How’s actual existence not a predicate?

Is existence a predicate? Is it a property or characteristic of an object? I guess it might depend on how you understand existence and being. Isn't Kant saying that if a chair 'exists' then we are not saying anything useful about that chair - it's existence is assumed in it being there as a chair... Or something like this.

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs

The simple argument is that if existence is a defining attribute of a thing, then you can't say the very same thing either exists or doesn't -- you're just talking about two different things, things that differ in at least one property. If existence isn't orthogonal to the set of properties of a thing, it can't do the one thing we need it to do. This is why in modern (post-Frege) logic, existence is not treated as just another predicate but as another category unto itself (the inference rules governing quantifiers).

If the stuff about logic is meaningless to you, go to Peter Smith's site.

Depends on how you define it. If you define existence as, "What is" then existence is the base upon which predicates are made. If you say, "My identity of existence", that's a predicate. I wouldn't worry too much about definitions that overcomplicate things regardless.

Quoting Tom Storm

Is existence a predicate? Is it a property or characteristic of an object? I guess it might depend on how you understand existence and being. Isn't Kant saying that if a chair 'exists' then we are not saying anything useful about that chair - it's existence is assumed in it being there as a chair... Or something like this.

I honestly don’t know what he may’ve have meant besides what it means on face value; & on face value, denying that actual existence is a predicate, understanding that word in its common way, is self-evidently wrong, in my opinion. So, yeah, the key term’s definition is integral here, if it’s meant or understood in any other way than the common one.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

The simple argument is that if existence is a defining attribute of a thing, then you can't say the very same thing either exists or doesn't -- you're just talking about two different things, things that differ in at least one property.

Sure, but that’s beside the point that’s in question, which is: can actual existence be denied of a thing? Kant, & Russell, I believe, answered negatively.

Quoting Philosophim

I wouldn't worry too much about definitions that overcomplicate things regardless.

Which is exactly what’s the problem with philosophy today. It’s troubled by over complications, especially when it comes to terminology & definitions.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

Which is exactly what’s the problem with philosophy today. It’s troubled by over complications, especially when it comes to terminology & definitions.

100% agree.

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs I like the reply of @Philosophim. It is very clear.

On the other hand, I respect your point that the problem of philosophy nowadays is giving definitions to every concept. Nonetheless, I think that your OP needs so. It is not really clear and maybe you could elaborate it more. :smile:

Some background

Kant's argument for "existence is not a predicate" is grounded in his analysis of the logical structure of judgments. He argued that existence is not a characteristic or a property that can be added to the concept of an entity, but rather it is a necessary condition for any judgment to have meaning. In other words, existence is a precondition for any predicate to be attributed to a subject.

Here's a simplified version of the argument:

• In a judgment, the predicate must be distinct from the subject to convey new information (synthetic judgment).
• For the predicate to be distinct from the subject, the predicate must be related to the subject by either inclusion (analytic judgment) or by some external connection (synthetic judgment).
• Existence cannot be a predicate that is included in the subject because it does not add any content to the subject itself. The subject can be conceived without considering whether it exists or not.
• Therefore, existence cannot be a predicate that is externally connected to the subject either since it is a necessary condition for any predicate to be ascribed to a subject.

In essence, Kant is arguing that existence is not a property or characteristic that can be attributed to an object as an additional feature. Instead, existence is a necessary precondition for any meaningful judgment to be made about an object. Put another way, Kant's point is that existence does not function like other predicates (e.g., black, three-sided, etc.) that add attributes or qualities to a subject. Instead, existence is a necessary condition for any predicate to have meaning in a judgment. Without existence, there is no subject to which predicates can be ascribed, and thus, existence is not a predicate that adds specific content to the subject itself. It is implicitly assumed by any proposition.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

To me, he’s downright wrong here, because the inverse is self-evident.

You might explain what you mean by this as it's not at all obvious (to me at least).

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

can actual existence be denied of a thing?

Do you mean can actual existence be denied of an actual thing? Would you affirm or deny existence of an imaginary thing?

Quoting Quixodian

In other words, existence is a precondition for any predicate to be attributed to a subject.

Surely imaginary predicates may be attributed to imaginary things, no? Also, is "imaginary" a predicate?

Perhaps "existence" is a predicate but not a 'property' – i.e. a noun in a sentence can either denote some existent or nonexistent object; however, it doesn't makes sense to refer to a (concrete) thing, or fact, that 'lacks existence' (à la Meinong's distinction between sub-sistent (i.e. imaginary) A's & ex-istent B's, no?) :chin:

Quoting Janus

Surely imaginary predicates may be attributed to imaginary things, no?

Kant's argument is not concerned with the ontological status of the subject (i.e., whether it actually exists or not) but with the logical structure of meaningful judgments. The very act of making a proposition about a subject presupposes the existence of that subject, whether it exists in reality or is a product of the mind.

But consider the case of a fictional character like Sherlock Holmes - saying that his actual existence is not a predicate seems questionable to me, because if (hypothetically) it was discovered there actually was a detective called Sherlock Holmes, on which Conan Doyle had modelled his character, then the real existence of this Sherlock Holmes could be predicated of him, couldn't it?

So - I don't know if Kant's argument does hold up, but as that is the subject of the thread, I thought it at least worth spelling it out in a bit more detail. (And I'd be interested to hear whether the above objection to it is considered valid by someone who is acquainted with the argument.)

Quoting Quixodian

Kant's argument is not concerned with the ontological status of the subject (i.e., whether it actually exists or not) but with the logical structure of meaningful judgments. The very act of making a proposition about a subject presupposes the existence of that subject, whether it exists in reality or is a product of the mind.

What would be the logical structure of a meaningless judgement?

It was pretty much my point, that making a proposition about a subject presupposes that the subject has some kind of existence, either actual or imaginary, and the question I asked was as to whether 'imaginarily existent' and 'actually existent' are not attributes or predicates, of different kinds of things. I suppose it could be said that the 'existent' there is redundant, but I'm not sure it is, otherwise 'actual' could be simply equated with 'existent' and 'imaginary' with 'non-existent'.

O, the slipperiness of language...

