Kant's antinomies: transcendental cosmology
Cosmic silence before the Big Bang
"[i]We are often told that the Big Bang is a theory of cosmic creation that it tells us how the Universe was created out of nothing and went on to evolve into all the galaxies, stars, and planets. The problem with that characterization is that only the second part of it is true. Yes, what we call the Big Bang is a theory of cosmic evolution. But the Inflationary Universe standard model that guides cosmology says nothing about cosmic origins. The birth of space, time, matter, and energy is simply not there. . . . .
It is an issue called Kants First Antinomy. Two centuries before Lemaître, the philosopher Immanuel Kant asked how the Universe could be explained through a deterministic cause when it must be the very thing that embraces all causes. Since the Universe encompasses all things and, therefore, all causes, what can exist outside of it to set the Universe in motion? . . . .
But Lemaître already knew that his formulation did not really solve the First Antinomy, because it did not explain where the primeval atom came from.[/i]"
https://bigthink.com/13-8/big-bang-does-not-explain-cosmic-creation/
Before the Big Bang
[i]For decades, the Big Bang has been taught in high school physics classes as the leading theory for the way the universe began. But despite the overwhelming evidence supporting it, several questions linger for physicists. How could something come from nothing? And why do the laws of physics not hold up at the bang? . . .
Now, some scientists say that the Big Bang was not the beginning, and that there was a universe before ours. . . .
This problem has left scientists, including the likes of Einstein, perplexed for years.
In my opinion, this is the single most embarrassing problem of physics, said Max Tegmark[/i],
https://scienceline.org/2008/07/physics-heger-bigbang/
Although physicists typically define their subject, Nature/Universe, as the evolving physical/material system that began 14 billion years ago, some have been embarrassed by the metaphorical similarity of the semi-official/semi-consensus Big Bang Theory to ancient Origin Allegories. Consequently, to avoid confusion with religious myths --- and to TV sitcoms --- a few Cosmologists, along with some Philosophers, have invested significant think-time to forming plausible conjectures about the Transcendent-Time-or-Place-before-Space-Time which seems to have emerged from out beyond our where & when Reality.
That kind of non-sense is what physicist Sabine Hossenfelder sarcastically calls Existential Physics. Moreover, due to lack of material evidence, she dismisses such notions as non-science. Which apparently implies that probing beyond the beginning of physical evolution is "mere philosophy".
Nevertheless, such existential questions have persisted since ancient times, and still pop-up frequently on The Philosophy Forum. Alas, Idealist philosopher, Immanuel Kant argued that we can never know Reality directly, but only our mental models of the world. Which raises the question : are our Existential Physics models any more true or relevant than ancient Ontological God-myths?
Despite our epistemological limitations, philosophical thinkers are still intrigued by un-verifiable open-questions and challenged by perplexing paradoxes. So Kant labeled our attempts to cognize the nature of transcendent reality by means of pure reason as "Antinomies" (Contradictions or Paradoxes). Although Transcendent reasoning is a no-no for empirical scientists, such puzzles seem to be unavoidable & necessary for the work of model-making Cosmologists & theoretical Philosophers seeking reverse-reductive or holistic solutions to the Big Why questions.
PS__In the next post, I'll provide some ruminative commentary & questions on Kant's Antinomies, as they relate to Transcendental Cosmology. What are your thoughts on existential Transcendence? Is it irrational to imagine the unknowable "What-If" beyond the partly known "What-Is"? Should we "fall-down & prostrate"? or just "shut-up & calculate"? Or is it reasonable for speculative Philosophers & holistic Cosmologists daring to venture into the "Great Beyond" where pragmatic Scientists "fear to tread"?
"[i]We are often told that the Big Bang is a theory of cosmic creation that it tells us how the Universe was created out of nothing and went on to evolve into all the galaxies, stars, and planets. The problem with that characterization is that only the second part of it is true. Yes, what we call the Big Bang is a theory of cosmic evolution. But the Inflationary Universe standard model that guides cosmology says nothing about cosmic origins. The birth of space, time, matter, and energy is simply not there. . . . .
It is an issue called Kants First Antinomy. Two centuries before Lemaître, the philosopher Immanuel Kant asked how the Universe could be explained through a deterministic cause when it must be the very thing that embraces all causes. Since the Universe encompasses all things and, therefore, all causes, what can exist outside of it to set the Universe in motion? . . . .
But Lemaître already knew that his formulation did not really solve the First Antinomy, because it did not explain where the primeval atom came from.[/i]"
https://bigthink.com/13-8/big-bang-does-not-explain-cosmic-creation/
Before the Big Bang
[i]For decades, the Big Bang has been taught in high school physics classes as the leading theory for the way the universe began. But despite the overwhelming evidence supporting it, several questions linger for physicists. How could something come from nothing? And why do the laws of physics not hold up at the bang? . . .
Now, some scientists say that the Big Bang was not the beginning, and that there was a universe before ours. . . .
This problem has left scientists, including the likes of Einstein, perplexed for years.
In my opinion, this is the single most embarrassing problem of physics, said Max Tegmark[/i],
https://scienceline.org/2008/07/physics-heger-bigbang/
Although physicists typically define their subject, Nature/Universe, as the evolving physical/material system that began 14 billion years ago, some have been embarrassed by the metaphorical similarity of the semi-official/semi-consensus Big Bang Theory to ancient Origin Allegories. Consequently, to avoid confusion with religious myths --- and to TV sitcoms --- a few Cosmologists, along with some Philosophers, have invested significant think-time to forming plausible conjectures about the Transcendent-Time-or-Place-before-Space-Time which seems to have emerged from out beyond our where & when Reality.
That kind of non-sense is what physicist Sabine Hossenfelder sarcastically calls Existential Physics. Moreover, due to lack of material evidence, she dismisses such notions as non-science. Which apparently implies that probing beyond the beginning of physical evolution is "mere philosophy".
Nevertheless, such existential questions have persisted since ancient times, and still pop-up frequently on The Philosophy Forum. Alas, Idealist philosopher, Immanuel Kant argued that we can never know Reality directly, but only our mental models of the world. Which raises the question : are our Existential Physics models any more true or relevant than ancient Ontological God-myths?
Despite our epistemological limitations, philosophical thinkers are still intrigued by un-verifiable open-questions and challenged by perplexing paradoxes. So Kant labeled our attempts to cognize the nature of transcendent reality by means of pure reason as "Antinomies" (Contradictions or Paradoxes). Although Transcendent reasoning is a no-no for empirical scientists, such puzzles seem to be unavoidable & necessary for the work of model-making Cosmologists & theoretical Philosophers seeking reverse-reductive or holistic solutions to the Big Why questions.
PS__In the next post, I'll provide some ruminative commentary & questions on Kant's Antinomies, as they relate to Transcendental Cosmology. What are your thoughts on existential Transcendence? Is it irrational to imagine the unknowable "What-If" beyond the partly known "What-Is"? Should we "fall-down & prostrate"? or just "shut-up & calculate"? Or is it reasonable for speculative Philosophers & holistic Cosmologists daring to venture into the "Great Beyond" where pragmatic Scientists "fear to tread"?
Comments (138)
KANT'S ANTINOMIES :
*1. "The antinomies, from the Critique of Pure Reason, are contradictions which Immanuel Kant argued follow necessarily from our attempts to cognize the nature of transcendent reality by means of pure reason".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kant%27s_antinomies
Note -- Transcendent Reality : is this an oxymoron ; antinomy ; contradiction ; paradox?
Oxymorons may seem illogical at first, but in context they usually make sense
*2. Kant calls transcendental realism the common prejudice https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/
*3. Meaning of Infinite Transcendent Reality:
This being is transcendent, meaning that it is beyond the normal range of our experience of our material universe. At the same time this being is a reality in the human life process.
*4. Pure Reason seeks answers about topics that are beyond the five senses (also called metaphysical questions, e.g. about God, Creation, Soul, etc.). Practical Reason is content with answers about topics within the realm of the fives senses, e.g. questions about Economics, Psychology, Science.
https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-pure-reason-and-practical-reason
Outline : https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~ggoddu/modern/272h-k1.html
# 1st Antinomy
Thesis : The world is limited with regard to (a) time and (b) space.
Antithesis : The world is unlimited with regard to (a) time and (b) space.
Comment --- Big Bang theory provided circumstantial reasons for assuming that space-time is existentially bound in the past, by infinity-eternity. But the future seems bounded only by Entropy. Einstein hypothesized that the physical shape of the universe is finite but unbounded. which describes a static sphere. However, the expanding universe seems to be unconstrained in volume and surface area. So, the physical boundaries are somewhat flexible.
In response to the ex nihilo implications of instant emergence, the formerly singular universe (Nature) has been hypothetically multiplied into an infinite-eternal Multiverse, presumably unlimited in space & time, and inexhaustible in Creation & Causation. How plausible is that unlimited higher-dimension super-nature into which our space-time-bounded balloon universe is expanding? Do such unverifiable cutting-edge concepts qualify as non-scriptural theological god-posits, or as non-empirical atheist god-surrogates?
# 2nd Antinomy
Thesis : Every composite substance in the world is made up of simples.
Antithesis : No composite substance in the world is made up of simples.
Comment --- Modern Science has been pursuing the holy grail of Atomism for centuries. But each presumed (and hailed) fundamental particle has been superseded by another hypothetical Simple. Currently Quarks are no longer pictured as atomic, but composite. So the material world may also be flexible in space & time. What then, what does this unfulfilled quest tell us about rock-solid Materialism? Do we have to go out of this world to find the ultimate transcendent Simple : the essential element from which reality is built?
In contemporary mereology, a simple is any thing that has no proper parts. Sometimes the term "atom" is used, although in recent years the term "simple" has become the standard. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_(philosophy)
Traditional Atomism asserts that all physical objects consist of different arrangements of eternal atoms and the infinite void in which they form different combinations and shapes. There is no room in this theory for the concept of a God, and essentially it is a type of Materialism or Physicalism. https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_atomism.html
# 3rd Antinomy
Thesis : There is freedom in the world.
Antithesis : There is no freedom in the world.
Comment --- Free-Will arguments typically hinge on the notion of an unbroken chain of Causation & Determinism. But Quantum Theory introduced random statistical states-of-being that seem to be a-causal and indeterminate. But are statistical states real, or just mathematical abstractions? If Math is the logical foundation of Science, how can it allow ontological freedom : gaps in the chain of causal determination?
Psychologist Karl Jung postulated an Acausal Connecting Principle ("Synchronicity") related to Awareness, Meaning & Time. While that anything-goes notion may make sense for Metaphysics, is antithetical to Classical Physics. Can it be reconciled with the queerness of Quantum Physics?
A-Causal : isolated event or thing existing without a known provenance.
