Is truth always context independent ?
The sky is blue only applies during daytime therefore in this scenario truth is context dependent.
1+1 = 2 is true in all circumstances because its a calculation performed on numerical values.
In this aspect we get some truths being changeable and some being constant.
But are such statements as the first one of any value to the philosopher when its truth value changes with the conditions (context) from which the statement is made?
On the other hand statements such as the ones in the second examples are tautologies but in a sense are more valuable in modern setting as theyre the basis of calculators and more complex computational machines which we rely on in the modern world.
My question is quite simple.
If truth is not an axiom that can be applied universally then are such truth statements as the first one in this OP useless?
Edit: title changed to reflect correct line of inquiry.
1+1 = 2 is true in all circumstances because its a calculation performed on numerical values.
In this aspect we get some truths being changeable and some being constant.
But are such statements as the first one of any value to the philosopher when its truth value changes with the conditions (context) from which the statement is made?
On the other hand statements such as the ones in the second examples are tautologies but in a sense are more valuable in modern setting as theyre the basis of calculators and more complex computational machines which we rely on in the modern world.
My question is quite simple.
If truth is not an axiom that can be applied universally then are such truth statements as the first one in this OP useless?
Edit: title changed to reflect correct line of inquiry.
Comments (113)
If they were useless, they wouldn't be used. If they were not widely and frequently useful, they would not be so widely and frequently used.
All communication takes place in a context, is coherent only because it contains an internal logic, and is useful only so all participants in a conversation understand both these things. A truth is useless only when one attempts to transpose from one function to another.
Depends on the philosopher and the question that philosopher wants to probe.
Interesting.
Take the following statement below as not only being out of context but also being untruthful.
All red apples are sweet
In the above statement would you say its useless by the mere fact that its out of context or that it is untrue ?
~~~
Now lets turn to a truthful universal statement
Apples grow on trees
The above has informative value in any given context as it informs the uninformed that apples grow on trees.
Quoting invicta
Yes, truths that are modulated according to conditions are useful, if that is what you are getting at.
For instance, I might say about a person's decision to act in a certain way:
If one has the ability to have chosen otherwise, then one has free will insofar as the truth of different possible future outcomes is concerned. That is a pretty basic way of summarizing compatibilism.
But in the second quote you seem to be talking about algorithms. Algorithms - as exemplified by the Turing machine, which can implement any conceivable computer algorithm given enough time and a long enough strip of paper - are processes that we follow to make calculations or solve problems. They do not have to be tautological, or even true, but rather (ideally) efficient, possessing a finite number of steps, and directed at solving some specific problem.
Quoting invicta
It could be useful even out of context if it were an integral part of a list of steps in an algorithm, which doesn't require truthfulness but rather something more contextual directed at solving a problem.
If it were just untrue then it just wouldn't be a good basis for a philosophical argument.
Quoting invicta
This is better for a basis for an argument because it is universally true and also informs.
It's useless in describing apples, but useful in illustrating an untruthful statement for the purpose of discussion.
Quoting invicta
It's informative regarding the provenance of apples - and meaningful to anyone who either wants to know something about apples and is willing to continue the investigation (since, obviously, this snippet of truth is insufficient). It's completely useless in response to such questions as: "What colour is this thing? and "Is this apple sweet?", utter nonsense in the context of celestial navigation and meaningless noise to speaker of Mandarin.
[
The algorithm for determining if red apples are sweet is true.
Step 1 is apple sweet true ? No ? Go step two
Step 2 is red apple sweet true ? No ? Go step three
Step 3 is green apple sweet ? No? Go step four
Step 4 output: green apple sweet no. Red apple sweet no.
//
Step 1 is apple sweet ? Yes/No - unable to determine give input.
Input 50% apple sweet/50% apple bitter
Step 2 determine is apple sweet.
Output Apple 50% chance of being sweet.