Reply to Janus Immanuel Kant's critique was based on what he saw as the false premise that existence is a predicate, arguing that "existing" adds nothing (including perfection) to the essence of a being. Thus, according to his argument, a "supremely perfect" being can be conceived not to exist.

But I think it's fallacious, because if such a being were thought not to exist, then it would not constitute 'a being', merely a figment.

Reply to Quixodian You are rehearsing Anselm's ontological argument, which I think Kant rightly disposed of.

Such a being is an imaginary being (as far as we can know). That is the whole point of the CPR. You are echoing Maritain's critique of Kant; that he rejects the idea of intellectual intuition as exemplified by the rationalists: Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. Hegel attempted to resurrect the idea with his contention that "the Rational is the Real".

I think Kant was right, though, that the fact that we can imagine something and that it seems to make intuitive sense is no guarantee that what we imagine is a reflection of any ultimate reality.

All this is quite a different matter than the question of whether existence is a predicate though: I think the idea that existence is not a predicate could be thought to be right from one angle and wrong from a another: in other words, there is no fact of the matter, and it all depends on how you look at it.

Quoting Janus

All this is quite a different matter than the question of whether existence is a predicate though

It was in the context of refuting the ontological argument that Kant made that case.

Reply to Quixodian Which is precisely what I acknowledged above when I said you were rehearsing the ontological argument. The connection speaks only to Kant's concerns. I think he was right to reject the ontological argument, but not on the grounds that existence is not a predicate.

An existent perfect being would be more perfect than an imagined perfect being, because an imagined perfect being would not be perfect at all, but only imagined to be so, and that's why I've been stressing the difference between actual existents and imagined ones.

It doesn't follow that because an actual perfect being would be actually perfect whereas an imagined perfect being would only be imagined to be perfect, that therefore the imagined perfect being must exist. That is simply faulty logic.

So, that's why I said that the question about existence being a predicate is a different matter; I wasn't suggesting that Kant thought it was a different matter.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

can actual existence be denied of a thing?

Yes. Obviously. But the logical form here is not that you deny it has some property. If it did, existing would make it a different thing.

In essence, you just deny that any of the things that do exist meet the description given. There are lots of equivalent ways to do this.

Thanks for insisting on providing some useful information, for anyone who’s in need. Yet I think that the crux of the problem can be addressed here.
Quoting Quixodian

Existence cannot be a predicate that is included in the subject because it does not add any content to the subject itself. The subject can be conceived without considering whether it exists or not.

If you can give me one, only one, instance of your latter assertion here being the case, then Kant’s not wrong. If you can’t, which you, & whoever else, can’t, then it should be self-evident that Kant’s argument, as you’ve it expressed it here, is.

Quoting Janus

Do mean can actual existence be denied of actual thing? Would you affirm or deny existence of an imaginary thing?

No, I mean what I originally said, namely, can actual existence be denied of a thing? L.o.l., sure, yeah, if you specify an actual thing, actual existence can’t be denied of it without a contradiction. Yet I’ve never asked that, nor implied it.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

Yes. Obviously. But the logical form here is not that you deny it has some property. If it did, existing would make it a different thing.

I’m sorry to say this, but you seem to have missed what’s under consideration. Kinds don’t come into the question here. Such expressions aren’t of different kinds but members of the same larger one.

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs :ok:

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs I don’t buy Kant’s argument. That something exists or doesn’t is surely something predicated of it.

Quoting Janus

Would you affirm or deny existence of an imaginary thing?

Sorry, I missed this post & last question of yours. As to it, I’d affirm it. What’s imagined exists, as non-existence can’t be imagined.

Quoting Quixodian

That something exists or doesn’t is surely something predicated of it.

Quoting Quixodian

... don’t buy Kant’s argument.

Thank you; & that’s all that I’ve been maintaining throughout my thread, all of Kant’s verbosity & abstruseness can’t hide the fact that a simple consideration of what’s in question will clearly falsify him.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

Kant famously said, or something close to it at least

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

To me, he’s downright wrong here

A bold claim from someone who doesn’t know what Kant said. Read on…

Quoting Quixodian

I don’t buy Kant’s argument. That something exists or doesn’t is surely something predicated of it.

Kant admits that existence can be predicated of something. What he says is that existence is not a real predicate—that is, a determination, like a property, as opposed to mere logical or grammatical predication.

[quote=CPR, A598]I would, indeed, hope to eliminate without much ado all this meditative subtlety through an exact determination of the concept of existence-had I not found that the illusion arising from the confusion of a logical with a real predicate (i.e., with the determination of a thing) permits almost no instruction [to dispel the illusion]. Anything whatsoever can serve as a logi­cal predicate; even the subject [of a proposition] can be predicated of it­ self; for logic abstracts from all content. But a determination is a predicate that is added to the subject's concept and increases it; hence it must not already be contained in that concept.

Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., it is not a concept of anything that can be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the pos­iting of a thing [in itself] or of certain determinations in themselves.[/quote]

Otherwise @ItIsWhatItIs, pay attention to @Srap Tasmaner, and to the fact that modern logic agrees with Kant. And check out this answer on Philosophy Stack Exchange.

To clarify the quotation from Kant, it’s best not to think he’s saying that existence, while it looks like a predicate, is not actually one, but rather that we can divide predicates into two kinds: those that determine a thing—which he calls real—and those that don’t.

Modern logic, on the other hand, goes ahead and banishes existence from the world of predicates entirely.

Reply to Jamal Glad you’ve chipped in, but still having trouble. Say with the example of ‘discovering Sherlock Holmes was real’. The fact that he was real as distinct from fictional would be a real predicate wouldn’t it?

Reply to Quixodian I wouldn’t say so. It would be saying there’s a man called Sherlock Holmes about whom we can predicate properties. (Or to be more logical, there’s a something we can predicate properties of including that it’s a man, that it’s called Sherlock Holmes, that it’s a private detective.)

The key bit is “there is”, which is setting up the thing for the assignment of properties but is not assigning a property itself. Loosely, you can only assign properties once you’ve got something to assign them to, and the existence of something just is having something to assign properties to, so existence itself cannot be assigning a property and is therefore not a real predicate.

