A Case for Objective Epistemic Norms
Although moral facts may not exist andeven if they didare useless, epistemic normative facts exists; for epistemology has a hypothetical imperative as its precondition: that one ought to gain knowledge. Thusly, one is already committing themselves to knowing the world when they engage in epistemology, and there are objectively better ways of knowing: there are epistemic normative fact-of-the-matters which are better for knowing.
Although I cannot claim to have discovered all epistemic normative facts (and I am confident there are probably many more), here are some that I think are quite plausibly such:
1. Intuitions (i.e., intellectual seemings): one ought to take as true what intellectual strikes them as being the case unless sufficient evidence has been prevented that demonstrates the invalidity of it.
2. Parsimony (i.e., Occams Razor): entities ought not be multiplied without necessity.
3. Coherence: the belief (in question) should cohere adequately with ones higher-prioritized beliefs about the world.
4. (Logical) Consistency: there ought not be logical contradictions in the belief nor in contrast to higher-prioritized beliefs.
The first epistemic norm (i.e,. #1 above) is, I would say, inevitably circularly justifiedlike reason in general: I use it because I absolutely have to irregardless; and it is the grounds for the others. For example, it strikes me as the case that it is objectively better to explain a phenomena without extraneous conceptual details when one is committed to gaining knowledge about the world.
Contrary to what I have argued in past (with some members of this here forum), I think that, in light of this, rationality, in the sense of acting in a manner that agrees with reality, can be objectively grounded insofar as the hypothetical imperative (of knowing the world) is a presupposition of epistemology and thusly not within it; and so rationality, which in the sense defined (above) is deeply rooted in epistemic principles, is grounded in the objective epistemic norms.
Thoughts?
Although I cannot claim to have discovered all epistemic normative facts (and I am confident there are probably many more), here are some that I think are quite plausibly such:
1. Intuitions (i.e., intellectual seemings): one ought to take as true what intellectual strikes them as being the case unless sufficient evidence has been prevented that demonstrates the invalidity of it.
2. Parsimony (i.e., Occams Razor): entities ought not be multiplied without necessity.
3. Coherence: the belief (in question) should cohere adequately with ones higher-prioritized beliefs about the world.
4. (Logical) Consistency: there ought not be logical contradictions in the belief nor in contrast to higher-prioritized beliefs.
The first epistemic norm (i.e,. #1 above) is, I would say, inevitably circularly justifiedlike reason in general: I use it because I absolutely have to irregardless; and it is the grounds for the others. For example, it strikes me as the case that it is objectively better to explain a phenomena without extraneous conceptual details when one is committed to gaining knowledge about the world.
Contrary to what I have argued in past (with some members of this here forum), I think that, in light of this, rationality, in the sense of acting in a manner that agrees with reality, can be objectively grounded insofar as the hypothetical imperative (of knowing the world) is a presupposition of epistemology and thusly not within it; and so rationality, which in the sense defined (above) is deeply rooted in epistemic principles, is grounded in the objective epistemic norms.
Thoughts?
Comments (94)
I have a more complicated perspective on intuitions.
Intuition is foundational to our thought and taking intuitions as true is something we do as fast thinking on autopilot. Being creatures that sometimes need to act quickly in emergencies, we sometimes need to act on intuitions without questioning them.
That said, there is a lot of epistemic value in questioning/testing intuitions when we have the luxury of doing so, because over the long term our intuitions can evolve to new and better intuitions as a consequence of such questioning/testing.
Another way of looking at intuitions, is as being the conclusions we jump to, and I expect we all have experience with jumping to wrong conclusions and can recognize value in reducing the frequency with which we jump to wrong conclusions.
I'm a big advocate for honing one's intuitions, and leaving that honing to other people's presentation of contradictory evidence seems excessively passive to me. An ability to refine one's intutions over time seems to me to be fairly crucial to philosophy and science, and inability to learn from philosophy and science looks looks to me as if it is strongly tied to an inability or unwillingness to question one's intuitions.
I appreciate your response! Everything you said I found to be fair enough!
I was not meaning to imply that the evidence against one's intuitions must come from beyond oneself; as I agree that one should be actively trying to "attack" their own intuitions. However, they will only be able to critique their intuitions, or even change their minds, by accepting new (or other) intuitions; and so intuitions, I would say, are still primary even in the case that one is critically thinking about them.
I assume, @Bob Ross, you will take issue with this paraphrase and so I look forward to you making explicit its problems or confusions.
Aren't (3) and (4) key components of rationality? As in, a rejection of rationality could target either of these points. Your thinking seems to have been heavily influenced by the ideas of rationality as shown by (3) and (4), as well as your use of "objective".
Your definition of rationality is terrible, "acting in a manner that agrees with reality". You're really going to refer to "agrees with reality" as being "objectively grounded"?
The manner of acting that can be referred to as "agrees with reality" is just "good". That which is sensible, efficient, or appropriate, is what can be referred to as "agreeing with reality", more or less, right? So, it's objectively good to be things that by definition can only refer to things that are good? Yeah... no kidding.
Contrast rationality with a reasonable alternative. Setting up rationality as "good" and then talking about how it's good to be good, that's pointless.
Hello 180 Proof,
I do, in fact, take issue with the paraphrase (:
Heres my contentions:
1. It is a not a paraphrase of the OP but, rather, applies the OP to a specific metaethical & normative ethical position.
2. Specific metaethical or/and normative ethical positions are irrelevant to the OPs argument, as, according thereto, there are objective epistemic norms simply due to the nature of epistemology.
3. A hypothetical imperative (of reducing suffering ) being a presupposition of ethics has no relevance to there being a hypothetical imperative of epistemology. There could be moral facts or no moral facts, and there would still be the hypothetical imperative of one should determine how to know [the world] which is implicitly accepted when engaging in epistemology.
4. Moral facts are useless. See here for details.
5. Moral facts could certainly impact how one engages in epistemology, but they wouldnt themselves generate (by my lights) epistemic normative factsthey would only ever produce more moral facts (of which influence, at a deeper level, ones epistemic commitments to some degree).
6. Although this is going to come down to what you mean by rationality, I would say that rationality is not deeply rooted in ethical principles. For example, a psychopath can systematically kill people in an extremely rational fashion.
It seems like, and correct me if I am wrong, you ground rationality purely in ethics and not epistemology (and I do the opposite).
I look forward to hearing your reply 180 Proof!
Hello Judaka,
I would say that all four epistemic norms (I expounded) are key to being rational.
I am not entirely sure what you mean here: yes, acting in a manner that agrees with reality is the general definition I use. The epistemic principles which are used to do so are objectively better or worse then other epistemic principles one could use to try and do so; and so rationality, being grounded in those norms, is likewise grounded in objective norms.
This is a semantic association that I did not want to use for the OP (because it isnt necessary). Objective epistemic norms provide an epistemic goodness but not a moral goodness.
The act of agreeing with reality (i.e., being rational) is epistemically good because it is an objectively better means of knowing the world, which is a hypothetical imperative that one has committed themselves to the very moment they engage in epistemology.
No. That which is appropriate or sensible, is going to depend on the person or society and I am not arguing that any sort of individual or collective agreement itself proves a principle to be objective (epistemically).
That which is efficient could be an aspect of being rational, if by that you mean parsimonious, coherent, logically consistent, etc.
Couple things:
1. I am not saying that one should be things that agree with reality: I am saying that one should act in a manner that agrees with reality.
2. It is not objectively morally good but, rather, epistemically good to be rational.
3. I dont understand what you mean by by definition can only refer to things that are good: being rational is not itself what is good here but, rather, the epistemic norms provide the good and rationality is guided (or compelled to) that epistemic goodness.
What do you mean? A reasonable alternative definition?
I never used the term good nor did I imply that rationality is just by definition "good": you are countering your own straw man of my argument.
Quoting Bob Ross
Okay. Your definition can't be taken literally, as it wouldn't make sense, and so I need to interpret what kind of manners of acting would "agree with reality". You've said this isn't just "good", great, prove me wrong. I struggle to imagine you can come up with one because I can't understand why it would ever be good to not "act in a manner that agrees with reality". Could you give me an example of where it would be?
I've called your definition another way of saying "good" because I'm confident you think it's always "good" to act in a manner that agrees with reality. Meaning, you will not be willing to refer to anything that you thought wasn't good as "acting in a manner that agrees with reality". Do you see my logic? Your definition almost certainly divides between good and bad, and that's seemingly the only thing it does.
Quoting Bob Ross
I hadn't intended "good" to refer to "moral goodness". Your "good" is unknown to me, it's just clear that your definition is a version of "good".
Quoting Bob Ross
Objectively better? Could you elaborate? Do you have any evidence to back up your claim?
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, I believe I said as much, the "it's" here is referring to what I had guessed "acting in a manner that agreed with reality" entailed.
Quoting Bob Ross
Well, that would work too.
I read your response to 180 and hmm, you are definitely understanding rationality in your own way. I had been assuming much based on my understanding of normative rationality, but it's clear that doesn't apply to you.
Hello Judaka,
It seems as though we are thinking of rationality in completely different ways, which is fine! What would be the fun in us simply agreeing? (;
Although I am going to address your points as adequately as possible, I would like to ask you to define and elaborate on, likewise, what you think rationality is; that way, I can assess and compare our views more sufficiently.
I am failing to see why it doesnt make sense when taken literally: could you please elaborate on what wouldnt make sense if taken literally?
Firstly, I honestly dont know to interpret a generic goodness. Although I dont think this is what you are asking (because of the last section of the above quote), if you are asking how one could consider it morally bad to act in a manner that agrees with reality, then I would say that literally any position that one could hold that posits such would be an example. For example, it is perfectly compatible with my OP for one to also posit that it is morally abhorrent to be rational (in the sense I defined); or for a psychopath to systematically kill people in a highly rational manner.
In the sense of epistemic goodness, although I may have misspoke in a previous post, I would say that the goodness is the result of accepting the hypothetical imperative to determine how to know; and from this is where epistmology stems (and the epistemic norms therein and rationality).
In the sense of another category or type of goodness, I genuinely do not know what to make of it without further clarification. What exactly do you mean by this?
What is good, if I were to allow myself to contemplate this generic goodness without fully understanding it yet, in its most trivial sense, is just what one thinks one ought to do; and if you think that you ought to act in a manner that agrees with reality, then, yes, it would be good. However, in this sense, goodness is trivial: I can say of any definition of any verb, for example, that it is good insofar as I think I ought to be performing that actionbut the definition of the verb is not presuming that it is in-itself good as a matter of definition. I would say that being rational is an objective consequence of engaging in epistemology, and that the definition of it has nothing to do, in-itself, with it being good. In other words, being rational is good if one is engaging in epistemology (or committed themselves to some sort of moral imperative).
Couple things that standout to me in this sentence:
1. Whether I think being rational is good (in any sense of the term) is irrelevant to its definition in the OP.
2. I could, as a hypothetical, claim that it is (morally) bad to be rational, or that one can be rationally evil because the definition is morally neutral itself.
I dont see how it, by definition, divides between moral goodness vs. badness, and it being epistemically good is not the definition of it but, rather, a biproduct rationality being an essential element of epistemology.
How is the division between some good vs. bad the only thing it does?
There are objectively better norms for knowing the world; that is, there are better ways, independent of minds (i.e., of opinions, of subjects, etc.), to come to know reality.
An easy way to think of this is that if there werent any better ways to know something, then any explanation is valid. Thusly, I can say that I know that this is green because a square circle told me; that cucumbers are on mars because I like the idea of that; that you are wrong because 1+1=2 (and somehow that makes you wrong); etc.
Epistemology entails that one is engaging in intellectual investigation that tries to figure out what actually exists, and this implies that there are betters ways of knowing. These ways are not just subjectively better, it is objectively (epistemically) wrong to claim that cucumbers are on mars merely because I like that idea because it violates this attempt to know the world (as opposed to what we want the world to be).
We clearly do not think of rationality in the same way, and that is why I would appreciate it if you elaborated more on your view (so that I can better respond to your inquiries). For me, the only kind of rationality is normative, so when you say normative rationality it makes me anticipate that you may believe that there is a non-normative mode of being rational: is that true?
Quoting Bob Ross
Rationality has a few aspects to it:
1) Logical thinking - One should think logically, and avoid unhelpful emotional and psychological influences.
2) Goal-driven thinking - One acts in accordance with their goals
3) Logical Consistency - One acts in accordance with their values and beliefs
4) Hierarchical Thinking - One follows 2) but prioritises goals and values in order of importance
5) Reflection and Openmindedness - One aims to improve their thinking and decision-making
6) Ethical Considerations - Rational decision-making should take into account ethical principles and moral values.
7) Acknowledging Biases - One should aim to think objectively, be mindful of the potential for biased thinking and aim to focus on the facts
8) Evidence-based Thinking - One should ensure their thinking has sufficient evidence to be justifiable
In comparison to alternatives, I'll highlight a few things that are accurate in my estimation:
1) Goals must be rational
This is a critically important point to understanding rationality, one's goals must qualify as rational, or else goal-driven behaviour is irrational. It's unlikely that a psychopath's desire to kill would qualify as rational, though it's possible. If they understood their actions were wrong, considering that morality is of the highest importance, we couldn't say their actions aligned with their beliefs and values, which is a prerequisite to rationality. Their actions have risks such as imprisonment or death, if one understands the risks of an action outweigh the potential rewards, then by definition, pressing ahead anyway would be irrational.
Rationality has an important role in morality, because within philosophy, morality is overriding, it's of the highest priority. To argue logically that morality isn't overriding is unlikely to succeed within the context of philosophy. Essentially, one doesn't get to ascribe rationality to their own actions, and there are quite a few hoops to jump through.
2) Rationality is holistic
Rationality perceives a person as a machinery comprised of beliefs, values and goals, all tied together, what one produces should correlate with those parts. One's beliefs need to be non-contradictory, there needs to be cohesion, and everything should make sense together. One must review their beliefs, values and goals to ensure their quality and cohesion.
There's more I could say, but that's the gist of it.
What you're describing is seemingly best described as "instrumental rationality", a strict means-end approach.
Quoting Bob Ross
Are you honestly saying that it's not epistemologically good to "act in a manner that agrees with reality"? I interpret your definition to be directly referencing my accurate understanding of the world, and my ability to understand my acts in relationship to how things really are (reality). It suggests that when one makes decisions or holds beliefs, they're basing them on accurate information and evidence about the way things actually are.
You've set up rationality as inherently good with your definition, have you not? Rationality by your definition is "good epistemological practices". It's not that complicated, there's no circumstance where you'd consider being called irrational praise. It's not conditionally good, it's necessarily good. No soul under any circumstances would consider being called irrational praise, especially not with your definition.
Quoting Bob Ross
I agree, but only because being rational is inherently good by your definition, and I believe it's unreasonable to think otherwise.
Quoting Bob Ross
How unfortunate, you're contrasting rationality against nonsense. I find your understanding incorrect on so many levels. To begin with. where in your definition of rationality does it reference anything related to "knowing the world"? Or in other words, why do I need to act in a manner that agrees with reality to know the world? It's pretty much the other way around, I need to know the world to act in a manner that agrees with it.
I could fail to follow most of what you call rationality and be no worse off in "knowing the world", perhaps if you want to talk only about epistemology, that's what you should do. Make no mention of acts, logic or goals, limit your definition to knowledge if that's all you want to talk about.
Quoting Bob Ross
By normative, what I mean is, rationality can be interpreted in a number of ways, "normative" is "the normal way". As in, there are other ways of interpreting rationality besides the normal way. My only meaning is that l I'm saying your understanding isn't normal.
