Epicurean Pleasure
Epicurus' theory of pleasure is more complicated than the usual theory of desire where one is fulfilling a lack, and any lack from basic hunger to a refined wine palette fits within the model. link
[quote=Letter to Menoeceus]We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure. Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing.[/quote]
As I understand the theory there are three kinds of pleasure: natural and necessary, natural and unnecessary, and groundless. As examples of the kinds: thirst, sex, and immortality.
The ethical goal of Epicurean philosophy is to cure the soul of its anxieties which arise from desire, and thereby live a life of tranquility in spite of the vagaries of fortune. The groundless desires are ones that simply cannot be fulfilled, and yet people still want them -- no one wants to die, and yet everyone will die. But the worry of death is what makes life less pleasant, rather than death itself, so it's better to let go of that desire than it is to pursue it. Pursuing groundless desires is what leads to human misery.
For the natural and unnecessary desires these are fine as long as one doesn't worry about them (and note how "fine" works differently here because it's a hedonic ethic -- it's not fine to worry because the whole point of Epicurean ethics is to be tranquil and happy, not because it's a sin)
For the natural and necessary desires these are the ones a person is supposed to focus upon. They are the easy ones to satisfy or to resist -- pain and pleasure alike. To get an idea of how austere this is:
I bring this forward for ethical consideration because I think Epicurus' theory gets at what I'd term is good in life but while also acknowledging human limitations. While it doesn't sound moral to our ears to pursue pleasure as the central motive for doing good there's a certain sense in which people are kinder to others when they are happy, and crueler when they are frustrated. Further Epicurus' theory gets at something fundamental about desire -- that our desires can be the reason we are unhappy, rather than us being unhappy because we're not satisfying those desires, and so the cure of unhappiness is to remove the desire rather than pursue it. Which is a very different kind of hedonism from our usual understanding of the word since it's centered around limiting desire such that they can always be satisfied and you don't have to worry about them rather than pursuing any and all of them.
I was thinking about my own self-chosen dogma due to the dogma thread. The hook might be: "Why not hedonism?", but in this qualified sense.
[quote=Letter to Menoeceus]We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure. Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing.[/quote]
As I understand the theory there are three kinds of pleasure: natural and necessary, natural and unnecessary, and groundless. As examples of the kinds: thirst, sex, and immortality.
The ethical goal of Epicurean philosophy is to cure the soul of its anxieties which arise from desire, and thereby live a life of tranquility in spite of the vagaries of fortune. The groundless desires are ones that simply cannot be fulfilled, and yet people still want them -- no one wants to die, and yet everyone will die. But the worry of death is what makes life less pleasant, rather than death itself, so it's better to let go of that desire than it is to pursue it. Pursuing groundless desires is what leads to human misery.
For the natural and unnecessary desires these are fine as long as one doesn't worry about them (and note how "fine" works differently here because it's a hedonic ethic -- it's not fine to worry because the whole point of Epicurean ethics is to be tranquil and happy, not because it's a sin)
For the natural and necessary desires these are the ones a person is supposed to focus upon. They are the easy ones to satisfy or to resist -- pain and pleasure alike. To get an idea of how austere this is:
Again, we regard independence of outward things as a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but so as to be contented with little if we have not much, being honestly persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of it, and that whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win. Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain of want has been removed, while bread and water confer the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate one's self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.
I bring this forward for ethical consideration because I think Epicurus' theory gets at what I'd term is good in life but while also acknowledging human limitations. While it doesn't sound moral to our ears to pursue pleasure as the central motive for doing good there's a certain sense in which people are kinder to others when they are happy, and crueler when they are frustrated. Further Epicurus' theory gets at something fundamental about desire -- that our desires can be the reason we are unhappy, rather than us being unhappy because we're not satisfying those desires, and so the cure of unhappiness is to remove the desire rather than pursue it. Which is a very different kind of hedonism from our usual understanding of the word since it's centered around limiting desire such that they can always be satisfied and you don't have to worry about them rather than pursuing any and all of them.
I was thinking about my own self-chosen dogma due to the dogma thread. The hook might be: "Why not hedonism?", but in this qualified sense.