I’ve mixed up the Kantian and the modern logical approaches there, but I’m not sure it matters.

Reply to Jamal But there’s something the matter with that. Both the statements, ‘there is a fictional character by the name of Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘there is a real detective by the name of Sherlock Holmes’ contain ‘there is’, but the subject of each sentence can be distinguished as being fictitious and real respectively. So to only of one of the pair can the predicate ‘actually exists’ apply.

Reply to Quixodian Yeah, there are different ways of treating fictional things, and that's probably a side-issue just with respect to Kant. I guess we have to distinguish between fictional/non-fictional and existent/non-existent--such that they don't align--because given the domain of fictional characters we can truthfully say that Sherlock Holmes is a detective etc., (which assumes existence).

This amounts to a difference between logic and ontology, where existence in logic is neutral as to ontology. But someone besides me should run with the baton of modern logic.

My guess is that if you want to bring in ontology, you can just specify a domain of discourse, so that you can say that it's true that Sherlock Holmes is a detective etc., in the domain of fictional characters.

But what I think it comes down to is that whether or not the thing is fictional, the way the assignment of properties to--the "determination of"--a thing works is such that existence itself must first be stipulated, with the existential quantifier or kind of like this:

Quoting Jamal

Loosely, you can only assign properties once you’ve got something to assign them to, and the existence of something just is having something to assign properties to, so existence itself cannot be assigning a property and is therefore not a real predicate.

Reply to Jamal Thanks, very helpful clarification. :up:

Reply to Quixodian :up:

But I’m on shaky ground when it comes to modern logic and the debates about existence and fiction therein.

I suspect you approve of my intuitive account since, in distinguishing between ontology and the logic of quantification, it distinguishes between being and existence. :grin:

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

How's actual existence not a predicate?

By not being deniable of actual things.

Quoting Jamal

A bold claim from someone who doesn’t know what Kant said.

L.o.l., that’s cute. Only someone who’s not familiar with (or just now happened to look up) the fourth section of the third chapter of the second book of the “Transcendental Dialectic” would say that.

Quoting bongo fury

By not being deniable of actual things.

I’ve already addressed this point when someone else (either intentionally or not) misquoted me. So, allow me to reply to your comment with one of my previous replies.
Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

No, I mean what I originally said, namely, can actual existence be denied of a thing? L.o.l., sure, yeah, if you specify an actual thing, actual existence can’t be denied of it without a contradiction. Yet I’ve never asked that, nor implied it.

Quoting Immanuel Kant, CPR, A598

I would, indeed, hope to eliminate without much ado all this meditative subtlety through an exact determination of the concept of existence-had I not found that the illusion arising from the confusion of a logical with a real predicate (i.e., with the determination of a thing) permits almost no instruction [to dispel the illusion]. Anything whatsoever can serve as a logi­cal predicate; even the subject [of a proposition] can be predicated of it­ self; for logic abstracts from all content. But a determination is a predicate that is added to the subject's concept and increases it; hence it must not already be contained in that concept.

Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., it is not a concept of anything that can be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the pos­iting of a thing [in itself] or of certain determinations in themselves.

I think this is a good example of a case where Kant really pales in comparison with Aristotle. Kant's divisions are very neat and tidy, but as a result they do not track reality. Kant continually presumes that logic and content (the "formal" and the "material") are entirely separable, and in this case he classes existence with logic and excludes it from content. The problem is that this is a significant misunderstanding of being. As Reply to Quixodian pointed out, the fact that fictional Sherlock and real Sherlock possess different content is proof that being is not univocally logical.

In the Categories Aristotle argues that there are ten different kinds of being, not one:

Quoting Aristotle' Categories | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(1) substance; (2) quantity; (3) quality; (4) relatives; (5) somewhere; (6) sometime; (7) being in a position; (8) having; (9) acting; and (10) being acted upon

For Aristotle the different senses of being are not equivocal, but are related around a common predicate, and yet this predicate is not, properly speaking, a genus:

Quoting Aristotle's Metaphysics | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

But ‘being’, as Aristotle tells us in ?.2, is “said in many ways”. That is, the verb ‘to be’ (einai) has different senses, as do its cognates ‘being’ (on) and ‘entities’ (onta). So the universal science of being qua being appears to founder on an equivocation: how can there be a single science of being when the very term ‘being’ is ambiguous?. . .

It seems that for Kant being is not a "determination" because it does not "add to the subject's concept." Aristotle would agree that being in itself is not a genus because nothing exists outside of that genus (everything has being). But Aristotle also grasps the truth that different things have being in different ways, and therefore the predicate does differentiate in meaningful and real ways, such as happens with Sherlock. Further, because there is a primary mode of signification (substance), being is a real predication (because its meaning tends towards substance). This is why metaphysics really is possible, the science of being qua being:

Quoting The different meanings of 'being' according to Aristotle and Aquinas, by Alejandro Llano

Western metaphysics takes its starting point in the formulation of that root question which asks after its own object: «What is being?»[1]. For, in effect, «there is a science which studies being qua being, and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its own nature»[2]. And yet from the outset, metaphysics is aware of the extraordinary difficulty involved in dealing with its proper object. Because «[…] it is impossible […] for being to be a genus of existing things»[3], since it is characteristic of the genus that the differences should lie outside it and yet there can be no differences that lie outside being. In this way metaphysics dodges ab initio what will continue to act as a temptation: the conception of its central theme as something supremely abstract and empty of content, and hence able to be inserted into a formal-logical framework[4].

(As I read Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals I find that he does the same thing there, artificially and unduly separating the "formal" from the "material".)

Quoting Quixodian

But consider the case of a fictional character like Sherlock Holmes - saying that his actual existence is not a predicate seems questionable to me, because if (hypothetically) it was discovered there actually was a detective called Sherlock Holmes, on which Conan Doyle had modelled his character, then the real existence of this Sherlock Holmes could be predicated of him, couldn't it?

No.