I appreciate your elaboration of your view! As I believe now that our views are not so apart as we originally thought.
I agree with a lot (although not all) of the tenants you voiced about rationality, as I would consider them coherently derived from my definition: let me explain.
Why does thinking logically entail being rational? Because, I would argue, it is means (an act) which agrees with reality when one is trying to derive something. In other words, if they want to derive something, then it is most rational to be logical because it agrees with reality; and, for example, why it is irrational to think in accordance with if it is has the property of blueness, then it is true: if not, then it is false is because it doesnt agree with reality: blueness is not a property that determines, in reality, the truthity of a proposition.
Why is goal-driven thinking rational? Because, in reality, one has to start with their will when performing anything; so it agrees best with reality to understand what ones goals really are (so that, for example, they dont waste a bunch of time).
I dont agree with this one for two reason:
1. Logical consistency is not one acting in accordance with their values and beliefs: it is to not hold any logical contradictions in ones beliefs.
2. Acting in accordance with ones values and beliefs, to me, is subsumed under goal-driven thinking.
Again: it is rational to do this because it agrees with reality. If prioritizing things was merely a reflection of whimsical imagination, then it would not be rational to do so when trying to perform actions, or actualize goals, in reality.
This is rational because, as you can anticipate, it provides the person with a better understanding of the world, which, in turn, is predicated on the goal to agree with reality. If one doesnt care about agreeing with reality, then they may very well decide to be close-mindedto stick to whatever belief they like and stand ten toes down.
No (: This is a hard no for me. Again, a psychopath can kill people in a highly rational (as in carefully planned, logically consistent, goal-oriented, coherent, effective, etc.). Which leads me to briefly respond to:
You have amended the originally example I gave in a manner that fundamentally changes it: you are positing that the psychopath themselves believe that they are doing something wrong. Of course, a person who does something they think is wrong (in its most primitive sense of the term) is being irrational because they are contradicting themselves.
However, my example made no such stipulation: a psychopath could believe it is perfectly right (or at least permissible) to do horrific things to other people; and they can do so in a highly rational manner. This is no different than anyone else who deploys principles of which they think highly agree with reality to achieve their goals.
I agree that if the reward does not outweigh the risk, then it does seem (at least prima facie) to be irrational to do so. However, two things to note:
1. It is not self-apparent that the psychopaths reward of thrill and gory action against countless victims does not outweigh the risk of being put in prison (from their perspective).
2. The reward is subjective in most scenarios; that is, how rewarding an action is is usually based heavily on ones personality. So, for me, it may be that I dont find the reward outweighing the risk, but someone else could and would be still rational.
Ok, back to your tenants:
This is only rational because it is a principle which attempts to agree with reality: in this case, to try to know the world better by attempting to remove the bias lens of subjective interpretation.
This is rational because it is the best way of agreeing with reality (in action). If I want to know something, then the best way to know (something about reality) is to evaluate the evidence. If this were not true, then this would not be rational to do.
In summary, I think that your tenants are derived from my over-arching definition of rationality.
I am not denying that morality supervenes on epistemology but, rather, that what one ought to do to know the world is distinctly and completely different, in principle, from what one ought to do for the sake of being ethical. Thusly, to be rational is purely an epistemic consideration; but it may be that certain rational behaviors are banned for moral reasons.
It is, but you werent claiming that before: you were claiming that it is good.
I wouldnt say it is inherently good whatsoever; but I would say it is i]epistemically[/i] good and not (necessarily) morally good. This is because what I need to do to know the world may not coincide with what I need to do to behave ethically; and rationality is only epistemically good because it is the best means of achieving knowledge, and the definition itself does not entail an inherent goodness of any sort. It is good as a biproduct of what epistemology is set out to do: to know the world.
Rationality is conditioned to be epistemically good by what epistemology is set out to accomplish, which is to know. It is not logically, actually, nor metaphysically necessary that it is good.
This is just an reflection of the colloquial usage of rationality: of course, it is an insult in every day-to-day talk to be called irrational; but that doesnt lend any weight to your argument that rationality as I defined it is inherently good.
Irrationality is nonsense.
Because in order to know the world one has to deploy principles which agree with it.
This is a good point, and I think there are two things worthy of pointing out here:
1. You rightly point out that one cannot just inherently know how to agree with reality; but my point is that that is what people who are engaging in epistemology are trying to do! They are, in other words, attempting to agree with reality to know it; for one cannot come to know reality by using principles which do not hold for anything in reality: it is like using an instrument that doesnt work. I would say that rationality is all about, at its core, agreeing with reality in this way; and that rational people are always taking in the world as input, processes it, and attempting to come up with principles which will help them better process the information.
2. No one, under my definition, is perfectly rational: not even if they did every tenant you can think of 100% of the time. This is because one can never absolutely know that their actions 100% agree with reality. That belief of agreement is pragmatic (i.e., evidence-based) reasoning. We can only ever strive to to be perfectly rational.
Actions, logic, and goals are all pertinent to epistemology, and are not precluded nor excluded by the practice.
Normativity, as I understand it, is etymologically the normal way but means something which is a prescriptive statement (e.g., ought, should, obligated to, etc.) and not merely what is normal in society. Granted, sociologically people tend to use it in the normal to society manner.
Fair enough!
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, well, as I said, you're describing instrumental rationality.
Quoting Bob Ross
I didn't amend anything, I merely said it was unlikely and then gave some if statements.
Quoting Bob Ross
They're definitely not derived from your over-arching definition of rationality...
Your definition is so vague, that I'd be surprised if you couldn't fit whatever you wanted into it. Hence why I called it a form of "good".
Quoting Bob Ross
You're entitled to your opinion, but you'll get pushback from others.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is just linguistics. You're behaving as though your definition was earned, given to the term rationality because it really deserves it. Have you forgotten that you just made it up...?
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm shocked it's something that required an argument. Genuinely, how is this even a discussion for you? There's zero ambiguity here, it's never good to fail to act in a manner that 'agrees with reality", there's no merit to it. Not epistemologically, morally, logically or in any other way.
Quoting Bob Ross
And you've decided these are the two options? Rationality or irrationality? Get a bit more creative.
Ahh... by the way, you won't be able to succeed in this if you keep your current definition of rationality. Perhaps just try to think about rationality through its tenants instead.
Quoting Bob Ross
Principles that agree with the world? Good gracious... Well, that's checkmate I guess, nobody would dare argue with principles that agree with the world.
Hello Judaka,
Based off of your response, I do not think this discussion is going to be productive. I think I put in the effort to address all of your points and, instead of reciprocating that effort, you resorted to primarily re-voicing your distaste for my definition (with no real substantive response).
I am going to briefly respond to your points, but if you are unwilling to engage with my previous response, then I think we may have to just agree to disagree.
This is may be true, but I do not know what this instrumental rationality is that you are referring to; and, thusly, will not endorse it. I am saying what I am saying, and if it happens to coincide with some position I have never heard of, then thats fine.
You said:
Your justification for it not counting as rational, which is imperative for your position to work, is the hypothetical that they understood their actions were wrong; which was not a part of my example: thats what you amended. If this was just a hypothetical side-note, then please respond with how the psychopaths rational murdering is irrational. You seem to just be saying, by my lights, that it is immoral, but why would that have any affect on the rationality of it?
You cannot fit anything into it: it is a very clear definition. If one is acting in agreement with reality, then they are fundamentally behaving in a rational manner. Any principles derived from this obligation or taste to act in agreement with reality is likewise a part of being rational.
That is fine, but I am wanting to know your push back.
Logical, actual, and metaphysical necessity are not mere linguistics: they are modes of modality.
All definitions are made up, but that doesnt mean they are whimsical or arbitrary.
What do you mean by earned? My definition is meant to best portray, at its root, what rationality is and I think it captures it quite well. I was never claiming to have provided every principle that can be derived therefrom.
Logic does not comment on the merit of arguments other than its form, so what do you mean by it has no merit to it if it abides by logical laws?
I already accepted that it is epistemically good; and any moral merit is just an irrelevant importation of you own ethical theory.
I am not sure what you are implying here: either something is p or it is not p; so either something is rational or it is not rational.
The tenants of rationality are not the same as its definition: they are examples of it. I gave the definition.
Quoting Bob Ross
What do you think makes something part of rationality? Is something only part of rationality when we agree with it? What makes an understanding of the concept "correct" or "incorrect"?
You say you disagree with the ethical dimension of rationality, but is it even valid for you to disagree? Who gets to decide what is or isn't part of rationality, and on what basis?
Rationality just is what it is, I explained my understanding of what it is, and if you provide a very good problem with it, then I won't just say "Ah, that's not part of rationality then", I'll instead say, "You've pointed out a good problem with the concept".
You've set up rationality as "good", you've literally defined it as "good practice", and thus, rationality can never be a problem, and I think that's asinine. There are many flaws with it, but look at your OP, you're making the case for rationality, while also defining rationality as "best practice". Can't you see how stupid that is? If rationality is best practice, then it's self-evident that it's the best, so why would we need a thread validating it? There's nothing to discuss, besides rejecting your definition.
Quoting Bob Ross
I said it was possible for a serial killer's actions to be considered rational, but it was unlikely, and then I defended that assertion of unlikelihood. I did not give points to assert that it was inherently irrational.
The reason rationality is biased against the serial killer is that it emphasises moral views as being of the highest priority. Morality excludes personal factors and motivations, it's about what's best for the group. The serial killer's joy of killing isn't a valid moral argument, and without that, intellectually speaking, the serial killer would probably conclude that their actions weren't best for the group - obviously. Yes, they press ahead anyway, but rationally, their actions do not correlate with their moral beliefs, so we could say they're being irrational.
You may understand rationality as unbiased and fair, as you seem to think it's literally perfection, but all that means is you're unable to critically analyse the concept. It's not unbiased, it's not fair, and the concept is rigged against the serial killer - though mind you, most people are fine with that.
If you wanted to know what instrumental rationality is, how about, GOOGLING it? What the heck... I'm not the first person to bring it up to you.
Quoting Bob Ross
Everyone has an opinion. Reasons and justifications come as easily as ideas, nothing special. That's no cause for dishonest language. Rationality can be best practice - and let anyone define what that is, or it can be a specific idea, as outlined previously, choose one.
Quoting Bob Ross
Ah, is that so? You said yourself that nobody can be 100% perfectly rational, which should invalidate it as a binary, does it not? Rationality is just an idea, it can have flaws, well, at least if you define it reasonably, which you haven't.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, I'm unwilling to work with you while you use that definition, it's dishonest to an extreme, but like I said, keep it as is your right. I recommend that if you intend to keep it no matter what, you shouldn't respond to this comment, it will be a waste of your time.
I never intend to retain my views at all costs, as that is intellectually ingenuine and does not further the conversation. If I am convinced by anything you say, then I am more than happy to concede on whatever point you are making; and I expect the same from anyone else.
These kinds of straw mans do not help us further the conversation: why do you think, in addition to me being wrong, that I am being dishonest?
I already gave the definition and elaborated on it in detail to you: see the OP.
Not at all, and I never suggested that. Someone is being rational if however they are acting sufficiently seems to be agreeing with reality.
This is just a question about epistemology in general, and I would say that it is based off of many factors; such as the ones I had in the OP. E.g., parsimony, explanatory power, intuitions, reliability, credence, logical consistency, coherence, empirical adequacy, etc. Of course, we develop more fine-tuned principles depending on the goals of the particular study, but I would say the aforementioned are the basics.
I think so. I dont think you have demonstrated why rationality would include ethical considerations, and I think I have demonstrated that excluding ethics actually fits experience better (such as in the case of a rational psychopath).
Epistemological speaking, on evidence, intuitions, explanatory power, coherence, etc
I am not saying that everyone should use the term in the manner I defined it: there are literally millions of contexts and there may be some where it is better to use a different definition; and, of course, if one wants to discuss with a particular group of people who use it in a specific manner, then it is probably best to use it in there sense of the word (even if one disagrees).
It just depends; but I think that my definition gives the best account of the crux of what it means to be rational.
I agree, but this has not happened in our conversation. You have not provided, by my lights, a very good problem with my definition. If you did (and I recognize it), then I would gladly concede on that point.
It can never be an epistemic problem, but it can surely be a pragmatic or moral problem! You keep conflating the different types of goodness I have outlined with some sort of generic one, which doesnt work.
Also, I have not crafted rationality, by definition, in a way that fits my goals (i.e., as good); but, rather, it is epistemically good because of the inherent hypothetical that a person commits themselves to when engaging in epistemology. You keep overlooking this point I keep making.
This is stupid because you are arguing against your own straw man of my position. I never said rationality is the best practice: practice of what? I, likewise, am not even claiming it is inherently, in-itself, the best practice of epistemology: I am saying that the inherent hypothetical imperative to epistemology favors rationality as the best means of achieving it.
Let me clarify. If you accept that a serial killer can be rational and it is morally wrong to be a serial killer, then rationality precludes morality. Now, please tell me which antecedent you disagree with, so we can further this discusion.
It sounds like your response is that it is possible because morality is about what is best for the group: now you are just importing your specific normative ethical theory into this, of which, in this case, I disagree with; but I do not see how it is relevant for us to now argue about our different ethical theories. First, I want to know what benefit there is to including moral considerations in the term rationality, and then we can dive into ethical theories if we want to.
As I have defined it (which has no moral considerations), it isnt rigged; so the crux between our positions is that you seem to think it needs to include moral considerations, and I dont. Why do you think it needs moral considerations?
I dont want to know (right now): it isnt relevant. I want you to engage with what I am saying, and not whatever instrumentalist rationalism says.
Not at all. I said nothing that denies the law of noncontradiction.
I never said my definition is flawless.
I would also like to mention that the primary focus of the OP is not the definition rationality: you have just hyper-focused on it: the argument is that there are objective epistemic norms.
Quoting Bob Ross
Clarify something for me, are you trying to use the word "rationality" as though you invented it? To give it your own definition and understand it in your own way. Or are you treating it as a public term where I need to justify my understanding of rationality?
On one hand, you're telling me that your OP defines rationality, and I should deal with what you're saying, on the other, you want to have a discussion about "What rationality is" and what comprises it.
Quoting Bob Ross
Instrumental rationality excludes ethical considerations, if I wanted to convey that I wasn't using them, I'd use that term. As for why rationality would include ethical considerations, it's largely because most people care about them. I listed ethical considerations as an aspect of rationality, not a prerequisite to being rational, and I explained that a serial killer could be considered rational, and gave some if statements to demonstrate part of what was necessary for that to happen.
Rationality is holistic, unlike instrumental rationality, and so it includes the wider ramifications of one's actions. You've given me a hypothetical of a serial killer with no conscience, and a very particular and unusual set of priorities and beliefs, and I've agreed that they could be rational, but your example isn't representative of even the average serial killer, let alone the average person.
For the majority, who do have moral beliefs and value ethics, one will naturally need to take these factors into consideration. One aims to act in a way that makes sense considering one's goals, beliefs and values, that's rationality.
You're depicting rationality as ultra-pragmatic and goal-driven by denying the ethical element, which would be fine if you specified you were talking about instrumental rationality... or if you're pretending you made up the term rationality and you're defining it in your OP.
Quoting Bob Ross
The problem you outlined with a "generic one" and the way in which it doesn't work was intended. I've only ever brought up the term "good" to demonstrate the problems with your definition. You've overcomplicated things by insisting on interpreting "good" as moral. I'm tired of making the same point though, so I won't.
