In the brain

Quoting Andrew4Handel

What phenomena are in the brain and if so how?

The brain itself does not have 'senses' of its own so "phenomena in the brain" – humuncular theory – does not make sense.

We know that we have memories.

My oldest brother died a couple of years ago and I could tell you a lot about him from my memories without referring to photos or a written account etc. I could try and describe smells, sensations. I know where he used to live. I lived with him for a few years. Colours, DVDs he owned. His catheters. Pressure sores. Thousands of things potentially.

I mention this because he has passed on which emphasises the ability of memories to capture things that are long gone or not in current spacial temporality (and may be described as representations the common term for mind brain correlated).

It does seem that the brain is the only candidate for these memories to reside in. Yet nothing in the brain is like my memories of my brother.

Memories are vivid and multidimensional. I can remember things such as my brothers beliefs, his religious beliefs, political beliefs etc. Yet all we have in the brain is neurons, dendrites, axons, support cells, blood, synapses, chemical or electrical transmitters etc and none of these things share the characteristics of mental states.

The only possible options that spring to mind for me right now is another realm of mental objects or a new perspective on the physical world that supports mental and physical entities.

Quoting Andrew4Handel

We know that we have memories

"Memories" are functions, not "phenomena".

Quoting 180 Proof

"Memories" are functions, not "phenomena".

What function do the memories of my brother serve. Or what function does my earliest memory of having a cold and being in a pram sucking a cough sweet on a wet day serve?

Quoting Andrew4Handel

What function do the memories of my brother serve

I'd say we developed memory because it had significant utility - remembering what was safe to eat, what caused sickness sand death, how to stay safe from predators, etc. Recognizing friend from foe, family from stranger requires memory too. No doubt memory has a range of other utilities that allows humans to plan, strategize, nurture, survive. The bonus is that you have early memories of siblings, parents, friends.

Reply to Tom Storm 180 proof claimed memories were not phenomena.

Well as I mentioned my memories are vivid and have a lot of detail (that might be referred to as qualia).

I am describing the phenomenal properties of mental states here not their function.

The function or potential uses of a mental state doesn't explain its emergence.

For example I am using the computer and internet now. But it's usefulness to me is not a history of its development. An evolutionary explanation of something in my opinion has to be an explicit causal explanation explaining emergent properties. Not a story of the benefit of a trait. I think the two things are conflated.

Eliminative materialism and behaviourism do contain explicit attempts to ignore or deny the phenomenal aspects of mental states. If they were just physical functions we wouldn't call them mental states.

Reply to Andrew4Handel Ok. I thought you were asking a different question.

Reply to Andrew4Handel Nevermind. Carry on with ... :roll:

Reply to Andrew4Handel By function @180 Proof is indicating a means of existing, not so much saying that they play a role, I think. Memories exist, but not as structure, not as property, but as function (or action, behaviours of neurons, something like that.) Driving exists, but if we take apart a car and its driver and examine all the parts, we don't find anything we can call driving. Thinking exists, but if we take apart a brain we don't find a object or property called 'thinking', but, the argument goes, we do observe the brain doing stuff, and that is thinking.

Reply to Andrew4Handel Talk of ‘what brains do’ was called ‘the mereological fallacy’ in a well-known book on neuroscience and philosophy. The mereological fallacy is to ascribe to parts of the body what only agents or actors are capable of doing. ‘The brain’ becomes a kind of explanatory unit, an idealised black box which ‘does’ this or ‘produces’ that and so on. But ascribing thoughts to ‘the brain’ is like saying your computer writes your entries in this thread. Humans think, humans write. They need normal brain function to do so, but it’s not ‘the brain’ which is doing that. Brains are always situated as part of a whole, which is precisely what ‘mereology’ refers to.

And, memories are not ‘phenomena’. Phenomena means, strictly speaking, ‘what appears’. The northern lights are a fascinating and colourful phenomena, caused by radiation from the sun reacting with the Earth’s ionosphere. But the explanation is not ‘a phenomenon’. What appears as a consequence of those reactions is the phenomenon.

Reply to Wayfarer It doesn't make sense to attribute mental states like my memory of my grandmother or my belief that 2 + 2 = 4 to the whole of my body or a function.

But that does sound like a rehash of behaviourism.

I have distinct mental contents which is not similar or identical to any part of my body or behaviour.

This is usually discussed under the concept of mental representations in cognitive science.

Quoting Andrew4Handel

It doesn't make sense to attribute mental states like my memory of my grandmother or my belief that 2 + 2 = 4 to the whole of my body or a function.

But that does sound like a rehash of behaviourism.

It's not behaviourism but on re-reading your OP, I'm inclined to agree with it. You are indeed referring to the explanatory gap.

Quoting Andrew4Handel

But when I have a pain in my foot I experience that is in my foot extended out yet that is also a sensation supposed to be experienced in the head.

The pain is in your foot -- but neurons communicate with each other to send to your brain the message that your foot hurts. Your brain doesn't "hurt", it's the acuity of the pain receptors that's responsible for exciting the spinal cord.

Quoting Andrew4Handel

What phenomena are in the brain and if so how?

Neuronal processes are in the brain, just as digestion is in the body. That said neuronal porcesses are not just in the brain apparently:

Neurons do exist throughout the body, performing a variety of functions. Most neurons fall into three classifications: sensory, motor, or interneuron.

Sensory neurons are spread throughout organs, including the skin, muscles, and joints.

Motor neurons are found in cell in the heart, intestinal system, diaphragm, and glands.