The first step to understanding this is to understand that "Sherlock Holmes" is not even a name. We pretend it is, but it does not refer to anything, and what we pretend it refers to is not a thing (in this case, a consulting detective), not even a thing that happens not to exist. There is no thing at all, and that's why what could be a perfectly good name isn't. (I'm sure there are plenty of cats and dogs named "Sherlock Holmes" and in all of those cases it is a real name.) The expression is real but since the supposed referent isn't, the relation is-a-name-of is also not real. When you tell a story about Sherlock Holmes you pretend you're talking about someone but you aren't.

For comparison, the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo no longer exists, but it used to, and we make an exception for what used to be the name of a real thing. (There's a related exception with the dead bodies of persons.)

Quoting Leontiskos

As ?Quixodian pointed out, the fact that fictional Sherlock and real Sherlock possess different content is proof that being is not univocally logical.

Neither exists and therefore neither possesses any content, so no.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

The first step to understanding this is to understand that "Sherlock Holmes" is not even a name. We pretend it is, but it does not refer to anything, and what we pretend it refers to is not a thing (in this case, a consulting detective), not even a thing that happens not to exist.

I think you must be using some very idiosyncratic definitions of 'name', 'thing', 'referent', 'real', and even 'exists'.

'Sherlock Holmes' is a name that refers to a real thing that Arthur Conan Doyle created with his pen. The fictional character that Doyle created with his pen does exist, even if not in the way that a living, non-fiction person exists.

Quoting Jamal

But what I think it comes down to is that whether or not the thing is fictional, the way the assignment of properties to--the "determination of"--a thing works is such that existence itself must first be stipulated, with the existential quantifier or kind of like this:

Quoting Jamal

Loosely, you can only assign properties once you’ve got something to assign them to, and the existence of something just is having something to assign properties to, so existence itself cannot be assigning a property and is therefore not a real predicate.

One way to see the weakness of such a schema is by considering the artist and their artifact. For example, a sculptor might have a beautiful piece of marble and a dozen ideas about what to carve. In time they will cause one of the ideas which exists in their mind to exist in the marble. The creation of the sculpture changes what exists ontologically, and if our logic is to be accurate then it should be cognizant of this sort of ontological alteration of being. The problem with modern logic is not that it fails to model being, for all logic fails to model being. The problem is that it pretends there is no being to be modeled, and thus flattens out reality.

Quoting Leontiskos

'Sherlock Holmes' is a name that refers to a real thing that Arthur Conan Doyle created with his pen. The fictional character that Doyle created with his pen does exist, even if not in the way that a living, non-fiction person exists.

But that's clearly wrong. No one in the Holmes stories believes Holmes, the bearer of the name 'Sherlock Holmes', to be a fictional character. (I'm playing along here; none of them believe anything, not being persons.) So which is it? Does the name belong to an abstract object, or maybe a hyper-object that is the virtual collection of all of Conan Doyle's uses of 'Holmes', or a person who doesn't exist?

I think I'd be okay with a fictional character being an abstract object but it's a very complicated sort of object, nothing at all like a person, and it doesn't usually have a name. When we talk about books, we sometimes talk about this object, and we use the name as a sort of metonymy to refer to it, but we also say strange, impossible things, like "Holmes discovered the footprints in Chapter 2."

Fiction is really complicated and we miss that fact because we're so used to it, but if you want to analyze it you have to break that spell.

Fiction is, at bottom, an elaborate sort of lying, but it's not deceitful because everyone knows it. The root pretense of fiction is that the author is telling a story, as you might tell a friend about your weekend, but this is not true. The author is pretending to give such an account. They do not know the events in their 'story' in the same way that you know what you did last weekend. They did not witness the events they describe, or talk to anyone that did, or see evidence of them. They are making it all up, so the connection between the account given and the storyteller's experience is fundamentally different.

And so too for the audience. We pretend to follow the story as we might an account of your camping trip. But the supposed people and places and events that seem to be mentioned are not really being mentioned, not being referred to at all, because they do not exist. For comparison, if I tell a lie about you and what you got up to last weekend, I'm definitely referring to you, likely as well to real places, but making up the events. You have whatever properties you have, whether I mention them or not, but this is not true with fiction. If Conan Doyle never mentions Holmes's height then 'he' doesn't have one. That's a strange sort of person, who doesn't have a height.

At any rate, sure, Conan Doyle created these artifacts, the Holmes stories, but they are not stories about people who happen not to exist and events that did not happen. They look like they are those kind of stories, true ones and false ones, but they are fundamentally different.

Reply to Srap Tasmaner

I disagree with the entirety of that post, so I'm not really sure where (or whether) to begin.

Trying to stay close to the topic of the OP, I will note that fictional stories are not lies. If you disagree then feel free to give your definition of a lie.* Further, fictional stories exist. We could support such a claim by means of the adage ex nihilo nihil fit, noting that fictional stories can and often do have a profound effect on readers and their lives. Fictional characters can have a similar effect. More directly, thoughts and stories do possess existence, if not the same sort of existence as a physical object, for there are different kinds of existence.

You seem to be explaining away the existence of fictional characters in much the way you describe in your thread, "How to do philosophy." This strikes me as Kantian insofar as "neat and tidy divisions do not track reality." If a taxonomy of speech acts cannot account for stories, then either the stories cannot exist, the stories must be subsumed under some foreign category (e.g. lies), or the taxonomy needs to be revised. I think the medicine for the Kantian is very often that third option, although subjectivism resists such correction.

* For my part I am happy with Augustine's traditional definition, "a lie is an utterance of a person wishing to utter a false thing that he may deceive" (De Mendacio, 4).

Quoting Leontiskos

I disagree with the entirety of that post, so I'm not really sure where (or whether) to begin.

Good for you! Why don't we agree to take this up again some other time, some other thread.

Reply to Srap Tasmaner
Sure thing. :up:

Quoting Leontiskos

Aristotle also grasps the truth that different things have being in different ways

That's the nub of the issue in my view. I'm not well-schooled in Aristotle, but as a matter of general knowledge it is understood that metaphysics in the classical tradition accomodated a range of meanings for the verbs 'to exist' and 'to be', as you note. These have all tended to collapse into a single kind in the transition to modernity (in which Kant occupied a pivotal role) - which 'flattens out reality' as you point out. (I've often argued, usually against much flak, for a fundamental distinction between 'being' and 'existence'.) Hence I think it's quite acceptable to say that real human subjects and fictional characters exist in different senses, and so also to say that real existence can be predicated of the former, but not of the latter.