Quoting Bob Ross
Benefit?
Quoting Bob Ross
I don't think it needs to, it just does. I understand rationality as something far more specific than you seem to. In terms of "agreeing with reality", that is so goddamn vague, I could add anything I wanted, and I would, as would everyone. I would understand the term however I wanted. You can't both define rationality as "acting in a manner that agrees with reality" and then also outline the ways in which we must understand when actions "agree with reality". A definition is just a small, short few words, and then people fill in what that means for themselves.
Quoting Bob Ross
Well, if you say so.
Quoting Bob Ross
There are objective standards for good singing or dancing as well, and everything else, sure, why not epistemic norms as well?
Hello Judaka,
Before responding to your whole post, I wanted to get some clarification first.
I think I may have identified our confusion with each other: are you trying to convey that "rationality" includes the consideration of one's morals and values, as opposed to 'rationality' entailing any sort of particular ethical theory?
If you are just trying to convey that one needs to be consistent with their own values, whatever they may be, then I agree and do not see how my definition precludes that. If you mean that 'to be rational' includes someone adhering to a particular ethical theory, then I disagree and say "rationality precludes ethics" (in that sense).
I think that it is rational to consider one's values stems from the fact (i.e., that it agrees with reality for me to say that) that one must use their values inevitably to perform any actions; and so it would be irrational to contradict or put no effort into deciphering one's values. However, there is no consideration of any ethical theory in what it means to 'be rational', as it would be very odd indeed to say that someone is irrational for merely disagreeing with one's normative ethical theory (or what not) even in the case that they are being logically consistent, coherent, etc.
And to respond to your clarification request:
I am not sure if I fully followed this question, but I would say that I am treating it as a term that is open to refurbishment as problems arise with its current definition.
If by public term you are referring to colloquial speech, then I would say that I am not aware of any reputable dictionary that defines rationality with any ethical consideration (as it usually just means vaguely "to abide by reason"); and, furthermore, people (at least from my experience) tend to have a notion of rationality that precludes ethical considerations in the sense of what is or is not ethical to do.
For example, if someone disagrees with another persons normative ethical theory (e.g., someone disagrees with you that what is morally good is what is best for the group) and their theory was highly thought-out, logically consistent, coherent, has some good points, etc., then most people would say that the person (that disagrees with their theory) is being rational but that they simply disagree. In your definition, I think it lacks this key aspect of how people use it in colloquial speech if you are claiming that what is wrong or right is relevant to 'being rational' as opposed to 'one must be coherent and consistent in whatever they think is right or wrong'. Hopefully that makes sense.
In terms of a technical definition, which I am much more interested in than colloquial notions of it, I think that my definition is a sharpened form of the colloquial notion.
For now, I would like to start here so as hopefully we can progress the conversation and hone-in better on what each other mean.
Bob
On the contrary, I "ground" ethics and epistemology and ... "in rationality" (i.e. adaptive inferential-discourse). Maybe this divergence is why we're talking past each other.
To whom? For what? Like ecological or medical facts, the utility of "moral facts" is a function of context, Bob: that is, such facts oblige rational agents to posit hypothetical imperatives normative practices which are adaptive with respect to those facts as constraints.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yep.
Quoting Bob Ross
I am not saying one needs to be consistent with their own values, I'm saying that's part of rationality.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, rationality by definition references the importance of acting in accordance with one's values, that's what rationality is. You keep referencing your definition to prove we can justify the tenants of rationality with it. Yet, your definition is so vague, that I have no doubt your definition can be used to justify anything bar utter nonsense, so I'm not convinced by what you're doing whatsoever.
Technically, yes, any ethical theory could suffice, but it's more complicated than that as I explained earlier. Your ethical theory must be rationally justifiable and must be in harmony with what's realistic, your expectations, your values and your goals. Consider also, who it is that finds an ethical theory rational or irrational.
If I'm judging the rationality of your choice of ethical theory, I may arrive at a different conclusion than you, and the serial killer is a good example of that. Most wouldn't find the serial killer's goals and values to be rationally justifiable, and so even though his actions align with their own goals, it mightn't matter, but it depends. Rationality is a bloated concept, so full of aspects that I think one can arrive at whatever conclusion one likes.
You took issue with me explaining rationality references ethical considerations, but I just explained my view of what rationality is, it wasn't an endorsement. I don't like or see the value in the concept of rationality, your attempt to just redefine the term as evaluative, as utterly good while retaining the nuances of it, I find a dishonest practice. I'm not interested in fixing the term, it refers to what it refers to.
Hello 180 Proof,
Probably. Can you firstly define what you mean by rationality and, secondly, explain how and why you ground ethics in it?
Are you saying that the moral facts obliges us to posit hypothetical imperatives? If so, then what are those facts? And how are they facts (as opposed to hypothetical imperatives themselves)?
In terms of my position, I have already outlined it here.
Hello Judaka,
I see! Let me try to interpret your response through this lens then.
I am confused here: arent you saying that it is a part of rationality to be consistent with their own values? If not, then please elaborate on what exactly you are referring to here is a part of rationality (so I can assess).
Or are you making a distinction between acting in accordance with vs. consistent to ones values? Because you say:
So I can understand your counter here better, please provide me with one example of something which you can derive from my definition which is utter nonsense (or even just nonsensical).
I agree, and this is why rationality is not contingent on ones ethics. It is not irrational or rational, in-itself, for a psychopath to murder people simply because they are doing something immoral. However, it is irrational for one to be inconsistent in their ethical commitments.
Why? If that psychopath is being consistent, coherent, etc. then I dont see why anyone would be justified in saying they are irrational on the grounds of them performing an act which violates that persons ethical theory (of what is the right thing to do).
Well, now rationality is just being treated as a trivial notion! My definition is the core of the concept of what it means to be rational; the term, for me, is not just a whimsical term.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, I am. In other words, I am saying an aspect of rationality is for one to act in accordance with one's values regardless of whether I think one should act in accordance with their values. I personally don't think one should strive to act in accordance with their values, as I think this leads to rationalisations. My decision-making process inherently involves using my values, if I decide to do something that apparently contradicts my values, I don't see a problem with that. By the way, I'm not aiming to contrast "acting in accordance with" and "acting consistently with", as I think they express the same idea.
I'd argue the entire idea of acting in a way that is consistent with one's values is a moral one. It's about holding people accountable. If you can get me to agree that "People should treat each other with respect", then you can hold me to that in the name of rationality whenever I fail to do that. I might then say "Well, in this case, they deserve it, so it's fine", and then you might dispute that, and that's an important role rationality plays in morality and ethics.
If I agree "People should treat each other with respect" but then later say "Oh, but by the way, I don't really care and I'll just do whatever I want, whenever I want", then what was the point of agreeing in the first place?
You can interpret the relevance of this idea as you like, but that's how I perceive it. The idea of rationality starts to fall apart if we don't include any moral considerations, particularly in the holistic element, noteworthy as instrumental rationality lacks that holistic element. We can talk about what one should do to accomplish goal X as is done in instrumental rationality, provided the goal is measurable and specific. (i.e. not "agree with reality" or any other non-specific, unmeasurable term).
Quoting Bob Ross
It's not possible from your understanding, because you've defined rationality as the opposite of nonsense. Linguistically, it'd be a contradiction to say something that can be correctly referenced as rational was nonsense, because by referencing something as rational ("...agrees with reality"), one is literally saying it's sensible. I can't call something sensible and nonsensical at the same time, can I?
You just don't appear to view this as a linguistic problem, your term more-or-less references sensible behaviour, that's its definition. In language, we would then reference something as "rational" to convey our opinion that "this is a manner of acting that agrees with reality". It can never be true that "a manner of acting that agrees with reality" was nonsensical, as anything nonsensical cannot be correctly referenced as being "a manner of acting that agrees with reality".
It's when you allow me to interpret and use the word you've created, without you interfering with my usage, that I can show the problem. But if I say "X action agrees with reality", to show how I've interpreted something nonsensical to be "agreeing with reality", I presume you will just tell me "Nope, wrong, X doesn't agree with reality, therefore your example is invalid". Arguably, the very fact that I intentionally selected a nonsensical example is contradictory, because I'd know my example was wrong.
The difference between the word "sensible" and rationality, is that sensible has no baggage, it's a purely evaluative term. Thus, I consider it an honest word. Rationality is inherently "That which is sensible" and also includes a bunch of subjective ideas, which implies that those subjective ideas define what's sensible.
Quoting Bob Ross
Right, but I didn't say that. I'm saying they'd find the serial killer to be inconsistent and incoherent because the serial killer's ethical stance was nonsensical or unjustifiable. Most serial killers believe that what they're doing is immoral, they just either don't care or can't help themselves. You consistently misunderstand language, as though there's an objective truth to whether the serial killer is consistent and coherent, rather than thinking of these as words people use to convey opinion.
Obviously, nobody who thought the serial killer was coherent and consistent would simultaneously say he was irrational because he was incoherent and inconsistent, as that would be contradictory.
It's a symbolic practice heuristically (or algorithmically) effective for controlling behavior and / or the environment despite insufficient time and/or information IIRC, Peirce-Dewey's conception of 'rationality': practice.
Quoting Bob Ross
I ground ethics in rationality (i.e. inferential rules/heuristic-making) because I conceive of ethics as the study of 'the how of well-being', that is, how to reduce negations of well-being. (NB: Thus, I analogize well-being (how to reduce its negation) in ethics with e.g. sustainability (how to reduce its negation) in ecology and optimal health-fitness (how to reduce its negation) in medicine.)
Yes; just as medical facts and ecological facts also oblige us to ask 'how to reduce' their adverse impacts as noted above.
Species (e.g. h. sapiens) specific functional defects natural vulnerabilities which cause dysfunction or worse increase suffering in living individuals when such defects are neglected and/or exacerbated (via e.g. deprivation). In other words, whatever harms is bad for our kind.
At minimum, they (e.g. hunger, bereavement, isolation, injury) are constitutive constraints on limits to (our) biological functioning.
I agree and dont see how this contends with my definition. Also, this entails that the psychopath is being rational as long as, all else being equal, they are acting in accordance with their values.
Right now, we are just discussing what rationality is, not why one would be motivated to tell someone to act in accordance with their values. With regards to motivation, there are a lot of reasons someone would advocate for a person to be rational.
I agree that ethics heavily relies on rationality (which is epistemic); but not vice-versa. Usually, what is used to decipher what is wrong or right is epistemic principles (e.g., law of noncontradiction, etc.), but rationality itself does not include any moral considerations (viz., rationality only makes reference to people being consistent which, in turn, implies that one ought to be consistent in their values; and they must abide by their values because they literally cant act without a value judgment occurring; but neither of these consideration are ethical ones: it doesnt say what is right or wrong).
I dont see any moral considerations in what you have been saying about rationality. Saying that one should be consistent in their moral considerations is more like a prerequisite to ethics, not ethics itself.
I dont care if you abide by my semantics, if you think that my definition leads to implied nonsensical propositions (that are posited as true), then I need you to be able to demonstrate at least one. Otherwise, I dont think you can claim that.
What action that is a manner of acting in agreement with reality is nonsensical to you? Give me one example.
Like common sense and reasonable, it has a ton of baggage.
But if all you are claiming is that a part of rationality is that one should act in accordance with one's values, then they would be factually wrong to claim that the serial killer is irrational because their ethical position is so-called unjustifiable or nonsensical. As long as they are being consistent and coherent (with their own views), then a person would be wrong to call them irrational; hence, rationality does not have any meaningful connection to ethics.
You have to be careful here: usually they mean immoral merely in the sense that they are doing something that most people would consider wrong, but they themselves dont think it is.
Firstly, I dont think truth is objective nor subjective, but thats for a separate discussion.
Secondly, I do think there is a truth to the matter of whether the psychopath or serial killer is being internally coherent and logically consistent: that absolutely not a matter of mere semantics.
Then you agree with me that ethics is not a part of the discussion about if a person is being rational; for that serial killer could be violating every common moral law and still be considered rational.
Thank you for the definition! So, is rationality, then, for you, a pragmatic tool for achieving our desires? If so, then wouldnt that tool be separate from the desires and wouldnt it have a set of principles which stem from it that are rational? If so, then wouldnt those rational principles, which you say are used for pragmatic purposes of control, devoid of moral content themselves (irregardless of whether someone is deploying them with morally motivated reasons)?
Upon further contemplation, I actually dont see anything wrong with this (without importing my own normative ethical theory in the mix); but I am saying that vice-versa is false: rationality is not defined with any moral considerations. Someone can be utterly rational and immoral.
To me, you using rational principles to infer your ethical obligations is fine, as rationality, then, would be a prerequisite to your ethical discussions; but rationality itself would not be presupposing any ethical considerations.
I see.
I understand that these are facts, but how are they moral facts? They do not inherently have any obligations contained therein, nor do they inherently have moral worth, nor are they categorical imperatives...someone has to decide, as a matter of taste (no matter how deep within their psyche), that they have any moral worth.
A limit to our biological functioning is not, by my lights, a moral fact; it is an amoral or non-moral fact. There is nothing about a limitation on our biological functioning that itself categorically obligates someone to strive to reduce impairments or injury to their physiology.
Quoting Bob Ross
Me neither, which makes sense, given it doesn't have anything to do with your definition.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm talking about the motivations for creating the word rationality and the motivation for seeing actions or choices as rational or irrational.
Quoting Bob Ross
I don't think rationality "relies" on ethics, but ethics play an important role in rationality, in so far as one's goals, values and beliefs naturally take ethical considerations into account. If one admits that's not true for them, fine, as their reward, they can expect their contributions in group discussions to be largely ignored going forward.
Your thinking is binary. As far as you're concerned, seemingly, if you can prove a single exception, then you've proven rationality is disentangled from ethics. I'm focusing on the 99.99% of cases where ethics matter, you're focusing on the 0.01% of cases where it mightn't.
Why are you so concerned with this technical, trivial truth that rationality doesn't necessarily include ethics? If rationality doesn't technically mandate including ethics, should we ignore the relationship between the two? Welcome to the real world, where people don't always speak honestly. Where we advocate for rationality, full well knowing and intending the implications the concept would have on morality and ethics.
Quoting Bob Ross
The importance of rationality in morality and ethics is the moral consideration, that's why the idea is attractive. Take that away, and we won't ignore that rationality is complete nonsense. It's merely a convenient/useful fiction.
Rationality lists a plethora of different standards for thinking, and it contains within it, nothing that mentions anything that falls outside the area of thought. Despite that, its definition, as well as yours, primarily focuses on acts as being rational or irrational. If I skip going to the gym because I feel tired, since going to the gym is aligned with my long-term goals, we could call that irrational. If I was studying but got distracted by a conversation with a friend, since what I'm studying for is action to accomplish my higher priority goal, then by definition, that's irrational. If I know it would be beneficial to put my keys in the same spot each time, but I forget to do it, by definition, that's irrational.
The implication of rationality as a word is clear, my action is irrational, and here are all of these various thinking techniques that are aligned with rationality, in other words, the term inherently asserts the problem is in my thinking. Yet, by definition, actions are rational or irrational even in cases where there's nothing wrong with the quality of my thinking. Why inherently? Because as you yourself said, it's merely true that one's actions were irrational, well, that holds even if common sense would tell us that this is not a knowledge problem.