The third major category of neurons is the interneurons. These neurons are specialized to provide for communication between the sensory and motor neurons. Interneurons are also able to communicate each other.

It doesn't seem quite right to assign any specific location to thoughts, memories and desires, although it might be reasonable to say that they are associated with the persons who 'have' them or are aware of them.

Not all questions can be expected to have a definitive answer.

Quoting L'éléphant

The pain is in your foot -- but neurons communicate with each other to send to your brain the message that your foot hurts

There are phantoms pains. People experience pain in a missing limb. This what suggest pain is all in the brain.

There is Congenital insensitivity pain where a person doesn't experience tissue damage as pain (something that can also happen under anesthetics.)

I actually think or belief in the physicality of the world is based on a spectrum of pain. (from mild to strong) and Haptic sensations in general (touch).

I have actually has someone say something to me like "if you don't believe in the physical world then let me bash you over the head with this baseball bat and see how you feel"

But all that would prove is that I have pain sensations. So what information is being transmitted by neurons exactly? Is it accurate? Just rambling here on the surrounding topic.

Quoting Janus

It doesn't seem quite right to assign any specific location to thoughts, memories and desires, although it might be reasonable to say that they are associated with the persons who 'have' them or are aware of them.

My issue is that we clearly have (or at least I do) vivid mental states including beliefs like "Paris is the capital of France" and images of an external world, dreams, hallucinations and so on.

I think they have to exist somewhere. If we are physicalist of some sort and think things have to supervene on a physical reality or emerge from it. But mental stuff does seem to really challenge physicalism. We probably do need a radical new paradigm or end up with the Mysterian stance of Colin McGinn.

But I think theorists should really focus on this phenomenological explanatory gap.

Another issue about brain states is how they can have truth values. How can brain activity which may be automatic and unreflective preserve truth value or evaluate it? It seems that 2+2= 4 should be true in any gover world and not depend on the right brain state.

Reply to Andrew4Handel If you accept that all those vivid mental states are underpinned by neuronal processes and neuronal processes are in the brain or brain/body, then I guess the only answer you could give would be that those states are in the brain/ body. The problem is that neuronal processes can be more or less precisely located, but mental states cannot unless they are equated with brain activity. Are there any other alternative approaches you can imagine or even begin to imagine?

Some have conjectured that the brain does not produce thoughts and memories but rather that it is like a transceiver. How could we test whether that or the standard picture is the true one?

If we assume that mental states and brainstates are really the same, then the ability of brainstates to be truth-apt is a mystery: how could a neuronal process that underpins a true belief be distinguished physically from a neuronal process that underpins a false belief? If they cannot be distinguished physically then there is something about different mental states that can be distinguished that cannot be distinguished in the corresponding brain states, and that does seem to be a problem, at least for eliminative physicalism.

Quoting Andrew4Handel

There are phantoms pains. People experience pain in a missing limb. This what suggest pain is all in the brain.

No. It just means that the spinal cord and the brain sustained a major trauma (losing a limb) that threw the system into disorder. We never said that the system is perfect -- brains aren't perfect.
When we talk about consciousness, we know we're talking about the system as it functions in human beings.

It's all Kant's fault. It's nearly always either Kant or Descartes, But this is Kant. The whole point of talking about phenomena was to be as vague as possible about what he was talking about; that is to say NOT to make any assumptions. So I talk about a phenomenon that occurred in the desert, that might have been an oasis, or might have been a mirage. If it was a mirage, it would be odd to ask where it is.

Quoting Andrew4Handel

What phenomena are in the brain and if so how?

When one locates something, it is not the phenomenon, but the cause or origin of the phenomenon; which is to say the noumenon. the phenomenon is the appearance, and has no location. The rainbow is not in your head, because then I could not see it, but nor is it there where we see it, otherwise we could find the pot of gold at the end. It's 'a trick of the light' – a phenomenon.

A vivid memory of a deceased relative can be so vivid that one seems to see them in the world, or hear their voice, or catch their scent. Call them a 'trick of the brain' if it pleases you, or be satisfied to call them phenomena, but I would say that the phenomenon is no more in your brain than the phenomenon of the tree I can see at the bottom of the garden is in my brain. Brains are wrinkled rubbery phenomena, not recommended eating.

"Where are hallucinations?" is a wrong question. One might want to say that they originate in the brain, but they are not experienced in the brain but in the world. Yet they are not in the world either, they are nowhere - they are hallucinations.

Mirages, rainbows, memories, trees, brains, movies, hallucinations phantoms, as phenomena are appearances that are if anywhere, exactly where they appear to be and what they appear to be; the function of talking about them as phenomena is to talk about the appearance of things and not the reality of them.

Reply to 180 Proof That makes no sense … but neither does the OP :D

Meaning our ‘sense of the world’ is ‘in our brain’. We do NOT ‘see’ with our eyes nor ‘hear’ with our ears for example.

Reply to I like sushi "Sense of the world" is not "memories are phenomena in the brain". My comment "makes sense" when read in context.

Quoting unenlightened

"Where are hallucinations?" is a wrong question. One might want to say that they originate in the brain, but they are not experienced in the brain but in the world. Yet they are not in the world either, they are nowhere - they are hallucinations.

These days, I say we put them in the world. Just as we use entities like good intentions and bad moods in the reasons we offer for our doings, so can we use hallucinations. The inferences we allow and disallow will keep these 'internal' or 'private' entities from flooding us with confusion. One doesn't crash a car into a hallucination but possibly because of it.

