What do we know absolutely?

Reply to Cidat

Even the cogito could be wrong?

We could be il-logical and therefore mistaken that to think we must exist. Or we could be in some kind of illusion such as a simulation with fabricated rules of logic. The cogito is built upon the unprovable assumption that we are thinking logically and our rules of logic are correct.

Quoting Cidat

Besides the cogito, what absolute knowledge do we have?

None. In despite of what many humans hold to be grand truths, our knowledge is always subject to doubt, misconception, expansion, misinterpretation, revision and adjustment. The cogito thingie... I guess you have to start someplace. There couldn't be any knowledge without a knower of some kind. We do need a fairly strong basis to believe we exist, but we can never be 100% certain of our own identity.

I answer this hear if you're interested in something serious and not surface level. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

What do we measure knowledge with if not with our lifetime? There was no possibility of knowledge prior to birth, nor will there be after death.

I suppose, if forced to speculate, that if I really attempt to focus on what happened the few instances prior to the spark of consciousness arose, there was just total "darkness", for want of any word whatsoever.

If I extrapolate that state prior to being conscious, to a future state in which I will no longer be conscious, then I suppose the best "knowledge" I have, is that there will be "darkness" for a very long time.

Assuming there is no afterlife, or reincarnation and so on.

If we can dispense with the doubt that everything is possibly an illusion and therefore an epiphenomenon of an underlying truth, there are many indisputable facts. Why wouldn't these facts count as a provisional kinds of absolute knowledge.

I need to absorb water to survive as a large mammal currently. This doesn't eliminate the possibility that I could survive without water in some unknown future by some novel physiology but many would agree the fact is indisputable.

Quoting Cidat

Besides the cogito, what absolute knowledge do we have?

Aren't there problems with the cogito? Assuming that there is an 'I' doing the thinking. And what exactly is it we know about thinking?

I worked for many years with people experiencing schizophrenia, many of whom have thoughts they can't explain and that they believe not to be their thoughts. Thought insertion is a fairly common phenomenon.

Within certain systems of thought, rigorously defined, there are absolutes. Mathematics, for instance. In general it's best to avoid any such perspective. Except death and taxes.

Quoting Cidat

Besides the cogito, what absolute knowledge do we have?

The cogito is a tautology; if it is true that I think, that there is an "I" that thinks, then of course it is also true that I exist. Something is going on, that much we know, and thinking certainly seems to be one of the things going on. Perception is another, sensation is another, desire is another: if it is true that there is an "I" perceiving, feeling, desiring, then it is also true that I am.

All our knowledge is relative...to how things appear, so in that sense none of it is absolute. We can think 'absolute' as the binary opposite of 'relative', but it does not follow that we can know anything absolute.

Quoting Cidat

...absolute knowledge...

Are you asking, what is indubitable? Beyond doubt?

There's a lot of work to be done here, sorting out knowledge from certainty and belief and doubt and truth and so on.

Quoting Nils Loc

Why wouldn't these facts count as a provisional kinds of absolute knowledge.

Only because no single individual knows all of them. We each know some facts we're sure of - mainly regarding such simple physical matters as what we require to survive. As a species, we also pool such knowledge in repositories available to the human community. When we each draw information from such a repository - library, internet, tribal chronicles, rock art - we trust it and rely on. Does that make the knowledge absolute?
Close enough for practical purposes, but not 100%. It always needs updating, correcting, adding detail.

Reply to Cidat Reply to Nils Loc :chin:

IMHO, I absolutely know that no one has "absolute knowledge" of everything (including 'the Absolute').

Reply to 180 Proof Yes, we know that because it is impossible.

Quoting Banno

Are you asking, what is indubitable? Beyond doubt?

I think what is being asked is more than that. Some things are indubitable, but only within a context or contexts. The idea of absolute knowledge as I understand it refers to knowledge which is both true, indubitable and transcendent of all and any context; an obvious impossibility.

A universal negative judgment is absolute.

Quoting Janus

The cogito is a tautology; if it is true that I think, that there is an "I" that thinks, then of course it is also true that I exist. Something is going on, that much we know, and thinking certainly seems to be one of the things going on. Perception is another, sensation is another, desire is another: if it is true that there is an "I" perceiving, feeling, desiring, then it is also true that I am.

Does something being a tautology make it false, if it’s really so? A tautology, just because it’s one, isn’t a falsity.

Quoting Janus

All our knowledge is relative...to how things appear, so in that sense none of it is absolute. We can think 'absolute' as the binary opposite of 'relative', but it does not follow that we can know anything absolute.

How do you understand the term “absolute”?

Quoting Tom Storm

Aren't there problems with the cogito? Assuming that there is an 'I' doing the thinking. And what exactly is it we know about thinking?

What makes something an “assumption,” according to you?

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

Aren't there problems with the cogito? Assuming that there is an 'I' doing the thinking. And what exactly is it we know about thinking?
— Tom Storm

What makes something an “assumption,” according to you?

It's not about what I think assumption means. The idea of thinking assumes there is a thinker - that's essentially what the cogito says, right? "I" being the thinker ('therefore I am'). Here's one issue; I have known many people who experience thoughts who are convinced those thoughts are coming from someone else. How do we determine that any thinking you experience is yours, that there is a you, an 'I am'? In relation to "I think therefore I am' Nietzsche also argued that there is an assumption being made that there is thinking and that I know what thinking is.

Quoting Tom Storm

The idea of thinking assumes there is a thinker

So, the thinker is assumed but the idea of thinking isn’t? What makes it that the latter isn’t but the former is?

Quoting Tom Storm

I have known many people who experience thoughts who are convinced those thoughts are coming from someone else. How do we determine that any thinking you experience is yours, that there is a you, an 'I am'?

Doesn’t the fact that those people think that presuppose that they’ve already determined themselves as thinkers in contrast to others? If not, how could they think that they were getting thoughts from someone else, i.e., distinguish between a sender & a receiver mind (so to speak)?

