Can we avoid emergence?
There are many theories that try to explain consciousness starting from non-consciousness. E.g.: identity theory, functionalism, computationalism, and others are even stranger, like Joscha Bach's virtualism. These seem to explain consciousness without mentioning the emergence from non-conscious to conscious, sometimes giving me the impression that they can be explained without this phenomenon, be it weak or strong.
Q1. Is it possible to build a theory that starts with fundamental non-consciousness and reaches consciousness without going through the classic weak emergent or strong emergent?
Q2. Does any of the above theories (virtualism, computationalism, functionalism, etc.) manage to bypass emergence (weak or strong)?
Q1. Is it possible to build a theory that starts with fundamental non-consciousness and reaches consciousness without going through the classic weak emergent or strong emergent?
Q2. Does any of the above theories (virtualism, computationalism, functionalism, etc.) manage to bypass emergence (weak or strong)?
Comments (118)
Q2: Not that I know of.
At its simplest level it is characterized as an automobile, which involves a pattern or arrangement of parts. Under downward causation in Wikipedia:
Downward causation might be a key to understanding consciousness, but mathematically it is not well understood. The explorations I have done in infinite compositions of functions might eventually play a minor role, especially inner compositions which relate mathematically to the convergence of continued fractions. Don't worry, I won't get started. :nerd:
Q1 - I don't think so. However, the most ground breaking theories tend to overturn long held assumptions in shocking ways, so we may be surprised. Indeed, if such paradigm shifts weren't difficult to conceptualize, they wouldn't go unposited for centuries and be so revolutionary.
I suppose some of the more austere versions of eliminitivism do accomplish this, but at the cost of denying consciousness exists (granted, strawmen of this variety greatly outnumber theories that actually go this far).
Q2 - Yes, in some forms. Some forms of computationalism also embrace panpsychism. If the entire universe is conscious then consciousness doesn't have to emerge from anywhere. Rather, what neuroscience must explain it simply how these conscious parts can cohere into a the experientially unified whole of our first person perspective.
In favor of this argument are observations about split brained individuals (those with the central connections between the two sides of their brain severed). In experiments, if you ask the person questions, they will write down different answers with each hand, e.g. seemingly a different dream job for each side of the brain. The individual is not aware of this difference, evidence that perhaps consciousness can exist as a less unified thing while still possessing some of the complexity we associate with it.
Another oft used example is that of multiple personality disorder, where multiple consciousnesses appear to occupy one body. Unfortunately, some famous hoaxes were attached to this phenomena in the mid-20th century. However, I know of one more recent case study where a woman with a blind alternate personality both acted blind when that personality was in control and had visual cortex activation that was drastically different and similar to someone with vision impairment when this personality was dominant.
Sleep and anesthesia might also be taken as evidence of at least the plausibility of this view. When we are unconscious, we no longer have this same unified consciousness, even if we are experiencing a parasomnia like night terrors or sleep walking and are exhibiting complex behaviors. Indeed, the brain appears to need to take drastic steps to stop us from walking around and doing things while "we" are gone, rather than simply going into some hibernation mode (although the brain also certainly does go into a hibernation mode in many other ways during sleep).
The central idea here is that there is "something that it is like," to be anything in the universe. But what this experience is like is very hard to say. Rocks and rain droplets have no sensory systems or short term memory systems through which to "buffer" whatever experience it is that they have, so any inner life they lead would seem to be so incredibly bare as to defy the concept of first person experience we are looking to explain in the first place.
I oscillate on this view quite a bit. Sometimes I think the fact that people even consider it is a sign of how intractable the hard problem is, because it seems absurd in many ways. Other times it seems at least somewhat plausible, or at least that it could be if the problem of how conscious parts construct more sophisticated mental wholes could be explained.
Of course, many flavors of idealism also avoid emergence too. I think that is a far easier context in which to do so.
Yes. Thomas Metzinger's [url=https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self_model?searchToken=aov5trxduudkxcx5rw0f9i9dn]
self-model theory of subjectivity[/url] seems to do the trick. Also, an extrapolation from Metzinger's work is R. Scott Bakker's scientifically-grounded, speculative Blind Brain hypothesis.
I think "functionalism" (e.g. a tangled hierarchy) comes closest.
So just to make things clearer. I am referring to both weak and strong emergence.
Weak emergence = consciousness just is a configuration of something that is non-conscious/ it is totally reducible to non-consciousness, like water being weakly emergent from H and O, without having new properties,
Strong emergence = consciousness appears from non-consciousness, but it has totally different properties.
Quoting 180 Proof
Even if I haven't seen emergence being mentioned in functionalist theories, it is hard for me to make sense of this without weak emergence at least. Functionalism states that consciousness is a function of the brain or at least a function of an organism. Firstly, the organism must weakly emerge (let alone the brain). Secondly, consciousness would be a particular configuration of matter satisfying a role in that particular emergent body. So I personally don't see how consciousness wouldn't be a weak emergent phenomenon in functionalism.
But because I haven't seen it mentioned in functionalist theories, I also take into consideration the fact that maybe my logic is wrong. Is that the case?
1. Is a physical body/organism/brain necessary for the existence of consciousness (in the way you define consciousness)? If yes, would you accept that the body/organism/brain is a weakly emergent property of fundamental matter?
2. "The self-model is the central concept in the theory of consciousness called the self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT). This concept comprises experiences of ownership, of first person perspective, and of a long-term unity of beliefs and attitudes. These features are instantiated in the prefrontal cortex" - how is that non-emergence (weak emergence)?
:ok: Good luck with all that.
So... my clear questions demand clear answers. I didn't define consciousness before you accused me of reifying it. I didn't say what consciousness was, everyone has the freedom to define it. I asked if one could come up with an alternative on strong and weak emergence.