Quoting 180 Proof

"Memories" are functions, not "phenomena".

1.
the faculty by which the mind stores and remembers information.
"I've a great memory for faces"
2.
something remembered from the past.
"one of my earliest memories is of sitting on his knee"

When one has a memory of an event, it seems to me that memory is a phenomenon. One could put it in verb form: I just remembered what it smelled like in the car, but it seems 'memory' can refer to the function or the phenomenon of remembering. That experience.

Reply to 180 Proof So, where does the process of sensing take place. (this is not skeptical question - for example, how could it be other than in the brain? - but rather one trying to see what your position is)

Reply to Bylaw To my mind: a "memory" is a map and "phenomenon" is the territory. A "rememberance" isn't an appearance to the senses (i.e. phenomenon).

Reply to Bylaw The peripheral nervous system. The brain 'binds' disparate sense-data from all bodily senses into 'experience' that is temporarily held in 'working memory' to begin with. I see perceptual cognition something like this: phenomena —> data —> experience <——> memory traces <——> information (signal:noise) ... etc.

Reply to 180 Proof
I suppose this is due to my computing background, but at the most fundamental level, I perceive what human/brain does, as an IPO system. Input - process - output. To me, we created computers to emulate this system. The other main component of an IPO system is memory/storage.

A 'thought' then becomes a 'wetware' output. Would you consider the IPO model useful here or of little value?

Quoting Andrew4Handel

I feel like it is too convenient just to try and correlate any concept and or mental state with a brain state and assume the brain state does all the explanatory work we need without an actual causal explanation.

Quoting Andrew4Handel

Memory (my vivid memory of a deceased relative, their voice and appearance etc)?

Based on my very simplistic IPO model as described above, the detailed causal explanation that explains why a memory suddenly gets activated, must exist within the IPO model.
Some Input trigger or some, operating system kernal routine which has a randomised input causing a memory to activate in a brain.

Perhaps my IPO model of what's happening 'In the brain,' is far too simplistic, to be of any significant value but I think I could 'explain' any thought I have, to a 'certain level of detail,' as a list of algorithmic style (pseudocode) steps.
If I were a neuroscientist, I could probably refine my list into sub-lists (refinements) with more detail.
This 'stepwise refinement' process, would reach a stage where not enough is scientifically known, to be able to refine any further. Does this not, in a simplistic way, take us to where we currently are in trying to describe human consciousness?

Reply to Andrew4Handel For me a memory, for example, is something a person experiences. It's an odd thing for instance to come to a place you believe you've never been before, and realise you were wrong. It's as if the memory of that place resides partly in that place: the experience is an interaction between person, place and time. In a sense then the philosophical question feels more like, Why do I want to specify a location for my memory? Must a memory be allocated to a body-part, or even to a location within that particular person? One of my long-time favourite poems is Henry Reed's 'The naming of parts', a wartime poem which riffs on the purported provision of part-naming, amid the natural experiences of Spring. Here's the poem.

Quoting universeness

the detailed causal explanation that explains why a memory suddenly gets activated,

I don't think the problem is the storage of the memory but the phenomenal access to mental content. A machine could place something in a box and retrieve it later with no awareness.

One theory of consciousness does invoke the idea that certain activity in the brain is firing together in such a strong unison that that somehow leads to that brain activity reaching consciousness, but it is not clear how or what "reaches consciousness" means.
I think consciousness requires a self and we have point of view in front of which we experience things. It almost invokes a homunculus in the middle of the brain watching a screen with images on it or some central location where we can have a unified coherent perception or thought.

I feel that people forget that mental states are conscious. So they are all tied to whatever causes consciousness. I don't think the term mental should be applied to subconscious brain processing. (But that is a whole nother topic)

I could store a hundred toys in a cupboard and retrieve them randomly at a later date when I wanted to use one or more. Is a computer doing anything more than this?

I don't think anything in computation invokes mental states. The information we garner from the screen is for our conscious consumption but the computer isn't aware of it. The computer doesn't benefit from any of the info stored on it.

Quoting Andrew4Handel

I think consciousness requires a self and we have point of view in front of which we experience things. It almost invokes a homunculus in the middle of the brain watching a screen with images on it or some central location where we can have a unified coherent perception or thought.

Then the self is not the experiences but the capacity to have experiences and persists longer than the experiences themselves and the experiences are seperate and made from sensations created in the brain.

Quoting lorenzo sleakes

Then the self is not the experiences

That does seem to follow. I don't not consider things I think or perceive to be me.

It seems you must have to differentiate between yourself and input into your senses.

It is hard to give analogy but may be it is like when you watch a film but don't consider yourself a character in the film.

Strangely none of the biophysical matter of the brain features in our consciousness. We were unaware that we had neurons and neurotransmitters until scientists discovered them.

Quoting mcdoodle

Why do I want to specify a location for my memory?

It could be quite. There are rare cases of Photographic memory which is apparently fairly unpleasant because you do what to forget some things.

But on the other hand it would be good if we could store and access information more easily making learning easier. Now there is also the potential to have traumatic memories erased.

"Memory erasure has been shown to be possible in some experimental conditions; some of the techniques currently being investigated are: drug-induced amnesia, selective memory suppression, destruction of neurons, interruption of memory, reconsolidation,[1] and the disruption of specific molecular mechanisms"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_erasure

Quoting plaque flag

These days, I say we put them in the world.

