Definitions have no place in philosophy

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B758:one must not imitate mathematics by starting from a definition

So what do you think? Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative?

Definitions therefore are poor substitutes for a skill, namely the ability to use terms successfully, an ability that does not rest on definitions but on shared meaning.

In this circumstance, our ability to flexibly use terms is superior to our ability to comprehensively define them.

the word “explication” derives from the Latin for “unfold,” and I think this is a good way of thinking about what philosophy does.

Concepts are open

Although I seemed to be starting out by “defining my terms,” in the way that some people in philosophical discussions demand, what I was really doing was explicating a concept that we’re all familiar with, and I was not aiming for comprehensiveness. I was beginning an analysis of a term which we already understand and know how to use; or, to put it differently, I was beginning to describe what we look for in a definition. It may have been a useful exercise, but not because you didn’t already know what a definition is, and not because there’s a likelihood we would end up talking past each other without it.

So what do you think? Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative?

People who get stuck on specific definitions are often irritating pedants and seem to miss the point.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B758:In philosophy one must not imitate mathematics by starting from a definition ...

... In a word, in philosophy the definition, as involving rigorous distinctness, must con­clude rather than begin the work.

People who get stuck on specific definitions are often irritating pedants and seem to miss the point.

I just wanna provide pushback on this linear definition->theorem->proof characterisation of mathematics. As Lakatos highlights in Proofs and Refutations, the concept of "Eulerian polyhedron" was redefined repeatedly over mathematical history to avoid cases which obviously weren't Eulerian polygons. Even in mathematics, a definition is an attempt to explicate a concept, which can be revised if it is insufficient.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B759:Mathematical definitions can never err. For since the concept is first given through the definition, it contains exactly just what the definition wants us to think through the concept. But although there cannot occur in the concept anything incorrect in content, sometimes–although only rarely–there may still be a defect in the form (the guise) of the concept, viz., as regards its precision.

Skill looks like the right focus here. Inspired by Brandom and others, I think of applying concepts as a skilled labor, mostly inarticulate cando knowhow, manifesting sensitivity to and respect for the discursive norms we are always already thrown into, which make asking for definitions or after their value possible to begin with.

In my view, it's helpful to emphasize the larger context in which definitions matter. We make and evaluate claims about the world, including what we should do within in it, as part of a community. I claim that it's only because they are used in claims that concepts matter.

From a 'Hegelian' perspective, concepts are always in flux, slowly drifting. We change the object being clarified (language) as we use it to articulate its own character.

Beautiful metaphor ! Making It Explicit. If we named global Geistware Shakespeare, we can name the philosophical module Hegel, in honor of someone who made making it explicit explicit to itself. 'Hegel' is that part of spirit (cultural software) which articulates the character of articulation itself.

The reminds me of discussions of genesis versus structure. That concepts are open make genesis possible. As individuals we can get lucky with a new metaphor which gets adopted becomes relatively literal, hardens like cooling wax. Or we can add to the machinery of metacognition by seeing that maybe the inferential relationships of claims are what make concepts within such claims meaningful, etc.

The first is one I've expressed here often - many, I would say most, of the frustrating, fruitless discussions we have here on the forum start out with disagreements about the meaning of words and then never make any progress toward actually dealing with any interesting philosophical issues.

I don't disagree that discussions where we work out among ourselves what particular terms mean are valuable. I have started a few discussions for that purpose - What does "mysticism" mean; What does "consciousness" mean; What does "real" mean. They were among the more satisfying discussions I've participated in.

On the other hand, I often start discussions about specific issues I want to examine, often something to do with metaphysics. In my OPs I often make it clear exactly what I intend the meaning of specific words are for the purposes of that particular discussion. Then I obnoxiously and legalistically defend that position, sometimes asking moderators to help. I do that because I want to talk about a specific concept or subject and I don't want to argue about what "metaphysics" really means. If I don't make those kinds of requirements, the thread will just turn into an argument about something I'm not interested in.

“Mathematical definitions never err,” he’s wrong?

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B759:But although there cannot occur in the concept anything incorrect in content, sometimes–although only rarely–there may still be a defect in the form (the guise) of the concept, viz., as regards its precision

So, in general, I think that we most of the time, have a decent idea or notion of what we want to communicate. The failure of communication has more to do with the ideas behind the words, than the words themselves. So, I'm inclined to agree that philosophy shouldn't be primarily about definitions, though these can help.

Examples are looked down upon by several philosophers, but they’re often what allow me to first get ahold of a concept,

Note the lower textual location in B only, this in reference to understanding, whereas the other quotes with higher textual locations, refer to pure reason’s dogmatic use, and is found in both editions.