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

So, the thinker is assumed but the idea of thinking isn’t?

No. I already made this point. Both are assumed.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

Doesn’t the fact that those people think that presuppose that they’ve already determined themselves as thinkers in contrast to others? If not, how could they think that they were getting thoughts from someone else, i.e., distinguish between a sender & a receiver mind (so to speak)?

The salient point is that there may not a straight forward 'I am' as the Cogito suggests. The experience of thought insertion leads some folk to doubt that they are a self and that their thinking may not be their own.

A thread such as this is always amusing.

There's the argument, never quite made explicit, that since we can put "absolute" in front of "knowledge", it follows that we don't actually know anything. Reply to Vera Mont seems to think something along these lines, although perhaps their argument is that because we are occasionally mistaken about what we think we know, we therefore do not know anything. It's a bit of pop philosophy, a bowdlerised fablsificationism or simplified pragmatism. But it's wrong.

Because you do know stuff. Like which draw your socks are in and what your phone number is and occasionally even where your keys are. It takes training in philosophy to deny this. And even more philosophy to learn otherwise.

There's the view of philosophy as needing a foundation of certainty, a replacement for the by now mortally dismembered Cogito. It doesn't occur to folk that we might start with the location of the socks and keys, with the confidence of our everyday activities; such things just don't seem sufficiently profound. And philosophy is no fun if it is not profound. So off we go, Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole.

And there are the many sages, mostly retired engineers, it seems, who suppose of a sudden that a lifetime spent working with databases and counterweights has uniquely prepared them to answer the many questions those silly philosophers have been unable to solve, but who mostly havn't understood the question in the first place.

And there's the occasional curmudgeon, grumping about the good old days when the quality of posts was so much higher and how the young folk nowadays wouldn't know a bad argument if it hit them in the arse.

Not I, of course.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

Does something being a tautology make it false, if it’s really so? A tautology, just because it’s one, isn’t a falsity.

Tautologies don't tell us anything about the nature of things.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

How do you understand the term “absolute”?

It means 'not relative', not relative to any other thing or context.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

A universal negative judgment is absolute.

Meaning what? All our judgements and knowledge, whetger true or false, are relative to us, so none are absolute.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

So, the thinker is assumed but the idea of thinking isn’t? What makes it that the latter isn’t but the former is?

Thinking is experienced, the thinker is not; the thinker is an idea, an artefact of thinking. There must be thinking if there is an idea of a thinker, but it doesn't follow that there is a thinker, since the thinker could be nothing but an idea.

Quoting Cidat

Besides the cogito, what absolute knowledge do we have? That is, besides the cogito, is everything we claim to know temporary (that is, may go away during our lifespan) or is some knowledge absolute (never go away during our lifespan)?

There is absolute knowledge.

Quoting Banno

although perhaps their argument is that because we are occasionally mistaken about what we think we know, we therefore do not know anything.

That's nowhere near what I said. I said, we have plenty of knowledge, both individual and pooled, that's accurate enough for practical used, but it's never prefect, complete or absolute.

Quoting Vera Mont

Close enough for practical purposes, but not 100%. It always needs updating, correcting, adding detail.

At 7:53 PM EST on July 24 2023, the person with the avatar name "creativesoul" posted on a philosophy forum.

Since when is perfection and omniscience necessary for knowledge???

:worry:

Quoting creativesoul

Since when is perfection and omniscience necessary for knowledge???

Yes, why make any criteria for absolute knowledge impossible. Instead we could just rely on ordinary language as when someone says "I know with absolutely certainty at this time that..." and said knowledge also can't reasonably be doubted, Is accepted as universal fact.

I'm absolutely certain at this time that if we remove your head from your body by whatever method you will die. No one can dispute this without an appeal to some extreme contingency or medical miracle that doesn't currently exist. That I know there could be hypothetical exceptions just further informs the perfection of such knowledge.

Maybe the next Black Swan will be a Talking Bodiless Head... Then we will just get used to the fact that some people don't die by absolute decapitation.

Quoting Vera Mont

I said, we have plenty of knowledge, both individual and pooled, that's accurate enough for practical used, but it's never prefect, complete or absolute.

Maybe. Or maybe you hadn't actually considered what you were claiming. We know you read my post, since you replied to it - it's too later for you to pretend otherwise.

Knowledge is not green either, and was never meant to be. Was it ever meant to be "perfect, complete or absolute"? Perhaps such terms are no more applicable here than "green"...

All this by way of pointing out that we do know things, and not just for practical purpose. Reliance on pragmatism comes from looking only at a limited set of cases. We know lots of things.

Quoting Banno

We know you read my post, since you replied to it

A well chosen example. People on this forum accuse each other of responding to posts they haven't read, but as you note that's simply impossible. We all know for a fact that @Vera Mont read every word of your post before she clicked on the little arrow.

Quoting Janus

Tautologies don't tell us anything about the nature of things.

They actually do, just no novel information.

There’s no way to argue that “X = X” can’t express “the nature” of “X,” granted that it doesn’t express any (relatively) new information about it.

Quoting Janus

It means 'not relative', not relative to any other thing or context.

Is what’s “not relative to any other or context” conceivable? If not, why do you speak on something that’s not thought?

Quoting Janus

Meaning what? All our judgements and knowledge, whetger true or false, are relative to us, so none are absolute.

... “relative to us.” Does that imply that if wasn’t relative to just “us,” it’d be “absolute”; that is, that it’s just because that it’s just related to “us,” that it’s deemed “relative”; as if a relation to someone beside(s) “us” would qualify it as “absolute”?

Or are you saying that any relationship excludes a thing from being “absolute”?

Quoting Tom Storm

No. I already made this point. Both are assumed.

... & you’ve yet to define what disqualifies a thing from being “assumed” or an “assumption.” When I first asked you, this was your response...
Quoting Tom Storm

It's not about what I think assumption means.