Acausal means not having a cause. In classical physics all events are believed to have a cause; none are acausal. In quantum physics, some interpretations of quantum theory allow for events to occur without a cause, that is, they are acausal.
http://www.quantumphysicslady.org/glossary/acausal/
Ontological Freedom :
To claim that human beings possess freedom is one way to resolve this conflict, but the existence of freedom raises problems of its ownin addition to concern over the source of this freedom and its manner of interacting with the causal chains in which it supposedly interferes, the existence of freedom seems to undermine our ability to explain any events according to causal rules, insofar as those rules lose their universality and applicability to a large range of events in the world. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=gradschool_theses
# 4th Antinomy
Thesis : A necessary being is either part of or cause of the world.
Antithesis : A necessary being is not (a) part of the world or (b) cause of the world.
Comment --- Everything in space-time seems to be contingent on prior causes. Except of course, the first step in the physical chain of causation : the Singularity that banged. Everything after that first event in the 14 billion year series of transitions, from nothing to something, has been contingent. Was the mathematical Singularity somehow exempt from the laws of physics? Was the Singularity super-natural? Is there a higher law of Necessity that transcends contingency? If Logical Necessity preceded the beginning of Time, is it a Being, or a Simple, or a rational Principle?
Summary :
Posters on The Philosophy Forum often run afoul of supposed limiting Laws of Ontology & Epistemology. The transgression occurs when we try to extend our metaphysical Minds beyond the physical limits of space-time-matter-energy. Is that excursion even permissible in modern empirical Philosophy? Can we "cognize transcendent reality by means of pure reason"? Or is Philosophy limited, like Science, to physical means of knowing, and to the mental margins of space-time? If we somehow quantum-tunnel through the invisible walls around Reality, are we in danger of losing our sanity? Is scientific Cosmology trespassing in the domain of Theology, when it tries to explain the implicit existence of a mathematical point-of-convergence (zero point singularity) between Space-Time and Infinity-Eternity?
Considering that we have only one instance of Reality for evidence, is the expansive notion of an Infinite Regression of Bangs (serial Singularities ; repetitive Black Hole leaks ; cyclic-creation-events) a plausible scientific solution to the enigma of existence? What can Multiverse or Many Worlds theories tell us that we don't already know? Wouldn't Ockham's Razor prefer a more parsimonious postulation? Can we condense the various pre-bang scenarios into a singular Eternal Potential? Would that explain more or less than more-of-the-same-stuff hypotheses?
Not sure what this means in a math context. The north pole of the Riemann sphere is, in a sense, "the" point at infinity in the complex plane. So in the chordal metric one gets closer and closer to "infinity".
The antinomies are ill-formed. In part they relate to physics, in part to logic and the structures of the language in which they are formulated.
Your thoughtful and specific reply shows the problem in one case. Showing it in each of the many cases in 's posts would be a gargantuan task.
And the capitalised heading is just annoying.
Sorry to quibble, but quarks are sub-atomic, not atomic, and considered to be the smallest particle.
Then on the non-quibble, is Kant's work really a good example to use for your topic?
If your critique is on cosmology, why not use Ptolemy and Thales? What's so special about Kant? His transcendental idealism? This is the wrong application of Kant's work.
From the prelude to the exposition of the antinomies .
. It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being presented and intuited in a possible experience. But we should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical conception thereof.
Now the transcendental reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something that we do know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an unavoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are necessitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.
(CPR, A339/B397)
..the argument is that it isnt so much a question of whether or not our metaphysical minds are permitted to wander beyond the limits of space-time-matter-energy, but that it has a tendency to so wander in accordance with its own nature. The antinomies themselves merely demonstrate, on the one hand, reasons proclivity to transcendental illusion, and on the other, the very same reasons exposition of the error contained in it.
Humans do this all the time, albeit not necessarily on the extreme scale shown in the antinomies, in that no matter what anybody says, from deities to theoretical physics, odds are that somebody else will find something wrong with it.
I apologize for the muddled message. It was not intended as a formal mathematical definition, but more like a poetic metaphor of mirrored universes : before & after the Singularity. In Multiverse theory the chain of universes would continue in both directions : infinite past & infinite future. The implicit point is that the beginning point of our universe would not be Singular, but Incidental.
The image below may be closer to what I was trying to express in inadequate words : that The Multiverse (portrayed as a singular thing) implicitly minimizes the significance of our own universe's birthday (Copernican Principle). Matter, Energy, and Natural Laws eternally evolving new worlds, but without end or purpose.
The intended question was whether imagining the source of our existence as an all-encompassing Multiverse (Eternal/Infinite existence with unlimited Potential) could be considered as a god-like Creative Power (including the innate potential for Life & Mind). For scientific purposes of course, that limitless Power is assumed to be Accidental, instead of Intentional : perhaps containing little minds, but mindless as a whole system : a blind groping demi-deity. :nerd:
Singular : exceptional ; uncommon
Incidental : accompanying but not a major part of something.
Multiverse :
The multiverse is a hypothetical group of multiple universes. Together, these universes are presumed to comprise everything that exists: the entirety of space, time, matter, energy, information, and the physical laws and constants that describe them. ___Wikipedia
A schematic representation of a generic Big Bang singularity , corresponding to a (0) = 0. The universe can be continued before the Big Bang without problems.
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/A-schematic-representation-of-a-generic-Big-Bang-singularity-corresponding-to-a0-0_fig2_51966428
So, was Kant saying that his own Transcendental Idealism is an illusion and an error? Or was he merely warning about how easy it is for reason to accept "appearances" as reality, and also to imagine "ideals" as more real than the testimony of the senses? Apparently, Science can play it safe by avoiding Metaphysics altogether. but Philosophy's job description is to explore the un-mapped territory beyond the known safe zone. :smile:
Kants Critique of Metaphysics :
[i]Very generally, Kants claim is that it is a peculiar feature of reason that it unavoidably takes its own subjective interests and principles to hold objectively. And it is this propensity, this transcendental illusion, according to Kant, that paves the way for metaphysics. Reason plays this role by generating principles and interests that incite us to defy the limitations of knowledge already detailed in the Transcendental Analytic. . . . .
Kant, however, complicates things somewhat by also stating repeatedly that the illusion that grounds metaphysics (roughly, that the unconditioned is already given) is unavoidable. Moreover, Kant sometimes suggests that such illusion is somehow necessary for our epistemological projects.[/i]
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-metaphysics/
Kants Transcendental Idealism :
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that space and time are merely formal features of how we perceive objects, not things in themselves that exist independently of us, or properties or relations among them. Objects in space and time are said to be appearances, and he argues that we know nothing of substance about the things in themselves of which they are appearances. Kant calls this doctrine (or set of doctrines) transcendental idealism
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/
I was using quibbleable "atomic" in the original Greek sense of irreducible.
This thread was inspired by the Big Think article, which mentioned "Kant's First Antinomy". The rest is just me babbling about Transcendence --- about which, according to Kant, I know nothing. But, per Kant, as a philosophical thinker, I can't help but transgress beyond the transcendental boundaries in the ship of Pure Reason. Besides, Cosmologists have already made in-roads into the Terra Incognita. So, even amateurs like me can experience little adventures into unverifiable Possibilities. :smile:
No.
Quoting Gnomon
Reason doesnt concern itself with the reality of appearances, nor imagining ideals. Reason is a logical function, by which the principles we understand in support of science, are applied to that which science doesnt support, or hasnt yet supported. Sometimes it works, re: chasing light beams and standing in free-falling elevators, sometimes it doesnt, re: an unconditioned cause.
Yes, as per Hegel, every idea contains the seeds of its own negation, which is just what you would expect, given the dualistic nature of human thought.
Pondering what is 'before the beginning' is just the kind of question that Buddhism designates as unanswerable, of which in some versions, there are ten:
1. The world is eternal.
2. The world is not eternal.
3. The world is (spatially) infinite.
4. The world is not (spatially) infinite.
5. The being imbued with a life force [i.e. 'soul'] is identical with the body.
6. The being imbued with a life force is not identical with the body.
7. The Tathagata [i.e. the Buddha] exists after death.
8. The Tathagata does not exist after death.
9. The Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death.
10. The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death.
Scholar T R V Murti notes in his 1955 book, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, that there are considerable similarities between this list and Kant's antinomies of reason, particularly the first four. (The book contains many comparisions of Buddhist philosophy and Kant, for which it is nowadays mainly criticized.) The Buddhist attitude towards such imponderables is expressed by the 'simile of the poisoned arrow', in which a wanderer is shot by a poisoned arrow, but rather than seeking to have it removed, wants to know who fired it, what it was made of, etc, and consequently dies as a result. The Buddha's teaching is to 'remove the arrow', i.e. overcome the cankers and cravings, rather than think about unanswerable questions such as these.
(This is frequently interpreted to say that Buddhism is 'anti-metaphysical', but that is only partially true, as Buddhism is certainly not positivist or naturalist in the modern sense, although consideration of that would take us far afield.)
Closer to home, there's another way of framing the whole problem of 'before the beginning'. I think, perhaps, the idea of trying to envisage God as being a literal first cause in a series of events is itself problematical, as it is in a way reductive. It's part of the 'God as supreme engineer' metaphor. But I don't know if a first cause is conceptually equivalent to the 'ground of being' in philosophical theology. It is more like the hypothesis that LaPlace had no need of. Karen Armstrong's 2009 book, The Case for God, laments that this tendency of early modern science to hypothesis God as standing behind science, as one of the causes of the decline of faith in God. Her view is that the basis of religious cosmologies resides in a fundamenal cognitive shift on the part of the believer, not in a theory of everything (review.)
One further remark - George Lemaître himself was a Catholic priest, but he never invoked his cosmological theories as any kind of argument for God. In fact by the 1950's, Pope Pius XII had started to mention Big Bang theory as a kind of affirmation of 'creation ex nihilo' - something which embarrased Lemaître, as he believed that his scientific work was a separate matter to his faith, and who prevailed upon the Pope's science adviser to, you know, cool it. Which the Pope did! He henceforth refrained from making such a connection in his speeches. A salutary lesson, I would have thought.
Thanks for the reply. Neat image. :cool:
I agree. Such speculations are metaphysical, not physical. Obviously, reasoning from experience with conditional causes to an unconditioned First Cause cannot provide empirical evidence for the actual existence of such a transcendental entity. But perhaps such reasoning beyond experience can point to a plausible explanation for existence : Ontology. Theoretical Philosophers can "boldly go" where empirical science cannot. And that's what theoretical Cosmologists have done with their conjectures of a time-before-Time. Is that a waste of time, or merely a way to put our brief time on Earth into a larger perspective?
