Blurring the Moral Realist vs. Anti-Realist Distinction
In metaethics, it is exceedingly common to divide views into two subcamps: anti-realism (i.e., that there are no categorical imperatives) and realism (i.e., that there are categorical imperatives). Although I find this to be an intuitive distinction (as an approximation), I am finding the distinction blurring for me the more precise I analyze my metaethical commitments.
I find that an objective norm (or categorical norm) is a norm (i.e., an obligation) which is necessarily issued by a beings faculty of normitivity; and it is implicit and involuntary. In other words, such a norm (which is objective) is because one exists with a nature that fundamentally has such and not an obligation that they decided to fixate upon. Thusly, I find the need to distinguish implicit-moral judgments and fixated-upon-moral judgments: the former being objective, and the latter non-objective. When I try to map this to the moral anti-realism vs. realism distinction, I find that I dont fit nicely into either: if one asks me do you think there are objective moral judgments, then my answer is yes; but, at the same time, I will concede that one does not thereby have any obligation to fixate upon those objective moral judgments, which more aligns with a moral anti-realist stance. I say that there are, consequently, no objective fixated-upon-moral judgments but, nevertheless, there are objective implicit-moral judgments, and the only bridge I can fathom for these two types of moral judgments is to commit oneself, by subjective affirmation, to the idea that it is most rational to fixate upon what is implicit of ones nature--and this is by no means a concession that anyone must abide by that principle (i.e., that it is itself a categorical imperative).
When it comes to fixated-upon-moral judgments, I find that I align with moral anti-realists; for ultimately the obligation to fixate upon a principle is arbitrary and originates from a subject; but because I do commit myself to the principle that I ought to fixate upon what is of my nature I fixate upon the objective, implicit moral judgmentsso I act, in every day-to-day life, like a moral realist.
What do you all think? Is the moral realism vs. anti-realism just a good approximate line to draw? Is it clear and cut? Do you think one can hold there are objective moral judgments and that none of them are obligatory to fixate upon?
I find that an objective norm (or categorical norm) is a norm (i.e., an obligation) which is necessarily issued by a beings faculty of normitivity; and it is implicit and involuntary. In other words, such a norm (which is objective) is because one exists with a nature that fundamentally has such and not an obligation that they decided to fixate upon. Thusly, I find the need to distinguish implicit-moral judgments and fixated-upon-moral judgments: the former being objective, and the latter non-objective. When I try to map this to the moral anti-realism vs. realism distinction, I find that I dont fit nicely into either: if one asks me do you think there are objective moral judgments, then my answer is yes; but, at the same time, I will concede that one does not thereby have any obligation to fixate upon those objective moral judgments, which more aligns with a moral anti-realist stance. I say that there are, consequently, no objective fixated-upon-moral judgments but, nevertheless, there are objective implicit-moral judgments, and the only bridge I can fathom for these two types of moral judgments is to commit oneself, by subjective affirmation, to the idea that it is most rational to fixate upon what is implicit of ones nature--and this is by no means a concession that anyone must abide by that principle (i.e., that it is itself a categorical imperative).
When it comes to fixated-upon-moral judgments, I find that I align with moral anti-realists; for ultimately the obligation to fixate upon a principle is arbitrary and originates from a subject; but because I do commit myself to the principle that I ought to fixate upon what is of my nature I fixate upon the objective, implicit moral judgmentsso I act, in every day-to-day life, like a moral realist.
What do you all think? Is the moral realism vs. anti-realism just a good approximate line to draw? Is it clear and cut? Do you think one can hold there are objective moral judgments and that none of them are obligatory to fixate upon?
Comments (140)
Almost like it's irrelevant. . .
I appreciate your response!
I generally agree; but I actually blend, in my normative ethics, both deontic and virtue-theoretic ethics together (and also consequentialism)--for I do seek and hold that there are "immutable rules" (in sense of being a part of one's nature) which are true for all "moral agents" (which I call "wills") and, at the same time, contend that a main focus which stems out of such is fixating on the development of one's character to become "wiser" (and the only means of progression is a pragmatic approach that incorporates also the notion of analyzing consequences).
I see anti-realism (regardless of whether it be error theoretic, subjectivist, non-cognitivist, or some other sub-camp underneath anti-realism) as the claim that there are no objective norms, which I think is half-incorrect (as there are implicit-categorical norms, but no fixated-upon-categorical norms); but, likewise, moral realism tends to be that there are objective norms, and this is taken to mean both fixated and implicit types--which I disagree with. So, I am, more and more, starting to give up on the distinction itself.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Categorical imperatives are found in deontology, but not so much in consequentialism or virtue ethics.
Moral realism is the idea that moral statements have a truth value - they are true or they are false.
So moral realism is not that "there are categorical imperatives" unless one already accepts deontology, which would be odd since if one accepts deontology one would presumably suppose that the categorical imperative is true, and hence be a moral realist.
Are there consequences depending on which approach you pick? I mean moral consequences, differences in what behavior you consider moral and, more importantly, how you behave.
An architect draws up plans for a building that does not exist. The plans are general instructions (commands) for the construction of the building. To complain to the architect that the building does not exist would be foolish; what matters is, if and when the instructions are followed, will the building stand, or collapse? And if it stands, will it provide whatever requirements for shelter and comfort were envisioned?
One would like to answer these questions before expending a deal of effort on building, and so one has recourse to engineers' calculations and planning departments and building regulations and materials specifications and health and safety rules etc. Society and individuals learn from experiments, mistakes and successes what sorts of buildings work. All this accumulated knowledge and wisdom helps a good architect produce plans that are realistic. But it takes a team of builders to produce a real building.
:fire: :up:
First I'd say that distinction is a general one -- so no need to hold to it.
But also, no need to hold to "objective norms" or "there are/not categorical imperatives" as setting out the meaning of anti-realism.
Generally I believe meta-ethics tends to not map onto normative ethics -- usually you can find a way to defend a realist or anti-realist version of a norm, depending upon how you set out realism or nihilism.
But onto your distinction:
Quoting Bob Ross
The anti-realist could say something along the lines that these implicit and involuntary norms don't sound like categorical imperatives, because you couldn't choose them. Deontology, in its Kantian form (which I'm guessing that's appropriate given "categorical imperative") at its base, is an ethics of freedom -- so remove freedom, and it's no longer a moral choice (though it could be a legal choice, say if we brainwashed a criminal into becoming good, they would be following the legality of the moral law but not the morality)
So it'd be better to classify that kind of instinct as non-cognitivist -- an emotional attachment which has no reason. Hence, anti-realism.
Then, of fixated-upon norms, it kind of goes in reverse -- it's the very basis of choice which allows these to be moral! Hence, moral realism.
Quoting Banno
Error theory being a noteworthy example to highlight for blending those two sentences: they have a truth value, and they are false.
Mostly using your post as an opportunity to highlight how realism-nihilism don't have clean maps, and can be set out in various ways.
I thought the categorical imperative wasn't a name for a type of view, by the particular view of Kant, namely something like "act only on those principles that, if universalised (acted upon by everyone) does not lead to contradiction." Or something, there are various formulations. I've always thought it was complete bollocks but perhaps I don't get it. It's an attempt, contra Hume, to ground morality in reason rather than sentiment. Is that really what you wanted to talk about? It seems like it may be that you are looking to ground morality in reason as well perhaps:
Quoting Bob Ross
Are you getting at the tension between there being moral facts about the world, but the individual person is always able to say "So what? I don't actually give a crap bout that."?
I thought that was moral congitivism. Moral realism, surely, is the idea that morality exists independently of any minds.
Hello Banno,
Thank you for your response! I think we are semantically disagreeing, as I dont think you defined the terms correctly; so let me explain my usages of the terms and let me know what you think.
You are correct that the term categorical imperative is found most notably in deontology (specifically starting with Kant), but those are normative ethical theories, not metaethical theories. As far as my knowledge goes, a metaethicist asks the question of are there objective moral judgments? (where categorical imperative is just a synonym for objective moral judgment), or more generally what are morals?, instead of what is wrong or right (given our understanding of what morals fundamentally are) which is what a normative ethicist would be inquiring about. I am fundamentally questioning the metaethic distinction of moral realism and anti-realism, not anything pertaining to normative ethics (at this point); but if you think it is relevant, then we can definitely dive into normative ethics as well!
I think you are partially correct: it is a two-fold thesis.
1. Moral statements are propositional (i.e., have truth value).
2. Moral statements are objective.
I think your definition only includes #1, which is also could be a moral anti-realist position (such as moral subjectivism).
Again, with a due respect, I think you are conflating metaetchics with normative ethics; but please correct me if I am wrong.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Hello T Clark,
I appreciate your response!
The metaethical one has tends to greatly shape (I would argue) peoples normative ethical theories. For example, most moral anti-realists that I know tend to try to found internal contradictions in anothers view to pursued them not to do some action and if they cant find one then they just accept it as it is (because they dont think there is any objective standard to hold that person to). Now that is just an example, and by no means every anti-realist is committed to that; however, realists, on the other hand, tend to command do not do X or do X based off of what they think is the objective standard. So you can imagine how different the normative ethical theories are that a realist and anti-realist would subscribe to.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Hello unenlightened,
Contrary to your name, I think that your analogy was quite enlightened and thought-provoking: thank you!
Let me try to take a crack at it, with my current understanding, and correct me where I am wrong. It seems as though this kind of metaethical view is anti-realist (squarely), and your normative ethical view is pragmatic. Your analogy is fundamentally conceding, as far as I can tell, that there are no objective moral judgments but, nevertheless, if we all subjectively want to build a building (or most of us do) then there is a procedure we can take to pragmatically achieve that goal (in the most cogent means possible). Thusly, to me, your view (or analogy at the least) seems to hold that morals are ultimately contingent on wills (i.e., subjects) and that there are objective better ways to achieve those goals; but, importantly, I dont think you are claiming there are objective morals themselves at all. Am I understanding you correctly?
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Hello Moliere,
I think, according to the standard definitions, moral anti-realism is the position that there are no moral facts (i.e., objective moral judgments). But I would be interested to hear more about:
What exactly do you mean here? I dont think I completely followed.
I think that your critique is splendid for Kantian deontic philosophy, but that isnt a contention (I would say) with the realist idea that there fundamentally are categorical imperatives. By categorical imperative, I am not invoking Kant (although the term does originate with him) but, rather, objective moral judgments. As far as I understand, one does not need to hold there is this Kantian notion (or rationalist notion) of free will (in the sense of autonomy vs. heteronomy) to be a moral realist. So an anti-realist (or, as a matter of fact, anyone) can validly state that my implict-moral judgments are not voluntary in the Kantian sense, and so Kant would probably disagree that they are moral judgments; but I dont agree with Kant either.
The idea with an implicit moral judgment is that it happens regardless of whether one feels like it or not and it is objective, but you are correct that it wouldnt be itself cognitive. This is a prime example why the lines between realism and anti-realism (in the sense of there traditional definitions) blur for me. I dont think it is a non-cognitivist anti-realist position, but classically there are no non-cognitivist realists (but I techinically am one of those in a way).
Interesting, I think fixated-upon norms would be anti-realist because I dont think any of them are objective. I dont think the thesis for moral realism entails that one has to have a basis of choice over it, but I could be wrong.
Error theory is not a moral realist position: it is an anti-realist one. They hold that:
1. Moral statements are propositional (i.e., cognitive).
2. They are all objectively false.
I guess I should clarify that by the realist position I do not mean that they just hold a position grounded in objectivity but, rather, that there are true objective moral judgmentssorry if that was ambiguous in my post.
I appreciate your response,
Bob
Hello bert1,
Thank you for your response!
I am not talking about normative ethics in my post but, rather, metaethics. Likewise, I am not invoking Kant, although the term categorical imperative originating with him, but, rather, it is a term in metaethics to discuss objective moral judgments in general (and not specifically a Kantian deontic normative philosophy). Kant and Hume are good examples of realism vs anti-realism in a traditional sense, but in my view I am seeing the lines between the two blur.
Exactly. I can note that there are moral facts, but not hold that you are thereby inherently obliged to obey them, which, to me, seems like a key point that moral realist is going to disagree with (and anti-realists are going to agree with to some degree).
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
"Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately." https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism
Quoting unenlightened
Your analogy: Ethical rules are to social functioning as architectural plans are to building functioning. The truth of either determinanable by an analysis of how well they have advanced the objective.
What then is the objective?
Is it the advancement of happiness or the protection of individual autonomy or something else?
Unless you are willing to admit that the objective being advanced is the Good independent of the subjective consensus, but that it exists as an independent fact, then that is subjectivism and not moral realism.
This is to say murder is wrong because (1) it fails to advance the Good, and (2) the Good is defined as X, where X is not subject to reinterpretation as to time, place, or culture. That is, murder is always wrong, even where it can objectively be shown society would benefit from its allowance because the Good stands as the immovable real, the rock, the building, and the actual thing.
So, back to your building. The plans are pragmatically good if the arena holds the concert, but unless the arena is ethically good, the plans are not ethically good, but only pragmatically so. If society decides what arenas are ethically good, that is not moral realism.
What criteria are used to determine if the arena is ethically good?
I'll do my best to explain myself.