This may be one of the least philosophical things that I think that I’ve ever heard (no disrespect is meant here, truly). Of course what you think a word means within your argument is significant. If it’s meaningless to you, how am I ever to grasp your meaning?

Quoting Tom Storm

The salient point is that there may not a straight forward 'I am' as the Cogito suggests. The experience of thought insertion leads some folk to doubt that they are a self and that their thinking may not be their own.

Saying & thinking a thing are two different things. In other words, just because something is vocalized doesn’t mean that it’s true.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

They actually do, just no novel information.

There’s no way to argue that “X = X” can’t express “the nature” of “X,” granted that it doesn’t express any (relatively) new information about it.

I think that the only information about things is given by their relations, not by their identity. Identity itself is nothing without difference.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

Is what’s “not relative to any other or context” conceivable? If not, why do you speak on something that’s not thought?

But the absolute is thought as the polar opposite to the relative.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

Or are you saying that any relationship excludes a thing from being “absolute”?

I'm saying that the nature of anything which depends on its relations with other things is relative, not absolute. In philosophy, historically speaking, the only entity which qualified as absolute was the Absolute: namely God, because God was thought to be the only being whose existence did not depend on anything else.

Quoting Janus

I think that the only information about things is given by their relations, not by their identity.

Quoting Janus

I'm saying that the nature of anything which depends on its relations with other things is relative, not absolute.

According to you, is there a smallest possible relation? If so, how many members comprise it?

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

According to you, is there a smallest possible relation?

Do you mean relations between the smallest possible things?

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

o. I already made this point. Both are assumed.
— Tom Storm
... & you’ve yet to define what disqualifies a thing from being “assumed” or an “assumption.” When I first asked you, this was your response...
It's not about what I think assumption means.
— Tom Storm
This may be one of the least philosophical things that I think that I’ve ever heard (no disrespect is meant here, truly). Of course what you think a word means within your argument is significant. If it’s meaningless to you, how am I ever to grasp your meaning?

The salient point is that there may not a straight forward 'I am' as the Cogito suggests. The experience of thought insertion leads some folk to doubt that they are a self and that their thinking may not be their own.
— Tom Storm

Saying & thinking a thing are two different things. In other words, just because something is vocalized doesn’t mean that it’s true.

If you can't grasp my meaning there might be bigger problem here than you being concerned about what an assumption is.

In fact, it's hard to imagine you don't understand it since you used the same word in the same way as me when you wrote this:

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

So, the thinker is assumed but the idea of thinking isn’t? What makes it that the latter isn’t but the former is?

What have I missed? You seemed to have grasped my point rather well for someone who doesn't understand how assumption was being used. And it remains curious that you missed me saying this:

Quoting Tom Storm

there is an assumption being made that there is thinking and that I know what thinking is.

So we seem to agree on this point and I don't think there's a serious quibble about words being used.

Do you have any thoughts about the actual point being made? I'll concede it's not especially interesting of itself.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

Saying & thinking a thing are two different things. In other words, just because something is vocalized doesn’t mean that it’s true.

Agree. But where did you get the idea that something is being presented as 'true'. And what's this about saying and thinking? We know that the cogito was an attempt to identify that which cannot be doubted by a person. The point I made was that thought events do not necessarily convince everyone that there is an "I" at the centre.

Even a cursory glance at Wikipedia's pedestrian entry on cogitio ergo sum lists philosophers who make similar arguments -

The objection, as presented by Georg Lichtenberg, is that rather than supposing an entity that is thinking, Descartes should have said: "thinking is occurring."

One critique of the dictum, first suggested by Pierre Gassendi, is that it presupposes that there is an "I" which must be doing the thinking. According to this line of criticism, the most that Descartes was entitled to say was that "thinking is occurring", not that "I am thinking".

What do I think about these arguments? They are interesting but I'm not sure. I'm here to understand the range of views.

Reply to Tom Storm
Do you know of any compelling arguments/evidence against the existence of 'I,' as representing
I think therefore I am, as opposed to thinking exists, therefore thinking has A source, but we can't confirm with 100% surety, what that source is.
My thinking happens within my brain and your brain functions separately/independently from mine.
What evidence currently exists to refute this?

I like the example of:
Think of a film title.
Now think of another film title.
Why did the two titles manifest to/in you in the order they did, and why those two film titles, as opposed to all others your brain has stored?

Did 'I' make the choice of film title 1 and film title 2, as an act of free will? Did I use some criteria to make the choice, almost in auto mode? As I had to respond quickly?
Did some external source make the choice for me? In which case, my thoughts are not fully my own, dualism is probably true, we have no free will and the universe is deterministic.

If 'I' does not really exist then does dualism, determinism and no free will, then not follow?
I currently don't find any arguments for any of these 3 proposals, convincing, do you?

Quoting universeness

If 'I' does not really exist then does dualism, determinism and no free will, then not follow?
I currently don't find any arguments for any of these 3 proposals, convincing, do you?

Well, the real question is probably if 'I' isn't there, then what is? And the answer to this is, fucked if I know. :wink: There are philosophical views which would consider you and I to be dissociated alters of the same eternal conscious mind. But as you might say, do we have sound evidential warrant to accept this?

I'm just interested in the various understandings regarding this foundational and hoary chestnut of philosophy - the cogito, that is.

Quoting universeness

My thinking happens within my brain and your brain functions separately/independently from mine.
What evidence currently exists to refute this?

This seems to be the case. But we are getting perilously close to a layperson's discussion on neuroscience and consciousness.

Are you convinced by the cogito as a foundation for certain knowledge that can withstand doubt and skepticism?

Quoting Tom Storm

And the answer to this is, fucked if I know.

I think this is the best answer most current humans should offer, on most of the current 'big' questions, as it's probably the most honest one. It is certainly my most honest response. The rest is just an exchange of personal opinion, based on limited understanding of the scientific field involved. It still remains interesting to hear the musings of others to compare with my own.
I freely admit that non-scientific opinion, for me, falls somewhat beneath my interest in the scientific musings of myself and others.

