The Non-Objective and Non-Subjective Nature of Truth
I find that it is a false dilemma to posit a thing as either objective or subjective, as there can be emergent things from the relationship between the two which would be neither purely one or the other. I think that 'truth' is a prime example of this, as it is the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity; that is, the correspondence of asserted being and actual being. There can be no asserted being without a subject, and there can be no actual being without an object. Truth itself is thusly neither object nor subject but, rather, when the subject correctly 'maps' (or corresponds) their assertion (in thought) with something which exists (in reality).
To clarify the terminology: by 'objective', I take it to mean, generally, 'that which is mind-independent'; and by 'subjective', I take it to mean "that which is mind-dependent".
I cannot say that truth is objective, because without a subject it cannot exist; however, I cannot, equally so, claim that it is subjective (for the truth is surely not equivalent to the asserted being but, rather, its correspondence to reality).
This is why I have always found Aristotle's definition of truth to be the most compelling: "Well, falsity is the assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is and truth is the assertion that that which is is and that that which is not is not" (Metaphysics, Gamma 7, p. 107). Truth seems, by my lights, to be an act of uncovering and lies to be the act of covering up what was already uncovered; and this depends on there being both a subject and object.
What do you all think?
To clarify the terminology: by 'objective', I take it to mean, generally, 'that which is mind-independent'; and by 'subjective', I take it to mean "that which is mind-dependent".
I cannot say that truth is objective, because without a subject it cannot exist; however, I cannot, equally so, claim that it is subjective (for the truth is surely not equivalent to the asserted being but, rather, its correspondence to reality).
This is why I have always found Aristotle's definition of truth to be the most compelling: "Well, falsity is the assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is and truth is the assertion that that which is is and that that which is not is not" (Metaphysics, Gamma 7, p. 107). Truth seems, by my lights, to be an act of uncovering and lies to be the act of covering up what was already uncovered; and this depends on there being both a subject and object.
What do you all think?
Comments (32)
Quoting Bob Ross
If a proposition is objective when its truth value is mind-independent, and there are no truths or truth values which are mind-independent, then there are no objective propositions. The same holds of subjective propositions given your assertion that truth is not subjective.
Thus the problem arises that, according to your definitions, objective and subjective propositions do not even exist. This isn't odd; it happens all the time. The words 'objective' and 'subjective' tend to be vague, ambiguous, and historically recent. Attempts to pin them down are quite hard.
That said, I agree with you that truth involves a correspondence between mind and reality, and therefore cannot be reduced to either one in isolation.
This is a very good point that I am honestly slapping myself for it! I definitely need to refurbish my definitions, as they are clearly insufficient. For 'objectivity', then, I think I am trying to express "that which is not contingent on minds" and by 'subjectivity' 'that which is contingent on minds'. Defining them in terms of propositions, as you noted, cannot work since propositions are an expression of truth-values.
Within these new definitions, it would be said that propositionalizing things, as well as all Truth in general, is contingent on both object (being) and subject (mind).
I am going to refurbish the OP to reflect this definitional change: thank you Leontiskos!
Emerging from what exactly? What could be something on which both an objective and a subjective process can be applied?
You offer "truth" as a prime example of it. But this poses some problems related to your proposition:
1) Can anything at all emerge from truth? What could be that?
2) Can truth ever be objective? Who is out there who can speak about it? And if he can speak about it, wouldn't that have a subjective tint?
I have more questions, but I don't want either to overwhelm you or become too critical (because I already seem to be! :smile:)
Hello Alkis Piskas,
I am not sure if I fully understood the question, but I would say that it is possible for a thing to exist as emergent from the relationship between subject and object; that is, between a thinking mind and the world of which it thinks about.
I dont think anything emerges from truth per se in the same manner as truth is emergent from the relationship between object and subject; as only emergent things from truth are really just aspects of the truth: theres nothing extra emerging. However, with both subject and object, there really is a new thing which we call truth, which is a correspondence of thought with the referent thereof.
