Introspective Evidence against Emotivism
for those who might not know, Emotivism is the belief that the words "good" or "bad" refers to emotions that we have, not beliefs or true statements.
there is (potentially) introspective evidence against Emotivism, and for Realism about ethics:
(1) if words like "bad" are supposed to express emotions, that we would predict that the stronger the emotion, the more "bad" something would be. however, in some cases this is not the true. for example, I think it is equally immoral to kill my mom than to kill a stranger, however, I have stronger emotions tied to the idea of someone killing my mom.
(2) the way we form moral judgements is more like how we form other objective belief's, and less like how we acquire emotions. for example if I want to know if capital punishment is bad, I think about it, read about it, and talk to other people about it. this is exactly like how I acquire my other beliefs (like the fine-tuning argument doesn't succeed, or there's an external world), and not at all how I acquire emotions. we don't read, discuss or think about what emotions we have, much less worry about getting them right.
there is (potentially) introspective evidence against Emotivism, and for Realism about ethics:
(1) if words like "bad" are supposed to express emotions, that we would predict that the stronger the emotion, the more "bad" something would be. however, in some cases this is not the true. for example, I think it is equally immoral to kill my mom than to kill a stranger, however, I have stronger emotions tied to the idea of someone killing my mom.
(2) the way we form moral judgements is more like how we form other objective belief's, and less like how we acquire emotions. for example if I want to know if capital punishment is bad, I think about it, read about it, and talk to other people about it. this is exactly like how I acquire my other beliefs (like the fine-tuning argument doesn't succeed, or there's an external world), and not at all how I acquire emotions. we don't read, discuss or think about what emotions we have, much less worry about getting them right.
Comments (2)
I agree with the position you seem to be taking against emotivism, but there is significant scientific evidence to show that emotion has a major role in human thinking on all issues, not just moral ones. It would make sense to me if moral beliefs form in a manner similar to other beliefs.
Quoting aminima
I don't find this argument convincing. Whatever connection emotion has with reasoning, moral or otherwise, it is unlikely it would act in such a simple manner.
Quoting aminima
I don't know that we simply "acquire" either emotions or beliefs, but as I wrote previously, it would make sense to me if moral beliefs formed in a manner similar to other ones.
Quoting aminima
I think the process of forming beliefs is significantly more involved than this and doesn't depend only on rational factors.
Quoting aminima
It is my understanding that aspects of emotions are learned. I think many people worry a lot about getting emotions right. It's a common psychological difficulty I suffered from when I was a teenager. It's a terrible thing.
It is generally regarded (as far as I know?) as about personal expression; rather than true statements it is true expressions. So if you express that your mother being killed is worse than someone else being killed that is your true expression rather than some kind of one size fits all statement.
Emotivism is not a belief it is a metaethical category which can be use to explore the moral landscape. By saying something we often express opinions about what we believe to be morally right or wrong, but that this is not identical to some underlying/absolute right/wrong dichotomy.
Most, if not all, areas of meta ethics serve to question how emotional/ethical/moral terms are played out in academic parse and day-to-day ramblings, as well as the kind of functions and possible miscommunications that can occur alongside these points (including how you or others interpret certain topics of meta ethics.
The general field of meta ethics is - I strongly believe - a hard shift away from parcelling up black and white views we hold dear in order to clear the field of thought for a more generalised understanding of ourselves, others and how differing views and opinions collide.