Argument for a Mind-Dependent, Qualitative World

Quoting Bob Ross

P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality. [p ? !q]
P2: Qualities exist (e.g., conscious experience). [q]
C1: The world (which has such qualities) cannot be quantitative processes. [!p] (Modus Tollens)

Modus tollens:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.

Therefore, not P.

Quoting Bob Ross

I would like to share my formulation of an argument for the world being mind-dependent and qualitative; and see everyone's thoughts thereof.

I don't disagree with the result of your arguments - the world is mind-dependent. I'm not so sure of some of the arguments themselves. That being said, what would a mind-independent world be? Is that just objective reality? Is it what was there before there were minds? Did nothing exist before there were minds? I don't think that is a ridiculous idea to propose.

Reply to T Clark

Do you think that the entire world is mind-dependent, or just certain of its features?

Reply to charles ferraro

I like this quote from phenomenologist philosopher Dan Zahavi:

“Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind -and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.”

In other words, you don't have to go as far as the idealism of Bishop Berkeley to posit a world created by our perceptions and cognitive apparatus.

Reply to chiknsld

Hello chiknsld,

Modus tollens:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.

Therefore, not P.

Correct. In my case, it also uses double negation and modus tollens—which I forgot to mention in the argument form:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.
C: Not P.

In my case, Q = ‘!T’, so it becomes:

1. If P, then !T (If P, then Q).
2. !!T (!Q).
C: Not P.

It’s the same form of inference: modus tollens. Granted it also assumes the law of double negation.

Reply to T Clark

Hello T Clark,

That being said, what would a mind-independent world be? Is that just objective reality? Is it what was there before there were minds? Did nothing exist before there were minds? I don't think that is a ridiculous idea to propose.

I would say that objective reality is a mind-at-large, and our conscious experience is a survival-based dashboard of experience of mental events. Since you said you agree that the world is mind-dependent, what do you think that entails or implies?

Also, yes, I think that there was a world before our minds but, under my view, not of all minds.

Quoting Tom Storm

In other words, you don't have to go as far as the idealism of Bishop Berkeley to posit a world created by our perceptions and cognitive apparatus.

Exactly, but it seems some minds are not satisfied with anything that is not black or white. The world must be either completely mind-dependent or completely mind-independent; I just won't have it any other way!

Quoting charles ferraro

Do you think that the entire world is mind-dependent, or just certain of its features?

I like @Tom Storm's answer.

Quoting charles ferraro

Do you think that the entire world is mind-dependent, or just certain of its features?

Where would the line be drawn?

Quoting Bob Ross

I would say that objective reality is a mind-at-large ...

I don't grok your statement. Clarify what you mean by "objective reality" and/or "mind-at-large".

Also, if "the world is mind-dependent", then "mind" is world-independent (i.e. separate from the world, or disembodied), no? Evidence?

Hello Bob! As you are using specific vocabulary, it would help to make your point clearer by also defining exactly what each piece of the vocabulary means to you. What is a quantity by your view? What is quantitative vs qualitative to your view?

Logic only works when you have immutable properties that do not change or are open to interpretation. Definitions often times are immutable based on the internal definitions of the reader, as well as the context in which they can be placed accidently by the user.

Without very explicit terminology, I do not think the proposal can be evaluated.

I'm somewhat of an amateur fossil hunter. It would seem odd to me, that when I find fossils I am not holding the remnants of the bodies of animals that existed a long time ago, but am instead holding... ? I suppose under the 'all is quality' view, I am holding nothing more than mind-dependent qualities - the way the fossil looks, feels, it's texture. It only signifies the past to the degree that I build an explanatory narrative around my perceptions (i.e. there is nothing more to the past than this narrative). But I think what's missing from this account that reduces our existence to 'quality only' is our pre-theoretical lived experience as being human bodies.

When we speak of "quality" what we are really referring to is our bodies sensory perceptions - our visual field is predicated upon our eyes. The senses of taste and smell are bodily - one puts food in their mouth, or holds something to their nose. You cannot touch fossils without hands. It would seem incoherent to think both my hand and its touch are 'in my mind' - my body would be 'in my mind' yet my sensory perceptions are dependent upon my body? It appears nonsensical, especially considering my body will remain when I die, much like these creatures whose fossils I find. You have direct evidence of this every time you eat a chicken - a plate full of bones.

Quoting Bob Ross

P3: If a view multiplies ontic categories without necessity, then it should not be accepted (Occam’s Razor). [p ? q]

Surely this leads to solipsism - why posit minds beyond your own? But I think applying Occam's Razor to ontology is a misapplication. There is no requirement for the ontology of the world itself to be as parsimonious as possible.

I think mind-dependence is misleading. Neither pure subjectivity nor pure objectivity can be conceived in isolation; each requires the other. Aligning with Kant, Cassirer says "the unity of the I does not come before that of the object, but rather is constituted only through it." The universe is dynamic, dynamism requires energy, and energy is the result of a tension between opposites. For a gradient to exist, there must be a high and a low, which are mutually determined. The most absolute opposition conceivable is that of subjectivity and objectivity. The quality of quantity; quantities of qualities.

I have been waiting my entire life for a simple tool like chatgpt...my entire life.

Quoting Bob Ross

Hello chiknsld,

Modus tollens:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.

Therefore, not P.

Correct. In my case, it also uses double negation and modus tollens—which I forgot to mention in the argument form:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.
C: Not P.

In my case, Q = ‘!T’, so it becomes:

1. If P, then !T (If P, then Q).
2. !!T (!Q).
C: Not P.

It’s the same form of inference: modus tollens. Granted it also assumes the law of double negation.

Hi Bob Ross, you cannot apply "double negation" in such a way to the modus tollens without fundamentally changing the structure of this rule of inference. I believe that is what I was trying to tell you, but I know that you will probably understand it better if it comes from another source right? ...hehe (chatgpt let's go!). I went ahead and did you the favor.

You are correct in your concern. Applying double negation in the way described does not align with the standard form of modus tollens and, in fact, changes the logical rule being used. Modus tollens is a valid form of inference, but it should not involve double negation in the manner shown in the argument.

The standard form of modus tollens is as follows:

If P, then Q.
Not Q.
C: Not P.

This form follows the classical rules of deductive logic. However, the argument presented by adding double negation:

If P, then ¬T (If P, then Q).
¬¬T (!Q).
C: Not P.

While this argument might still lead to the correct conclusion, it deviates from the standard modus tollens form and introduces the law of double negation in an unusual way. Double negation elimination is a valid law in classical logic, which states that if you have a double negation (¬¬P), you can eliminate both negations and arrive back at the original statement (P). However, in the context of modus tollens, it is not common to introduce double negation in the premises or conclusions.

To maintain clarity and adherence to standard logic, it's best to present the argument in the standard form of modus tollens without introducing unnecessary double negations. So, the correct form of the argument should be:

If P, then Q.
Not Q.
C: Not P.