I would say that truth is neither objective nor subjective but, rather, a relationship between the two. It is still absolute (i.e., we do not get to make up the truth), but it isnt objective.
Feel free to ask away my friend! I can assure you that I will not think you are being too critical nor that you are overwhelming me. Depending on what you say, I may need to take some time to think it over, but that is the nature of these kinds of substantive conversations!
Hello Bob Ross!
I cannot say that truth is subjective either. But you claimed that reality is mind-dependent and thus, there can be no asserted being without a subject. If I didn't understand you mistakenly, your point here is that, despite the fact that truth is not objective or subjective, it cannot really exist without our minds.
Well, I personally think that truth can be objective.
I have another definition of truth from Plato: This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of the good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge and of truth in so far as known.
A year ago, I read an interesting paper by Richard A. Fumerton called Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of Perception. He asked to the participants the following question: How do we know when there is and when there is not a real object? If you are interested, here is the link to the thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12945/hallucination-and-truth/p1
I agree with his points that real objects are phenomenal, as we ordinarily treat them; and the things that appear are, most of the time, real.
Yet, this assertions can be contradicted by your arguments and I thought it was interesting to share them in your thread. I personally think that truth exists objectively but we even interpret wrongly due to hallucinations.
Conclusion of what I try to argue: reality does exist objectively but we manipulate it through our mind and thats why we never really know if something is real
Hello javi,
Correct.
Interesting! I didnt really follow platos definition: how exactly are you defining truth then? Is it a platonic form for you?
Thank you for sharing!
I think our disagreement is going to lie in the fact that I dont think truth is synonymous with being; it is, rather, a process of uncovering, which requires an uncoverer (mind) and the covered (mind-independent). For you, it sounds like, perhaps, truth is just being, which is the light, so to speak, of reality (as plato thought?)?
I don't know if it is a platonic form of definition. But I would define truth as "the reality itself when it is perceived objectively".
Quoting Bob Ross
Exactly.
What I tried to argue is that truth or reality are independent selves. They do exist there objectively, but the significance and definitions are mind-dependent. Here is where I agree with you. Yet, we can end up in a complex situation regarding the interpretation of truth: hallucination. The latter is part of our "subjectiveness" more than we wish and then, can elaborate biased definitions and interpretations while the reality and truth are just there.
It is true that there are some concepts which, without mind perception, cannot exist. For example: colors. But there are also other objects that already existed even before our own existence. For example, the universe. I think we apply a lot of "inter-subjectivity" in terms of defining both groups. My conclusion is that the universe is a reality or truth that exists independently. It doesn't need to be linked to our minds to make an "existence".
Exactly. Truth is incoherent without the concept of falsity. Moreover, without belief in the mix, without subjectivity, why even bother with a concept of truth? There is just that which "is." Once subjectivity is on the scene though, then we can have belief. But, when we try to move to knowledge, "true belief," now we must also have a conception of false belief. If beliefs cannot be false, then there is no reason to distinguish belief from knowledge.
So, the concept of knowledge itself implies the potential for false belief. This possibility then negates our claims to truth-- how can we know that our beliefs aren't false? So, we end up with skepticism, like Descartes at the outset of the Meditations. This prompts us to justify some of our beliefs, to develop "justified true belief," negating the negation (skepticism) and producing a new conception of knowledge as true belief that has been challenged by skepticism and overcome it. That old Hegelian dialectical in action. :cool:
Right, it "unfolds" from the interplay of object and subject. This is a problem if we have a metaphysics of objects (maybe) because this might entail something coming from nothing, right? It seems that way, unless we can justify some sort of "strong emergence." But it doesn't seem to necessarily be a problem for a metaphysics of process. Indeed, above it follows directly from a dialectical process.
Although, does such a process really take place "through time?" That's a trickier thing to figure out. When/where is this "emergence?"
[Quote]Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth unveiled, truth as it is in and for itself. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of finite spirit.