Input 3 is red apple sweet? Yes/no, 50% chance
Output 50% chance
In the context of a farmer wanting to grow bitter apples to make Cider then useful, correct? In the context of the same farmer wanting to buy a rocket ship from profits of such farming useful, correct ?
In the context of the purchase of star maps for celestial navigation useful correct ?
In conclusion determining if an Apple is sweet or bitter enables the farmer to go to the stars.
Correct!
Yes, that appears to be correct. But how does that relate to truthfulness? That algorithm is just useful for determining whether red apples are sweet. It doesn't actually tell us that red apples are sweet; we would need to test the two types of apples. That's the point I'm making.
I think he already knows they grow on trees. Quoting invicta
No, it doesn't, and the fact that they grow on trees has no effect on their flavour.
And putting a response in the context of the wrong question makes no point.
Quoting Vera Mont
You are missing the point. Your failure in seeing the relevance of a celestial star map to the cider brewer is about connecting the dots from revenue generation via brewing cider to their ambition to go to space.
Quoting ToothyMaw
The algo would tell you that given enough info whether the apple is sweet or bitter before you even tasted it.
But as a general principle and the point of this thread is that decontextualising some statements can alter its truth value from true, too uncertain to completely untrue.
I say some statements above because there are other statements that are universally true irrespective of context such as 1+1 = 2
I must point out too that theres a subtle difference between knowledge and truth as well with truth retaining an objective relationship to some aspect of reality whereas knowledge being more subjective in some ways such as the personal knowledge that the Apple you just ate is indeed sweet.
That may be so, but it's not in the example you presented. Quoting invicta
No, it can't.
It can, however, render it inapplicable, irrelevant or nonsensical. Just as you demonstrated.
Isnt that the same thing as untrue, uncertain etc I think youre just using different words
That would be a question of mathematics itself and its construction.
Yes signs indicate operation as a given, if they did not then the statement 1+1 = 2 would be meaningless.
I'm using different words that mean different things, because I intend to convey different meanings.
The truth or falsehood of a statement, such as "Mammals are warm-blooded animals." is unaffected by the fact that they are not applicable to question such as "Do apples taste like bananas?"
It doesn't matter how convoluted a line from the taxonomy of animals to the chemical components of flavour, the statement remains true.
I dont understand you here. What are you trying to say ?
Again this is incoherent please can you tell me what youre trying to say as I dont understand the way its been written.
No. Better stay away from mathematics for your "true under any circumstances" example.
The whole apple sequence is.
1. Red = sweet: F
2. Apples grow on trees: T
Neither statement, nor their respective falsehood and truth, is affected by farmers, their nationality, cider press or rocketship.
A The statement is either true or false.
B The statement is either responsive to a particular question, or it is not.
A and B are not interdependent: either, both or neither may be true without affecting the truth or falsehood of 1. and 2.
C: Truth is not context-dependent.
What a sentence says is dependent on it's circumstances (context, language, purpose, consequence, and so on)
Hence it is sentences that are "context driven"; not truth.
What could this possibly mean? Are use suggesting that context "drives" the sentence like a person would "drive" a car, a team of horses, or a herd of cattle? What exactly is context doing here which qualifies your use of "driven", to say that the sentence is driven by context?
it seems to me, that it would be more appropriate to propose that it is what the sentence says (it's meaning) which is true or false, and this, "meaning", is dependent on the context. Doesn't that make more sense to you?
If a truths manifold ways of expression includes sentences via vocalisation as well as visual representation then truth can be context dependent or universal as Ive tried to demonstrate.
For example
All trees have foliage is only contextually true when its summer and partially true as coniferous trees have foliage all year round.
In any given context the below sentence would be true:
All trees are made of wood
Supposing then the farmer utters this sentence in the middle of summer.
Today is a hot day.
The thermometer would agree reading 40Celsius.
These two truth values are not only context dependent but interdependent as a hot day is affirmed to be true by the thermometer reading.