Given any norm, be it consequential, deontic, virtue-theoretic, or somewhere in between, I claim that one can classify that norm as realistic or nihilistic based upon one's theory of realism or nihilism. The inclusion-rules for realism-nihilism can be modified without ever changing the normative-level theory. I believe it's a different question from the normative one, entirely, so as we change the rules for realism-nihilism we can include and disclude the normative-level theories -- which at least leads me to believe that there will never be a clean map between the normative and the meta-ethical. It will always be blurry, until we start nailing some terms down. And then it will be specific, and it won't be a general theory of realism/nihilism.
Quoting Bob Ross
Cool, cool. I'm shooting in the dark a bit. I don't mind being corrected, so correct away :)
Quoting Bob Ross
Yup, no worries. I agree. If anything my position is emphasizing how much room we have for our theorizing, and how that's what makes it difficult. I chose Kant because it looked like it fit and it's a rich vocabulary, but I know we don't have to use his words. Hell, I don't agree with him either !
Quoting Bob Ross
I agree here. Sorry for the confusion. I was specifically riffing off of @Banno's definition to point out how there can be ambiguity in any set up of realism-nihilism, which is mostly what I'm pointing to I think: we're going to have to pin down some words and terms before being able to answer.
I want to be a bit more realist than that. We do need buildings, and architects and all those ancillary workers i mentioned are the experts on these things. Different climates, different buildings; different geology, different standards; different population densities... etc. But none of this makes architecture 'subjective', merely complex.
Clearly, things ain't what they ought to be, otherwise we wouldn't need to talk about the way they ought to be. In the same way, if I already had an adequate house, I wouldn't be wanting plans for another. But granting that things are not as they ought to be, already allows that they could really be better; and here's the plan...
The more we are honest, the more we can trust each other, and the easier it is to to cooperate. I don't think this is subjective, I think this is the way it is - just as a wall will stay up longer the more vertical it is.
Quoting Hanover
'Flourishing'. The objective is coexistence with the environment, the health of which can be measured by its resilience, complexity, stability and so on. The question of an individual building is sufficiently complex to allow of differing judgements, but that doesn't make such judgements subjective. One would have to balance the potential boost to trust of folk coming together for various purposes, against the ecological cost of such mass movements and the deprivation of that portion of wilderness and so on.
http://environment-ecology.com/deep-ecology/63-deep-ecology.html
Hello Hanover,
I appreciate your response!
As most of your message is directed at another, I will address only the part directed me: the definition from Wiki. That is, indeed, a good generic definition of moral realism, but I am failing to understand the relevance to my post?
Bob
I am starting to understand more: thank you! It seems as though you are formulating two mutually exclusive options (which are different than the moral realism vs. anti-realism distinction, for nihilism is an example of the latter): realism or nihilism; where the former is the position that there are objective moral judgments and the latter is that there isnt. Furthermore, this realism-nihilism distinction is fundamentally ambiguous (and only for general distinction purposes). If one derives an unambiguous distinction, then they are, according to your view, not making a metaethical distinction because that can only be general (which is ambiguous). Am I understanding you correctly?
If so, then it seems as though you are claiming one is barred from achieving a clear distinction in metaethics; however, I am uncertain as to why that would be true. Why, fundamentally, can we not achieve a clear distinction between objective and non-objective morals? I understand that I too am blurring the distinction; but I mean it more in the sense that the current distinction is blurred and not that I cannot fundamentally achieve a clear distinction in metaethics.
Likewise, I didnt entirely follow the entailment from the fundamental, blurry nature of distinctions in metaethics (e.g., the realism-nihilism distinction) to there is always going to be a blurry line between metaethics and normative ethics: can you explain that further? I am understanding you to be claiming that the meta-normative ethic distinction is, likewise, blurry (and fundamentally always going to be that way): assuming I am understanding correctly, why?
I appreciate that, and please feel free to correct me as well!
It sounds like to me that you are almost saying we could get a clear distinction going (if we only clarified our terminology in a precise manner); so I might have misunderstood your first paragraph.
Bob
The issue I have with this is that the need for buildings is subjective (or inter-subjective at best), so I think your analogy isnt actually mapping to a moral realist position. Am I misunderstanding that part of the analogy? Are you claiming that the need for buildings is objective (and not subjective nor inter-subjective)?
I would agree that there are objectively better ways to build, but the goal to build is subjective; so I am failing to see how this isnt an anti-realist view.
To me, this just explicates that people have goals (which are subjective) to actualize things which are currently only potential. I am failing to see how this entails that what ought to be is objective itself (i.e., a moral fact).
They could be better in relation to what you want out of a house. Again, I am still failing to see how your idea of a better house is ultimately objective. I understand that if one wants a house that has a working stove, then but wheres the categorical imperative here?
The objective (i.e., the goal) here, I would argue, is ultimately subjective. How is it objective?
Bob
Thanks for your response. I must admit I haven't spent a lot of time thinking about it, but I don't think I believe in normative ethics, at least not as something driving our behavior. I see moral rules more as a reflection of personal and social judgements. If nothing else, your thread has helped me realize that.
I don't want to send the discussion off on a tangent, so I'll leave it there.
Have you ever been homeless? It might change your mind.
Quoting Bob Ross
"Ultimately objective" is a curious term. I wonder how it it works?
An organism exists in relation to an environment. It can only exist within certain environmental parameters to which it is tolerant, and conditions outside these parameters are lethal. So for example the antarctic is only survivable to humans with ongoing input of food, energy, materials, and shelter brought in from elsewhere. These are facts, no? The full details are complex, but most birds need to nest, and so do humans, even if their nest is a mobile or temporary one.
There is no necessity for there to be humans, or any life whatsoever, of course, but as a matter of fact there is life, and life has a necessary relation to its environment. Most of the planet is not survivable to humans without some constructed shelter. So what do you mean by saying it is subjective? shall I go into detail about how a clean water supply and waste disposal maintain the home as an optimised healthy environment along with thermostatically controlled air conditioning? Subjectively, you might prefer 60F, while I like 72F, but there is no liking to boil or freeze.
Fish like water, and philosophers like neat divisions, but what is called 'subjective' is a certain minor variability in human-environment relations, the major part of which is biological necessity. This is why global warming is so important to humans. We are very fragile.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'd formulate realism-nihilism as more of a gradient, I think, where the most extreme form of the gradient is exclusion/inclusion rules without any exceptions, in which case it would then be two mutually exclusive options. And to make it even more confusing, I'd note that even the rules for establishing the gradient are up for negotiation.
Also, I was using "nihilism" more loosely to be synonymous with anti-realism, and just thought it sounded better than repeating realism vs anti-realism -- purely aesthetic choice there, but I should have stuck with your terms to keep the conversation more manageable.
Given that I don't believe there to be a general theory of moral realism or anti-realism my support for my initial claim is only due to repetition of the above procedure: For any given norm it can be given either a realist or anti-realist interpretation, and often the same norm can be given either interpretation just by changing the rules of inclusion/exclusion for the categories "moral realism" or "moral anti-realism".
We have cognitivism vs non-cognitivism, for instance, where the former is often interpreted as a form of realism, and the latter is often interpreted as a form of anti-realism. But then error theory is a response to the sense-making argument for cognitivism (that moral statements are meaningful, and used, so how could they be different from the other statements, like plumbing or building buildings, which are meaningful and used?): it provides an interpretation of all moral sentences, in the T/F sense, assigning "False" as the value for all moral statements. This is then secured by noting how the artificial process described here mirrors common ways of thinking, like how we think about astrology -- the words all make sense, but most of us who like rationality tend to think they aren't about real things. They are false statements that make sense.
And here you're providing the realist interpretation of non-cognitivism in your OP :D -- at least if I'm understanding you correctly.
The procedure above is similar to the one I started with Kant's notion of Freedom grounding ethics. In general what I'd aim to do for any proposed rule for classifying an ethical position as moral realism vs moral anti-realism is provide an interpretation which reverses the initial determination. The stronger reversals do not add auxiliary hypotheses (which I think Error theory accomplishes), but I hope we can agree that a reversal can be accomplished through auxiliary hypotheses without that being controversial.
Hopefully this is clarifying rather than adding more confusion. I appreciate your patience!
Hello T Clark,
I totally understand and partially agree: I think that moral facts are involuntary, and the moment one fixates thereupon then they have invoked their own preference; and I think that my normative ethics is grounded upon fixating on what are moral facts. So, I do think normative ethics are important because it gives us an ideal to persevere towards (regardless of whether we can fully actualize it) and, under my view, is just as much of an objective inquiry as epistemology (or in other words I setup moral norms the same as epistemic ones).
My friend, if there is something that you wish to discuss, then please, by all means, bring it forth! I do not mind a tad bit of derailment!
Bob
Hello Unenlightened,
I think we may be slightly misunderstanding each other, so let me try and narrow down the disagreement.
I am not disagreeing that I do want to have a home (or a shelter) but, rather, that it is fundamentally my preference. If I were to give an argument for why I need a shelter, then it will ultimately bottom out at my willnot something objective. The fact that most people (or even if every person) wanted a home (or shelter) does not thereby make it a moral fact but, rather, a universalized subjective fact. In other words, my mind is absolutely in agreement with you that I do want a shelter, and that most people (if not everyone) wants one, but I am disagreeing that that judgment is fundamentally (i.e., ultimately) objective: the latter is what metaethics, I would argue, is about and not the former.
What am trying to express is that I think that the derivation of reasons for a judgment ultimately bottoms out at a particular will, not something objective under your view, because you are simply invoking very common preferences people tend to have (e.g., have a home) or, arguably, the preference to abide by the basic objective needs of the body. No, it is not true that every human being wants a home, but I would grant, to your point, that the vast majority do; but that is not a moral realist position (as far as I am understanding you). By contingent on a will, I just mean that your examples are ontically true of most people (i.e., you are right that most peoples personalities waver towards achieving basic bodily needsincluding me). It would have to be an ontological aspect of a will to be considered a moral fact (to me).
Correct me if I am wrong, but, to me, you are correct that these are factsbut they arent moral facts. It is a fact that my body needs food to survivebut why ought I care about survival (i.e., why am I obligated to keep surviving)? I think you may be conflating biological facts with moral ones (but correct me if I am wrong here). Perhaps, you are arguing that these biological facts should be moral ones?
Bob
Hello Moliere,
I dont think I am still quite following, but let me address your points and you tell me if I am getting closer.
It sounds like you are noting that words are always up for redefinition: that, at every level, we could cut it up differentlyam I correct?
If so, then it seems to me that this is true of all words, is it not?
Absolutely no worries! Please feel free to continue using that terminology, as I now internally know what you are referring to.
I thought the point was that they are only ever general theories? Are you saying theres no way to make a distinction (even generally) at all?
I am a bit confused, as moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism are not indicators, in themselves, of whether a person is a moral realist or anti-realist: moral subjectivists, like nihilists (error theorists), also hold that moral judgments are propositional. If someone tells me they think moral judgments are cognitive, I do not thereby infer that they are a moral realist.
Is your point, perhaps, that error theory is an example of a moral anti-realist view that, somewhere along the history of the moral realist vs. anti-realist debate, broke the distinction; whereof they had to refurbish it to accommodate for it?
Exactly, I think that objective moral judgements are only possible as non-cognitive, whereas cognitive moral judgments are always subjective. It is, indeed, a very unusual realism (or maybe anti-realism: I dont know (: ).
I didnt quite follow this part: what does it mean to reverse the initial determination? I am failing to comprehend what a reversal would be.
Bob
Yes. Though I'm hopeful that the point is non-trivial to what you are asking. I pretty much hold this belief with respect to any discussions about determining what is real, so there is a general place I'm coming from in thinking here, though I'm trying to tailor it to the specific topic at hand.
General philosophical categories are frequently like this. They are not like the general category of "cars" because there are concretes to refer to. Here the elements of the set are philosophical positions, which themselves usually operate more like webs than isolated propositions. And as you hold certain parts of a view as true -- the metaphor of nailing them down within a conversation -- usually you can find various ways of interpreting a position as part of one camp or another due to the web-like structure of philosophical positions and how you can interpret them in various ways.
Quoting Bob Ross
The reverse! We can make distinctions, but upon doing so we are no longer talking generally, but rather are creating a set of understandings that we can think through together.
But after making those distinctions, say you were to go to another group of people who are enthusiastic about philosophy, they won't hold in some general sense. New terms will have to be forged in that group.
But the general notions of realism or nihilism will still be there -- people will generally know what you mean by those terms, that one holds morals to be real in some sense and the other holds morals to not be real in some sense, that it's basically a metaphysical question (as opposed to an ethical question), and usually if someone has read something they'll have a general idea about which positions tend to fall under which category.
But at that stage everything is blurry -- we haven't really agreed upon terms yet. We could very easily talk past one another in thinking that these terms have set definitions! Something in a school setting that's easier to do is give these words some kind of permenance on the basis of the reptition of classes or a shared understanding of certain works. But when trying our hand at it here -- well, it seems apparent to me at least that these general categories don't have fixed meanings, that they frequently -- when we include multiple beliefs and positions within them -- have conflicts within themselves that can be exploited for philosophical purposes.