Comments (46)
Me too.
Quoting Moliere
Indeed. Philosophy educator Alain de Botton wrote I nice essay on this in his early book The Consolations of Philosophy.
This passage struck me and rings true for the wealthy, ostentatious people I've met.
Feel pity for the guy driving the Maserati - he's just working hard to be noticed and loved. :wink:
Heh. This gets to the heart of where I have problems with Epicureanism as spoken of by The Master -- he recommends against politics for the same reason that it causes anxiety, which it surely does, and yet I still feel that pull.
But there's the curious case of Cassius.
Focusing so much on invulnerability, which was a major philosophical theme at the time so it makes sense, is also another point of departure for me. This dovetails with the above. It's not to be impervious to fortune, but to be able to feel and go with the flows of fortune with tranquility.
I like the letters because that's where I began.
We're similar in spirit then. I hate cars -- nothing has caused me more anxiety in my life than all the things I have to do to do cars. But I am nowhere near as austere as The Master recommends -- if I am one then I'd say I'm a bad Epicurean :).
But I'm still Punk rock! Kind of. Not really. Sympathetic. (just to riff on 80's counter-culture)
Alain de Botton's remark reminds me of Thorstein Veblen's theory of Conspicuous Consumption.
This speaks to:
Quoting Moliere
The entanglement of the personal within 'the scheme of life' cannot be dissolved but there are degrees of freedom regarding the 'habits of emulation.' I think that Foucault's The Care of the Self is a close examination of this "Epicurean" virtue.
Thanks. That's that's come up a bit. I need to find time to investigate it.
I am fascinated by how possessions seem to be used to construct a kind of wish fulfilment identity and manage feelings of inadequacy.
The first and the second relate to what I mentioned in the dogma thread -- that superstition or cosmic significance ("supernatural" in that thread) are easy paths to anxiety. If you believe everything you do is judged by god in the here and now and in the afterlife (the first and the second doctrines, in my interpretation) then you will pursue groundless desires that can never be fulfilled -- the afterlife isn't the life you have to deal with, and the gods are already perfect so don't think anything about you.
I think I've explained the third doctrine in the previous posts on pleasure.
The fourth one has always been the hardest for myself, in trying out this way of thinking and living. But my second post about being "impervious" (resistant?) to pain due to having so much joy is something that's making a lot of sense to me as explanation.
Avoid pain, seek rewarding work and loyal friends, live simply and stop fretting about how other people are messing up? Could some customized variation on that theme work for you?
I generally avoid/shun anyone who adheres to any ism with rigidity and persistence.
As a general rule it helps to pursue pleasure where you do not expect to find it and measure the lasting pleasure gained through work and commitment. Advice given though is usually due to ones own failings in following it! :D
Heh, never. I read philosophy, which means I'm interminably unsatisfied ;). On a more personal note I think I grab-bag because I see resonances and also balances between philosophies -- so, for instance, Marxism-Anarchy holds both a resonance and also they balance one another. Something like that. Still working it out.
The doctrine shouldn't be ignored. I say "The Master", and thought I should include Epicureanism in my list of dogmas, because of Martha Nussbaum's Therapy of Desire -- whom I owe a deep debt to. The Garden, in terms of the community, was dogmatic in the same way that a hospital is dogmatic. The Doctor knows how to set a bone, and The Master knows how to cure your soul. Why would a doctor listen to the opinion of a non-practitioner? At least, this is how I've been able to make the most sense of the Epicurean philosophy so far.
Quoting I like sushi
True, but it's a therapy of desire rather than the elimination of, or freedom from, desire. At least in this rendition -- obviously these are ancient texts and we can read things in various ways. And because of my general existential outlook I'd say one has to actually want ataraxia in order for the therapy to begin to work. Nietzsche is a good contrast case, here. From Thus Spoke Zarathustra:
If one wants to be filled with passion and pursue great deeds, inventing new values in a continual process of puissance and overcoming then the words of Epicurus look like advice to get good sleep, rather than advice on how to be truly good.
So as with any ethic there is a normative dimension to its prescriptions, and we might choose to emphasize different norms. In a grand sense what unites both of these ethics is the focus on freedom, but their ideas of what constitutes freedom of the self differs -- one emphasizes joy and tranquility, and the other emphasizes nobility and striving (ever striving!).