(By the way, and for what it's worth, I think the deep history of the ontological argument originally arose from a primal sense of wonder at the abundance of nature. This was also associated with the 'pleroma', the over-flowing abundance of nature. From this, the idea became accepted that being itself possessed a kind of perfection or virtue which non-being could neither exhibit nor displace. I think that's the historical intuition behind the many forms of the ontological argument which are based on the argument that if being is a perfection, then God must necessarily possess it, as the absence of being is a defect or lack. Aristotle's 'Nature abhors a vacuum' was perhaps an expression of that sentiment.)

Quoting Quixodian

That's the nub of the issue in my view. I'm not well-schooled in Aristotle, but as a matter of general knowledge it is understood that metaphysics in the classical tradition accomodated a range of meanings for the verbs 'to exist' and 'to be', as you note. These have all tended to collapse into a single kind in the transition to modernity (in which Kant occupied a pivotal role) - which 'flattens out reality' as you point out.

I think that's right. My original schooling was in computer science and analytic philosophy, both of which are outgrowths of modern logic. Such paradigms operate with a truncated approach to reality because they are only capable of interacting with and manipulating a particular subset of reality. This isn't a problem until someone mistakenly assumes that reality in its fulness comports with such a paradigm, e.g. Turing machines, or analytic reasoning, or modern quantificational logic. Yet that mistake occurs often, and it leads to a flattening of reality according to one particular lens.

"To be" is one of the most complicated and mysterious predications in any language, and the ontological argument is fueled by the paradoxes that arise. It's interesting, too, that those who disagree with the ontological argument very often disagree with one another about why it is wrong. For example, Thomas Aquinas disagreed with the argument, but he would not have agreed with Kant. These are probably some of the reasons why the ontological argument is such a fruitful argument for an introduction to philosophy class.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

Does the name belong to an abstract object, or maybe a hyper-object that is the virtual collection of all of Conan Doyle's uses of 'Holmes', or a person who doesn't exist?

The name simply belongs to an imaginary character. It's not all that different to historical characters; they live on (for us at least) only in the imagination.

Reply to Janus

Just think about all the ways a made-up story is different. Who gave Holmes the name "Sherlock"? Was it his mother or Conan Doyle? Can a novelist get things wrong and be corrected by someone else? Can there be things about a fictional character that the author doesn't know? (Kind of, but that's a story about the creative process, which is different from a person's life.) Look at what happens especially in comic books: a character might end up with several different origin stories; is one of those true? Or did the character live several different lives, unlike a real person?

I could keep going, but I'm not really very invested in this discussion at the moment. Some other time.

Quoting Janus

The name simply belongs to an imaginary character. It's not all that different to historical characters; they live on (for us at least) only in the imagination.

This is particularly true once we realize that there are certain characters whose historicity is contested, where some people believe they are historical figures and others believe they are only fictional characters set within stories or myths.

Reply to Leontiskos Quoting Srap Tasmaner

Just think about all the ways a made-up story is different. Who gave Holmes the name "Sherlock"? Was it his mother or Conan Doyle? Can a novelist get things wrong and be corrected by someone else? Can there be things about a fictional character that the author doesn't know? (Kind of, but that's a story about the creative process, which is different from a person's life.)

When I said "not so different" I wasn't suggesting there are no differences. The differences seem to rely on the (untestable) truth regarding purportedly real historical characters. If a purportedly real historical character never actually existed, then there would be no difference, because then the character would be imaginary and not actual.

In the story we might assume it was Sherlock's mother who named him, unless it is specified by Conan Doyle somewhere. If it is not explicitly stated that he was christened by his mother and no explanation is given as to how he got his name, then from the perspective of the story it is unknown. The same sort of thing could happen in actuality, with an orphan for example. We would assume in that case that somebody must have named the orphan, we just have no way of knowing who it was. So, there is that difference between actual and imaginary characters; but that difference is always already implicit in the distinction between actual and imaginary.

And of course, in another sense it was Conan Doyle who created both character and name.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

Can a novelist get things wrong and be corrected by someone else?

No, but if I said to someone, 'I've just been reading a Sherlock Hacks detective story', the response would be 'surely you mean Sherlock Holmes, don't you?'

Quoting Leontiskos

"To be" is one of the most complicated and mysterious predications in any language, and the ontological argument is fueled by the paradoxes that arise

A link to a great paper got posted here some time back, [url=https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/95/]The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Problem of Being', Charles Kahn.

Thanks Reply to Quixodian, I downloaded a copy for reading. :up:

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs The point of Kant and Russell about existence not being a predicate is that existence is not something individuals possess, it's about the concepts of individuals. So if I say, "God exists," what I'm saying is that the concept God has an instance in reality that makes the proposition true. On the other hand, if I say that "God does not exist," then I'm saying that the concept God has no instance in reality. Thus the concept God is true of nothing. They believe this view is necessary in order to make sense of propositions which deny the existence of individuals. For e.g., if I deny the existence of unicorns, then my statement must be about something. But what could it be about since unicorns don't exist? It's about the concept of unicorns, or the concept of God. So again the concept of existence isn't a property that individuals possess, it's about the concept having an instance in reality.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

Fiction is, at bottom, an elaborate sort of lying, but it's not deceitful because everyone knows it.

I can see why you would say that and partially agree, but we should consider that poetry (fiction) can be more honest than history as a sort of condensation or intensification of history's lesson. We are essence-mongers. Fiction is potentially hyperreal.

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs

Hello ItIsWhatItIs,

I would say that being is not a proper predicate and is not a valid property because it is presupposed in each predicate and each property. To me, every assertion of a non-existent entity is a shorthand for technically an assertion of an existent entity lacking a specific property (or properties); and, so, for me, I disagree that the “inverse is self-evident”.