But upon doing so we usually start holding terms steady. And that's when it seems that we're no longer dealing with some general philosophical categories which have distinct meanings but rather a loose grouping of positions which we can then explore together upon coming to a mutual understanding.
Quoting Bob Ross
Hah! Well, if you don't know, then I certainly don't! :D -- And with what I've said so far I'd expect any particular philosophical position to be difficult to categorize within the general frames.
Quoting Bob Ross
From "real" to "not-real" -- the reversal is with respect to the judgment of a position as realist or nihilist.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes! A rephrase, though -- I don't think I could make the claim in history, because while I'm familiar with the terms I'm not familiar with the contemporary history. However, conceptually, that's what I'm saying. It may be that this was more an idiosyncratic example of a theory which forced me to rethink the categories, but I think I've managed to communicate myself by golly. :)
Terminology. The cognitive/non-cognitive discussion is distinct yet related to the realist/anti-realist discussion. It's all a bit of a bitch. I wonder if we can make sense of it.
So roughly, non-cognitivists claim something like that moral statements are not the sort of thing that can be true or false.
And if you are not a non-cognitivist, you are a cognitivist, and think the at least sometimes moral statements may be true, or they may be false.
Realists are cognitivists, and they suppose that moral statements are either true, or they are false, with no other option.
Anti-realists hold that there may be moral statements who's truth value is neither true not false. They may do this while holding, contrary to non-cognitivists claim, that they are nevertheless the sort of thing that can have a truth value - it's just that there are more than the two possibilities of true or false.
How does that go?
Well, that's a stretch. As a counterexample, consequentialists claim to make moral judgements without reference to the (or a) categorical imperative. Something similar happens here, were you seem to equate categorical with objective:
Quoting Bob Ross
Now a categorical norm, like a categorical imperative, would be one that applies in all cases. That's not the same as being "objective". Something is objective if it is not the result of personal feelings, or something along those lines.
Seems to me also that your use of "categorical imperative" is nonstandard. You speak of a plurality, when there is usually only the one.
Finally, the dissection between meta-ethics and ethics is perhaps not quite so clear as you seem to think, in that deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics signify differences in meta-ethical approach as well as to normative ethics. Each may subscribe to or be implied by differences in metaethics.
But seems to be following the discussion, despite my confusion. So I might leave you to it.
Not the point at all. What people want is absolutely to be removed from the equation. Animals take shelter from the storm, or the predator, or the heat or cold, or they die. No recourse to subjective wants explains how a yeast cell absorbs sugar and excretes alcohol. that's just how they work, and this is how humans work, - they shelter or they die. they arrange the environment just as rabbits do or birds do We don't have to invoke the subjective world of these animals at all, any more than we have to invoke the subjective world of a yeast cell.
Life does what is necessary to survive, or it dies. but if it dies, it is no longer life. Therefore life does what is necessary to survive. And human life is no exception. We need to control our environment or we die. And those that are homeless must make a shelter from cardboard and plastic waste as best they can.
Is there a name you might use, by which this faculty is also known?
Quoting Bob Ross
To say one exists with a nature that fundamentally includes such an objective obligation, as opposed to some other decidable kind, seems to question the need for a faculty to issue it necessarily.
I get what youre driving at; just trying to see if I can arrange what you say in my terms.
Hello Moliere,
Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems as though you are noting that philosophical positions tend to be complex and hard to nail down precise distinctions between views, which I agree with; but, why would this entail that we cant achieve oneor shouldnt strive for it? I dont think that we are barred from making concrete distinctions in philosophy, but I would grant it is exceptionally difficult to achieve such due to the nature of the study.
I agree that it is best to come to set definitions before discussing a topic, as we do tend to make general distinctions and then make (usually false) assumptions about each others views; but I do think that distinctions should and can have set definitions (including for general ones). Moral realism and anti-realism have set definitions (and are not, in terms of their definition, blurry), and I would argue that my position simply breaks it (and that is what I meant by blurring the distinction) in it being mutually exclusive and exhaustive options. It sounds like, and correct me if I am wrong, that you are arguing that we just simply dont have set definitions at all (unless we dive in precisely into each others views)whereas, for me, I would grant that humans tend to make ambiguous, general distinctions but, nevertheless, people should derive clear definitions of things (and certainly can if they put in enough effort) which includes general distinctions. In my opinion, the realist vs. anti-realist distinction was predicated on false presumptions, which is why I am able to validly (I would argue) break it; but that just means we need to re-think the distinction and make it better. To your point (I think), we can never truly know that we arent still operating on false presumptions until someone validly breaks the new distinction we make; but I still think we should be trying to achieve clear distinctions and would say that we can (just not in the sense of absolute knowledge).
I do agree, to your point, that we do seem to be no longer working with the general categories once weve been discussing each others particular views for some time, but if the general distinction is supposed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, then ours views should be squarely in one or the other. If we can provide a view which doesnt, then we have successfully broken the distinction and need a new onebecause the old one is ambiguous now.
I agree, but I still think we should strive for it. However, I am starting to view general distinctions in philosophy as not mutually exclusive and exhaustive options (to your point).
I see; so a reversal would be to negate what one previously held (e.g., this position was realist, now it is anti-realist), is that correct?
It seems as though we have a lot in common with our views; and that youre response to my blurring of the distinction is that that is what the distinction is (i.e., blurry) by its own nature; but I still think we ought to strive to make clear distinctions (even generally).
Bob
Hello Banno,
If a person who has consequentialist tendencies claims there are no categorical imperatives, then they are thereby squarely a moral anti-realist (metaethically). That's not to say that all consequentialists are anti-realists, but if they make that specific claim then I do think they are an anti-realist. A categorical imperative, in metaethics, I would argue, is an objective moral judgment (as they are used inter-changeably). When a moral realist claims there are true objective judgments, they are thereby claiming that there are categorical claims they can make about moral judgments (hence the use of categorical imperatives).
Now, with being said, I totally understand your distinction (and I agree) that something being objective does not entail that it is obligatory for a person to obey it (and so one could denote an objective moral judgment as disynonymous with a categorical imperative in that sense); but, traditionally, if a moral judgment is objectively true, then it is thereby obligatory for one to obey (and it is true and applies in all caseswhich is a categorical imperative).
I, like you (as far as I am understanding), would push back on this presumption (that an objectively true moral judgment is thereby obligatory to hold) and I, instead of making a objective moral judgment vs. categorical imperative distinction, am inclined to make a implicit-moral judgment vs. fixated-upon-moral judgment distinctionbut these are essentially (as far as I am understanding) expressing the same critique. Within how you are using the terms, I would say that I am claiming that there are no categorical imperatives (i.e., no absolutely obligatory moral judgments which are not grounded ultimately in a will) but there are true, objective moral judgments (i.e., involuntary obligations that are grounded in the nature of the being).
I agree that most ethical theories that invoke categorical imperatives tend to only have one, but the definition of a categorical imperative does not entail, by necessity, that there is only one.
I agree that normative ethical theories are fundamentally grounded in meta-ethical theories; but that doesnt mean there isnt a clear difference between the two different studies themselves. Normative ethical theories are not the study of the metaethical differences that each may instantiatebut, to your point, they are definitely pertinent to such discussions.
Bob
Hello unenlightened,
Again, if you are going to claim that peoples wants are absolutely to be removed from the equation in terms of morals, then you must be able to ground objectively the choice to keep surviving. By my lights, all you are noting is biological (or otherwise scientific) facts and not moral ones: it is a fact that life does whatever is necessary to survive, or it dies, but why ought a person keep surviving? By noting that life either survives or dies, you have not thereby made any moral claims at all.
In other words, a person needs to control their environment (to some extent) to survive, but this tells me nothing of why I am obligated to keep survivingwhy not just die? That is where the moral facts come into play (if any). All I know, at best, from your argument is that if I would like to keep living, then I must control my environment; but that is just, by definition, a hypothetical imperative.
Bob
Hello Mww,
I appreciate your response!
I purposely did not note an organ or what not which is responsible for such production because I dont think a subject is reducible to its body and, even if it were, I do not know which organ(s) would specifically deal with producing norms. Regardless of which way one leans in terms of philosophy of mind, I dont think it matters for all intents and purposes: by analysis of wills (i.e., subjects) we can come to understand how they issue norms (i.e., obligations) and see if there are any which are involuntary. By faculty of normativity, I just mean a power (i.e., faculty) which produces norms for a given beingwhether that is a physical organ or a spiritual substance (or neither), I think it is irrelevant (but correct me if I am wrong).
By faculty, I just mean the power to produce norms: are you questioning whether there needs to be a biological organ or spiritual substance that produces it? In other words, are you taking more a bundle theorist approach?
I mean it more generally, as I dont think it matters what position one takes on that in philosophy of mind, but I could be wrong on that.
I totally understand: hopefully I did an adequate job of addressing your questions. Otherwise, please ask away!
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Quoting Bob Ross
No, I haven't made any moral claims, and no one has to choose to keep surviving. But if one should choose not to keep surviving, there is no more choice and no more obligation. There is an inequality between living and dying. And out of this inequality comes necessity and from necessity comes obligation. If you want to die, don't be bothering me about morality, because I am concerned with living, I'm not interested in dying.
Whether moral realism or anti-realism is correct is a function of how we define the terms.
Assume we use your definition of moral realism as the reality of categorical imperatives, which I take to be imperatives about what we somehow ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. Then I would argue that moral realism is unlikely to be true.
But, as Hanover mentioned, people have also defined moral realism as:
"Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism
By wikipedias definition, I support moral realism. My realism claim is based on the empirical observation that past and present cultural moral norms (ethical sentences) refer to parts of cooperation strategies (reciprocity strategies for the most part) which are objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.
One criterion for the most useful definition of moral realism (and other terms in moral philosophy) is which will make understanding morality less confusing. It would be confusing to simultaneously 1) define moral realism as the reality of categorical imperatives (which results in the conclusion that moral realism is likely false) and 2) accept the empirical data that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems (which implies a kind of moral realism).
Thus, the most useful definitions of moral realism and other terms in moral philosophy could be based on what we empirically observe about morality.
Perhaps the difficulties you refer to in your opening post are due to a mismatch between your chosen definition of moral realism and the reality of what human morality is?
Cool. I was just thinking ..Enlightenment moral philosophy proposed freedom as a causal what not, the necessary condition for production of objective obligations.
Quoting Bob Ross
If we actually do have objective obligations, we should expect a source sufficient to provide for them, and usually our will is considered that way.
Irrelevant sidebar: there was a guy on PBS in the early 70s, had a painting technique demonstration broadcast, from upstate Vermont, on Saturday afternoons. His name was Bob Ross.
Oh I think it's OK to strive for impossible goals. Else philosophy would surely disappear! :D
Just noting that as we move from different communities that we sort of have to start rolling the rock from the bottom of the hill again. (EDIT: And sometimes even within the same community!)
Quoting Bob Ross
Cool. :)
Quoting Bob Ross
Yup! I think we understand one another now!
See, that doesn't work. A consequentialist claims that the worth of an action is found by looking at its consequences. This stands in opposition to the deontologist looking at a moral rule, such as the categorical imperative.
And yet consequentialism prides itself on being "objective", as basing its morality on measurables. It is realist.
If your account has consequentialism as being antirealist, it has gone astray.
Hello unenlightened,
I apologize: I must have, somewhere along our conversation, misunderstood what you are claiming. Are you claiming there are objective moral judgments, or are you not?
This is all fine and well if you are claiming that there are no objective moral judgments and, consequently, the obligation is ultimately subjective; but once one obligates themselves (by subjective affirmation) to keep living, then they must determine the best means to achieving that, which produce sub-obligations (so to speak). Is that what you are trying to convey?
Bob
Hello Mark S,
I appreciate your response!
I agree, as there is no such thing as a stance-independent judgment.
Very interesting! To be honest, I have a hard time conceding this definition as truly a moral realist position (but please correct me where I am wrong here): it seems to me that this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective, but it adds that there can be inter-subjective norms. By my lights, these inter-subjective norms can persist and function very similarly to objective norms (insofar as any given individual can die an the norm is still present in some manneri.e., laws) but are not themselves objective (for they are not stance-independent nor are they deptictions of involuntary aspects of one's will): they are formulated based on collective agreement). To me, theoretically, the only valid definition of objective moral judgments is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will).
Again, I have a hard time understanding how this is actually a moral realist position: can you please elaborate?
The problem I have with this is that it seems to conflate description about prescriptions with the prescriptions themselves. The fact that you can describe that I obligated myself to X does not thereby make that obligation objective; that is, the empirical inquiry of obligations is not itself an indicator of obligations themselves being objectiveit is just an indicator that we would like to study them.
This could the issue: I am not sure. However, currently I dont think it is: I think that the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction is broken for my views; but it could be due to me misunderstanding them or formulating an invalid metaethical theorythat is partly why I create this discussion board!
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Hello Mww,
If by causal freedom you are referring to libertarian free will, then I do not think that such is necessary for one to have obligations (as I am equally perfectly happy with a compatibilistic view as much as a libertarian one).
Exactly! I would say that a description of an involuntary aspect of our will would be an objective moral judgment.