In conclusion, the original argument you presented without double negation was valid modus tollens, but the modified version with double negation deviates from the standard form and may cause confusion or misunderstandings.

Reply to 180 Proof
Hello 180 Proof,

I don't grok your statement. Clarify what you mean by "objective reality" and/or "mind-at-large".

By ‘objective’, I mean ‘that which is mind-independent’ and by ‘mind-at-large’ I mean that reality is fundamentally a mind. That mind, however, objectively exists; that is, it’s existence is mind-independent—i.e., it doesn’t manifest itself nor uphold its own existence.

Also, if "the world is mind-dependent", then "mind" is world-independent (i.e. separate from the world, or disembodied), no? Evidence?

The “world” is in that mind (under my view). It is disembodied in the sense that it doesn’t have an organic body if that is what you are asking; and, as for evidence, I would like to focus on the argument I gave in the OP for a mind-dependent, qualitative world.

Reply to Philosophim

Hello Philosophim!

As you are using specific vocabulary, it would help to make your point clearer by also defining exactly what each piece of the vocabulary means to you.

That is fair.

What is a quantity by your view? What is quantitative vs qualitative to your view?

A quantity is ‘an definite amount’ (e.g., 3 m/s^2, 1 meter, 4 newtons, 80 volts, etc.); and a quality is ‘a non-quantity’ (i.e., an indefinite amount)(e.g., the bitterness of an apple, feeling of pain, the redness of an apple, etc.).

Logic only works when you have immutable properties that do not change or are open to interpretation. Definitions often times are immutable based on the internal definitions of the reader, as well as the context in which they can be placed accidentally by the user.

Without very explicit terminology, I do not think the proposal can be evaluated.

True, please let me know if there are any other terms that need defining. I will also put those definitions in the OP. Thank you Philosophim!

Reply to Inyenzi

Hello Inyenzi,

I'm somewhat of an amateur fossil hunter.

That is awesome!

It would seem odd to me, that when I find fossils I am not holding the remnants of the bodies of animals that existed a long time ago, but am instead holding... ?

That, indeed, would be odd; thankfully, objective idealism makes no such postulation: when you examine dead organisms, under objective idealism, you are examining a representation of them, of a real ‘dead organism’. The question becomes: what is the thing-in-itself of which I am representing? Is it a tangible, organic organism like I perceive? Objective idealism postulates that your representation of the organism is of fundamentally mental process; just like how the word document on your monitor is a representation of 0s and 1s. The physical world within our conscious experience is just a survival-based dashboard of representations.

I suppose under the 'all is quality' view, I am holding nothing more than mind-dependent qualities - the way the fossil looks, feels, it's texture. It only signifies the past to the degree that I build an explanatory narrative around my perceptions (i.e. there is nothing more to the past than this narrative).

So, in objective idealism, they are mind-dependent but NOT dependent on your mind. Of course, your representations of them are dependent on you, but they actually exist—just as ideas in a universal mind. You are in a fundamental, universal mind (in this view) and so is the dead organism you are inspecting. Ideas, I would argue, are also ontologically qualitative: there’s no definite beginning or ending to them, nor are they completely separable from one another within our minds. This universal mind doesn’t have a definite amount of ideas: it is a stream of ideas: an ‘idea’ is just a unit of measure we use to estimate it for descriptive purposes.

But I think what's missing from this account that reduces our existence to 'quality only' is our pre-theoretical lived experience as being human bodies.

If by ‘pre-theoretical lived experience’ you are referring to before we were ‘conscious’, then I would say that species are all conscious (to some degree) and human beings, throughout evolution, have been conscious. By conscious, I mean qualitatively experiencing; and not some higher-order emergent property of a brain. The brain, under my view, is an extrinsic representation of a higher order organ that has evolved slowly over time with more and more higher order capabilities (i.e., deliberation, cognition, introspection, etc.).

When we speak of "quality" what we are really referring to is our bodies sensory perceptions - our visual field is predicated upon our eyes.

I would partially be meaning that; but more broadly anything which has no definite amount.

It would seem incoherent to think both my hand and its touch are 'in my mind' - my body would be 'in my mind' yet my sensory perceptions are dependent upon my body?

You hand, a physical object within your conscious experience, is a dashboard representation of the hand-in-itself, which is an idea in the universal mind. The hand-as-a-physical-object doesn’t fundamentally exist, no differently than the word document application doesn’t fundamentally exist in the computer in that manner: it is a bunch of 0s and 1s.

It appears nonsensical, especially considering my body will remain when I die, much like these creatures whose fossils I find. You have direct evidence of this every time you eat a chicken - a plate full of bones.

Under objective idealism, the world is independent of our minds, but not of every mind. The eternal, metaphysically mind is where all of the world exists in (as ideas therein). So, your body will indeed still exist after you stop experiencing, and if I were to see your corpse it would be a dashboard representation of a perished mind.

Surely this leads to solipsism - why posit minds beyond your own? But I think applying Occam's Razor to ontology is a misapplication. There is no requirement for the ontology of the world itself to be as parsimonious as possible.

Good question: I would say that solipsism is not parsimonious. Yes, it says “this all here is just in my mind”, but upon close inspection the justification for it explodes into completely unfalsifiable nonense. For example, if your mind is the only thing that exists, then your mind must be eternal; but what about the fact that everyone seems to die? Oh, you are the exception to that rule? (:

Reply to Pantagruel

Hello Pantagruel,

I think mind-dependence is misleading. Neither pure subjectivity nor pure objectivity can be conceived in isolation

Interesting: I am not quite following, but let me try to respond. What we know of immediatelly is subjectivity, and an ‘object’ in the sense of something tangible or mind-independent is only found from abstract reasoning about the subjectivity. So I would say, prima facie to your point here, that we can actually conceive of a world which is pure subjectivity in the sense that there are no mind-independent objects other than the universal mind itself.

"the unity of the I does not come before that of the object, but rather is constituted only through it."

I am not sure if I understood this correctly, but I would say that the ‘objects’ in the sense of something ‘without me’ is definitely necessary for conceiving of oneself as an ‘I’; but that is to use ‘object’ differently than previously mentioned.

The universe is dynamic, dynamism requires energy, and energy is the result of a tension between opposites.

Are you saying that the universe is fundamentally energy? Is universe synonymous, to you, with reality?

The quality of quantity; quantities of qualities.

What is a ‘quality of a quantity’? That doesn’t seem possible to me. The latter makes sense, as we could give a quantitative estimate of something fundamentally non-quantitative.

Reply to chiknsld

Hello chiknsld,

I have been waiting my entire life for a simple tool like chatgpt...my entire life.