You said yes, and gave me two examples. I don't think they avoid weak emergence. Any counter-arguments?
:ok: Maybe someone will else give you better examples or demonstrate to your satisfaction that weak emergence cannot be avoided.
So I am waiting for you to overcome your personal insecurities and be rational.
Are you guys disputing whether it is possible for something to exhibit fundamental features of consciousness without actually being conscious? If so, this seems question-begging to begin with. And the distinction between weak and strong emergence is really just a question of degree, unless you completely trivialize weak emergence. IMO.
No. My question is not about consciousness, it is about emergence. I am not interested if it's possible for something to exhibit consciousness without being conscious.
My question is that if one could create a model of consciousness starting from non-conscious substance AVOIDING the use of emergence (weak or strong).
In this regard, mentioned functionalism and this theory https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self_model?searchToken=aov5trxduudkxcx5rw0f9i9dn
I replied that I don't see how these two theories lack emergence and he then accused me of ''reifying" consciousness. That's the story.
1. I don't understand why accused me of ''reifying" consciousness before me giving any definition of consciousness.
2. I don't understand how come functionalism and Self model don't imply weak emergence.
Help me on these two matters please!
What "false accusation" are you falsely accusing me of making?
I'm not engaged in a dispute about "emergence".
Sure, it's called reductive materialism.
Quoting Pantagruel
No, it isn't. There's a clear distinction between them.
Quoting 180 Proof
Quoting 180 Proof - where had I reified it before you mentioned that?
To be clear, there is a clear distinction amongst people who agree that there is a distinction. I don't agree. Strong emergence is characterized by a much greater degree of autonomy between the emergent property and the source domain. This can be attributed to either a greater or lesser degree of understanding. So whatever appears to be a case of strong emergence can be understood in the same way that cases of weak emergence are understood, given a sufficient adequation of knowledge.
Your OP conflates two questions into one, which can be reduced to simple logical truths. Either consciousness is an emergent property or it is not. Either there are emergent properties or there are not.
Emergent properties seem to be trivially empirically evident (the universal phenomenon of evolution, for example). Ergo, it seems highly likely that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon. The alternative, as mentioned, would be reductive materialism.
2. Quoting Pantagruel - No, it doesn't.
3.Quoting Pantagruel - I don't care what your personal belief is. There is a clear description for both of them: "Weak emergent properties are said to be properties of a large system that can be predicted or derived by computing the interactions of the system's constituent parts. Strong emergent properties of a system are said to be impossible to predict by computing the interactions of its constituents."
4. How come reductive materialism avoids emergence at all? You have the freedom to define emergence as you like. So define emergence and then show me that reductive materialism does not imply emergence. Thank you!
Im not familiar with Joscha Bach but Im looking at some web pages about him now. What Ive read so far reminds me of Bernardo Kastrups theories.
As to consciousness and emergence, I think much depends on if we regard consciousness as something that is, or something that the brain does.
If we regard consciousness as something that is (perhaps what 180 Proof means by reification), then it seems difficult to me to understand how any type of emergence could explain consciousness as emerging from fundamental entities (electrons, quarks) which themselves do not possess consciousness. Thus, the hard problem of consciousness. One solution is panpsychism, i.e., that the elementary particles possess some form of consciousness or proto-consciousness, but then we have the problem of how trillions of proto-conscious entities unite to form my single, united consciousness. Another solution is that consciousness is fundamental and universal (per Kastrup and others). Then we have what has been called the hard problem of matter, i.e., how/why a single consciousness appears as separate, individual consciousnesses in an external world of what is apparently matter.
If we regard consciousness as something the brain does, then emergence may work, just as individual water molecules can unite to form waves. Waves dont exist at the molecular level but only emerge in large bodies of water. But this is only a vague explanation of how consciousness could emerge from non-consciousness fundamental entities. Waves are merely the motion of large collections of water molecules and water molecules exist in space so their motion doesnt seem mysterious. But how the motion (i.e., physical, chemical, and biological brain processes) can produce consciousness still seems mysterious to me. The hard problem of consciousness returns.
A direct implication of your OP questions about emergence. Activities are not emergent and you assume that "consciousness" (I prefer minding, or mind) is something more concrete than an activity. Context matters, Eugen. Assumptions of questions (re: OP) matter. My recommended sources do not assume that mind(ing) is anything but an activity (i.e. what a sufficiently complex CNS interacting with its environment does), which probably is what's confusing you about them.
Quoting Eugen
Quoting 180 Proof
Spoken like someone who relies on internet synopses for information. "Impossible to predict" equals "currently unable to predict". Which is what I said.
Quoting Eugen
I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree?
Can you provide me with reliable sources on that one? Thank you!
2. How come reductive materialism avoids emergence at all? ?Pantagruel You have the freedom to define emergence as you like. So define emergence and then show me that reductive materialism does not imply emergence. Thank you!
Who says?
Even if it were an activity:
1. Aren't activities ''things"?
2. Do activities exist?
3. If they exist, are they fundamental or emergent?
4. If they aren't neither fundamental nor emergent, how could we explain them?
https://www.hindawi.com/journals/complexity/2022/9956885/
1. The point is, weak vs. strong is a conceptual distinction, not an objective "fact" about reality. If you treat it as something which can't be further elaborated and debated, you have completely denuded the value of the meaning of "emergence."
2. The typical philosophical interpretation of materialism is that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. So it doesn't necessarily avoid emergence, per se, but rather obviates the question. Which was my problem with the topic. It is either question-begging or self-contradictory. If you accept emergence, then consciousness probably is emergent. If you want a non-emergent theory of consciousness, you are left with epiphenomenalism (as a corollary of material reductionism).