This is the man wherefrom I get my name (;
Bob
Hello Moliere,
Fair enough my friend!
I think so too.
As I am unsure what to segue into now, I would like to just tell you that I really appreciated our conversation Moliere, and I look forward to many more! I think, as of now, we understand each other, so I dont think theres much more to say; but please do not hesitate to contact me (or respond to this message) if you have anything you would like to discuss further!
Bob
Hello Banno,
I see. The problem (I think) is that consequentialism does not entail, in itself, any metaethical position specifically. I wasnt trying to claim that all consequentialists tend towards the view that there are no categorical impertatives, as simply noting that one is going to derive the good from consequences (and not intentionslike deontic normative ethical theories) does not entail anything about the fundamental origins of this good: it could be objective or subjective (or inter-subjective or what not). So, to clarify, I think that a consequentialist can be a moral realist or a moral anti-realist; but, fundamentally, if a given consequentialist claims there are categorical imperatives, then they are thereby a moral realist and if they claim there arent, then they are thereby a moral anti-realist. The good which a consequentialist is analyzing in the consequences of an action is what a metaethicist is going want to get a clear answer on (and that isnt really a part of normative ethics to answer that question itself).
Same, I think, goes for deontic normative ethical theories: one is simply noting simply that one has a duty to a rule, and that rule could be grounded in a subject (i.e. a will) or something objective. Simply telling me that one has deontic ties (or is wholly subscribed to a deontic normative ethical theory) does not, in itself, tell me whether one is a moral realist or anti-realist. Now, I will grant that it is usually a safe bet to assume they are a moral realist, but that isnt actually deducible therefrom.
Hopefully that clears things up. If not, then please correct me where you think I am wrong!
Bob
Cool. Guess the sidebar wasnt that irrelevant after all.
Thanks for your careful reply. I am keenly interested in better understanding reasons for preferring your or Wikipedias definitions of moral realism.
Wikipedias definition - "Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."
I understand your definition to be
Quoting Bob Ross
Rewriting Wikipedias claim in a parallel structure:
A valid definition of objective moral judgments is that they refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the involuntary obligations definition of "objective moral judgments"?
Advantages:
Disadvantages:
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the objective features of the world definition of "objective moral judgments"?
Advantages:
Disadvantages:
?
Additions or corrections to advantages and disadvantages?
Also, I dont understand this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective when the subject is objective features of the world. Science is good at being objective concerning features of the world.
Then you say Again, I have a hard time understanding how this is actually a moral realist position: can you please elaborate?
It is not a moral realist position by your definition. My response's point is that your definition of moral realism is less useful than the objective features of the world definition based on the above advantages and disadvantages. These are just definitions. We are free to choose, assume, or advocate the most useful.
Postscript:
Do you have a reference for a formal definition of objective moral judgments consistent with Quoting Bob Ross
One can choose to be moral or immoral, but one cannot chose what is moral and what is immoral.
Is there a difference in your mind between choosing and deciding? Are you associating choice with something arbitrary or capricious? That's not how we generally make choices, especially about things that we deem to be important.
Hello Mark S,
Wonderful response! Let me see if I can adequately respond.
I think that, firstly, I must, regrettably, dive into a bit of semantics, as I think you are alluding to such a discussion with:
I certainly agree that we can use terms how we please; so let me explain how I am using the terminology and why so that we can compare.
By objective moral judgement (and categorical imperative), I mean a description of an involuntary obligation, and, by my lights, the only valid source thereof is a will. However, this is not a contemporary definition in terms of the traditional definitions of moral realism and moral anti-realism: it would be, technically speaking, a niche subgroup within moral realismbut I disagree that it should be there as I think it also agrees with fundamental aspects of moral anti-realism (and thusly think the distinction fails to function properly).
For example, I totally understand that moral cultural relativism (which, correct if I am wrong, is what it seems you are at least partially describing) is a moral realist position in the literature; however, within my view, I dont see it is a view that is holding truly objective moral judgments as existent. To me, it is describing inter-subjective judgments at best (i.e., judgments which are not contingent on one particular will but, rather, on multiplebut is still contingent on wills and thusly not objective). Nevertheless, my view is not a mainstream, traditional definition when it comes to the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction; and that is why, I would presume, standford keeps the definition incredibly ambiguous:
Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face valuemoral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism (although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way). ...It is worth noting that, while moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/)
So, to answer:
No. The reason I use my definition is because I think there is a lot of ambiguity and overlap between moral realism and anti-realism. Something being objective means for it to be will-independent (by my lights), subjective is to be contingent on at least one will, and inter-subjective is to be contingent on wills. The study of what laws we put in place, as a cooperative society, is an objective study of inter-subjective facts.
I suspect that you are using a different definition of subjective opinion than me, as I dont think societal norms and laws are truly independent of wills. What do you mean by a subjective opinion? Is it being used more in a whimsical, colloquial sense of the term?
Now let me try to address your disadvantages of my definition:
I actually do think such involuntary obligations exist: I can elaborate on them if you would like.
Firstly, I agree and understand my view is confusing, but I would argue it is confusing in light of the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction; in other words, it is only confusing when one tries to fit it into one category or the other as traditionally laid out. Secondly, I would like to clarify that the objective moral judgments (i.e., involuntary obligations) which I refer do not result in moral anti-realist claims: the involuntary obligations are squarely within a realists perspective of the world; however, anyones obligation to fixate on those objective moral judgments is squarely within a moral anti-realists perspective (since I dont think there is such a thing as a fixated-upon-stance-independent judgment). In other words, the term objective moral judgment has the idea of absolute fixated-upon obligation stripped out of it completely.
I think it does (in just the same manner any other moral realist could argue for): we resolve our disputes by committing ourselves to fixating upon any objective moral judgments.
Let me know address your advantages of your definition:
If objective moral judgments are defined as will-independent, then those are not objective features pertaining to moral judgments. At best, it is really objective features of events which themselves are inter-subjective facts about societies.
Maybe I am just misunderstanding you, but I dont see how this provides a mind-independent basis: it seems as though you are making laws and cultural norms the standard of what is good.
In a literal sense of the term, cultural norms and laws are not involuntary at all. They are very much voluntaryalbeit sometimes hard to get away with disobeying (but that isnt thereby involuntary).
Let me try to explain with an analogy. Lets say I wake up in the morning and, despite my bodily wants directing me to go back in my cozy bed and fall back asleep, I decide to workout. I then workout. Now, from a post-analysis, it is an objective fact that (1) I wanted to workout (in the sense of myself as a will and not my bodily wants) and that (2) decision (which is an obligation I issued upon myself) originates from my will (and is thusly contingent upon it). In this example, it would be incorrect to say that my decision that I ought go workout instead of fall back asleep is objective because it one can post-analyze the events that occurred. In other words, the fact that I worked out because I decided to doesnt make the judgment (which is my decision) objective.
I think that is what you are doing with cultural norms and laws: you are correctly noting that we can post-analyze the events, which ultimate originate from wills, and that those events are objective factsbut that doesnt make the judgments themselves (which originated from the wills) objective.
Bob
Hello Unenlightened,
I agree with your first paragraph and I think I understand better what you are saying: thank you!
However, your last sentence is confusing me:
To say someone can choose to be moral (or immoral) is to concede that there is a standard ultimately outside of themselves for what is moral (or immoral); and, likewise, to say that they cannot choose what is moral is to say the same thing. However, I thought in agreement that your position doesnt have any objective moral judgments in it: so how is there a standard of what is moral which no one gets to choose?
Bob
Hello Banno,
Hmm, I see: could you please elaborate on that more?
Bob
We are trying to communicate.
Communication depends on honesty.
It is open to us to be dishonest, and only pretend to want to communicate in order to manipulate each other rather than understand each other.
But the moment either one claims that they are not intending to communicate but to manipulate, the meaning of their words is lost, and the discussion is over. Our social relations depend on honesty and -cannot depend on dishonesty. Social relations presume morals, and the particular morals are necessary features of social relations. We simply cannot discuss on the basis that we are not going to tell the truth - we would be wasting our breath. One can lie, but one cannot make lying good.
the only valid definition of objective moral judgments is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will) Bob Ross
I understand you to be saying (here and elsewhere) that fixating on a cultural moral norm (encoding it as a moral norm in your moral sense in my terms) makes it an objective moral judgment an involuntary obligation.
Also,
Quoting Bob Ross
A key miscommunication between us is what the function of cultural moral norms refers to. Function refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe is should shed light on how to best define objective moral judgments.
Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms is provides an objective standard of what is good and bad.
(The superficially diverse, contradictory, and strange norms of cultural moralities without this insight into their ultimate source and function is relatively useless.)
But what is the source of this functions bindingness? Are we logically free to fixate (and advocate as a matter of will) for a different standard of what is good and bad? Of course. The empirical observation of the ultimate source of cultural moral norms carries no innate bindingness. This functions bindingness may be subjective and the choice to fixate on it to trigger the feeling of bindingness a matter of preference. But the ultimate source of human morality is an objective truth not a subjective one.
So what is the mind-independent function of cultural moral norms? To solve cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.
In highly cooperative societies, all intelligent, independent agents must solve these same cooperation problems and therefore their morality will also have the function of solving these cooperation problems. (We can expect them all to know why the Golden Rule is a useful moral guide and, if they are sufficiently advanced, when and why it goes wrong and should be abandoned.)
Based on what I argue the function of human morality is (solving cooperation problems), the most useful definition of "objective moral judgments" is based of the objective features of the world rather than an involuntary obligation (of a will).
Morality as Cooperation Strategies is wonderfully compatible with
Wikipedias definition - "Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."
But could it be normative? By the SEP, normativity sounds likely:
"The term morality can be used ... normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."
I expect rational people would prefer to live in cooperative societies and therefore would be interested in basing their moral system on solutions to problems that block cooperation.
Nowhere in this do I find a moral judgment. You are simply noting that if one wants to communicate, then they must speak the truth most of the time.
The part which one cannot choose in that example is something which is not a moral judgment: its the best means of abiding by the moral judgmentit is the means not the judgment itself.
I agree and totally understand; however, it seems to me that you are simply noting that one cannot control the sub-obligations which emerge as a result of the ultimate obligations that one commits themselves to (which I agree with): I am failing how those moral judgments are objective in that case. It seems as though they are ultimately objective but there are better ways of achieving them (or abiding by them).
Bob
Not quite! I am saying the opposite: fixating on a moral judgment is subjective; and moral judgments which one cannot opt-out of (cannot unfixate upon) are objective.
Thank you for elaborating on this, but, to me, I dont see why a primary reason for norms existing would be thereby an objective norm: why is that the case?
As you can probably guess, I am confused by the last sentence: why would that be an objective truth of moral judgments? Are you claiming there is a force (or something) which is the ultimate reason why we do what we do?
I went ahead and read your initial post for that discussion board, but, nevertheless, I dont see how cooperation problems are objective moral judgments nor how it pertains to morality itself. I dont think something is determine right or wrong solely on whether it helps us cooperate better. Also, even if is the case that cooperation is a key driving factor for why people tend to have certain obligations, that would tell us nothing about whether those obligations are objective or not.
Personally, I just dont think that description by SEP is correct: morality is not an appeal to the populace.
Bob
I'm not saying that. "Come buy my snake oil, it will make you immune from snake bites." Some people do lie all the time. It is corrosive to society. I'm saying that one cannot in good faith say say it is good to lie. One cannot found a society on the practice of lies, because lies only work at all in a social context of trust and honesty.. It is an argument against subjectivism and against error theory.
All moral statements are false.
However, trust and honesty are frequently built on false beliefs. In fact, for a lot of communities belief in false things is how a group checks to see if someone is trustworthy -- if you believe the gods are watching, you might think twice about crossing the rules of the tribe even when the people aren't watching. Christian communities are often obsessed with what people believe, and belief maintenance. Going to church is part of belief maintenance is part of community building is part of trust and honesty. Once a month, in the Morman church -- at least when I was a little one, who knows now -- there is what is called a "Faith and Testimony Meeting" where people who feel the spirit will get up and declare to the church their faith and testimony in the church due to the teachings and beliefs which are being maintained.
In fact, if moral statements were true, then I'd expect the sort of behavior as above, but I'd expect it across a much smaller groupings of beliefs. Instead what we have are a very wide margin of possible false beliefs that, insofar as a group lands on some strategy for child-care and belief-reproduction (belief maintenance within the family, missionary work) it's good enough to survive and thrive in the cultural jungle.
The scenario is different from the snake oil salesman, who knows he's selling snake-oil, and the false prophet, like Joseph Smith -- it's the people they are talking to who believe in false things, and form community from that. There's plenty of faith, honesty, and trust. Just not much truth.
The categorical imperative that I long considered as true was "Thou shalt not kill" -- but reality woke me up from that one. Clearly the societies which are very efficient at assigning the best people to killing are the ones which thrive. At which point -- what is moral realism anymore?
They are only false if you misinterpret them to be statements of fact.
You ought to do good, but you will not.
The moral conflict arises from identification, which is separation. I want versus we want, and then we want, versus they want.