Hegel, Science of Logic, p.29[/quote]
It works this way for Hegel because he sees thought as coming first, methodologically and, to the extent he mirrors Boehme, ontologically as well. Of course, he also sees man coming from nature, the way we tend to do today, so this is hard to square.
Or as Augustine puts it: "all truth is God's truth." The Father is the universal ground, so all truths trace back to God (and are known through the Son/Logos, by the Spirit).
I didn't know that definition of Aquinas. I personally think that it is simplistic and drives us to reductionism. I would understand it in a theological version but not from a metaphysical perspective.
St. Thomas believed, with Aristotle, that universal natures or essences are real and present in individual beings. I guess this is called "Realism"
While Aquinas might find some ground in Aristotle's metaphysics to quibble over the implications of this, it is quite obvious, for instance, from Aristotle's writings that his God works no miracles or in any other way abridges the regularity of the laws of nature -- something required by Christian theology.
On the other hand, I think we should mention William of Ockham who argued that only individual beings are real and that universals do not have objective existence, etc.
Hello javi,
With your definition here, I dont see the actual disagreement with what I said, as the act of perceiving requires a subject. So truth, even under your definition, if I am understanding you correctly, is not objective. Unless by perceived objectively you mean a perspectiveless perceiver of reality?
I think, in that case, then you are just talking about being; which, to me, isnt truth. If thats what truth means, then it is just a redundant term and we need another term to denote the correspondence of asserted being with actual being.
I think the problem you are going to run into is that it is true (viz., in truth) that you had the hallucination; so I dont think you can cleanly separate truth from hallucination. Instead, I would argue that it is false to correspond the hallucination as something it is not (namely, whatever one is mistaking the illusion for), but the hallucination itself is true insofar as one recognizes it as one (since the claim would correspond with what actual is: the hallucination).
I sort of agree, but the biased definitions and interpretations themselves are in the truth. Thats why I say that truth is the correspondence of what is thought to what is. If there is a biased definition, then when it is claimed in thought that there is a biased definition it is true as they correspond.
It sounds like, and correct me if I am wrong, you are using truth and being interchangeably; which in terms of the latter I do not disagreebut I dont think that captures what truth is. It is the activity of uncovering what is, which is not what is itself.
I would also like to address the other post you mentioned me in:
I think this kind of definition is a good approximate but does not completely capture what truth is. The outward-focus of objectivity is just what I mean by truth; that is, the impartial uncovering of what is. The subjectivity that is mentioned here (e.g., speculations, sentiments, and experiences) is pretty much what I mean by thinking. It is true that I speculated about X iff that assertion corresponds to realityviz., I actually speculated about it. Thats truth.
Hello Count,
Wonderful post! I agreed with a lot of it.
I am not sure how truth as an relation between subject and object would entail strong emergence: one can reduce truth to a relationship between the two. Why would it be strongly emergent?
I am interested in this process style metaphysics, could you tell me more?
In terms of Hegel, I am still reading him so I am not entirely sure what he meant yet; but I followed your references and agreed with them.
Exactly.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, I use them as different terms as clearly. On one hand, we have "being" that needs a precise definition of its concept. Every object is a "being" and we just define them to introduce them into our vocabulary with the aim of understanding our "reality".
On the other hand, we have truth, which also needs a precise definition of the concept. I agree with you in this point, when you interpret it as It is the activity of uncovering what is, which is not what is itself.
Apart from those premises, I still defend that one of the "weaknesses" of truth is hallucinations or the abuse of subjectiveness when we are defining. Sometimes, we can all be wrong when we "uncover" what it is.
Hello javi,
But this is a contradiction in terms: you cant have a perspectiveless perspective, nor a non-perceiver perception.
This is true, but I dont think it is a weakness of truthit is a question pertaining to how well we can come to know the truth.
Hello again Bob!
I agree with your position. I sound contradictory trying to find out a definition. I will try again: I think "perspectiveless" is not what I was thinking about when I was typing my answer. I believe that truth is self-evident, and I do not know how extensive mind-dependence is on it.