Of course definitions have a place, if only in justifications for a method.

How is deciding the meaning of a concept like define related to deciding such legitimacy ?

It's the same thing?

People who get stuck on specific definitions are often irritating pedants and seem to miss the point.

I think (?) inferentialism would say yes, but of course we have to think of all possible inferences involving 'define.'

Guilty. Just my math background showing.

A definition is a statement that specifies the correct use of a term.

I hope you don't mind if I jump in here,

One thing I can't do well is games, like chess and poker.

telling oneself and others that one is borderline innumerate might just reinforce a psychological block that stands in the way of your mathematical genius.

Like music, it demands constant practice to stay on the horse, and without that it becomes very difficult to get back on.

I agree, but I’m putting it more strongly: they can help, but they can also positively hinder.

If someone asks for a definition and/or questions how a term is being used then it is on the author to attempt to offer a different line to bring the reader in or for them to judge the worth of bothering to do so

Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative?

I don't think God is such a concept

So what do you think? Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative?

It’s not clear to me whether this situation is the result of a lack of definitions, or an excessive focus on definitions.

I understand. This looks like stipulative definition, which I was mostly ignoring, treating it as something separate.

Or maybe what you’re referring to is the exception in my main thesis, those times when a term is so ambiguous that you need to prevent confusion with a clear statement that this, not that, is what you mean.

the Aeon article that Wayfarer linked to above

Do you think there is a math brain or a type of person to whom math speaks?

The difference between a definition and a stipulative definition is somewhat collapsible if you stipulate you are referring to X "in its common use" or "according to its dictionary definition" to avoid the impression that your argument rests on a particular interpretation that might be unfamiliar to the reader. And if, to the contrary it does, you stipulate that interpretation.

Both seem potentially helpful avenues towards discussion. In the process of explanation, is definition any more than a tool to increase clarity and discursive efficiency such that what and when you define need not be based on any general precept but simply what you want to do in the conversation?

Is that what inferentialism entails? That's a bummer.

You're in danger of forcing me to read Brandom.

Maybe it's that you and I have a different approach to philosophy. Now that you've started actively participating in discussions again, it seems to me you focus more specific philosophers and works. In those cases, the context of the discussion can take care of a lot of the potential misunderstandings. I came to philosophy with my own understanding of how the world works, the nature of reality, how discussions should proceed. I also came from a profession where, given an audience which is often non-technical, defining terms was very important.

I think I use the writings of philosophers differently than some others on the forum do. I use them to test my understanding. If I find someone whose ideas resonate with mine, they can help me refine and extend my understanding. That's why Collingwood and Lao Tzu are so important to me. I've always disliked Kant, but more recently I've found that some of his ideas are similar to those of Lao Tzu. His somewhat different approach has been interesting. I think maybe the discussions I start, and often those I join, are more free form and are not tied down to specific works and philosophers. I often avoid those more specific discussions because I don't know enough to participate usefully.

But if this is a problem of delimitation, so may be a rigid application of your thesis?

When used in a certain way this is a fallacy, the fallacy of persuasive definition, a mark of sophistry rather than philosophy. Even when it’s not fallacious, it forecloses on certain of the range of possible results.

That’s interesting. I hadn’t even thought to question Kant on that. I suppose then that when he says in the same section that “Mathematical definitions never err,” he’s wrong?

But here’s the full passage:

Mathematical definitions can never err. For since the concept is first given through the definition, it contains exactly just what the definition wants us to think through the concept. But although there cannot occur in the concept anything incorrect in content, sometimes–although only rarely–there may still be a defect in the form (the guise) of the concept, viz., as regards its precision.
— Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B759

I wonder if that covers it.

For example in order to know what counts as a definition, one needs to know what counts as a 'count'. And there's no accounting for that, except by making up a story.

In Socrates' defense he was not looking for definitions but accounts, and this for the sake of inquiry.

For example, in Plato's Republic Socrates defines justice as minding your own business. A deeply ironic definition.

We all have some sense of what justice means. What Socrates is asking is that we go further. The problem is not resolved by definition. Whatever definition is proposed we can always ask whether this is what justice is? Does this determine what is and is not just in a particular case?

Or, you could do like the mathematicians do, and practise what Jamal calls the fallacy of persuasive definition.

I do notice that you tend to personalize the issues, as you have done here, and that is indeed very different from my approach. I'm not saying it's bad or uninteresting; it's just very difficult for me to find a way of engaging with it (although I'm doing okay right now).

what is right for engineering may be wrong for philosophy.