1. Quoting Pantagruel
I'll read it. Still... the definition is irrelevant to my OP.
2. Define epiphenomenon in your own terms please.
3. Quoting Pantagruel - it seems to me you don't understand that reduction entails emergence. You cannot reduce something that wasn't priorly emergent.
It's like saying you can deconstruct something that has never been constructed.
In which case you have reduced the concept of emergence to simple analyticity. That is discussed in the article regarding the weaking of the concept of weak emergence.
Can you just clarify why you feel that emergence is a problem of some kind?
1. Quoting Pantagruel
I don't care about the definition! Define it as you like. The difference between me and you is that you don't accept that there is a concept of strong emergence as it is defined by most of philosophers. I don't care! Define it as you like! Ok... there is only emergence in the sense you described it. This makes no difference to this OP.
2. Quoting Pantagruel
When did I say emergence was a problem? Do you even understand my question?
Quoting Pantagruel
For the last time, no, it is not! I am not embracing or dismissing emergence.
The two are actually kind of enemies, they had a rough dispute some time ago.
I understand the problems of all the theories you mentioned, but that is not what I'm about here.
All I want to know is if there is a way in which we can build a theory of consciousness starting from non-conscious, without emergence being involved or implicit. I'm looking for a way to get around emergence completely. Or maybe some other theory has already done this. Maybe functionalism, maybe Bach's theory. I don't care about theories where the mind is fundamental, i.e. idealism or panpsychism.
So far, 180 Proof says that all I need to do is to consider consciousness a process rather than a thing, so in this way I can explain consciousness without appealing to emergence, because activities are not emergent. I didn't say it can't be a process, I'm saying I personally don't see how this could make any difference. So...
1. Do you think a process is fundamentally different from ''a thing"?
2.Do you think processes are so distinct from the rest of reality that they are neither fundamental nor emergent?
3. Do you think ''emergent process" would be a non-sense concept?
Which makes it very strange that you are concerned whether or not there are theories of consciousness which "manage to bypass emergence" then.
Oh, and things are processes. "Thinghood" is just an artefact of the spatio-temporal limitations of cognitive processing. Acorns are trees and trees acorns. That's the beauty of thought: it allows for the overlay of present awareness with systematized protentions and retentions that enable us to "see" things that are otherwise only processes.
Whitehead is a great process metaphysician.
Quoting Pantagruel
Actually, I can, in principle, agree with that. Still... I personally don't see how this affects emergence.
I'm not sure about "affecting" emergence. But systems theory is all about the reality and nature of processes, and one concept of central concern is emergence. So there's that.
This reminded me of a discussion that @apokrisis participated in. Here is his discussion about downward constraint. It's long:
Quoting apokrisis
It seems to me he didn't avoid emergence after all.
Identity theory is emergence. Consciousness is a certain material arrangement. That material arrangement must come into existance somehow, it mist emerge.
Viceversa, consciousness is reducible to a certain material arrangement.
I don't see how that's not emergence.
1. Normally, we consider processes and things as different. A whirlpool is a process of water spinning. The water is the thing that is spinning. But if everything is a manifestation of universal mind or Brahman or The One, then everything could be considered a process. Analogy: every thing we see on a computer monitor is the result of the monitor's light. The action of the light forming a thing can be considered a process. In a monist ontology, there is only one "thing" and everything else is a process, an action of The One.
2. Hm. If we consider matter as a thing, then any material process is merely the thing in motion. Is the whirlpool fundamentally different than the water molecules? Is the whirlpool an emergent process of the water. I think both questions can be argued different ways depending on someone's ontology. If everything is a manifestation of The One, then processes are not fundamental but might be considered emergent.
3. Again, I think it depends on someone's ontology. Taking water as matter, then I'd say the whirlpool is an emergent process because a whirlpool fundamentally differs from water. For instance, if the flowing water were gradually replaced with alcohol or a thin oil, then the whirlpool would continue existing but no longer as water spinning.
No, there is The One and there's its manifestation. Two things.
Quoting Art48
It seems you agree with me that The One and the process are different.
Quoting Art48
Agree and I would actually add that emergence itself is a process.
Quoting Art48
That's strong emergence. I don't think water is fundamentally different from its molecules. Water is its molecules.
It seems to me he doesn't have logical arguments, but rather he's driven by psychological biases. He's against the idea that consciousness is somehow fundamental. He doesn't arrive to this conclusion by logical reasoning, he simply doesn't want this to be the case. At the same time, he seems to acknowledge the problems of materialism, so the only way is simply to re-define consciousness. Hey, consciousness is a process, there is nothing like to be X. He's basically moving the same problem to another level. If tomorrow he were convinced processes don't do the job anymore, he'd find another escape: consciousness is not a process, it's a mambo-jambo. Mambo-jambos escape all problems, so think about consciousness as being mambo-jambos.
But that's just my opinion, and I might be wrong about him.
But even if I accept his view of ''consciousness being a process", he still hasn't convinced me why processes cannot be emergent and most importantly, how come there is something like to be a process.
The latter is not connected to the topic, so I don't need an answer for that.
I am sure you would agree that everything neuroscientists currently know about the workings of the human brain are processes, yes?
So the best evidence we have, supports the proposal that consciousness 'emerged' as the result of earlier processes. These processes emerged from very large variety combining in every way possible.
What's the alternative's on offer?
Quoting Art48
Consciousness the entity!!! What entity? ..... god? aliens ( is consciousness panspermic?), are we all holograms? or in a matrix? I think consciousness did 'emerge,' from previous processes, leading all the way back to the big bang singularity, style placeholder. I give far far more credence to that, than to any of the alternative offerings.