I must admit that it is difficult for me to express myself properly, but the paper I shared yesterday explains better what I want to mean: "But we are still left without clear criteria to distinguish between veridical perception and hallucinatory perception. How do we know when there is and when there is not a real object?"
Then, it seems to be interesting for me the appreciate that Richard A. Fumerton did: "we are never directly acquainted with the fact that a physical object exists..."
I follow Fumerton's argument. In our experience we are, perhaps, directly acquainted with the facts concerning our mental states, but the possibility that experiences are hallucinations proves that we cannot be directly acquainted with the facts concerning physical objects that, beyond our reckoning, may or may not be causes of our experiences.
Hello Javi,
I see. I am just a bit confused, as if you agree with my position, then wouldnt that entail you agree with my definition? Or are you only partially agreeing with me?
I disagree: facts which we know now were not, in the past, self-evident to anyone (e.g., washing ones hands helps prevent illnesses) and something that was self-evident to people sometimes turn out to be non-factual (e.g., racist claims towards other groups of people).
Absolutely no worries! I am just trying to understand your position better, and I am still a bit confused.
Perhaps this is because I am unfamiliar with Fumertons work, but, to me, veridical perception includes hallucinatory perception; so I dont see this kind of divide fruitful in defining truth. Again, to claim that one was hallucinating when they were would be true (and in the truth: veridical). Or, perhaps, since he is focusing on perceptions, then there are, indeed, misleading vs. non-misleading perceptions; but, then, truth is allegedly reduced to what is perceived, and I would say truth is not related to the subject in perception but, rather, in thought.
This is true: our conscious experience is a representation of the world-in-itself.
I find this questionable; as I can be mislead about my own mental activity (e.g., be deluded about it or downright wrong). For example, I could mistake the feeling of serenity with a feeling of vast pleasure. In this case, my assertion does not correspond to reality and, thusly, is false.
We come to know subject and object in the same manner: as representations. I come to know myself as myself unfolds within my representations.
Hi Bob!
At first your post seemed very compelling to me, but now I'm not so sure if you got it right.
It isn't clear that a proposition is necessarily subjective. Sure, until recently propositions were produced by subjective beings, but does that make them in themselves subjective?
You quoted Aristotle, is this quote a subjective emission of a man, or is it an objective artifact that outlived its creator, who is now not even dust?
Does the truth of the propositions in a math book depend on the the fact that a subjective human happened to write them? Or is it independent of their creator?
Of course, now AI can write them and all other propositions as well. Does the fact that AI wrote them somehow affect their truth?
There are three things, I think, not two:
____(1)____ _____(2)_____ ___(3)__
Formulator --> Proposition<--->Reality
1 is (often) subjective, 2 and 3 are objective, and truth is the relationship between 2 and 3.
Hello again Bob!
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, I am partially agree with you.
The problem with my premises or Furmetons arguments is that it proves too much. Taken with sufficient seriousness, it is an argument against the possibility of knowledge in general, not just against naive realism. Fumerton cannot recover from the wider implications of such an argument, and his own honest conclusions are that scepticism is difficult to refute, that he doesn't see how we can do so, and that perhaps a philosopher shouldn't adopt some sort of program to refute scepticism.
Real objects are phenomenal, as we ordinarily treat them; and the things that appear are, most of the time, real. That is just the point.
I personally believe that this is common sense. Objects, themselves, are real and we should perceive them objectively. How important is it to perceive them subjectively if we can make the mistake of misinterpretation?
Yet, the big issue is to discern when there is a real object and when there isn't. This weakness on the objective side of perception indicates that the relation between subject and object is not one that, even with undecidability, is ontologically symmetrical (in other words, whether there is always one when there is supposed to be other).
Hello Hypericin,
You positing something very thought provoking! Let me see if I can adequately respond.