Kafka:It is not necessary that you leave the house. Remain at your table and listen. Do not even listen, only wait. Do not even wait, be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to you for its unmasking, it can do no other, in ecstasy it will writhe at your feet.

To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men,— that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for always the inmost becomes the outmost—and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. Familiar as the voice of the mind is to each, the highest merit we ascribe to Moses, Plato, and Milton is that they set at naught books and traditions, and spoke not what men, but what they thought.

I think I want to say that the latter is the definition-centric one and the former is more like philosophy, where "planning is guessing". That is, in philosophy and innovation, things have to be kept open to a significant degree; or to put it differently, we have to realize that things just are open.

I am wondering, ?T Clark, what you made of the article ?Wayfarer linked.

I also didn’t bother following along when he began analyzing the poetry, and skipped to the end, which didn’t seem to be saying very much. Could be I’m missing out, but what I took away from it was that Collingwood is a good one to read on this stuff. (Self-reliance doesn’t imply that you shouldn’t read books, only that you shouldn’t get all your ideas from books.)

A definition is a statement that specifies the correct use of a term.

Cool, we’re on page 3. Gotta beat Banno’s 8 page discussion on definitions from three years ago.

... we have only to notice that if we speak about defining words we refer to something very different from what is referred to, meant, by 'defining things.' When we define words we take another set of words which may be used with the same referent as the first, ie.,we substitute a symbol which will be better understood in a given situation. With things, on the other hand, no such substitution is involved. A so-called definition of a horse as opposed to the definition of the word 'horse,' is a statement about it enumerating properties by means of which it may be compared with and distinguished from other things. There is thus no rivalry between 'verbal' and 'real' definitions.

...the Banno approach--semi-pointless trouble making.

That lost me...

What I generally do at about this point in the discussion, is bring out the weapon of mass destruction that is The Meaning of Meaning, by Ogden and Richards. It is the definitive text, and to my mind an object lesson in the futility of trying to define a word and thereby divorcing meaning from context.

When I say 'context', I invite you to imagine not just the words around the word in question, but also the armchair around the philosopher and the ever-collapsing political order in which they are necessarily embedded.

Gotta beat Banno’s 8 page discussion on definitions from three years ago.

Look up the definition of a word in the dictionary.

Then look up the definition of each of the words in that definition.

Iterate.

Given that there are a finite number of words in the dictionary, the process will eventually lead to repetition.

If one's goal were to understand a word, one might suppose that one must first understand the words in its definition. But this process is circular.

There must, therefore, be a way of understanding a word that is not given by providing its definition.

Now this seems quite obvious; and yet so many begin their discussion with "let's first define our terms".

I have a friend who refuses to eat kale because of the bullshit surrounding the supposed superfood. I have explained to him that just as the bullshit is not a reason to eat kale, it is not a reason not to eat kale. It's irrelevant to the decision to eat kale.

Like kale, definitions might have a place on the plate, with the right accompaniments and in the right quantity.

why do you think it lost you

Will Harris:What are you trying to say? When you asked
me that I closed my laptop, offended. Why? It never mattered what
I said.

Because figuring out the language is part of the experience of poetry. Because providing definitions would, in many cases, distract from the experience of the poetry.

The point of the OP of that thread was a fairly simple one, that definitions do not, in a very important sense, give us meaning.

Clichés are to be avoided because they do our thinking for us (and imagining, feeling, etc), or they shut out thinking;

The poem is a showing, not a saying.

They are something to play with, juggle, kick down the street.

paintings exist to teach us how to see the world in a new way.

And as soon as you stipulate that, I want an artwork that doesn't teach you to see the world anew.

But art did not decline along with the decline of magic rituals and beliefs; and now, in invoking and manipulating the spirits of things in its works—in bringing out the meaning of things in their interconnectedness and in their irreducible particularity, in treating things as spiritual rather than as specimens for scientific study—art continues to perform magic but liberated from the need to claim that there are supernatural entities or that it has the power to influence nature and events.

Similarly, we can make arguments by beginning with a statement of the conclusion—indeed I think this is the clearest and most common way of presenting arguments in philosophy.

That is to say, it’s in the use of a term that we can understand the meaning of concepts, not primarily by definitions.

These all happen because we take recursive stipulation seriously.

Adorno means it almost literally though,

In the sense that the same practice carried on without that lie.

art continues to perform magic but liberated from the need to claim that there are supernatural entities or that it has the power to influence nature and events.

There are no spirits and demons.