Quoting Moliere
What moral realism is not is either that the good works or is rewarded. So societies can 'thrive', just as individuals can 'thrive', by identifying self -interest as the individual against the rest, or the tribe against the enemy. In the latter case, the selfish individual is subsumed into a selfish society. A religious sect typically makes this identification, and strengthens it with supernatural threats and promises, and pretends it is not all a mafia.
Being moral will not save you. It was always an empty promise, because if it would save you, it would be mere expediency, and even arseholes would find it expedient to be good. But it is the only end to the internal conflict, to end the identification. Than one is, ahem, beyond good and evil. In the meantime, it is a commonplace that God favours the big battalions, and therefore being good is costly and painful.
Isn't that what moral realism does? Moral anti-realism wishes to divest moral statements of fact-hood. There is no truth here -- just what's important. It's not the truth that will set you free, because there is no truth to the matter. There's nothing to deliberate or discover or argue. There are one's convictions and that's about it. Decision, in a backwards way, is what sets one free. It's the lack of deliberation, the lack of uncertainty, that frees one. Hence the temptation to call it a fact, to secure ones moral status even more.
It's only a moral conflict if there be a truth to the matter, though. If there be no truth, it's just a set of desires. And they need not even be in competition, unless that's what we want.
Quoting unenlightened
Right! So it makes sense to call it false. There's nothing there. There's no fact to the matter. There's no goodness. It's just you on your own making choices that feel right, just like everyone else.
I read Nietzsche as the philosopher that cared so much about value that he was willing to sacrifice the good to save valuation itself.
I'd say I'm more attached to the good than I am to moral realism, and tend towards nihilism contra Nietzsche. I'm not willing to kill to save valuation. (EDIT: flipped the vowels to match the german phonetic rules)
If I do what I ought to do, then what I ought to do becomes the fact of what I do. Either my morality or my immorality is realised. The reality that I am defending here is that I can only pretend that my immorality is morality I can only pretend that killing is good, or lying is good.
That is a justification. It has the form, killing is bad, but something else is worse, so killing is necessary, not killing is good.
I mean, one can claim that they don't believe that murder is a crime. But rarely do such views lead to such acts. On the other hand, those who are serial killers, may actually believe this, and act according to this belief.
But then even they (frequently, not always) acknowledge that what they did was morally wrong, and society labels them as lacking a fundamental component of being a human being, correctly, in my view.
Aside from related examples, I don't see a big issue. But someone could clear up my confusion here, as I know almost nothing about such topics.
For example, at a human level of perspective, is it moral for a young, innocent child to die of famine? I think not as we generally feel it needless, unwarranted and harmful.
And thus can we as humans hold general life/existence accountable as a source of unwholesome and merciless states of affairs? Ie is life unfair? Immoral? Antinatalists may believe such a state of existence to be so.
On the other hand, is it moral or ethical for mother nature to endure a parasitic, resource hungry, pillaging and plundering species at the expense of all of her other species and natural existants - all other flora and fauna that make up her balanced, fined tuned and harmonious/equilibric ecosystem?
In that case, earth may reactively become hostile to any existant that disturbs her natural and imperative balance/harmony.
Climate change punishes those most dependent on things staying as they are. So the complexity and thus inherent dependency of humanities endeavours on a steady natural state leaves our systems perhaps most vulnerable to any change in that state/ environment.
And that translates into famine, and thus children in such famine prone areas starving to death.
Whos fault is that? Who is morally accountable. Is it mother nature being hostile? Or is it us being hostile to mother nature and experiencing the equal and opposite reaction.
If "justice" can be equated to natural balance, then our suffering is justice for the woes we commit against nature, just as our ability to foster diversity and ecology would lead to abundance/ prosperity, harmony and peace in nature.
Nature can be our provider or aggressor and I think this is in response to us being it's provider or aggressor. A two way system.
Morality works at many levels not just human ones. Although when inhuman in effect/manifestation, we observe it as imbalance or impaired/dysregulated ecosystem.
We can rationalise toxifying the atmosphere in our own insular human moral struggles against one another in a competitive capitalist society. But then the toxic atmosphere in turn toxifies us. And we can choose to consider ourselves at fault or life/nature at fault.
In the end it is clear that cause and effect work at multiple levels and magnitudes, and thus any immoral, unfair or harmful outcome is not restricted to direct unethical human action but also how those actions ripple out into other systems we would normally consider not within range of morality, and yet come back to bite us in the ass.
I have a hard time believing that anything is noble. Hence I am at least an anti-realist towards these virtues. Rather, people feel the sublime in contemplating noble actions -- but the reality of noble actions is far from beautiful, sublime, or good: for the most part Honors and nobility are the rewards of war. Moral goodness and war frequently go hand-in-hand, at least of this variety of moral goodness.
As much as I respect Nietzsche as a philosopher a lot of my beliefs can be read contra his entire project. Him and Aristotle are the usual suspects I have in mind when I think "Who is it I just basically disagree with on everything when I finally piece it all together into something coherent?" -- both hierarchical thinkers, both believers in masters and slaves, and both entirely bloodless in their lives while building an architecture of thought that supports empire, in Aristotle's case, and domination, in Nietzsche's case -- with a side dose of "self overcoming" to help those of us still invested in our slave moralities to accept Nietzsche's morality of domination.
But I would put the myth like this -- Noble goods are divine goods, and that they are out of reach for human beings. The most good a human being can do is to live a peaceful life among friends and family pursuing the simple pleasures of life. The noble goods inspire us, but they aren't meant for us to reach for them -- when we do we often commit to terrible things in the name of this greater good. They are better for myths and stories to reflect upon rather than emulate.
And yet that's far from some kind of morally realistic account. It's very much bound to an intepretation of our nature and the results I observe when people believe in a certain way, in addition to the kind of life I want to live. I want to live a peaceful life of simple pleasures, and I do so -- and I would do so were The Form of the Good to tell me to do otherwise.
I'm with you there. Look, I think that the difficulty, the disagreements, mostly arise from dealing with horrors War to end war, defeat fascism etc. But there is no question of setting up Fascism so we can have a good war, any more than there is any question of getting pregnant in order to have an abortion. Dealing with evil for the good is hard. But making the distinction in principle, other things being equal is much easier - life over death, truth over falsehood, freedom over coercion love over hate, peace over war.
The easy cases are the principles we say we hold to. "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" is my war-tribes creed, and they are willing to kill in the name of these values. (even as we take on more and more fascistic cultural elements, what the creed says and how it functions are at odds. They basically contradict one another)
It's always a contrast with action that causes my uncertainty in principles, so for myself it is not easy to make in-principle distinctions. I am tempted by the good, but since I have no knowledge of the good, I have no truth of the good. And I don't even have a guess as to how someone could possibly have such a knowledge. Hence, being committed to honesty, I announce my nihilism.
The realist/antirealist discussion pretty much reduces to whether you want to use a bivalent logic or not. Realists say that all statements, even those about things we we don't believe, know, perceive or whatever, are either true or false. Antirealists say that at least some statements either do not have a truth value at all, neither true nor false, or have some third truth value that is neither true nor false.
The subjective/objective discussion remains mired in imprecision, sometimes being about the difference between public and supposedly private statements, sometimes being about distinguishing the world from supposed mental states, and sometimes being about grammatical differences between first and third person accounts.
It seems to me that you might have inadvertently carried the ambiguity of the subject/object discussion into the realist/antirealist discussion.
Hello unenlightened,
I am understanding this analogy to be agreeing that your moral system doesnt purport to have objective moral judgments, is that correct?
This is all fair enough, but, to me, when you use the term good you are invoking a moral term. This term, so far, has not been demonstrated to be objective nor absolutely obligatory; which, as far as I am understanding you, you arent trying to claim that. But ..
Then you state this: your view, as far as I understand, is moral subjectivism. You are claiming:
1. Moral judgments are propositional (i.e., cognitive); and
2. There are not true objective moral judgments; and
3. Moral judgments are ultimately grounded in the subject (i.e., moral expressions truth is relative to the subject at hand).
Which is the definition of moral subjectivism. If you are refuting that position, then I think you would have to refute one of the above theses of it.
Bob
Hello Manual,
I appreciate your response!
Generally speaking, ones metaethical position is going to shape their normative ethical and applied ethical positions; in other words, metaethics asks the fundamental question of what it means for something to be good (right) or bad (wrong), normative ethics uses that definition to determine what is considered good and what is considered bad (and usually tries to formulate them as rules), and applied ethics is an attempt to apply those normative ethical rules to nuanced, every-day-to-day situations to see what the right or wrong thing is to do.
For example, if one is more of a moral anti-realist (generally speaking) then they dont think there are objective moral judgments and so there general outlook on moral philosophy is to determine what is right or wrong based off of usually either their desires or their will; whereas, moral realists tend to view the world as if there are absolutely obligatory moral decrees and they must obey them regardless of their own personal stance.
Metaethics, although it definitely influences what ought to be laws, is not itself a study of what should be a crime: it is whether there are any objective moral judgments. I agree that simply whimsically thinking that one doesnt think killing (in the sense of what is normally considered murder) is wrong will usually result in nothing, as they dont sincerely and deeply believe it. I can tell myself I dont belief something that I belief, but that wont thereby make me unbelieve it (as I am think beliefs are involuntary to a large degree). But, imagine that someone does sincerely believe it is right to kill an innocent person as they take a walk passed their house: are there any absolutely obligatory judgments that you can point to to condemn their behavior? That would be a metaethical question.
Bob
Hello Benj96,
I appreciate your response!
That is fair, but at that point, I would argue, it is a matter of studying inter-subjectivity and not objectivity (which is fine if you arent claiming moral judgments are objective).
In terms of your examples, I think you are rightly noting that our actions have consequences (e.g., environment crisis leads to an inhabitable planet, etc.), but is there any objective or absolutely obligatory moral judgments guiding (or should be guiding) our actions?
Bob
Hello Banno,
I dont think this is an accurate depiction of either view. To me, moral realism is the thesis that:
1. Moral judgments are cognitive (which you mentioned); and
2. They are objective.
Whereas, moral anti-realism is that there are no true objective moral judgments, and there are three main sub-categories: subjectivism (i.e., expressivism), non-cognitivism, and error theory (i.e., nihilism).
That is fair. I think that, upon further reflection, that I failed to separate out clearly the distinction between an objective moral judgment and one that is absolutely obligatory: but I think that my fixated-upon vs. implicit moral judgment distinction suffices.
Bob
Quoting Bob Ross
In this example, I think so. To kill an innocent person for no reason, is not only irrational but outright evil. I mean, it's even a bit embarrassing to spell out why killing an innocent person is evil. These types of cases have been talked about in depth by others.
Having said that, I think it's important to realize that, at a certain point, it boils down to this is wrong (or this is good), without any further understanding of what this wrongness entails, beyond it being wrong.
I suspect that our understandings aren't elaborate enough to explore this topic with much more depth. If an alien species exited that had a higher overall intelligence, they would know significantly more about these topics.
Alas, that's my intuition, could be totally wrong.
Sure. Then we ask how "objective" plays out. In realist/antirealist discussions, the fraught notion of objectivity gives way to a tighter discussion of truth values. An antirealist will say that there are moral statements that are not either true nor false; so they might say that moral statements are actually commands, or expressions of preference, or exclamations; but not statements. And not being statements, they may not have a truth value.
This is how your subjectivism, non-cognitivism, and error theory treat the truth value of moral statements.
Whereas deontology and consequentialism may say that there are moral statements, and that these are either true or they are false, and thereby take a realist stance, what you might call an objective approach.
And within each of these there are multiple ways in which things might play out.
This is the way the realist/antirealist discussion has been played out for thirty years or so.
I wasn't able to follow your "fixated" and "implicit" account. It looked a bit like Anscombe's direction of fit.
No. I am saying, (reluctantly because I prefer to avoid 'isms' as being ways not to listen to what is being said), that moral conflict arises from a psychological conflict between self-interest and social interest. It is a real conflict and because it is grounded in the nature of social individuals, there is a real difference between what is moral and what is immoral. Thus I am a 'moral realist' in that particular sense. By the same token, I am equally an 'immoral realist'. The reality of immorality is that individuals can and do exploit the sociality of people for a-social reasons and thereby harm and undermine sociality, including and importantly communication. This is expressed here in a simplified humanistic sense for ease of comprehension; to be more even handed and philosophically useful, I would reference not merely human society, but the whole environment.
Hello Manuel,
I also agree that it is evilbut is evil referring to something objective? And are we absolutely obliged to fixate upon thou shalt not kill an innocent person or does it bottom out at a subjective affirmation (that one ought not kill an innocent person). Ultimately, is thou shalt not kill an innocent person a matter of taste or is it stance-independently wrong?
In every day-to-day talk, you are absolutely right; however, philosophy accepts no presumptions and will question everythingeven what we take for granted as right or wrong.
So, you think the origin of morals is indeterminate?
I dont think I quite understood this part: why?
Bob
Hello Banno,
I think this is incorrect: moral subjectivists are cognitivists and so are nihilists.
This is only a depiction of non-cognivitist moral anti-realist views and not moral anti-realism in its entirety. An error theorist claims that they do have truth value, but that they are all false; and, likewise, a moral subjectivist claims that they do have truth value, but it is relative to the subject at hand.
One could be a moral subjectivist, for example, and accept that stance you just explicated.