Describing actions that don't align with long-term goals or higher-priority beliefs as a flaw of one's thinking is a riot, but that's exactly what the term does. The implication that such actions are necessarily thinking or knowledge problems is absurd and antiscientific, but that's really the only unique thing about rationality. To be able to argue that a failure to act morally is in fact, a knowledge/thinking problem, is greatly useful, but in reality? It's rarely that simple.
Rationality as a word, fails because it doesn't know when not to apply itself, and your definition is just as poor. One's actions may not be of "a manner that agrees with reality" for many reasons outside of knowledge. You can insist that the term is purely epistemic, but you're wrong. Your definition, and normative rationality, merely imply that irrationality is an epistemic problem, and do so incorrectly and misleadingly.
There are many other problems with rationality, mostly in the implications it has about the nature of human beings and thought. That there's a need a kind of logical consistency mindmap, ensuring none of one's beliefs contradict and that everything aligns perfectly, is just another nonsense. It's perfectly healthy to have contradictory beliefs and logic doesn't have to be able to work perfectly when being taken out of context. Again, where it does seem particularly important that we don't allow contradictory beliefs and for logic to be inconsistent is in morality and ethics, which I don't think is a coincidence.
Quoting Bob Ross
You're asking me to give an example of sensible behaviour being nonsensical, why don't you see that as a problem? The definition is vague, that's the issue, and what I consider sensible may seem nonsensical to you and vice versa.
Quoting Bob Ross
Explain how "There is a truth to the matter" is not the same as saying there's an objective truth. Aren't you saying, "There is a truth that is true regardless of whether someone disagrees", or in other words, that it's not subjective?
Quoting Bob Ross
It's part of the discussion in 99.99% of cases, and arguably in 100% of cases, but there's some subjectivity there. As I said, if I want to interpret the serial killer's actions as irrational, and his thinking and goals as foolish, nothing stops me. You're intent on understanding rationality as an actual, objective truth, but I won't join you there. It requires interpretation, and the claim here is vague and unmeasurable, I think treating its truth as scientific-like truth is silly.
Hello Judaka,
But, as I said before, rationality does not consider anything ethical except for being consistent in ones ethics; and I thought you agreed with me on that? Now it sounds like you are claiming that what is rational is contingent on what one thinks is ethical or unethical beyond merely being consistent.
Sort of. If I can provide an example of a person that you would consider rational, under the definition thereof, which does not exhibit a property of which you are claiming is essential to rationality, then I thereby have demonstrated a contradiction in your view. Thusly, either, in that case, you have to refurbish your definition of rationality or reject that the person is being rational. You cant have the cake and eat it too (;
In the case of the psychopath, you cant claim that (1) there is such a thing as a rational and egregiously immoral psychopath and (2) that rationality, by definition, entails moral goodness.
I am just using a radical example to tease out the contradiction in your view. I dont think morality is relevant 100% of the time to whether or not a person is being rational. Perhaps, if you would like, then you could offer a counter-example, similar to mine, that demonstrates the need of moral consideration to determine a person as being rational? I would be more than happy to entertain any such examples.
I am not. Again, the OP is about there being objective epistemic norms: it isnt even focused on rationality. You brought up rationality, and somewhere along the lines we started conversing about whether ethics plays a role in its the definition.
What relationship?!? You are just begging the question here, as I am saying there is no relationship between rationality and ethics (in that direction), but there is vice-versa. If you think that there is, then please elaborate; or, at this point, just provide a counter-example (like my psychopath one).
There is absolutely no relevance to the OP whether people are dishonest or not.
Like I said before, ethics is tied to rationality, but rationality is not tied to ethics. I dont disagree that what is rational will impact ethics, but you are saying that ethics impacts rationality.
In that case, then you arent saying that ethics impacts rationality but, rather, vice-versa; which I have no problem with.
Thinking is an action, and actions which are in agreement with reality are rational. Sure, one could say that one is not intentionally being rational if they act in agreement with reality (to the best of our knowledge) but more lucked their way into itbut they would still be acting in a rational manner.
That is all the definition should ever portray: what is rational, and, in light of that, what is not. There is absolutely nothing else the any definition should do other than define the word.
Firstly, this just depends on what your goals are: if you are just casually studying, then it would not be irrational to step into a side conversation.
Secondly, if the goal is the maximize comprehension (of what one is studying) then it is actually better to take breaks.
I dont think this is irrational because you were still being consistent, to your best ability, with your goals: you just forgot. I dont see how the act of genuinely forgetting is irrational.
I think this is a good point: I think that defining it as merely an act precludes intentions, which I think matters. Perhaps a better definition is an act that attempts to agree with reality. If you had the intention of doing something quite rational, but for some reason your body fails to actualize that intention in a rational manner, then I wouldnt say you are being irrational; because the irrational behavior was outside of our control (in any meaningful sense of the term).
I dont see how this is a flaw: if one has a goal and has prioritized it above all the others, then it makes no sense do something prioritized lowereither de-prioritize the goal or do it.
How is it absurd and antiscientific?
Give me some examples of when someone would be justified in acting in a manner that disagrees with reality.
I am starting to suspect you dont have any examples of my definition implying something nonsensical; as I already stated that you dont have to use the term nonsensical in whatever way you are assuming I use it. You are the one who said it implies nonsensical claims, so what are they?
I am interpreting, on my end, the term in its colloquial usage (unless you specify otherwise): having no meaning; making no sense or ridiculously impractical or ill-advised.
You keep assuming I define nonsensical in terms of rationality, but even if I do it has no bearing on whatever you claiming, as you used the term in whatever sense you mean it.
You can see my thread on truth here .
Then give me an example!
You would be violating my definition and most (if not all) colloquial definitions.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540198
Quoting Bob Ross
Nope, goals must be rational as well, if your ethical position is invalid, inconsistent or illogical, then you aren't being rational by merely being consistent.
Quoting Bob Ross
I described it as an aspect, we've already covered this, and yet you're bringing it up like I haven't clarified this multiple times.
Quoting Bob Ross
My claim isn't that by definition it entails moral goodness, but I think one could reasonably interpret moral goodness to be a condition for rationality. In practice, us consistently finding immoral actions to be irrational would allow one to interpret that moral goodness was a condition. Remember that when you give me an example like "the serial killer has this goal and this opinion and these values", that's remarkably distinct from reality. I have no basis by which I can question the traits or opinions of a hypothetical serial killer, and so your word is law here. You can give your serial killer all the traits, values and beliefs (and you have done that) to make him rational, and thus, I can't reasonably call him irrational. That's true for the hypothetical serial killer, but not in any real-life case.
In real life, I'll be using my interpretations, my beliefs, my characterisations, my knowledge and my understanding of the serial killer, not yours. It's there that my biases and my opinions will be allowed to operate as usual, and there that the serial killer is unlikely to be considered rational - though it depends on the judge.
We won't see eye to eye on this though, it's clear enough that we have a different understanding of logic, language and truth.
Quoting Bob Ross
I already tried to, but you just found ways of dismissing everything I said, as though that meant something. Whatever traits or beliefs your serial killer needed to be rational, you gave him, however, it was required to interpret his actions to be rational, you argued for. As someone who considers rationality highly subjective, none of this is compelling. Mostly you're just proving that he who acts the judge can conclude how they deem fit.
Quoting Bob Ross
Just rationality's importance in ethics.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm saying that rationality is merely a tool for ethics, everything else is largely misdirection.
Quoting Bob Ross
So you keep insisting. I was generous with your definition, I thought you were relying on a common understanding of what it might mean for something to "agree with reality", but it seems not, do you mean it literally? Can you explain how two unthinking concepts can be "in agreement"? Explain how that works.
Quoting Bob Ross
The definition of rationality defines what is rational, the word portray sends shivers down my spine... Do you think rationality is a natural phenomenon or what?
Quoting Bob Ross
Your definition makes no mention of "to the best of one's ability".
Quoting Bob Ross
That would be a significant improvement for sure.
Quoting Bob Ross
How silly. I'm going to just ignore this comment.
Quoting Bob Ross
A failure to act logically isn't necessarily an inability to comprehend what's logical, in fact, it's usually not. We struggle to do what we know we should do for a variety of reasons, surely, you can think of examples without my help.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yep, you're right. I won't repeat myself a third time.
Quoting Bob Ross
Your understanding is a mess as expected. Truth is merely a correct reference or the correct answer, it's a function of logic and it's tied to language. I wrote something somewhat relevant recently.
Quoting Judaka
To reference the "truth" of whether an act is rational or irrational is the same as referencing "the correct reference" or "the correct answer". Scientific claims are measurable and specific, and there, if the truth conditions and claims adhere to standards, then there should be a "correct answer". Rationality, neither measurable nor specific, is an unscientific claim, its truth betrays the characteristics you imagine truth should have. Anyone can create a category, give it a logic, and then claim truth when those conditions are met, isn't that so?
Hello 180 Proof,
I appreciate you referring me to your exposition of moral facts (in another thread), but, unfortunately, I am not seeing how they are really such. A promise is not an is that entails an ought, for it is the obligation to fulfill ones promises that furnishes one with a valid deductive argument for any obligation contained in the promise itself. Just my two cents.
I don't understand your objection. Consider this SEP article ...
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/
Hello Judaka,
Saying ones ethical position is irrationalif they are inconsistent or illogical, is to agree with me. Saying it is invalid is ambiguous: what you do mean by invalid?
Besides your criteria of validity, you just agreed with the sentence you quoted of me while attempting to disagree with it:
Perhaps the confusion lied in me not explicitly saying ethics must adhere to ones logical theory?
It isnt. There have been, historically speaking, very rational serial killers. In fact, there were some who did it in such a rational and ingenious way that it took the authorities a really long time to catch them.
Thats why it is called a hypothetical: you evaluate it based off of the stipulations. This is not a problem whatsoever.
Firstly, you admitting in the hypothetical that the serial killer is rational refutes your position that ethics is a criteria for rationalitythats why I used that example. Hypotheticals are really good ways of teasing out incoherencies and inconsistencies in peoples views.
Secondly, there are many real life cases of serial killers that were quite rational: they just didnt value other human beings well-being.
This is completely irrelevant and misses the point of hypothetical thought experiments: they test whether you are being coherent and consistent in your beliefs, by giving you stipulations and seeing if the necessary conclusion is made that aligns consistently and coherently with your claims.
You have not given a counter-example nor an example of how my definition leads to nonsensical and true propositions: you have continued to beat around the bush, and if you arent willing to give them then just say so!
If you really think you are provided counter-examples, then please quote them from a past discussion response you made, and I will happily concede if I am wrong here.
I am starting to think we may need to just agree to disagree here, because we seem to be getting no where: I already stated that this is a non-issue for us and is not the claim I am contending with but, rather, your claim that ethics pertains to rationality.
I dont quite understand what you are asking. Two concepts could be in agreement in the sense that they cohere well with each other, are equivalent to each other, are analogous to each other, etc. But the concept is in agreement with reality iff that concept corresponds to something in reality.
So a concept which is of another concept (like the concept of concepts) would be true (and in agreement with reality) if, in reality, that really is the concept of that other concept (e.g., my concept of concepts corresponds to what the concept of concepts is in reality). Is that what you are asking about?
On second thought, I actually dont think intentions matter for rationality, because one could be intending to be rational while actually being incredibly irrational; so I think the definition stands as to act in a manner that agrees with reality.
I honestly am starting to believe you dont any examples of what you are claiming, as you never provide them and constantly beat around the bush about them. So long as you provide none, I am going to assume you have none.
If you want to discuss theories of truth, then please post it in that discussion board (I linked): this one is for this OP.
Hello Apustimelogist,
There are, indeed, those who argue for the non-existence of categorical epistemic norms based off of Humes is-ought gap; but, to me, since epistemology is predicated off of the hypothetical imperative of one ought to know the world and that impertive is outside of epistemology itself (as a precondition for it), then there are objective norms which are derived from the hypothetical imperative which, within the context of epistemology, are categorical.
Hello 180 Proof,
In your post you shared with me (where you outlined your justification for their being moral facts) I understood the crux of your argument to be that promises are some sort of is that is an ought and thusly are moral facts (as that is what you said in that post). My point was that they are not an ought that is an is: I am claiming that I ought to do X because I promised X, but that isnt a valid argument (but, rather, a colloquial shorthand). The real argument is:
P1: I ought to fulfill my promises.
P2: I promised X.
C: Therefore, I ought to do X.
Notice that the promise is not an is that is also an ought but, rather, a mere description: a fact, but not a moral fact. Thusly, as far as I understood your post, you didnt prove nor suggest any sort of moral facts.
In hindsight I think is-ought was a poor analogy/description for what I meant which was just that there doesn't seem to be a straightforward link between the evidence you accumulate and your decision to take up a belief.
In what sense would you say your norms are objective?
Quoting Bob Ross
You said rationality stipulates only that one must be consistent with one's ethics, and I took that to imply that one's ethical positions can be anything, rationality just requires one to act in accordance with them. I disagreed by saying that ethical positions are held to standards within rationality, but if you agree with that, then great.
Quoting Bob Ross
I will make this my last response, as you're right this is getting nowhere. Mainly, from my perspective, because you are adamant about not interpreting my meaning as I intended. What I said was that your hypothetical example was different from reality, which is just true, for the reasons I said it was. Instead of saying something like, "Yes, I agree, but there are plenty of examples where serial killers are rational in real life", you instead tell me that I'm wrong because there are examples of serial killers who are rational in real life. Which makes no sense.
All of your responses are like this. You so rarely deal with what's actually being said, you either don't understand it or you assert its invalidity, but for the latter, unfortunately, with no argument for why.
Quoting Bob Ross
I explained the problem, and emphatically telling me I'm wrong isn't an argument.
Quoting Bob Ross
I've stated probably at least four separate times that ethics isn't a mandatory criterion for rationality, I argued only that it's an important aspect that in practice is almost always considered.
Quoting Judaka
Quoting Judaka
Quoting Judaka
Quoting Judaka
I'm sure there are more than that, but all of those quotes acknowledge the possibility of a serial killer being rational, a sentiment I've repeated from the very first response to you bringing up this example.
Your thinking is unbelievably binary, and most of your arguments are related to a binary, and you strongly reject any challenge to your binary thinking as irrelevant or illegitimate. I don't see the value in that, and I don't subscribe to such absolutism. Rationality is heavily entangled with ethics, and I don't feel even remotely threatened in this claim by your serial killer example, I never have, and I have no idea why I would be. I see you are unwilling to budge, if I have no absolute binary to present, then you're uninterested, so be it, suit yourself.
Quoting Bob Ross
I've explained that it's impossible and that I wouldn't give one, which I believe I've said twice, but you're still asking for one. Rather than addressing my explanation, you ask again and again as though I just ignored you, unbelievable.
Quoting Bob Ross
Your overall explanation is unintelligible to me, I ask to have it disambiguated if I intended to continue this discussion, but I don't. This sentence stands out at least, as an egregious misunderstanding which helps me to understand the issue here. I appreciate that you see yourself as reasonable and willing to be proven wrong, but that's not my view, so I don't see the point in putting effort into explaining your error. You should more strongly emphasise the role of language, don't take it for granted, that's all I'll say.
Quoting Bob Ross
Rationality is a manmade concept, it can refer to whatever we want it to, intentions or acts. Obviously, an understanding of rationality as acts where intention is irrelevant, finds intentions to be irrelevant, but you actually seem to think you're saying something deeper than that. Rationality isn't some natural phenomenon that one studies like a scientist, the word just refers to what it refers to, but I agree, it disregards intention. Hence why I went through a list of problems that creates, which you avoided dealing with quite masterfully.