The quoted science articles at the beginning of this thread indicate that some Big Thinkers think that our world must have emerged from something instead of nothing : "Cosmic silence before the Big Bang" and "Before the Big Bang". Yet, philosopher of science Bjorn Ekeberg, in The Delusions of Cosmology, admitted that even the Big Bang was a metaphysical hypothesis. So, he seems to be implying that Cosmology is not Science, but Philosophy. As such, it uses logical extensions from known information to make its conjectures seem plausible. Therefore, if you disagree with the logic, you can deny the premises. Do you think Big Bang and Multiverse have been validated? Do you think Cosmology is an appropriate topic on a Philosophy Forum? :smile:
You can't build a cosmological model without metaphysics :
From the outset, the 'Big Bang' was always a hypothetical premise - if t=0, then... it allowed for calculation of scenarios. When this in turn could yield models that conformed to observations, it was seen to validate the original premise. . . . . My point is you can't build a cosmological model without metaphysics; to think cosmology is pure science is delusional. . . . The Enlightenment ideal is still vitally important to science but the belief that the universe is made of math and that the role of physicists is to reveal its 'secret code' is a pervasive strand of thought in modern science that is indistinguishable from faith. ___Bjorn Ekeberg
https://iai.tv/articles/the-delusions-of-metaphysics-auid-2145
Depending on whose terminology is used, such speculations are transcendental, insofar as ALL speculations, whether physical/empirical or transcendental, are metaphysical. Anything predicated on logic a priori, as opposed to observation a posteriori, is from a logical ground, hence the name transcendental. Other philosophies, or even other properly scientific doctrines, re: demonstrable cause/effect conclusions, may use other names, but reason itself remains as it is.
Yes, the Buddha seemed to be a practical empiricist instead of a theoretical metaphysicist, focused on the concrete here & now instead of imponderable possibilities. Even so, he postulated a few metaphysical notions, such as Nirvana & Non-Self, in order to explain why we should do what he prescribed. Perhaps his avoidance of metaphysics made his philosophy more palatable to pragmatic modern Western minds, even though his own people quickly turned his austere science of the mind into ritualistic religion of the senses. :smile:
Yep.
Then presumably there is an idea that negates "every idea contains the seeds of its own negation"...?
:up: I guess I can't steal that word "quibbleable" now. You own it.
Quoting Gnomon
I see.
Of course. Such would be the dogmatic ideas. Could not any of those be negated? Do you think it is possible that any idea exists which could not be negated? Isn't there always a 'no' to any 'yes?
That's easy for you to say. :joke:
Yes, the cosmic sausage-link image does neatly encapsulate the "Big Bounce" theory of cyclic universes pinched-off from previous 'verses. But such information leakage models require some exotic physics. And the accelerated expansion models seem to turn the bounce into a "Big Rip". Those one-way models assume a single line of linear time. Yet other Cosmological models envision multiple miniverses budding-off from a singular central Multiverse. However the point of the original post is that all of these math-supported speculations, while internally logical, are not scientific theories, but philosophical conjectures that attempt to deny the unique creation-event implications of the Big Bang theory..
Meanwhile, other thinkers limit their speculations to the knowable world. And a popular cosmological model (Tipler 1995) begins and ends with a Singularity, sometimes labeled "Alpha & Omega Point" theories. Ironically, both Singularities are defined as "God". Others label the future Omega Point as a Technological Singularity (Vikoulov 2020). How can these confusing Ontologies be simplified into a plausible Epistemology? :smile:
Alpha and Omega: The Search for the Beginning and End of the Universe
by Charles Seife, author of ZERO : Biography of a dangerous idea
https://www.amazon.com/Alpha-Omega-Search-Beginning-Universe/dp/0142004464
ONE & DONE : EXPANSION + ACCELERATION
BIG RIP
BIG BUDS from Multiverse
RHIZOME (rootlike) Multiverse
Metaphysical ideas can be negated; Kant's antinomies are based on metaphysical speculations. It's not merely a grammatical matter; the grammar reflects what is imaginable. Any speculative idea may be true or false, or at least so we might think. Scientific theories themselves are never proven; they can, and often do, turn out to be wrong.
Underestimating grammar's capacity to mislead is the source of metaphysics, don't you think?
This is all just my opinion, containing the seeds of its own negation, of course.
More a way to passing wind.
Perhaps we can tie things down a bit more. Any proposition can be negated. All the supposed mysterious, metaphysical antinomies amount to is a statement and its negation. What appears to some as profound is no more than prefixing a tilde. Hence:
Quoting Gnomon
is just (P v ~P) with the content to be filled out.
The issue then becomes what "limit" might mean, in regard to space-time. And it's not going to be the same now as it was for Kant.
This by way of showing that there is nothing in the antinomies themselves.
I suppose the "antinomies" are merely polar opposite positions that we could take in philosophical arguments. As you implied, Kant was not concerned with the antinomies per se, but with the conflict that arises from such black-vs-white opinions. That's also why Aristotle advised us to aim at the Golden Mean, instead of "either of two abstract things that are as different from each other as possible".
I'm just guessing that what Kant meant by "limitation" on space-time was implicit in his use of "Transcendence" to describe our philosophical speculations beyond the boundaries of space-time into infinity-eternity --- both of which are merely abstract ideas. And that's the topic of this thread : Is it acceptable for philosophers & cosmologists to make conjectures about anything not directly perceptible by the physical senses? If not, then they are wasting everybody's time with literal non-sense : "passing wind". In that case, this whole forum could be characterized as nothing but a collective fart.
Whereas Locke & Hume proposed a "blank slate" model of the human mind, Kant argued that "the blank slate model of the mind is insufficient to explain the beliefs about objects that we have; some components of our beliefs must be brought by the mind to experience"*1. Empiricism implies "garbage-in, garbage-out" (GIGO), with nothing contributed by the information processor. Yet, Steven Pinker studied the tabula rasa question, and concluded that the human brain is born with innate categories, into which sensory inputs are sorted.
Pinker is an advocate of the Computational Theory of Mind*2. The result of that computing & processing is not GIGO, but novel ideas that add a personal perspective (qualia ; beliefs) to the objective facts. To filter out the garbage requires Judgement & Wisdom. Which is the whole point of Philosophy, is it not? Empiricism collects raw facts, while Rationalism selects & cooks those facts*3, sometimes combining antinomies of sweet & sour. :smile:
*1. Empiricism vs Transcendence :
Since the human mind is strictly limited to the senses for its input, Berkeley argued, it has no independent means by which to verify the accuracy of the match between sensations and the properties that objects possess in themselves. . . . Hence, while Kant is sympathetic with many parts of empiricism, ultimately it cannot be a satisfactory account of our experience of the world.
___Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/
*2. Computation of Mind :
In philosophy of mind, the computational theory of mind (CTM), also known as computationalism, is a family of views that hold that the human mind is an information processing system and that cognition and consciousness together are a form of computation. . . . The computational theory of mind asserts that not only cognition, but also phenomenal consciousness or qualia, are computational
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind
*3. The main difference between Rationalism And Empiricism is that rationalism is the knowledge that is derived from reason and logic while on the other hand empiricism is the knowledge that is derived from experience and experimentation. Rationalism is about intuition while empiricism is about visual concepts.
https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/rationalism-vs-empiricism/
Perhaps. But overestimating the proper scope of Physics might also have bad consequences. Blocking access to metaphysical ideas would turn Philosophy into Empirical Physics --- and by what authority?. Would Physical Philosophy be a desirable alternative to the current unverifiable & unregulated metaphysical speculations of Philosophers & Cosmologists?
Grammar is merely the structure of language, while Semantics is the content. So you could equate Grammar with Empirical Physics, and Semantics with Theoretical Metaphysics. Universal Grammar is a constraint on language, while the meaning of our words is malleable and subject to personal interpretation in variable applications. But somehow we manage to communicate, despite the cacophany.
Should we take away the freedom of poets to interpret the world? Should we legislate against Metaphysics, as the Marxists attempted to do? Or should we continue to openly debate Transcendent ideas, in the free market of ideas, as philosophers have always done? Let's not over or under-estimate, but aim for the Golden Mean. :smile:
Grammar refers to the structure of language: how words are used in speech and how groups of words are put together in patterns. Semantics refers to the literal meaning of the words we use. Both concepts are connected to the use of language, but are different aspects of language function.
Universal Grammar is usually defined as the system of categories, mechanisms and constraints shared by all human languages and considered to be innate
"Language allows us to transcend time and space by talking about abstractions, to accumulate shared knowledge, and with writing to store it outside of individual minds"
"The Origins of Us: Evolutionary Emergence and the Omega Point Cosmology (The Science and Philosophy of Information Book 1)" by Alex M. Vikoulov
Wittgenstein taught philosophers a somewhat different way of using the word "grammar", roughly as a single term for both semantic and grammatical rules, but also including some other less obvious aspects. It's the term he used for the rules of how language is used.
Given that his approach was to replace looking at the meaning of words with looking at their use, "grammar" has some significance.
It's this, somewhat specialised use that I was using, and given things said elsewhere I think @Janus understood this.
So the point being made is the capacity of the way we use language in one situation to mislead us in another. Janus points to reification as an example, while I was pointing out that, the mere fact that we can negate any proposition tells us nothing about how things are.
And that's pretty much my response to your thoughts - the mere fact that we can set out a proposition and it's negation be it about the cat being on the mat or the universe having a beginning is uninformative.
So what makes them informative? Well, when they have a use. So this view is more sympathetic to Hossenfelder, that if a theory can't be checked against the world, can't be made use of, then it amounts to little.
As for Kant, there's been some developments in philosophy over the last two hundred years. You wouldn't think so looking around here, but that's part of the oddity of these fora.
Quoting Banno
None of our imaginative speculations tell us how things are. It is even questionable that scientific theories or mathematical discoveries do. The fact that our thinking is dualistic tells us something about how we think, about its limitations, is all. Do you think the Koch snowflake tells us anything about the nature of the cosmos?
The significance is no more than recognising that the question remains unanswered, indeed, unanswerable.
Introducing things-in-themselves and transcendence remains unhelpful.
Which is exactly the point of Kant's antinomies as I understand it; to indicate the aporias that inevitably attend upon dualistic thinking. Kant referred to the "transcendental illusion". His project was aimed to draw a distinction between the transcendental, that which is beyond human experience and judgement, and the transcendent; that which is (unjustifiably) posited to, not be merely imagined or imaginable, but to actually exist.
Kant introduced the idea of things in themselves only to denote the hidden nature of empirical things, their super-sensory attributes we can know nothing about. That doesn't help us to know anything about the ultimate nature of things (obviously) but it shows the limitation of human experience, judgement and thought.
It seems obvious that you find all this unhelpful, but that fact indicates more about you than it does about the value of Kant's philosophy.