(:

I believe that is what I was trying to tell you, but I know that you will probably understand it better if it comes from another source right? ...hehe

I appreciate you sharing this with me, and I will address it as adequately as I can in a moment; but I wanted to disclaim that appeals to authority do not matter to me (in this context at least): if you demonstrate your point and I find it correct then I will gladly concede. I trust your points just as much as ChatGPT (;

Firstly, your quote from ChatGPT clearly concedes that it is not invalid but, rather, adds confusion (which I agree with):

It first says this:

Applying double negation in the way described does not align with the standard form of modus tollens and, in fact, changes the logical rule being used. Modus tollens is a valid form of inference, but it should not involve double negation in the manner shown in the argument.

But…:

In conclusion, the original argument you presented without double negation was valid modus tollens, but the modified version with double negation deviates from the standard form and may cause confusion or misunderstandings.

The point that I got from ChatGPT, and correct me if I am wrong, is that one cannot say they are merely using modus tollens if they also used double negation; for some logicians accept one but not the other. If one accepts double negation, then my argument clearly results in modus tollens. If they don’t accept it, then it won’t be modus tollens they are disagreeing with but, rather, my use of double negation to get to modus tollens. If that is what you are noting, then you are absolutely right.

I am going to modify my OP -> P2 to simply not use double negation, and it is now in its traditional form.

Reply to Bob Ross Minimally, to be a subject is to be a subject "of" something. I am a subject of perceptions, of ideas, of feelings. So while the "ordering principle" of objectivity is subjective (Kant) knowledge of objectivity arises with experience. Hence, the "synthetic a priori" which yokes the two.

For me, any attempt to conceptualize a pure subjectivity falls into the black hole of idealistic-solipsism. Everything that I "am" is in "relation to...." and anything that I stand in relation to must be other than what I am. This seems fairly self-evident (to me). Similarly, for objectivity, something is an object "for a subject".

Ontologically, I am speculating that perhaps the most fundamental characterization of reality is that of subjective and objective. We literally cannot think what a universe minus subjectivity would be because that would be a universe minus thought, which cannot be thought. Even if we tried to imagine it, that would still be an imagined universe. It is a variety of panpsychism for sure.

Reply to Bob Ross Reading your work is always a delight! Unique thinkers are what we need and I enjoy mulling over your work. With your initial definitions, I'm going to present a couple of potential questions and potential issues I see, but feel free to amend your definitions as we go into detail.

Quoting Bob Ross

P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality

Lets say I have 1 apple. The oneness denotes a quantity, but if I remove the 1 and just say, "apple", is this a quality? If so, then we can combine the quantitative and qualitative. If not, then what is "apple" in a non-quantitative sense?

Next, lets disregard whether "apple" is a quality or quantity, and just say I have 1 apple. I quantitatively add another apple to a "pile". What is a "pile"? Is that quantitative or qualitative? I could also call them a "pair" of apples now. Is the word pair quantitative or qualitative now? It seems to have the quality of "grouping", but the quantity of two.

Lets add one more apple to make 3 apples. Now I have a "few" apples? "Few" generally means more than 1 but not too many, or not a "lot". Is "few" a quantity, or a quality?

Finally, let us now add in the quality of "red". I add two red apples together. In my quantitative process did I not also produce the quality of 2 "red"? This refers back to my first point, so I'll let you answer before I continue with other thoughts.

My own common-sense, naive view prohibits me from following along with any of these arguments. I become stuck on what I find to be an unresolvable problems: the adjectives used here to describe the world— mind-dependent and qualitative—cannot be applied to anything in particular. If I were to apply them to anything in particular I’d have to find and point to things independent of my mind in order to do so.

What I mean is, If I were to ask the idealist to show me a mind-dependent and qualitative apple, and then observe his immediate actions, he could neither find nor produce one unless he went to a place where his mind was clearly absent, like the inside of a fridge or the fruit bowl in the kitchen. He’d need to go to places independent of his mind and find apples in order to prove their mind-dependence, which to me is contradictory.

So the very act of finding qualitative and mind-dependent objects proves their mind-independence, according to my common sense view. Ask the idealist to point to a mind-dependent sun, for instance. Why does he point away from his mind and towards something else? Is mind up there too, then? Doesn’t the fact that idealist points away from his mind and towards something else betray his own argument?

Quoting Bob Ross

Since you said you agree that the world is mind-dependent, what do you think that entails or implies?

I think it's a metaphysical statement - a way of thinking about things or a point of view - not a fact. I like the way @Janus said it in a different discussion - It's a catalyst for new ideas and feelings. In a sense I think it's a meta-metaphysical statement. It demonstrates that our fundamental understanding of reality is human, I guess you would say subjective. That tells us not to be too arrogant about how universal our beliefs are.

Quoting Bob Ross

I would say that objective reality is a mind-at-large, and our conscious experience is a survival-based dashboard of experience of mental events. Since you said you agree that the world is mind-dependent, what do you think that entails or implies?

Is this some sort of Analytic Idealism?

Quoting NOS4A2

Doesn’t the fact that idealist points away from his mind and towards something else betray his own argument?

Idealism doesn't necessitate the belief that the world is wholly "in one's mind". For example Kastrup (and to a degree Schopenhauer's) ontological idealism necessitates the world is mental process "all the way down". Thus, objects are the appearance, and mental process the reality. This is a bit different than say, Kantian Idealism which posits an epistemological idealism whereby there's no direct knowledge of the objects/world, only the appearance as shaped by cognitive faculties. The world "in itself" would be an "undefined error" (like 1/0). The presumption is, if there are not things like time/space/qualities/shape/quantities, etc. what is the world? It would seem that those categories necessitate (or at least are defined by) immediate experience or abstracted observation and reflection.

Thus there is not a denial of a "there" there in terms of the outside, by many idealist approaches to metaphysics and epistemology. The one that comes closest to the idea that there is absoutely no "there" there, is Berekely's Subjective Idealism. However, not all idealisms are the same. The things they have in common is the belief that the nature of reality can never really be extricated from mentality. It either has to have a subject to (metaphorically and literally) "take shape", or reality in some way, is comprised itself of mentality in its very nature.

Reply to schopenhauer1

I get the explanation, but my naive and common-sense understanding of the world prohibits me from following the arguments. I don’t know if I lack the brain power, or what, but I am unable to afford any reality to any one of the objects, substances, and things in their ontology. It may not be the case that they are arguing that world is wholly in their mind, but every object or substance they claim constitutes reality cannot be found anywhere else, which is suspiciously convenient.

Quoting NOS4A2

It may not be the case that they are arguing that world is wholly in their mind, but every object or substance they claim constitutes reality cannot be found anywhere else, which is suspiciously convenient.

I think you overshot their arguments and went right to incredulity. Implicitly direct realism presumes animals like humans have a god-like (near) perfect view of reality. Too many problems arise from this.

Reply to schopenhauer1

I think you overshot their arguments and went right to incredulity. Implicitly direct realism presumes animals like humans have a god-like (near) perfect view of reality. Too many problems arise from this.

