Brainstorming science

Quoting Moliere

Now-a-days I'd say science is a profession tailored to the economy.

Would it not be the other way round? The economy being tailored to science.

Quoting Moliere

As a starting place maybe it'd be nice if public libraries had access to academic journals.

You can get a lot of information from academic journals on the web, but not the ones that contain the information that is moving the economy.
But the question there is, how many people would actually be interested in reading them? Not too many i believe.

Quoting Sir2u

Would it not be the other way round? The economy being tailored to science.

I'm interested! One of the reasons I thought to start the discussion was the hash out various meanings of "science".

Care to say more?

Quoting Sir2u

You can get a lot of information from academic journals on the web, but not the ones that contain the information that is moving the economy.
But the question there is, how many people would actually be interested in reading them? Not too many i believe.

Yup. And due to budgetary reasons public libraries don't invest in such things because they are prohibitively expensive and the interest is low. Usually public libraries attempt to cater to the people around them (which they should). So in terms of the social infrastructure that might be required I don't think I have an explicit opinion that'd actually be practical. I'm not sure how to get there.

But it seems fair. Why block knowledge? Isn't that a good thing for the public in a democracy?

Quoting Moliere

One of the reasons I thought to start the discussion was the hash out various meanings of "science".

How would you define it?

Quoting Moliere

Care to say more?

Maybe.Quoting Moliere

And due to budgetary reasons public libraries don't invest in such things because they are prohibitively expensive and the interest is low.

Yep. Where I live there is not really such a thing as public libraries, I think there might be 3 or 4 in the country. Most of the universities have libraries but except for the one attached to my place of work I have no idea if they are even used.
After reading an article a couple of years ago I made a few inquiries over the internet to public libraries I found that most of them would make an effort to get the books they don't have if asked in advance.

Quoting Moliere

But it seems fair. Why block knowledge? Isn't that a good thing for the public in a democracy?

Fair plays a very minor role in society, haven't you noticed? Research is expensive, if your company has spent millions of dollars developing some sort of technology you do not want others getting it and preventing you from recovering the money. People in your company would lose their jobs maybe.
If it was a true democracy them everyone would respect the rights of others and information could be freely spread around. If it was a true democracy them everyone would know all about the people the are voting for and fewer idiots would be elected.

Quoting Sir2u

How would you define it?

I think that science is a part of knowledge. I don't have a general definition in the sense for all possible examples.

But usually I think of it as any culture's knowledge which enables. Science and technology, for me, are closely linked. I'm more skeptical of notions of science which posit metaphysical theses. I tend to think of science as what human beings do together. But the specifics of that, verses other things we do together, aren't easy for me to pin down.

Somehow human beings come together in groups and are able to generate knowledge that happens to be useful to people outside of that group, but in a particular way too. Something to do with being able to manipulate our environment.

Reply to Moliere I think of science as the process of acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge being the result of scientific examination and experimentation.
That is why knowledge is so well kept by the industries that succeed in gaining it, it is bloody expensive to maintain the labs and funded universities that do the research.

Quoting Sir2u

I think of science as the process of acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge being the result of scientific examination and experimentation.

I agree with this.

That is why knowledge is so well kept by the industries that succeed in gaining it, it is bloody expensive to maintain the labs and funded universities that do the research.

Oh, sure. I'm aware. Knowledge is valuable. Not just in some esoteric sense. It's worth money. Lots of it.

Science is a practice of bookkeeping guess work.

But the only way to make that bookkeeping guess work worthwhile is through honesty, or perhaps another virtue.

So, transcendentally: How is it possible to arrive at scientific truth? The only possible way is through honest bookkeeping.

Is there a question here? There is a lot more to science than honest bookkeeping.

edit: didn't see the previous replies.

Quoting Moliere

Now-a-days I'd say science is a profession tailored to the economy. I want to figure out how to tie it to Marx, duh, and so call it knowledge-production.

I would want to say that the reason science is not knowledge-production is because it is tailored to the economy. Modern science is GDP-production, or arms-production, or health-production, and is only incidentally knowledge-production. This has been particularly true since the inception of the modern research university. Speculative knowledge has been more or less entirely eclipsed in our culture.

From an interesting and pertinent article by the Harvard historian of science, Steven Shapin:

Quoting Steve Shapin, Is There a Crisis of Truth?

So, by the middle of the 20th century, the scientific community — in the United States and many other Western countries — had achieved a goal long wished for by many of its most vocal members: it had been woven into the fabric of ordinary social, economic, and political life. For many academic students of science — historians, sociologists, and, above all, philosophers — that part of science which was not an academic affair remained scarcely visible, but the reality was that most of science was now conducted within government and business, and much of the public approval of science was based on a sense of its external utilities — if indeed power and profit should be seen as goals external to scientific work. Moreover, insofar as academia can still be viewed as the natural home of science, universities, too, began to rebrand themselves as normal sorts of civic institutions. For at least half a century, universities have made it clear that they should not be thought of as Ivory Towers; they were not disengaged from civic concerns but actively engaged in furthering those concerns. They have come to speak less and less about Truth and more and more about Growing the Economy and increasing their graduates’ earning power. The audit culture imposed neoliberal market standards on the evaluation of academic inquiry, offering an additional sign that science properly belonged in the market, driven by market concerns and evaluated by market criteria. The entanglement of science with business and statecraft historically tracked the disentanglement of science from the institutions of religion. That, too, was celebrated by scientific spokespersons as a great victory, but the difference here was that science and religion in past centuries were both in the Truth Business.

When science becomes so extensively bonded with power and profit, its conditions of credibility look more and more like those of the institutions in which it has been enfolded. Its problems are their problems. Business is not in the business of Truth; it is in the business of business. So why should we expect the science embedded within business to have a straightforward entitlement to the notion of Truth? The same question applies to the science embedded in the State’s exercise of power. Knowledge speaks through institutions; it is embedded in the everyday practices of social life; and if the institutions and the everyday practices are in trouble, so too is their knowledge. Given the relationship between the order of knowledge and the order of society, it’s no surprise that the other Big Thing now widely said to be in Crisis is liberal democracy. The Hobbesian Cui bono? question (Who benefits?) is generally thought pertinent to statecraft and commerce, so why shouldn’t there be dispute over scientific deliverances emerging, and thought to emerge, from government, business, and institutions advertising their relationship to them?

Quoting Moliere

Science is a practice of bookkeeping guess work.

But the only way to make that bookkeeping guess work worthwhile is through honesty, or perhaps another virtue.

So, transcendentally: How is it possible to arrive at scientific truth? The only possible way is through honest bookkeeping.

The only way to arrive at truth is to desire truth, and those who desire truth as a means to something else do not desire truth qua truth. Scientists were once lovers of truth, and because of that they were reliable. But now that science has become a means, scientists are no longer reliable. Their science (and its truth) is a means to some further end, and because of this the science has lost its credibility. When the scientist was a man who sought truth we believed him to be speaking truth, but now that the scientist is an employee of institutions, we believe him to be acting in the interests of those institutions.