I don't think so. Doctors - and yes, I do want to see that diploma from a reputable medical school on his wall, and read the patient feedback on his web listing - study all the technical details of their trade for years and then practice under close supervision for several more.
Anybody can call himself a philosopher. Especially the ones that have been dead a long time are not required to pass any rigorous testing....
.... except my own scrutiny.
(Of course, my soul isn't broken. My heart has been, but it used to heal by itself when I was younger.)
If a full regimen as prescribed by a Master works for you, that's great.
I say The Master because I think that's the appropriate way to read the texts -- Epicurus was a dogmatist in the same way that a modern doctor is a dogmatist, in that you don't allow people to opt-in to sickness. I don't say it because he is my master.
Maybe it's best to say that Epicurus is one of the philosophical masters that I think people should study because there's something good in there.
I'm not sure I understand that correctly. Okay, you don't opt in or out of sickness, but not all doctors are dogmatic in the sense of the dictionary meaning of dogma. (I do know the word is a rugby ball around here.) Some doctors adhere to a very strict treatment method, while some are more open to alternative medicine; some welcome patient input and a wide latitude in decision-making, while others are authoritarian.
And I suppose every founder of a "school" from Plato to Jung to Gropius to Escoffier has been dogmatic about their system.
But you absolutely do determine, have only your own sense to determine, the condition of your spirit. Others, including psychiatrists and gurus, may diagnose and prescribe, but only you can decide what works for you.
At least this is how the texts make sense to me.
And to make things even more confusing I'd point out that sometimes we don't really know what works for us, and others can tell better than we can. The only refrain here is to double-down on the value of individual freedom over other values.
But there's a hint there -- one of the goals of the Epicurean cure is autonomy. So what Epicurus aims to remove from the soul without your permission are the very things which inhibit a person from being free.
But surely there's no rule for that.
Invariably. Once the student surpasses, rejects or proves the master wrong, he must go build his own school somewhere else.
Of course, that's all hearsay - credited only because the dogmatism of masters is a given.
Quoting Moliere
By overruling you, or rolling over you.... not quite my definition of freedom. But that's okay: none of them would take me as an acolyte any more than I could accept them as masters.
Sure.
What if I'm hurting myself, though?
If goodness is living a tranquil life, and tranquility is what leads to independence, then the material conditions of freedom aren't exactly being satisfied if I'm chasing groundless desires out of anxiety.
Which goes to show different faces of freedom -- in one freedom is an individual choice and inhibiting that choice is what deprives one of freedom. In the other freedom is the ability to choose from tranquil desires rather than from groundless desires -- since the anxious desires tend to build on themselves and make one un-free.
It's the state of mind, rather than one's formal rights, which define freedom.
The main reason I like the ancients is because, through study, you can start to get a sense for how different life was back then which gives a basis for understanding how life is now.
To get an idea across I say I'm an Epicurean-ish person, but in thinking through the implications I don't think it's really possible due to the practices of Epicureans. There's a philosophy we can piece together from the quotes of others and study, and I think it's a worthy and worthwhile philosophy -- but the community is long dead. And looking at the efforts of stoics it's apparent to me that reviving ancient communities still manages to ignore the important political problems of the day.
Ethics as a personal quest rather than as a way of life.
And while you don't need Epicurus to see that difference, it is a remarkable difference to note for understanding ourselves -- then there were masters of ethics, and now:
Quoting Vera Mont
Many people call themselves philosophers, and they are on offer like a buffet for each individual to pick and choose as they see fit.
Which is different from the way the Epicurean philosophy reads, and is different from the way the Epicurean philosophy was practiced.
As human beings, however, we have reduced anxiety when we do not attribute cosmic significance to the world, and so the naturalization of experience -- demystification -- is appropriate not because of the power it brings over nature, but rather because of the peace of mind it brings someone to realize that the sun doesn't rise because we sacrifice goats, but due to momentum and the way of nature. The mantras you say are for you, and not for the gods or nature. You have no magic powers.
So even knowledge is put in a secondary position. In my reading Epicurus is a practioner of ethics as first philosophy.