Hegelian dialectics is the best philosophy for explicating the truth of concepts.

it’s in the use of a term that we can understand the meaning of concepts, not primarily by definitions

now we bring in Hegel

Recursive how?

Like that, for a start. Setting out a definition in order to ground an argument is already taking a stance, which may itself be brought into question.

Moreover, we might think in terms of Searle's status functions and institutional facts. Language builds on itself, so that saying it is so makes it so, or counts as its being so.

Moreover, we might think in terms of Searle's status functions and institutional facts. Language builds on itself, so that saying it is so makes it so, or counts as its being so.

That sort of attitude is just not going to get your thread past eight pages.

I could say that meaning is pointing if that would help?

Language builds on itself, so that saying it is so makes it so, or counts as its being so.

Teach me; how else can naming a ship be distinguished from magic, other than by their being seperate instances of the same thing?

I suspect Adorno wants to grant a special status to art that I might deny.

Adjourning a meeting was never involved in spiritual practices.

Like that, for a start. Setting out a definition in order to ground an argument is already taking a stance, which may itself be brought into question.

Sometimes, often, I want to examine the substance and details of a particular position. Getting into arguments about the meaning of words can make that impossible

Beliefs are truth-functional though, and art in the service of false beliefs is thereby a lie.

Of course, the other way to write a dictionary is on historical principles; as an account of the development of the language over time.

But it's a big dictionary.

Getting into arguments about the meaning of words is examining the substance and details of a particular position.

Like that, for a start. Setting out a definition in order to ground an argument is already taking a stance, which may itself be brought into question.

Any argument will have its grounding assumptions or premises.

It is inconsiderate and unphilosophical

You seem to be unable to do that.

how the question is framed often is the issue. Folk are prone to uncritical acceptance of a naive or pre-philosophical position.

Again, questioning those assumptions is basic to doing philosophy

It’s a refusal to abide by the terms of the debate as set out. But this is exactly what philosophy ought to do. The same goes for definitions.

a definition can be read as an argument that we ought to agree.

For example say someone starts a discussion proposing to deal with how semiotics or phenome nology helps us understand the nature of consciousness and the human relation to the world. There would be little point in someone asserting that semiotics and phenomenology don't do either of those things, because that would just signal that no discussion is possible between those two interlocutors, at least so it seems to me.

That's true but doesn't augur well for discussion between those who do not share basic assumptions or definitions.

...where does that leave us?

It might be inconsiderate, but it is not necessarily unphilosophical. Classically in philosophy, there is questioning the question. To do this might be to go against the wishes of the asker, who just wants a straight answer. It’s a refusal to abide by the terms of the debate as set out. But this is exactly what philosophy ought to do. The same goes for definitions.

Some would say it’s inconsiderate of you to disrespect the topic in this way, in that you have failed to follow your own advice and “address the issues as laid out in the OP”. In this case I think it’s also unphilosophical.

I see you’ve managed to personalize things again.

In one of your posts in reply to me a few pages ago, you appeared to interestingly combine this personalizing approach

I asked you how this played out, but you were not interested enough to answer, so that avenue fizzled out.

Again - it's very personal to me

Baloney. If you don't want to play by the rules I set up in my OP, there are other threads to go too. My OPs always leave plenty of room for disagreements, but they focus on the issue I am interested in discussing. I don't start discussions offhandedly. I have a specific purpose in mind. Generally, it's because I don't understand something and want to examine it closer and I want help from you guys.

Then Banno stuck his nose in in his usual smug, bullshit, lazy way. He pretends he's involved but he doesn't put any effort in.

I don't think it means that because it's personal to you, the very fact that it's personal to you is all you need to talk about.

There are the philosophical issues too. You often seem to forget that.

This is what we're exploring here.

Getting into arguments about the meaning of words is examining the substance and details of a particular position.
— Banno

Sometimes yes. Often no. As I noted, and you ignored, sometimes I want to look at a particular view of an issue and not talk about how others might define the issue. You often don't respect that desire. It is inconsiderate and unphilosophical. The solution is always simple, if you don't want to address the issues as laid out in the OP, go somewhere else. You seem to be unable to do that.

It's irrational, anti-philosophical, trivial and distracting.

You brought it up, not me.

I don't think that's true. Example please.

Getting into arguments about the meaning of words is examining the substance and details of a particular position.

Sometimes yes. Often no. As I noted, and you ignored, sometimes I want to look at a particular view of an issue and not talk about how others might define the issue. You often don't respect that desire. It is inconsiderate and unphilosophical. The solution is always simple, if you don't want to address the issues as laid out in the OP, go somewhere else. You seem to be unable to do that.