Quoting Tom Storm

Are you convinced by the cogito as a foundation for certain knowledge that can withstand doubt and skepticism?

I would not assign any aspect or concept of knowledge as ever being outside of the reach of doubt or skepticism. I am deeply comforted by that, as it means I am immune to accepting proposals like god/perfection/infinity etc as truth.

Reply to universeness :up:

Quoting Banno

Knowledge is not green either, and was never meant to be. Was it ever meant to be "perfect, complete or absolute"?

Since the word 'absolutely' appears in the thread title, I thought it appropriate to address. Perhaps I was wrong. Perhaps I should say, rather, that however perfect and complete other people's knowledge of trivial facts may be, my own knowledge is never absolute.

Quoting Vera Mont

my own knowledge is never absolute.

Are you certain of this?

Quoting Banno

Are you certain of this?

99.99% certain

Randomness does not exist. Some possibilities are merely impossible.

Quoting Vera Mont

99.99% certain

You mean one time in every ten thousand you act as if you're omniscient?

Go you!

Quoting Isaac

You mean one time in every ten thousand you act as if you're omniscient?

Very possibly - doesn't everyone? I wouldn't have been aware of it if I behaved that way, or recall how many times it happened. I can only tell you the degree of confidence I have in my present state of knowledge.

Quoting Isaac

Go you!

Indeed. And now what?

Quoting universeness

My thinking happens within my brain and your brain functions separately/independently from mine.
What evidence currently exists to refute this?

Well... this is besides the bickering between the two of you, but...

The evidence that currently exists which refutes and/or falsifies the claim that "your brain functions separately/independently from mine" is the very words you used. Language bridges the gap between your brains. It connects them. Connected things are neither separate nor independent.

Quoting Vera Mont

99.99% certain

Ah, a number. That must make you feel so much more confident...

Quoting Banno

That must make you feel so much more confident...

Does speculation about my possible feelings make you feel more confident?

Quoting Janus

Do you mean relations between the smallest possible things?

Sorry, but, no. I mean exactly what I asked: according to you, is there a relation wherein the number of members can’t possibly decrease, i.e., a “smallest possible relation”? If so, how many things comprise it, i.e., is it in the single, double, or however many, digits?

Quoting Janus

But the absolute is thought as the polar opposite to the relative.

A lot of this turns what you mean precisely by “polar opposite,” & yet that’s ultimately unimportant, so allow me to ask you: does the definition of “x” include “not-‘x?’”

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

Sorry, but, no. I mean exactly what I asked: according to you, is there a relation wherein the number of members can’t possibly decrease, i.e., a “smallest possible relation”? If so, how many things comprise it, i.e., is it in the single, double, or however many, digits?

Sorry, I'm not trying to be difficult, but the question is incoherent to me: I cannot get any conceptual grasp on it.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

A lot of this turns what you mean precisely by “polar opposite,” & yet that’s ultimately unimportant, so allow me to ask you: does the definition of “x” include “not-‘x?’”

From memory and roughly paraphrased, Hegel said something like "every determination is a determinate negation". So a tree, for example, is defined as much by what it is not as what it is. It is not a shrub, or a mountain, a river, or an animal. This is how the game of "twenty questions" proceeds.

Quoting Tom Storm

In fact, it's hard to imagine you don't understand it since you used the same word in the same way as me when you wrote this:

Quoting Tom Storm

What have I missed? You seemed to have grasped my point rather well for someone who doesn't understand how assumption was being used. And it remains curious that you missed me saying this:

L.o.l.,, why won’t you just (simply) define “assumption”? It’s actually quite funny that you won’t & avoid it by referring to a single reader for the purpose, such as myself.

Although, yeah, I used it however you originally or firstly used it, as a term to describe things. Yet I never considered a definitive definition for it because I was ready to use it, & thus ultimately understand your meaning, in whatever way you were to choose to express your argument.

You literally just said that both the thinker & the idea of thinking are assumed. I just then merely asked you, for affirmation, if you mean that the thinker & the idea of thinking are assumed, i.e., is that how you’re choosing to describe them? To which you replied positively. Okay, now that that’s out in the open, the next is question is or was: what do you mean by an “assumption,”i.e., what makes something an “assumption”? Yet you refuse to do that, oddly yet not surprising enough. If you go this whole time without defining it, that’s really something, l.o.l..

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs I'd like to go this whole discussion without defining it.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

You literally just said that both the thinker & the idea of thinking are assumed.

I literally did not. I said I had described these as assumptions, as a concern some might have. I was in fact referencing Nietzsche. You may notice from the conversation that I have no particular commitments in this space. I am simply interested in the various responses to the cogito.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

the next is or was: what do you mean by “assumption,”i.e., what makes something an “assumption”

A you and I both know, an assumption is like a presupposition, or something which is taken as a given.

What do you think of the cogito as a foundation of indubitable knowledge?

Quoting Janus

Sorry, I'm not trying to be difficult, but the question is incoherent to me: I cannot get any conceptual grasp on it.

It’s quite simple actually... do multiple things make up a relation? If so, what’s the fewest amount of things that can form a relation? If you don’t get the question now, then, yeah, I think that you’re just being difficult, l.o.l.. Yet that’s no problem.

Quoting Janus

From memory and roughly paraphrased, Hegel said something like "every determination is a determinate negation". So a tree, for example, is defined as much by what it is not as what it is. It is not a shrub, or a mountain, a river, or an animal. This is how the game of "twenty questions" proceeds.

So, you’re saying that the definition of “x” includes “not-‘x,’” or the definition of tree includes not-tree?

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

It’s quite simple actually... do multiple things make up a relation? If so, what’s the fewest amount of things that can form a relation? If you don’t get the question now, then, yeah, I think that you’re just being difficult, l.o.l.. Yet that’s no problem.