We've done this before. Kant invents a thing about which we can say nothing, as if it were an explanation.
I'll stick to the stuff about which we can say things.
I think that's roughly Hossenfelder's approach, and in line with Wittgenstein.
So I don't seem to be alone.
To proceed, can we find a novel way to approach these issues?
As I see it Kant doesn't offer the thing-in-itself as an explanation of anything, other than to point out that if something appears it seems to follows that there must be something which appears. and we seem to have no reason to believe that that which appears is the exactly the same as its appearance, or even anything at all like it.
Some people have found this helpful, and that says something about them, but if you do not, that's fine and it also says something about you.
I can't think of any novel way to approach these ideas. Maybe try Hilary Lawson's Closure, or Zizek, but I don't expect you will find them useful. I look forward to being pleasantly surprised.
Hossenfelder is/was an empirical scientist, and she insists that "Physicists must stop doing metaphysics"*1. Ironically, the same warning could apply to this forum : Philosophers should stop pretending to do Physics. Science is the search for practical knowledge that has a pragmatic "use" in the real world (e.g. food & clothing). But philosophy, by definition, is a search for abstract "wisdom" (e.g. to mature our minds). So, the "use" (purpose) of Wisdom is Discernment or Judgment : "ability to reach intelligent conclusions".
Both approaches (exploring outer & inner worlds) can be "informative" and useful, but Science is supposed to use its information to navigate the Real world of Nature, and Philosophy uses its wisdom to negotiate the Ideal world of human Culture. Is natural information (facts) more "informative" than inter-personal information (beliefs & values)? Is putting a man on Mars a practical "use" of Science? Is the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence (SETI) a pragmatic "use" of scientific knowledge, or is it feckless Philosophy? Is Cosmology "informative" or merely a vain attempt to see the world from a divine perspective? :wink:
*1. "Don't confuse science with philosophy".
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mCZh4VE0k-0
Quoting Banno
Yes, but this thread applies Kant's 400 year old antinomies to 21st century Cosmology : Philosophical Science and/or Metaphysical Physics? And the jam-fingered people quantum-tunneling through the imaginary wall between pragmatic physics & idealistic metaphysics are the professional physicists that Hossenfelder shakes her mommy-finger at*1.
Hence, the topic of this thread*2. Should we try to prohibit (legislate) Theoretical Scientists from practicing Theoretical Philosophy, or vice-versa*3? Is it even possible to completely separate Natural Philosophy from General Philosophy : separation of powers ; non-overlapping magisteria? 2500 years ago Aristotle divided his encyclopedia of Nature into observational (physics) and theoretical (metaphysics) volumes. And we are still trying pretend that human knowledge must be either utilitarian or irrational, with no middle ground? :nerd:
*2. Transcendental Cosmology :
What are your thoughts on existential Transcendence? Is it irrational to imagine the unknowable "What-If" beyond the partly known "What-Is"? Should we "fall-down & prostrate"? or just "shut-up & calculate"? Or is it reasonable for speculative Philosophers & holistic Cosmologists daring to venture into the "Great Beyond" where pragmatic Scientists "fear to tread"? ___original post
*3. Einstein's Quest to 'Know God's Thoughts'
[i]"In 1925, Einstein went on a walk with a young student named Esther Salaman. As they wandered, he shared his core guiding intellectual principle: "I want to know how God created this world. I'm not interested in this or that phenomenon, in the spectrum of this or that element. I want to know His thoughts; the rest are just details."
The phrase "God's thoughts" is a delightfully apt metaphor for the ultimate goal of modern physics,"[/i]
https://www.livescience.com/65628-theory-of-everything-millennia-away.html
...and no reason to think that it might be other than it appears. Kant is just using language badly.
I don't mind Zizek.
Hoffman sheds new light on the old ding an sich question : evolution, via conditional survival, has taught us to treat "appearances" as-if they are the real thing. If you follow his evidence and reasoning, it should make sense. But, if you judge it by common sense, it may sound like non-sense. :smile:
The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality :
The cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman uses evolutionary game theory to show that our perceptions of an independent reality must be illusions.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-evolutionary-argument-against-reality-20160421/
Right, we have no reason to think that it is or is not how it appears, or even that it might be one or the other. Precisely Kant's point; and nothing to do with bad language use.
Zizek is an avowed Kantian (and Hegelian). It's very warm and fuzzy that you don't mind him, but I would be surprised if you agreed with him about Kant (or Hegel).
Yeah. I'm reading that. Not so impressed.
There's a trend for engineers and physicist to move in to philosophy. What I've noticed is that they at first suppose that they have the answer to an age-old philosophical issue; they present this to the community, and are taken aback that it is not just accepted. Often, what happens is that they have only a superficial grasp of the issue, and so are not seeing the full breadth of the issue.
I'll have more to say when I finish Hoffman.
Back to . I don't think that it is helpful for either to put limitations on their domains. The intersection of cosmology and epistemology is quite interesting. But there is a tendency for physicist to underplay the conceptual problems involved.
Take a look at Philosophical Plumbing. If Midgley were around, she would eviscerate Hoffman.
Yeah, but we can move (have moved...) on. That very differentiation of how things appear as against how they are can be seen as a misapprehension of how language works. That's the lesson of Wittgenstein, Austin, and so on.
Quoting Janus
Of course. He makes use of Hegel, and is quite amusing (snuffle, pull t-shirt, whip nose on forefinger.) That's so much more interesting than talking about Hegel.
SO are you about to commend Evald Ilyenkovs Cosmology: The Point Of Madness Of Dialectical Materialism to ? That might be fun. I really can't imagine what he would do with it.
I'm looking forward to this.
...and I saw what you did there. Not saying any more.
You may think that you have moved on (not sure who you think the "we" are), but many would disagree with you; some may say we have moved backwards rather than "on" (forwards).
Seeing that differentiation "as a misapprehension of how language works" seems implausible and simplistic to me. I doubt Wittgenstein would agree with your interpretation of him.
I'm not familiar with Evald Ilyenkovs Cosmology: The Point Of Madness Of Dialectical Materialism, so I don't think I'll be recommending it.
Quoting Banno
Ah, so you see him as using Hegel as a prop for stand-up comedy or some such? I agree he is a very amusing talker, but if you want to know what he thinks about Kant and Hegel you need to read his books.
I suspect that precious few academic philosophers nowadays would count themselves Kantian. If you want a more sophisticated counterargument, you might first produce a more sophisticated argument. That is, it's not clear what is being posited here, by the OP or by your good self.
Quoting Janus
Ha! Yes, that's the way.
I have read a couple of his books.
I don't have a lot of time for academic philosophers; too much peer pressure at work. I doubt that many "sophisticated" philosophers (outside the 'analytic' tradition at least) do not recognize the enormous influence of Kant on modern philosophy.
In any case, these kinds of things can be looked at from so many angles, that it comes down to personal preferences: there is no fact of the matter as to whether Kantian style thinking is useful or not.
Quoting Banno
It'd be interesting to know which ones you've read.
I just don't need to go fishing with you. If you have a case, something we haven't been over in our myriad previous conversations, let's see it. Otherwise, I see no point in continuing.
Or are you just here for the abuse?
Quoting Janus
I pointed out that this is no more than saying that we can put a negation in front of any proposition. It's grammar masquerading as profundity.
You insist that there is more, but what? Your
Quoting Janus
is utterly hollow. You keep saying nothing of consequence, as if it were relevant.
Cheers. I'm done.
Quoting Janus
Quoting Janus
'It' has sure done a lot of 'appearing' to you for something which is other than it appears.
Digression, but the question I have for Hoffman is, if everything you think is a result of evolutionary adaptation, doesn't that include his theory of evolutionary adaptation?
I wondered how you got on with the second chapter. Beauty as a chemical reaction.
I laughed at his use of a Wittgenstein quote (p. 19 of paperback). I don't think he read it the way I would...
Needs its own thread.
But nothing like empiricism as generally understood. Buddhism is maybe more like what William James had in mind with 'radical empiricism'. James believed that reality is not just a collection of objects and events that exist independently of human perception, but rather a constantly evolving process that is shaped by our experiences. The entire domain of experience, whether subjective or objective, constitute the understanding of being. He argued that we should approach our experiences with an open mind and a willingness to learn rather than dogmas, religious, philosophical or scientific.
The point about Kant's antinomies is their grounding in his observation that we ask questions we can't know the answers to, as a consequence of our ability to reason. That's the sense in which they're comparable to the Buddha's 'unanswered questions'. You can waste a lot of time wondering, but the reality of existence is a pressing matter and not captured by speculative wondering. Not that it's something that I myself don't do.
Quoting Banno
There is one.
Quoting Wayfarer
Which is fine, so long as we don't pretend to have those answers...
Just to be sure, you do see that it does not follow from this that there is no "independent reality"?
Quoting Banno
An idea is a problematic conception, a singular representation of the understanding, for which the intuition of an object belonging to it is impossible, or, the representation of an object inferred as belonging to it, does not relate, re: the idea is unintelligible.
(E.g., truth, justice, up)
(re: solid time)
A proposition is a subject/copula/object synthetic judgement, necessarily containing a plurality of conceptions in a relation to each other, and is for that, a cognition.
(E.g., idea/contains/seed)
To contain the seed of its own negation merely indicates the principle of complementarity intrinsic to the dualistic nature of human intelligence, insofar as the complement for any such problematic conception, is given immediately in the thought of the original, the complement, being immediately given, requires no thought at all, insofar as its representation is precisely whatever the originals is not.
(E.g., fiction, corruption, down)
The negation of a proposition, on the other hand, is never given immediately by the construction of the original, but is itself a different judgement predicated on different conceptions, or different modalities of the same categorical conception, all of which, without exception, must be cognized as such.
(E.g., idea/contains/words; idea/does not contain/seed)
To posit the notion that an idea contains the seeds of the negation of a proposition, is a gross misunderstanding of the constructs of theoretical a priori human reason, to which the conflict properly belongs, by the insinuation of analytic language philosophy, to which it doesnt.
Don't take the title of the book too literally. It was intended to be provocative. Hoffman said that he began as a "naive realist". But after years of research into perception & conception, he has evolved to a more nuanced philosophical view of reality --- a virtual reality. He's another pragmatic scientist, who was forced by the direction of the data to "move into philosophy" : Ontology & Epistemology. So back to the question of this thread : is it a bad thing for serious scientists to dabble in "trivial" philosophy? Is philosophy the underachieving poor relation of science?