You and banno apparently don't like the fact I think definitions are important.

But with the definitions and assumptions in place and an expectation that others abide by them, those who don't share them are not involved at all. To put it mildly, that's not always good.

Do we ever see productive discussions between those who don't share definitions and assumptions?

In a discussion of phenomenology's relationship with post-structuralism, for example, would there be any value contributed by a participant who only wanted to argue that neither phenomenology nor post-structuralism can contribute anything of philosophical value?

On the other hand, what if someone wants to explore the meaning of Dasein and a hostile party butts in with, say, Adorno's excoriating analysis of Heidegger's abuse of language and celebration of irrationality? Would that be philosophical? I think the answer is at least sometimes no, so what's the difference here?

Taking a concept and analysing it is most of the work of philosophy.

You and banno apparently don't like the fact I think definitions are important.

Yes. Semantic norms. Appropriate and inappropriate use of a flag or siren.

In a discussion of phenomenology's relationship with post-structuralism, for example, would there be any value contributed by a participant who only wanted to argue that neither phenomenology nor post-structuralism can contribute anything of philosophical value?

A bad definition, by contrast closes debate, it says "we will be using the definition this way, so don't point out any flaws in doing so"

But overwhelmingly I agree that ".. it’s in the use of term that we can understand the meaning of concepts, not primarily by definitions", and indeed I've taken this further, suggesting elsewhere that the notion of a concept is a reification of the use of the term at issue; that all there is to a concept is the use of the associated words.

On the other hand, what if someone wants to explore the meaning of Dasein and a hostile party butts in with, say, Adorno's excoriating analysis of Heidegger's abuse of language and celebration of irrationality? Would that be philosophical? I think the answer is at least sometimes no, so what's the difference here?

if someone wants to explore the meaning of Dasein and a hostile party butts in with, say, Adorno's excoriating analysis of Heidegger's abuse of language and celebration of irrationality? Would that be philosophical?

It says "we ought use the term this way and here's why". That can be disputed.

imported into English with a vast baggage.

EDIT: actually you did say that the definition of art I gave might be useful.

Personally I wouldn't mind if we used 'existence' for 'Dasein,' or something like that.

Isn't English crammed with imports though ?

We check understanding of a concept by checking that it is used as expected.

The analysis of existence that followed from the work of Frege and Russell is to my eye far better than that given by the Germans. I would not be happy to have it befuddled in this way.

it is largely this narrative that determines the value of the piece.

Earlier I was thinking about people who'd say 'nothing is true.' I use to like this kind of radically open-minded aphorism.

Makes me think of Adorno's one: "only exaggeration is true".

WHy? From what little I've seen he seems to fall into the same problems.

Yes, the failed definition is also a success. It's a metaphor. As a matter of style, it's offered exclusively. But perhaps the speech act should be interpreted as a gift, as a good place from which to peep at a complex phenomenon for a moment.

Adorno, Minima Moralia:Art is magic delivered from the lie of being truth

Fair question. I'm a fan of Austin, who's method involves the close and detailed analysis of the terms of our language, the "tools of trade"; I use that sort of analysis in my own considerations, having the OED and various etymological dictionaries at hand. This is quite a different process to mere stipulation, seeking an understanding of the historical development of terms and their interrelationship. Rather than closing the conversation off, this approach invites further commentary and comparison.

But it doesn't go down well in a forum. such as this, where if any attention is paid at all it's in order to point out how irrelevant it is.

A term such as Dasein is stipulated. It's what folk now call a term of art, a neologism, having no history, or rather not relating to any etymology, imported into English with a vast baggage. It's no good to reject the use of Dasein, so one might look to the use; but notice that the place the word is mostly used is in discussions of what it means... These are grounds for suspicion.

I gave the example above of using a definition at the commencement of an argument. That's not problematic, indeed it is setting up the furthering of the discussion by admitting the limitations of context, and so inviting critique

Your comments had me puzzling over the difference between an artist and an artisan. I had thought of this previously as a difference in the narrative, but if one takes your definition, there is something of ritual involved as well - magic involving ritual.

I think perhaps a philosophical discussion needs a linguistic hierarchy of three classes of words. Most words being working class, taken for granted, over-worked and underpaid attention to; then some middle-class words, pedantically defined, and always following the rules of logic; and finally some few aristocratic words that are what the discussion is all about.

Which might suggest that one's philosophical instincts in this discussion are somewhat indicative of ones' class loyalties. Or it might just be a big tease.

it shows something about art nonetheless, and not really or entirely by analogy.