Yes, quite possibly. But not phenomena. If you go putting phenomena in the world, what are you going to do with the noumena?

Reply to Andrew4Handel
I think the IPO model from computing science is only useful as a model for human consciousness, at a fundamentally mechanistic level. It does little to help explain self-awareness or the concept of me, myself. I or you. But I do personally find it a very useful model for illustrating certain ideas.

For example, A computer processor can access the contents of every single memory location it has access to, via a unique address. Our 'consciousness,' or 'wetware,' cannot do that.
For me, facts like that, are more interesting, because what human consciousness cannot do, speaks louder to me, than what it can do. Any natural system I know of, or has been described to me, is a system with limits. This for me, suggests that human consciousness is 'localised.'

Based on the work of Carlo Rovelli, et al, I also think that for our species, time is localised, in that we each experience it 'individually,' throughout our lives.
We are still far away from being able to explain what causes the individualised notion of 'me' or 'you,' but I think we can at least agree, that no individual current consciousness or grouped/networked consciousness qualifies for any of the omni labels and it is unlikely that any ever will.

Whichever way we individually choose to approach the topic of human consciousness, it seems to me that the two main camps remain. Those who think it's completely contained in the brain and those who think some aspects of human consciousness exist external to the brain, all the way to a god source.

I realise that is a 'no shit Sherlock' statement but until we get new strong evidence from neuroscience or god (for me, a non-existent). I don't see how we can make much progress for now.

Reply to universeness I think that the computer analogy works dependent on how much you think consciousness is involved in a process.

Some people go to the extreme of no free will and consciousness as an epiphenomena so that all processing for behaviour is unconscious. This would sit best with a computational non phenomenal model.

So I suppose we have to work out when consciousness is necessary for something. I think quite a lot more things require consciousness than cognitive psychologists believe.

So it can range from "no cognitive process needs consciousness" to "they all do".

I do believe the brain would has the capacity to perform computations.

Quoting universeness

Would you consider the IPO model useful here or of little value?

I think that model is too linear to be analogous. Are you familiar with Douglas Hofstadter's writings on 'tangled hierarchies' model of cognition (e.g. Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought)? Artificial neural networks seem to me much closer analogues to the processing of (meta)cognition than von Neumann architecture 'programs'. In the 'sketch' at the bottom of my last post I use bidirectional arrows to simplistically suggest nonlinear relationships (i.e. self-recursion / self-referencing) among the 'nodes'.

Btw, a more empirical, less speculative, model of '(meta)cognitive brain functions' is – I've found it most informative and insightful in the last fifteen or so years – the monumental Being No One (or it's nontechnical summary The Ego Tunnel (re phenomenal self model)) by Thomas Metzinger. I highly recommend his work if you're not familiar with it. I want to stress that while I appreciate that perceptual cognition, etc in primate brains is computational, I'm also convinced that these brains are not computers in the (mostly) linear 'IPO' sense – just as David Deutsch points out that it does not follow from the computability of fundamental physical laws (re: constructor theory) that the universe is a computer simulation.

I think that skepticism about other peoples mental states is on weak ground because we only have private access to our own.

So I think some skepticism amounts to calling other people liars or attempting to revise how they can describe their own mental states, like somebody claiming I didn't describe my dream or memory correctly.

So I think psychology and neuroscience are probably working with an interpretation of peoples descriptions of their mental states a lot of the time. And so brain correlates are not between concrete well defined mental states and brain states.

The theorist decides what I mean and how to formalise it and attach it to a biophysical counterpart.

Quoting 180 Proof

I think that model is too linear to be analogous.

Well, how about an extension of the IPO model, that is more in-line with current computer systems and their various network topologies (star, bus, ring, mesh and fully connected mesh.) Do you have any knowledge of network topologies and the workings of stand alone operating systems/networked operating systems?

If we mimic a brain model such as the triune brain model of R-complex, Limbic system and Cortex, then we could compare this with three separate core's on the same CPU.
We can then use the IPO model to include parallel processing. Would this not alleviate your concern, regarding the linearity of the IPO model, when applied to a single 'stand alone' computer?

Quoting 180 Proof

. Are you familiar with Douglas Hofstadter's writings on 'tangled hierarchies' model of cognition (e.g. Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought)?

No, but I will follow your link and become a little more familiar with it. I have found your suggested links in the past, to be useful and informative. I will comment after I have read the material your link offers.

Quoting 180 Proof

Artificial neural networks seem to me much closer analogues to the processing of (meta)cognition than von Neumann architecture 'programs'.

What neural network examples are you referring to? One based on biological components or ones based only on electronic components?
Considering wiki's description of:
A neural network can refer to either a neural circuit of biological neurons (sometimes also called a biological neural network), or a network of artificial neurons or nodes in the case of an artificial neural network. Artificial neural networks are used for solving artificial intelligence (AI) problems; they model connections of biological neurons as weights between nodes. A positive weight reflects an excitatory connection, while negative values mean inhibitory connections. All inputs are modified by a weight and summed. This activity is referred to as a linear combination. Finally, an activation function controls the amplitude of the output. For example, an acceptable range of output is usually between 0 and 1, or it could be ?1 and 1.

The major aspect seems to me, to be the weight system applied and how that mimics human credence/confidence level, that a human might assign to a particular thought. I agree that is of significant value, BUT I think a biological system might involve sensation's/feelings, that affect the 'weight' assigned to a neural net output, whereas an electronic/artificial neural net, uses probability calculations to provide a weighting to an output.
I think the IPO model is still of good use here, as a neural net still complies with a serial and parallel notion of the three stages of input, process and output. The Von Neumann architecture merely adds the concept of the stored program and stored data files to the IPO model, along with connecting communication/carrier channels.