That's why I put that school in with the Pythagoreans, Zen, Bauhaus and Kellogg - because they're holistic lifestyle regimes, rather than stand-alone philosophical theories. The immersion method is exactly what some people need -- but it must be one that corresponds to their actual life situation and the options available to them. Anything you can't move into for six months is just theory: interesting, often edifying, but external.
Quoting Moliere
What if you are? You may be a professional prizefighter, ballerina or soldier and nobody thinks it's any of their business. If you are seen to do certain kinds of self-harm, you may be deprived of your liberty by legal authority and placed in an institutions. But modern human rights codes generally allow people to overindulge in food, drink, sex, extreme bodybuilding, masochistic relationships, conspiracy theories or sleep-depriving, stressful occupations.
Either it's your life, your choice, your responsibility or it's someone else's.
Cool. Then I won't re-iterate the point :).
Quoting Vera Mont
Yup! So goes it with Epicureanism. The closest I could find were Buddhist study centers, but the emphasis was different enough for me -- I was looking for something more materialist than what I encountered. I did do a lot of gardening at the time, though... and still love gardening (I'd like it if I ever get access to a plot of dirt again).
I've always preferred the immersion method, though I'd call it the phenomenological method. Combining gardening, buddhism, and Epicurean philosophy with a few academic monographs I got a coherent feel for the philosophy at the way-of-life level, but then I had all the thoughts I've already expressed about the lack of a community and how it's very much a long dead way of life out of time.
That, or something like it may already exist. https://www.ic.org/directory/communes/
Or you can start one. Modern intentional communities are whatever the participants want them to be.
I'd say that our legal system is doing the work for us here -- Epicurus made a decision as to when it was time to intercede on the basis of self-harm, and we have to make that same decision collectively if we ever believe it's OK to act against someone else's will for their own good.
Quoting Vera Mont
Starting one wouldn't be the same, would it? Not for the method of immersion, at least. That would be a creative move rather than listening and letting go to see where a particular way of life leads in practice.
The reason I chose Buddhist centers is Epicureanism is variously described as greek Buddhism, and there are enough resonances between the thoughts that I thought it worked as a living tradition that's close enough. (though, clearly, I eventually decided that was wrong)
Of course not! There's a world of ranges from passive acceptance through degrees of participation to creation. They're all available options to a free human.
But the Epicurean wouldn't care that their life is a private affair. In fact, if we adhered to the code that would be the right thing to do.
And, on the flip side, if one is dedicated to a political life, Epicureanism serves as a counter-balance to making that a total life philosophy -- the impulse to totalize can be tempered with an opposing philosophy.
In the end the resolution is only in how we actually act. The philosophies are for reflection on that, but regardless of the justification we're the ones who own the choices we make. So there's an existential element to my approach to ethics. In fact I don't think we can re-create that era when there were ethical masters, so in a way the existential approach is forced on us by our circumstances.
If you want to be involved in politics on the large scale, you have to get involved in politics. there is no clean, safe, happy way to do that atm. It's a fairly binary choice - not because of philosophical or ideological conflict, but just because of where we are in history.
Answering my own hook question: that's where the hedonic ethic starts to fall short. There are some circumstances, namely political, which the hedonic ethic is incomplete for. I believe this is true for all ethical philosophies. They are good-at or good-for, rather than good simpliciter or an arbiter of all action allowing us to once and for all categorize our actions and choose the good ones. And when they are good-at or good-for isn't subject to a rule: it's a choice which we make.
But in favor of this still counting as a moral realism, rather than the obvious anti-realism that this seems to indicate, I might say that hedonism is the first morality, cribbing from Levinas. It's not always the case, but often enough we look out for ourselves and our pleasures and our people and our projects first, and we are even expected to do so. So if there is a higher ethic, something beyond human beings seeking pleasure, due to us being human we have to find a way to satisfy our hedonism regardless.
And then from Levinas I would depart to Kate Millet's Sexual Politics -- forming a Bildungsroman that starts with human pleasure and integrates sexual, racial, and economic equality as a worthy pursuit. Just tempered by human pleasure and joy -- because while anger is a gift, it's a double-edged one that can turn into rage and hate if left unchecked.