I hope the above quote satisfies your request. I find @180 Proof's arguments quite logical.
He has described himself as a naturalist in previous posts and in general, he tends to reject woo woo proposals that don't have very strong supporting evidence that can survive scientific scrutiny. I support such standards of evidence. I assume you do to.
The increased quote above, does not, in my opinion, require any editing of my post containing the shorter quote.
Not entity as in a person (god, aliens) but entity as in substance, i.e., something which exists independently, in its own right. In contrast, a process supervenes on its components. For instance, the whirlpool process supervenes on water. The claim is that consciousness supervenes on the brain. "Consciousness is what the brain does."
Our own consciousness is the only thing we can be absolutely certain exists. We know the external world only through consciousness. I don't seriously say the external world does not exist, but it is a fact that there is some epistemic uncertainty about the existence of the external world, however small. We could be brains in a vat, or victims of Descartes' demon. So, maybe the hard problem of consciousness exists because it tries to explain the absolutely certain, i.e., our own consciousness, in terms of the, however slightly uncertain, i.e., exterior world. Its Bss Aackwards. (If you don't understand the last sentence, switch the bold letters.)
By the contrary. That was pure crap from your side to quote me with something I never said. I don't care if consciousness is a process or a unicorn and I have never said consciousness is not a process.
Quoting universeness
I can imagine the following:
1. An entity that's doing absolutely nothing - a static reality;
2. An entity whose one of its properties is to change - process.
What I cannot imagine is a process without the thing. The process is what the thing does.
AGAIN: I'm not saying consciousness cannot be a process. It just seems to me you're prioritizing processes over things.
Excellent answer!
But I guess that would be woo in 's view, so he wouldn't take it seriously. It's a non-starter for him.
Yes. He seemed very trustworthy on technical subjects like this. I miss his participation.
Can you envisage the properties of such a 'substance'?
Do you propose that the source of consciousness is currently undetectable in the same way dark matter/energy is undetectable?
A whirlpool is a direct consequence of underlying processes, that causes an overall 'change' to the system. Just like the concept of melting points etc. I am sure there is a 'build up,' of activity to a 'critical moment' in the brain that we label a thought. I am sure there are microtubules, dendrites, synapses, neurons etc involved, as part of the build up to experiencing a thought. As I am not a neuroscientist, I don't know the full currently known details involved in the process, but it sure seems like a definite process to me!
I also think consciousness is what the brain does, no entity as a god, aliens or independent substance involved. Unless there is some evidence that such a 'substance' with such properties exists, even to the same level as the proposed existence of dark matter/energy.
Quoting Art48
No one can disprove hard solipsism, I agree, but notions of god, infinity and nothing, also cannot be disproved. God, infinity, nothing, solipsism are mere placeholders, they serve no other purpose and have no other value than that.
Quoting Art48
In what way is your 'consciousness = an independent substance' any more likely or more worthy than the simple god posit for the source of consciousness? There seems to me to be about the same level of evidence for both.
You have to type it twice to get the required effect. it's woo woo!
I was not using 'consciousness is not a process,' as a direct quote that I assigned to you. I used it as a presupposition, to the point I wanted to make. I did not intend for it to annoy you.
Would you not question the rationality of a 'static reality' being the source of human consciousness?
Do you propose this static reality entity, is concentrated somewhere in the universe, or omnipresent?
If you are musing about the source of consciousness, as an 'entity,' then in what sense do you suggest this entity can experience or cause change? Do you muse that it can grow/become more concentrated/learn/alter the mechanism of its connection to lifeforms such as humans, etc?
Without offering far more detail, regarding what you propose this 'entity' IS and how it functions, it will reduce inevitably to woo woo. This is only my opinion, again, I am not trying to deliberately annoy you. I only do that when that's what I think I am getting from the person I am exchanging views with. I am sure, based on your last couple of responses to me, that you do the same.
I don't recall Bakker rejecting emergence vis-á-vis consciousness, he just rejects "spooky emergence," (and I don't recall ever seeing a satisfactory explanation of what constitutes "spooky").
The main thrust of BBT is to explain why consciousness is not what it appears to be, and why folk definitions of the phenomena are wrong. Consideration of emergence is somewhat conspicuous by its absence. But I would assume that what we mistake for "consciousness," does indeed "emerge" from physical interactions given the rest of theory. I take from his other positions that the status of emergence is a question where he would grant the philosophy of physics and physics itself primacy, subjects he doesn't explore much in his writing (interestingly, since it seems relevant to what he is exploring).
I think the problem with eliminitivist narratives, Bakker's effort being no exception, is that they attempt to answer a different set of questions then the ones people are looking to see answered.
It's sort of like, if the origins of life were more contested than they are today, and someone tried to answer the question by saying "life doesn't really exist, it's a folk concept that doesn't reflect reality." They might have a point. Life is hazily defined Computer viruses check a lot of boxes for criteria for life, but are they alive? Memes? Biological viruses? Silicone crystals that self replicate and undergo natural selection? Other far from equilibrium self organizing systems?
And they could go on to show how life often doesn't have all the traits we think it does and is not clearly defined in nature the way other phenomena are. Which might be a good set of points; it is certainly a set of questions biology does take very seriously, but it also doesn't answer the main question, i.e. "then why does what we mistake for life/consciousness exist for a very small set of observable phenomena in the universe?"
On a related note, I wonder if Bakker still subscribes to BBT. His follow up quadrilogy seems to move in a quite different direction, but that could just be because he didn't want to beat a dead horse and the ideas had been fully explored already.