Quoting 180 Proof

In the 'sketch' at the bottom of my last post I use bidirectional arrows to simplistically suggest nonlinear relationships (i.e. self-recursion / self-referencing) among the 'nodes'.

Quoting 180 Proof

to begin with. I see perceptual cognition something like this: phenomena —> data —> experience <——> memory traces <——> information (signal:noise) ... etc.

But bidirectional is not non-linear in this sense. For example, the data bus inside a CPU is bidirectional as data can be sent to and retrieved from storage, but it's still linear, the data bus is made up of parallel communication channels, etched in silicone.
Phenomena described in philosophy, as the object of a person's perception. would produce personal data, yes, but could a persons personal interpretation of inputed data, not also produce personal phenomena? Could the arrow between the two not also be bidirectional?

I think we are still ONLY modelling mechanistic aspects of consciousness in the brain and we are still no closer to the notion of 'me' or 'you.' Would you, at this stage, assign any credence to the proposal that the mechanics of a working electronic neural net IS a very low level feature of consciousness?
As I delve deeper into such models, I keep returning to consciousness as an emergent feature of component parts. I keep returning to the 'more than the sum of its parts,' idea.

Quoting 180 Proof

I've found it most informative and insightful in the last fifteen or so years – the monumental Being No One (or it's nontechnical summary The Ego Tunnel (re phenomenal self model)) by Thomas Metzinger. I highly recommend his work if you're not familiar with it.

No again, I am not familiar with it. You are assigning me too much homework sir! I already have a large reading list, but I will do my best to find some time to peruse Mr Metzingers work.

Quoting 180 Proof

I want to stress that while I appreciate that perceptual cognition, etc in primate brains is computational, I'm also convinced that these brains are not computers in the (mostly) linear 'IPO' sense – just as David Deutsch points out that it does not follow from the computability of fundamental physical laws (re: constructor theory) that the universe is a computer simulation.

I agree that a purely computational model of the human cannot be the full story of human consciousness. I currently assign almost 0 credence to simulation theory as the 'reality' of our universe.

Reply to universeness Very good response. I think it's best to pause here, not because we're at an impasse but due to us both looking through different ends of the tele / micro scope – you from a computer science background and me from a cognitive science (& philosophy of mind) background. It seems we're on the same page though, namely that the computational-mechanical model of perceptual / (meta)cognition is insufficient, or completely wrong. Notions of 'extra stuff', however, are incoherent and render speculations on (meta)cognition – its "emergent properties" as you say, universeness – theoretically DOA. In other words, I'm not any flavor of mysterian, mind-body dualist, panpsychist or idealist.

Anyway, apologies for dumping a reading list on you; I just wanted to share possibly common points of reference since the devil is definitely in the details here. I suspect 'human brain functioning' will be the toughest nut to crack by a (hybrid classical-quantum computing) AGI, though whether or not human neuroscientists & philosophers will be intelligent enough to comprehend AGI's 'brain model' or have to accept it as an explanatory black box that nonetheless gives us orders of magnitude more neurocognitive control, I suppose, remains to be seen. I suspect (hope?) the status quo, my friend, is about to be smashed by converging devepments of AI-tech, nano-tech, bio-tech & cognitive neuroscience. No doubt, AGI will know more about our minds than we will ever comprehend about its thinking (thus, as I say, artificial-autonomous-alien general intelligence, of A³GI). :nerd:

[quote="Andrew4Handel;801036"]"Memories" are functions, not "phenomena". — 180 Proof
What function do the memories of my brother serve. Or what function does my earliest memory of having a cold and being in a pram sucking a cough sweet on a wet day serve?Reply to 180 Proof's distinction between a Function and a Phenomenon may be relevant to your question. But not necessarily in the dismissive irrelevance he intended. A brain function*1 is a causal relationship between input & output, this because of that. And a phenomenon*2 is what the physical senses detect. So, objectively, there are no phenomena in your brain. Unless you count the targets of inwardly focused senses.

The brain receives inputs from bodily senses, evaluates that information relative to body welfare (survival), then sends outputs back down to various organs, as required to maintain the life processes of the system. A necessary function of that evaluation is the memory of previous experiences. So, the memory of your brother may be relevant to your social & familial support network (e.g. kin selection as an evolutionary strategy for genetic survival). In that case, a memory is a subjective phenomenon.

180 goes on to assert that "The brain itself does not have 'senses' of its own so "phenomena in the brain" – humuncular theory – does not make sense." The brain may not have a physical "little man organ" (homonculus) whose function is observation of external & internal phenomena. But it does connect to a variety of interoception & exteroception sensory organs to gather information about environmental & body states. Those combined sensory inputs, as a whole system, could be characterized as "senses of its own" : a metaphorical homonculus*4. And the evaluative or executive function of the brain could be viewed as a Symbolic-Self created by the brain's Imagination Function to serve as a mental model of the body system as a whole.