And that's definitely not tranquil.
I don't know about 'higher', but I put avoiding pain - both the suffering and inflicting of pain - should precede the pursuit of even the noblest of pleasures.
I think Epicurus is right on happiness, and I think happiness makes us more willing to do good towards one another, but the world is such that people aren't happy, do cruel things, and the Epicurean philosophy isn't enough to stop them.
You have to want tranquility, and most people are attached to, as Epicurus would say it, groundless desires.
And given that we're a social species, and even more deeply interconnected now through a world economy, what others do matters for the purposes of living a tranquil life.
So there might be a political angle I could work in. But given the time I wouldn't want to make it consequential -- I'd want it to be virtue-theoretic somehow.
I don't think I would, actually. I don't reject or renounce my negative feelings. They're not pleasant, but they're reasonable, necessary; they serve a function and fill a need I could probably explain if I took the time and attention to articulate it - probably; not really sure. In any case, I don't consider them as suffering or pain, possibly because I don't feel as intensely or with such commitment as I did at 20 (when there was an immersive, creative pleasure in being miserable), or even 35 (when I considered it instructive; conducive to empathy toward others). I find that one's perspective on everything, even one's own emotional state, changes over time.
But then another aspect of my life has changed over time: my physical world, and especially my social world, has shrunk, even as my info-sphere has expanded. Perspective is skewed; it's an entirely different configuration and dimensions from what it was 20, 30, 40, 50 years ago.
Then I've misinterpreted you in my own way as I try to mark out distinctions and such.
I agree with this in that I don't reject or renounce negative feelings. I think the Epicurean philosophy can lead one to being even more able to feel those feelings. They are healthy to feel, I think.
Quoting Vera Mont
I'm at about the 20, 30 line -- not the 40, 50 line. But I still can empathize with perspective being skewed, and feeling like everything is different now from whenever.
One of my cravings is for boredom. May I never have another interesting thing happen to me again. I march to the drum of the blinking last man who wants good sleep.
Marching in that state, you're liable to keel over and the rest of the sleepwalkers will march right over you. Not a pretty end for such a pretty cat!
Indeed. Good post!
Quoting Moliere
True, but 'hedonism' as it is often used is more of a philosophical punching bag than something which anyone actually adheres to. Hedonism as a moral philosophy invariably distinguishes between good pleasure-desires and bad pleasure-desires, just as Epicurus does. Even the hedonists who hold that all pleasures are commensurable still hold that there are praiseworthy and blameworthy decisions when it comes to seeking pleasure. In short, hedonism as a moral philosophy must still be at least a prescriptive theory, and not merely descriptive.
I think the misunderstanding arises in no small part from amateur hedonists who, while trying to defend their theory, end up falling back into something which is so safe as to be merely descriptive. Having thus fallen back, they have successfully defended themselves from being wrong, but they have at the same time failed to put forth a theory which says anything substantial, and they also lead onlookers to believe that hedonism is a flat, one-dimensional beast. ...So maybe Epicurus is odd to us in part because we are surrounded by such lazy hedonists. :grin:
A good point. I think of them as untheorized hedonists - they are more likely to be using the term in an undifferentiated fashion to describe 'pleasure seeking' despite the consequences. Dissipated voluptuaries tend to have a limited shelf life.
Quoting Leontiskos
What I've liked about Epicurus is the setting of achievable standards for hedonism - we do not really require all that much in order to be happy. It lends itself to a minimalist spin on the idea of contentment which contrasts well against the avaricious, materialistic acquisitiveness of consumer capitalism, even when pursued at an unambitious, middle-class magnitude.
Yes, I think that's right. And of course there are unreflective individuals who do seek pleasure in an undifferentiated fashion, but this would be 'hedonism' as an unreflective way of life rather than 'hedonism' as a moral philosophy. I think it would be hard to find a moral philosopher who advocates for undifferentiated pleasure seeking.
Quoting Tom Storm
That's a good point. I have been lamenting something of the opposite in Aristotle, who is in some ways elitist. Epicurus provides a way of life which is universally accessible and which can be enacted in greater or lesser ways.