The video linked below might "impress" you more than the book. A writer can present his views in a logical linear manner. But, when challenged man-to-man & face-to-face, a "superficial grasp of the issue" might begin to unravel to reveal kinks in the logic. Michael Shermer is a science-defending skeptic by trade, and few people can go toe-to-toe with him and come out with their dignity intact. :smile:
SKEPTIC interview with Hoffman :
https://www.skeptic.com/michael-shermer-show/donald-hoffman-case-against-reality-why-evolution-hid-truth-from-our-eyes/
"take it seriously, but not literally"
The point of this thread is to ask the question : Is it a sin for a professional astronomer to speculate on a cosmological view from god's perspective? Or is it a waste of brain-power for a philosopher to engage in imaginary Ontological & Epistemological exploration? Are we chasing the elusive butterfly of love? :smile:
I'll defer to Hoffman to answer that question from a better-informed position. In the video linked above, he addresses the conundrum : "does the moon exist when we're not looking"? As a "naive realist" though, I assume -- without sensory evidence -- that the moon continues to exist apart from my sensory experience of it. But I can't prove it. :joke:
PS__Is the world within a Virtual Reality headset an "independent reality"?
He addresses this at some point. The main point, if I recall, is that he is arguing for not-P. One does not need to prove P to prove not-P, he only needs to show that the view he is attacking is very unlikely to be accurate. Following Dennett, he also takes natural selection to be a basic ontological heuristic suggested by parsimony, Ockham's Razor, rather than something unique to evolutionary biology.
IMO this is a big miss, because natural selection also applies to all physical systems, and I think there is a lot we can learn about the world by looking at how a tendency towards greater entropy causes selection effects to shape the surviving systems we see around us. (Whitehead talks about this in The Function of Reason to better effect).
In any event, I don't think the defense of our sense of logic and reasoning abilities is particularly strong (it takes up all of a few sentences despite being crucial). The rationality of the world, and our belief that we can apprehend it, has to be posterior to any empirical theories; I don't think he addresses this adequately.
EZPZ, just claim time is illusory and that the universe is an eternal object, then one up Hume and claim cause isn't just reducible to something simpler to understand, but non-existent. Wala! You've solved the cause problem.
Tegmark's own theory does this.
I just have a hard time figuring out how people who see themselves as dedicated empiricists also reconcile themselves to the non-existence of change, but it apparently can be done.
You might be interested in Black Hole Cosmology, which does propose a cause of the Big Bang. Our universe is just what a Black Hole singularity looks like on the inside. Black holes we observe are the births of other universes. Natural selection implies that universes that produce more black holes are selected for over time, and this is even more true if the parent universe somehow passed traits on to its offspring. This can in turn address the "fine tuning" argument to some degree. It just so happens that the values for many constants that support life happen to be the same ones likely to generate black holes, of which we have tons.
There is some interesting evidence to support this theory, but it is for the moment unfalsifiable and not directly discernible from theories where the Big Bang is unique.
I haven't suggested it is profound. Grammar reflects our thinking, which is dualistic; and that is basic. But it is simplistic to suggest that it is merely a matter of grammar.
Quoting Banno
What I said there asserts or implies that:
Philosophers have been speculating about the nature of the universe for millenia, about, for example, whether it is infinite or finite, eternal or of limited duration, created or not, designed or not, and so on.
This is an exercise of the imagination, considering what is possible, speculation constrained by a dualistic logic.
Our grammar merely reflects this.
We have no way of determining whether even the best theories of science reflect some objective, mind-independent reality.
Scientific theories are never proven, etc...
All you can come up with is to attempt to dismiss what I've said as "utterly hollow", "nothing of consequence", "irrelevant". Yet the topic is Kant's Antinomies. Why are you here if it is of no interest to you? All you ever seem to do is whinge about the poor quality of threads on here and yet you are here more and make more posts than just about anyone else. It just looks kind of sad and hypocritical to be honest.
So it just looks like you don't even have any counter-assertions, let alone counter arguments. This is not engaging in discussion in good faith on your part.
You want to claim that Kantian thinking is "not useful" not merely to you, but per se, and this attitude is nothing if not tediously dogmatic. Who are you to decide what is useful for others?
I'm happy to be done with you.
Quoting Isaac
Do you think that it follows from the the fact that something appears that the something is as it appears. If so, do you have an argument for that or is it merely a matter of faith?
I don't understand what this says.
Quoting Mww
While there is no one definition of a proposition, it at the least can be represented by a statement with a truth value. Not all propositions have the structure subject/copula/object, nor are all propositions synthetic, and while a proposition my be judged true or false, it does not follow that a proposition is a judgement. You might argue that claiming a proposition to be true or to be false involves a judgement, but that's not the same as a proposition's being a judgement.
Quoting Mww
I can't see that this says anything but what I already pointed out - that it is a simple fact of grammar (or logic, if you prefer) that any proposition can be negated.
Quoting Mww
This appears to be a constipated way of saying that one might judge either a proposition or its negation to be true. Yep. Of course the negation of a proposition is given "immediately by the construction of the original" (sic.), simply by understanding negation. If you can propose (write, accept, believe, posit, suggest, guess, demand, command...) P, then you can propose ~P.
Quoting Mww
I can't decide if this is agreeing or disagreeing with what I said.
I understand that you are a fan of Kant. Perhaps what you are setting out here makes sense in Kantian terms, but for me it remains very unclear. Most especially, and as we have discussed previously, I think that logic and philosophy of language have moved on considerably over the last two hundred years, especially with the advent of formal logic.
Quoting Gnomon
I like logical and linear. It seems to me that a "superficial grasp of the issue" is more likely from a video than from a book. An interesting difference in opinion.
Quoting Gnomon
Philosophy is difficult. Hopefully the "dabbler" will begin to see this. But more often, they fail to grasp the breadth or depth of the issues involved.
Quoting Gnomon
Not sure form the context whether it is Hoffman, you or both who were "Naive realists". The term is problematic, with those who claim the title often using it in a different way to those who reject it. There's thread after thread after thread on that topic in this forum alone.
Quoting Janus
And yet you come back for more.
Quoting Banno
Yes. I think that's what 'something' means. It refers to the linguistic/cultural object we're collectively constructing. So 'it' is all about appearance. We theorise (when we do cognitive science, not in day-to-day life) that an external (external to the system concerned) state constrains the parameters that object can take. We theorise this largely to explain the consistency of reaction we get when interacting with these objects.
But whilst the parameters of a 'tree' might be constrained by external states, none of those external states can be said to be the tree 'as it really is' because the tree is a social construction. It 'really is' how it is constructed to be. It 'really' has branches and leaves because we made it that way and how we make it is how it 'really' is.
One cannot, with consistency, declare the category 'spider' to contain all creatures with eight legs and then also claim there's some 'real' grouping 'spider' whose properties we're only guessing at. We just christened the group 'spiders' and in doing so we determined it's properties.
Likewise with trees, and cups, and numbers, and 'external states', and 'noumena', and 'things-as-they-really-are', and...
It still is something completely different to a termite, a forester, and a koala. And none of them are mistaken.
:grin: Yep!
'A man (not a man)
throws a stone (not a stone)
At a bird (not a bird)
in a tree (not a tree)'
What is it a description of?
No problem, examples notwithstanding. That understanding is required nonetheless, in order for the argument following from it to hold. Basically all it says is an idea carries its own negation, a proposition carries its own negation, but an idea cannot carry the negation of a proposition, as you implied.
-
Quoting Banno
No doubt, those being some of what we as humans do.
But one thing hasnt, not one iota, that being how we do what we do.
An insult to our intelligence, I say, to move on from an inquiry into how we think, for no other reason than a satisfactory proof for it is inaccessible .a euphemism for well geewhiz, its just too hard fur lil ol me to bother with ..yet substitute an inquiry into how we speak, for which a satisfactory proof is not even required.
Or .how to dumb-down while attempting to maintain a respectable face.
Define 'completely' different. As opposed to what other type of difference? We determine what a thing is in our naming practices. We theorise that the astonishing degree of consistency in our interactions with that thing are because the properties we assign to it are constrained in some way by external states, but nothing in these external states is 'the tree' - not 'as-it-is', nor 'in-itself', nor 'really', nor any other weird euphemism, because 'the tree' is the thing we named thus.
Anything else is why we named it, not the thing we named.
So yes, there are differences. If we hypothesised external states as an homogeneous soup it would be hard to explain how we end up identifying such an incredibly consistent set of boundaries, but they're not the 'real' boundaries, nor the 'boundaries-as-they-are-in-themselves', they're an hypothesis to explain cognition. Something contained squarely in the textbooks of cognitive science.
We can continue to trade insults if you like: what you say is at least the evidence for what you think, and if what you say is incomprehensible or incoherent, that does not bode well for what you think.
You would have us enquire into how we thinking with scant reference to how we say it, as if philosophy could leave logic behind. But language is the tool of the philosopher, and we ought at least understand something of how it works, and seek to use it well.
All you are doing here is stipulating a particular way of talking about things. As you say we theorize that there is something, some configuration of particles or energy or whatever, more or less invariant which gives rise to human perceptions of a particular tree. The characteristics of the tree we perceive are the result of our bodily interactions with whatever it is that appears as the tree. We cannot but think that it has some kind of existence beyond those characteristics, or the characteristics of any other percipients' perception, and we refer to that as the tree in itself. The tree as it is in itself as opposed to the tree as it appears to us is a voherent logical distinction, and really says nothing whatsoever about whether the tree in itself is the same as it appears to us.
Of course this is just a diferent way of thinking and talking about it than your preferred way, but neither way is priveleged in the sense of presenting any matter of fact; they are simply two different ways of thinking.
And thinking is the tool of the human being .
When folk try to put words in the place of what is being indicated, trouble ensues.
And although you have well-argued, and may be right, that this was what Kant was doing, others have taken his ideas as if they were arguments, or sometimes facts, not indications.
anyway, I've said that I do not understand whatever point it it you wish to make, and you seem uninterested in clarifying your account, so...
Ehhhh .I trusted you not to have any trouble putting the proper words in place of the dots.
Quoting Banno
No one asked for it.
:meh: then I'll leave you to your games.
So I'll join with .
No. That's not what I'm saying at all. It's a common misinterpretation of all predictive coding models, they're models of how information is processed, nothing to do with the physics of the universe. They're not making any ontological claims.
The term 'external states' (which has caused an immense amount of confusion here for some reason) refers to that state of a node in an information diagram. Like {on/off} or {high/low} something like that. So, whilst I dislike bridging cognitive systems theories and social constructs, it would be something like that external nodes must be in some state (contain some data) that is at least moderately consistent because our inferences about the state of those nodes from our internal nodes yields fairly predictable changes when acted upon.
That the tree is made of atoms is still all inference. It's not 'tree = internal, and 'atoms' = external.