Quoting Bob Ross
Your lack of ability to provide your own examples only demonstrates that you don't understand what I'm talking about, which, well, makes sense considering you rarely do. Examples are in areas of psychological factors, mental health problems, working memory/memory, executive function, thinking patterns, environmental factors, socioeconomic factors, physical factors and many other considerations. To begin with, one's prioritisation of long-term goals represents itself a goal, and is not purely reflective of someone's feelings and thinking. Many want to become fit, for example, is their inability to succeed in that a mere knowledge problem? Surely, you can understand it's deeper than that.
You're clearly willing to deviate from your definition as it suits you to make things work, and you might be okay with that, but I'm not. The truth conditions of your rationality are exclusively about acts, and yet all of the implications have to do with knowledge, and that's a problem. You know that if mental health issues or executive function problems are at fault, then one is not just being irrational, because the term clearly implies problems with thinking. What you've done in agreeing isn't defend the legitimacy of your definition, you've torn it apart, you've demonstrated how absurd it is to understand rationality as an epistemic term. It's disappointing that you can't see that, but I'm not surprised.
Our discussion was regrettable, despite everything I've said, I know your intentions were genuine, and I wish you the best.
Hello Apustimelogist,
I would say that there are objective (i.e., mind-independent) epistemic norms insofar as there are objectively better ways to know the world which, in turn, is the precondition for epistemology in the first place. In other words, epistemology, as a practice, is predicated on the acceptance of the hypothetical norm that one ought to acquire how to come to know the world and this, as a precondition of this practice, has objective consequences (e.g., that since I am committed to knowing the world, I should use whatever principles/norms are the best at acquiring knowledge).
Hello Judaka,
I agree that our conversation, regrettably, has not been fruitful; but, likewise, I recognize that you are also being genuine and I respect you for that! Sometimes when two people converse the words which they use to express their positions are being used in such foreign manners to the other person that it becomes hard to convey anything; and that seems to be the case here.
I appreciate you taking the time to discuss the topic with me, and I wish you nothing but the best as well!
That may be, I just thought that these rules would have to work all the time to be objective but I can imagine scenarios where the rules you suggest would sometimes would fail.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540198
I see! You are right that they would have to absolutely apply to epistemology, so if you have examples where they fail then I would love to hear them!
I apologize if I misunderstood (and thusly misrepresented your view), but I can assure you it is not on purpose. Here's why I thought you were speaking of promises as moral facts:
You are absolutely talking about 'promises', which you seem to have denied in your current response, and you definitely claimed that a 'promise' is an IS that entails an OUGHT. So I am failing to see how I misrepresented you; but please feel free to clarify as I do not wish to misrepresent you.
Quoting Bob Ross
Obviously your intuitions may be wrong but it also seems to be that I could apply the opposite rule and it wouldn't necessarily have an effect on how well I gather knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
I just don't see why this needs to be the case. I can imagine someone applying this and it turning out that the correct option had more entities than they woukd have deemed necessary.
Quoting Bob Ross
Your higher-prioritized beliefs may be wrong.
Quoting Bob Ross
This one I agree with most and is most intuitive of what we want to do but at same time maybe sometimes we do hold inconsistent models about the world which nonetheless are useful.
Indeed. I'd suggest it could have a salubrious effect on how well a person gathers knowledge, in that someone might be more likely to see through faulty intuitions which impede having a more accurate view as a result of questioning intuitions.
Hello Apustimelogist,
Are you saying that taking what doesnt strike you to be the case as the case would be equally legitimate as doing the contrary?
With parsimony, it is not a principle that determines what is necessary to explain but, rather, to restrict ones explanation thereto; so, a person not explaining the entire phenomena (which would thusly require more entities to explain) would not be more parsimonious than a person would utilized more entities to explain it but they were all necessary for explanatory purposes. Parsimony is not the simplest answer wins, it is entities should not be multiplied without necessity. Of course, what one thinks is necessary could be different than what another thinks, but that is not of concern for this principle itself.
True. But if you believe something with higher confidence than something else, then why would it ever make sense to, when in conflict, take the less confident belief as true over the more confident one? This seems irrational to me and clearly not a good way of knowing the world.
Of course! However, utility is not knowledge. For utility, as opposed to knowledge (truth), the goal is only to provide whatever is the most useful towards another goal, which could entail any sort of explanation so long as it achieves just that. Thusly, you are absolutely right that it may be the case that a inconsistent, paraconsistent, illogical, incoherent, paracoherent, etc. theory may be a more useful than one which is perfectly consistentbut its usefulness, to me, says nothing about its truth (other than, of course, that it is true that it is useful).
Well, your quote cherry-picks its emphasis (indicative of uncharitably reading me out of context again) by missing / ignoring the following...
Quoting 180 Proof
In this eusocial-existential context, the fact of suffering is not 'value-free' it's the disvalue and therefore Hume's guillotine does not obtain; thus, again I refer you to the following article on "promises" with my stated reasoning on moral facts* in mind:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/
*à la ecological facts & medical facts
Yes, because at the end of the day, aslong as you are receptive to evidence and change your views based on that then it should lead to the same result.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, but why should one have to use parsimony if a non-parsimonious explanation is just as good? If the non-parsimonious one gets the job done, is there really a requirement to use a more parsimonious one?
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, true it subjectively doesn't make sense to take the less confident belief to be true but then if you are mistaken about your high confidence beliefs then this practise will systematically give people wrong answers.
I will grant that it doesn't actually make sense to go against this principle but at the same time this principle is not guaranteed to give you knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is fair ; I am probably just less inclined tp believe that there is a strong line here between truth and models or that even truth is something that we can access beyond the restrictions of employing models.
Quoting Bob Ross
This was a good way of focusing the discussion. I will have to take a look at your ethics post, but I can agree with this approach. You're not trying to justify why one ought to gain knowledge, you are simply noting it is something which exists. This is irrefutable and removes the whole discussion of ethics from knowledge.
Is it a precondition? Again, you cleverly note that it is not a precondition to have knowledge, it is a precondition to actively understand and pursue epistemology.
Quoting Bob Ross
A minor quibble with the word "true". I would replace "true" with "known".
Quoting Bob Ross
Correct. It is not that we attempt to make things simple. It is that if we have two equal theories that serve the same outcomes, but one takes fewer steps and words to communicate, we take the simpler theory.
Quoting Bob Ross
I don't think this quite works. Your focus is epistomology, which is the study of knowledge. Beliefs are of course part of the discussion of knowledge, but beliefs are steps towards knowledge, not knowledge itself. Good epistemology does not seek coherence by forcing our rational outcomes into a belief system, but an already established knowledge system. To clarify further, it is not that we change or alter knowledge to keep coherence, it is that a system of knowledge should be coherent naturally. A lack of coherence is evidence of contradictions or poor methodology. A lack of coherence is a hint that what you hold is not knowledge, but a poorly constructed belief.
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, I would replace the word "belief" with "knowledge". Beliefs are like the clay that the pottery of knowledge is built out of. While the pottery is not yet set, the clay will go through many shapes and contradictions to its initial path. Often times while trying to construct perfect pottery, we must experiment with the clay. Going against the norms, or doing things which seem contradictory can at the end of the day result in new ways of creating that pot.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is not circularly justified. In fact, you made no justification for it at all. All you did was make a statement as a given. Someone could of course question or ask for justification. If you recall, that's what I did in my paper. It is justified by the fact that logically, it is our best way of assessing reality within our limitations. You are listing norms, but you have not given any justification for them at this point.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm going to sum up what I believe you are stating here. Rationality = acting in a manner that agrees with reality. This is grounded by the epistemic norms you listed above.
I don't think anything you stated leads up to this conclusion however. You list norms that exist, but you do not give any justification for them. Listing norms as a discussion topic is good, but I don't think you made the steps to take this topic beyond a list of norms and into a justification of them. At a basic level, wouldn't it make more sense that rationality is what the epistemic norms are grounded in, and not the other way around?
Hello Philosophim!
It is great to hear from you again! I always enjoy our conversations, and I look forward to hearing your thoughts on my posts!
Firstly, your reservation that I did not justify the epistemic norms themselves nor rationality adequately in the OP is completely warranted: my main purpose was to just demonstrate the objectivity of epistemic norms, and then to very briefly enumerate some of the principles I find to be such norms (and to define rationality). In terms of giving an elaboration justification for them, I can absolutely provide those. Although, I will disclaim that I am still thinking through my own epistemological theory, but I am looking forward to hearing your critiques of what I am thinking so far!
To elaborate a bit, my justification for those four principles as epistemic norms is based off of intuitions; so I will need to start us off with the first principle (namely, intuitions as a principle itself), which leads me to:
Correct, I merely alluded to the circularity of, well, the first principle; so heres my thinking on why it is actually circular.
If one is to say that one ought to take what strikes them as the case as true until counter evidence is provided that demonstrates its unreliability (p.s., I know you dont like that word in this usage, so I quoted it to defer that conversation for now), then what justification is there for that claim other than that it strikes them as the case that one ought to take what strikes them as the case as true <...>? I submit to you that there isnt. I can only justify my belief that intuitions should be taken as true <...> based off of my intuition that it has been my best means of navigating life. But if someone were to ask why are intuitions reliable?, then I have nothing but an intuition to give themhence the circularity.
You alluded to a solution that you have in your epistemological theory:
But I think your solution is plagued just the same by this issue, as I could ask what justification do you have for intuitions being the best way of assessing reality within our limitations?...is that not an intuition you have based off of your experience which strikes you as the case that your intuitions, which have not been invalidated as unreliable by counter-evidence, are the best way of assessing reality?
Intuitions, by my lights, seems to be an epistemic primitive: I cannot even invalidate intuitions (by claiming them all as unreliable) without thereby trusting intuition that they are all unreliable, which thusly leads to a paradox.
Next up, is your alluding of true being improper within epistemology, as, if I remember correctly, you believe that epistemology is devoid of consideration of truth and, rather, is about cogency. You express this here (I think):
To me, to claim something is known is to take it up as true, even if it is not certain as to whether it is true. I dont see (anymore) how a person could claim to know something and simultaneously not take it as true (even if they are not certain about it). Perhaps, as I suspect you disagree here, you could briefly give me a refresher on how this would work in your epistemological theory?
To me, whatever the proposition may be, it has prepackaged within it a context (i.e., a scope), and to claim to know it (about the world) is to take it up as true within that context. We may not be able to know the absolute truth of things, but we are, by my lights, still getting at truth in this contextual manner. For example, if I claim Bob Ross exists, then it is pretty ambiguousas I could be saying many things with that statement, such as Bob Ross exists in the world-in-itself or Bob Ross exists in the world-for-us. However, once the ambiguity is resolved, it becomes clear (to me) that if I were to agree that Bob Ross exists in the world-in-itself, then I am taking that proposition as trueit is not somehow not true and I know it.
Another thing you noted was the role of beliefs in knowledge, which I would like to briefly address:
Although it has indeed been awhile since I read your papers (so correct me if I am misremembering here), I remember your use of belief as something like an initial attitude towards a proposition (i.e., a conjecture/hypothesis about reality which hasnt been verified yet). To me, it seems as though beliefs are knowledge (i.e., the verified claim) and the conjectures (i.e., the preliminary attitudes towards something), and the difference is only whether the claim has passed the rules of verification (within the epistemological theory). My conjecture that I exist is a belief, and even after it has been verified it is still a belief I have: it is just now a verified belief (viz., I stamp it with the approval of it passing my epistemic validation, like a value returning a 1 when inputted into a function).
I would say that within you clay analogy the beliefs are indeed the clay, and so is the pot that is made out of itand the difference is merely in the clay passing the validation of being whatever it was intended to be made into by the potter (in this case, a pot).
Another thing you mentioned is coherence not being a consideration of epistemology, for .
I agree that the epistemological theory should itself, be coherent; but I also add that within the theory a consideration of coherence of current knowledge with the candidate knowledge is important. For we assimilate the world around us via what we already claim to know about it, and we attempt not to incessantly force the candidate knowledge to bend and appropriate to our current knowledge but, rather, to assess the hierarchy web of our knowledge with the inclusion of the candidate knowledge to see how well it fits in contrast to our higher-prioritized knowledge (within that hierarchy web). For example, I reject that I can fly by flapping my arms in the air because it is, among other things, incoherent with my current knowledge (beliefs, as I would call them) of the world. There is absolutely no logical contradiction in such a claim, but nevertheless it is incoherent with all the knowledge I have that I prioritize higher than that claim (as potential knowledge).
Lastly, you mentioned that:
I would say no, for then rationality would be defined outside of epistemology, which, in turn, only leaves it room to be crafted within morality, which, to me, doesnt quite fit what rationality tends to mean. We dont mean that you are rational or irrational in relation to whatever ethical theory one has (e.g., you are acting irrationally because I take ethical theory A to be true and in A your action is immoral) but, rather, we take rationality to be epistemic (and, thusly, psychopaths can even act very rational when committing egregious crimes). If it is to be placed in epistemology, then it would have to be derived from the epistemic norms, whatever primitive ones exist, which are objectively better for knowing the world--and thusly rationality is not the prerequisite for the epistemic norms themselves.
For the sake of brevity, I shall stop here and give you a chance to respond.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Hello Apustimelogist,
I dont think this works, as you are saying that if it strikes you as the case that the counter-evidence (which would change your mind) was true, then you should do the opposite and thusly not change your mind. I dont see how one would be receptive to evidence if they always have to negate their intuitive reaction to the situation, as they would be obligated to never accept counter-evidence that they would normally accept.
If they both explain the same data, then it is extraneous to accept the more complicated theory: it is just superfluous and, thusly, there is no legitimate reason to accept it.
That is absolutely fair enough! Yes, I am not saying that this principle, in itself, provides any understanding of how accurate ones beliefs are in relation to the world, but I do think that it is a factor for knowing the world better, if that makes any sense.
Hello 180 Proof,
Since I seem to be misrepresenting you, let me just ask for clarification: are you claiming that these promises are moral facts because (1) they are mind-independent (as biologically embedded into us as organisms) and (2) also obligations? Is that the idea?
My intention is not to go back into my view of epistemology, but just provide a point that whether I succeeded or failed, I did attempt to justify this notion. I feel I succeeded, and would agree with you that intuitions defined as such are a norm of epistemology. The difference is I feel it is actually justified more than in a circular fashion. If you believe that it is impossible that intuitions cannot be justified in any other way other than circular reference, then that is of course your choice. I will not rehash my original paper, as that is not the focus of your thread; I just felt that you could make your point stronger.
Quoting Bob Ross
Cogency is a descriptor of reasonable inductive beliefs. Knowledge is a sound and valid deductive belief. But my definition of knowledge is unimportant to your thread. Truth as defined is what "is" despite what one knows. I view, and many others, that one can know things which aren't true, and one can encounter truth without knowing it. Truth is what we seek in knowledge, but that does not mean we obtain it. So in general, the words truth and knowledge have remained separate.
If however you feel that what is known is true, then there is one question which must be answered: "How do I know that what I know is true?" If I have a coin in the palm of my hand, and everything I can observe and identity leads me to say, "I know this is a coin", how do I actually know its a coin? Because it turns out that its not a coin, its a transponder disguised as a coin that I was unable to detect. I had never even known that such a thing could exist. Is it not possible that many of the things we think we know, actually have something about them that we are unaware of or are unable to detect?