Let's suppose I can't. Then what is your point? That lack of a full and complete explanation proves a hypothesis invalid? Careful. Can you solve the hard problem of consciousness? If not, then you lack a full and complete explanation of how consciousness arises from brain activity, correct? So, is "consciousness is what the brain does" is an invalid hypothesis?
One of the points against "consciousness is what the brain does" is that correlation doesn't prove causation. For example, imagine a mousetrap of the old kind: a wooden base, a spring connected to a hammer, cheese bait that triggers the hammer. Also imagine the mouse trap is conscious. It experiences anticipation when triggered, and peace after catching a mouse. There are physical correlates: the spring has more potential energy when set (anticipation) and less potential energy (peace) after its been triggered. Spring potential energy might perfectly correlate with feelings of anticipation and peace, but would not explain how a mouse trap could experience those feelings.
Even if we had a perfect correlation, such as "firing of these specific synapses in this specific part of the brain corresponds with tasting vanilla and only with tasting vanilla" that would fail to explain why the synapses firing is experienced as vanilla.
Of course the various forms of panpsychism attempt to do percisely that. Experience does not emerge mysteriously from non experiential matter. Consciousness does not pop into existence de novo. It is a particular form of mind or experience which has evolved from more primitive mental precursor states.
"[i]Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focal
region of clear illumination, and a large penumbral region of experience
which tells of intense experience in dim apprehension. The simplicity of
clear consciousness is no measure of the complexity of complete experience.
Also this character of our existence suggests that consciousness is the
crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessary base.
(p. 267)
Whitehead is saying that unconscious experience is the ground of consciousness;
therefore, the unconscious is a necessary presupposition"[/i]
Everyone who knows what they're talking about on this topic. Make your case, Eugen, If you say different.
No. It's a working assumption in cognitive neuroscience (and philosophies of mind which are constrained by experimental findings) in the absence of any grounds (other than folk psychology) for assuming its an entity (pace Descartes et al).
Eugen's OP questions about "emergence of consciousness from non-consciousness" assumes, in effect, entity-A emerges from entity-NotA. This incoherent assumption is the target of my "reification criticism" incoherent because it presupposes substance dualism.
Even though I found the OP questions to be incoherent, I recommended process-conscioussness models and thought-experiments which neither explain nor describe the broader topic in terms of entity-consciousness; apparently, however, Eugen cannot follow those demonstrations because he is, wittingly or not, committed to entity-consciousness and, therefore, the pseudo-problem with "emergence" that he raises.
.
Rhetorical, no?
Of course not. Reread above.
I know you've never been a substance dualist, but emergence typically applies to properties, not entities, in the discourse. And properties can refer to actions as well. So if consciousness is the action or function of modelling the world and making predictions, then the capacity to do that is the corresponding emergent property.
Quoting 180 Proof
:chin:
Yes, this is sloppily written.
To answer you're previous question about my position on 'emergence of consciousness': no, my conception of 'consciousness' in relation to the brain-environment has not changed significantly in the last two decades; I've just not expressed my position clearly enough on some occasions (especially when read out of context of the discussion within which it was expressed).
It's time to expose some bullshit here.
Quoting 180 Proof -
1. My question wasn't assuming emergence was true. My question was totally different, but this guy simply cannot comprehend the fact that some people are genuinely curious and ask questions because they simply want to find an answer. Guys, my question DOES NOT imply anything. If you're on this OP, please answer my question without assuming I believe this or that.
2. Quoting 180 Proof - No, it doesn't assume that, this is why I mentioned weak and strong emergence. Weak emergence means water emerges from H and O, without having extra-properties.
Quoting 180 Proof
3. Because your philosophy is poor and you're closed-minded, and because your only purpose is to defend materialism. You even spent months trying to convince me Spinoza was a materialist.
Quoting 180 Proof
I don't have a case, I only have questions. Are you capable to understand that some people don't ask questions in order to find answers and not to defend their crappy views like you do?
I know you didn't and I wasn't offended. Still, it was a crappy move.
Quoting universeness
The problem is that the more I say it, the more I imagine a gay orgy between de Grasse, Sean Caroll and Dennett where they're moaning wooo wooo wooo wooo. I simply don't want that in my head.
Besides, woo is apparently the most humoristic thing that physicalist nerds have ever invented, it would be unfair to take advantage of their wonderful term.
Quoting universeness
I genuinely find your questions interesting, but I'm afraid this OP has departed from its origins too much.
I would like to know your opinion about my initial questions. Thank you!
Yeah, a non-reductive physicalist functionalist-enactivist :smirk: (if there's such a hybrid).
1. I'm trying to be as empathic and sincere with you. so PLEASE don't get upset and don't take it personally. You've got two issues: one is psychological and the other comes from your poor philosophy. You're paranoid - you look at every question as having a hidden substrate, an anti-materialistic assumption, so instead of answering the question and giving arguments, you start assuming this and that and after 1-2 exchanges you're enetinrg ''it's time to defend materialism" mode. And when you're like this and your philosophy is also bad, things like conflating Spinoza with materialism and saying emergence entails dualism happen.
Now, I still hope you're able to be rational. So I still believe you could be helpful. Bear with me please...
2. You think that emergence can be avoided (weak or strong). And your argument was that as long as you consider consciousness a process, and processes non-emergent, then emergence disappears. So far, so good...
The problem is that I mention two types of emergence: weak (where properties are entirely reducible from their fundamental constituents - monism) and strong (properties cannot be reduced entirely to their constituents - dualism). So I guess you're definitely saying that strong emergence can be avoided. And I'd totally agree. Functionalism and identity theory reject strong emergence, but there's still weak emergence here.
Water is a weakly emergent process from H and O. I am not postulating any kind of dualism here, water is matter, and water emerges from non-water. Now the question remains if we could reach consciousness from non-consciousness as we reach water from non-water, WITHOUT weak emergence.