Firstly, I would say that propositions are statements that express alleged truth and are not independent of a subject. So, heres your diagram:
____(1)____ _____(2)_____ ___(3)__
Formulator --> Proposition<----> Reality
I would say something like this:
__________(2)__________
Proposition
____(1)____ ___(3)___
Formulator --> Reality
In other words, a proposition references a formulation (i.e., an assertion) which is allegedly corresponding to something in reality; and it is true insofar as it actually does correspond and false if it doesnt. The proposition, by my lights, cannot exist independently of formulation (i.e., of subjects).
I think for the propositions to exist subject-independently, which is what I am understanding you to be voicing as a concern here (that that may actually be the case), they would have to be abstract objects (like platonic forms); and I dont really see any justification for claiming that (at this point).
Now, another interesting thing that you brought up is:
In summary: does the truthity expressed in those propositions, when true, persist beyond (1) their initial formulator and (2) all subjects? This is a very interesting question.
I would say that propositions do not exist subject-independently, but that the proposition will hold equally so for any possible subject; so if Aristotle asserted something which corresponds to reality at his time period (or what not), then for any other subject (of past, present, or future) that proposition would hold truebut it wouldnt itself be an abstract object (or something like that). Without any subject, propositions dont mean anything: without subjects, truth dissolves into mere being.
I would say no, but that the proposition itself doesnt exist subject-independently in the world because of that; for I am claiming that truth is subject-dependentnot dependent on some particular subject or subset of subjects (assuming AIs are classified as true subjects, which, as a side note, I doubt).
So, in short, the relationship between the assertion (i.e., the formulation) and being (i.e., reality) is contained as the referent of the concept (or idea) of a proposition.
Hopefully that was an adequate response!
Hello Javi,
I see. Unfortunately, I am not entirely following where our disagreement lies: could you please refresh my memory as to what, then, you are disagreeing with in my assessment of truth?
I dont think this quite captures truth (for reasons I have already expounded); and, as another reason, it seems perception-dependent, which doesnt capture many truth statements. For example, if it is just about determining if one is perceiving something illusory or non-illusory, then one could never determine the concept of concepts (or the concept of anything) because it is non-perceptive.
We disagree in the assessment of truth because I interpret this concept objectively, without any interference of mind. I didn't say it previously, but I believe that truth doesn't depend on the value of mind or conciousness. Truth is a reality that does exist and "is there", doesn't matter if we are percievers or not. Nonetheless, you consider truth as a "process of uncovering, which requires an uncoverer (mind) and the covered (mind-independent)."
Here is where it lies our discrepancies. I interpret truth objectively but subjectively (If I am not wrong...)
Quoting Bob Ross
I understand. But this is a problem that relies on us, not the truth itself. Again, "determining the concept of concepts" is a task inherent in our knowledge because we need to expand our criteria. But I do not see why that's necessary to uncover the truth, when perception can lead us to artificial illusory "truths"
Strong emergence just means that something is a product of, or somehow ontological dependant on, other things. In this case, if subjectivity does not exist, then truth doesn't seem to exist as a coherent concept.
Strong emergence is the idea that something can exist which depends on other things, but which is not reducible to them. For example, if consciousness is "strongly emergent," in the popular materialism of our day, it would mean that subjective experience cannot be adequately explained only in terms of biology/chemistry/physics. Weak emergence is a claim that we simply cannot predict how higher order things will emerge from relations between things, e.g. we can't tell how a tornado will progress simply from knowing how air molecules work, but in theory a tornado is reducible to the things that make up the atmosphere (maybe).
Process ontology is the idea that everything is process, flux, not discrete objects.
This is a long quote so I highlighted the most relevant parts:
Mark H. Bickhard - Systems and Process Metaphysics - Handbook of the of Science Philosophy Philosophy of Complex Systems
Process metaphysics does have challenges with delineating boundaries and individuals, but at the same time it isn't clear that substance metaphysics does this well either. Human beings for example replace 90+% of the atoms in their body on a regular basis, so in what sense are we defined by supervenience?
Hello Javi,
Correct me if I am wrong, but then it sounds like you are simply completely disagreeing with me, no? What are we in agreement about then?