Quoting Bob Ross
If we are stating something is contextually true, is it contextually true, or contextually known? The idea of truth tends to be what "is" regardless of context as well. At least this can better answer the question of "How do I know that what I know is true?" However, a second question now forms. "How do I know which context is the true context?" Meaning, if we have two contexts where one person concludes A is true, an in the other context one concludes A is false, which one is correct? Our idea of contextual truth turns out not to be true.
Quoting Bob Ross
For my purposes here, there is again no need to go into my paper. We can use the normative idea of beliefs. You are proposing a normative set of epistemic normative facts, and by the norm, a belief is something we use in gaining knowledge, but is not knowledge itself. If I believe the sun will explode tomorrow, normatively, no one would claim I knew that. A belief is a claim about reality that has in some combination neither been confirmed nor denied. A conjecture is normally defined as a knowingly incomplete belief. It is a belief that knows it does not have all of the information to make a claim to knowledge, but commits to the claim regardless. A belief can be knowingly incomplete, or believed to be so tight that it is claimed it is knowledge itself. Epistemology's attempt is to find a consistent method to examine beliefs and claim without inconsistency or indeterminacy whether someone's belief is knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
I believe we are fully in agreement here! My quibble was mostly with the term "belief" instead of knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
Since I separate truth and knowledge, then yes, it would necessarily follow that rationality is a precursor to epistemology. First comes the desire to make claims that are not contradicted by reality, then comes the establishment of norms and theories that help us refine and become successful at this. Since you do not separate knowledge and truth, then of course you would reasonably disagree with me here. So until that is resolved or an agreement of disagreement is reached, I believe we each have a valid reason to believe our own conclusions on this part here.
Again, I largely agree with your approach here besides a few conceptual and semantic differences!
Hello Philosophim,
It seems as though we use the term truth differently, as you appear to use it in the sense of being and I use it in the sense of the correspondence of thought and being. You say:
For me, I hold that truth is a relationship between subject and object, such that the asserted being (i.e., thoughts about reality) correspond to (i.e., agree with) actual being (i.e., reality). Truth, for me, is thusly not subjective nor objective, but emergent from both. For the full story, see my discussion board on truth.
So, within my terms, truth serves the same role as knowledge; since wanting to know the world is to try to correspond, to orientate, ones thoughts to what reality is.
I think, semantics aside, this is mostly what you are claiming as well, and my term truth would just be the ideal function of epistemological theories for you and your term truth is simply reality for me (i.e., being).
Which leads me to:
I agree with you that the ideal of epistemology is to try to get at, as best as possible, reality (i.e., to know reality) and that it cant ever absolutely obtain it. So I can, generically speaking, only know that what I know is true iff I have sufficient reasons (i.e., it passes epistemic verification) that what I am thinking corresponds with reality. Of course, I can only be certain of this correspondence on limited examples (such as a = a as a logical principle), and the rest I only can be more or less confident in their truth.
My point knowledge always equating to truth is that it makes no sense to me, within my terminology, to claim something is true (that is, it corresponds to reality with respect to whatever it is alleging of reality) but that I dont know it; nor that I know it but that I dont affirm it as true. Sure, even if I affirm it as true, that doesnt mean I am certain of itbut, by my lights, I am taking it up as true by saying I know or, otherwise, I am saying that I dont believe this corresponds to reality, but I somehow know it anyways.
By contexts in propositions, I was merely trying to note that if one affirms a proposition, then they are thereby claiming it is true (i.e., that it corresponds to reality); and that proposition, whatever it is claiming, has a scopeso one is claiming it is true insofar as it is within that scope. If I affirm that cats are green, then the scope I am affirming is every cat is green which is the totality of whatever I classify as a cat.
To say it is contextually true (or known) was, for me, just to say that the claim corresponds to reality and that claim is limited in some scope (i.e., everything, totality of a class of objects, etc.). Perhaps I made it more confusing than it needed to be by invoking contexts.
To clarify, I am not claiming that truth (or knowledge) is contextual (in the sense of what I believe you are asking), as I would say it is absolute (in that sense); and this is why claims can be propositionalized. Either the proposition, when inquired, passes the tests to be considered corresponding to reality (with respect to what it claims about reality) or it doesnt: it isnt relative.
I mainly agree, but I would add there is more to it than being merely logically consistent and providing clarity (determinacy). Logical consistency, in itself, does not promise any sort of correspondence to reality (which I think you agree with me on that).
Interesting, I think we largely agree here (just not about where to finally place rationality). I would say, epistemologically, that the desire to know the world (i.e., know reality) is the prerequisite to epistemology and stemming from that desire is to want to not contradict reality. The desire itself to want to not contradict reality can be taken on without wanting to know reality; however, I dont think one needs to the desire, as a prerequisite, to desire to know reality.
The big issues I would have here is that it makes (1) the desire to know the world not the sole imperative of epistemology and (2) it places rationality as moral tenants, which I would argue are inevitably going to bottom out at subjective moral judgments. When placed in epistemology, it becomes objectively based.
Wonderful! I figured we would agree on quite a bit, but that there are some places we wont (as of yet).
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Yes, more or less ...
In any group of sufferers, suffering engenders an implicit promise to reduce each other's suffering as much as possible; this implicit promise is a fact (i.e. human eusociality) and it is moral (i.e. optimizing human well-being) because it constitutes participation in soliciting help and being solicited to help reduce suffering.
Quoting Bob Ross
I was assuming a separation between one's initial intuitions and the process fo evaluating evidence but this is a good point that they could converge in the sense that accepting or denying evidence would rely on intuition.
However, at the same time this conception seems to be viciously circular in a way that almost defeats the purpose of framing the question the way you did when it could have been done simpler - just follow your intuition (because I am using intuition to accept or reject evidence also - or perhaps you could frame it as "follow your intuition and then when you get an intuition that this last intuition was wrong, follow the new intuition"). I don't see how this could be an objective rule though as your intuitions could be faulty and never lead you to truth, never lead you to accept the correct evidence or interpret it in the correct way. It presupposes something about our intuitions which may not be objective; in fact, in a scenario where we have no reason to think our intuitions are very good, including intuitions about evidence, going against intuitions may still be as effective a way to find knowledge.
I agree that it makes very little sense to not follow your intuitions in the way i described above in the bold part, and it makes little sense to something like take up a belief which you believe to be wrong. At the same time, just because this is the only really coherent way to go about looking for knowledge, doesn't mean it objectively gives us knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
But so what? Some people may have a preference for superfluous explanations. Why does that matter if a superfluous one is just as good at predicting what we want to predict as the non-superfluous one?
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, I think almost everyone wants their beliefs to be logically consistent and not to actively select inconsistent models or views of the world.
Hello 180 Proof,
I see: that would be qualified as moral facticity. However, I neither think that a promise is implicit (to ones biology) nor that my biology is mind-independent.
Hello Apustimelogist,
That is fair: I just like to elaborate a bit more as follow your intuitions seems a bit ambiguous to me (and doesnt precisely nail down what I mean). With sufficient evidence, I do not merely mean intuitions but, rather, all forms of evidence (which includes intuitions).
It is an inevitable rule that we must follow if we want to know the world as best as we can. The goal is not to merely follow whatever intuition they have blindly (as, of course, they should try to critically think about it) and it isnt that evidence is purely intuitional (for a person should be developing an intellectual seeming about reality and not just their imagination).
Like I said previously, strictly going against ones intuitions will almost certainly lead to accepting that which is false.
Its an objectively better way of gaining knowledge in contradistinction to the alternatives, I would say. It doesnt guarantee that ones intuitions are purely factual.
Because it claims to know extraneous information about reality, since it deploys extraneous explanatory entities to explain the same data about reality. It is purely imaginative and non-factual knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, fair. I don't think this changes my interpretation of what was said however since I was explicitly thinking that we accept or reject evidence in a way which has recourse to intuition so I was actively envisioning both of these being subsumed under "follow your intuition".
Quoting Bob Ross
It seems to me most likely the only coherent way of approaching knowledge but if it doesn't necessarily give me knowledge I don't see it as objective. If someone has particularly bad intuitions then maybe a different rule would give them knowledge better.
Quoting Bob Ross
I think my point thought evidence being intuitional is that if you look at some evidence and accept it then ask yourself why you accept it, it leads to intuitions eventually. You may have a reason why you think that evidence is good, but then ask yourself why that reason is good, and then the reason for that reason and so on... I feel like it would just end up at intuitions and so in a sense, everything we do here is on some level driven by intuition.
Quoting Bob Ross
But my point is that it depends on the context so I can't say it is objective unless I rule out that alternative contexts (e.g. having awful intuitions) are possible, which I cannot do. There will be contexts when going by someones intuitions will be counterproductive too.
Quoting Bob Ross
I think the notion of parsimony I'm more used to is about what seems most parsimonious choice between some options so it is in some sense a subjective thing and not really about factual knowledge. The way you have described it just now seems to be more or less equivalent to "just pick the correct explanation" which is a bit redundant since you don't know what that is. Who knows maybe what you thought was the most parsimonious explanation may turn out insufficient under further evidence which would be an example if the rule not working out.
Hello Apustimelogist,
I agree. Heres how I envision it:
Level 1: I intuit X.
Level 2: Someone provides me (or I myself provide) counter evidence, which does not include intuitions.
Level 3: I intuit that the evidence provided sufficiently counters my initial intuition (X), such that I no longer hold X.
So, for me, I dont think this kind of reasoning is sufficiently elaborated on by saying follow your intuition--as, for me, that sounds like all levels would contain intuitions.
I think it does give you knowledge, by intuitively making mistakes and intuiting refurbishments (at rock bottom) based off of the evidence. Sure, someone could be particularly bad at intuiting, but there is no better alternative, for the alternative is to reject ones intuitions (which I dont think works).
You are absolutely correct, and that is why I call it an epistemic primitive.
I think this is a fair point that I overlooked: if one were to not follow their intuitions, that may actually help them navigate the world. However, upon further reflection, this is a paradox (which annihilates it as a possibly viable alternative) principle, as in order to follow it one would have to intuit that it is true that they should not follow their intuitions; but if that is true, then they should not not follow their intuitions; but if they are intuiting that as true (which they would have to to accept it), then they should not not not follow their intuitions...ad infinitum. They would not be able to operate, which is means no knowledge of the world whatsoever.
Parsimony, as I am using it, is that entities should not be multiplied without necessity, which is Occams razor. I do not mean that one should merely just pick the correct explanation, as, you mentioned correctly, that just begs the question. Rather, I mean that when explaining a set of data (about reality), do not extraneously posit entities (as it is superfluous and corresponds to nothing confirmable in reality).
Hello 180 Proof,
I dont believe that is true at all. All that is required for idealism (and solipsism I might add: not that they are similar at all) is that existence itself is mind-independent, not that there exists any mind-independent entities within it.
I'd say the best evidence against one's intuitions necessarily comes from beyond oneself. There is an external reality to learn from.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is fair I think.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, agreed. I guess I do kind of agree with you on this point in the way you're putting it now, I think I was just thinking about the notion of "objectively best way to get knowledge" in a different way beforehand which I would be more skeptical of.
Quoting Bob Ross
I still think I disagree profoundly on this one. If it is not about picking the correct explanation then I don't see an obligation to pick the more pasimonious explanation that would be independent of some further contextual details.
I may actually have to go back on my agreement on this one because thinking about, someone might be able to just formulate a more specific rule which tells them when they should and should not follow intuitions, which may avoid this.
Quoting Bob Ross
Right. Basically instead of "How do I know what I claim is true is true," for you it would be, "How do I know what I claim is real is real?" I think we're simply using different signs (words) for the same concepts. Whether you call truth real or real the truth, the end question still comes about.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, agreed!
Quoting Bob Ross
I agree here as well. I did not mean that the desire to want to know, meant an articulation or breakdown that the best way to know is to find something that does not contradict reality.
Quoting Bob Ross
Okay.
A typo don't you mean "mind-dependent" instead?
Non sequitur
I didn't imply or state that they were.
Nope. I do not think that 'being' unfolds from a mind, as that mind would be 'non-being' then, which makes no sense to me. Instead, there exists, fundamentally, one mind (at-large) of which we are minds within it. This is what I think objective idealist theories tend to purport, but of course there are theistic accounts that posit God as some sort of producer of even existence itself.
How was that a nonsequitur? I said that there are not mind-independent existent 'things', which is what I mean by 'there are no mind-independent entities'.
I guess I didn't follow what you were trying to claim with invoking solipsism before: could you elaborate?
Hello Philosophim,
Under my theory of truth, the real (in the sense of simply what exists) is never true but, rather, is a part (an aspect: a component) of what is true.
In other words, since truth is the correspondence of thought with reality, when a thought is true it corresponds to reality with regards to what it references about it. Thusly, what is real is a component of the truth, in the sense that whatever is true must correspond to it; but the real is never true itselfas it is just what is real. Without thought, there is no truthbut there is still reality (i.e., being).
I think this is how it should be, for when we speak of truth what we mean, I think at least, is that the person at hand has a thought (or thoughts) which do correspond to reality. Truth is the act of uncovering reality, so it cant be reality itself.
I agree. The problem becomes how does one know that what they think corresponds to reality actually does?. My answer is that we cannot know with certainty that the correspondence holds but, rather, can only construct epistemic verification methods to determine whether we accept it as corresponding or not. Once accepted, irregardless of whether it is certain or not, then the person is taking it up as true (irregardless of whether it is). So, for me, one can know something, and thereby take it up as true, and then, upon further evidence, reject it and claim that they dont know it anymore. I dont think that the new evidence invalidates the persons justification for claiming to know it before (and saying it is true) even though they now think it is false. I think gettier problems assume that the end result (which verifies the illegitimacy of the original claim of knowledge) is certain (i.e., set and fixed as the truth). Thusly, one claims to know X with justification Y, and then, upon new evidence, determines Y did not provide any correspondence to X; but, then, it takes for granted that justification Z for the illegitimacy of Y (for X) is also not guaranteed to correspond.
In other words, Truth is the correspondence of thought and reality; but that correspondence is never certain between any particular instance of thought and reality, such that our aim is to correspond, but never to claim that we have definitively (absolutely) gotten there.
Bob
This leaves a bit of a mystery as to what the real is then. I think I see what you're doing, which is taking vocabulary and turning it around to solve an issue. The problem I see is you're not really solving the issue, you're just moving words around and avoiding the problem that is now only more difficult to see.
There's a fine line we all tread in philosophy where we have to redefine words. Sometimes we find that certain properties of a word are simply impossible, or a misunderstanding. But while we change what the words properties can mean, we shouldn't change its essence. And by that, I mean some universally recognized aspect of that word.
I'm not going to counter your redefinition of truth, instead I'm going to ask you some questions. Since we're on the Gettier argument, we can use that. JTB, or justified true belief, clearly separates a belief, justification, and then truth. Truth can be different from one's justification, and different from one's belief. But in your definition, truth can no longer be separate from one's justification or your belief.
So the question is, what value are we getting out of changing the meaning of truth so drastically? How could I look to a normal person, describe truth as you are, and they want to accept that from the norm?
Quoting Bob Ross
Here again, I think this is normally what people would refer to as knowledge. Truth is normatively seen as reality, while knowledge would be the understanding of reality, or truth. We can change it, but why? What benefit do we get out of it that cannot be gleaned as normal?
Quoting Bob Ross
Right, but this problem is already stated with the interplay between normative knowledge and normative truth. So here we've changed the normative meaning of the words, but we're right back to the same problem between knowledge and truth, its just called truth and reality now. Isn't that just introducing a lack of cohesion for the same result? We really haven't solved anything.