I understood it that time. In theory something could have a relation with just one other thing, but I doubt that is possible in actuality. Take anything you like: I think the relations that thing has with other things cannot be quantified.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

So, you’re saying thar the definition of “x” includes “not-‘x,’” or the definition of tree includes not-tree?

Yes.

Quoting Janus

Yes

So that means that you accept that “x = not-x,” or “a tree = not-a-tree.” I’m sorry but there’s no greater reduction to absurdity than that, being led to say that a thing is not what it is.

It’s now to be understood why your theory on relativity is, in my opinion, incomprehensible (no disrespect is meant here). It’s because the basis of your view is contradictory.

Quoting Tom Storm

I'd like to go this whole discussion without defining it.

L.o.l., man, that’s hilarious.

Quoting Tom Storm

I literally did not.

So, you didn’t say...
Quoting Tom Storm

No. I already made this point. Both are assumed.

... ???

Yeah, bro, it’s cool, man, l.o.l.. Leave it alone, man, it’s cool.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

So that means that you accept that x = not-x, or a tree = not-a-tree. I’m sorry but there’s no greater reduction than that, saying that a thing is not what it is.

No, it does not follow that if something is defined in terms of not being something else, that it is that thing. In fact, it's precisely the opposite, the tree is defined, not only in terms of what it is, but what it is not.

Quoting Vera Mont

You mean one time in every ten thousand you act as if you're omniscient? — Isaac


Very possibly - doesn't everyone?

No. I think you're on your own there. I can't recall a time where I became convinced that I know everything there is to know. But hey, next time it happens to you, perhaps have a crack at one of the millennium problems, could be your route to fame and fortune.

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs Interesting response, it sounds like you are determined to distort my account.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

So, you didn’t say...
No. I already made this point. Both are assumed.

That's right I didn't say it, I paraphrased the point which has been said by others. Let's look at the full quote together and the context.

Quoting Tom Storm

Nietzsche also argued that there is an assumption being made that there is thinking and that I know what thinking is.

You had added this as a point (about thinking being assumed) yourself after me as if it hadn't been said yet.

I was trying to reference what people have said about the cogito. You were hung up on a word.

Are you happy with the word assumption/presupposition or not? I'm very happy to hear an alternative word. I'd be even happier to hear what you think of the cogito, which seems not to have come up in all this.

But if you want to pass that's cool too.

Quoting creativesoul

The evidence that currently exists which refutes and/or falsifies the claim that "your brain functions separately/independently from mine" is the very words you used. Language bridges the gap between your brains. It connects them. Connected things are neither separate nor independent.

A computer can act forever, as a stand alone device. A human brain can also function as a completely stand alone device (hermitical human). You can connect computers together in a network by wired or wireless means and allow them to communicate, via language/code. Human brains can also network via language/code, yes. But, networking is optional, and is not evidence that refutes the existence of 'I.'

Quoting Tom Storm

Descartes should have said: "thinking is occurring."

“….. I take the word ‘thought’ to cover everything that we are aware of as happening within us, and it counts as ‘thought’ because we are aware of it. That includes not only understanding, willing and imagining, but also sensory awareness…..”
( Principia Philosophiae, 1. 9., 1644)

Pretty indicative of occurring, I should think.

Still, there will be those that insist heartbeats are thoughts…..occurring inside and conscious of, and all that…..hence the advent of a proposed substance not the kind to be laid out on the cutting table.

Quoting Mww

Pretty indicative of occurring, I should think.

No argument there, but Lichtenberg's point (which I must have made unclearly or I am not following you) was that he might have said instead thinking is occurring and not also the latter part therefore I am. This, as I wrote, has been questioned by some and I kind of get it. But it's not going to convince all.

Quoting Tom Storm

thinking is occurring and not also the latter part therefore I am.

So would you be more attracted to 'thinking is occurring (as a presupposition), therefore I probably am?
To me, the best we can do individually, is analyse what we 'think' we know, and assign our own personal level of conviction/credibility towards the available positions. I am 99% convinced that me, myself and I exist. I am still quite attracted to the fact that I genuinely experience 3 contributors, when I think about an issue. They debate the merits of a point. Overall, I could call them a collective that I refer to as 'I.' But, I am also happy to call them me(Rcomplex), myself(Limbic system) and I(cortex.) This is in no way novel, but it does seem to match what goes on inside my head.
As you say, we are not discussing real neuroscience here but, as I said, I have always experienced these three contributors. Do you have any commonality with that experience?

Quoting universeness

So would you be more attracted to 'thinking is occurring (as a presupposition), therefore I probably am?

Good question. I guess I am ok with 'I think therefore I am' as a presupposition. I'm just exploring the notion that if Descartes can imagine a reality wherein an evil demon has created an illusion of a world around us, then why did he assume the thoughts he experienced were his or that they were thoughts? Could an evil demon not also broadcast thoughts into one's mind? Might we in fact be many people in one body, etc...

Many people experience thoughts as someone else's in their heads. This would be enough to doubt the 'I am.'

It's not a huge point with me but it's kind of interesting.

Reply to Tom Storm

Oh, so….I think, therefore thinking is occurring? I get it, but that reflects on Reply to Janus’s note on tautological truths and minimal relations, in that the switch wouldn’t lead to a productive philosophy. He wasn’t interested in the thinking, which was never in doubt, but only in that which thinks, and that as something other than object.

Reply to Tom Storm All of the alternatives you listed seem to me to fit well within the "I am" category. They don't seem to be actual alternatives to "I think, therefore I am", they are just counter intuitive notions of circumstances that correspond to "...I am"

Quoting Tom Storm

Many people experience thoughts as someone else's in their heads. This would be enough to doubt the 'I am.'

I think 'I' can be perceived as singular or as a collective, without destroying the independence or individuality of me, myself and 'I' as an individual thinking agent with intent and the ability to create meaning and purpose. This is what cogito ergo sum, indicates to me and divine hiddenness is evidence that no god exists that can demonstrate cogito ergo sum and 'I am that I am,' in my opinion, is a very poor, irrational and incoherent competitor to cogito ergo sum.