I've read their arguments but they cannot show me a single mind-dependent object. Hence my incredulity. Are you able to point to one without pointing to your own forehead?

A better explanation for me is that the idealist holds a naive view of his own biology (he cannot see his optical nerve, for instance), and so assumes that the observable parameters of biological arrangements cannot explain mental phenomenon.

Quoting NOS4A2

I've read their arguments but they cannot show me a single mind-dependent object. Hence my incredulity. Are you able to point to one without pointing to your own forehead?

A better explanation for me is that the idealist holds a naive view of his own biology (he cannot see his optical nerve, for instance), and so assumes that the observable parameters of biological arrangements cannot explain mental phenomenon.

Your response indicates to me you might not get the idealist arguments then. The “mind-dependent object” is everything the mind is comprehending. No object is not comprehended otherwise a contradiction, this there isn’t anything that is not mind-dependent.

Reply to schopenhauer1

I do not get them, and I don’t know how one could. If mind-dependent objects are everything the mind is comprehending, then it is comprehending itself. It’s too circular for my own tastes. It perpetually raises the question: what is it the mind is comprehending? Again, no one could produce such an object.

Quoting NOS4A2

do not get them, and I don’t know how one could. If mind-dependent objects are everything the mind is comprehending, then it is comprehending itself.

What do you mean "then it is comprehending itself"? That doesn't seem like you are characterizing it correctly.

Quoting NOS4A2

It’s too circular for my own tastes. It perpetually raises the question: what is it the mind is comprehending? Again, no one could produce such an object.

It's comprehending all the things that the mind comprehends. I don't get the question. All we know (literally) is what the mind has comprehended. How are you confused about that. Or how are you skeptical about that?

Reply to schopenhauer1

What do you mean "then it is comprehending itself"? That doesn't seem like you are characterizing it correctly.

If it was comprehending anything that wasn’t mind it would be comprehending something that was independent of mind.

It's comprehending all the things that the mind comprehends. I don't get the question. All we know (literally) is what the mind has comprehended. How are you confused about that. Or how are you skeptical about that?

It’s a circular answer. And you could never point to, illustrate, or show me a picture of something the mind comprehends. So why do you believe it?

Quoting NOS4A2

If it was comprehending anything that wasn’t mind it would be comprehending something that was independent of mind.

No, that's not what mind-dependent means. Mind-dependent simply means that mind is comprehending/shaping/experiencing the reality in order for it to appear as it does (or in some constructions, for it to exist but then that gets into the schools of ontological and epistemological idealism). It does not mean that what is being comprehended is necessarily "the mind".

Quoting NOS4A2

It’s a circular answer. And you could never point to, illustrate, or show me a picture of something the mind comprehends. So why do you believe it?

This I don't get at all. Quite the opposite. Every object and thing I think about is dependent of my mind. Name one thing that is not comprehended by the mind?

Quoting Quixodian

Do you think that the entire world is mind-dependent, or just certain of its features?
— charles ferraro

Where would the line be drawn?

That which is existentially dependent upon minds and that which is not.

It's the knowledge regarding that distinction which is difficult to acquire. It's all about method.

Quoting Bob Ross

P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality. [p ? !q]

But sucking on one teaspoon of sugar (a quantitative process) will produce the sensation of sweetness (a quality). So P1 is not right.

The world contains both qualities and quantities.

Reply to schopenhauer1

No, that's not what mind-dependent means. Mind-dependent simply means that mind is comprehending/shaping/experiencing the reality in order for it to appear as it does (or in some constructions, for it to exist but then that gets into the schools of ontological and epistemological idealism). It does not mean that what is being comprehended is necessarily "the mind".

It does necessarily mean that what is being comprehended is the mind because the contents of the mind (like “conscious experience” or “phenomenal consciousness”) are necessarily mental.

This I don't get at all. Quite the opposite. Every object and thing I think about is dependent of my mind. Name one thing that is not comprehended by the mind?

The device you’re using to type those words. What sort of shape did you make of this device? What of it has changed and become of it since you comprehended it? Can you point to these changes?

Quoting NOS4A2

It does necessarily mean that what is being comprehended is the mind because the contents of the mind (like “conscious experience” or “phenomenal consciousness”) are necessarily mental.

Phenomenal experience isn't necessarily "all in your mind" though. I explained earlier, if it is epistemological idealism, it is the mind's affect/effect on the object/world. If it is ontological idealism, it could be the case that it is a part of a more foundational mental process observing other parts of or other mental processes. But the way you make it seem is all idealisms believe that "it's all in the mind", kind of like a naive idealism/subjectivism/solipsism. That would be a gross mischaracterization of idealism.

Quoting NOS4A2

The device you’re using to type those words. What sort of shape did you make of this device? What of it has changed and become of it since you comprehended it? Can you point to these changes?

But surely, the only way I know about these changes or even "change" itself is through comprehending through my mind.

Reply to Pantagruel

Hello Pantagruel,

Very interesting, let me try to pick your brain a bit.

Minimally, to be a subject is to be a subject "of" something. I am a subject of perceptions, of ideas, of feelings. So while the "ordering principle" of objectivity is subjective (Kant) knowledge of objectivity arises with experience. Hence, the "synthetic a priori" which yokes the two.

Given your invocation of Kant, would you say that there is a mind-independent world but that many elements of our experience is due to the structure of our minds? Is the mind reducible to the brain to you? Are you a substance dualist?

For me, any attempt to conceptualize a pure subjectivity falls into the black hole of idealistic-solipsism. Everything that I "am" is in "relation to...." and anything that I stand in relation to must be other than what I am.

To your second sentence, I don’t think that everything that I am is in relation to something else but, rather, my knowledge of myself requires an other; so, I would say that I could (potentially) exist without an other but I need the other to know that ‘I’ exist. I would say it is not the case that I only exist (i.e., solipsism) but that the universal mind other minds to know itself.

To your first sentence, I would say that objective idealism is not solipsism, since the latter is the idea that only one’s mind exists.

Ontologically, I am speculating that perhaps the most fundamental characterization of reality is that of subjective and objective. We literally cannot think what a universe minus subjectivity would be because that would be a universe minus thought, which cannot be thought. Even if we tried to imagine it, that would still be an imagined universe. It is a variety of panpsychism for sure.

Interesting, so, for you, there’s two types of fundamental things: object and subject; and so you are not a monist then, correct?

Reply to Philosophim

Hello Philosophim,

Reading your work is always a delight! Unique thinkers are what we need and I enjoy mulling over your work.

Same goes to you my friend!

Lets say I have 1 apple. The oneness denotes a quantity, but if I remove the 1 and just say, "apple", is this a quality?

What do you mean by “apple”? To me, that is just ungrammatical and, thusly, does not reference anything (except for being “a word”). Is it “an apple”? If so, then you just have “1 apple” minus “1 apple”, which is nothing. Are you talking about the essence of an apple? The concept?