There is now! I'll see if I can work out what that means.
Not on my understanding of the concepts of emergence. Even if we say that activities don't emerge, we can just rephrase to make the properties those activities depend on emergence. So if consciousness is something a brain does, then the capacity of a brain to do that thing would be an emergent property of the matter comprising the brain. To my mind, @180 Proof is an emergentist at least with regard to the properties necessary for a system to realise consciousness, but we may have different understandings of what emergence is.
I don't think so. It seems to me there are broadly three basic categories that theories of consciousness usually fall into:
Eliminativism (nothing is conscious)
Emergentism (some things, relatively late in the universe, are conscious)
Panpsychism (everything is conscious)
Most physicalist theories are either emergentist or eliminativist. But it depends on what concept of consciousness they are starting with. Some people are eliminativists regarding concepts of consciousness that they (usually wrongly) suspect of being fuzzy woo woo concepts, but emergentists with regard to what they think of as more modern scientific concepts of consciousness (usually defined in functionalist terms to begin with).
Some panpsychists call themselves physicalists (Galen Strawson) arguing that physical nature, properly conceived, has consciousness built in as a fundamental feature. It's just another physical property of the world.
Idealism I suppose is a kind of panpsychism.
Agree.
Reread. So, you're saying it's a working assumption that consciousness is a process, and that a working assumption has made whether consciousness is a process or an entity a closed question?
My point is to establish that what you offer, is a bare bones posit, with very little or no flesh.
I don't see why your 'entity' manifest as some independent substance, deserves any more credence as a possible source of human consciousness, than positing that a theistic god is the source.
Quoting Art48 No, it just condemns it, to never progress beyond that of pure speculation. Perhaps there is enough anecdotal evidence to label the existence of an 'independent substance' as a source for human consciousness as a SCIENTIFIC hypothesis. I am content to label it a philosophical hypothesis, but do you think there is the potential for future evidence in support of this philosophical hypothesis, that would elevate it to becoming a scientific theory?
Quoting Art48
I appreciate your note of caution, and no, I cant.
Quoting Art48
Correct! The current evidence is not 'full and complete,' BUT, there is a far larger preponderance of significant evidence, (mostly from the neuroscience field) that, for me, and many others, warrants assigning a much higher level of credence, to the proposal that "consciousness is what the brain does" and consciousness emerged from very large variety combining in every way possible, and is therefore procedural. But you are correct that the popular high credence level, assigned by humans to a particular hypothesis, does not, in itself, add to the probability that it is true. Theists prove that all the time, as they have a lot of supporters world wide, for a concept that may well be utter fantasy.
Quoting Art48
Quantum entanglement is a correlation. Do you accept that quantum entanglement really happens?
Quoting Art48
What a bizarre scenario to suggest, A conscious mousetrap!!!
How about a conscious planet such as Mother Earth, sometime referred to as a living planet as opposed to a planet CONTAINING life. Do you consider GAIA real? Is the planet Earth alive via your independent substance? Is Venus alive? It is certainly animated and active.
Would your mousetrap, or planet Earth/Venus not have to demonstrate a list of abilities, for humans to consider it to be inherently alive? Or would you be satisfied with an evidence level, such as something akin to inter-planetary morphic resonance, which we cannot yet detect, or understand the workings of?
What is your own 'standard of proof,' that allows you to increase the credence level you assign to a particular proposal?
Quoting Art48
I am sure you would agree that answering why questions is the most difficult task in science.
Why does the universe exist at all? is not a question a hard working research scientist is keen to try to answer, leading to such exclamations as "aw shut up and calculate."
I assume the answer to why a certain brain state in a particular brain correlates to and corresponds to the taste of vanilla in one brain and the exact same setting in another brain corresponds to a taste like coconut or almond to the person involved. Such could be dependent on other signal inputs at the time, skewing the predicted/expected outcome of 'vanilla' for that particular brain setting. I am of course merely speculating. I don't want this 'cross contamination from other sensory inputs,' speculation to be considered as my 'hypothesis' or my 'theory.' :halo:
Ok, I will do my best to comply with your request:
Quoting Eugen
Do you consider an 'impression' that something is plausible, to be convincing enough that it CAN be done? I don't think consciousness can be explained, without the concept of emergence. The only alternative that makes any sense to me, would be the suggestion that the source of consciousness is eternal, and did not 'emerge.' Do you think there could have been an aspect, of whatever started THIS universe, that was aware of its own existence? That proposal seems so irrational to me.
Surely if such an independent substance/entity exists then the question is, why is it hidden from us?
If it is the source of all intent and purpose that exists in the universe, then why is it so undetectable?
It's the source of my and your consciousness, but it is INDEPENDENT of us, and it cannot (so far) be detected by us. What a useless crappy substance! Don't you agree?
Quoting Eugen
Sure, its called god did it, and I think it's BS. Apart from god did it, there are less annoying ideas such as an entity in the form of an independent substance, and even more fringe ideas such as enformationism or DIMP (a DIMentionless Point source that exists 'outside' of our universe but does act as an input/output port for such phenomena as consciousness).
Quoting Eugen
Not in a way that convinces me personally. Is my standard of proof, that enables me to adjust the credence level I assign to a particular posit, superior to yours, no, probably not. We can only continue to plant our flag of support where we choose to and debate how wise our choices are, as we do, on threads on sites like this one. Most of us are genuinely seeking truth, yes?
Yes, it happens. How is that relevant to the question of if correlation proves causation or not?