A computer program is a singular program, but it's also a collection of code instructions. Each instruction is singular but is a collection of binary digits. Each binary digit is singular but represents a range of voltages (in the case of BInary digiT 1) and the absence of any voltage but over a collection of moments or durations of time (for the case of a BInary digiT 0). A human though is singular but also involves a neurological process, involving many separate events. Each event is a collective of ......., and on and on we go.

All such paths must eventually lead to quarks, quantum fluctuations, and a regress back to a cause for the origin of the universe, which an individual can choose to push back, much much further, into cyclical time aeons, using something such as Roger Penrose's CCC. You can also just decide that the posit of an eternal cosmos or 'energy,' is the only final solution. If you want to insist that is what god is, then I, as an atheist, am ok with that. I would accept that rather meaningless label. It's only when someone insists that such a god, is an absolute thinking agent with intent, that I start to accuse them of irrational thinking.

Quoting Isaac

I think you're on your own there.

And here. OK

Reply to Cidat In logic there are two kinds of arguments (inductive and deductive), an inductive argument means the argument is either strong or weak based on the strength of the evidence. So the conclusion of an inductive argument is more or less likely (probable) based on the strength of the evidence/reasons. The point being, is that the conclusion doesn't follow with absolute certainty. However, the conclusion may follow with a very high degree of certainty. So, again the conclusion isn't absolute but it's still considered knowledge if the evidence is strong enough. Most of what we know falls into this category, including science.

Deductive arguments, on the other hand, follow with absolute certainty if the argument is sound (i.e., it has true premises and it's valid). Deductive arguments are proofs in the strict sense, i.e., they follow with absolute necessity if they are sound. So yes we can know things with absolute certainty.

Finally, it's not a matter of knowing that we exist (Descartes cogito). It's a brute fact that's not in need of justification. What would it mean to even doubt one's existence? Explaining this would take us into Wittgenstein.

Well the term "absolute" is relative, as it is compared to a reference standard. The question is: who gets to decide what is the standard? Thus the question devolves into a question of perspective.

Reply to LuckyR There are other uses of the concept absolute, but it seems pretty clear to me what is meant by absolute certainty. We're referring to an epistemological concept, not some use apart from epistemology. Although, given the many theories of epistemology I'm sure that there are other uses. I'm defining absolute certainty as something that necessarily follows, i.e., we know with 100% certainty as opposed to some probability based piece of knowledge (inductive reasoning).

Who decides what the standard is? Language users decide what the meaning of our concepts are based on how we use the concept in a variety of contexts. There is no committee or person that decides unless there is a new discovery that requires a new concept. It's not just a matter of perspective, i.e., I can't just use words any way I want, although today people think they can.

Quoting universeness

The evidence that currently exists which refutes and/or falsifies the claim that "your brain functions separately/independently from mine" is the very words you used. Language bridges the gap between your brains. It connects them. Connected things are neither separate nor independent.
— creativesoul

A computer can act forever, as a stand alone device. A human brain can also function as a completely stand alone device (hermitical human). You can connect computers together in a network by wired or wireless means and allow them to communicate, via language/code. Human brains can also network via language/code, yes. But, networking is optional, and is not evidence that refutes the existence of 'I.'

False analogy. Irrelevant.

Humans are not computers. Boolean logic is not equivalent to native tongues/common languages. Common language acquisition is not optional. So, the comparison is a false analogy on its face. That's enough, really, to dismiss the counter you offered.

There is no "I" without common language. There is no common language without shared meaning. There is no shared meaning without a plurality of language users. There is no plurality of users without others. Hence, there is no "I" without others. There is no "I" without a belief system replete with self-identification stemming from common language use.

None of this refutes the existence of "I", nor was I trying to(hence, I prefixed the original objection by saying it was completely beside the point of the ongoing quibble it was dissected from). Rather, this is only meant to help you recognize that the statement "your brain functions separately/independently from mine" is false on its face. It doesn't. It cannot. It's impossible, because you cannot unlearn common language while continually using it. You cannot 'disconnect' all of the meaningful correlations that you've long since drawn between language use and other things, including the use of "I" and yourself.

All this only to say that our brains do not function separately/independently from each other. Language bridges the spatiotemporal gap with shared meaning, shared belief, shared thought, shared understanding. If your brain functioned separately and independently of every other brain, you would not even have the capability to say so.

Quoting Sam26

Finally, it's not a matter of knowing that we exist (Descartes cogito). It's a brute fact that's not in need of justification. What would it mean to even doubt one's existence? Explaining this would take us into Wittgenstein.

As I understand it Kant asserted that every thought is. implicitly at least, an "I think", but he does not take this to entail that the I is something, a substantial entity, that is itself something more than a thought. Kant saw the I as a kind of master thought that is implicit in all the others.

It is not a matter of doubting our own existence, but of knowing what we are. the most immediate certainty is that there is thought, sensation, feeling, experience. It does not follow that there is any substantial entity thinking, sensing, feeling, experiencing,

Quoting Janus

It is not a matter of doubting our own existence, but of knowing what we are. the most immediate certainty is that there is thought, sensation, feeling, experience. It does not follow that there is any substantial entity thinking, sensing, feeling, experiencing,

Nice - that's what I was getting at.

Quoting Janus

It does not follow that there is any substantial entity thinking, sensing, feeling, experiencing,

What does 'substantial' bring to 'entity' in this statement? Recall the Aristotelian term that was translated as 'substance' was 'ouisia' which is much nearer in meaning to 'being' than what we normally mean by 'substance' ('a material with consistent qualities'.) So does this mean that there's no being who thinks, senses, feels, etc?

Quoting Janus

Kant saw the I as a kind of master thought that is implicit in all the others.

Isn't this where Kant's theory of transcendental apperception comes in? Which is designated in Kant as the transcendental ego, and was also accepted by Husserl.