Just to illuminate my position (perhaps to help here), let’s say there is an actual “apple” on a table in front of me. I would say that “that apple” and “that table” and “this reality” are all inextricably linked: there’s no, ontologically speaking, an exact ending to “that apple” and “that table”; but, I can describe, via quantities, different aspects of reality which I deem useful, such as “an apple” or “that table”. These descriptions are where, for me, quantities emerge: they are nominal. The quantities are not in reality beyond my ability to cognize about reality. Hopefully that helps.

I quantitatively add another apple to a "pile". What is a "pile"?

To me, “a pile” is to cognize, to single out, some piece of reality; and so, for starters, it is one pile, which is quantitative. However, the what constitutes “a pile” (e.g., is it anything greater than 3?) I will leave up to semantics. It could be that “a pile” is just a useful indefinite, and thusly qualitative or perhaps just ambiguous, colloquial term to note a hazy bit of reality; just like how there’s no exact spot where a heap becomes a pile of sand. We could force the terms to start somewhere definite, or just let it be qualitative (indefinite) and let people decide what is the most useful in the context.

I could also call them a "pair" of apples now. Is the word pair quantitative or qualitative now?

So, the word “pair” references nothing (technically speaking) as it is ungrammatical (or at least it must be suspended what one means without further context). “a pair” is one pair, which is one “of two of a type”. The word “pair” is itself, as a mere word, quantitative insofar as it is one “word”. The word “word” singles out a piece of reality, namely words, and in this case “pair” is the word that has been created to single out something.

Perhaps I am confused as to what you are saying, but I think the words that we use to describe reality single out things, which will make it quantitative; but the words themselves do not reference something that is quantitative. For example, yes, one red apple plus one red apple is two red apples; but “redness” and the “actual apple” are qualitative. We use quantities to estimate the qualitative.

I add two red apples together. In my quantitative process did I not also produce the quality of 2 "red"?

So the addition of the apples (if by that you mean combining them physically) is not a quantitative process (or at least that’s what I am arguing); and the physical combination of colors produces more qualities. However, the cognitive process of singling out “one red apple” and “another red apple” and mathematically, in one’s head, adding them together is a quantitative process and will result in “two red apples”.

Hopefully that helps.

Reply to T Clark

Hello T Clark,

I think it's a metaphysical statement - a way of thinking about things or a point of view - not a fact

Interesting, I would say metaphysical claims are facts (or at least purported facts). Metaphysics, I would say, is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience but necessary relates to experience; and a ‘fact’ is an assertion that corresponds to reality (in regards to whatever it references).

I like the way @Janus said it in a different discussion - It's a catalyst for new ideas and feelings.

Could you elaborate on this a bit? I didn’t quite follow.

It demonstrates that our fundamental understanding of reality is human, I guess you would say subjective. That tells us not to be too arrogant about how universal our beliefs are.

Oh, I think I may understand. Are you simply noting that our understanding of the world is dependent on our minds? If so, then perhaps you aren’t making any ontological claims, but more epistemic?

Reply to schopenhauer1

Hello Schopenhauer1,

Is this some sort of Analytic Idealism?

The argument itself doesn’t quite get you to Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism, but it does get to objective idealism (or actually I may need to provide another argument to move from subjective to objective idealism). If by ‘analytic idealism’ you just mean objective idealism, then I would say it basically gets one to that view (just with a bit more arguments to eliminate solipsism).

I would build off of this argument to get to a form of objective idealism very similar to Analytic Idealism; so my terminology is very similar thereto.

Reply to Banno

Hello Banno,

But sucking on one teaspoon of sugar (a quantitative process) will produce the sensation of sweetness (a quality). So P1 is not right.

I deny that “sucking on one teaspoon of sugar” is a quantitative process. The teaspoon, the sugar, and the act of sucking the sugar from teaspoon is qualitative; and our cognitive description of that process is that it was “a teaspoon of sugar getting sucked on”; and we can describe in much detail the entire process happening, but only in terms of quantitative estimations of the qualitative processes.

Quoting Bob Ross

I deny that “sucking on one teaspoon of sugar” is a quantitative process.

Thought you might. So consider this proof that the world is quantitative:
Quoting Bob Ross

P1: A qualitative process cannot produce a quantity. [p ? !q]
P2: Quantities exist (e.g., more than one letter in this sentence). [!!q]
C1: The world (which has such quantities) cannot be qualitative processes.

Same argument you invoked, used to prove the opposite.

Looks to me that you've juxtaposed qualitative and quantitative and then trapped yourself in a word game.

Quoting Bob Ross

... reality is fundamentally a mind. That mind, however, objectively exists; that is, it’s existence is mind-independent—i.e., it doesn’t manifest itself nor uphold its own existence.

An "unmanifest mind" – how do we know it "objective exists"?

By ‘objective’, I mean ‘that which is mind-independent’ and by ‘mind-at-large’ I mean that reality is fundamentally a mind. 

I'd asked about your phrase "objective reality" ... and so you're saying – referring to the above – "mind is mind-independent"? :chin:

It is disembodied in the sense that it doesn’t have an organic body...

By "it" are you referring to "mind"? If so, then the evidence I'd requested is for a specimen of "a disembodied mind".

From one of your previous thread discussions ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/813077

Quoting 180 Proof

An "unmanifest mind" – how do we know it "objective exists"?

Why we should know anyway? objective exists both separately and independently from us. It doesn't matter if we "know" or "are aware" if it does exist or not.

Reply to javi2541997 What?

Reply to 180 Proof What, what? :eyes:

What did I say wrong that you didn't understand me?

Quoting Bob Ross

Interesting, so, for you, there’s two types of fundamental things: object and subject; and so you are not a monist then, correct?

I don't think that either monism or dualism do justice to what's going on in the universe. Cassirer talks about reality as both meta-physical and meta-psychical (i.e. transcending both matter and mind) and I think this has merit. Freedom and determinism, matter and mind, form and substance, being and non-being. Reality seems fraught with antinomies, but these seem more like poles or extremes of a dialectic which mutually condition and require each other. I just posted a link to a book in my old thread on science and metaphysics that purports to be a systems theoretic metaphysics. If you view the universe from a systems theoretic perspective, traditional problems are not solved so much as they do not appear as problems. For me, it is the logical and scientific presentation of a process ontology.

Quoting Bob Ross

To your second sentence, I don’t think that everything that I am is in relation to something else but, rather, my knowledge of myself requires an other;

All intellection takes place in and through language, and language is emphatically a social construct/phenomenon. I just cant fathom the idea of a 'disconnected mind.'

Reply to Banno

Hello Banno,

Thought you might. So consider this proof that the world is quantitative:
P1: A qualitative process cannot produce a quantity. [p ? !q]
P2: Quantities exist (e.g., more than one letter in this sentence). [!!q]
C1: The world (which has such quantities) cannot be qualitative processes. — Bob Ross
Same argument you invoked, used to prove the opposite.