Therefore, the images created by the brain to represent external phenomena, could be construed as "phenomena in the brain". 180's distinction may be merely intended to point-out that internal models are Ideal, not Real; subjective, not objective*3. To you, memories of your brother are essential to your life story. But to him, the phenomena pictures in your brain are meaningless --- unless he can metaphorically resonate with your feelings. Subjective images of phenomena are immaterial, hence literally don't matter to those with a Materialist worldview. :smile:


*1. A function relates an input to an output. ... It is like a machine that has an input and an output. And the output is related somehow to the input.
https://www.mathsisfun.com/sets/function.html

*2. A phenomenon, in a scientific context, is something that is observed to occur or to exist.
https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/definition/phenomenon

*3. The Embodied Self and the Paradox of Subjectivity :
Broadly speaking, the paradox of subjectivity concerns the relationship of subjectivity or consciousness to the world. On the one hand, subjectivity constitutes or discloses objects, in the sense they have for us as conscious beings. On the other hand, subjectivity pertains to humans who are, of course, objects in the world. But these two claims do not seem to fit together well, although it is not immediately obvious what exactly the problem is.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10743-019-09256-4

*4. HOMONCULUS model of sensory detectors in brain

Reply to 180 Proof
I think you identify and describe the main parameters, limits, shortfalls and developing tech, currently present in the efforts being made towards the goal of explaining the workings, structure and source of human consciousness, very succinctly. I also think and agree, that if and when the full story becomes known and understood, all aspects of it's workings, structure and source will prove to be 'natural.'

Reply to universeness :cool:

Quoting Andrew4Handel

It doesn't make sense to attribute mental states like my memory of my grandmother or my belief that 2 + 2 = 4 to the whole of my body or a function.

But that does sound like a rehash of behaviourism.

I have distinct mental contents which is not similar or identical to any part of my body or behaviour.

If you are to ask where these states are located then where else but the body? I mean they are your states, and where else are you but with your body?

I don't see how this has anything to do with behaviorism, but maybe I'm missing something.

It's true that we have mental states which are not similar or identical to any behavior or part of your body. You also have parts of your body which are not similar or identical to any other parts of your body, like your navel, your nose, your scalp, your heart, lungs, stomach etc., etc.

But in any case it's not that your mental states can be understood to be parts of your body, because body parts are obviously observable and physical like the body is. Mental states are not obviously physical, not observable, so they cannot comfortably fit into the category of 'parts of the body'. It may not be possible to precisely locate a mental state, but there is no doubt they are associated with living bodies; yours with yours and mine with mine. I mean it would make no sense to say that your mental state is located anywhere else would it?

Quoting 180 Proof

Are you familiar with Douglas Hofstadter's writings on 'tangled hierarchies' model of cognition

Quoting universeness

No, but I will follow your link and become a little more familiar with it.

Quoting universeness

I will comment after I have read the material your link offers.

Quoting 180 Proof

I think it's best to pause here

So, even though we are pausing, I wanted to do what I said I would above:

Even this first sentence in the article you linked me to:
A strange loop is a cyclic structure that goes through several levels in a hierarchical system. It arises when, by moving only upwards or downwards through the system, one finds oneself back where one started.

Made the 7 layers of the OSI model (open systems interconnection/integration model) for a computer system, come to the fore in my head, straight away.


And yet when I say "strange loop", I have something else in mind — a less concrete, more elusive notion. What I mean by "strange loop" is — here goes a first stab, anyway — not a physical circuit but an abstract loop in which, in the series of stages that constitute the cycling-around, there is a shift from one level of abstraction (or structure) to another, which feels like an upwards movement in an hierarchy, and yet somehow the successive "upward" shifts turn out to give rise to a closed cycle. That is, despite one's sense of departing ever further from one's origin, one winds up, to one's shock, exactly where one had started out. In short, a strange loop is a paradoxical level-crossing feedback loop.

This comment above from Hofstadter then provides an understanding of the clear difference between the kind of set, hierarchical, bidirectional, working cycle of the OSI model and the 'strange loop' model he is presenting.

Gödel showed that mathematics and logic contain strange loops: propositions that not only refer to mathematical and logical truths, but also to the symbol systems expressing those truths. This leads to the sort of paradoxes seen in statements such as "This statement is false," wherein the sentence's basis of truth is found in referring to itself and its assertion, causing a logical paradox.

Hofstadter claims a similar "flipping around of causality" appears to happen in minds possessing self-consciousness. The mind perceives itself as the cause of certain feelings ("I" am the source of my desires), while according to popular scientific models, feelings and desires are strictly caused by the interactions of neurons.
To me, this is the 'more than the sum of it's parts,' moment when the 'interaction of neurons' 'correlates' to a sense of 'I' (awareness of self).

The computer models I know about seem to match well with 'how humans think.' This is probably another of my 'no shit Sherlock,' statements as computers were invented by us, our pooled brains!

I love the Penrose stairs image, that he created based on Escher's (who was a friend of Penrose's father) work.
https://i.pinimg.com/736x/d2/38/7d/d2387d0225b634e7aa7e9bae9a1a22fc.jpg

Reply to universeness :up:

Quoting Bylaw

When one has a memory of an event, it seems to me that memory is a phenomenon.

Depending on the context and the used of the term, memory can be a process but also its product or content. Like "thought": it can refer to either the thinking process or its product or content.
Thus. we speak about "memories" and "thoughts" referring to contents, both consisting mainly of mental images, often accompanied with sense objects other than visual, considered also as mental representations of actual events, incidents, etc.