Unfortunately, I am not that well versed on direction of fit, but from a basic reading off of google it was interesting. By implicit moral judgments, I mean that it is an involuntary obligation that occurs simply because a beings nature is designed to orient in that manner, whereas an fixated-upon moral judgment is an obligation which one has voluntarily focused on to abide by it (and is possible for them to thusly not-focus, not-fixate upon it).
Bob
Hello unenlightened,
It seems as though, to me, that you are a moral realist in the sense that you do think that there is a real conflict between social interest and self-interestbut these interests boil down to inter-subjectivity and subjectivity respectively (and, therefore, are not objective moral judgments).
Are you just trying to note that your attitude is that of a moral realist in the sense that there are things which must be done societally to preserve the nation, which have very minimal concern for any particular individuals wants?
Bob
It's a bit tricky. It's species-dependent in so far as evidence pertaining to other animals being moral is shaky, some apes show the first glimmerings of such a capacity, but it's nowhere near the level of sophistication we show when we make moral judgments.
So, it's "objective" in the sense that human beings tend to agree on moral judgments, much more frequently that is otherwise stated, but we do not know if hypothetical alien species would necessarily have the exact same morality we have. It doesn't have the same level of objectivity physics has, for instance.
Quoting Bob Ross
As mentioned above, despite some tenuous evidence that other species may have morality in very specific occasions, the degree in which we have morality is not paralleled by anything else we see in the biological world.
This probably shows that in having a sophisticated moral capacity, we are speaking about a new level of complexity in nature, in which understanding is limited.
Again, if another, more intelligent alien species exists, that also had a moral system somewhat similar to ours, they might very well be able to explain why "murder is wrong" or "rape is wrong" in terms other than "it's wrong, you wouldn't like to be murdered or raped."
At bottom of these judgments, there's a feeling of repulsion or wrongness that is hard to verbalize.
I suspect there could be more to say instead of relying on feeling, but we don't know enough - we don't have a sufficiently large understanding - to explain these things in more depth.
It's more than that. We are discussing together; we are using language. This means we are already in a social relationship and already necessarily committed to a common purpose that involves truth and not falsehood. This moral position is necessary to commit to in the sense that to aver its negation would be a performative contradiction equivalent to my trying to persuade you that I do not care about you or what you think. In your terms, there can be no intersubjectivity that is not committed to truth. The sociopath is in practice a solipsist with nothing to say, though he may choose to appear to communicate as a manipulative strategy. This is very different from, say, establishing intersubjectively a rule for driving on one side of the road and not the other, which is necessary but arbitrary.
Truth, honesty, care for each other. These are the necessary components of social living, and social living is the necessary condition for communication. Morality is therefore necessary for language, and as real as language. And language is really real.
Don't misunderstand: I'm offering this as a clarification, a proscription, of the use of "antirealist", by way of bypassing the "contentious and unsettled nature of the topic". I'm basically stealing the use made of it by logicians such as Kripke.
Otherwise we will be prone to an unhelpful, even tedious, diversion into the many and various "..ism"s.
Hello Manuel,
Thank you for the elaboration!
It seems as though morality, to you, pertains solely to biologyis that correct?
If so, then I dont really think we should be deriving moral commandments from whatever we were biologically born to do. However, I do get that we do quite a bit of things simply because it is a part of our nature (and that is certainly a rational thing to do): but, with morality, it just makes one wonder why one ought to do something simply because it is a part of their nature? Are they simply subjectively affirming it (and thusly it originates out of taste)?
If I am understanding you correctly, then I would agree, but I would call this inter-subjective and not objective at all.
It seems as though morality, to you, is the convergence of biological empathy (or something along those lines)--is that correct?
Otherwise, I am not following why it would matter if aliens agreed with us pertaining to moral judgments, as, for me, the truthity of those judgments (if they are objective) would be separate from our or the aliens understanding of them.
[quote]
At bottom of these judgments, there's a feeling of repulsion or wrongness that is hard to verbalize./quote]
Why is a conscience a good indicator of what is right and wrong? A human can be bread to do the wrong thing and feel good about it, just as much as the can not do the right thing because it would bother them to do it.
Bob
Hello Unenlightened,
Although I agree (in the sense that I am trying to get to the truth, and I have no doubt you are too), I dont see how it is impossible for a discussion board conversation to be, on both sides, geared towards what is false (masked as truth). We could both be, for example, just interested in debating each other and are thusly just communicating counter points to each other (and not for the sake of what we think is true pertaining to the subject at hand) for the sake of having a good debate. To clarify, I dont find any evidence either of us are doing that, but, as far as I am understanding you, it seems as though that kind of conversation wouldnt be able to function properly (especially on a grand scale)--but I am failing to see how it would degenerate. Fundamentally, I think this is our dispute:
But there can most certainly be in terms of first principles. Sure, if I lie, then I think it is true that should lie (i.e., I have uncovered the truth that I think I should lie)--but the lie itself is the covering up of what was uncovered. I would agree that the bigger the society the harder it is to be oriented towards untruth, but I dont think it is impossible (or fundamentally radioactive). For example, we could all proclaim that thou shalt not kill simply because we dont want to die (and it makes most rational sense to promote that in society) while lying that it is due to an absolute decree (devoid of any personal feelings and taste): this would operate just fine in societywouldnt it?
I like that analogy, but I dont think it holds if you are arguing for an objective morality: if the judgments themselves are ultimately arbitrary (and are not depictions of involuntary obligations), then those judgments are subjective (or inter-subjective).
I agree that promoting those principles is the most rational thing to do, but I disagree that most of society has to be sincere about them.
Bob
Hello Banno,
Oh, I see! So you are essentially saying that moral realism should be classified as simply moral cognitvism? Is that correct?
Bob
When the boy cries wolf when there is no wolf, he teaches the world to ignore what he says. When we all ignore what each other says, there is no meaning and nothing to understand. It seems so obvious to me that i struggle to understand what you cannot understand. You do know the story?
Quoting Bob Ross
I repeat, "Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms is provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad." How could you argue that was false?
Past and present cultural moral norms are cultural standards for right and wrong. If virtually all past and present cultural moral norms have the function of solving cooperation problems, then solving cooperation problems provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad that is an objective (mind independent) feature of our world.
Note that my claim is silent regarding this standard of good and bads imperative obligation. It is also silent if there are other objective (mind independent) standards of good and bad of either the objective feature of the world or imperative obligation varieties.
And my claim is silent regarding the normativity of this objective standard of good and bad. I do argue that this particular definition of good and bad will be normative by Gerts definition (what all well-informed rational people would advocate). But note that Gerts definition is silent on imperative obligation. Gerts definition describes as normative what all rational people would advocate, not what they would be imperatively obligated to do.
You seem to be focused on moral claims that somehow have the objective property of mind-independent imperative obligation. To me this is odd. Perhaps because I have come to the study of morality from the science of morality side. From the science of morality side, the existence of behaviors we are imperatively obligated to do regardless of our needs and preferences is highly unlikely.
The biologist/philosopher Michael Ruse seems to delight in saying, "Morality is an illusion foisted on us by our genes. Perhaps this makes sense to him because he also is focused on morality as imperative obligations while ignoring morality as an objective feature of the world (as strategies that solve cooperation problems). Morality as an objective feature of the world is definitely not an illusion. It explains, among other things, why such an illusion of imperative obligation is encoded in our genes.
Hello Unenlightened,
I am familiar with the story; however, it isnt relevant (I would say) to the example I gave. Take our conversation right now: you are saying it is predicated on truth whereas I allow for the possibility of a functioning deception (e.g., that we are not trying to converse about what is true but, rather, just simply enjoying debating each other). The moral of the story of the boy who cried wolf is that he demonstrated his lies and thusly no one cares anymoreI am not saying we are both explicating or leaking our want to deceive each other. If we both were honest about the fact that we just wanted to debate each other (in the hypothetical scenario I outlined), then, yes, you would be right to say that that conversation is disfunctional (if we are saying we just want to debate but yet acting as though we are searching for the truth).
If the boy who cried wolf masked his narcissistic desire to spook his village with crafty, legitimate reasons for crying (whereof when they approached there was no wolf but everything indicated that the boy was sincereeven though he truly isnt), then they would have kept showing up. I am not sure if I am explaining this adequately, but hopefully that helps.
Bob
Hello Mark S,
Thank you for your response! I suspect we may be misunderstanding each other, so let me try to explain back to you what I am understanding you to being saying (and please correct me where I am wrong).
You seem to be essentially noting that we can derive objective facts pertaining to what norms societies are setup with (and sustain) and that these judgments (which are guided by the need for cooperation) are an objective standard for morals. Am I understanding you correctly?
I understand that you are not arguing that the objective standard (that you outlined) is absolutely obligatory; however, my problem is, more fundamentally, with your standard even being considered objective morality. I understand that descriptions of norms are, in fact, objective; but that does not thereby make it objective within the moral sphere of discourse.
For example, lets say that a particular society (or even all societies) have a rule thou shall not kill. That is an objective fact (in this hypothetical scenario) because it is a description of a norm which exists in that society (or all societies); however, by my lights, it is not thereby an objective moral judgement--on the contrary, the depiction that a society decrees thou shall not kill is not a prescription itself (it is simply a description of what is currently the case in society). Therefore, it isnt an objective moral judgment: it seems as though you are advocating that it would be simply in virtue of it being a norm in society. Am I misunderstanding you?
I think I followed and agree: I just want to explicate that I am not contending that you have to hold a moral judgment as absolutely obligatory in order to be classified as an objective moral judgment. On the contrary, I am questioning how the study of subjects (being objective features of the world) is a source of morality. How does It is an objective fact that most people think I shouldnt kill translate to I should not kill?
Bob
Indeed so. there is advantage in immorality. Cheats prosper, but always at the expense of the honest. That is why I call it immoral realism as much as moral realism. This is hard for people to understand because decent folk want the world to be fair and reward virtue, but it is not and does not. As long as there is a community of the honest, the charlatan can exploit them; it is only when the charlatans become dominant that there is a collapse, and then the hard lesson has to be learned again that nothing can be done without virtue.
Hello Banno,
I see. I dont think that is a good use of the term moral realism because it fundamentally shifts the focus from the sole purpose of metaethics: whether there are objective moral judgments. One can be a moral cognitivist and hold that there are or are not objective moral judgments: it makes no difference.
Bob
Hello unenlightened,
Fair enough: I didnt fully understand what was meant by immoral realism until now.
I can see that, but I am hesitant to say that all forms of insincerity would cause society to crumble in the event that it is dominant. For example, lets say that 99% of the population were convinced there wasnt an objective law prohibiting murder, but they realize that the best bet to not get killed (in very unnecessary ways) is to promote and insincerely affirm that there is an objective law prohibiting it. In that case, I dont see how society would crumble. In other words, dominant pretending isnt necessarily a highway to destruction.
Bob
Yes, you have found an exception..If one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false... one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful. (Not that I really know what an objective law is, mind. It tends to make me think of laws of physics that one obeys without exception, rather than human prescriptions that one can and sometimes does break.)
Hello unenlightened,
But doesnt this fundamentally break your previously claim? Or am I misunderstanding? As far as I understood, you were claiming society cannot function predominantly on lies, but then you just admitted (as far as I understand) that there are instances where they can. Are you just claiming that most subject-matters need to be predominantly submerged in truth while some minority do not?
In my scenario, the assumption is that it actually is false and they are pretending it is true (not that it it was true); but now it seems as though you are claiming that there is some sort of objective moral law which is independent of the inter-subjective cooperation required to survive as a species.
Well, this is exactly what I would need to know, because if you dont know what the objective law is then, to me, you dont have one; so you cant claim that their pretending of it being true is actually accidentally corresponding to something that is true.
However, I will concede that I generally agree with your definition of objective morality if you mean laws of physics that one obeys without exception. I just define it as a description of the faculty of normativity of a being which is involuntary: mine is just in more philosophical terminology.
Bob
the sort of objectivity I am claiming is the objective inequality I mentioned way back honesty is moral and dishonesty is immoral; similarly killing folks is immoral and keeping them alive is moral. It cannot work the other way around, and thus there is objectivity, without that being the kind of law like gravity that one cannot defy.
I don't think i'm saying anything extraordinary or new here, so I wonder why it is so difficult to grasp. I'll try a quick recap.
1. Humans are heavily socially dependent on each other and have developed language as an aid to cooperation, including education planning and agreements.
2.Humans also make identifications of themselves as individuals, and this can give rise in thinking and planning to a conflict between self- interest and social interest.
3. This conflict manifests as the moral conflict, whereby one has to choose between self-interest and social interest. Because morality is a social judgement, acting in the social interest is moral and acting against it is immoral whenever there is a conflict.
4. Animals without language cannot articulate to themselves the nature of social interest or clearly differentiate it from self-interest, and therefore largely avoid such internal conflict. Here for example, we have the beginning of language, and the beginning of dishonesty.
The dishonesty has to be, as Attenborough says 'very occasionally', because otherwise the warning would not work either as a deception or as a warning. And I would add that it is clearly an intentional deception, and thus the original sin.
I wonder what the "trouble" is if the other monkeys found out about the deceptive monkey. Do they have punishment?