It sounds like, when you say truth is a reality that does exist and is there that you are just using truth as synonymous with being; as if a thing exists, then it does so independently of minds. In this view, I think it doesnt capture what truth is, as when we say he is after the truth or he is in the truth we do not merely mean that something exists but, rather, that his assertions correspond to what exists.
If by truth I was meaning being, then I would agree with you here. Whatever exists, well, exists! This doesnt rely on a subject; but whether or not something is true or not does insofar as it presupposes a subject that is asserting something.
What truth is is different than how well we can obtain it. Truth can be the correspondence of assertion (thought) to reality (being) all the while humans could be, lets say, always 100% false in their assertions. This would just entail that what is asserted always does not correspond to reality (i.e., it is false). Therefore, the definition of truth stays intact irregardless of human error in obtaining it.
Hello Count,
I think the former definition is inadequate (as that is really just the definition of emergence, not strong emergence), but the latter one I agree with.
I have many problems with strong emergence (as opposed to weak emergence); and perhaps you can help me sort them out. To say that a property (or something) exists as emergent from a system (i.e., parts and the relationship/process between those parts) but cannot be conceptually reduced to such parts and relationships/processes between those parts is to posit an extra component to the emergence of this property (or something) that isnt from the system; and, thusly, it is either to posit (1) that the system still is wholly responsible for the emergent property whilst being inadequate to explain it, or (2) that warrants the positing of another system to explain it. In the case of #1, one ends up with magic, in my opinion, as an explanation; for there is quite literally a piece to the puzzle that cannot be reduced to the system that allegedly caused the emergencebut then why think it emerged out of it (other than it being pure magic)?
For example:
To me, irreductive materialism is nonsense (and I say that with all due respectand, perhaps, you can show me where I am wrong here): if one cannot conceptually explain yet consciousness in terms of the parts and relations/processes of parts that allegedly produced it, then one cannot say they know if that system produces it (although they may still find it plausible). Secondly, if they cannot explain it ever, which is what irreductive approaches are conceding, then they should look elsewhere, or amend that original formulation, for what produced it (and not just posit it still somehow magically emerges from it). Please correct me where I am wrong.
Thank you for sharing that quote: I am not sure I completely followed, but I will respond as adequately as I can:
Where I am confused, is that if theres just constant change, wouldnt we still be able to nominally reduce phenomena to the estimated flux of parts that caused it (and thusly still are doing a form of reductionism)? I have no problem with admitting that the world has constant change in it, but how does that help evade the divide of mind and matter (e.g., reverses the exclusion of emergence)? To take your example, a tornado may just be a flux of parts relating to each other in just the right way to form a tornado; but thats still a reductionist account of a tornado, no? Theres not strongly emergent property that cannot be explained here (by my lights).
I think for people who deny continuance of identity through time, they would just respond that the mind (or body as a whole) is emergent from some parts which can be replaced periodically without damaging the emergent property (just like slowly moving data from one hard drive to another shouldnt harm the data thereon); and, so, in the example of atoms, it doesnt really entail, in itself, that we are not the same person even though we are not the same body anymore.
Quoting Bob Ross
I agree with your explanation of the truth. I think here is where we agree definitively. You explained that, as much as I interpret truth, it seems that I see truth as a synonymous of being. Well, this is true, you know what is - more or less - on my side in this debate. I wish I had better grammar skills because I am aware that I am not expressing myself properly and maybe this is why you are confused.
I will try it again:
I think that the basic element to understand truth is to understand "objective" and "subjective" previously, because I am considering that "truth" depends on one or the other. "Objective" is where metaphysical or epistemological questions depend on objects. "Subjective" is where they depend on the or a subject. Where objects exist independently of subjects, existence and knowledge are also independent of subjects. "Subjective" implies dependence on what may be relative, uncertain, idiosyncratic, whimsical, and arbitrary.