It is context dependent because it would not be a hot day in the middle of winter when the thermometer reads -5 Celsius.
And as the truthfulness of such a statement depends on mutual agreement between two or more subjects then its no longer subjective (context dependent) but objective (context independent) for certain statements only which are subject to change such as current heat level.
To sum up, objectively true statements are only true if accord can be given to them by the subjects to which such a statement applies hence Today is a hot day would no longer be true objectively when the mercury falls but it could be true to an Eskimo whose conception of heat is different to a farmer.
But this does not include certain statements which hold true universally such as Apples Grow on Trees. You could negate this of course by growing your own Apple artificially in a lab without the tree at all (somehow) or statements like the The Earth is Round. Objectively true, no context needed, truth value remains absolute.
That is not a T/F statement; it is a subjective judgment.
A thermometer measures increments of heat; it does not indicate truth or falsehood.
A day is a measure of time, one rotation of a planet; it has no temperature.
The statement as written is a typical human habit: the imprecise use of terminology.
It would be more accurately stated as: "The air feels hot to me today."
If both participants in a conversation have a similar metabolism and speak the same language, the speaker does not need to phrase it this way to get his meaning across, because the hearer automatically fills in the omitted and information and compensates for the misattribution of property.
Quoting invicta
It is just the other way around.
Linguistic intuition and shared experience do not influence objective truth,while subjective truth cannot be verified from independent external sources.
Would you then say that truth is relative in this given scenario.
The temperature is high right now!
(at 40Celsius)
Or would such a statement have no relevance to truth relatively or absolutely?
It is not a T/F proposition; it's an opinion or observation by a conscious entity, made in imprecise language.
In order to be true or false, its non-sloppily worded version would read:
The temperature [ of an unspecified physical substance] is higher [on the Celsius scale] than 39 and lower than 41 degrees.
All comparative descriptions are relative; only true in relation to something else, whether the "else" is stated or not, understood or not. All statements regarding quantity are relative; therefore the term "truth value" is applicable only in a particular context.
It's not the "truth value" of the statement that's in question but the applicability and relevance of the statement to the topic of a communication.
In short, truth is not a property of subjective observations; it resides in the contextual judgment of the observer. The only "truth value" such a statement could have is in the sincerity of the person making it - which can perhaps be verified by a lie detector... if lie detectors were reliable.
"Truth" conceptually is a mess, but I think generally, the idea is that by calling something true, you are asserting it is independent of the context of the speaker, and not that it is context-independent. The logic for why it's independent of the speaker is based on rules, such as the rules of a language. "It is true that the first letter of a sentence should be capitalised in English", for example. Or based on agreed-upon rules for measuring something, like "It is true that Messi is an accomplished soccer player". There is no such thing as "accomplishment", it's a man-made concept, but it's so apparent that Messi should be by any person's account considered accomplished as a soccer player, that one could call it a truth.
"Truth" is an entirely man-made concept, in reality, "truth" doesn't exist, things simply are, I suppose. There aren't necessarily any agreed-upon rules for this, just a test that an individual or group made up. Whether that actually makes this subjective or not, is the thing that's context-dependent, I'd say.
Hmm, agreement between two or more subjects produces truth and objectivity? That sounds like a conspiracy theory to me.
If two or more parties agree by experience that it is currently hot then that is truth.
How do you get conspiracy out of that?
If two parties agree that the moon landings were faked then were in conspiracy territory indeed that is if the majority consensus says that the moon landings were in fact real.
In effect truth is a matter of agreed upon consensus reflecting reality.
If its agreed consensus with no basis in reality then indeed conspiracy.
Truth is self-evident and its power lies in its ability to describe reality.
Triangles have 3 sides.
The ocean is made of water.
The earth is round.
The above three statements cannot be disputed in terms of them being truthful. They are self evident.
Truth is used to convey truthful information to another person and is the progenitor of the scientific method and inquiry.