Covid is a very good example. Fauci appealed to his scientific bona fides to inform us that masks are ineffective against Covid-19. We later learned that he was lying in order to ensure enough personal protective equipment (PPE) for medical professionals. We thought the scientist was speaking the truth, whereas in fact he was acting in the interests of his institution by speaking outright lies.

Quoting Leontiskos

When the scientist was a man who sought truth we believed him to be speaking truth, but now that the scientist is an employee of institutions, we believe him to be acting in the interests of those institutions.

Do you think that being employed by an institution is somehow contradictory to being a man who seeks truth?

I suppose that would be at least as problematic for clergy.

Quoting wonderer1

Do you think that being employed by an institution is somehow contradictory to being a man who seeks truth?

There is no more ubiquitously conflicting interest than the interest in truth. Consider the Fauci case:

1. Masks are effective against Covid-19.
2. If society knows this, then there may not be enough PPE for medical professionals.
3. Therefore, I must lie and say that masks are ineffective against Covid-19.

This is a perfectly standard expedient lie, and there may be nothing that humans are more adept at than the expedient lie. When science becomes fettered to an end that is separate from truth, conflicts of interest such as these inevitably arise. The sort of institutions that science has now become wed to all hold such heterogenous ends.

Quoting Moliere

As a starting place maybe it'd be nice if public libraries had access to academic journals. Taxes go to pay for that research after all. It should be accessible.

Agree 100%, that research results paid for by tax dollars should in general be more freely available. However, I'm afraid the fraction of the electorate that cares much about the issue is rather small, and I don't forsee much change anytime soon.

Quoting Leontiskos

This is a perfectly standard expedient lie, and there may be nothing that humans are more adept at than the expedient lie.

Perfectly standard? I'd think it is an unusual situation, for a scientist to have to make such judgement calls with millions of lives at stake.

Quoting Leontiskos

When science becomes fettered to an end that is separate from truth, conflicts of interests such as these arise. The sort of institutions that science has now become wed to all involve such heterogenous ends.

It's not very conducive to having an accurate view of things, to reify science as you are. You also seem to be committing a genetic fallacy. Do you want to rephrase that in a less fallacious way?

Quoting wonderer1

You also seem to be committing a genetic fallacy.

How so? Try making a real argument, bud.

Reply to jgill No worries. I started this in the lounge once upon a time for the reason that I don't really understand science, and also know others here are scientific sorts: but I didn't want the burden of argument to inhibit the thoughts.

As the title suggests: brainstorming science (together)

If you could say what more there is to science than honest bookkeeping then I'd be happy: I agree with you, but I also wonder "how much more is there to it?"

Quoting Leontiskos

The only way to arrive at truth is to desire truth,

Yes, I agree here.

and those who desire truth as a means to something else do not desire truth qua truth. Scientists were once lovers of truth, and because of that they were reliable. But now that science has become a means, scientists are no longer reliable. Their science (and its truth) is a means to some further end, and because of this the science has lost its credibility. When the scientist was a man who sought truth we believed him to be speaking truth, but now that the scientist is an employee of institutions, we believe him to be acting in the interests of those institutions.

I believe scientists are very much still in that pursuit.

Covid is a very good example. Fauci appealed to his scientific bona fides to inform us that masks are ineffective against Covid-19. We later learned that he was lying in order to ensure enough personal protective equipment (PPE) for medical professionals. We thought the scientist was speaking the truth, whereas in fact he was acting in the interests of his institution by speaking outright lies.

Surely what Fauci said and did is not the same as what scientists do?

And, with respect to brainstorming science, Covid is only understood cuz of science. We only know about it because of the various pursuits into virology and biology and so forth. We could detect it because of the advances in ELISA and qPCR techniques.

Which is to say: Some scientists say outright lies to use the mantle of science for their cause, but in the long run scientists will criticize them and point out the truth because that's what we do: be annoying nerds about technical truths. lol

Quoting Moliere

If you could say what more there is to science than honest bookkeeping then I'd be happy

Does bookkeeping involve wonder and investigation? I'm not sure science is bookkeeping at all. It seems more basically to be an investigation of the unknown in nature.

Quoting Moliere

I believe scientists are very much still in that pursuit.

Some are, but Shapin's article is very good at illustrating why they are becoming so rare.

Quoting Moliere

Surely what Fauci said and did is not the same as what scientists do?

It is what scientists increasingly do. There are many causes, but they combine to result in something like what Ioannidis argued in his famous paper, “Why Most Published Research Findings are False.”

Quoting Moliere

Which is to say: Some scientists say outright lies to use the mantle of science for their cause, but in the long run scientists will criticize them and point out the truth because that's what we do: be annoying nerds about technical truths. lol

Shapin's article is in large part addressing the idea that science will win in the long run. I should reread it, even though it is a bit long. He gets at the curious truth that speculative sciences are paradoxical insofar as their success leads to their failure.

But from the perspective of someone like John Henry Newman in his Idea of a University, science and the liberal arts have been degrading for a long time now. Today science is associated with power more than truth, and this has been a long time coming.

Quoting Leontiskos

Does bookkeeping involve wonder and investigation? I'm not sure science is bookkeeping at all. It seems more basically to be an investigation of the unknown in nature.

In terms of practices the bookkeeping is important: the reference to the same kinds of units so that methods and findings can be shared, for instance, can be characterized as a formalized method of collective bookkeeping so that they can communicate what they observe to one another.

And the honest part is because it's a pretty valued trait in the sciences, I find.
 

There can be motivations to do science like a sense of wonder, but there are also motivations like "I want to make more money", or "I want scientific glory" or "I want to disprove that sunavabitch!" :D

But even moreso I don't think the motivation matters as much as the activity: whether you're there out of a sense of wonder or because it's how you pay your bills the work that is valuable requires communicable findings.

But also in reflecting on this -- I'm interested in reducing scientific practice to something easily communicable as well as true of the those practices for pedagogic and philosophical reasons. The philosophical reason is that I think there's a temptation to treat science as a kind of magic, which I don't believe it to be: More like an intricate conversation that's been recorded over time and modified in light of good bookkeeping (so that the conversation can happen over time, for the most part) of some clever guesses with checks -- mathematically it's "Guess and check" within a community that spans over time.

Of course the nature of science has changed since Newton, but I'd say that truth is very much a part of its enterprise still even though it's industrially aligned -- science, like any human activity, changes with the changes in economic forms, but that doesn't mean you can make a science without truth. (it does not surprise me that most published research is false -- that's one of the explicit reasons for publishing research is so others can read and check it and publish a reply. This is why you can't just grab a study and claim to know something)

Quoting wonderer1

Agree 100%, that research results paid for by tax dollars should in general be more freely available. However, I'm afraid the fraction of the electorate that cares much about the issue is rather small, and I don't forsee much change anytime soon.

That's how everything that's ever been important starts ;)

Quoting Moliere

As a starting place maybe it'd be nice if public libraries had access to academic journals.

Ban academic paywalls. That's a cause I can get behind. Especially when it's taxpayer-funded research. But even the so-called privately funded universities take plenty of taxpayer dough. Ban the paywalls.

ps -- I came to the thread late and I see that @wonderer1 and others have made this point.