For example, if I say “this imaginary apple does not exist”, then, although this is perfectly adequate for practical purposes in colloquial speech, I am technically claiming that “this existent imaginary apple lacks the property of ‘being non-imaginary’”. Whenever we point out anything, that is something that exists, and when we say that it “doesn’t exist” what we really mean, I would argue, is that it lacks a property that we colloquially associated with ‘existence’; but, technically, it all exists.

Likewise, if I say “there exists no apples on this table”, then I am saying that “what exists here is not apples” (i.e., “what exists here lacks the property of ‘being an apple’”).

My denial of existence being a property entail that it is technically wrong (although practically adequate in most cases) to say “this apple has ‘being existence’”; and my denial of it being a proper predicate means that it is meaningless to say “this apple exists”. Even in the case that “this apple doesn’t exist” is asserted, whatever “apple” is being singled out here exists—just lacking whatever property the person asserting it thinks is colloquially associated with ‘existing’ (such as ‘being non-imaginary’).

Likewise, as a side note, I am motivated to do this because I don't think "nothing" can exist; and that negative claims (i.e., negations) are always of something. It is wrong to think, by my lights, that there exists a thing that has no existence--rather, something exists and we can negate a property for it.

Reply to plaque flag

Yeah all that's fine. The debate is about the ontology of fiction, which I see as informed by fiction's very unusual pragmatics.

Reply to Srap Tasmaner :up:

Quoting Sam26

So if I say, "God exists," what I'm saying is that the concept God has an instance in reality that makes the proposition true. On the other hand, if I say that "God does not exist," then I'm saying that the concept God has no instance in reality. ... . They believe this view is necessary in order to make sense of propositions which deny the existence of individuals. For e.g., if I deny the existence of unicorns, then my statement must be about something. But what could it be about since unicorns don't exist? It's about the concept of unicorns, or the concept of God. So again the concept of existence isn't a property that individuals possess, it's about the concept having an instance in reality.

Is a "concept ... in reality" anything other than words, i.e., do you talk of "concepts" nominalistically?

Quoting Bob Ross

Likewise, if I say “there exists no apples on this table”, then I am saying that “what exists here is not apples” (i.e., “what exists here lacks the property of ‘being an apple’”).

It's self-evident that "not apples," i.e., "-x," can't exist, let alone here or there. Therefore, it's self-evident that "what exists here" can't be "not apples" (& as a corollary, unless a quality is posited, it's not thought that anything does).

Now, if an "apple" can lack the property of existing here ("here" being within one's immediate empirical frame of reference), as "what exists here lacks the property of 'being an apple,'" then it's arguable that an "apple" can be considered as not existing, & so existence as a predicate is deniable of & thus not presupposed by it.

The obvious retort to that is that although it doesn't exist here, it does there.

Yet there's a major fallacy in such a retort. For, if an "apple" doesn't exist "here," that is, within one's immediate empirical frame of reference, but "there," then how's it known that it does exist "there"? & if it's not, it should be self-evident that existence as a predicate is deniable of & thus not presupposed by it, which is what was to be proven or made self-evident.

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs

Hello ItIsWhatItIs,

It's self-evident that "not apples," i.e., "-x," can't exist, let alone here or there.

Firstly, there are quite a lot of people that consider nothingness (which is merely the pure negation of things, including “not apples”) as possible; so I don’t think most people view it as self-evident that it can’t. Of course, I agree with you here because I do not thing ‘nothing’ can exist; but think of all those debates people have about if “something can come from nothing”: it presupposes that nothing can exist in the first place.

Secondly, if “not apples” cannot exist, then it is improper (and meaningless) to say that “this apple does not exist” because there is no apple: either that assertion is incoherent (because it presupposes an existent apple that does not exist) or it is meaningless (as “this apple” is nothing at all: there is no “this” apple).

Likewise, it is invalid to say that “this apple lacks the property of existence” because if it is an apple then it necessarily does not lack the property of existence.

Therefore, it's self-evident that "what exists here" can't be "not apples"

“What exists here” has the property of “not being an apple” and is thusly, in shorthand, “not apples”. If it “can’t be ‘not apples’”, then it is apples.

Now, if an "apple" can lack the property of existing here ("here" being within one's immediate empirical frame of reference), as "what exists here lacks the property of 'being an apple,'" then it's arguable that an "apple" can be considered as not existing, & so existence as a predicate is deniable of & thus not presupposed by it

Something lacking the property of ‘being an apple’ does not entail that there exists an apple somewhere else. Also, an apple lacking the property of existing somewhere implies that it does exists somewhere else: the justification for claiming that it does exist a separate question.

To say that “an ‘apple’ can be considered as not existing” is to say that “not apples” can exist; for that sentence expresses an existent entity (‘an apple’) and either predicates of it or assigns to it the property of non-existence—which is incoherent.

The obvious retort to that is that although it doesn't exist here, it does there.
…
Yet there's a major fallacy in such a retort. For, if an "apple" doesn't exist "here," that is, within one's immediate empirical frame of reference, but "there," then how's it known that it does exist "there"?

There’s absolutely no fallacy in pointing out that the sentence “this apple lacks the property of existing here” presupposes that the apples does, indeed, exist—regardless of what justification a person may or may not have to claiming such.

if it's not, it should be self-evident that existence as a predicate is deniable

Are you claiming that existence is a valid predicate? A property? Both?

Hello, Bob Ross

Quoting Bob Ross

Firstly, there are quite a lot of people that consider nothingness (which is merely the pure negation of things, including “not apples”) as possible; so I don’t think most people view it as self-evident that it can’t. Of course, I agree with you here because I do not thing ‘nothing’ can exist; but think of all those debates people have about if “something can come from nothing”: it presupposes that nothing can exist in the first place.

Well, some people might define "nothingness" in a unique way, which may make their assertion valid, i.e., words aren't absolute. Yet if it's defined as a total negation, which is how must people do so, then it's unquestionably self-evident that it's not; as positing anything about what doesn't have qualities or properties is invalid, unintelligible; despite anything anyone might say, i.e., such vocalizations being as meaningless as saying that "darkness is light."