Quoting Bob Ross
I could just as easily say, "Knowledge is the correspondence of thought and truth; but that correspondence if never certain between any particular instance of knowledge and truth. Our aim is to correspond, but never to claim that we have definitively gotten there."
The second statement keeps the cohesion of the general understanding of knowledge and truth, so why not just keep that?
Quoting Bob Ross
Mind is non-being?
Ergo, "mind (at-large)" is being?
This account reminds me of Berkeley's subjective idealism (or Leibniz's monadology).
Hello Philosophim,
Semantically speaking, I contest the idea that truth as reality itself is the norm in society: a hazy correspondence theory of truth is equally as popular (colloquially). I will grant that many people do think of truth as just what is, but many also think of it as an agreement between thought and what is.
This is easily reflected by looking up the word truth in the webster dictionary, where #1 reflects your definition (i.e., the body of real things, events, and facts) and #2 mine (i.e., the property (as of a statement) of being in accord with fact or reality). So I dont think I am radically shifting the terminology like you are proposing.
Now, you ask a good question: what benefit is there of taking truth as some sort of correspondence instead of merely as reality itself? Heres my reasons:
1. Using truth as interchangeable with reality is redundant vocabulary. Theres no reason to have two words for the same thing, and reality is a much better word (when compared to truth) for what one is describing. It is generally accepted that semantics should avoid redundant terms, and this is a text book example of two words which serve verbatim the same meaning (and arent even synonyms: they are literally equivalent under this sort of view).
2. Using truth as interchangeable with reality doesnt completely capture what is meant by truth in society. If someone is on trial and they make claim X and I say they are right about X (or X is true or they are in the truth), then it wouldnt complete for those to merely express that there exists X (in reality) but, rather, the whole meaning is that that persons thoughts corresponded to X (in reality). Using truth as reality completely overlooks the persons assertion. This is even more self-evident if I were to re-write my claim (in this example) a bit odder: there exists X in reality, and what that person said (which was X) matches X so what they said is true--the claim that it was true is derived from the correspondence of their assertion with reality and not merely from it being in reality.
3. Theres no use for the term truth if there were no subjects. We already have a term for what a world is without subjects (or with them as well): reality; and there is absolutely no such thing as any claim being true without subjects, so true, as a term, is now obsolete. My definition handles this, I would say, better insofar as truth dies with (the totality of) subjects, which I think makes more sense: it isnt just merely inapplicable but still somehow pertaining to something in reality.
I think they can and are separate: my thought (or held belief) is not truth, for truth is the correspondence of that thought (or held belief) with reality. Truth is emergent from thoughts and reality (from subject and object).
I can formulate a belief without it being true, or without checking whether it is true or not; so I can have a belief without truth.
Justification, likewise, is just what is used to verify the belief with reality (to determine its truth) and thusly is not truth itself.
I am failing to see how these are the same thing under my view.
[quote
How could I look to a normal person, describe truth as you are, and they want to accept that from the norm?[/quote]
A lot of peoples notion of truth is correspondence, so I dont think it would be as foreign to them as you are supposing. As a matter of fact, Ive explained this to laymen before, and, although they werent sure of all the technical details, they usually say that that seems about right because they intuit truth as a correspondence. However, I will grant that if I also brought up truth is what is, they are very likely to say that same thing.
The fact of the matter is that people usually have notions and not concepts of terms; and I am interested in having the best concept of truth I can (whatever that may be). So appealing to peoples notions doesnt really help me, except in attempting to keep it as similar as possible thereto (which I think I have done).
Knowledge isnt truth, but they are very closely linked: the latter is the boiler plate for what it means for something to be true, whereas the former is system (or method) of gathering information in a manner that produces the most truth. Knowledge needs truth, but truth does not need knowledge (although, of course, one cannot claim something is true without thereby claiming to know it as well, but they are not biconditionally, as terms, contingent upon each other).
I was never intending to claim that my theory of truth itself solves gettier problems: I was extending past that into a bit of my theory of knowledge and claiming that I no longer see them as an issue.
The gettier problem would, as you rightly point out, be an instance, in my terminology, of something being claimed as true but isnt real.
You could, and that would reflect our semantic differences, but I dont think, as I stated before, that truth as reality quite captures what is truly meant by the term.
Perhaps some people think of knowledge as correspondence of thought with truth, which can be very practical and useful, but I dont think that quite captures truth nor knowledge. To say something is true, in principle, is quite different (to me) than saying it is known (although knowledge is contingent on claiming it is true): the latter is claiming something is true in virtue of passing some epistemic verification while the former is merely stating that, in principle, the thought corresponds to reality (and not making any note, in itself, about how the agreement was verified).
I think you misread what you quoted of me, as I was claiming that mind cannot be 'non-being', which would be required if existence itself was mind-dependent; which you took it to mean I was claiming mind was 'non-being'. There was nothing incoherent (that I could find) with my statements (that you quoted).
I find Berkeley to be neither a true subjective nor objective idealist: I find him to be the father of idealism in general, and his views really weren't fully fleshed out. He was more focused on refuting materialism. However, I view, although (just like any other idealist view), does have similarities with Berkeley, mine is not his view. I find too many things wrong with his formulation.
So, leaving aside Berkeley, you're not a Leibnizian? not a Kantian? not a Hegelian? ... but rather, an 'idealist' in the vein of Gabriel Markus? or Donald Hoffman? or Bernardo Kastrup? ...
The property of being in accord with fact or reality is another way of saying truth is reality. For example, if I stated, "That apple is red, is that true?" I'm asking the truth assessment of the property, or whether this is in accordance with reality. In no way does this definition imply thought. The idea of tying thoughts themselves with truth is philosophy, and a different take on truth. I'm not saying you can't change the norm of truth, but the norm of truth is what is real, not the marriage of our thoughts and what is real.
Quoting Bob Ross
I do not see them as redundant. Reality is a general descriptor of experience. It is the "what is" that everyone understands at a primitive level. Reality is much like the term, "tree". Truth is a higher order descriptor. It is more carefully thought out, and describes a particular notion of reality. After all, an illusion is a real experience. But truth carefully describes how it is real in an objective manner. A visual illusion is a real experience of our senses, but we make unconfirmed assumptions about the physical aspects of the experience that aren't true. Truth is more refined in its description of that particular tree because it takes both the subjective and objective existence of the tree into question. Yes, they can overlap at times, but truth is a useful and different enough identity to matter in conversation. It is more about the context of the terms. Reality is generic, truth is more stringent.
Quoting Bob Ross
If a person is on trial and someone said their thoughts were corresponding to reality, a good lawyer would counter with, "But how do you know?" Such statements require proof, which is the realm of knowledge. It can be true that our thoughts correspond with reality, but knowledge is the process that demonstrates how this is possible. Truth does not require justification. Truth simply is. It is when we claim that something is true that we require justification. This is again, at the heart of the Gettier argument. I can have a thought that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket. Its true that he does. But the justification which lead me to believe that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket is false. So again, truth requires no justification, truth is simply "what is". As such, I see no need to tie it solely to one's subjective experience.
Quoting Bob Ross
This agrees with what I've noted. Truth is "what is". A person can claim something which matches with reality, so what they said is true. Its just an observation, not a justification. In this case a correspondence and it being real is the same thing. For if it was not real, we could not correspond.
Quoting Bob Ross
In this case, yes, they are synonyms. "It is reality that I believe the visual illusion means something physical is there, but my belief is not true." "It is true that I believe the visual illusion means something physical is there, but my belief is not real." Even in this synonym case, it is useful to have a separate term to hammer home the intention. Keeping it all the same word just makes the statement more confusing.
Quoting Bob Ross
But is it not practically the same to say, "For truth is what is real?" Because if my thoughts did not correspond with reality, I wouldn't have the truth. For the truth is what is real regardless of whether my thoughts correspond to it or not. What you're trying to do is make truth dependent on the subject. Which violates the normative definition of truth which includes both the subjective and objective. Truth exists within the subject and despite the subject.
Quoting Bob Ross
The first sentence is correct. If you have a thought that corresponds with reality, that thought is true. That's because its "what is". If you had a thought that did not correspond with reality, this would also be true, in the fact that is the thought you are having. These are subjective truths. Truth is not an emergent property. There is the "what is" of the subject, but also the "what is" that is apart from the subject. If you tie truth to only the subjective viewpoint, you ignore the "what is" apart from the subject, which has traditionally been called "truth" as well. I think that is your mistake here Bob. You think because we can note that our subjective experience is true, that the truth of that subjective experience suddenly means all truth is tied to our subjective experience. This is not the case. There are things that exist apart from our subjective experience, and normatively, these things would be considered true existences, despite our lack of subjectively observing them.
Quoting Bob Ross
This mirrors my experience as well. But note that they have two different notions of true. You also did not contrast true with the definition of knowledge. Part of our job as philosophers is to sort definitions and words in a clear way that both ascribes to the cohesion of common language, while clarifying generalities into non-contradictory specifics. People have a notion of what is "good". But ask them to specifically define it and most will have a difficult time. That's our job. Same with "truth". Yes, the general person is going to lump in truth with knowledge. But as we drill down into it, we realize that truth and knowledge are simply not the same thing.
We take a general understanding of truth and knowledge, refine them, but still keep them within the cohesive framework of how people generally think where possible. Thus I can tell that same layman, "Truth is what is. Knowledge is a process that attempts to figure out what is true with the information we have. What we know can sometimes match the truth, but sometimes our knowledge is not true.", and while they will ask for clarification, they generally agree at the end of the day that knowledge and truth are separate entities.
Quoting Bob Ross
However, I'm talking about the normative definition of truth within philosophy. I cited the JTB breakdown. We can know what is true. But what is true exists despite our subjective attempt to know it. Perhaps a better breakdown of truth for you might help. Essentially there is "subjective truth" and "objective truth". Your tying the word "truth" to only the subjective aspect of truth ignores the objective aspect. That is not the norm, and I do not as of yet see any advantage in changing from the norm besides personal preference.
Hello Philosophim,
I absolutely disagree: lets break it down. To say something is in accord is another way of saying in correspondence with, so we can rightly refurbish this definition, without changing its meaning, to the property of being in correspondence with fact or reality. Secondly, to simplify this down, I am going to remove fact from the definition and stick to just reality (simply so we dont have to derail into our definitions of fact, and we already agree on the definition of reality). So it is now the property of being in correspondence with reality. Thirdly, your definition is that truth is reality, which has no consideration of whether a thing has the property of corresponding to reality: it simply doesnt matter for your definition. So, right there, in itself, these two definitions are not equivalent. Fourthly, to get my definition, all we have to do is specify what has the property of <...>, which I claim is thought: the property of being in correspondence with reality, which can only ever be a thought. This webster definition, as can be clearly seen, is a spin-off of mine (or mine is a spin-off of it); and is most certainly not the same as claiming truth is reality, for if that were the case, then there wouldnt be any sort of property of correspondence to reality being posited in the definition.
I think you are using my definition here implicitly, and this is a great example of why truth being is reality doesnt workit leaves out that you are assessing whether the claim (the thought) corresponds to reality (i.e., is in accordance with reality). I think, within your terms, you would have to say that you are (1) assessing whether the thing exists (and this is truth), and (2) to determine that (which isnt itself truth) you see whether your claim about it corresponds with reality (which perhaps would be knowledge); but you wouldnt be able to claim that your assessment of the truth of it is whether it corresponds with reality, which is, if I understood you correctly, what you claim in the quote above.
Thought is the only thing which has the ability to correspond to reality, because it has the property of aboutness. Non-thinking beings just are: they dont have any potential for correspondence with reality: they are just a part of reality.
We may have to just agree to disagree, but I think webster is a legitimate source of colloquial definitions, and a correspondence theory of truth is definitely in there.
Under your term, illusions are a part of truth; but it is odd: isnt it? What aspect of illusions makes them true (in the sense that that a part of reality is illusion) and them false (in the sense of what they are)? Within your definition, there is no way to account for this other than saying that an illusion, as an illusion, is real (and in the truth), but that to say whatever the illusion pretends to be is real is false because it isnt. A much clearer way of depicting, I would say, is to note that the truth or falsity about illusions depends on what the thought about them references about reality. If I am saying that illusions exist, then that is surely true because my thought corresponds correctly to what it is alleging of reality; whereas, if I say that the illusion is what it is pretends to be, then it is false because the thought does not correspond.
This cannot be true if you are defining truth as equivalent to reality; but sounds like you may not be, correct?
Whatever is true, is real; whatever is real, is true. It is irrelevant whether someone has a precise or vague idea of what exists (which is what you were referring to, as far as I could tell). So they, by my lights, if they are the same thing, are redundant. I can, in your terms, describe every vague vs. refined idea a person has about reality in terms of the real or the truth. For your argument to work here, I would say, there would have to be something about the truth which is not the real.
Then, like all trials, which they certainly do this all the time, they would present evidence in the courtroom of why one ought to believe that their claim corresponds to reality. This is the whole point of eyewitness testimony, videos, audio recordings, images, etc. that are submitted as evidence and presented to the jury.
Correct. That is why I said that truth, in my view, is simply that what is true is that which corresponds, but makes no claims about how to determine how it corresponds (as that is knowledge).
I would say truth simply is the correspondence of a claim with reality and requires only the justification required to demonstrate it is that, but whether or not a claim corresponds to reality is not a matter of truth itself, but the means of determining whether it is a part of the truth.
I simply say that one can take up something as true on evidence, and then reject it later on counter-evidence; it would have originally been true, but is now considered false. The gettier arguments falsely presuppose that the counter-evidence suggesting it is false is final: that is definitively false; but one can simply ask further: what if it turns out to be turn, upon further counter-counter-evidence?. For me, I dont view it as a problem because I am not claiming that we can absolutely know the agreement between thought and reality.
It is not solely tied to ones subjective experience: it is tied to subjective experience (in its entirity, and not dependent on nor relative to one particular subject) and the objective world, as emergent from both.
Correspondence is not equivalent to what is real: it requires a subject to correspond to reality. You cant have a correspondence with reality without a subject.
My point is that the matching of is irrelevant to truth under your definition, because it does not include any sort of correspondence with reality in it. For you, truth just is, and corresponding with it is just how we know it.
I am not sure I fully followed this part; but, by my lights, the truthity of these claims is critically contingent on the correspondence (or lack thereof) with reality; but your definition does include that as a consideration.
So, for you, truth persists when there are no subjects, because it is just what is. Whether we correspond to reality or not doesnt matter with respect to truth, so, for you, it is not that the lack of correspondence in the first claim (in the quote) that makes it false: it is simply that it isnt real (and we come to know it by that lack of correspondence).
Truth still exists despite a subject, under my view, but not despite of all subjects.
The thought, under you view, isnt true by corresponding: it is known; what is true is whatever is claimed isbut the thought is irrelevant to whether it is true or not. You have removed the subject from truth.
Not at all. Simply because we obtain something as true, it does not follow that it is subjective; nor that it is contingent on the subject whatsoever. Just because I obtain that there is a ball in my room, the balls existence is not thereby contingent on me. I am saying that truth itself is an emergent property of subjects uncovering the world (in a more aristotilian definition) because of the previous reasons I already outlined.
I agree, but I dont see how I am going that far from the norm.
There is no subjective and objective truth: there is just an absolute truth of the matter; and I never claimed that truth was subjective (in that sense): I claimed that is dependent on both object and subject. If there was no object, but only subjects, then I would say there would be no truth either.