What is true what is not, is a very important question to ask as it propels one towards the knowable or deception.
Truth remains the truth even if there are no minds to perceive it as reality exists independent of minds. So to claim that truth is man made as you have is to ignore reality as every truth must reflect reality, or the way things are.
Of course it's true: that's how it was invented: What is a triangle? A closed figure with three sides and three angles.
Quoting invicta
What is an ocean? Can you define it anything other than water?
Once you make a general statement beyond the confines of the definition, it becomes debatable; the more description you add and the less precise your language, the farther you wander into subjective territory.
What shape is the Earth?
Quoting invicta
Approximation of a truth; imprecise.
Facts are not man-made, but they are perceived by humans with variable degrees of accuracy and reported with variable degrees of precision - and sincerity.
Family trees?
There are statements which by their nature are undeniable in their claims I.e truth/s
The sun emits light.
Cows dont make eggs
Chickens have feathers until you pluck them.
The heart pumps blood around the body.
@Vera Mont
Which of the above statements would you like to dispute and get anal with?
Ok you can add fake plastic Xmas trees too, you get the gist.
But I don't think you do. Any truth can be set out in a statement. It is the statement that is context dependent, not it's truth.
Is truth always context dependent? Yes, because it is statements that are true, and stements are context-dependent.
:100: :fire:
Thanks (even though its lost on most of them).
As family trees dont refer to actual trees but conceptual generational lineage then that statement seems true regardless of context.
Plastic trees of course undermine in a way, but only in the way I did not anticipate the artificial trees as human invention, thus not real trees.
The oceans on Titan are methane.
Not disputing the truth of facts. I was asking you whether there is any extra information conveyed by repeating the definition of something, and further asserting that the more approximate information you add, the more farther you get from fact and closer to opinion.
Quoting invicta
All of these can be true statements. So can a great many others. Does that make them "context-driven?" Cows won't make eggs, even if you put them in a rocket-ship bound for the moon and translate the sentence to Lunatic.
True if verifiable
Are they still technically "oceans", or do we just use the term because they resemble bodies of water that we observe on Earth? The same can be said of family trees and the tree of life - which are metaphors - and artificial constructs made to imitate trees.
The statement can be easily modified to say
Oceans are made of liquid.
In that case it would hold true if it was on earth or some far flung moon.
Quoting invicta
My family tree is "actual".
Quoting invicta
It'll be true, or it'll be false, whether you are able to verify it or not. Truth doesn't care what you believe. or why.
Quoting invicta
Truth is not an axiom. Axioms are statements that are taken to be true.
So I'm nto sure what you are asking about. Can you paraphrase? "The sky is blue" will be true only if the sky is blue. And, as it turns out, the sky (here, now, as the sun rises) is indeed blue.
The sentence can be modified; the definition of "ocean" can be modified. You can even modify both to the point of gibberish, but that still won't make it context-dependent.
Ah, nice. You have oceans of counterexamples.
You see the word ocean gives context to the whole statement otherwise youre right.
How does the word ocean give context ? It gives context to the liquid mass, for which without it would not be an ocean.
Quoting Banno
Youre finally starting to see the wood for the trees.
This is the point Im trying to make as the sky can appear red when setting. So truth changes value from blue to red.
Quoting invicta
But see Dairy Repro 101: Anatomy and Function in a Dairy Cow
You are saying it wrong. Truth did not change value. The sentence"the sky is blue" was true, and now it isn't. It's the sky that changed, not "truth".
It doesn't. That is a word, and nothing more. If you have a solid (when frozen) definition of ocean, it provides an object or image to place into a senetence, which can then become a communication, which has a context.
But if you've modified the word to where it might as easily be a glass of milk or a barrel of gasoline, then "ocean" no longer refers to large body of salt water. It is meaningless without elaboration: e.g. an ocean of methane, an ocean of counterexamples.
A word which of course refers to a certain large body of water/liquid etc.
If there was no water or liquid upon it, it would just be landmass.