It's hard to see what you could be meaning by 'value' here. Even if you wanted to gain a 'better' insight into phenomenology, or post-structuralism by your question, deciding in advance that 'better' only consists of answers which accept both traditions rather than question them indicates that you've already decided others are not as capable as you of determining what is and isn't the case, as such the enquiry seems disingenuous.

Someone else who wants to make this thread all about me. :grin:

Then Banno stuck his nose in in his usual smug, bullshit, lazy way. He pretends he's involved but he doesn't put any effort in.

I don't know. Sometimes it works.

you can probably imagine a better example

...you're just calling into question the very project of trying to understand Being and Time.

I had a brief chat with an economist yesterday about art. There is an amusing fiasco emerging in Australia's art business in which it seems that white fellas have been "guiding" indigenous artists so that they produce more saleable work...

It's called "dots for dollars."

APY studios deny 'whitewashing' allegations as National Gallery launches investigation:The National Gallery of Australia has commissioned an independent review of a major upcoming exhibition of artworks from the APY (Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara) Lands, following explosive allegations in The Australian.

The gallery said it was launching a review into the provenance and creation of works in its forthcoming exhibition Ngura Pulka - Epic Country after it was alleged that non-Indigenous arts workers painted parts of works by Aboriginal artists.

It's illegal for non-indigenous people to pass their works off as indigenous, but indigenous people can make whatever they like and call it indigenous.

Yep. That's not what was happening here.

How do you classify words? I think you could picture them in such a way that it's absurd to say they have the property of being definable.

Well, I don't see how you would get a better insight into the relation between two traditions by rejecting one of them.

Rejecting a whole tradition as being wrong-headed seems itself to be wrong-headed, in any case. A balanced view sees all traditions as forms of life. I understand that AP is a form of life, that must yield some insight within a certain field of enquiry.

You won't get far in any field if you call into question the "usefulness" of the entire discipline.

I didn't say 'rejects', I said 'questions'.

deciding in advance that 'better' only consists of answers which accept both traditions rather than question them

Except, it seems the tradition that holds that some traditions are wrongheaded. That, apparently is the exception to your rule, which you proceed here to reject as wrongheaded.

I don't see why not. Ruling out the possibility that the discipline is useless seems an entirely unnecessary shackle.

Questioning some ideas within a tradition involves accepting the tradition overall and questioning it from within.

if you think a tradition is wrongheaded then there is no point attempting to discuss its ideas with those who think it is a good tradition because you will be off topic from the start.

So you think that, for example, you could advance QM by arguing that the whole discipline is useless?

Not at all. If one can question some of the ideas in a tradition (and find them flawed) it follows that one can question all ideas in a tradition (and find them flawed). There's no logical reason why every tradition must contain at least one non-flawed idea.

The reason I made the distinction is that rejecting a tradition as a result of questioning its ideas is different to merely rejecting it dogmatically

Yes, absolutely - assuming my argument has any merit (which I can't see how it would with QM), but it seems unarguable that if a discipline is useless, then arguing that case will advance that discipline. Finding out that it is useless is one of the possible end points of a field of enquiry. Phrenology, for example.

What? You seem to be saying that disagreeing is off topic. That If I think something is bad, I'm off-topic when discussing it with people who think it's good.

I want to say that the most interesting and famous philosophers have radically undermined or rejected the premises of their predecessors. If this is an exaggeration, it’s not much of one.

EDIT: should we, along the lines of Kuhn, distinguish normal and revolutionary philosophy? Maybe the analytic logic-choppers and the continental disciples of whichever big postmodern philosopher you care to mention are doing the former.

A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal… implies different things for us… [ and ] are poor substitutes for a skill, namely the ability to use terms successfully…

but working together to see the breadth of our world in openly, seriously "producing" the terms the other is using, by creating examples and imagining a context where they are valid (as pointed out by plaque flag); to, as Socrates says, stand in the other's place, their shoes. I take this "unfolding", as you say, of our unexamined (shared) lives as the purpose and skill of the philosopher

If what you said were true we could find the whole of science or mathematics to be flawed.

Traditions tend to have their own premises, so to reject the entire tradition would be to reject the premises. But if you reject the premises of a tradition then there would no point entering into discussion with those who hold to the premises; you would just wind up talking past one another.