Quoting Janus
No, I don't believe it is because you've used the term 'it' (as I pointed out earlier). For the 'tree-as-it-is-in-itself' to be anything it must already be inferred (no less than the 'tree' was in the first place). It's existence is no less a product of our perception.
Quoting Janus
As usual with arguments like this...
"thisis'nt just a different way of thinking and talking about it than your preferred way, and one way is privileged in the sense of presenting any matter of fact; they are not simply two different ways of thinking."
Can one assume that the above 'way of thinking' is, by your own theory, no more privileged than the one you espoused from which it is derived, by negation? Just a different way of thinking, yes? Equally valid.
Absolutely. In fact, I'd go as far as to say that the nature of language is such that we cannot possibly be always deceived - against what truth would we measure that deceit?
Quoting Banno
See this is where guys like me get lost in the modern shuffle.
I pointed out the error in the one case, where the initial condition was an idea but you forced in a proposition, supposing something of the one would apply to the other, re: negation. Now, youre doing it again, in this case the initial condition is appearance, but you forced in language, supposing something of the one would apply to the other, re: deception.
As if that wasnt enough, if being deceived is to participate in a world, and there is nothing whatsoever for any human to particulate in except a world ..why in the HELL is it that we may not always be deceived, if the guarantee of the truth of NOT being deceived relies on the very participation that may deceive us?????
So, youll allow me to be justified in quoting you .
quote="Banno;789928"]It remains that much of your post could not be understood, and what could be understood was, as argued, wrong.[/quote]
I do not understand what this is about.
Which case? What was the initial condition? What was "forced in a proposition"? Did you mean "forced into a proposition"? Which something "of the one" applies to what other?
Cmon, man. Dont do me like that. The which case? is your discussion with , re: , then repeated in kind with , re:
You chastised me for not having an interest in clarifying my account, but Im faced on the one hand with having it discounted as wrong, making clarification of it moot, and on the other, having the occasion for its relevance repeated, making my account superfluous, hence its clarification irrelevant.
Heres some proper philosophy for ya:
The Platonic riddle is chock full of propositions representing ideas, which to you, and anyone generally, are only appearances;
At the time, during your perception of the riddle, the world in which you are a participant, is utterly irrelevant;
At some time, between your perception of the propositions constituting the riddle, and your response constituted as pumice is a stone ..there were no words. Not a single one.
As soon as one realizes no words are ever spoken that are not first thought, all language philosophy loses its stranglehold on our intelligence.
Quoting Mww
...in an ugly sentence with a half-dozen sub-clauses.
I can't tell if you are continuing something of the abortive discussion with Janus. @Wayfarer is never so obtuse.
Quoting Mww
It seems your thoughts are to remain inexpressible. Then we have no grounds for supposing that you even have thoughts.
We'll have to leave you to your solipsistic brilliance.
Exactly, just as the idea of the tree-in-itself makes no ontological claims other than that our perception of a tree does not exhaust its nature or show us what it is in itself, and these are actually epistemological, not ontological, claims. When I mentioned microphysical configurations it was just an example of the sort of thing that might be thought (think Democritus as the primal example) not any sort of claim as to what things in themselves are. It's a fact that we don't, and cannot, know, since all we study are appearances..
Quoting Isaac
No, it is simply inferred to be an unknown "something" that gives rise to the perception; "it" is simply a placeholder.
Quoting Isaac
All views about the ultimate nature of things are just different ways of thinking. We can equally say that the tree which appears to us is, in itself, just as it appears or that it is not just as it appears. What is a fact is that we don't know.
It's not a matter of being deceived, but of being under-informed, and of acknowledging the limited scope of what we do know.
HA!! I was thinking more Lucy to everybody elses, except a scant few, Charlie Brown. Destroys the game by yanking the football, then thinks it a win.
It is fun, though, seeing how far apart the response is, from what the response is aimed at.
Stand by for the inevitable rebuke.
Quoting Mww
It can be, but I just lose my patience sometimes...which is admittedly my own failing.
E.g, if i judge my earlier beliefs to be "false" on the basis of new evidence that I obtain, then I am taking the referents of my present judgements and my past beliefs as being identical, in order so that I can speak of the new evidence as falsifying my earlier beliefs.
Alternatively, I could consider the new evidence as constituting a new referent of my present judgements , in which case I consider my earlier beliefs to be obsoleted by the new evidence, rather than being falsified by the new evidence.
Yes, nice point, what we count as evidence for beliefs is always based on presuppositions as to what should count. If beliefs change while presuppositions don't, then falsification is presumed to have occurred. If presuppositions change then the context within which the belief finds it sense changes, and the old context and the beliefs that go with it are now obsolete.
The Antinomies derive from the logical simple that if you posit P you can also posit ~P, for any proposition (sentence, assertion, statement...) P. Mere deduction cannot get us to the truth of P or ~P, we have to tie them in to the world in some way - usually some sort of observation is required to tell us how things actually are.
And the same goes for the various abstract physical theories to which Hossenfelder objects. So the widespread indeed, pop acceptance of multiple universe interpretations of quantum stuff remain quite unfounded, despite winning at the Oscars. One would think it accepted science, but of course it isn't, and I think Hossenfelder's lack of enthusiasm for what is in the end a misapprehension of her field of expertise is justified.
But there ought be a place for what we might call speculative physics, just for the fun of it, as Janus says, but also because it has folk playing with beautiful mathematics as you have shown in your diagrams and that in itself may lead to testable ideas. Consider Dr. Higgs.
It's just the ever-present temptation to jump to a conclusion, to believe one has the answer before the arguments are finished, that is to be avoided.
. As impartial umpires, we must lay aside entirely the consideration whether the combatants are fighting for the right or for the wrong side, for the true or for the false, and allow the combat to be first decided. Perhaps, after they have wearied more than injured each other, they will discover the nothingness of their cause of quarrel and part good friends .
I am not a Kant scholar, and I had never heard of his list of Antinomies (logical contradictions) until I read the article quoted in the OP. So, Kant's authority is not a concern of mine. The list was just a convenient outline for an open-ended philosophical discussion on the inherently meta-physical topics of "Transcendence & Cosmology". The browsing questions are inviting considered opinions, not final answers*1. I doubt that we will ever "deduce" any full-stop ultimate conclusions about "Transcendence" or "Metaphysics". But we may refine our personal worldviews with such abstractions, sifted through fine-grained philosophical argumentation.
However, since you mentioned it, how else would you derive "metaphysical facts" apart from "mere deduction"? Are such non-physical necessities empirically observable & testable? What is a "metaphysical fact" anyway*2, other than a consensus opinion drawn from collective reasoning rather than experimentation? I suppose you are expecting that "conclusions" drawn from a pattern of "metaphysical facts" would be merely confirmation of prior personal beliefs? So, as with all such abstract or ideal topics, a modicum of skepticism would be advisable. But a complete ban on metaphysical speculation would be the death of philosophy.
A list of opposing concepts, exclusive of middle ground, logically neutralizes itself. So any useful conclusions would have to come from the inter-relationships between those extremes. Therefore, your comment that abstract Logic alone (sans concrete instances) cannot lead to practical knowledge, goes without saying. Besides, as Hume noted, Reason serves at the pleasure of the passions ; so philosophers must learn to control their own base motives. This forum is a school of hard knocks for self-serving egos. :smile:
*1. Transcendental Cosmology :
PS__In the next post, I'll provide some ruminative commentary & questions on Kant's Antinomies, as they relate to Transcendental Cosmology. What are your thoughts on existential Transcendence?
___original post
*2. What is an example of metaphysical facts? :
Examples of metaphysical concepts are Being, Existence, Purpose, Universals, Property, Relation, Causality, Space, Time, Event, and many others. They are fundamental, because all other concepts and beliefs rest on them.
http://getwiki.net/-Metaphysics
Quoting Banno
Yes. hasty generalizations are to be avoided in rational argumentation. Ironically, such leaps do occasionally occur, even on a philosophy forum. But, how can you know when the "arguments are finished"? In formal Logic, conclusions are supposed to necessarily follow from the indubitable premises presented. But on this amateur forum, such mathematical logic is rarely presented.
Transcendence & Metaphysics are inherently doubtful, and must be supported by reasoning instead of experimentation. And in this thread, absolute final facts cannot be expected to compute from the informal "ruminations" and open-ended questions of the OP*1. I'm aware that many, if not most, comments on this forum are implicitly defending a sentimental personal worldview, instead of abstract Truth. So, speaking of antinomies, your admonition should apply to devotees of both Physicalism & Metaphysicalism, both Materialism & Idealism, both Naturalism & Transcendentalism. :cool:
Yes, the antinomies are intrinsically aporetic; and I think that is so on account of the way space and time are visualized.
Quoting Banno
For me the lesson of the antinomies is that there is no possible non-paradoxical answer; and this reflects an inherent limitation of dualistic thought.
[quote=SEP;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#:~:text=Kant%E2%80%99s%20constructivist%20foundation]Kants constructivist foundation for scientific knowledge restricts science to the realm of appearances and implies that transcendent metaphysics i.e., a priori knowledge of things in themselves that transcend possible human experience is impossible. In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion. This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. Thus, Kant says, I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith (Bxxx). Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing.[/quote]
Some notes:
Quoting Eric Reitan
(That is why Kant can describe himself as both an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist; there are two perspectives, one of which is almost always rejected, or not recognised, by naturalism.)
And
Quoting Eric Reitan
The crucial point that is largely lost in Western cultural traditions is the idea - although it's not an idea - of self-realization in the philosophical or spiritual sense. It is very difficult to define and so plain-language philosophers will always use this to argue that it is meaningless, which is a big part of the problem.
Suffice to say that Asian culture has maintained the connection between philosophical analysis and praxis - you see that very clearly in Tibetan Buddhism but it's also true of other Asian Buddhist schools, such as Zen and Tendai. It comprises an insight into and realization of the unity of being and knowing - to put it once again in rather Aristotelian terms. But this insight can't be captured or described in propositional terms, as it is something that has to be actualised. The crucial error in Western culture is to attempt to reduce it to propositional knowledge on par with (but inferior to) empirical or natural science.
Karen Armstrong has traced those developments in her book The Case for God (which is not a text of religious apologetics although of course a lot of people won't be able to see it any other way). See her OP, Metaphysical Mistake.
As you say, that depends on what is to count as metaphysical. The term is used, and misused, quote broadly.
By way of an example, in the Popperian school ideas are metaphysical if they are not falsifiable. So the conservation laws, being neither provable by mere deduction nor falsifiable, are metaphysics. For Watkins this is no more than an evaluation of their logical structure, but others will take this as an insult, not wanting anything in physics to be metaphysical. The conservation laws are not derived only from logic, but from experimenting and theorising over considerable time.