Quoting Wayfarer

Talk of ‘what brains do’ was called ‘the mereological fallacy’ in a well-known book on neuroscience and philosophy. The mereological fallacy is to ascribe to parts of the body what only agents or actors are capable of doing. ‘The brain’ becomes a kind of explanatory unit, an idealised black box which ‘does’ this or ‘produces’ that and so on. But ascribing thoughts to ‘the brain’ is like saying your computer writes your entries in this thread. Humans think, humans write. They need normal brain function to do so, but it’s not ‘the brain’ which is doing that. Brains are always situated as part of a whole, which is precisely what ‘mereology’ refers to.

You and I seem to be more attuned to Part/Whole paradoxes*1 than most forum posters. I suppose that sensitivity derives from a General/Holistic (philosophical) rather than Specific/Reductive (scientific) worldview. Ironically, I am better read in Science than in Philosophy --- but not much depth in either. So my Holism stems mainly from my focus on the multiform roles of Generic Information in the world : including Energy & Mind. It's not so much influenced by familiarity with Eastern philosophies.

In the context of this thread, the pertinent distinction seems to lie between Brain (as Mechanical Black Box) and Mind (as personal Agent : the Self). Mechanical processes, including those of neural nets, are governed by physical laws ; so are orderly, and though complex, somewhat predictable. But Agency is a more centralized & integrated & self-oriented, so less predictable, System than a scatter-brain. :joke:

*1. Merelogical Fallacy :
To ascribe attributes to a part of a whole that can properly be ascribed only to the whole-of-which-it-is-a-part is a mereological fallacy.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41682961


Quoting Andrew4Handel

I feel like it is too convenient just to try and correlate any concept and or mental state with a brain state and assume the brain state does all the explanatory work we need without an actual causal explanation.
It seems to lead to a kind of apathy where it is almost too much effort to look for another type of explanation. (For me anyway). It means fighting against an entrenched paradigm.

As Reply to Wayfarer noted, the "paradigm" you are struggling with may be the Reductive perspective of Classical physical science (since Newton), which focuses on collections of parts, rather than whole systems. Since the isolated parts are not viewed in the context of an integrated interrelated System, the Cause of their functional integrity is a mystery : the Hard Problem.

Fortunately, a new way to do Science*2 has emerged, since Quantum physics was shown to be non-Mechanical and non-Classical. One place where Systems Science is being practiced is the Santa Fe Institute*3 for the study of Complexity. Whole systems may be internally complex, but externally they have a singular aspect. And the black-box human brain may be the most complex and integrated physical system in the universe. So, it's not surprising that the "entrenched paradigm" of Reductionism cannot explain how a tangled mass of neurons can become self-conscious, and can be aware of stored memories.

The Institute may not have discovered the ultimate "causal explanation" yet, but it is working toward that end. Perhaps the best known theory to come out of SFI is the Integrated Information Theory*4. I have my own theory of the First Cause that led to brain systems with a sense of Self. But I won't go into that complex concept in a single post. :smile:


*2. Systems Science is an interdisciplinary field that studies the complexity of systems in nature, social or any other scientific field. Some of the systems science methodologies include systems dynamics modeling, agent-based modeling, microsimulation, and Big Data techniques.
https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu/research/population-health-methods/systems-science

*3. Santa Fe Institute :
The Santa Fe Institute was founded in 1984 by a group of scientists frustrated with the narrow disciplinary confines of academia. They wanted to tackle big questions that spanned different fields, and they felt the only way these questions could be posed and solved was through the intermingling of scientists of all kinds: physicists, biologists, economists, anthropologists, and many others.
https://www.santafe.edu/

*4. Integrated information theory (IIT) attempts to provide a framework capable of explaining why some physical systems (such as human brains) are conscious, ...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory

I am aware of different arguments in cognitive science and the Philosophy of mind. And there is a huge number of papers from various perspectives. Among these are searches for the neural correlates of consciousness and the concept of mental representation.

"For many years I have argued that the “grandmother cell” hypothesis should be taken seriously (Bowers, 2002, 2009). On this view, single neurons code for familiar categories, such as well-known persons (Jennifer Aniston), objects, and words. The alternative view is that each neuron is involved in representing many different categories, and that a pattern of activation over many neurons codes for a specific category; so-called distributed coding. Unfortunately, it has been difficult to have a constructive debate on this issue because critics typically reject straw-man versions of the grandmother cell hypothesis. The most recent high-profile example of this was published a few months ago by Chang and Tsao (2017) in a paper entitled: “The Code for Facial Identity in the Primate Brain”. A key claim of the authors is that their findings rule out the hypothesis that single neurons code for single faces. As they write in the “In Brief” section of their article:"

https://jeffbowers.blogs.bristol.ac.uk/blog/grandmother-cells/

People are arguing that brain regions and even single neurons can be correlated with phenomenal content of mental states.

I think the dominant paradigm is to correlate any mental states reports and concepts with brain states.

There are lots of objections to all perspectives including the computational theory of mind, embodied cognition et al which I can cite papers for.

I want to know where my phenomenal experiences are occurring and where the content is coming from. It may hinge on an explanation for consciousness which may be impossible. But as no one seems to be defending conscious states are brain states here I suppose there is no one to argue with.

Quoting Gnomon

As ?Wayfarer noted, the "paradigm" you are struggling with may be the Reductive perspective of Classical physical science (since Newton), which focuses on collections of parts, rather than whole systems. Since the isolated parts are not viewed in the context of an integrated interrelated System, the Cause of their functional integrity is a mystery : the Hard Problem.

My issue is that I know I have vivid mental states like dreams which I have every night that have phenomenal content. Including dreams about dead people and places I lived as a child and fictional scenarios.