Quoting fishfry

Ban academic paywalls. That's a cause I can get behind. Especially when it's taxpayer-funded research. But even the so-called privately funded universities take plenty of taxpayer dough. Ban the paywalls.

ps -- I came to the thread late and I see that wonderer1 and others have made this point.

No worries, it's nice to hear that others' have similar thoughts on something that seems pretty esoteric with respect to the usual issues. And I agree that paywalls are a big burden, especially for international researchers. Whereas I can, if I feel the gumption, usually find some route to a paper through going to libraries and asking people and whatnot, a researcher on the other side of the world only has access to what is available, the internet is a great tool for distributing that sort of thing, but the owners of these properties -- and it's really really complicated, I don't understand the revenue streams of research very well -- put that stopgap in there; my guess is it's mostly there so that they can charge institutions the amount that they require to continue running, but that in turn means that individuals have to align with an institution, and that create a huge barrier to international scholarship.

Quoting Moliere

...my guess is it's mostly there so that they can charge institutions the amount that they require to continue running...

Excerpt from https://blogs.uwe.ac.uk/psychological-sciences/standards-and-profits-in-academic-publishing-all-publishers-and-open-access-arrangements-are-not-the-same/:

But increasing numbers suggest that even traditional academic publishers can be bad for science (see here and here). Academic publishing used to incur appreciable costs in terms of typesetting articles, producing physical copies of journals and distributing them around the world. More recently, desktop publishing software and online articles have reduced these costs considerably. Today, the academic publishing industry reports profit margins of around 40%. A New Scientist leader article argues it is the most profitable business in the world.

While the business model of academic publishing is extremely profitable for the publishers, it is extractive in terms of the academic labour involved (see here and here). Academics write articles for free, associate editors find reviewers for free, peer reviewers critique the articles for free, and even many editors in chief guide the whole process for free. All the while, some publishers are making huge profits.

Reply to wonderer1 oof. Alas we can all be sweet summer children at one point...

So, it's even worse than that! A group riding an economic wave because why not, when the people involved see the why not and would like to, like, not....

Quoting Moliere

In terms of practices the bookkeeping is important: the reference to the same kinds of units so that methods and findings can be shared, for instance, can be characterized as a formalized method of collective bookkeeping so that they can communicate what they observe to one another.

In order to collaborate scientists need to communicate with each other, both across generations and within generations. Sure, but it does not follow that science is communication.

Quoting Moliere

There can be motivations to do science like a sense of wonder, but there are also motivations like "I want to make more money", or "I want scientific glory" or "I want to disprove that sunavabitch!" :D

But even moreso I don't think the motivation matters as much as the activity: whether you're there out of a sense of wonder or because it's how you pay your bills the work that is valuable requires communicable findings.

But what is the activity? That's the question. It's not communication. Not everyone who communicates is doing science, nor is everyone who shares a finding doing science.

Quoting Moliere

I think there's a temptation to treat science as a kind of magic

True and then some.

Quoting Moliere

More like an intricate conversation that's been recorded over time and modified in light of good bookkeeping (so that the conversation can happen over time, for the most part) of some clever guesses with checks -- mathematically it's "Guess and check" within a community that spans over time.

The Catholics and the Muslims have been communicating for many centuries. Is that science? A conversation recorded over time?

Quoting Science | Merriam-Webster

1a: knowledge or a system of knowledge covering general truths or the operation of general laws especially as obtained and tested through scientific method
b: such knowledge or such a system of knowledge concerned with the physical world and its phenomena : natural science

A science is an ordered body of knowledge. "Science" is the ordered body of knowledge which modern man tends to find most important (i.e. natural science).

Quoting Leontiskos

But what is the activity?

Guess-check-share-guess-check-share-guess-check-share...

I think that the particular era of science will specify what makes a good guess, what would count as a check, and how one goes about sharing. In Newton's day philosophy and science were closer than most generally hold now.

One of the problems with method is that it doesn't exactly exist in some big sense. The methods of interest are already established in various ways at this time so it entirely depends upon what science you're working within, and even which lab you'd find yourself in. But these methods are in no way general in the way philosophy likes, or even as the public tends to think: this going some way to push against the magical thinking that science might tempt.

Also it asks the reader to get out of their head and look at what the scientists are doing as a method for defining science :D -- A systematic body of knowledge isn't exactly a science either. Plumbing is a systematic body of knowledge that relies upon empirical guess-work, but it's not a science. And all the many systems of knowledge which philosophers produce aren't exactly a science either.

Quoting Moliere

I think that the particular era of science will specify what makes a good guess

Here is a good article to begin debunking the guess/check paradigm: Cartwright on theory and experiment in science.

Quoting Moliere

-share-

Why share? Is it necessary?

Quoting Moliere

Guess-check-share-guess-check-share-guess-check-share...

This is a bit like describing tennis as, "Swing-hit-run-swing-hit-run..." That's not what tennis is. It's a physical-reductionistic cataloguing of certain events that occur within the game of tennis.

Quoting Moliere

Plumbing is a systematic body of knowledge that relies upon empirical guess-work, but it's not a science.

I think it is, and more than that, I think those who say it's not will not be able to give a coherent account of what a science is. That's what we've begun running into, here.

Quoting Moliere

And all the many systems of knowledge which philosophers produce aren't exactly a science either.

Why not?

Quoting Leontiskos

I think it is, and more than that, I think those who says it's not will not be able to give a coherent account of what a science is. That's what we've begun running into, here.

Is it incoherent to say "Science is what scientists do, and what scientists do changes over time"?

Quoting Leontiskos

Why not?

By the above criteria. You don't see Gassendi or Lucretius referenced in the activity of sciences today (just to give some naturalist philosophers that would seem to get along with the ideas, but aren't needed for science). Why should you?

That is, rather than an organized body of knowledge based on empiricism, I'd say science is what scientists do.

Quoting Leontiskos

Here is a good article to begin debunking the guess/check paradigm: Cartwright on theory and experiment in science.

So the claim that looks like might conflict with what I'm saying is: "that science is essentially just theory plus experiment;"

But what science is is what scientists do, and what scientists do changes over time. That is I'm taking up a historical-empirical lens to the question -- the philosophical theory is "Science is what scientists do", which, of course, is defined only ostensively and so doesn't have some criteria for inclusion.

A perhaps annoying but purposeful use of vagueness: What shall we include in saying "science"? What are the examples that need to be considered? It seems we ought to include real examples of science, and so an emphasis on the activity of scientists rather than looking at theories of knowledge or qualifications of philosophers.

That is, I'd defend the notion of a standpoint: I think that people who do the thing are in a better position to know about it. That doesn't mean they're in a better position to philosophize about it, of course, which is why a lot of philosophers of science are both scientists and philosophers: that phenomenology of science is considered an important grounding in judging the history of science from a philosophical perspective. (so, yes, I'd also defend the notion that we come to know science from a historical perspective, which is contextual and not amenable to universal conditions)

I don't think my notion of science would deny the part where Edward says: "In addition to theory and experimentation, there are models, narratives, diagrams, illustrations, concrete applications, and so on. None of these is reducible to theory or experiment, and neither are they any less essential to the practice and content of science. And when we take account of them, both science and the world it describes are seen to be far more complicated than the common conception of science and its results implies." in the opening, either. So while, sure, I have been brief and so it's understandable to question, I'm wondering if we're in conflict at all?