Hence context of words within sentences referring to actual things in the real world being important aspect in articulation of truths.
It's the engineers, again. Worse than christians.
The sky changed colour of course theres no denying that.
The truth changed too because of a lack of constancy in the colour of the sky.
Another truthful statement would be:
The sky can change color.
Its truth wrapped up nicely in a sentence, deny it if you like, youd be denying the truth, the sentence expressing said truth and natural phenomena.
No, what was true changed; the truth didn't.
What you are suggesting in the OP remains unclear, but...
There is a difference between the nature of truth, and the things which are true; between the use of "...is true" and the things which are true or not. The former can remain constant, while the latter changers. SO
holds at one time, and
holds at another; and what changes is the colour of the sky, not the nature of "...is true".
In both cases - indeed, in all cases,
remains so. For whatever statement you substitute for P. in this regard, "...is true" is not context dependent.
'Technically"?
Yes, they are oceans.
Are you being serious here?
I will take it as being serious.
What is the truth then regarding the color of the sky? One of the properties of the sky is its ability to change colour depending on the position of the sun, so both statements are true: the sky is red when it is indeed red and the sky is blue when its blue.
But so what, the truth changed with the colour, why is this a big deal to you ?
Very.
The problem seems to me to be that you have not set out the issue you wish to address with sufficient clarity. And I think that if you were to do so, you might see that there is no issue.
What I would have you notice is that what is changing is the colour of the sky, not the nature of truth.
Think carefully about the difference between the nature of truth on the one hand, and what is or isn't true.
Here's a sentence about the nature of truth: For any statement "P",
Now I think this is pretty much as much as can be said about the nature of truth.
Here's a sentence about the sky:
And another:
Notice that this last is first about the sentence "the sky is blue" and second about the colour of the sky?
Quoting invicta
Indeed, and that is a way to phrase what I have been saying. It is the sky that changes colour. So what is or isn't true can change; but that is not a change in the nature of truth.
Try it this way. Consider
"The kettle is boiling" is true
and
"The tree has three branches" is true.
What changes between these two sentence is the stuff in quotes, not the predicate "...is true". It is the same in both. It does not change with the context.
Compare this with your title.
I do not see how your requirements for what is the truth counteract my OP at all.
Ive distinguished between two types of truths the constants and the variables right from the outset when I laid out my OP, so Im sticking with it as I remain unconvinced by your assertions so far that truth is unchangable and not derived from context or independent of context.
The point of my OP is to defend both the changeable and unchangeable truths (constant and variable)
i.e. both contextual truths and truths holding on their own independent of context.
I'm not at all sure what it is you are saying in you OP, so I am not in a position to say if what I say is agreeing with or "counteracting" it.
I guess I'm trying to understand what your claim is.
You now say that it is about "two types of truths"... Are you talking about "triangles have three sides " as opposed to "the sky is blue"? Well, one might argue that there are different types of statements, say necessary and contingent; or a priori and a posteriori. But that's again not saying that there are different types of truth.
And Quine can be read as saying that these two distinctions cannot be made clear. HIs empiricism says roughly that even supposed necessary truths can be subject to review.
Again, my point is the simple, small one that you seem to be talking about different sorts of sentences, but mistakenly saying that these are different sorts of truths.
There is only one sort of truth.
Exactly that! Thank you
You claim that there is only one sort of truth, well I claim that there are two. Constant truth which never changes night or day and the variable type that changes the colour of the sky night or day.
You get me rudeboi!
That's two different sorts of sentences, not to different sorts of truth.
If we were to both take pictures of the sky where we are being in opposite sides of the world my sky would be dark yours would be blue.
We would of course both be right and both be truthful in our assertions relating to the colour of the sky.
Yes.
Quoting invicta
Yes.
So what.
So what ? Truth is not constant, perhaps re-read my op.
But its also constant.