To reject a tradition is to reject its founding principles. Such a rejection is inevitably dogmatic, since premises are not supported by reason

No, I'm saying that if people are trying to have what to them would be a productive discussion in, for example, theology you barge in with what amounts to "theology is bullshit" that you will not be contributing to a productive discussion and you will be off-topic.

in any case even if the uselessness of a whole tradition could be established, that is not going to advance that discipline but rather will demolish it

Of course elsewhere he puts this "thing-in-itself" outside the reach of our knowledge, thus the lack of faith in our ordinary understandings

[In fact, in the realm of empirical reality—that which we can know—Kant is very much on the side of our ability to know, to directly perceive and to judge objectively.

Indeed the whole point of that section of the CPR is to say that what works for mathematics is not appropriate for philosophy.

You, I, Austin, Wittgenstein, and Kant are similarly sceptical about definitions in philosophy, claiming that we can use these concepts without such "mathematical certainty".

Again, digressing, but Kant takes this as a failure and a tragedy for philosophy, rather than a fact that nevertheless doesn’t make philosophy less rigorous than science, less methodical, practical, relevant.

Well, this is the realm of science, not philosophy

we also fail to define the empirical, to Kant’s satisfaction

In creating “objectivity”, Kant cordoned us off from the world “directly”, unfiltered by us, though that was his ideal.

I don’t really want to do more of this exegesis, but I suppose it’s fair if what you’re saying is that I was mistaken in using Kant to back up my point.

I still disagree with your angle on Kant but otherwise (I’ve read your first post in this thread) I think we’re in agreement.

Maybe it does not matter, but we may disagree because I would say that we can define our concepts, after investigation, and it’s just that Kant’s understanding of, and requirement for, a “definition” is wrong.

Of course elsewhere he puts this "thing-in-itself" outside the reach of our knowledge, thus the lack of faith in our ordinary understandings
— Antony Nickles

In fact, in the realm of empirical reality—that which we can know—Kant is very much on the side of our ability to know, to directly perceive and to judge objectively.

Yes, that's right, but only if a sound argument were given finding flaw in every single premise. That seems incredibly unlikely. Not so with a philosophical tradition.

By "knowledge," Antony means knowledge of a mind-independent world.

You, I, Austin, Wittgenstein, and Kant are similarly sceptical about definitions in philosophy, claiming that we can use these concepts without such "mathematical certainty".

But we were in agreement on the terms empirical and a priori and it was just a mixup as to which one I was referring to in making the point about Kant creating an “object” and then putting it outside of knowledge’s ability to access.

By "ordinary understandings", didn't you mean our assumptions about the mind-independence of the world we experience? Or what?

Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative?

So is "the chap who wrote Hamlet" a definition of Shakespeare?

Why bother with Kant. It's confused waffle. Quine and Kripke provide firmer and more fertile ground.

But to go there, we need to differentiate various sorts of definition, and differing ways to refer. That'd get you past page eight.

when there are terms that have more than one commonly accepted use, [definitions are] certainly helpful for mutual understanding.

The definition of terms is an interesting case. Kant differentiates between a priori concepts and arbitrary ones, which I take him to mean: technical terms (set aside by Jamal; referred to as “stipulated” by @Banno). He says they are ones (conceptions) that we create, which (unlike the other kinds of concepts) we can define; he says: however we choose, as we created them (which Kant excelled at).

Definitions have no place in philosophy

A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal.

Why bother with Kant. It's confused waffle.

Thank you for your efforts in getting us to page eight. :grin:

However, he cannot “define” it for you, even for himself. It takes the whole book for him to bring you along with him, to show us the differences to the ordinary use through examples

In ancient logic the idea was that a definition picks out something. A bachelor is, by definition, a person, and male and not married, or holding a first degree from a university.

Here's a definition of the set G: G=df{Frank, the North Pole, electrotherapy}. These items form a set, but perhaps not in virtue of having some universal which is exclusive to just them

The point is that a definition is an abstract object.

all definitions are sets

Please believe that not all new users are here to spam your forum. I'm a long time reader and enjoy reading the posts here. I finally had something interesting to share because it reminded me of something that I had a personal connection with.

A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal.

It’s possible that T Clark’s approach is more relevant than I thought, although it’s an approach to analyzing TPF discussions in terms of psychology rather than analyzing definition itself. What I mean is, I’ve noticed that people are disagreeing in what seems a temperamental or polarized way rather than substantively. It’s not clear that, for example, @Janus and @Isaac, or @T Clark and I, would really differ much given an actual discussion to look at, and what differences there would be might be to do with temperamental levels of tolerance for troublemaking.

I fall back on my experience here on the forum as the basis for my response - many discussions quickly descend into confusion and lack of direction caused by lack of agreement on what words mean. Prime examples are "consciousness," "metaphysics," "truth," and "reality," but there are plenty more.