Quoting Leontiskos

This is a bit like describing tennis as, "Swing-hit-run-swing-hit-run..." That's not what tennis is. It's a physical-reductionistic cataloguing of certain events that occur within the game of tennis.

What is tennis? :D

In the attempt to provide a non-magical sketch of science I am, also, attempting a pedagogical sketch at science -- it doesn't need to be an essence or universal notion, I don't think. Coherency and specificity is enough, I believe. (also, I don't think there is an essence to science, of course)

Quoting Leontiskos

Why share? Is it necessary?

I think so. It keeps you sane. When you go about questioning reality on a regular basis it's a good idea to listen to others :D -- many a scientist has had some pretty kooky beliefs outside of their work.

Quoting Moliere

Is it incoherent to say "Science is what scientists do, and what scientists do changes over time"?

Yes, it is. It is called equivocation, and it is also a non-definition. Someone who does not know what scientists do will simply not be able to identify scientists.

Quoting Moliere

By the above criteria. You don't see Gassendi or Lucretius referenced in the activity of sciences today (just to give some naturalist philosophers that would seem to get along with the ideas, but aren't needed for science). Why should you?

Why shouldn't I? You aren't offering any answers at all.

Quoting Moliere

That is, rather than an organized body of knowledge based on empiricism, I'd say science is what scientists do.

That's a nothing-burger. :wink:

Quoting Moliere

That is, I'd defend the notion of a standpoint: I think that people who do the thing are in a better position to know about it.

People who do what thing? You've made "science" a set of seven incomprehensible letters.

What do scientists do? What is a scientist?

Quoting Moliere

many a scientist has had some pretty kooky beliefs outside of their work.

Well as long as they are a scientist, then according to your definition whatever they are doing must be science.

Again, this is what Science is:

Quoting Science | Merriam-Webster

1a: knowledge or a system of knowledge covering general truths or the operation of general laws especially as obtained and tested through scientific method
b: such knowledge or such a system of knowledge concerned with the physical world and its phenomena : natural science

Quoting Leontiskos

Yes, it is. It is called equivocation, and it is also a non-definition. Someone who does not know what scientists do will simply not be able to identify scientists.

If you had a definition for "scientist" do you believe that the person who does not know what a scientist does will be able to identify scientists?

Let's say "Scientists are the people who produce knowledge about the physical world", to use Merriam-Webster. So "Science is what scientists do, and what scientists do is produce knowledge about the physical world, and that production process changes over time" fits with what I've said.

Quoting Moliere

If you had a definition for "scientist" do you believe that the person who does not know what a scientist does will be able to identify scientists?

That's just what a definition is.

Quoting Moliere

Let's say "Scientists are the people who produce knowledge about the physical world", to use Merriam-Webster. So "Science is what scientists do, and what scientists do is produce knowledge about the physical world, and that production process changes over time" fits with what I've said.

"X is what Xers do" is a tautological and uninformative statement.

The "changes over time" idea is similarly uninformative and unhelpful. If the use of a term changes over time then we have equivocation, and in that case in order to talk about the same thing one needs two different terms, and in order to understand what older texts mean by the older definition, one requires linguistic historical knowledge.

Quoting Leontiskos

That's just what a definition is.

:D

This points out a pretty big difference between our understandings, at least.

I'd say that the Oxford English Dictionary's philosophy of language requires us to be able to pick out examples in order to derive definitions.

Quoting Leontiskos

"X is what Xers do" is a tautological and uninformative statement.

But that's not my theory of science -- my theory of science isn't so general as to say that all all things like "science" are defined by the actions [s]of[/s] of the people involve. And even if it were so, which I doubt, a tautology is always true. "Science is what scientists do" isn't something I could say is true strictly, but rather is a criteria for class inclusion for uses of "science" or "scientist"

"Science is science" would be a tautology, but "Science is what scientists do when they are acting as scientists" isn't. (it asks the reader to add interpretation, of course -- it's a definition not looking for necessary/sufficient/universal conditions)

Quoting Moliere

As a starting place maybe it'd be nice if public libraries had access to academic journals. Taxes go to pay for that research after all. It should be accessible.

Better even if academic journals would be available freely in the net. Think about general science magazines if they would have links to all the original publications. There's still the paywall and simply you have to somehow have to have the knowledge of an interesting article being in some publication.

Quoting Moliere

I'd say that the Oxford English Dictionary's philosophy of language requires us to be able to pick out examples in order to derive definitions.

There is a problem with Socrates' pet peeve of giving examples instead of explanations, and dictionaries don't generally fall into this mistake, but in fact you haven't given any examples. You are falling into a more basic mistake of using the definiens in the definiendum, something like this:

• "What is science?"
• "It's what scientists do."
• "What do scientists do?"
• "Scientists do science."

In response to an objection you added a rider that exemplified this problem:

Quoting Leontiskos

Well as long as they are a scientist, then according to your definition whatever they are doing must be science.

Quoting Moliere

"Science is what scientists do when they are acting as scientists"

If we remove the definiens terms the problem becomes even more apparent:

• "What is science?"
• "Science is what someone who does it does when they are doing it." (or)
• "Science is what someone who does it does when they are acting as someone who does it."

Quoting Moliere

And even if it were so, which I doubt, a tautology is always true. "Science is what scientists do" isn't something I could say is true strictly, but rather is a criteria for class inclusion for uses of "science" or "scientist"

This is in large part why I wrote my thread on transparency. When we do philosophy we have to take the risk of saying substantive things, even though this leaves us open to critique.

Reply to Leontiskos If we begin with Merriam-Webster, as you've done, then "Science is what scientists do as scientists" is filled out by our common-sense understanding of these terms.

I've said more than just the statement of a theory, though: Good bookkeeping, communication of results over time, humans being coming together to create knowledge, the marriage to economic activity, and a basic sense of honesty though an irrelevance for the motivation of a particular scientist. And I've referenced Newton while explicitly saying that the definition of "science" will always be vague (Newton was a scientist, so science is what Newton did as a scientist -- but if we compare other obvious examples, let's say Francis Crick, the differences between what they do are more obvious than their similarities): But we can still get by and say interesting, and somewhat general, things about science in spite of not starting from some explicit set of criteria for class inclusion. We generally know what we mean by the word, and generally know who is included -- but then when we get more specific, or try to do so, cases can fall out.

I've also said there are two explicit things I'd like a theory of science to accomplish: the demystification of process so that science is not perceived as magical, and a pedagogical simplification not for the purposes of identifying science, but for the purposes of learning how to do science: in some sense my definition of "science" is serviceable enough for those tasks, and we needn't begin at The Meaning of Being in order to say good an interesting things about the subject at hand.

And in the background of all of this thinking is the transition from verificationism to falsificationism to Quine's attack on empiricism and Feyerabend's deconstruction of all such programs: so the background, springboard question is the Question of the Criterion that Popper begins with, and my answer is that there isn't really a general theory that covers all cases, but that we can situate a more limited theory of science within a community of practitioners.