Quoting Bob Ross

Secondly, if “not apples” cannot exist, then it is improper (and meaningless) to say that “this apple does not exist” because there is no apple: either that assertion is incoherent (because it presupposes an existent apple that does not exist) or it is meaningless (as “this apple” is nothing at all: there is no “this” apple).

Quoting Bob Ross

Likewise, it is invalid to say that “this apple lacks the property of existence” because if it is an apple then it necessarily does not lack the property of existence.

Sure, to say that "this apple doesn't exist," when, by "this" apple, you mean one which you're presently experiencing, is wrong. Yet that was never my assertion. You seemed to have misunderstood my question about the claim of an "apple" not existing "here," but "there."

Quoting Bob Ross

“What exists here” has the property of “not being an apple” and is thusly, in shorthand, “not apples”. If it “can’t be ‘not apples’”, then it is apples.

So, for reassurance, you're saying that a negation, or negative property, i.e., "not being an apple," can exist here?

Quoting Bob Ross

Something lacking the property of ‘being an apple’ does not entail that there exists an apple somewhere else.

Sure, but I've never claimed that. My point was that if "'what' exists here lacks the property of 'being an apple,'" then (it's obvious that) an "apple" doesn't exist in that spot (&, again, as a corollary, until a quality is posited, it's not thought that anything does).

Quoting Bob Ross

There’s absolutely no fallacy in pointing out that the sentence “this apple lacks the property of existing here” presupposes that the apples does, indeed, exist—regardless of what justification a person may or may not have to claiming such.

The fallacy, which I referenced in my previous post, is, as I held, conditioned by (how I assumed) what's meant by "here"; & it holds if such is the case.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

Well, some people might define "nothingness" in a unique way...

It may be helpful to remember that the verb "to be" often connotes the counterfactuals which did not come to pass. That's part of what was getting at.

If a soldier comes back from war and his disoriented mother says, "Oh, you exist!," she is not applying a vacuous predicate. She is marveling at his existence because it is not necessary and perhaps not even likely given the circumstances.

Quoting Leontiskos

It may be helpful to remember that the verb "to be" often connotes the counterfactuals which did not come to pass. That's part of what was getting at.

If a soldier comes back from war and his disoriented mother says, "Oh, you exist!," she is not applying a vacuous predicate. She is marveling at his existence because it is not necessary and perhaps not even likely given the circumstances.

What have I written that denies or is inconsistent with any of that?

Nonetheless, I've noticed that you've made a few posts within this thread, Leo, so I thank you for your participation within it.

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs
I was only offering another arrow for your quiver. :razz:

Quoting Leontiskos

I was only offering another arrow for your quiver.

Okay, well, in that case, I'll thank you another time, & this time for your offer. :up:

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs

Hello ItIsWhatItIs,

Well, some people might define "nothingness" in a unique way, which may make their assertion valid, i.e., words aren't absolute. Yet if it's defined as a total negation, which is how must people do so, then it's unquestionably self-evident that it's not; as positing anything about what doesn't have qualities or properties is invalid, unintelligible; despite anything anyone might say, i.e., such vocalizations being as meaningless as saying that "darkness is light."

Let me just ask you: do you think there could have been nothing instead of the universe (or reality) in which we live? Based off of what you are saying, I am anticipated you may be in agreement with me that the answer is ‘no’.

Moreover, I just want to clarify that this use of “nothingness” that I expounded is not the minority view in society; in fact, mine (and yours if you agree with me) is. Most people would answer yes to the aforesaid question (and thereby concede that nothingness can exist). Also, many prominent thinkers, such as Pierce, have posited that in “the beginning” there was nothing, and that nothing negated itself into something; however, most people, I would say, will not go that far: they just think that there could actually be nothing if all of reality was removed or never began to exist.

Sure, to say that "this apple doesn't exist," when, by "this" apple, you mean one which you're presently experiencing, is wrong. Yet that was never my assertion. You seemed to have misunderstood my question about the claim of an "apple" not existing "here," but "there."

Correct me if I am wrong, but I understood you to be saying that someone was asserting “this apple does not exist” when they were not presently experiencing an apple; and I was commenting that that assertion, if true, presupposes that there does exist an apple somewhere (of which they are singling out). They don’t have to be directly experiencing the apple to assert it exists.

“What exists here” has the property of “not being an apple” and is thusly, in shorthand, “not apples”. If it “can’t be ‘not apples’”, then it is apples. — Bob Ross
So, for reassurance, you're saying that a negation, or negative property, i.e., "not being an apple," can exist here?

I am saying that “what exists” is something, whatever that may be, which has the property of “not being an apple”. If it cannot be ‘not an apple’, then it must be (by double negation) an apple; but I am saying that, in this example, it not only can ‘not be an apple’ but actually ‘is not an apple’. The negative property of ‘not being an apple’ does not exist in that something: it is our cognition that simply negates it having that possible property. Negative properties do not subsist in the object itself. The yellowness in a yellow keyboard, as a positive property, subsists in the keyboard; but the ‘not greeness’ does not exist in the keyboard: it is just the cognitive negation of a property with respect to that object.

My point was that if "'what' exists here lacks the property of 'being an apple,'" then (it's obvious that) an "apple" doesn't exist in that spot

But how does this help your point that existence is a proper predicate? My point is that the ‘what’ that exists exists and the predicate of ‘is not an apple’ is merely a negation of that which exists. The negation itself doesn’t exist; but everything we assert is of something which exists (i.e., we can predicate existence to anything). Even in the case we are talking about negative properties (and negations), they exist insofar as they are concepts/ideas in our minds and they lack the property of being outside of our cognition.

The fallacy, which I referenced in my previous post, is, as I held, conditioned by (how I assumed) what's meant by "here"; & it holds if such is the case.

But what is the actual fallacy?

Quoting Bob Ross

Let me just ask you: do you think there could have been nothing instead of the universe (or reality) in which we live? Based off of what you are saying, I am anticipated you may be in agreement with me that the answer is ‘no’.