This isn't the place to take up the subject, but I don't understand your objection to "personalizing" philosophical issues. As I've noted before, one of the goals of philosophy is self-awareness. For me it is the primary goal. This is certainly true of eastern philosophies, but also western ones. After all, some guy supposedly said "The unexamined life is not worth living." The point, at least the only point, isn't to discuss ideas and reason, we're also here to examine our lives.

To restrict the use of a term at the beginning is to shut down the philosophy. I understand your position. My last post was a response to the post of yours in which you appeared to conflate definitions at the beginning of a discussion with definitions as an aim. This is the crucial point.

I have explained as clearly as I can what I think is wrong with personalizing everything, so I don’t think I’ll say any more on it.

a lot of the discussions on the forum stink because people never get beyond disagreeing on definitions.

"truth,"

"P" is true IFF P

"a very large herbivorous mammal of the family Elephantidae, the only extant family of proboscideans and comprising the genera Loxodonta (African elephants) and Elephas (Asian elephants): Elephants of all species are characterized by a long, prehensile trunk formed of the nose and upper lip, pillarlike legs, and prominent tusks, which are possessed by both sexes of Loxodonta and just the males of Elephas."

Look up the definition of a word in the dictionary.

Then look up the definition of each of the words in that definition.

Iterate.

Given that there are a finite number of words in the dictionary, the process will eventually lead to repetition.

If one's goal were to understand a word, one might suppose that one must first understand the words in its definition. But this process is circular.

There must, therefore, be a way of understanding a word that is not given by providing its definition.

Now this seems quite obvious; and yet so many begin their discussion with "let's first define our terms".

"It can be done," said Achilles. "It has been done! Solvitur ambulando.

am not sure if frank is amongst them - think that a good definition fixes the referent of the term involved, in such a way that doubt is not possible

...extensional definitions...

...communication between minds...

f we're each alone in little isolated bubbles between our ears, there's no way to tell if we really communicate or if we just believe we're doing that.

How do you get things without facts, or facts without things?

Language is constructed socially, and minds are as much a part of that construction as words.

f we're each alone in little isolated bubbles between our ears, there's no way to tell if we really communicate or if we just believe we're doing that.
— frank
...and so that sort of perspective drops out of the discussion.

As my recent thread points out, though, this narrative is self undermining.

I am at a loss as to what it is you are supposing we are doing in philosophy.

The myth of the self?

I've in mind the difference between Wittgenstein's and Russell's versions of logical atomism, the indirect topic of ?plaque flag's recent thread. Is the world all the things, or all the facts?

With a different metaphysics, like we're all connected to a universal mind of some kind, then communication would be easy to explain.

To me this is a tempting but wrong approach. Our mentalistic folk psychology, very useful in ordinary life, gets adopted without criticism in a more serious metaphysical context. So we get dualism and the container metaphor for communication.

Right. Physicalism or materialism leaves us with that problem: how do meanings travel between heads? Physicalism is part of our present worldview, so that's why we're faced with the issue.

Many would like to point to social interaction as the basis for communication (meaning is use). But where behaviorism is rejected, this view doesn't really seem to do the job it's intended to do.

Another approach would be to start, tentatively, with what we can't do without.

That's part of what I'm doing in Nothing Is Hidden. But something like public concepts seems to be necessary, because we can't start doing philosophy unless we understand one another to some degree --- and have a world together that we can be more or less right about.

Now I do not think that you do hold to such a view; and so I am at a loss as to what it is you are supposing we are doing in philosophy.

A charitable interpretation of T Clark’s position is that he is not saying, for example, that in a discussion entitled “What is truth?” we have to agree on what truth is at the start to make any progress—that obviously couldn’t work—but that in a discussion about something else, some other concept, one that depends on the concept of truth, a way of directing the debate is to decide on the definitions of those dependencies, otherwise the wrangling over definitions never ends.

...the wrangling over definitions never ends.

Karl Popper:In my opinion, it’s a task in life to train oneself to speak as clearly as possible. This isn’t achieved by paying special attention to words, but by clearly formulating theses, so formulated as to be criticizable. People who speak too much about words or concepts or definitions don’t actually bring anything forward that makes a claim to truth. So you can’t do anything against it. A definition is a pure conventional matter.

They only lead to a pretentious, false precision, to the impression that one is particularly precise. But it’s a sham precision, it isn’t genuine clarity. For that reason, I’m against the discussion of terms and definitions. I’m rather for plain, clear speaking.