Because I don't really see a union between Aristotle and Marie Curie, for example. They're just doing different things, though it's fair to call Aristotle a scientist of his time.

Though there is also this other side, i think: There's something about a forum post that demands a more collaborative approach than the usual "presentation of a theory with reasons", at least from what I've seen: by overly relying upon the 20th century philosophers-of-science, for instance, I'd be ignoring other eras of science and their attendant philosophies, and I'd be looking at a particular bit of academic work -- mostly because I think that the philosophers who have tried such an enterprise before worth looking at.

But here some people haven't bothered with those particular philosophers, and I don't feel like they are the end-all-be-all of philosophy of science, either, just a touchstone for me of where I'm thinking from. The brainstorming process itself, though, is more about arriving at a thesis to defend, if there indeed be such a thing in the firstplace, or even a sharing of different perspectives on how we understand the beast science -- whereas for me I'm thinking about it from the perspective of what to do in order to be valuable to the scientific project as it presently stands, I like to keep threads open to other approaches.

Reply to ssu I agree.

The primary reasons to keep knowledge are profit and war: there is some advantage someone wants to keep.

This conflicts with the engine of knowledge-generation which requires sharing and creativity if something new, rather than procedural, is to be created -- and given that it's new there's no guarantee that it will be valuable at all.

Which is why research is jealously guarded: It takes lots of money to keep a staff that might not produce anything, and when it does you want to keep it for yourself. (though, under Capitalism, what else would you expect?)

Reply to Moliere If the knowledge or insight is worth money, yes. However there's still a lot of academic and scientific studies that people, who have done them, would enjoy if their ideas would be picked up by others. It's totally understandable that for example nuclear weapons technology and the science used is declared classified and you just don't sell it to anyone that wants it. With philosophy, it isn't.

Still, I think that there is a problem when there simply are so many scientists and academic researchers, group behavior kicks in and an incentive emerges to create your own "niche" by niche construction: a group creates it's own vocabulary and own scientific jargon, which isn't open to someone that hasn't studied the area. Then these people refer to each others studies and create their own field. Another name for this could be simply specialization: you create your own area of expertize by specialization on a narrower field. When there are a masses of people doing research, this is the easy way to get to those "new" findings. Hence even people in the natural sciences can have difficulties in understanding each other, let alone then the people who are studying the human sciences. Perhaps it's simply about numbers: 30 scientists can discuss and read each others research and have a great change of ideas, but 3 000 or 30 000 cannot. Some kind of pecking order has to be created. The end result is that you do get a science that is "Kuhnian" just by the simple fact that so many people are in science.

(In 1927 it was easier just with 29 quantum physicists meeting each other)


I remember when studying a course in philosophy in the university I personally got irritated when a philosophy teacher said that one could only use the German words for some philosophical terms or otherwise their "essence" would be lost (think example's like Heidegger's Dasein). Well, if you cannot translate your ideas to another language or cannot define something by using other words, there's something wrong with you. But that's just my opinion and others can disagree with this.

And this is universal and not just limited to philosophy. I remember another historian who went to great lengths to write one of her historical books to be as easily readable for the layman as she could do only then to be scolded by her peers for the book not being "academic" enough. For some to be as understandable as possible isn't the objective, the objective is to limit those who don't know the proper terms out of the discussion, even if they could participate in the discussion. Naturally people will simply argue that just like with abbreviations, we make it easier for people to read it when we use the academic jargon. But there can really be other intensions also.

(Yes, it's the length of the equation, even if mathematical beauty would say otherwise)

Quoting ssu

However there's still a lot of academic and scientific studies that people, who have done them, would enjoy if their ideas would be picked up by others.

It's true -- and perhaps another way to address these issues would be a reclassification of some kind rather than the radical solution I proposed. I do think that intellectual property is a bit funny in the law now, and mostly think that such things ought to be run by the state more than private industry because, generally, they benefit everyone, like roads benefit everyone.

Quoting ssu

Still, I think that there is a problem when there simply are so many scientists and academic researchers, group behavior kicks in and an incentive emerges to create your own "niche" by niche construction: a group creates it's own vocabulary and own scientific jargon, which isn't open to someone that hasn't studied the area. Then these people refer to each others studies and create their own field. Another name for this could be simply specialization: you create your own area of expertize by specialization on a narrower field. When there are a masses of people doing research, this is the easy way to get to those "new" findings. Hence even people in the natural sciences can have difficulties in understanding each other, let alone then the people who are studying the human sciences. Perhaps it's simply about numbers: 30 scientists can discuss and read each others research and have a great change of ideas, but 3 000 or 30 000 cannot. Some kind of pecking order has to be created. The end result is that you do get a science that is "Kuhnian" just by the simple fact that so many people are in science.

It's not open to others' only because they cannot study it, due to accessibility issues.

I mean, knowledge is created, not just sitting around to be catalogued, so it will take people inventing new vocabularies as we learn more. What I think we see is that there is just that much to know that no one person can know it all. Even in switching between labs I've had to learn whole new parts of science I've never encountered before (which is part of why it's interesting)

The difficulty is more one of familiarity than anything else: scientists I've known are always pretty specific about what it is they know know -- as in their area of research -- and elsewise.

You have to be because eventually it dawns on you that there's so much knowledge out there that you can't know it all. No one could live long enough to know it all.

I'm not sure that means there's a pecking order that must be established? I think science sprawls much more widely than that -- tho normal social hierarchies that are alive in all parts of our life are still operational in the sciences, too.


Quoting ssu

I remember another historian who went to great lengths to write one of her historical books to be as easily readable for the layman as she could do only then to be scolded by her peers for the book not being "academic" enough. For some to be as understandable as possible isn't the objective, the objective is to limit those who don't know the proper terms out of the discussion, even if they could participate in the discussion. Naturally people will simply argue that just like with abbreviations, we make it easier for people to read it when we use the academic jargon. But there can really be other intensions also.

My preference is for a wider audience, generally, and I dislike the attitude people take towards works which are actually quite technical and well researched, only broken down to a point that they read very easily. That's actually harder to do than rely upon the jargon! :D

But the jargon is fine, too, because sometimes I'd agree with your philosophy professor who irked you -- you need to use the word in order to set the right sense, because philosophy -- in part -- creates its own language, and it is generated from a natural language, and those natural-language associations can have important philosophical implications.

Quoting ssu

(Yes, it's the length of the equation, even if mathematical beauty would say otherwise)

:D I don't mind. It is the lounge for a reason, even if there are some heady thoughts out there -- I really wanted to brainstorm science with this thread, as in, trip across different ideas about science that are nevertheless important. And that requires a tolerance for branching out to related subjects (and since I've barely set a theme, well... have at it!)

Quoting ssu

If the knowledge or insight is worth money, yes. However there's still a lot of academic and scientific studies that people, who have done them, would enjoy if their ideas would be picked up by others.

I think people want to share their ideas and they want to profit by their ideas, at the same time. If the latter is not possible then philosophy is only a hobby and not a career. If all philosophy were free then philosophers would make no money.

The traditional donor system helps address this problem, but only to a point.

Quoting Moliere

If we begin with Merriam-Webster, as you've done, then "Science is what scientists do as scientists" is filled out by our common-sense understanding of these terms.