Each of Kant's antimonies looks to me to have been re-framed, and for the better, in the years after his demise. So the idea of a time before the big bang has been compared to the idea of a place south of the South Pole; And what counts as a simple is very much dependent on the task at hand rather than any absolute.
Yep. The discussion is re-framed so as to move on.
:down:
In one sense it does "drop out of the conversation", on account of its never being able to be a definitive part of our discourses, but in another sense it does not drop out of the conversation, because the fact that there is "in the background" so to speak, the unknowable, is an inherent and ineliminable aspect of the human condition.
And also is not reframed, and does not move on.
A423/B451
Thing is, we are only impartial umpires for someone elses judgements as expressed in his language. For each of us, for whatever our own reason concludes, there can be no impartiality, insofar as there are no disputants in a singular cognitive system.
. In the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated that it is always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may raise; and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition, which is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural phenomena, cannot in this case be admitted, because the questions raised do not relate to the nature of things, but are necessarily originated by the nature of reason itself, and relate to its own internal constitution.
So it is that reason always concludes to an answer its own questions, insofar as it is its nature to do so, but may without contradiction invoke different judgements as ground for them, insofar as its internal constitution is always a logical syllogism. Its no different in principle than considering getting to Chicago from Tampa by way of St. Louis (the thesis), or considering the same thing but instead, by way of Seattle (the antithesis). Doesnt matter .you get there either way (the conclusion) and while one route may be better in one respect (faster, cheaper, the major premise in a syllogism), it may be better in another (you get to stop in and see Grandma and Grandpa, the major in a different syllogism). As you say, on the one hand, a logical disjunction, but not on the other, a contradiction.
Going to Chicago is of course not a transcendental notion, but the logical method is the same as an antinomy. And while the antinomies themselves in the text exhibit negation beginning of the world/no beginning, etc .in principle the trip to Chicago is thetic/antithetic as well, re:, go this way/dont go this way, and furthermore, even if empirically conditioned hence certainly determinable post hoc by experience, the syllogistic method remains cum hoc consistent with reason itself.
The whole point of the antinomies is that for any transcendental idea, not just the four listed major examples of one, there is an antithesis for it, which follows logically from the fact any idea presupposes its own negation. And while it may be only the philosopher that dreams this shit up, every human is capable of it, assuming his sufficient rationality. Just because he seldom if ever does, doesnt mean he cant, and pursuant to the proper interest of philosophy, we want to know what we can do, along with the consequence of it, not what we cant be bothered doing.
True. But, I doubt that Western science is seriously challenged by the notion of Eastern self-transcendence, since each person can define his own criteria, and keep his propositional knowledge to himself. But Transcendence of physical (space-time) limits would undermine some basic assumptions of classical empirical science. So, it's a no-go.
Likewise, Metaphysics (Idealism) would be like a parallel realm of Reality (what I call "Ideality") that is inaccessible to the physical tools of Science. Also, mathematics is sometimes conceived in Platonic terms, and Psychology can be interpreted as dealing directly with the metaphysical Mind, instead of the physical Brain. Yet again, those classifications are moot.
Self-transcendence may be subjectively "actualized" without being objectively realized. So, it's not much of a threat to a Materialistic worldview. That's why Steven Jay Gould could accept the conciliatory notion of "non-overlapping magisteria" as a compromise between Science (how) & Religion (why). Similarly, I tend to view Philosophy, ideally, as an attempt to live in that demilitarized zone. :smile:
Kant's polarities probably seemed to be more fundamental from a classical (Newtonian) physics perspective. But quantum physics has knocked holes in some watertight classical categories. So, it's understandable that one era's firm facts may tend to wilt over time. But, if you are trying to set-up logical oppositions, for philosophical purposes, can you make a better list? :smile:
Kant vs Newton :
Kant thus directly confronts the metaphysical question of how to understand attraction that Newton attempted to avoid by positing it merely mathematically. As Kant interprets the situation, Newton abstracts from all hypotheses purporting to answer the question as to the cause of the universal attraction of matter [since] this question is physical or metaphysical, but not mathematical (4:515). In response to the most common objection to immediate action at a distance, namely that a matter cannot act immediately where it is not (4:513), Kant argues that action at a distance is no more problematic than action by contact (whether it be by collision or pressure), since in both cases a body is simply acting outside itself.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-science/
In the book I'm currently reading, Fire In The Mind (1995), by science writer George Johnson, I came across several passages that deal with the contention between material Physics & mental Metaphysics. The book is generally about the Santa Fe Institute's*1 unsettling work on Information & Complexity. Are such forays into previously unexplored fringes of physical science (Chaos, Complexity, Cosmology, etc) leading us into Metaphysical error? What is the grammar of Information?
Johnson notes that "we are finite creatures contemplating the infinite, and there is always the danger of confusing our maps of reality with reality itself". But that warning works both ways. Later, he tells about a son who asked his father, "do you believe in ghosts?". The father replies, "No, they contain no matter, and have no energy and therefore, according to the law of science, do not exist except in people's minds". Then, he reflects, "Of course, the laws of physics contain no matter and have no energy either and therefore do not exist except in people's minds". Tit for tat.
The author goes on to observe that : "Pushed up against this edge, science often retreats into platonism". As an example of such platonic idealism, he offers "information physics*2, being pursued in Los Alamos, Santa Fe, and elsewhere suggest a way of bridging the divide : the laws of the universe are not ethereal, they say, but physical --- made from the stuff called information" Ironically, until Claude Shannon labelled his algorithm's of 1s & 0s as "information", that word had traditionally referred to the ethereal contents of a human mind, such as ideas & memes.
If, as some cutting-edge physicists have concluded, "information is as physical as matter and energy, and if ideas and mathematics are made of information, then perhaps they are rooted in the material world. But the price for banning platonic mysticism may be a dizzying self-referential swirl ; the laws of physics are made of information; information behaves according to the laws of physics. Everything begins to seem like ghosts." Continuing with that theme, he says "with its grand unification theories and cosmological schemes, it is seeking answers so fundamental that they border on theology".
Should we then declare that border a no-fly zone for philosophers and theoretical physicists? Johnson thinks its too late to close the barn door. "Los Alamos and Santa Fe, where people are re-thinking some of the most basic beliefs of science, invite one to gaze inward and wonder if the maps could be drawn differently . . ." And I think grammar-weilding philosophers should lead the exploration of Terra Incognita of mind & matter. Of course, they must be careful to avoid errors of grammar & logic. :nerd:
*1. The Santa Fe Institute is an independent, nonprofit theoretical research institute located in Santa Fe, New Mexico, United States and dedicated to the multidisciplinary study of the fundamental principles of complex adaptive systems, including physical, computational, biological, and social systems. ___Wikipedia
*2. Information Physics: The New Frontier
At this point in time, two major areas of physics, statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, rest on the foundations of probability and entropy. . . . . Information physics, which is based on understanding the ways in which we both quantify and process information about the world around us, is a fundamentally new approach to science.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1009.5161 (mathematical physics)
In the book I'm currently reading, Fire In The Mind (1995), by science writer George Johnson, I came across several passages that deal with the contention between material Physics & mental Metaphysics. The book is generally about then new Santa Fe Institute's*1 unsettling work on Information & Complexity. Are such forays into previously unexplored fringes of physical science (Chaos, Complexity, Cosmology, etc) leading us into Metaphysical error? What is the grammar of Information?
Johnson notes that "we are finite creatures contemplating the infinite, and there is always the danger of confusing our maps of reality with reality itself". But that warning works both ways. Later, he tells about a son who asked his father, "do you believe in ghosts?". The father replies, "No, they contain no matter, and have no energy and therefore, according to the law of science, do not exist except in people's minds". Then, he reflects, "Of course, the laws of physics contain no matter and have no energy either and therefore do not exist except in people's minds". Tit for tat.
The author goes on to observe that : "Pushed up against this edge, science often retreats into platonism". As an example of such platonic idealism, he offers "information physics*2, being pursued in Los Alamos, Santa Fe, and elsewhere suggest a way of bridging the divide : the laws of the universe are not ethereal, they say, but physical --- made from the stuff called information" Ironically, until Claude Shannon labelled his algorithm's of 1s & 0s as "information", that word had traditionally referred to the ethereal contents of a human mind, such as ideas & memes.
If, as some cutting-edge physicists have concluded, "information is as physical as matter and energy, and if ideas and mathematics are made of information, then perhaps they are rooted in the material world. But the price for banning platonic mysticism may be a dizzying self-referential swirl ; the laws of physics are made of information; information behaves according to the laws of physics. Everything begins to seem like ghosts." Continuing with that theme, he says "with its grand unification theories and cosmological schemes, it is seeking answers so fundamental that they border on theology".
Should we then declare that border a no-fly zone for philosophers and theoretical physicists? Johnson thinks its too late to close the barn door. "Los Alamos and Santa Fe, where people are re-thinking some of the most basic beliefs of science, invite one to gaze inward and wonder if the maps could be drawn differently . . ." And I think grammar-weilding philosophers should lead the exploration of Terra Incognita both mind & matter. :nerd:
*1. The Santa Fe Institute is an independent, nonprofit theoretical research institute located in Santa Fe, New Mexico, United States and dedicated to the multidisciplinary study of the fundamental principles of complex adaptive systems, including physical, computational, biological, and social systems. ___Wikipedia
*2. Information Physics: The New Frontier
At this point in time, two major areas of physics, statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, rest on the foundations of probability and entropy. . . . . Information physics, which is based on understanding the ways in which we both quantify and process information about the world around us, is a fundamentally new approach to science.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1009.5161 (mathematical physics)
'Philosophy buries its undertakers' ~ Etienne Gilson
Quoting Gnomon
It's more like becoming absorbed by it. Deepak Chopra is a regular at the Consciousness Studies conferences held at the University of Arizona. The Tao of Physics was published in 1970. There are many memes and themes that have seeped through from Eastern culture into current science.
Quoting Gnomon
Does look a very interesting read.
I again recommend Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter.
True, (except for the fact that we can dispute with ourselves).
Quoting Mww
Yep, it's most important to exercise that metaphysical imagination, and also to feel the affective differences different perspectives bring with them. Given that all views are under-determined and inadequate, it's the differences different views make to how we live our lives that are most important. Correctness and general usefulness are pedantic illusions.
Yes, the "Meta" label has debatable baggage. Aristotle didn't classify his Nature topics in terms of falsifiability-by-experimentation, but he did divide his book between A. topics that were knowable by observation (Empirical) and B. topics that were knowable by reason & imagination (Theoretical). The latter later became known as "Metaphysics", and concerned concepts that are not directly knowable by the senses, and not verifiable by empirical methods. Most theories, even today, are endlessly arguable.