Moreover, I just want to clarify that this use of “nothingness” that I expounded is not the minority view in society; in fact, mine (and yours if you agree with me) is. Most people would answer yes to the aforesaid question (and thereby concede that nothingness can exist). ... : they just think that there could actually be nothing if all of reality was removed or never began to exist.

Most people (talking about the U.S. here presumably) are theists & believe in creation, & so they wouldn't say that "nothingness," that is, a total negation, existed before our universe. The rest, for the most part, "trust the science"; &, to be sure, everyone who's in that group doesn't hold that "nothingness" existed before the universe, with some holding that it came from a "singularity," & some others that it arose from within the "multiverse" (so, again, not even everyone who's in that latter group holds that "nothingness" existed before the universe).

So, no, in fact, most people (in the U.S. at least) wouldn't positively answer the aforesaid question, & thereby maintain a self-evident falsehood.

Quoting Bob Ross

They don’t have to be directly experiencing the apple to assert it exists.

Quoting Bob Ross

The negative property of ‘not being an apple’ does not exist in that something: it is our cognition that simply negates it having that possible property.

Quoting Bob Ross

... they exist insofar as they are concepts/ideas in our minds and they lack the property of being outside of our cognition.

Does "not apple" differ in conception from "not orange"?

Reply to ItIsWhatItIs

Hello ItIsWhatItIs,

Most people (talking about the U.S. here presumably) are theists & believe in creation, & so they wouldn't say that "nothingness," that is, a total negation, existed before our universe

I think most theists accept the possibility of nothingness (viz., that there is nothing incoherent nor logically inconsistent with positing nothing), and use it to demonstrate, according to their argumentation, that since there is something there could not have been nothing; for if nothing existed then there would always and forever be nothing (or so the argument goes). I don’t think most theists outright reject the possibility of nothing in-itself as incoherent (which I think they should) but, rather, that the fact that there is something eliminates the possibility of nothing. Irregardless, I get your point here as well. However, I think this is a bit of a derailment from the real substance of our conversation.

So, no, in fact, most people (in the U.S. at least) wouldn't positively answer the aforesaid question, & thereby maintain a self-evident falsehood.

What do you mean? How would people in the U.S. believing that nothing cannot exist help your case? Self-evident facts are not necessarily obvious facts (but, irregardless, I am failing to see the connection with your argument that existence is a valid predicate and/or property).

Does "not apple" differ in conception from "not orange"?

In terms of concepts, an “not apple” is not a concept nor is a “not orange”. An “apple” and an “orange” can be concepts (and, of course, they could just be ideas or concretes as well), and the “not” simply denotes that whatever the given concept (or idea or concrete) is, it does not inherit from the concept of an ‘apple’ (or is not of the idea of…, or is not concretely...).

This recalcitrant topic probably deserves it's own eternal thread, like the one @Baden set up for antinatalists.

There are a few ways to parse "to be". Half the confusion here is failure to differentiate them. A bit of formality will help here.

First, Russell and predication. One way we use "is" is in sentences like "The apple is red". In first order logic these are write in the form "f(a)", "a" standing for the apple and "f(...) for the predication "...is red". Simple.

But "The apple exists" does not fit this model well. So we make use of existential quantification, ?(...); and parse "The apple exists" as "There is something that is an apple", ?(x) g(x).

Now this is what Russell pretty much meant in saying that existence is not a predicate; it does not behave like f(...) and g(...), but stands over these, in a "meta-level", if you like.

Note also that the individuals (a,b,c...) and so on in this formal language are all, as it were, presumed. They are in play before we begin, being given in the "domain of discourse" - what we are talking about. There existence is not something that can be discussed within the formal logic. Sometimes these are done away with altogether, with the supposition that "to be is to be the subject of a predicate" - Quine, and some of Russell. That's not a bad rule of thumb.

Hence, also, the Wittgensteinian point that saying this or that exists is not part of the game, any more than putting the pieces on the board is a move in chess.

What's salient here is that the existence of some individual cannot be demonstrated in such systems. First order logic cannot show that god exists.

But what if you treat existence as a first-order predicate? Can you produce a consistent system? WHat if we allow he formation "Fred exists"? We can do this by introducing ?!, a single-place first order predicate. The result is what is called "free logic", free in the sense that it does not presume that the things it talks about all exist. We've now left classical logic.

But this does not get what folk seem most to want from these sorts of discussions. It's a good idea not to suppose that you can get something from nothing, and so one ought not expect to be able to deduce the existence of something - to have god appear in a puff of logic, as it where. So free logic does not permit expressions that conclude with ?!(a) unless the existence of a is found somewhere in the argument.

There's some fun stuff in here, but, it seems, no god.

Same goes for getting something from nothing. If the domain at which you start is empty, no amount of deduction will fill it for you.

Quoting Banno

If the domain at which you start is empty, no amount of deduction will fill it for you.

The hard problem of existence?

Reply to bert1 It's tempting to just say that existence is shown, not demonstrated.

Do you doubt that this post exists? Why not?

Existence is a predicate. But it isn't a predicate of things in the world. It predicates discursive subjects

"UFOs exist" is a substantive statement. But the subject of the statement is not the actual UFOs. The subject is the discursive notion of UFOs. You can talk about UFOs until you're blue in the face without UFOs actually existing. But then, lo and behold, this thing you've been talking about all these years actually exists! That is a real claim, but a claim about our discourse around UFOs, which is not at all the same as the actual UFOs.

Quoting Banno

Do you doubt that this post exists? Why not?

I don't doubt it. It appears before me unbidden!

Either God put it there, or an evil demon, or Banno.

Reply to bert1 Damn, you are on to me.

Quoting Jamal

Loosely, you can only assign properties once you’ve got something to assign them to, and the existence of something just is having something to assign properties to, so existence itself cannot be assigning a property and is therefore not a real predicate.

But when you are discussing something, there is always something to assign properties to: the discursive subject. Any property may be applied to or denied of a discursive subject, including existence. When we engage in discourse around some object, it is the discursive notion we have formed that may 'exist" or "not exist": that is, this discursive notion may or may not correspond to some independent reality.

Fiction is not some weird special case of language. It is merely discourse that is presumed to lack the predicate "exist".