The single word "science" is equally "filled out" by our understanding of the term. A definition presupposes that one does not understand the term.

Quoting Moliere

I've said more than just the statement of a theory, though: Good bookkeeping, communication of results over time, humans being coming together to create knowledge, the marriage to economic activity, and a basic sense of honesty

Sure, but none of these pick out science in particular. For example, this describes an honest law firm as much as it describes anything else.

Quoting Moliere

We generally know what we mean by the word, and generally know who is included

I want to say that if we generally know what we mean by a term then we will be able to give a definition, and if we can't give a definition then we probably don't know what we mean by a term.

Quoting Moliere

I've also said there are two explicit things I'd like a theory of science to accomplish: the demystification of process so that science is not perceived as magical, and a pedagogical simplification not for the purposes of identifying science, but for the purposes of learning how to do science: in some sense my definition of "science" is serviceable enough for those tasks, and we needn't begin at The Meaning of Being in order to say good an interesting things about the subject at hand.

It seems to me that your "accounts" of science are very much in line with the magical thinking of the culture. We don't really know what science is, but we revere it and generate overly robust or overly simplistic conceptions of it. Is it demystifying to say that scientists do bookkeeping? Hmm, I don't know. "Bookkeeping" is a very ambiguous term, and the ambiguity lends credence to the idea that you might be saying something very substantial. "Scientists type in computers," "Scientists read literature," "Scientists test theories." These are all true facts about scientists, but we don't know which of them is telling us anything that is actually connected with science in itself without a definition.

And if someone doesn't have a definition of science then I'm not sure how they could be trusted to teach others how to do science. A pedagogue must understand what he is teaching.

Quoting Moliere

The brainstorming process itself, though, is more about arriving at a thesis to defend, if there indeed be such a thing in the firstplace, or even a sharing of different perspectives on how we understand the beast science -- whereas for me I'm thinking about it from the perspective of what to do in order to be valuable to the scientific project as it presently stands...

I want to say that a scientist is ultimately interested in understanding the natural world, and he does things that achieve that end. I think science is just the study of the natural world and the ordered body of knowledge that this generates.

As a philosopher I would agree with Feser and say that many "scientists" do not understand science, and because of this it is wrong to define science in terms of their work. For example, we could inquire about a cathedral like Chartres and its architecture. Someone might say, "The architecture of Chartres is what the builders did." Except this is confused, for what the builders ultimately did was take orders from the head architect, and when the head architect died the selection process was very protracted: you don't just entrust Chartres to any old builder.

Quoting Moliere

That is I'm taking up a historical-empirical lens to the question -- the philosophical theory is "Science is what scientists do", which, of course, is defined only ostensively and so doesn't have some criteria for inclusion.

We know that it has implicit criteria for inclusion given the fact that you qualify it every time it produces a false conclusion, such as in the case of Fauci or in the case of scientists who are not properly "acting as scientists."

Aristotelian definition in the broad sense is not something you can do without. If you say, "Grass is whatever grows here in the next five years," and a tree grows there in the next five years, then that tree is grass, which is absurd. In light of the tree someone might emend their claim and say, "Grass is whatever grows here in the next five years, such that it looks and behaves like grass does." But this is the vacuous, viciously circular sort of claim. "Any grass that grows here in the next five years is grass."

Note too that real definitions are actually falsifiable. Someone can say, "Ah, but Leontiskos, computer scientists are scientists who do not study the natural world." At such a point I would not be allowed to give a non-answer about how my definition was not intended to be a definition. (And there is a healthy debate about whether "computer science" is aptly named.) The centrality of falsifiability is something that science and philosophy share, albeit in different ways.

Quoting Leontiskos

Sure, but none of these pick out science in particular. For example, this describes an honest law firm as much as it describes anything else.

No definition picks out anything in particular: gavagai could refer to the foot, the meat, the ear, or the weather in which one catches a rabbit. And the use of "gavagai" in a particular circumstance could refer to a philosopher's idea about translation and reference.

Definitions don't pick things out at all, nor do they presuppose total ignorance: sometimes I just want to know what is usually meant by a word, which is where dictionaries excel.

I'm thinking this notion of definition, the place of the categories, whether reference is accomplished through knowledge of predicates of the thing or activity, is a disagreement.

Quoting Leontiskos

I want to say that a scientist is ultimately interested in understanding the natural world, and he does things that achieve that end

I'm hesitant to say "the natural world", and I don't think there's a real end to science in the general sense -- across all time and space, ala Aristotle compared to Curie -- but I agree with the basic thrust of this statement, especially if I were talking to someone who knew nothing. I am thinking a little more above that in my brainstorm, for sure. I'm thinking about method and teaching method.

I don't think a scientist needs to want to understand the natural world as a whole, as Aristotle does. If someone wants to study cancer because someone they care about has cancer and that's all they focus upon while doing good science then they are a scientist. They care about the truth of cancer, but all the trappings of a "natural world" or wholeness are not there. They want to cure a disease through science and do science in order to get there.

Or no, in your estimation?

Quoting Leontiskos

We know that it has implicit criteria for inclusion given the fact that you qualify it every time it produces a false conclusion, such as in the case of Fauci or in the case of scientists who are not properly "acting as scientists."

Fauci is too political example for this thread.

But what is related: I don't agree with the notion that we should "trust" scientists -- the whole idea here being that others' can evaluate things for themselves so they don't have to take their word for it but see it themselves. This isn't to say anything about Fauci's acts, which I've barely paid attention to and don't really feel like digging into because to defend him as an upstanding scientist would go against this whole idea that I'm thinking through.

I don't care if some individual scientist fucked up, or if there's some reason why the public doesn't trust scientists (they shouldn't have trusted anything they read in a newspaper, if you ask me): I care about teaching others how to evaluate science and, if they so wish, do good science.

Basically I'm not interested in defending the "mantle" of science because I don't really believe in "experts" in the social sense anyways. There are people who are better able to do this or that, of course, but "experts" presupposes a lot more than ability -- it's a whole ass meritocracy complete with packages to judge people with.

Which, you may have picked up, is not my thing so much ;)

Quoting Leontiskos

Aristotelian definition in the broad sense is not something you can do without.

:D

But that's what I'm trying to do!

I'm being explicit about it at least.

Also:

One of the things I've noticed is how scientists range the gamut in metaphysical beliefs. Yet I trust them to do good science. So I conclude that metaphysical beliefs will not influence whether a person does good science or no -- and that's what I'm most interested in.

(EDIT: Well... "most"? No, just a point I like to bring up: I've learned from people of many faiths, and hence, many metaphysics. One of the things that I like about science is its ability to unite people from many backgrounds into international efforts.

Scientifically speaking it seems all metaphysics are valuable, rather than just one)

Quoting Moliere

I don't think a scientist needs to want to understand the natural world as a whole

Sure, and that's not what I was saying. A scientist need not be interested in the whole of the natural world to be interested in the natural world.

Quoting Moliere

No definition picks out anything in particular...

...

Definitions don't pick things out at all...

I'm not really sure where to start with these sorts of claims. Do words pick out anything at all? It would seem that we are back to Aristotle's defense of the PNC in Metaphysics IV.