Later still, empirical science began to develop methods for testing theories*1. But what we call a "Theory" today is still a philosophical generalization (generic class) that can't be verified short of testing all possible instances of the category hypothesized. So modern science still combines Observation (Physics) with Theorization (Metaphysics)*2. Some theories reach a dominant consensus for a while, but remain open to refutation.
Theoretical Metaphysics has been found useful in Science. So, the problem is not its lack of empirical verifiability (e.g. Big Bang ; Multiverse), but with its associated worldview (Materialism vs Idealism). Some form of Big Bang/MV theory can be taken for granted by those who don't accept religious theories (Genesis ; Messiah) on faith. Both types of theories are "Metaphysical" according to Popper. And neither has any confirmable consequences in the here & now Real world.
So, a pre-BB theory (Cosmology) can be judged plausible if it predicts observable post-BB consequences. Inflation Theory was intended to do so, but fell short*3. Both Multiverse and Genesis theories imply some real-world consequences*4. And both are Metaphysical in that they are not directly & conclusively verifiable. Therefore, "what is to count as metaphysics" seems to boil down to whether it supports your own philosophical worldview, or an "erroneous" view. :smile:
*1. Scientific theory :
A scientific theory is an explanation of an aspect of the natural world and universe that has been repeatedly tested and corroborated in accordance with the scientific method, using accepted protocols of observation, measurement, and evaluation of results. __Wikipedia
*2. Metaphysics of Science :
Metaphysics of Science is the philosophical study of key concepts that figure prominently in science and that, prima facie, stand in need of clarification. It is also concerned with the phenomena that correspond to these concepts. Exemplary topics within Metaphysics of Science include laws of nature, causation, dispositions, natural kinds, possibility and necessity, explanation, reduction, emergence, grounding, and space and time.
https://iep.utm.edu/met-scie/
*3. Is The Inflationary Universe A Scientific Theory? Not Anymore :
[i]And it's even worse, they argue, inflation is not even a scientific theory:
[I]nflationary cosmology, as we currently understand it, cannot be evaluated using the scientific method.[/i]
https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2017/09/28/is-the-inflationary-universe-a-scientific-theory-not-anymore/?sh=6066fd61b45e
*4. Genesis Prophecies :
https://www.icr.org/article/genesis-prophecies
You might enjoy Watkins' Confirmable and influential metaphysics, perhaps. Watkins followed Popper at the LSE, and here gives a firm logical basis for certain sorts of metaphysics, with great sympathy for scientific method built in.
Yes. I read the book almost 30 years ago, before the universal function of Information became a central focus of my personal philosophy. My current Enformationism worldview began only about 15 years ago. So, I'm hoping, the second time around, I'll absorb more of his historical & journalistic overview of post-quantum science. I especially appreciate his metaphorical writing style, that is easier for an amateur to picture, compared to the abstractions of typical technological teaching. As a trivial example, he refers to the Atomic Bomb, developed at Los Alamos, as "mathematical transubstantiation".
Referring to Los Alamos and Santa Fe institutes in northern New Mexico, he says : "There seems to be something about the altitude here and the stark relief between mountains and desert that pushes speculation to the edge and makes even the most sober of scientists more reflective, more willing to turn science back on itself, to theorize about what it means to theorize --- about how we make these maps of the world. A theory can be thought of as the fitting of a curve to a spray of data." [my emphasis] He goes on to juxtapose the otherworldliness of quantum science with the variety of religious "maps" in the same area : pueblo Indians, catholic Mexicans, anti-catholic Protestants, and peace-loving Muslims, along with a myriad of New Age notions. "Retracing the history of these disciplines in a different way --- viewing them more as artful constructions than as excavations of preexisting truth . . ." Then, he suggests a novel way to understand, both the complexities & contradictions of the world, and our methods of making sense of it. "Conversely, we will see physicists seeking signs of contingency in the way the universe happened to crystalize from the Big Bang, Perhaps the particles and forces we observe and the laws they obey are 'frozen accidents', just like biological structures."
Pertinent to this thread on Transcendence & Cosmology, he makes a comment that only years later made sense to me. "an attempt to recast physics and cosmology by climbing back to the trunk of the tree of knowledge . . . . and taking a somewhat different branch, in which the seemingly ethereal concept of information is admitted as a fundamental quantity as palpable and real as matter and energy." [my bold] Later, speaking of the broken symmetries of quantum physics, he said "the world would be mathematical if only reality didn't mess it up". I'll let you guess what he meant by that.
I looked at the website for Mind and the Cosmic Order, but it requires an "institutional subscription". The only "institution" I'm a member of is Google. I downloaded a PDF, but it included only the index. Maybe later. :smile:
I'm not sure what you think I'm after. The point of this thread is not the authority, or lack thereof, of Kant's scientific worldview. I simply used his list of Antinomies as an outline for my own observations on Transcendence & Cosmology, and to elicit the opinions of others. His "quaint & silly" conception of physics is irrelevant for my purposes. However, if you find my own notions "quaint & silly", that can't be blamed on Kant, since I am not a Kant scholar or acolyte. Most of what I know of his philosophy comes from Wikipedia.
What I am "after" is an answer to the topical question : "How could something come from nothing?" I too, am doubtful that Kant could shed any light on the 21st century significance of that Big Bang lacuna --- the controversial "god gap" that Christians plug with the Genesis myth, and Atheists fill with Multiverse myths. A secondary question is regarding whether "Transcendence" should be off-limits for inquiring philosophers and cosmologists. Is that concept itself intrinsically "silly"? :smile:
Transcendence & Cosmology :
What are your thoughts on existential Transcendence? Is it irrational to imagine the unknowable "What-If" beyond the partly known "What-Is"? Should we "fall-down & prostrate"? or just "shut-up & calculate"? Or is it reasonable for speculative Philosophers & holistic Cosmologists daring to venture into the "Great Beyond" where pragmatic Scientists "fear to tread"?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14109/kants-antinomies-transcendental-cosmology/p1
Categorical error. Existence for humans is immanent, not transcendent. There may be possible transcendent existences, but impossible that they be empirical for us, and for that contingent existence which is empirical, it is necessarily immanent for us.
Quoting Gnomon
Beyond the partially known is merely unknown, which is not irrational to imagine. It doesnt make any sense to ask for the unknowable what-if under any conditions, which makes asking for it regarding the partially known, irrational.
Quoting Gnomon
Dunno about holistic cosmologists, but the speculative philosopher sometimes operates by the construction of his concepts, not solely with the employment of those having been already determined, so he can be said to venture any damn where he likes, leaving the pragmatist far behind.
Still, the reasonable speculative philosophers do have their own regulatory parameters, just that those happen to be other than determined by Nature, even if related necessarily to it, which, if overstepped, ironically enough, allows the pragmatic scientist to catch up.
My thoughts
True, you can only access the chapter abstracts on the site, but the abstracts for the first few chapters convey the gist. I bought the Kindle edition.
Quoting Gnomon
Because we're intermixed with base matter, would be my guess.
Quoting Gnomon
That if you don't know what it is you're seeking, you have no hope of finding.
You hinted, in your talk of metaphysics, at a broader interest in how this question is framed, and asked about "transcendence" being off-limits to philosophers and physicist. The Watkins article presents a logic that can be applied rationally to metaphysics by physicists and philosophers. Thought it might better suit your need than Kant.
My own approach at present would be more after Wittgenstein, as I think I have explained previously. The emphasis must be on the use to which a theory is put, to what can be done and what can be tested. Speculations are fine, provided they are understood as speculations, a parlour game.
You do not appear to be too far from that same view.
I do not think your posts silly, but they are somewhat unclear.
Thanks for the suggestions and link. But, I'm no better informed about Wittgenstein than Kant. My GI Bill college education had no place for Philosophy, except for Logic, and that was a math requirement. Ironically, most of my minimal philosophical knowledge comes from philosophical scientists (e.g. physicist Paul Davies). I find them easier to understand than most academic analytical philosophers. So, I suspect that Wittgenstein, like Kant, would be way above my pay grade. That's why I depend on dumbed-down Wikipedia for accessible tidbits of philosophy.
Regarding "off limits" topics, this thread was inspired by harsh skeptical (Logical Positivism) reactions to my naive willingness to cross the empirical line-in-the-sand, of a material Big Bang beginning, into the imaginary realm of Transcendence -- which was construed as an indication of a god-shaped hole-in-the-heart. Actually, my narrow interest in Metaphysics is due to the 21st century notion that post-Shannon Information is fundamental to reality and equivalent to Energy*1. Yet, the Big Bang theory, about the origin of the material universe, left the origin of Energy (causation), and Natural Laws (organization), as an open question. So, I'm interested in the implicit transcendent Causation & Legislation that Cosmological theories take for granted --- as existing, in some sense, prior to the beginning of our universe, perhaps even eternally.
As a philosophical theory, that supposed eternal Causation & Legislation could fill the "god gap" that current Cosmology leaves open. I'm not expecting to find evidence for a Genesis god, though, in the unclocked time-before-time. At the moment, I refer to "it" as a philosophical Principle, like an Aristotelian "First Cause" or Platonic "Logos", that may be necessary to explain the flow of Information/energy in the real world. A scientific name for that "flow of causation" is "Evolution". Moreover, Darwin's competition for resources has been compared to a computer program crunching information in order to calculate some ultimate output*2. So, I think of the transcendent source of Energy & Laws metaphorically as "The Programmer". That's not a religious concept, but merely a philosophical postulation for the ultimate question of Cosmology : why is there something?
Since I'm merely an unpaid amateur philosophical dabbler, I have no practical "use" for metaphysical speculations. And, I don't need such "parlour games" to support traditional religious beliefs. Yet again, I might be interested in Watkins's "haunted universe" logic, but it's hidden behind a paywall, and requires some kind of affiliation to read or download. I'd like to know a bit more about what's for sale, before I invest my sparse money. :smile:
*1. Is information the only thing that exists? :
Physics suggests information is more fundamental than matter, energy, space and time the problems start when we try to work out what that means
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23431191-500-inside-knowledge-is-information-the-only-thing-that-exists/
*2. Programming the Universe :
A Quantum Computer Scientist Takes on the Cosmos
___Seth Lloyd
https://www.amazon.com/Programming-Universe-Quantum-Computer-Scientist/dp/1400033861
You should be able to get access to https://www.academia.edu/ simply by registering, for free. Access to 100 articles a month from some of their collections.
And see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9909/confirmable-and-influential-metaphysics/p1
The upshot is that we might use "metaphysical" to refer at least in part to sentences whose logical form renders them unfalsifiable, and/or indemonstrable, but which are nevertheless useful, perhaps for methodological or ethical purposes.
https://www.academia.edu/3843328/Watkins0002
Scroll down, past all the other stuff. No registration, no pay.