Reply to Cidat

There are no absolutes; I’m absolutely certain of it. :wink:

Reply to Quixodian Well there are conceptual or abstract entities: for example numbers or generalities. An entity as I use the term is anything identifiable, whether concrete or abstract.

'Being' for me is a verb, not a noun, an a tivity or process, not a substance. So be-ing is an activity that goes along with thinking, feeling, experien ing,

Quoting Quixodian

Isn't this where Kant's theory of transcendental apperception comes in? Which is designated in Kant as the transcendental ego, and was also accepted by Husserl.

Right, but I don't accept the idea myself: I think it is underdetermined, and that it seems more plausible to think that there is a primordial sense of self associated with the body's perceived difference from the rest of the world, and that sense gets transformed in thought into the "master" thought of "I".

The other point is that the idea of an actual transcendental ego is meaningless without thinking it as a transcendent substance, which would take us back to Cartesian dualism, and if we think of it as just an idea, then it is no different than the idea of a "master-idea-as-self". Such an idea would then be transcendental only in the sense that it is not empirically observable, but then no thoughts are, so in that sense all thoughts would be transcendental.

Reply to Tom Storm :cool:

Quoting creativesoul

False analogy. Irrelevant.

It's better to offer your argument and your evidence before you state your conclusive opinions.

Quoting creativesoul

Humans are not computers.

Computers are an attempt to simulate/emulate the human brain.

Quoting creativesoul

Boolean logic is not equivalent to native tongues/common languages.

It what way? Based on what evidence?

Quoting creativesoul

Common language acquisition is not optional. So, the comparison is a false analogy on its face. That's enough, really, to dismiss the counter you offered.

I stated that networking is optional, not common language acquisition. Don't accuse me of a false analogy I did not make and you just made up.[/quote]

Quoting creativesoul

There is no "I" without common language.

So to you, the deaf, dumb and blind kid has no 'I' before they learn to communicate through touch?
Helen Keller had no inner notion of an 'I' identity before she was tought to communicate through a common language of touch? Is that what you think?

Quoting creativesoul

There is no common language without shared meaning. There is no shared meaning without a plurality of language users. There is no plurality of users without others. Hence, there is no "I" without others. There is no "I" without a belief system replete with self-identification stemming from common language use.

I disagree. If I was placed here at birth and was maintained by a lifeless system until I was able to take care of myself and I never experienced or communicated with another human, in my life, then I think I would still be able to experience an 'I' identity, as different from the flora and non-human fauna around me.

Quoting creativesoul

None of this refutes the existence of "I",

We agree on that.

Quoting creativesoul

Rather, this is only meant to help you recognize that the statement "your brain functions separately/independently from mine" is false on its face. It doesn't. It cannot. It's impossible, because you cannot unlearn common language while continually using it. You cannot 'disconnect' all of the meaningful correlations that you've long since drawn between language use and other things, including the use of "I" and yourself.

Well, thanks for 'trying to help me, ' in the way you suggested but I think your arguments are incorrect for the reasons I have already given.

Quoting creativesoul

All this only to say that our brains do not function separately/independently from each other. Language bridges the spatiotemporal gap with shared meaning, shared belief, shared thought, shared understanding. If your brain functioned separately and independently of every other brain, you would not even have the capability to say so.

Again, incorrect, imo, for the reasons I have already given.

Quoting Mikie

There are no absolutes; I’m absolutely certain of it.

Paradox is such fun!

Reply to Mikie

Exactly. When it comes to human opinions, being certain is about as meaningful as the amount of effort it takes to say "oops" when what one is certain about is shown to be in error.

Quoting Banno

Because you do know stuff. Like which draw your socks are in and what your phone number is and occasionally even where your keys are. It takes training in philosophy to deny this. And even more philosophy to learn otherwise

Absolutely. Why do we have to know absolutely? I personally start from the (pretty obvious) assumption that 'everybody knows something.' That people know things is evident. The complications arise when we try to systematize what we know in an attempt thereby to know more. Sometimes it works, improved theoretical knowledge can lead to improved practical knowledge. The best example of this is the periodic table of the elements.

Quoting Mikie

There are no absolutes; I’m absolutely certain of it.

There is an absolute.
But I don't know anything about it.

Quoting Banno

Because you do know stuff ... It takes training in philosophy to deny this.

This is similar to the affliction many suffer when the first read psychology and convince themselves that they have various dire psychological disorders.

Socratic skepticism became a victim of its own success. On the one hand, contrary to what Plato's Socrates says, some come to believe that we know nothing, but others come to believe there is a realm of transcendent knowledge, and still others that the problem is methodological, that with the right method all will be revealed.

There are a few ways to not know where your socks are kept. One is pragmatism, in which the location of your sock draw can never be known, but only approximated asymptotically. Such brilliance derives not only from Charles Sander Peirce.

In a recent variation, due to Kant, Hoffman and others, you do not know where your sock draw is, but instead you construct an arbitrary mental video game that supposes the sock draw, allowing you and your ancestors to find their socks and hence survive, presumably by fending off frostbite. But you cannot know that there are socks.

Some will allow you to know where your sock draw is, but only relative to your own understanding. They will have an utterly different approach to socks, based on there own culture or their different experiences, and so develop beliefs about socks that are utterly incommensurate with your own, to the extent that in their world there may not even be sock draws.

Presumably this explains sock puppets.

Quoting Banno

One is pragmatism, in which the location of your sock draw can never be known

I would think that the pragmatist, or some subset of pragmatists, would say that opening the drawer and finding your socks where you claim they there is sufficient for knowing where they are.

Reply to Fooloso4 That'd be Dewy, not Peirce.

Quoting Banno

There are a few ways to not know where your socks are kept. One is pragmatism, in which the location of your sock draw can never be known, but only approximated asymptotically. Such brilliance derives not only from Charles Sander Peirce.

Why is it so hard to tell the difference between someone who knows where your socks are and someone who thinks they know? Why is it so hard to tell the difference even about yourself?

