a triangle is just a name for similar experiences, etc.
But this seems to run into the problem of explaining the similarities and differences that create these different names in the first place.
This reduces the very scientific theories and findings that are supposed to make us believe that physicalism is the case to either mere language games, statements about other statements/fictions, or outright incoherence.
My guess is this is why most nominalists who are into this thing enough to write about it tend to embrace trope theory, concept nominalism, etc.
I think the problem is that the considerations that motivate people to embrace physicalism are often the same sorts of considerations that cause them to embrace nominalism, but the two don't play particularly well together.
Yeah, @javi2541997 and @god must be atheist, why should Eugen have to put together a coherent, understandable post? Why should he have to define his terms?
You're just lazy. And you're also.... Well, let's just leave it at that.
This is not a philosophy forum dedicated to a narrow subset of thinking within analytic philosophy , it is a general forum. Concepts like emergence, qualia, functionalism and materialism can take on entirely different meanings depending on which branch of philosophy , and which particular philosopher, is using them. How about giving us names of philosophers who you are aligning yourself with so we have a context Whose thinking do you feel overlaps most closely with the claims of the OP?
Eugen may get scolded by the mods.
Mods don't usually get involved just because someone is being a dick.
Quoting Eugen
Understood.
If I were a (materialist) naturalist/physicalist I might try and make something of strong emergentism in order to keep my concept of phenomenal consciousness. But we're assuming it's false, so that's OK. No strong emergentism.
I would adopt weak emergence. And I'd jump straight to functionalism. I didn't think functionalism was a subset of identity theory. I thought Identity theory was that the mind is the brain, or something like that. But I could be wrong. Anyway, weak emergence is rejected too, fair enough.
So a type of mind is identical to a type of physical system? I guess that can be refuted by multiple realisation. But multiple realisation hasn't been proven. However it is intuitively plausible and is arguably entailed by functionalism. So we ditch that as well, fair enough.
Token-type identity? Which side is the physical, which the mental? I don't think I've understood this one. I did a quick search and nothing immediately came up.
If I were a physicalist functionalism is an attractive option. It has a number of virtues. Inverted qualia may be a problem for functionalism (but it hasn't been shown as far as I am aware), but I thought multiple realisability was one of its features, not a bug.
I disagree with you here. In principle one could have two identical brains realising the same function. In that way we would have two experience of the same type, assuming functionalism. They would be qualitatively identical, but quantitatively distinct. Have I misunderstood you?
I don't follow you here, sorry
I agree with you. So we're ditching functionalism here?
I'm unclear what your physicalist position is that you have arrived at. So what is an experience in this view?
EDIT: I sense logical thought in the OP, but there is too little concession to the reader to clearly discern it.
EDIT: the psychology of the materialist is odd here. He's decided to be a materialist, and then set about finding a coherent line. I guess that's what someone who isn't starting out as a materialist would do to charitably try to find a coherent materialist position.
I didn't say functionalism was a subset of anything. And why would you jump straight to functionalism?
Quoting bert1
There are no sides, there's one and the same thing. Type - category, while token - an individual subset of that category. In Type-Type, we had to admit that pain must be C-fibers firing, while in Token-Type, different pains can have different physical forms. But the following issue arises: in virtue of what we can call a pain, pain? Answer: By its function. Therefore, functionalism.
Quoting bert1
Actually, there's a ''multiple realization" problem for functionalism too, similar but not the same as that of identity's problem. I won't get into details here though.
Quoting bert1
If two brains are identical to the last atom, then they would be both qualitatively and quantitatively identical (assuming they experience the same environment as well).
My position here is the following: every experience is, in fact, identical to a physical state. Simple as that. But there are no categories of experiences (eg pains). We call them pains just because they're similar, but there is no such category in reality. There are just physical/mental variations. That's ALL. We don't have categories - we don't need to appeal to functions.
This position doesn't explain anything, but it does get rid of problems. I haven't found strong refutations so far.
I would use the term Physicalism rather than Materialism. Physicalism is closely related to Materialism, but Physicalism grew out of Materialism with advances in knowledge about the physical sciences. In the world of space-time there is more than just elementary particles but also elementary forces.
Therefore, an understanding of consciousness needs more than an understanding of matter but also the forces between this matter. The question with the mind-body problem is how consciousness is grounded in broadly physical systems, how the property of feeling pain could be instantiated by an entirely physical object, such as the nervous system.
Referring to the SEP article Russellian Monism, according to Bertrand Russell, fundamental physical entities are intrinsically qualitatively special such that they necessitate conscious states in macro structures, such as humans, but as yet, our understanding outstrips current knowledge. Russellian monism comes in two varieties: panpsychist and panprotopsychist. The former holds that the special intrinsic properties are themselves consciousness properties, and the latter denies this.
I find it hard to believe in panpsychism, in that electrons are conscious, but panprotopsychism seems a more sensible approach, whereby elementary particles and forces have certain intrinsic properties that enable the realization of consciousness in certain circumstances. For example, the property of movement cannot be observed in a system consisting of a single magnet, yet can be observed in a system consisting of several magnets in close proximity. It is also the case the the property of momentum of an objects exists neither in its mass or velocity, but is a product of the two. The property of volume of an object doesn't exist in its parts but in the relation of the parts making up the whole. Perhaps in the same way, the property of consciousness cannot be discovered in an individual element, but only emerges when several individual elements are combined in certain particular ways.
Perhaps protoconsciousness is an intrinsic feature of elementary particles and forces that only emerges as the property of consciousness when these elementary particles and forces are in certain combinations.