With those premises, I consider truth objectively as much as existence and knowledge. Otherwise, we can make the mistake of being arbitrary or idiosyncratic. We cannot achieve the truth if subjectiveness kicks in. I said "hallucination" in my previous posts, but we can use other kind of flaw subjective interference. For example: what is truth for you, it could be fake for me. Nonetheless, we have to accept the premise that there is something out there which is real. Whether it is true or false doesn't affect the being.
A dynamic in Hegel that helps confound the matter further is how the development of the individual is a matter of the concrete in distinction to a mere idea that only appears in thought. To some degree, that is an inversion of the individual subject for Kant and Reason's relation to the World. And to keep the snowball of the "Idealism" rolling further, Marx performs his 'inversion' of Hegel.
I don't expect to leave school with my lunch money....
Hello Javi,
No worries my friend! I may also just be my slow mind understanding what you are saying. This is where I am confused:
To me, these two claims are incoherent with each other: you say, on the one hand, that you agree with my definition (which entails that it is not objective) but then, on the other hand, say you disagree because it is objective.
However, I think I may be understanding now better what you are trying to say:
Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like you are noting that truth isnt subjective in the sense that we get to make up what is true; and, that, I totally agree with! However, I would say that truth is absolute to capture that and not objective. Perhaps it is just a difference in terms, but I would say that the assertion ? actuality relation holds true for every subject (and is not contingent on any particular subject); however, it is still subjective insofar as there needs to be a subject to assert it (if that makes sense). It cant be objective, by my lights, if it requires a subject (i.e., is contingent in any way on a subject), but it can still be absolute (viz., if my assertion corresponds to reality, then if you were to assert the same thing then it would also have to be truewe dont get to change propositional values based off of our feelings or the like). Is that what you are trying to convey?
This last part especially appeals to me. I associate it with Heidegger, who was strongly influenced by Aristotle. Truth-telling is often a pointing-out or a directing-attention-to. We are all in the same world together, talking about that single shared world, disclosing it for one another in greater depth and clarity, disabusing one another of various confusions and superstitions.
Hello Plaque Flag,
I agree. I was going to quote Heidegger's Being & Time where he talks about the act of uncovering, but I couldn't find the quote in any timely manner; but, yes, what I am saying is essentially what heidegger said without diving into dasein (because I don't think it is necessary in order to define truth to use his entire framework).
I totally respect going at Heidegger's themes without the baggage. I love Heidegger, especially the earlier stuff, but it's still nice to try to find a different vocabulary and different vector of approach. At the moment I'm kneedeep in Husserl, also great.
I think you are aiming at something like what I call the entanglement of the object and subject. They cannot be isolated without absurdity.
Indeed, I think the being-in-a-world-with-others-in-language is a single phenomena with different aspects. People try to snap off pieces and end up in performative contradiction and nonsense. As a philosopher, I cannot reject this minimal foundation, because it's basically already implicit in the concept/project of philosophy.
Hello Plaque Flag,
Yeah, his terminology isnt the most intuitive, to say the least; so I try not to import it into my statements unless absolutely necessary. Also, I am not that well-versed in Heidegger, so I also dont want to misrepresent his views.
One could say this of my view iff what they are referring to by object is being. Most people use object in the sense of an actual, tangible thing in reality that they are experiencing; and, as in idealist myself, I reject the existent of such things.
Theres has to be something, by my lights, mind-independent even in the case that the world is fundamentally a mindas, at the very least, that mind exists mind-independently. For me, being is the most primitive of all, and it is mind-independent.
Ah, I see. My take is that subjectivity requires a world that encompasses it to make sense as subjectivity. So I can't make sense of the world as fundamentally or most basically an independent subject.
On the other hand, I only know my own encompassing world in terms of the 'lens' or 'window' of my cultural human flesh which seems to contribute to the meaningfulness and color of the lifeworld. In my weird direct realist view, roses really are red. One might say that human cognition paints them red, so that they aren't really red, but to me this is a bluff --- for we can't see around human cognition. The world we can talk about is exactly the world for human cognition. The world apart from human cognition is a kind of bad check that cannot be cashed, a round square.