Quoting Bob Ross
Not quite. You are missing a critical element: the subject of the objective facts. The subject is the function of cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment).
Assume it is objectively (mind independently) true that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems and cultural moral norms are fallible heuristics for parts of strategies, such as reciprocity strategies, which solve those problems. Knowing the function of cultural moral norms enables us to resolve many disputes about if and when cultural moral norms will fail this function or will fulfil it in a way that is contrary to our values and goals. Therefore, this function provides an objective standard for moral behavior we can use to understand cultural moral norms better and thereby resolve disputes about them.
For example, consider Do to others as you would have them do to you as a fallible heuristic for initiating reciprocity. When tastes differ and following it would create rather than solve cooperation problems, the proposed moral standard (solving cooperation problems) provides an understanding that it would be objectively immoral to follow the Golden Rule in this case.
Again, the function of cultural moral norms provides AN objective standard for morality. This objective truth is silent regarding the existence of other moral standards that are either objective features of the world (as it is) or involuntary obligations (which it is not).
One thing I don't quite buy in Dawkins' theory of kin selection and altruism is that I don't see that precisely playing out that way in real life. That is to say, relatives (like children) are only cared for more because of proximity and cultural expectations (that are internalized).
If we take a scenario where you had a close friend that isn't a relative that you knew your whole life and were very close to, it would stand to reason that you would feel a kinship to them way more than a child that way later in life was introduced to you (that you didn't know was even yours). It's not like on seeing that person, you automatically form a kinship. Clearly this is the case of adoptions as well.
I'm perhaps misrepresenting his theory, but the point is that kinship altruism seems to be more altruism of proximity in relations (not due to being related because of the mere fact that they are relatives).
In fact, if someone were socially isolated but had a stuffed animal their whole life, they might form more loyalty and altruism to that object than any relation to a person. It's simply relational attachment and familiarity that tends to form in social animals, not even anything about persons per se.
Hello Unenlightened,
My confusion lies in the fact that you say honesty is moral and dishonesty is immoral because it cannot go the other way around in society, but yet you conceded that it can:
If you agree that people lying about there being objective moral standards (such as thou shall not kill) would actually sustain society (or at least not burn it to the ground), then you are conceding that it is possible for dishonesty to function as a good thing in society. If that is the case, then I am not following what grounds you are claiming lying is wrong. As of yet, you were claiming that it is wrong because society would crumble if lying were predominant, but that example I gave (that you agreed with) negates that notion: there can be predominant lying which functions just fine in society.
Then I began to infer that you were claiming there is an actual objective standard, which is despite whether the given thing helps society sustain itself, based off of the previous quote I just made of you (i.e., if one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false...one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful). It was starting to sound like you were claiming there is a standard that goes beyond just a need for particular norms to survive (because you still think lying is wrong despite it having the ability to help one survive even in a grand scalein the sense of it being predominant).
I understand what you are claiming with your summary points, but I dont see any objective morality in it is my problem; and, by your own standards, dishonesty would be able to be frequent in society as long as each person was good at it.
Bob
Hello Mark S,
I am understanding you to be saying here that we are heavily coerced by sociological factors (i.e., cultural moral norms as you put it): is that correct? If so, then I dont see how those are objective themselves as moral jugdments (but I do see how the empirical inquiry of them would be objective): an objective moral judgment is not, to me, just a description of a norm but, rather, a norm which is involuntary.
If the norm is voluntary, then it is contingent on a will which is, by definition, subjective. A descriptive fact that one volunteered (subscribed) to a norm does not thereby make the norm objective.
On the other hand, are you claiming that some cultural norms are involuntary for subjects and that is the objective morals you are wanting to investigate?
Fair enough, but heres where I dont understand:
It seems to me like you are really just arguing that we should commit ourselves to using this guideline of cooperative strageties because pretty much any (if not all) rational people would agreebut that doesnt entail that anything about that is objective morality. It would be inter-subjective at best.
Again, I am operating under the semantic use of an objective moral judgement being more than just a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills (in a voluntary sense): would you disagree with that usage of the term?
To me, it seems like you are noting that it is useful (from a rational agents perspective) to use the Golden Rule; and if it stopped functioning as a useful tool then we ought to disband from it. That is fine to me, but where are the objective morals in that?
Maybe it would help me understand if you gave me an example, if you can, of what you would consider an objective moral judgment. Is the golden rule an example of one to you?
It sounds like, to me, you are just engaging in an inter-subjective agreement with other rational agents, which is not objective morality. If the moral is not an objective feature of the world nor involuntary, then it seems as though you are using the term objective morality is a way that sounds like moral anti-realism to me.
Bob
Yes. it is possible occasionally that dishonesty can have good consequences, but not that it is 'a good thing'. It is possible that murdering Hitler would have had good consequences, but not that murdering people is a good thing. It is possible that abortion has good consequences sometimes, but it not a a good thing, in the sense that it is worth getting pregnant for.
I agree that 'objective moral judgements are more than a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills. Objective moral judgments are proclamations dependent on the same objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills since imperative obligation is not a necessary part of what is objectively moral.
Perhaps you are still thinking something like what is objectively moral is necessarily an imperative obligation. This idea is an illusion foisted on us by our genes" (as the philosopher of biology Michael Ruse likes to point out).
This illusion is the origin of the moral realism problem you describe in your OP.
An example of an objective moral judgment is "It is moral to solve cooperation problems; it is immoral to create cooperation problems" which summarizes Morality as Cooperation Strategies. It is objective (mind independent) in that it is the product of the objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense cooperation problems and the strategies that solve them.
Hello enlightened,
I think you may have misunderstood my counter-example or perhaps I didnt explain it well enough: it isnt that faking objective moral judgments is sometimes beneficial; rather, I was outlining that 99% of the population didnt think that there was such a thing as an objective thou shall not kill, but they kept promoting it as objective (thusly lying) because they recognize that it would be in their best interest to do so. In that example, lying is predominant and good.
If you are agreeing, then I think this throws a big wrench, at the very least, in your argument that lying is badunless, perhaps, you are saying that lying is only good in the case where we would be faking morality?
Bob
Hello Mark S,
To me, cultural moral norms are inter-subjective: why do you think they are not inter-subjective? I see it analogous to economic value: the value of a diamond (in terms of currency) is not dependent on my will (particularly) but, rather, on multiple wills. It is not thereby objective, like, for example, the fact that a diamond is made of carbon. It is, likewise, not subjective but, rather, inter-subjective. Why, on the contrary, do you think norms are objective?
Furthermore, what do you mean by moral sense? Are you talking about an evolutionary conscience?
I agree with this part: but why are cultural moral norms objective? Could you please walk me through that part? How do they meet the definition of objectivity (i.e., not contingent on wills)?
I see. I think that an objective moral judgment would be, by definition, a true obligation which is stance-independent; however, the truthity of the obligation as being fixated-upon (i.e., consciously decided to follow) would be relative to the subject at hand. I think this is essentially what you are saying in the second quote of you I made hereon: The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills. I agree (if I am understanding you correctly).
I really appreciate you giving an example: thank you! Let me try to dissect it and please correct me where I am wrong. The proposition It is moral to solve cooperation problems is directly translatable (by my lights) to one ought to solve cooperation problems. How is this proposition independent of our wills (in terms of its truthity). By my lights, the obligation to it is unclear (in an objective sense): could you elaborate on that? In other words, why is it is moral to solve cooperation problems itself true despite of anyones will.
To me, this doesnt prove that the obligation (previously expounded) is objective itself but, rather, that we need to cooperate to survive (or something along those lines). It almost seems like you may be arguing on these lines:
P1: One ought to consider what causes cultural moral norms and our moral sense objective moral judgments.
P2: Solving cooperative problems is the cause of cultural moral norms and our moral sense.
C: Therefore, one ought to solve cooperative problems.
Is that syllogism accurate? If so, I dont see where the objective moral judgment is (besides defining, semantically, objective moral judgment in the sense in P1but that isnt what objectivity means: it is will-independent and that new definition would not be).
Bob
I feel that the distinction is indeed blurry, however it only seems Hegelian in that respect if I may say so
In terms of meta ethics is where morality does indeed retain its objectivism for right and wrong are both imperative and categorical using kantian terminology (if i was to really get dialectical in the German sense)
The interjection only becomes obvious post fact although admittedly that is not always the case
Right. The way everyone pretends that Father Christmas exists. But that's not deceiving anyone is it? I don't think it's a very good foundation for a society, but such conventions are not lies but agreed performances - like the way every bride is beautiful and babies always look just like their parents.
It's like the idea of 'trickle down economics' no one believes it for a moment, but they recite it...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhYw-VlkXTU&t=380s
One of the things it talks about is the possibility of social collapse brought about by the ubiquity of deep-fakes becoming impossible to detect. Worth watching quite carefully, and rather supposing the moral case I have been making.
Bob,
No, it is not accurate.
How about this version instead as explanation?
P1: Virtually all cultural moral norms and our moral senses judgments and motivations are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for parts of strategies for solving cooperation problems. Game theory shows that a necessary part of cooperation strategies is the punishment of people who create cooperation problems by violating cultural norms that are the heuristics for solving cooperation problems.
P2: Solving cooperation problems is necessary for maintaining or increasing the benefits of cooperation in a society the principal reason societies exist.
C: Therefore, if you wish to maintain or increase the benefits of living in your society, you ought (instrumentally) to advocate cultural norms that are heuristics for parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems and whose violation deserves punishment. By doing so, you will advocate for an objective morality with no imperative moral oughts.
Would all rational, well-informed people wish to maintain or increase the cooperation benefits of living in their society? Perhaps. If they did, then the proposed objective morality without imperative moral obligations would be normative by Gert's SEP definition.
You've done a wonderful job of defending moral realism, from my perspective -- for what that's worth. I think for me I'm just more interested in anti-realist ethics. I live in a nihilistic culture, so they seem relevant.
Bob,
Getting back to the moral realism question in your OP:
Is Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) a kind of moral realism? Does it determine mind-independent moral truth values?
Yes, a necessary moral component (a definition of right and wrong) exists for all highly cooperative societies of independent agents. Regardless of anyones opinion, that moral component is strategies that solve cooperation problems.
MACS describes that necessary moral component. MACS, therefore, is an expression of moral realism that determines mind-independent moral truth about that necessary component.
Does MACS tell us what we imperatively ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences?
No. It is silent on imperative oughts.
Does MACS answer all our questions about morality and ethics?
No. It only describes the cooperation strategies that are a necessary moral component for all highly cooperative societies. MACS is silent about the goals of this cooperation and the broader aspects of the traditional ethical questions, What is good?, How should I live?, and What are my obligations?.
Hello Invicta,
I appreciate your response!
Interesting, I am not that familiar with hegel (as I found his books incredibly poorly written and hard to comprehend): could you elaborate on what you mean?
I am not sure what you mean here. Yes, Kant talks about objective moral judgments as categorical imperatives, but I actually think we mistakenly does so. Also, what do you mean by meta ethics is where morality does indeed retain its objectivism?
I didnt quite follow this part: can you please elaborate?
Bob
Hello unenlightened,
I think this is false: everyone does not pretend Santa (or perhaps you meant Jesus?) exists in an analogous sense to the morality counter-example. It is a faker, more-superficial acting that Santa exists because it is only for the sake of the children. In the sense of the morals, everyone would be acting very serious about it and would not only be faking it for children. When I say Santa exists in front of a child and an adult, the adult can look at me and we both acknowledge that that was a lie: we dont then try to lie to each other about it.
This could be true in the counter-example if everyone was really bad at faking it, but my example was that they are all skilled deceivers: therefore, it is not an agreed performance, because everyone is convinced the other sincerely believes there are objective moral judgmentsbut each person knows that they themselves dont buy it.
That is interesting, but, unfortunately, I do not have time to listen to it right now, so I will have to watch that later. I still dont see, if I am being honest, how your view has any objective moral judgments in it.
Bob
Hello Mark S,
Thank you for the elaboration: let me try to adequately respond.
The problem I have with your syllogism is that the conclusion does not follow from the premises.
If P1 is true, then we are acknowledging that subjects tends towards solving cooperation problems: it is a fact about subjects in the sense of what they tend to will (which is not will-independent), not a moral judgment that is objective.
If P2 is true, then we are simply acknowledge a non-moral objective fact.
Therefore, the conclusion does not follow that By doing so, you will advocate for an objective morality with no imperative moral oughts.
Your conclusion is actually a hypothetical imperative (an objective fact that follows validly only if one accepts the antecedent); but I think (and correct me if I am wrong) you would agree with that because you say with no imperative moral oughts; however, you are claiming something about that syllogism just produce a valid entailment of objective moral judgments (even in the sense that they are not absolutely obligatory): is it in P1? Because, to me, P1 is the only place I would imagine you may push back with the objective fact that a subject tends towards solving cooperation problems would be an objective moral judgement: is that correct?
Correct. But nothing about acknowledging that leads directly to any objective moral judgments.
Perhaps, but I think that definition is more for the purposes of noting different general camps of dispositions within metaethics, and not an accurate representation of what a moral judgment is. For example, one can be a moral realist by simply acknowledging there are objective moral judgments, but that doesnt mean that I think they validly hold any necessarily: its just a depiction of their disposition on the subject-matter.