Looks to me that you've juxtaposed qualitative and quantitative and then trapped yourself in a word game.

Excellent! I am surprised that no one has offered this parody yet, as I was fully expecting it. As you can already anticipate, I deny P1 in your parody argument because there is a symmetry breaker between quality ? quantity and quantity ? quality. A qualitative being can focus on and thusly single out an aspect of qualitative reality of which would be a quantity. In other words, our cognitive faculty is quite literally qualitative (in reality) but is the faculty that allows us to ‘cut up’ reality into definite parts. In contradistinction, a quantity and another quantity always produce more quantities; whereas, a quality could be focused on in a particular manner to single out (or cut out) a particular definite part of that quality.

For example, 1 + 1 will produce a quantity, even if I do not know what it will equal, because ‘1’, ‘1’, and the quantitative process of addition is quantitative through-and-through; whereas, a wall that is painted red, starting with lighter red on the left to a gradual darker red on the right, is qualitative but I can single out a definite portion of the redness and call it ‘section A’ and ‘not section A’. The sections are quantitative, but the reality which they are describing is qualitative.

Reply to 180 Proof

Hello 180 Proof,

An "unmanifest mind" – how do we know it "objective exists"?
…
By "it" are you referring to "mind"? If so, then the evidence I'd requested is for a specimen of "a disembodied mind".

I gave an argument here in the OP for a mind-dependent, qualitative world: let’s start there. What premise (or premises) did you disagree with?

Whether or not the universal mind is “unmanifested” is a later discussion after we’ve agreed or disagreed on the argument for the world being mind-dependent. It could be that we should hold the world is mind-dependent without knowing if that mind is eternal or a brute fact.

If by ‘evidence’ you mean just something you can tangibly test, then obviously no one can offer you that in metaphysics; the whole point of metaphysics is to use reason to guess what lies beyond that experience which explains that experience. Science is only a negative criteria for metaphysics (viz., it can weed out the really bad theories) but never a positive criteria (viz., that science confirms a metaphysical theory as true). I can give you philosophical arguments and say that it coheres nicely (I think) with empirical knowledge, but the latter isn’t going to positively affirm the former.

There is not any publicly accessible evidence for such an entity.

There’s plenty of evidence that we can explain the world in terms of mind. For example, have you ever had a vivid dream? That body in the dream was not identical to you (as ‘you’ were the mind producing the dream) and yet you had an extrinsic representation of yourself within it, did you not?

That consciousness is best explained via a mind-dependent world.

That quantum physics, such as entanglement, is best explained when thought of as extrinsic representations within a universal mind.

And if "everything is fundamentally mind-dependent" (including this "fundamental", which I find self-refuting),

Please provide the proof that it is self-refuting. Just to clarify, I am not saying that the universal mind is itself mind-dependent; as existence itself is mind-independent.

then "a universal mind" is only an idea, not a fact or "natural process".

The universal mind, under my view, would be a fact; and I would say it is a “natural process” because I do not hold that it is God (e.g., that it has personhood, can deliberate, cognize, consciously experience in the way we do, etc.). It is a primitive, rudimentary, process of mental activity. That’s why I would say I am still a naturalist. There isn’t some mind outside of the universe that willed it into existence.

Reply to Pantagruel

Hello Pantagruel,

I don't think that either monism or dualism do justice to what's going on in the universe. Cassirer talks about reality as both meta-physical and meta-psychical (i.e. transcending both matter and mind) and I think this has merit.

Then how do you account for the hard problem of interaction?

If you view the universe from a systems theoretic perspective, traditional problems are not solved so much as they do not appear as problems. For me, it is the logical and scientific presentation of a process ontology.

Interesting, could you elaborate on “process ontology” a bit more?

Quoting Bob Ross

Then how do you account for the hard problem of interaction?

To really appreciate it, a good grasp of systems theory is essential. However, I can offer part of Laszlo's explanation of why systems philosophy (the philosophical expansion of systems theory) constitutes a new "paradigm":

The disciplinary matrix, defining what may be termed the 'paradigm' of systems philosophy, may be stated as follows.
Holism as a world view. Reductionism exists in many forms: methodological, epistemological, ontological, radical and 'soft'. Holism likewise exists in these many forms. In systems philosophy a 'soft' variety of holism is usually espoused, as consistent with the openness of its scientific base and its
non-dogmatic spirit. It is assumed that many phenomena can be understood only by taking into account the full set of relations constituting them, without reducing them to casual interactions between analytically isolated parts. It is also assumed that it is often counterproductive to reduce concepts and
principles applicable to complex systems to the concepts and principles applicable to their parts.

Essentially, you never effect a split because everything we experience is always a "system" which is a composite of those elements. The best description I have ever encountered is in Laszlo's Introduction to Systems Philosophy (as I've mentioned before) however it's $120 on Amazon and I can't find a PDF so I can't quote it.

As for process philosophy, Whitehead and Bergson are probably the best examples. Considering "events" as metaphysically primary is essentially a precursor to the paradigm-shift to a systems-theoretic metaphysics.

Reply to javi2541997 I don't understand the question or subsequent statement in the context of my exchange with Bob Ross..

Quoting Bob Ross

If by ‘evidence’ you mean just something you can tangibly test, then obviously no one can offer you that in metaphysics; ...

Yes, and since you're making a fact-claim that there is "the universal mind" by which "consciousness is best explained", you're argument is pseudo-science, not metaphysics.

... the whole point of metaphysics is to use reason to guess what lies beyond that experience which explains that experience.

If this is so, then this so-called "use of reason" does not consist of sound arguments (i.e. lack of factually true premises ergo lack of factually true conclusion). This sort of "guess" consists of an untestable explanation about matters of fact (e.g. "experience") which is mere pseudo-science unlike, for instance, Kant's transcendental arguments which are epistemological critiques of metaphysical speculations of "pure reason".

Science is only a negative criteria for metaphysics (viz., it can weed out the really bad theories) but never a positive criteria (viz., that science confirms a metaphysical theory as true).

Agreed. Also, science rules-out bad (i.e. falsifed or untestable) explanations and thereby abductively affirms only provisionally better (i.e. successfully tested) explanations. As the original Aristotlean corpus suggests, metaphysics – First Philosophy – consists in categorical generalizations abstracted from the 'observed' conditions and limits of nature – physus – which first must be learned by 'empirical inquiries' Aristotle calls "Physics" – science; thus, the relation between 'metaphysics and physics' is a form of reflective equilibrium so that First Philosophy only conceptualizes and interprets scientific – successfully tested (or testable-in-principle) – explanations but cannot itself – as metaphysics – "explain" anything.

There’s plenty of evidence that we can explain the world in terms of mind. For example, have you ever had a vivid dream?

Firstly, anecdotes are not scientific evidence. Secondly, the "experience" of "vivid dreams" cannot itself be conclusive "evidence" for anything "beyond experience" which could be a candidate for – "guess" of – an "explanation of experience".