Quoting universeness
In the mousetrap thought experiment, there is a perfect correlation between potential energy and the feelings of anticipation and peace. It was meant to illustrate that correlation doesn't prove causation. It also illustrates how correlation might utterly fail to explain a phenomena, as I also note in the next response.
Quoting universeness
The point is, again, correlation and causation. To use another example (which you may also find bizarre), suppose a woman in Germany using her toaster corresponds perfectly with headaches I experience. The correlation leaves entirely unexplained how her using a toaster thousands of miles away, could cause my headache. Now, substitute "certain of my synapses firing" for "toaster" and "the taste of vanilla" for "headache". Is the taste of vanilla any better explained than my headaches?
Correlation does not proves causation. We may one day perfectly understand how consciousness corresponds to physical, chemical, and biological brain processes, but how such processes can possibly cause consciousness might remain as mysterious as today. (Of course, this is not to say we shouldn't study how brain processes impact consciousness.)
P.S. Leibniz's Mill makes points similar to my own.
Quoting universeness
In order to be as certain as possible in regard to a thing, I sometimes become very doubtful of my own logic. When this happens, I go on TPF and open an OP :lol:
Quoting universeness
Even if that's the case, our consciousness is still emergent. I don't know if reality is self-aware.
Quoting universeness
It's not hidden, it's actually the only thing we can be sure of.Quoting universeness
If you're talking about consciousness, it is not undetectable.
Quoting universeness
No, I don't.
Quoting universeness
I do, I don't know about everyone, but I'm sure some do and some are just looking for confirmation bias.
Unless wants to add something, I consider this thread closed.
Thank you again!
This is an interesting paper - thanks!
:up:
If you accept quantum entanglement really happens, then does it matter if it happens via what we define as 'correlation' or what we define as 'causation?' The full details of the process/mechanism that causes quantum entanglement remains elusive, but it's real so I don't care much about the use of cautionary (but warranted) terms such as correlation instead of causation, until we know more of the details involved.
To me 'correlation' is merely a diluted form of 'causation.' They both indicate a relationship between variable properties of two or more 'connected' entities.
From the difference between correlation and causation:
[b]Correlation refers to the relationship between two statistical variables. The two variables are then dependent on each other and change together. A positive correlation of two variables, therefore, means that an increase in A also leads to an increase in B. The association is undirected. It is therefore also true in the reverse case and an increase in variable B also changes the slope of A to the same extent.
Causation, on the other hand, describes a cause-effect relationship between two variables. Causation between A and B, therefore, means that the increase in A is also the cause of the increase in B.[/b]
Correlation provides no evidence at all, that the source of consciousness may be an entity manifest as an independent substance.
You are correct, I did find your toaster/headache example bizarre, and if investigated, then I would bet real money on 'no correlation' at all being found. I think it would turn out that the headaches were stress related, based on a person being irrationally annoyed (perhaps due to a childhood experience during a school trip to Germany) that women in Germany use annoyingly noisy toasters. :lol: and every time they recall the memory, they get a headache! aw! :flower:
I don't understand the logic of your conclusion here. If the big bang singularity was conscious, then we 'inherited' our consciousness from that property of the singularity. It did not emerge from 13.8 billion years of very large variety, combining in every way possible, via random happenstance. I think there is 0 evidence, that the origin of our universe was self-aware. All consciousness in the universe comes from lifeforms. Those who suggest otherwise have the burden of proof. They must provide a coherent list of properties, that an entity/independent substance/esoteric/god must demonstrate, to be labelled conscious, and then demonstrate that their targeted entity has the required properties.
What would a tree or a planet, have to demonstrate, for example, to convince YOU, that it is alive and conscious?
Quoting Eugen
I am referring to the SOURCE of consciousness being hidden and undetectable. If the source is already known to you then why did you author this thread?
Ok.
Just as liquid can arise in a specific combination of molecules, which lack liquidity individually, so does consciousness arise in a specific configuration of matter, while the separate parts of matter constituting a brain are not themselves conscious.
It's a fact about the world as well as a fact of our cognitive makeup, that we cannot understand how this could be possible. Too bad for our understanding.
Maybe the opening poster will benefit from a step away from the usual egocentric veil-of-ideas Cartesianism (I don't mean 'egocentric' ethically but just in terms of a focus on [oxymoronic?] individual consciousness.)
Thank you for your answer!
There has been some term confusion here. I mentioned two types of emergence: weak and strong. Weak emergence does NOT imply other new substance. Weak emergence can apply to water, water being emergent from H and O, but still nothing over and above the sum of properties of H and O.
Quoting green flag
So do you think this avoids weak emergence?
Quoting green flag
Cloud computing isn't emergent?
Quoting green flag
This OP doesn't suffer from anything unless people confuse emergence with strong emergence, i.e. a new phenomenon arising from its constituents, but having fundamentally new properties, irreducible to its components.
What exactly do you think consciousness is ?
There's a tendency to think of it as radically other than something which is purely physical or material. But this is, in my view, a superstition, a confusion.
I recommend reading about Ryle. He's one of many to challenge traditional assumptions that keep people running in loops.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ryle/#OffDocConOff
Strong emergence: starting with matter, ending with a new substance.
I am sure you reject strong emergence. So forget about this one.
But do you think someone could come up with a theory that avoids weak emergence as well?
You make a good point, but you take for granted that 'taste of vanilla' will signify, that we can know what you mean. If you assume some ethereal private Experience in each of us, why or how should 'taste of vanilla' refer to the SAME magic stuff 'in' all of us ?
We can't skip the semantic phase of this conversation. It's pointless to play with words without more of a grip on what we mean. For me to continue on this, I'll need to feel that my criticism (which I got from Ryle and others) of the typical quasimystical conception of consciousness has been assimilated. Otherwise you won't understand where I'm coming from anyway. And the reverse.