Instead you wrote "Is truth always context independent".
https://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-metaphysical-muddle-of-lawrence-krauss-why-science-cant-get-/10100010
So what are we to make of this self-contradiction?
My simple answer is that truth remains constant, but that what is true can vary by context; and that your analysis did not pick up on this distinction.
Then you agree with everything that Ive said and the duplicitous nature of truth so far discussed that it it always stays the same for some statements (truths, a la all triangles have three sides) and that it changes for in other statements (colour of sky)
Quite the opposite. That reality is ineligible is the conclusion of the scientific process.
Science works. Therefore the universe is intelligible.
Other way around Banno - its the fact that the world is at least in part intelligible that science can get a foothold. Intelligibility is a presupposition.
No.
Truth is not duplicitous. It is simple. "P" is true iff P. That's all there is to it. The "...is true" in "It is true that triangles have three sides" and "it is true that the sky is blue" are the very same. What changes is the other bit of each sentence.
And, seperate point, there is an historical division between sentences that are considered to always be true, and sentences that change their truth value according to circumstance. In his pivotal essay "Two dogmas of empiricism" Quine showed that this doesn't seem to work.
Instead, it's that we can tell stories about how things are that leads us to conclude that the world is ordered.
Theyre very different statements whose value however remains true of the former (a priori) and changes for the latter (empirical), as Quine rightfully investigated, although I was not aware of it until you brought it to light.
Your cited article does odd things with italics, but so far as I can tell the flow is that Krause wrote his book because he is scared of god. I wouldn't count Krause's musings as science. But what he does show, and what is avoided in the essay you cite, is that god is not necessary to explain the universe.
I might be wrong, there might be an actual argument in there. But I don't see it. So if there is, set it out.
Strictly, Quine's target is the analytic/synthetic distinction. This seems to be what you are so vaguely addressing. His main argument is roughly that there is no account of analyticity that is not circular. There are more problems with the distinction.
The conclusion is something like that treating supposed analytic statements as foundational is fraught with problems, and that some form of holism is needed.
Krause is confused on the issue of nothing that is all as he defines it as empty space i.e. dimensional which is not the same as nothingness (lack of all dimensions, space and time) from which no particle can pop into existence virtual or not.
His whole book revolves round this whole false premise.
With the corollary that sometimes overreaches what can be concluded from what we know.
Indeed. Many atheists (Massimo Pigliacci, Susan Haack, for two) bemoan Krauss' lack of philosophical knowledge and his crude reasoning.
The point which I think the OP wishes to convey is the distinction between necessary and contingent truths.
Or is it that between analytic and synthetic statements - which is not quite the same thing?
Yep.
What if what these two agree to, is contrary to what everyone else is claiming? For example, if two parties conclude by their own experience that the earth is flat, or that the sun revolves around the earth, while most other people are telling them otherwise, does that make it true? Sounds like the beginnings of a conspiracy theory to me, because then those two would have to explain why everyone else is conspiring against them.
What I think you've sensed is about the distinction between contingent and necessary facts. In philosophy, this is explained in terms of the difference between a priori and a posteriori facts - meaning things that can be known by reason along (like arithmetic facts) as distinct from things were are dependent on circumstances (like the colour of the daytime sky).
There is an enormous history of discussion of those distinctions, but a pivotal moment was David Hume's distinction of the two kinds. The textbook examples that Hume gave are such statements as 'all bachelors are unmarried', which is true by virtue of definition, that bachelors are unmarried men. An example of an a posteriori fact was that 'all swans are white', which was certainly true in Hume's time as no Europeans had yet set foot in Western Australia, where there are black swans. Hume went on to cast doubt on the logical status of the latter kind of facts, those being dependent on experience and custom, thereby undermining the status of causal relations which until then had always been assumed to be grounded in logic. This was a fork in the road for Western philosophy.