I think there are two issues here, and they are separable: (1) Is the idea of knowledge helpful for modeling our mental lives? (2) What's going on when someone says "I know"?

For the first, no, it's probably not. Even Hume knew that reasoning concerning matters of fact is probabilistic, but we didn't listen. We have probabilistic expectations about our environment and our own state, these eventuate in dispositions to act, and everything is subject to revision as we go.

For the second, I think it turns out Sellars was right, that "I know" puts your claim in "the space of reasons," meaning you commit to the claim and indicate a willingness to attempt to defend it with reasons. If you assure me that you know something, I might take your confidence into account, or I might not, but that depends on a lot of other factors. I won't, as a rule, take it as a fact about you from which I can infer the truth of your claim. Why would I? If you're wrong about one, you're wrong about the other. What does hold, for me, is that reasons to believe you count as reasons to believe what you claim, and that might be very helpful. (For you, this is useless, since you already believe both you and what you claim.)

"I know" is a sort of exaggeration of the reliability of our cognitive state, which makes it suitable for the back and forth of argument, but not as a description of how we navigate the world and keep tabs on our own thoughts. Or maybe it does have some introspective use, as a sort of marker for what is not at the moment being questioned, even if it isn't altogether unquestionable. Some of our ideas, habits of inference, are so close to wired in (I'm thinking of things like the physics we already 'know' as infants) that it takes a lot of work to question them at all.

The final word on this whole socks business:

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

Why is it so hard to tell the difference between someone who knows where your socks are and someone who thinks they know?

It is?

Ask 'em to get you a pair of your socks; if they succeed, then that'll do, won't it?

Quoting Banno

Ask 'em to get you a pair of your socks; if they succeed, then that'll do, won't it?

It'll mostly do, sure, but the question isn't whether the way we talk is fine, of course it is.

I think we ought to have a theory about how we do things like keep track of socks and find them on demand. (Or acorns. Squirrels do more caching than recovering, sometimes much more, but it's not entirely clear yet whether the unrecovered acorns are actually lost.)

And we also talk a lot, so that's more behavior we want a theory for.

The question is whether the sorts of stuff we usually say about the sorts of stuff we usually do is a good start on a real theory of what we do, and there I think it's a pretty mixed bag.

We do tend to treat what we say as a kind of theory, so we say things like "He can get the socks because he knows where they are," or "He can't get the socks because he doesn't know where they are." And that's theory-ish, because it looks like you could make a prediction, right? People who know where the socks are will be more successful and more efficient at retrieving them than people who don't, than people who are just guessing or searching.

But of course you just said that your test for knowing where the socks are is fetching them. That's a no good. We want to be able to sort people first by what knowledge they have and then test the theory that knowledge is predictive of performance.

You can keep your performance criterion like this: sort people first by whether they have successfully performed the task in the past -- pause for a moment and say this is a strong indicator of knowledge -- and then test whether those we've attributed knowledge to out-perform those we haven't.

But that's just induction. There's a flourish in the middle involving the word "knowledge" but you're really just testing whether past performance predicts future performance. Now it's starting to look like this is not a theory of behavior at all, but about how we use the word "knowledge." That is, we're not so much leaning on knowledge as an explanation of behavior, since we've given no independent criterion for its presence or absence, as noting that we make inductive inferences about behavior straight up and then label some behavior "knowing" and some not.

But even as a theory about how we use the word "know" this is pretty weak, because we allow all sorts of exceptions. I might not usually know whether the trash has been picked up but this time I do because I happened to see them stop this morning and take the trash.

Squirrels don't talk about where they've cached acorns; we (at least when doing philosophy or laundry) do talk about where we've put our socks. The fact that we talk about it doesn't change the fact that our sock caching probably relies on abilities we share with squirrels. (They sort and organize acorns, for example.) And that's why a theory of how we talk, though intensely interesting in its own right, is not the same as a theory of how we find our socks.

Reply to Srap Tasmaner

Excellently written.

I think this sums up the issue perfectly. If Bob says "I know the pub is at the end of the road", I don't stand in what is now a car park and stubbornly order a beer because he said he 'knew'. I treat the expression no differently to how I might treat it had he said "I'm quite sure the pub is at the end of the road". I treat the choice of words as an expression of confidence (in that context).

Likewise, someone who 'knows' where his socks are is my estimation of confidence in his likelihood of finding them.

We might build some castles in the air about what metaphysical constructs might be possible to invoke off the back of that connection, but they'd be subservient to the use, not the other way around.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

why a theory of how we talk ... is not the same as a theory of how we find our socks.

There's a paper title in that...

Reply to Isaac

The part I think is noteworthy is that when you claim that P, my reasons for believing you -- your trustworthiness, reliability, honesty, likelihood of having first-hand knowledge in this case, etc -- those now count as reasons for believing that P. That's an incredibly useful inference pattern, so useful that it runs on automatic most of the time: if I'm accustomed to getting the truth from you and you tell me you bought milk, I assume (that is, infer) that you did. Reasons only come into it if your claim has to be defended -- maybe against someone who doesn't know your many fine qualities as an evidentiary source.

And around we go. Suppose now I vouch for you. Our skeptic might have reason to trust what I tell him, but what does he know about my reliability as a judge of other people's trustworthiness? Might never have come up for him, so he'll believe you only to a degree because he doesn't know yet whether I've made the smart move believing you, whether that's something else about me he can rely on.

Reply to Srap Tasmaner

:smirk:

The test for whether someone knows where the socks are is not their reliability, honesty and integrity, but their interactions with socks - variously finding, returning, mending, washing and so on.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

We want to be able to sort people first by what knowledge they have and then test the theory that knowledge is predictive of performance.

Well, no. Knowledge is shown in performance, including linguistic performances. Induction does not seem the right notion to use here.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

And around we go.

Indeed, and around again, if knowledge is understood only as mental furnishing. Knowledge is enacted.

Reply to Banno

Have a nice day.

Reply to Srap Tasmaner And you.