You gave examples of cloud computing and software, both being weak emergent phenomena. So everything I can deduce is that you believe we cannot avoid weak emergence.
Perhaps I've misunderstood you. Could you correct me and explain what 'consciousness' means for you ? Another question : How do we know it when we see it ?
Consciousness = subjective experience, i.e. the way it is like to be something.
Quoting green flag
I totally don't understand this question.
What is it like to be a cockroach ? Or a wrench on its first visit to Vienna ?
If AI gains eminence we will all find out. :worry:
He explains how the need to control our emotions (need for survival) provides answers to the "why" questions of Chalmer's "Hard problem of consciousness".
:up:
Or, if we are lucky, we'll be pets. Maybe some of them will slum and take us for lovers.
How do you determine whether something has consciousness ?
Obviously, we don't determine. We just assume. But this is irrelevand.
Ok, let me simplify this again.
1. This question doesn't assume and doesn't want to prove anything. It's just a question.
2. I give you the freedom to define consciousness exactly as you like.
3. It is not important what I believe, so please ignore my personal opinions.
So...
Under your definition of consciousness, can one come up with a theory that avoids both weak and strong emergence?
If yes, how would that theory avoid emergence?
Instead, obscure language and fringe theories are used as Segways for known Death Denying Ideologies and comforting beliefs about reality.
According to the Philosopher responsible for the systematization of the field(Aristotle),in order for an inquire to be Philosophical, specific steps should be followed.
The first step is ????????????? (epistemology) and the second is ?????? (Physika...Empirical evaluation of our Epistemology). Only then we are good to proceed to our ?????????? (Metaphysics). So by avoiding the evaluation of what we currently know and how we know it and by not including the most credible, systematical and methodical body of knowledge, one is guilty of pseudo philosophizing.
Richard Carrier defines Pseudo Philosophy as:
"Philosophy that relies on fallacious arguments to a conclusion, and/or relies on factually false or undemonstrated premises. And isn't corrected when discovered."
Unfortunately most positions and discussions in this thread tick all the above. Most auxiliary assumptions are fallacious (unverified or unfalsifiable premises) but accepted as true while ignoring data that render them wrong. Even when they are exposed for their non epistemic value, most "philosophers" keep repeating them in the next thread.
Mario Binge's Ten Criticisms of contemporary Academic (or everyday) Philosophy identify the tactics responsible for allowing pseudo philosophy to coexist with actual Philosophy.(Wise Statement about the world).
Tenure-Chasing Supplants Substantive Contributions
Confusion between Philosophizing & Chronicling
Insular Obscurity / Inaccessibility (to outsiders)
Obsession with Language too much over Solving Real-World Problems
Idealism vs. Realism and Reductionism
Too Many Miniproblems & Fashionable Academic Games
Poor Enforcement of Validity / Methodology
Unsystematic (vs. System Building & Ensuring Findings are Worldview Coherent)
Detachment from Intellectual Engines of Modern Civilization (science, technology, and real-world ideologies that affect mass human thought and action)
Ivory Tower Syndrome (not talking to experts in other departments and getting knowledge and questions to explore from them or helping them)
Especially the last two criticisms and that of Chronicling instead of Philosophize (who said what) are the main reasons why Philosophical Discussions get derailed and become "theological declarations". This is why Philosophy of Nature (Science) has enjoyed a long run away success in epistemology while Academic Philosophy struggles with a weak peer reviewing system where pseudo philosophy and real Philosophy are published side by side.
Quoting Eugen
-Fundamental for survival? Sure, but not fundamental in a mystical way(ontology of reality). Maybe you can explain what you mean by the term " conscious is fundamental". That would allow a good conversation.
This OP is a simple question, no need for criticizm. Just answer.
Thank you and have a nice day!
I am done with my critic of your OP and the "philosophical practices" from my previous comment.
I moved on and asked you a simple question. What do you mean by the term "Consciousness is fundamental"? Fundamental in what sense? What does that mean for us.
I haven't made any claims on the topic yet , so how can you say that I am right about "everything"???
I only raised some red flags on the quality of assumptions behind the philosophical models and I swiftly proceeded in asking some basic questions. If forfeiting is your final choice, I can't do anything about it.
So, take care and enjoy the echo chamber of your preference...I guess.
So in essence what you're asking is can you get from non-consciousness (the substrate) to the product (consciousness) without the process/change in qualities/behaviour of the substrate that leads to the product (ie. emergence).
It's like asking can we get the property of water as a liquid from those of oxygen and hydrogen while skipping the effects of hydrogen bonding, the specific influence of bonds in and between the molecules.
Emergence is the simple idea that 1 has 1s behaviour on its own. 2 has 2s behaviour on its own. And when 1 and 2 are combined: 3s is a new behaviour that does not correlate directly with either of its subcomponents individual ones.
Emergence is imo I guess a "superadditive" effect when things are combined.
So I would say no theory that starts without the product can avoid emergence of the product.
But humans can't do that for one another. Or it wouldn't be interesting. Concepts are essentially/ideally public. If you correct me, you help prove my point.
I asked you to clarify what you meant to bring you in to my approach. That's all I can offer. To me this is not like a chess problem. It's as deep as the problems of meaning and being.
At this moment, people have already expressed their opinion in unanimity. So even if your opinion were different, it wouldn't matter without a very logical and complex argumentation behind it.
Long story short: due to your repeated avoidance of the topic, you lost time, so your potential short answer would be irrelevant anyway.
So, you either do it on my terms and start expressing your opinion and back it up with strong arguments, or you choose to remain irrelevant to the topic.
All the best!
I'm glad if you found what you are looking for, and I appreciate your politeness.