That consciousness is best explained via a mind-dependent world.

And what "best explains" this "mind-dependent world"?

That quantum physics, such as entanglement, is best explained when thought of as extrinsic representations within a universal mind.

Non sequitur (i.e. quantum woo woo).

I gave an argument here in the OP for a mind-dependent, qualitative world: let’s start there. What premise (or premises) did you disagree with?

I object to "P1"
Quoting Bob Ross

P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality. [p ? !q]

which is obviously not true in many cases.

e.g.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4479710/

also
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism

Just to clarify, I am not saying that the universal mind is itself mind-dependent; as existence itself is mind-independent.

So "universal mind" is not fundamental – dependent on – "mind-independent existence". Yes, minds are dependent on non-mind (i.e. physicalism).

There isn’t some mind outside of the universe that willed it into existence.

I agree. Thus, the physicalist paradigm: the universe is fundamental and minds are (or "the mind is") emergent in, dependent on, derivative from the universe.

Reply to Pantagruel

Hello Pantagruel,

To really appreciate it, a good grasp of systems theory is essential
…
It is assumed that many phenomena can be understood only by taking into account the full set of relations constituting them, without reducing them to casual interactions between analytically isolated parts.

This is interesting, but, unfortunately, I am not familiar with systems theory and that is why I was asking your system theoretic view. Could you elaborate more on reductionism vs. holism?

Personally, I don’t see how one could argue that something is made up of a set of parts but that the emergent properties are not reducible to those parts and the relationship between those parts as they perform their processes; and, thusly, I am a reductionist.

Reply to 180 Proof

Hello 180 Proof,

I appreciate your response: let me try to adequately respond.

Yes, and since you're making a fact-claim that there is "the universal mind" by which "consciousness is best explained", you're argument is pseudo-science, not metaphysics.

How does that make it a form of pseudo-science? I am not claiming that it is a scientific fact that there is a universal mind: do you think facts are only scientific?

If this is so, then this so-called "use of reason" does not consist of sound arguments (i.e. lack of factually true premises ergo lack of factually true conclusion). This sort of "guess" consists of an untestable explanation about matters of fact (e.g. "experience") which is mere pseudo-science unlike, for instance, Kant's transcendental arguments which are epistemological critiques of metaphysical speculations of "pure reason".

I suspect by ‘fact’ you mean a ‘scientific fact’: is that correct? By ‘fact’, I mean a proposition which is true (i.e., an assertion that corresponds to reality) and not merely an ‘observation about reality’.

Metaphysics is speculative (i.e., guesswork), even in Kantianism. Kant does not prove definitively that there are such transcendental aspects to our structure of representations he so adamantly advocates for. Yes, metaphysics, including transcendental philosophy, is fundamentally uncertain claims that attempt to best explain the data of experience (of which I believe you may be referring to as ‘facts’: although I wouldn’t quite define facticity in that way): what’s wrong with that?

In order for something to be pseudo-science, by my lights, it has to be claiming to do some form of science: metaphysics is not pseudo-science—not even bad metaphysics. Or are you saying all metaphysics (or perhaps bad metaphysics) is pseudo-science? If so, then why? What do you mean by “pseudo-science”?

Agreed. Also, science rules-out bad (i.e. falsifed or untestable) explanations and thereby abductively affirms only provisionally better (i.e. successfully tested) explanations. As the original Aristotlean corpus suggests, metaphysics – First Philosophy – consists in categorical generalizations abstracted from the 'observed' conditions and limits of nature – physus – which first must be learned by 'empirical inquiries' Aristotle calls "Physics" – science; thus, the relation between 'metaphysics and physics' is a form of reflective equilibrium so that First Philosophy only conceptualizes and interprets scientific – successfully tested (or testable-in-principle) – explanations but cannot itself – as metaphysics – "explain" anything.

I agree; but, then, why would you ban us from positing a universal mind to explain the data of experience best? My argument in the OP is not an argument from pure reason (like a ontological or modal logic argument for God): I am using the existence of qualities to inform us about what the best explanation of the reality that produces such (i.e., that those qualities are contingent upon).

Firstly, anecdotes are not scientific evidence

I never said they were scientific evidence: I said they were evidence. Do you think the only form of evidence is scientific? Scientism is self-undermining: it rests on philosophical principles which are not scientifically verifiable (e.g., PSR).

Secondly, the "experience" of "vivid dreams" cannot itself be conclusive "evidence" for anything "beyond experience" which could be a candidate for – "guess" of – an "explanation of experience".

I agree: I was not intending to argue that our vivid dreams conclusive prove that the world is mind-dependent but, rather, that it can be used as evidence of it (by anological equivalence). Vivid dreaming is direct evidence of the mind being able to (1) generate similar experience to what we have when we are awake and (2) to extrinsically represent archetypes (lower ‘m’ ‘minds’) as physical bodies. It can be cross-referenced as an analogy.

The point is that we start out with mind-operations, including our conscious experience of the real world, and so it is more parsimonious, if it can be done, to explain that data of experience in terms of mind: mentality.

And what "best explains" this "mind-dependent world"?

What do you mean? Metaphysics is about maximizing explanatory power (of the data of experience) while minimizing conceptual complexity. Thusly, there’s always, in any good metaphysical theory, something (or somethings) posited as brute facts.

The universal mind, as a brute fact, is meant to serve as a best explanation of the data of experience and is not a direct datum of experience itself.

That quantum physics, such as entanglement, is best explained when thought of as extrinsic representations within a universal mind.
Non sequitur (i.e. quantum woo woo).

This isn’t a conditional statement, nor a colloquial expression of one. There’s no consequent and thusly no false implication: it was a statement, which you can surely disagree with, that claimed that quantum physics makes physicalism, or at least materialism, less plausible than before.

I object to "P1"
P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality. [p ? !q] — Bob Ross
which is obviously not true in many cases.

I read your articles: the first one I didn’t see how it really contended with P1, so could you please elaborate?

In terms of emergentism, it sounds like an irreductive account of processes and, in that case, I see why one who subscribes thereto would reject P1. To me, claiming that a property emerges out of a system (i.e., out of parts and the relation/processes of those parts) but is yet not reducible to those parts nor the relation/processes of those parts is magic: this would entail that there is something extra that is completely unaccountable when analyzing the system which is responsible for the propert that emerged, but it somehow was produced by it. By my lights, an emgergentist view concedes that it can’t actually account, by analysis, for the property in its entirety via the system that produced it, as that is what being irreductive means. What are your thoughts on it?

So "universal mind" is not fundamental – dependent on – "mind-independent existence". Yes, minds are dependent on non-mind (i.e. physicalism).