It could be a form of moral realism in the sense that I could see its proponents advocating that it is a source of objective morality, but no I dont think it determines mind-independent moral truth values.
The fact that we need to solve cooperative problems to suffice our subjective wants does not include any mind-independent obligations. If I want to survive (subjectively), then I have to participate in society: its not an objective obligation to participate in society nor to solve cooperation problems but, rather, pragmatically necessary once one was committed themselves (for the most part) to surviving.
An objective moral judgment itself, I would argue, is involuntary and is an imperative in the sense that we do it regardless of whether we want to or not. I dont see how describing the most fundamental and subjectively universal hypothetical imperatives entails any objective moral judgments.
Bob
That's fine with me, I'm not much enamoured of the objective/subjective distinction in the first place. I tried to explain myself in your conceptual language and failed. Or maybe I'm just confused.
Quoting Moliere
Well I think that is good rhetorical tactics; rather than get into an argument that China might be a more peaceful, internationalist, and socially responsible society, just suggest learning from the enemy because they are certainly learning from you. When one has an important truth to tell, one should not cloud it with other controversies unnecessarily. Anyway, the containment is only a keeping hold of the power in a small circle - that might be worse. But now Bob's going to say that I'm promoting deception for the greater good. And i might be, but only as the exception, not as the rule.
Which is pretty much straightforward Kant. Lies need to be justified, and the truth does not.
If your child walks into the road in front of a bus, it's ok to jerk them back to the pavement so violently it dislocates their shoulder. But if you do something like that because they are using the fish knife when they should be using the butter knife, that's child abuse.
Fair point.
Quoting unenlightened
There's a tension in Kant that's related to this -- the tension between the absoluteness of one's maxim, and the allowance of exceptions as a further maxim. This is where it gets kind of funny. You can technically write a maxim as specific as you want and it will remain universalizable -- any rational being like myself with these abilities and those resources and those ends in this situation would act in accordance with this maxim... :D
The reason why it works as a reductio, though, is because of the tension between reason and passion in early modern philosophy, especially. Since passion can't be appealed to and any free agent can will a maxim and act in accordance with it out of respect for it (I certainly respect myself) there's not a clear cut way to rule out super specific maxims.
But the tension is that Kant was such an absolutist about lying, as indicated by his correction of a contemporary enthusiast of his system that it was OK to lie to the axe murderer, so the spirit of the philosopher's own interpretation of morality seems to indicate that we shouldn't be able to get away with that.
So it seems, if universal objective categorical imperatives are real, we shouldn't be able to make exceptions. I think that might be some of confusion between yourself and @Bob Ross? Maybe? I'm just making a guess in the dark.
But I want to hasten to add that any attempt to argue for moral realism that I've seen and thought was right basically questions the objective/subjective, or the naturalistic fallacy, or synthetic-analytic -- there's a conceptual change purposefully being made to try and make the case. (As it would have to be done -- since if you simply accept that there's a difference between truth and goodness then it's pretty hard to put them back together again)
Hello Unenlightened,
I respect and appreciate you attempting to explain your moral realist view from my conceptual schema! If you would like, then please feel free to invoke your own schema and I will do my absolute best to understand it. It seems as though, based off of your comment, that you wouldnt make even an objective vs. subjective distinction: what distinction would you make?
To me, your acceptance, within our conversation, about the morality counter-example I gave is, indeed, an acknowledgment of an exceptionbut, likewise, to me, it is a rather large exception. How many counter-example would I need to give for it to become the rule?
If everyone is capable of lying about morals and society doesnt crumble (but could actually flourish), then I think that a pretty large exception to the so called rule.
If I remember Kantian ethics correctly, then he actually thought that they are absolute: so, no, he would never permit a lie. He is famous for demanding we tell the truth to the axe man.
For me, this is all in accordance with the rule that we ought to strive to uphold the sovereignty of wills (i.e., subjects), and, as a part of that plan, to quickly summarize, it makes sense (pragmatically) to do exactly as you outlined above (in the quote). It almost sounds like, to me, you are advocating for absolute rules (e.g., dont lie) but yet they also can have exceptions.
Bob
Hello Moliere,
I wouldnt say it is the root of our dispute (as I dont even think their view has any objective morality in it but I would concede it would be generally categorized as moral realism in the literature), but I would agree with you that, yes, there cant be exceptions if it is an objective moral judgment. There can be seemingly exceptions within our pragmatic approach to upholding the ideal, but not in the ideal itself.
Maybe you, given you seem to understand what unenlightened is saying in terms of being moral realist, can explain what I am missing? Where are the objective moral judgments in their view?
Bob
I agree with you. but I do not believe in the flourishing society of liars. You would have to show me a real example, that is not a sub-culture exploiting the majority.
Hello unenlightened,
I think you have missed the point if you are asking for an actual example (as opposed to theoretical). You claimed that society cannot flourish in lies, and I gave a counter-example wherein society would flourish in lies. It is irrelevant if there has ever been an existent society which was setup with lies or not (in the sense of morality): it does not negate my contention whatsoever.
If your claim holds good (i.e., that society cannot flourish in lies), then you will have to demonstrate why it is impossible for a society to function in the manner that I described (whether that be actual, logical, or metaphysical impossibility I leave up to you).
Likewise, the counter-example was not a sub-culture exploiting the majority: it was the majority exploiting the majority.
Bob
If I take my keys out of my pocket in front of you, then I have demonstrated that my keys were in my pocket; I do not have to prove that they couldn't have been anywhere else. I'll leave it there though, as I don't think there is much to be gained at this point.
Bob,
Why would you argue that? I can't think of any rational or instrumental (goal-related) reasons for doing so.
That may be your intuition, but what is your intuitions philosophical merit if it is an illusion foisted on you by your genes?
Building moral philosophy on an illusionary understanding of an objective moral judgment is a recipe for endless speculations.
Why not ground moral philosophy in the origins and objective function (the principal reason it exists) of cultural moral norms and our moral sense? With that, you can build a solid, culturally useful structure and, for the most part, leave the endless speculations behind.
I wouldn't speak for @unenlightened, as I believe they've been making the case well. :D But I'll share my thoughts.
Any sort of moral realism which depends upon our nature, similar to your:
Quoting Bob Ross
will have to reconcile with some apparent difficulties like the naturalistic fallacy or the fact/value distinction. In so doing I think the classic picture of moral realism / moral nihilism is blurred, as you note. In a way what's being questioned are these old distinctions about objective morals or subjective choices and so forth.
I think the way I'm reading @unenlightened is the actuality of human realitionships require moral commitments to be shared overall in order for said set of human relationships to not deteriorate. And by and large I think there's some truth to that. And it makes for an interesting case where we are sort of combining values and facts together at once -- from the existential perspective we can always choose against some rule or value, and there are some who are smarter than others and can exploit the rules, but in actuality people are generally wise to who they can trust. If trust fades then relationships die, and trust is very important when it comes to keeping people together -- the very stuff of morality.
But it's in this blurry space where the objective/subjective divide doesn't fit so nicely.
Hello unenlightened,
I apologize for the belated response.
I am failing to understand the relevance of this claim, nor what necessary vs objective truth means. Could you please elaborate?
To me, I think that truth is the relation between thinking and being: it is when the asserted being (by a mind) corresponds to the actual being (which exists independent of that minds will).
What is the relevance of this? I see that it pertains to your formulation of necessary vs. objective truth.
The point was that you have not adequately addressed my counter-example. I dont think you can claim that society cannot flourish with lies and also hold that morality (at large) could (hypothetically) be all lies and still function properly (because that directly counters your own point): this does not cohere with your view well (at a minimum).
Bob
Hello Mark S,
I apologize for the belated response.
Because that is what (I think) objectivity means: a proposition whereof its truthity is will-independent. I am not defining it that way for the purpose of a goal but, rather, because I think that is the only coherent definition for objectivity itself.
Thusly, I extend this definition to what a objective + moral judgement would be, and conclude it would be a proposition which expresses a normative statement whereof its truthity is will-independent.
Finally, I conclude that the only example of such that I can think of for an objective moral judgment would be an objective feature of being a will itself, which causes one to be obligated towards a norm irregardless of what one chooses to be obligated to.
I dont think that definition (nor my derivation) is foisted on [me] by [my] genes in a way that would invalidate or undermine it: why would that be the case?
Why is it an illusory understanding?
One could choose to do that, but it wouldnt be objective morality but, rather, a kind of moral subjectivism. Do you think it would still be an objective form of morality if one chooses to do that?
It being culturally useful does not entail that it is a form of moral realism.
Bob
Hello Moliere,
I apologize for the belated response!
I want to clarify that my commitment to fixating upon what is of my nature is not itself an objective moral judgment. I dont think that a metaethical theory that simply contains the obligation to what is ones nature is thereby a form of moral realism.
I appreciate you elaborating on this! I also understood them in that way; however, where I am confused, is how any of that is objective morality. This sounds like a form of moral subjectivism that accounts for its fundamental obligations by reviewing what is required to have a functioning society. What, in terms of how you explained it, do you think is the objectivity in the moral judgments (of unenlighteneds view)? That is what I am failing to see.
I am not sure if I entirely understood your second post, but let me try to adequately respond. If someone acts as though P is good, that does not thereby make P objectively good (although, arguably, it may be subjectively good). A normative judgment is objective iff the proposition (that expresses it) has a truthity that is will-independent. If the truthity, on the other hand, is indexical, then it is subjective.
Bob
I'd counter here and say that a metaethical theory in conjunction with a metaphysical theory of naturalism is what makes that fixation a form of moral realism.
The metaphysical claim of naturalism is what girds it. If you're a naturalist, what could be more objective than your nature?
Quoting Bob Ross
Right! So the truthity of a fixation is your nature, and since nature is all that is real, it's a form of moral realism. It's not like you got to will your nature -- you were born human.
I think this is a fair assessment of what is considered in the literature moral naturalism, but when I look at the actual metaethical theories thereof I genuinely don't see any objective moral judgments. I would grant that they claim that there are moral facts, but I don't see anything in the (prominent) theories themselves that back that claim adequately.
What I was trying to convey is that the obligation to naturalistic accounts of morals is not itself a moral fact but, rather, there could be genuinely will-independent morals which are natural (regardless).
So here's where I think I have to be very careful. You are right that our nature is not in our control, as we cannot will what we will because we are that will; however, what we will is will-dependent and thusly the normative judgments we proclaim as true simply because we want it to be true are relative to our desires--they are not objective in virtue of our will in general being outside of our control nor being objectively true that they occurred (i.e., I desired X, and that is objectively true if I did desire X--but the desire for X is still subjective).
The idea, to me, of the distinction between will-dependence and will-independence is whether it was contingent on a will and not if that will has absolute control over itself.
I am a naturalist in the sense that I do think we are all a part of one, natural reality though; I just don't think that that justifies claiming that the propositions who's truthity is relative to (a) will(s) is somehow objective in virtue of our will's being a part of nature.
Bob
I'm not sure that a fixated upon virtue is something I'd say relies upon a will. Making the virtue true -- that part takes a will. But if goodness is somehow a natural pattern, in a similar way to procreation being a natural pattern (the desire to procreate isn't exactly something one wills) -- then the objectivity comes from it being apart from our will.
Such and such a moral proposition -- whatever form we decide is best(virtues, rules, or consequences) -- could be objectively good, if not objectively true. (Or we could also drop objective/subjective as a distinction and instead focus on the belief that there are real morals, as opposed to objective morals)
Do you see how this is different from the usual notion of will, which generally revolves around making choices?
Very interesting: so, to you, a moral judgment can exist without being true or false and whether it is true or false can be later provided by a will? Is that the idea?
I see. Let me clarify that I am not using "subjectivity" in the sense of "something we 'choose'" in the sense of the colloquial usages of the word 'choose' (which I find to be a vague distinction that is practical but does not hold up to scrutiny). Instead, anything which is "will-dependent" is "subjective" to me. Our ego is really a "part" of a bigger will, which is ourselves ultimately in our entirety of existing as an organism (or conscious being), and so I consider event that which is "ego-independent" but yet "will-dependent" as "subjective". In other words, I don't use "subjectivity" to refer to just "opinions" or "whimsical desires" or what have you.
With respect to how I define "will" (which is not synonymous with our egos), procreation would be subjective because it is will-dependent (regardless of whether it bubbles up to the ego in a way that one could intuit as the ego's decision). This doesn't mean that I think I can whimsically change my sexual orientation or general urge to procreate. So, if goodness were somehow a natural pattern analogous to procreation, then I am inclined to claim it is still subjective.
Interesting: could you elaborate more an this distinction between a proposition being "objectively true" vs. "objectively good"? I do not fully understand what that entails.
Bob
Yup.
No comment on anything else, but I wanted to say you got it.
This is where I lose the plot, and hence why I favor moral anti-realism out of laziness. I could make something out of this distinction, but I can't tell if it's better or worse or what... but it's the sort of thing that I think would be interesting at least because the division between truth/good at least sets it aside as a moral realism that doesn't just reduce to a form of Platonism.