But my eyes are closed and I am receiving no input from the external world. The number one candidate at the moment for where the dream is occurring is entirely in the brain.

People are looking for neural correlates of dreams:

"Using high-density electroencephalography, we contrasted the presence and absence of dreaming in NREM and REM sleep. In both NREM and REM sleep, reports of dream experience were associated with local decreases in low-frequency activity in posterior cortical region"

https://www.nature.com/articles/nn.4545

I personally am not wedded to any particular position but I do see an explanatory gap between any current paradigm and phenomenal mental states.

One issue is that everything is a mental state. We only have access to mental states that we are trying to analyse
and they are more real than the concept of physical world independent of our models of it.

Physics uses models and isn't committed to having a veridically mapped representation of the world. (as far as I am aware)

Quoting Andrew4Handel

But my eyes are closed and I am receiving no input from the external world. The number one candidate at the moment for where the dream is occurring is entirely in the brain.

Yes. Dreams seem to be re-constituted memories. But, they sometimes seem to portray someone else's experience. However, that's probably due to lack of context, or to altered perspective. When awake, with eyes open, the context of incoming imagery is obvious. But when asleep, the brain is free to improvise, and to alter the original context. For example, I used to dream of an extremely wide residential street that may have impressed me as a small child. But that dream image was used, years later, in different contexts, perhaps to express some childish feeling of awe that, as an adult, I can't explain in words.

Some have interpreted the weirdness of dreams as a sign of an external source. Perhaps a communication from God to warn you of danger or opportunity. But most of us just accept the bizarre nature of dreams as an indication that they do not portray reality, but possibility. In the realm of infinite unfettered possibility, almost anything is possible. When asleep, the brain is literally "unfettered" by top-down conscious control : it's a Free Agent.

One theory to explain the warning or tutorial message of dreams says that the brain continues to work sub-consciously on today's complex challenges, at night when it's not occupied by conscious inputs*1. In that case, it's not God or dead relatives trying to help you, but your computer-like brain continuing to process information in the "background" when you are not aware & interfering with its work.

After centuries of philosophical & scientific & mystical speculation on the meaning of dreams, the jury is still out. So, you can make of it whatever makes sense to you. But, as you said, the general consensus today, is that the imagery of dreams is "entirely in the brain", and not signals from the outer world, or spirit realm. So, the apparent "phenomenal" content of dreams is actually a noumenal*2 reconstitution of waking experience. Does that make sense to you? :smile:



*1. The problem-solving theory is a cognitive theory of dreaming that states the function of dreams is to help people solve their ongoing problems.
https://www.picmonic.com/pathways/college/courses/standard/humanities-social-studies-8836/dream-theory-2444/cognitive-theories-of-dreaming_1795

*2. Noumenal : not real, but ideal
noumenon, plural noumena, in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich) as opposed to what Kant called the phenomenon—the thing .
https://www.britannica.com/topic/noumenon

Quoting Andrew4Handel

My issue is that I know I have vivid mental states like dreams which I have every night that have phenomenal content. Including dreams about dead people and places I lived as a child and fictional scenarios.

But my eyes are closed and I am receiving no input from the external world. The number one candidate at the moment for where the dream is occurring is entirely in the brain.

Humans have perception of time, internally -- pulse and heartbeats, as examples. This is our starting point of the temporal nature of the mind. Consciousness develops because of the temporal and spatial nature of the brain itself. It is very common to describe the mind as "mental" (and the brain as physical/material). Yet, while we are correct about the brain, to say that the mind is mental is nonsensical. We are not saying anything new there!

The mind is temporal -- we connect the present with the past and the future, no matter how small the elapsed time is. This is how consciousness comes about. Recognition of things and people and places, regret of the past, anticipation of the future.

Consciousness wouldn't exist if the brain can only produce spatial perception. Why else would Descartes insist on the duality of mind and body?

Quoting 180 Proof

?Bylaw To my mind: a "memory" is a map and "phenomenon" is the territory. A "rememberance" isn't an appearance to the senses (i.e. phenomenon).

Maps are also territories, just not the territory they portray. I agree that remembrances don't appear to the senses, but isn't anything that occurs a phenomenon? Something that happens, and in this case experienced.

I suppose I'd add to this what seem to me the coherency of the phrase 'mental phenomena'.

Quoting Bylaw

... isn't anything that occurs a phenomenon? Something that happens ...

Events are phenomena, abstractions are not.

Maps are also territories ...

"Maps are" abstract, or imaginary, "territories" like memories. We cannot 'experience' abstractions because our 'experiences' are structured by abstractions. Do you believe that 'real numbers' or a 'map of Middle-Earth" are phenomena?

Quoting 180 Proof

... isn't anything that occurs a phenomenon? Something that happens ...
— Bylaw
Events are phenomena, abstractions are not.

It seems to me when I am thinking about an abstraction, or abstracting, this is an event. There would be the physiological side of this also.
Quoting 180 Proof

Maps are also territories ...
"Maps are" abstract, or imaginary, "territories" like memories. We cannot 'experience' abstractions because our 'experiences' are structured by abstractions. Do you believe that 'real numbers' or a 'map of Middle-Earth" are phenomena?

If I have a map of New York City. It is a map of NYC and a piece of paper with various inks on it and other physical features. The map is not imaginary.

That said, I would include the mental phenomena involved in imagining as phenomena.

Unless there is some kind of dualism here and amongst the things that happen, those things that are mental are not phenomena and those things that physically happen are phenomena.