Not quite. To say the world is fundamentally mind-dependent, in the sense I am talking about and objective idealists talk about, is to say that all entities in the world can be reduced down to one entity: a universal mind. Existence itself is mind-independent, but existence itself is not an entity (proper). Physicalism is metaphysical theory (or family of theories) that posits that everything is reducible down to some entity or set of entities that are mind-independent (and, again, being is not an entity nor attribute proper). In other words, I don’t think that being itself somehow sprouts or unfolds out of non-being, nor out of a non-being mind (or something like that). There is fundamentally an eternal mind or eternal mind-independent stuff, and being is what they share simply by being—by being generic existence.

I agree. Thus, the physicalist paradigm: the universe is fundamental and minds are (or "the mind is") emergent in, dependent on, derivative from the universe.

But if an eternal mind is being posited as reality (fundamentally), in the sense that I am arguing for, then that mind would not be emergent nor dependent on the universe but, rather, the universe is that mind. In other words, “universe” and “universal mind” would be interchangeable for me in your statement “the universe is fundamental”.

Quoting Bob Ross

To me, that is just ungrammatical and, thusly, does not reference anything (except for being “a word”). Is it “an apple”? If so, then you just have “1 apple” minus “1 apple”, which is nothing. Are you talking about the essence of an apple? The concept?

You are correct on all accounts. I'm fairly certain I understand what you mean by quantitative, but I'm trying to see what's qualitative. I didn't want to say "an" apple because that seems to be a quantity of a quality. There is a difference between one apple, one pear, and one penny. The quantity is the same, but its the qualities that separate them right?

The identity of the concept of "apple" cannot be quantitative, because no two apples are quantitatively alike. If we were to add two apples and compare them, we would see one is slightly lumpier than the other. The redness would not be the same, nor the height and size. All of these seem to be qualities. But qualities can be processed as quantities. After all, remove the qualities from the quantity, and you are left with a qualityless abstract number.

One the flip side, some qualities do not make sense without some quantity. Saying "apple" doesn't roll off the tongue like "an apple does". That is because in this case, the quality and quantity are inextricably linked. And because of this, I'm not sure you can set qualitative and qualitative up as if they cannot include one another in any process.

Quoting Bob Ross

It could be that “a pile” is just a useful indefinite, and thusly qualitative or perhaps just ambiguous, colloquial term to note a hazy bit of reality; just like how there’s no exact spot where a heap becomes a pile of sand. We could force the terms to start somewhere definite, or just let it be qualitative (indefinite) and let people decide what is the most useful in the context.

But then what about adding two piles of sand together? Is this not a mix of quantitative and qualitative?

Quoting Bob Ross

Perhaps I am confused as to what you are saying, but I think the words that we use to describe reality single out things, which will make it quantitative; but the words themselves do not reference something that is quantitative. For example, yes, one red apple plus one red apple is two red apples; but “redness” and the “actual apple” are qualitative. We use quantities to estimate the qualitative.

Let us remove the quality again however, and what are we left with? Isn't "oneness" itself a quality then?

I will try to answer faster next time, I am busy as of late.

Reply to Philosophim

Hello Philosophim,

There is a difference between one apple, one pear, and one penny. The quantity is the same, but its the qualities that separate them right?

There distinguishable properties are what separate them; and depending one’s metaphysical theory they may be completely quantitative, qualitative, or a mixture of both.

For example, for those who believe that the world is fundamentally quantitative, a blue table has properties that are qualities (e.g., blueness, feeling of roughness or smoothness, etc.) and quantities (e.g., its width, height, etc.). Importantly, the table exists fundamentally (ontologically) with definite, quantitative properties (e.g., it has a definite size mind-independently) and the qualitative properties emerge as a result of a mind experiencing it.

For example, for those who believe that the world is fundamentally qualitative, a blue table has no quantitative properties itself (e.g., width, height, etc.) but, rather, they are a mind’s cognitive estimation of them.

For the former example, measuring the table as having a width of X meters is an estimation of whatever the actual, definite width is of the table (let’s say: A meters). For the latter example, the X meters is an estimation of something with no definite width.

The identity of the concept of "apple" cannot be quantitative, because no two apples are quantitatively alike

Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but the concept of an apple is the singled out of a group of entities in the world by virtue of their similar attributes, which, in turn, are the singling-out of certain aspects of those entities. So I would say the concept itself is quantitative (definite) although there may be no mathematical relationships in the concept other then the concept and its attributes being quantitatively, numerically one (i.e., an attribute is one attribute and a concept is one concept).

If we were to add two apples and compare them, we would see one is slightly lumpier than the other.

I agree that the concept of an apple does not every fully capture the particular apples in existence.

The redness would not be the same, nor the height and size. All of these seem to be qualities.

If by height, for example, you are referring to an actual definite size of the apple beyond our mere ability to estimate the apple with math in our heads, then I would say that is a quantity which pertains to the world beyond our mere ability to cognize about it (which would entail a quantitative world to some degree or another).

But qualities can be processed as quantities. After all, remove the qualities from the quantity, and you are left with a qualityless abstract number.

Correct. I think qualities are processed as quantities (via our ability to cognize) and quantities do not exist beyond that. Furthermore, I think positing the world as fundamentally quantities (whereof the qualities emerge from brains) is incoherent because quantities can never produce qualities (viz., the brain cannot be fundamentally quantitative and produce the qualities of our experience).

One the flip side, some qualities do not make sense without some quantity. Saying "apple" doesn't roll off the tongue like "an apple does".

If I am right (and the world is fundamentally qualitative), then the world is an inextricable non-numerical one; for there is absolutely no way to non-nominally parcel up reality. So, I agree, in order to navigate and comprehend reality, we are forced to parcel it nominally (or cognitively); but that doesn’t mean reality is itself those distinctions we make (nor that it is quantitative like the nature of our cognition).

But then what about adding two piles of sand together? Is this not a mix of quantitative and qualitative?

I would say that mathematically adding (in my head) the X granules of sand (in pile 1) and the Y granules of sand (in pile 2) is a quantitative process that will produce (in my mind as a mathematical result of that operation of addition) X + Y. However, all of that is a estimation of the fundamentally qualitative piles of sand in a inextricably linked qualitative world; and I merely call it X and Y granules of sand (and add them together mathematically) for the benefit of getting a better estimated understanding of what is going on.

Ontologically, the sand is qualitative; and our minds cognize that quantitatively.

Let us remove the quality again however, and what are we left with? Isn't "oneness" itself a quality then?

If one removes all the qualities from an object, then I would say they would be left with nothing but the concept or idea abstracted of that object which, again, does not pertain to the object itself (but, rather, is strictly how one is able to try to comprehend that object). Oneness in the sense of a number does not exist, I would say, outside of our minds’ cognition; but oneness as a non-numerical unity would be all of existence itself—which is absolutely infinite under my view (for to admit it is limited would entail that there is an ‘other’ and thusly, a quantity).

I will try to answer faster next time, I am busy as of late.

Absolutely no worries!