If "science" doesn't mean anything at all then we obviously can know nothing about science. If "science" does not pick out anything in particular, then it would seem that we can't use the word meaningfully. You seem to almost be doubling-down on your circular definitions in claiming that definitions don't pick out anything.

Quoting Moliere

- tho normal social hierarchies that are alive in all parts of our life are still operational in the sciences, too.

And this is all it is, actually. After reading Thomas Kuhn's work I found it perplexing how someone could see it as something revolutionary or something that would be tarnish the shining shield of science. The simple fact that people in groups behave as people in groups. Yet this doesn't make science itself something else, a totally "social construct" as some wrongly think.

Quoting Moliere

:D I don't mind. It is the lounge for a reason, even if there are some heady thoughts out there -- I really wanted to brainstorm science with this thread, as in, trip across different ideas about science that are nevertheless important. And that requires a tolerance for branching out to related subjects (and since I've barely set a theme, well... have at it!)

I think there's no reason to have this in the lounge... this is an open Philosophy Forum and hence the threads in the first page aren't so different from this in the end.

An interesting question is if science will change, or will it be rather similar to what we have now even in the distant future, let's say 200 years from now in 2224. Now we can see very well where science was in 1824, just on this verge of a huge sprint that was taken in the late 19th Century and in the 20th Century. Yet in 1824, what typically was taught in the universities of the time and what was publicly known might be different than we think now. But how close science in 2224 to science in 2024? The more similar it is, I think it's more depressing as one would hope that astonishing new ideas would come around.

But will they?

Quoting Leontiskos

Sure, and that's not what I was saying. A scientist need not be interested in the whole of the natural world to be interested in the natural world.

Are appeals to "natural world" any less ambiguous than appeals to "scientific method"?

There's a sidetrail to metaphysics I see, but then it could just be this substitutes one mystery for another: "What is the natural world?" for "What is the criterion which differentiates scientific knowledge?" being a metaphysical and an epistemic question, respectively.


Quoting Leontiskos

I'm not really sure where to start with these sorts of claims. Do words pick out anything at all?

Names pick things out -- that's what we're doing with them! (it could be argued this is analytic, even.... so whether they really pick things out, well, who knows? How do you tell?)

Quoting Leontiskos

It would seem that we are back to Aristotle's defense of the PNC in Metaphysics IV.

I don't think so. I'd rather say that's a different topic entirely. I don't see any violations of that rule going on, at least.

Quoting ssu

I think there's no reason to have this in the lounge... this is an open Philosophy Forum and hence the threads in the first page aren't so different from this in the end.

I've been thinking through these aesthetics and ultimately what I've been doing with my threads is if there's just a kinda sorta thing going on that I'm thinking about but I don't really have a thesis I'll put it here as a sketch which isn't quite a post, even if there's some interesting stuff going along (else, why post it at all?)

But if I have some text or thesis or question that I want to explore to either aporia, uncertainty, or maybe an answer then I post it in a main forum.

Quoting ssu

An interesting question is if science will change, or will it be rather similar to what we have now even in the distant future, let's say 200 years from now in 2224. Now we can see very well where science was in 1824, just on this verge of a huge sprint that was taken in the late 19th Century and in the 20th Century. Yet in 1824, what typically was taught in the universities of the time and what was publicly known might be different than we think now. But how close science in 2224 to science in 2024? The more similar it is, I think it's more depressing as one would hope that astonishing new ideas would come around.

But will they?

They will. People are creative sorts, when enabled.

And as the economy changes the human practices that are a part of it will too. And the economy is never stable, so science will continue to change.

The metaphysical path I see is one which would be just as confusing as a methodological path, given that "nature" -- in description -- has changed with scientific knowledge and vice-versa; since there are different descriptions of nature. From what do we separate nature so that we know that the scientist is studying nature, and not some other metaphysical kind?

Also, there's a fear I see that I'd just get lost in the metaphysical question when the point is to demystify what we're doing and how we're doing it -- but metaphysics has a tendency to get mystical, so it might even go cross-purposes to what I'm thinking through.

One of the things that'd have to be worked out is how it is that scientists of different metaphysical beliefs can work together? My thought on this is that since there are theists, atheists, naturalists, and anti-realists -- and shades in-between (what is the status of consciousness?) -- that all can work together and agree upon the science that there is a difference between metaphysical belief and science. That is, there is no need to have a secure foundation in metaphysics to do good science when we look at people who do science.

In a lot of ways my criteria is mostly a meta-criteria for examples. What is science? Start with observations of scientists -- it turns it from a metaphysical question to a historical one. (or, in the case of Popper, from a normative question addressing the problem of induction, to a historical one)

Quoting Moliere

And as the economy changes the human practices that are a part of it will too. And the economy is never stable, so science will continue to change.

That's a similar conclusion I've made too.

Basically when humanity has to adapt to the post-Peak population era with falling populations all over the World, a lot more than just economics with models of perpetual growth have to be changed. It's not just economics: social sciences have to adapt to explain the new situation. Just like the research on infectious diseases have to adapt to the new diseases that simply show up. (If there aren't any, at least you always have a lab leak!)

Perhaps the real question is sciences like Physics, Chemistry or even Philosophy in general.

But great that you are optimistic! :)

Quoting ssu

Perhaps the real question is sciences like Physics, Chemistry or even Philosophy in general.

I believe these will adapt in a similar fashion. That is, I don't see them as "complete" at all.

One of the reasons I hesitate to pair science with metaphysics is metaphysics seeks a more complete story than the sciences tell. If scientific knowledge is the only basis for metaphysical belief then the only metaphysical belief we could reasonably hold is "I suppose we'll have to wait and see"

Further, while I believe the sciences are true, and even describe real phenomena, I believe they are always in some sense anthropocentric too: these are the parts of reality we're interested in articulating (or, perhaps at the time, able).

It's not like Isaac Newton's calculus applied to physics was purely a matter of looking at nature -- it also helped build better cannons (and so on): Being able to predict the motion of bodies is interesting to us because it can help with so many other things we want to accomplish.

Quoting ssu

But great that you are optimistic! :)

Oh, I dare not say that. If we do it bad enough I think these changes will come about painfully, given that the fear of death is still a popular motivator.

And the severity could still be cruel for all that, even though new ideas will come about.

I'm thinking that scientific methodologies are a means for models to converge on evidence/observations.
The models are revisable/adjustable and falsifiable (in principle always tentative/provisional).
So, in a way, sufficiently stabilized/usable models become parts of scientific theories, where "sufficiently" means within some domain of applicability or category of evidence/observations.
That may seem overly depreciative/critical, yet science remains the single most successful epistemic endeavor in all of human history bar none, and doesn't carry any promise of omniscience — the forums depend on science.
Doesn't science more or less take the role of "justified" in knowledge as justified true belief?

Quoting jorndoe

Doesn't science more or less take the role of "justified" in knowledge as justified true belief?