However this was later addressed in Kant's famous 'answer to Hume'. Very briefly (and literally thousands of volumes have been written about it) according to Kant, causality is not an empirical concept at all - that is, it is not derived from experience - but a necessary condition of experience. It is one of the categories of the understanding by which we make sense of experience. In other words, we do not derive our knowledge of causality from experience; rather, we bring our concept of causality to experience, which allows us to understand and interpret experience.
I interpret @Banno as coming from the 'plain language' school of analytical philosophy, which is not about any kind of abstract knowledge of truth, but only about what can meaningfully be said. This uses the famous last words of Wittgenstein's Tractatus ('That of which we cannot speak...') as a kind of firewall against many kinds of previously-contested metaphysical questions. That kind of 'deflationary' approach is typical of much of 20th century philosophy, particularly in the English-speaking world.
But I think there's a deeper, underlying issue. I think in traditional (pre-modern) culture, there was a larger conceptual place for the 'unconditioned' or 'non-contingent' category of truths, which over the transition to modernity has gradually been eroded away. I think it's because the idea of the unconditioned is associated with the God idea which is of course anathema (pardon the irony) to secular culture. That's why I mentioned the review of Lawrence Krauss. The writer's point about the 'anxiety over contingency' draws out the issue of the limits of empiricism and the attempt to avoid the implications of that.
In fact Krauss has been criticized by a number of other reviewers for his failure to grasp the limits of empiricism, or put another way, his attempt to use empirical science to make metaphysical statements (e.g. see David Albert's review in the NY Times which provoked a notorious hissy fit from Krauss.) But the article I linked to, gives a much fuller account of the meaning of 'intelligibility', as distinct from what it calls Krauss' 'animal extroversion' (which basically means taking naturalism as a metaphysic. Notice the reference to Bernard Lonergan a Canadian Catholic philosopher who is considered a representative modern exponent of metaphysics.)
Much more could be said, but that at least points in the direction I think the OP is trying to head.
Quoting Banno
Are you drawing a distinction between being context driven and being context dependent, or are you simply contradicting yourself?
I would agree with your second sentence that both statements and their truth or falsity are context dependent.
This is a tantalizing notion and you can't help wondering, if we add (as Kant does) space and time to our cognitive apparatus, what is it we are 'really' able to apprehend about the the world via empiricism? Are the regularities we seem to observe part of the universe or a part of us? How are we to understand the capacity to make predictions work in such a context?
The hard part is working out what counts as metaphysical insight if we are locked in to a world of appearances and cognitive limitations.
Q: Where would you look in modern English-language philosophy for discussion of the concept of 'the unconditioned'?
A: In modern English-language philosophy, you might look for discussions of the concept of 'the unconditioned' in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of religion. Some specific philosophers and works that address this concept include:
Immanuel Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason": In this work, Kant discusses the idea of the unconditioned in his critique of rationalism, arguing that human reason cannot reach knowledge of the unconditioned because it is beyond the realm of possible experience.
Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time": Heidegger explores the concept of the unconditioned through his analysis of human existence and the structures of being that underlie it. He argues that the unconditioned is the "groundless ground" of all that exists, and that it can be accessed through a process of "authentic" self-discovery.
Alvin Plantinga's "Warranted Christian Belief": In this work, Plantinga defends the rationality of belief in God by arguing that the concept of the unconditioned is essential to any adequate account of human knowledge and that belief in God provides a coherent explanation for the existence of the unconditioned.
David Lewis's "On the Plurality of Worlds": Lewis explores the concept of the unconditioned through his analysis of possible worlds and the idea of a "compossible" set of properties that can coexist without being dependent on each other.
Graham Harman's "Object-Oriented Ontology": Harman argues that the unconditioned can be accessed through a process of "withdrawal" in which objects reveal their hidden, inaccessible aspects.[/quote]
I would have nominated the first three, the second two I have heard of, but would not have thought of them.
You can add the Sufi tradition here too, I think - the notion Wahdat-ul-Wujood (the Unity of Being) all that that exists is held within god and all truth and the universe arises out of god (it's a kind of ground of being idea) but I am not an expert.
Are you just saying that there are some sentences that are always true and some sentences that aren't?
Im saying that there are two different sentences that can refer to truth. The difference between such sentences is that in one the truth value of it can change such as the sky is blue. In others it remains constant and never changes such as all triangles have 3 sides.
So yes!
Isn't that exactly what I said? Some sentences are always true and some aren't.
Yes I think I repeated myself.
Its worth noting Bannos view point that truth is one, (my objection is that yes it is one, but the sky changes colour so the value of truth no longer holds true) but that statements making truth claims are divided into two categories as explained above.
Is there a difference between these two sentences?
1. A triangle is a 3-sided polygon
2. "Triangle" means "3-sided polygon"
@Michael they appear to be the same sentence arranged differently?
"The truth is true and that's the truth", that's a good argument, I hadn't thought of that, thanks for enlightening me.
Just a standard posteriori statement. Factual but would need verification. Its a constant truth however as he will always be the 46th no matter who or what comes after himself.
1. A triangle is a 3-sided polygon
2. "Triangle" means "3-sided polygon"
3. Joe Biden was elected the 46th President of the United States
4. It is raining
Some make a distinction between a priori truths (1), and a posteriori truths (2, 3, 4), and others make a distinction between constant truths (1, 3) and non-constant truths (2, 4).
Is there some significance to these distinctions?
What if I distinguish between truths about the weather and truths about things that aren't the weather?
I wished to draw distinction and better understand the objections to the division of sentences in reference to claims that always hold true and claims that only hold true in some situations.
For lack of terminology it could be as simple as the a priori Vs posteriori division but it is not, as posteriori refers to truths verifiable and knowable via experience it does not delve into the variability of truth that some sentences reflect such as the sky is blue.
Next step is to deal with Quine. Then Chomsky. Then Davidson.
What I struggle with in terms of modern philosophy is when it gets technical and employs technical terms such as the ones youve mentioned, analytic, synthetic etc. It did start with Kant in his definition and distinction between such statements namely the priori posteriori split which become split further.
Yet the question in my mind always relates to truth and truth only and these complications that came afterwards with Kant and Hegel (synthetic) although a logical or even necessary step in the evolution of philosophy was a sideways development rather than upwards progression of the concept of truth.
Not a distraction either as the distinction is important however no such terminology was employed by the Greeks.
In terms of importance to overall philosophical thought Id say its minor.
Kant went to all the trouble to develop these terms, only for others to show that they don't much work.
Most folk hereabouts seem to stop at Kant, and apart from the fashionable Nazi, not bother with stuff from last century, let alone new stuff.
Can I commend Two Dogmas of Empiricism to you.
Analyticity is a central topic, in that one's approach towards it has import for one's approach to logic, and hence to what it means to do philosophy well.
The truth values of indexical propositions are context dependent. [sup]SEP, W, IEP[/sup]
For example, uttering "I am the CEO of IBM" will be right for one person (or zero), false for others.
Other propositions work differently.
Here true/false are taken to be properties of propositions.
You are assuming a few things, though understandably. Your measure of useful is based on the success science has had, which, as you say, is due to the certainty, predictability, consistency, etc. of its method (that it does not matter who does the scientific method).
Philosophy (that not peeled off historically as science) does not have this luxury of mathematical certainty, but judging whether its truths are useful is the desire to make philosophy be science, to require certainty, to avoid our part in our human truths. That we accept them and stand behind them, not in the sense of an opinion, but such, for example, that philosophy is not meant to explain, but to describe what you then might see for yourself, and in reaching to see and think in a way more than just certain knowledge, we change and become a better version of ourselves.
So are philosophical truths dependent on context? You wont get far outside of the non-contextual abstract universalized pre-determined fixation philosophy has without considering how context plays a part in how we have truth-value despite not being analogous to mathematical criteria.