I don't think so because justified true belief can be much wider than science. Why do I believe it rained? The ground is wet -- it's not exactly a scientific justification, at least in the sense of doing good science (though perhaps in the sense of making empirical inferences -- which I think is too broad; the example I like, which I stole from Massimo Pigliucci, is plumbing -- it's a technical empirical body of knowledge which predicts and models the world which is subject to revision, but it's not science)

Also I'd say that some science is true, so there's more to science than "justified"

Quoting jorndoe

That may seem overly depreciative/critical, yet science remains the single most successful epistemic endeavor in all of human history bar none, and doesn't carry any promise of omniscience — the forums depend on science.

Heh, I welcome being critical -- I'm not sure it's the single most successful epistemic endeavor, either. I'm not sure how one measures something like that. What are the units for epistemic success?

Quoting jorndoe

I'm thinking that scientific methodologies are a means for models to converge on evidence/observations.
The models are revisable/adjustable and falsifiable (in principle always tentative/provisional).
So, in a way, sufficiently stabilized/usable models become parts of scientific theories, where "sufficiently" means within some domain of applicability or category of evidence/observations.

Can you give an example of a scientific methodology? it'd help me parse this better.

Quoting Moliere

justified true belief can be much wider than science

Sure, make it ...

Quoting Aug 13, 2024

[s]Doesn't[/s] Can't science more or less take [s]the[/s] a role of "justified" in knowledge as justified true belief?

Quoting Moliere

an example

I think this might be a sort of standard example from physics:

Aristotle looks around, comes up with a theory of motion ? Galileo looks around some more, tests, comes up with better theories ? Newton thinks things over, observes, advances/generalizes theories (used to this day) ? Einstein, having access to more, improves theories, more complex, used by GPS

The models adapt to accumulating evidence/observations if you will. Might be worth noting that the methodologies became more evidence/observation-driven/dependent, say, in the 1600s. Model-falsifiability is a must these days.
Well, science can redo conventional wisdom, make something counter-intuitive acceptable, and help put rovers and stuff on Mars. :)
With something like sociology or psychology (about ourselves), things become more complicated, and we may have to contend with less accurate/stable theories.

Quoting jorndoe

Sure, make it ...

Can't science more or less take a role of "justified" in knowledge as justified true belief?
— Aug 13, 2024

Ah OK; I think we need to say more about science to make it it's own thing different from philosophy, but I think I'd be fine with saying that science is largely concerned with justification.

Quoting jorndoe

falsifiable (in principle always tentative/provisional).

I think of falsifiability much in the frame of Popper, which requires much more than merely being always tentative/provisional.

For instance -- I don't think that the first law of thermodynamics is strictly falsifiable, unless you encounter magic (literally getting energy for free). It's more of an accounting mechanism to force the ape to figure out why the numbers don't match.

But surely it's still provisional for all that -- if we find a better way we will abandon this way of accounting for energy transfers. But if we already knew that better way we'd already be there -- it's more that we could always encounter more, or reinterpret differently in productive ways (whatever our future species might like)

Quoting jorndoe

The models adapt to accumulating evidence/observations if you will. Might be worth noting that the methodologies became more evidence/observation-driven/dependent, say, in the 1600s. Model-falsifiability is a must these days.

I'm not comfortable with this use of "model", exactly -- there are times when "model" works, like when I build a model of a molecule out of balls and sticks to show its accepted structure in 3D space for students to learn. Or if I have a plan and I build a small version of the plan. Or if I have a proof of concept that it will work. Or medically I can have a model organism -- like a mouse or yeast -- to demonstrate the efficacy of some biochemically similar organism's reaction to a cure for cancer to test some halfway house to see if it will interrupt similar pathways and lead to death before putting it in humans, rather than a guess based on the description of the chemical network.

I'm not sure that Newton's Laws are a model. I think models are supposed to reflect something else -- they are models-of. What are Newton's Laws a model of? (All mechanics or nature is the original implication, but surely at this point we can see that we have enough exceptions that it's not UNIVERSAL universal, but pretty good)

Quoting jorndoe

Well, science can redo conventional wisdom, make something counter-intuitive acceptable, and help put rovers and stuff on Mars. :)

Yeh.

Quoting jorndoe

With something like sociology or psychology (about ourselves), things become more complicated, and we may have to contend with less accurate/stable theories.

Is that the only difference, in your estimation, between the so-called "hard" and "soft" sciences?

Typing this out from The Logic of Scientific Discovery

5. EXPERIENCE AS METHOD

The task of formulating an acceptable definition of the idea of an 'empirical science' is not without its difficulties. Some of these arise from the fact that there must be many theoretical systems with a logical structure very similar to the one which at any particular time is the accepted system of empirical science. This situation is sometimes described by saying that there is a great number-- presumably an infinite number -- of 'logically possible worlds'. Yet the system called 'empirical science' is intended to represent only one world: the 'real world' or the 'world of our experience'

I'm just flipping through to try and give some footholds in Popper, and liked the title of this section because it seems to get along with what I think.

There is more, which I'd have to revisit to get more clear, about observation vs. theoretical statements, or basic statements, which I think all goes down the dumpster when you look at the the publications of scientists. (Maybe one of the reasons I don't remember it ;) :P)

Quoting Moliere

Are appeals to "natural world" any less ambiguous than appeals to "scientific method"?

I think the latter appeal is less ambiguous than the former, but both would seem to be less ambiguous than the descriptions you have been giving.

Quoting Moliere

One of the things that'd have to be worked out is how it is that scientists of different metaphysical beliefs can work together?

I think what you're missing is that, in large part, they can't. The metaphysical differences between the groups you are identifying are accidental qua science. There are some metaphysics which are compatible with science and some which are not. It is an invalid argument to identify a few which are compatible and then claim that metaphysics is tangential to science. For example, science at least presupposes things like causal regularities, the intelligibility of reality, and the human mind's ability to know it. When Aristotle rejects Parmenides and Heraclitus he paves the metaphysics of science.

I think what we can draw from this thread is that people very seldom have any clear idea of what they mean by "science." If we literally applied a Wittgenstenian language-as-use approach, "science" would probably be the name of a modern god who is invoked in important questions, and who must be trusted. The creedal statement is, "I trust the science," and there is no clear referent for what "the science" is supposed to point to.

Quoting Leontiskos

I think what you're missing is that, in large part, they can't.

Why not?

Quoting Moliere

I don't think that the first law of thermodynamics is strictly falsifiable

Right. Would the zero-energy universe violate conservation?

1 - 1 = 0

?

 \ we're here

It's falsifiable, though, but maybe it won't ever be. In a way, the fluctuation theorem disproves strict entropy.


Evidence as proof

I take proof to be deductive, as found in logic and mathematics. I'm seeing two cases where evidence is proof:

• a particular existential claim ("here's a stampeding elephant")
• a counter-example to a general/universal claim ("here's a black swan")

(also check here)

These correspond to proving a ?x?S ?x proposition, and disproving a ?x?S ?x proposition, respectively.

(?) "there are extraterrestrial aliens", "the Vedic Shiva is real", ..., showing is proof
(?) "photons don't decay", "all life is DNA based", ..., showing a counter-example is disproof

Outside of such proofs, scientific methodologies aren't proofs, but (more or less) means by which to develop general claims inferred from particular existential claims. Naturally, this characterization is a bit rigid, and, as usual, there are all kinds of details.