Hello 180 Proof,
I am unsure as to where the confusion lies, so let me just re-state it and I will let you go into detail about what you think the inconsistencies are.
I am saying that existence itself, i.e., substance, is mind-independent; for, otherwise, the mind would exist and then being itself would unfold (or be produced by) it, which would, in turn, entail that the mind itself is non-being (i.e., does not exist) since it is outside of (as the producer of) being.
With this in mind, I am saying that my flavor of objective idealism posits that everything is mind-dependent in the sense that everything [u]that exists[/i] is mind-dependent, but not that existence itself, taken up as an entity itself, is mind-dependent.
Where are the inconsistencies with that proposal?
More in a bernardo kastrup sense, or an schopenhauerian sense.
So to paraphrase in Schopenhauerian terms: "everything that exists" is phenomenal, or only appearances (i.e. Representations), but "existence itself" is more-than-appearance, or noumenon (i.e. Will). :chin:
Is this close to what you're claiming, Bob?
And, as per the OP, "objective epistemic norms" are, in effect, justified by, as Schopenhauer argues, the (Platonic / Leibnizian) Principle of Sufficient Reason (à la "The Fourfold Root of ...")?
Btw, my take on Bernardo Kastrup is that his "objective idealism" (cosmopsychism?) isn't much more than a quantum woo-woo riff on Spinoza's acosmism (or Hindu Brahman). He seems slightly more rigorous (or strenuous) than ... Deepak Chopra. :roll:
Your paraphrase is of schopenhauer's metaphysics, which is all fine and good, but doesn't paraphrase what I was saying in the quote you have of me; as schopehauer doesn't get into these kinds of distinctions I was making. My point in saying my view is schopenhauerien is not to mask it under everything he claimed, but just to answer your question (when you asked if it is berkleian, etc.).
My point was that substance, analyzed as an entity, (i.e., existence) is not dependent on a mind; but the things which exist are because they are contingent upon one universal mind. In other words, all that exists is one universal mind.
No, my justification is what I put in the OP. I take elements of schopenhauer's thoughts, but I do not subscribe to everything he said.
Quoting Bob Ross
Lets keep it extremely simple. I view this as the normative view of truth. If you disagree with me, that's fine. But from my part, this is what I hold. Why should I not hold this? What does your view of truth introduce that solves problems of knowledge, or clarifies confusion in epistemology?
Quoting Bob Ross
I don't understand this statement. Can you clarify the latter part?
Quoting Bob Ross
First, let me add the follow up to that quoted statement. I said its true because what you are thinking is "what is". What you think, is "what is". The fact that you are having a thought is true. This is when truth involves the subject. But you seem to be entirely negating the idea of truth that exists apart from the subject. It is normative to hold that if a tree falls in a forest and no one hears it, it makes an air vibration. The vibration of the air is sound to an observer. Do we need the subject to interpret the vibration of the air into something else? Yes. That is the truth of the observers experience of that sound.
But the lack of the observer does not negate the air's vibration when the tree falls. That is also true. How does your view of truth that needs a subject handle this?
Quoting Bob Ross
Bob, this is a contradiction. You can't say that truth is not contingent on the subject, then say that it is an emergent property of the subject. And if it does necessitate the subjects claim about the world, this fits in with the normative notion of knowledge, not truth. This seems confusing and removes cohesion.
I'll also address this part about illusions.
Quoting Bob Ross
The truth is your experience of the illusion as is. What isn't true is when you assume physical characteristics as being real after only experiencing the visual illusion. Its not that the illusion is pretending to be something false. Its that our minds are jumping to improper conclusions that aren't real. That claim is false despite our justification, and despite our knowledge.
But I don't want to get off track here, as I think the crux comes down to your idea that truth must have a subject. The major note here is the contradiction I pointed out. Either you're holding something that cannot be true, or it just needs to be explained more clearly.
Hello 180 Proof,
Although maybe I have before (I cant quite remember), I wouldnt now: I would say that the type of existence is mental, which just signifies a nice shorthand for everything that exists is mind; but, of course, someone could point out that existence itself is mind-independent and is physical in that sense. However, to me, that misses the point of idealism entirely to think that it is a form of physicalism because existence is mind-independent, unless, perhaps, someone is positing existence as a valid attribute (which I dont) and thusly like a separate entity, similar to two separate existent entities within a substance.
A physicalist would say 'mind is physical' (just as processes like digestion and vision are physical).
Hello Philosophim,
Fair enough!
To speak briefly, using your definition:
1. Is redundant with the term reality
2. Does not completely capture its colloquial usage (e.g., saying bobs claim is true makes less sense if truth is reality, as it is implying that it is true in virtue of the fact that bobs claim corresponds with realitybut true no longer relates to correspondence under your definition).
3. Every deployed use of true is contingent on a thinking being: there is no example where someone would say something is true without that something being related to thought. E.g., that is true refers to a claim someone made and is useless as a proclamation if there was no claim made.
Under my view, I am not saying that truth is relative (e.g., that there is my truth and your truth, and they can be contradictory but equally true); I am not saying that if I died right now, that truth would no longer exist, for there are other subjects which still exist. So long is there is at least one thinking being, I would say truth exists; but if all subjects died, then there is no truth (and, within the hypothetical where there are no subjects, there is certainly no use for describing things within it as true or false: everything just is).
Yes, but whether it is true that you are thinking is not, for you, dependent on your thought (that you are thinking) corresponding to reality, such that you really are thinking. For you, it just has to be the case that you are thinking. Now, of course, if there are no thinking beings, then the claim, under your view, would be falsebut not because the claim that you are thinking does not correspond to reality but, rather, because it simply is not the case. Even saying it is not the case, to me, implies that something did not correspond to reality, which, under view, is irrelevant to whether it is true or not.
I am not saying that thinking is not a part of reality, my correspondence theory applies to everything in reality; so I am thinking iff my thought that I am thinking corresponds to reality such that I am actually thinking. This process applies subjective acts just as much as anything else.
In your analogy, I found nothing wrong with it (other than that I do not think that a tree literally falls, a physical sense, when no one is conscious of it: but I doubt we want to get into that right now). I am just failing to see how this ties to my idea of truth: could you elaborate a bit more?
I didnt say that, I pointed out that the argument you gave doesnt work and that is why, of course, you should find something flawed with (i.e., the claim You think because we can note that our subjective experience is true, that the truth of that subjective experience suddenly means all truth is tied to our subjective experience). I was simply noting that that is not what I am claiming.
To clarify, I am saying that truth is contingent on the subject and object; but not on any particular object nor subject (viz., if I die, then truth still exists; if every subject dies, it does not; if all possible objects of thought perished, then truth no longer exists; if one object of thought perishes, then it still does).
Exactly! Which makes more sense if we are depicting a faulty correspondence between their thoughts and realityand not just that it is not.
I don't think this quite depicts physicalism, as it implies (usually) that it exists mind-independently. So saying 'mind is physical' is shorthand, by my lights, for 'the mind is "emergent", a product of, a process of, etc. mind-independent entities'.
For me, I would say that 'mind is natural', but not that it is 'physical' nor 'material'.
I don't think you made a strong enough case for me to agree with these. I can definitely see some agreeing with you, but not the majority. But this is a minor quibble.
Quoting Bob Ross
If you said "some" instead of every, I would be in full agreement. As it stands truth is often referred to things objectively outside of our thoughts. I can say, "Its true that the universe would exist without me." and, "Its true that there are things existent outside of our thoughts". Am I right? That's a question of knowledge. The truth is what exists despite my statements.
Very simply Bob, I'll divide truth into two concepts. Subjective truth, and objective truth. Subjective truth is the experience of a subject. Objective truth does not care about a subjects experience or thoughts. A subject or subjects subjective truth are also objectively true, as it does not matter if another subject is aware of those subjective experiences. This is a normative notion of truth that will be accepted by the majority of the people.
Quoting Bob Ross
Perhaps its your approach that's the problem. Lets look at the notion of noting that the descriptor of true and false would not need to exist if there were no beings that. Why is that special for truth? That's the case for all words. Reality, belief, knowledge, and dog. Without any subjects, there is no use in describing anything, everything just is. And what "just is" is truth. Just as the descriptor of "what is and is man's best friend" is a dog. Your notion is just describing that we create identities, and without people to create identities, identities wouldn't exist. That's not a reason to change the identify of truth as "what is".
Quoting Bob Ross
You've noted that simplicity and coherency are a virtue of knowledge. I can say truth is what exists. There is subjective truth, my experience, and objective truth, that which is outside of my experience. Its simple, coherent, and everyone understands it. Bob, I'm not sure what you were trying to say in the above paragraph. Did you say anything above that couldn't just be resolved to the normative notion I put forward?
Quoting Bob Ross
As I noted early, this is a simple observation that without subjects, identities created by subjects don't exist. It doesn't mean the things we were identifying don't exist outside of us. And its surely not any justification for why we should suddenly stop calling the identity of "things that exist outside of us" objective truth. It doesn't give a reason to stop saying, "My subjective truth is my experience". Even the notion of subjective truth is objectively true. What I am thinking is what I am thinking, even if I believe I am not thinking it.
Quoting Bob Ross
We may have to, as I think this is the crux. Identities are our representations of what is real so we can understand them. What is real does not cease to exist just because our identities do. A tree is a combination of matter and energy. A tree falling is a state change of that matter and energy. Whether we're there to observe and identity it or not, that matter and energy exists, and has a state change.
I can say this using normative language, and its clear for everyone to understand. You note that reality exists apart from subjects. Aren't we essentially saying the same thing, but I'm able to do so more efficiently?
Hello Philosophim,
You seem to think that your definition truth is predominant in society and that mine is not; but they are both aspects of the standard colloquial notion of truth. I already shared the definitions as per the Webster dictionary, and, as one more, a simple Google search (which gives colloquial definitions at the top) defined truth as that which is true or in accordance with fact or reality in the second definition. So I dont see how you can rightly claim that my definition is not circling around in the colloquial ecosystem as a predominant notion. Thusly, when you keep saying things like:
You are just presupposing one of the things under contention.
I also would like to point out that your use of subjective truth is absolutely not the common notion of that term. People tend to mean by subjective truth that it is relative to the subject, or a whimsical opinion, and not the experience of a subject which is also objective true. I agree, though, that people use objective truth in the sense of something independent of opinion, factual, or independent of desires, thoughts, etc.
Nevertheless, I dont think that we should strictly always use colloquial definitions for the sake of keeping it immediately comprehensible for the public; for there are a lot of situations where the terms need to be technical to encapsulate its entire refined conceptual meaning. So, even if truth was predominantly viewed as what is in society, I have already elaborated on why this definition is insufficientsome of which you passed over as minor quibble:
Both of those, taking in conjunction, offer ample evidence that, if true, your definition is insufficient; so I dont think you can just skip over those two: please demonstrate the falsity or why they are irrelevant/insignificant to our discussion.
Its refers to a claim, and so this sentence makes no sense without it. So I dont think you have provided examples here of an expression of something that is true which is not being related to thought (implicitly or explicitly).
I never said it was special. The difference, however, between words and truth is that the former is only contingent on subjects.
No, I am not saying that truth is equivalent nor analogous to language. I am saying that the thought corresponding to what it references about reality is what it means for something to be true, and not that we create identities; but, of course, a thought is a created identity (in your terminology), and so if truth is defined with any contingency on thought, then, naturally, it is to some extent contingent on the subject (which I have already noted).
Couple things to note:
1. I didnt say simplicity is an objective epistemic norm: I said parsimony, which is very different.
2. Both of our definitions are coherent; so I am not following that part of your claim (that it is somehow in your favor with that regard).
3. With words, sticking to common language is ideal, so prima facie this does count (sort of) in favor of your view. But I think my is also very aligned with the common notion.
4. The common notion of truth is incomplete and vague; so it is not most parsimonious to stick with it, albeit simpler. I think mine is perfectly parsimonious for accounting for what truth is (i.e., I dont think it posits entities without necessity). However, yours does posit an extraneous entity: the definition is redundant with the definition of reality.
No. The point was that the correspondence theory applies to everything, including what pertains to subjective operations in reality. There is no subjective vs. objective truth distinction under my view, because I dont think it makes sense. The subjective truth as my experience is subsumed under absolute truth and is no different, in its nature as truth, as this objective truth that you mentioned (viz., reality doesnt care about my thoughts about my thoughts, which also fits your definition of objective truth but since it is just about my thoughts it is also subjective truthand now we have even more redundancies and unnecessary turbidity). Positing them both makes it sound like there are two natures to truth, or types of truth: which is false. There is only one truth.
I think it is completely irrelevant, as it simply depicts our metaphysical differences (which we are both aware of at this point) that do not affect in any way our definitions of truth. However, with that being said, I am more than happy to dive into this if you would like (if you believe it would help)!
Correct. I agree.
A tree, as a tangible object, is the representation; and not the thing-in-itself. So I disagree here (assuming you mean that reality herself contains such a tangible tree).
The information about the tree falling is independent of conscious experience of it; but not the material (i.e., tangible object) falling of the tree to the material ground.
Saying the same thing about truth? No. About reality being independent of our observance: yes. About reality as a material world being independent of our observance: no.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
Yes, and I disagreed with your interpretation, and noted looking to the Gettier argument's idea of truth gives the normative view of truth. My point however, is not to debate with you here. Its to note a potential problem I see you having when conveying your idea to others. Language is purely invented by us. I'll be the first to say, "Yeah, lets use a new definition." I'm just not personally convinced I should here.
If people accept your definitions, then its fine. I just think you'll have a difficult time doing so. As such, its really in the realm of opinion, and can only be tested by pushing your theory out to other people to see what they think. The definition change doesn't matter to me as much as the concept. I'm just not seeing why the definition change (in my opinion) is useful to your concept.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, my point was that I invented a phrase that took common language and conveyed a notion of what it was that was easy to understand. It was also an attempt to convey what you seem to be saying in a more concise manner. You didn't have to question what I meant by it. By all means disagree with its use. If you noticed as well I noted, "Subjective truth is also objective". Which taken at face value is contradictory. But because we're familiar with the terms, and their context didn't deviate too much, it was easy to communicate and understand.
My major point Bob, isn't necessarily an issue with most of the concepts. Its how you're conveying them. Your use of truth seems to conflict with a core of what I believe most people see truth to be, what is real despite our beliefs. Now, you also agree with this notion, but with vocabulary that seems overly complicated and wordy to convey the same point. Which is why I've been asking why bother changing the vocabulary at all. What do we gain out of this? And I think the only thing I can spot is that you want to say truth is not material reality, which I will get to later.
But before I continue, to sum:
1. The idea that truth is redundant with reality and therefore should have its definition changed is an opinion. At worst truth is a synonym with reality. At best, it has a little more context in relation to beliefs. Many people use these terms interchangeably, and many of these people are philosophers. Considering we may invent terms however we wish, the question is whether your statement of redundancy is enough to turn people off of its use. I'm doubtful, and for my part, no.
2.
This is the general understanding of truth as referred to in JTB. Truth is true irrelevant of your justification, or correlation to it. What is true does not care about our opinion or observations. Again, you may disagree that this is the general understanding, and this is fine. For myself, I have not seen a compelling case in removing the word truth as something which exists independently of subjects.
Quoting Bob Ross
The expression of grammar in language is not an argument. We are talking about an adjective of a noun. "The dog is red." "The dog is red is true". We are stating that the combination of language descriptors is not a mistake, but a correct assessment. Again, this argument against truth applies to any word Bob. You need to demonstrate why this argument for truth being purely a relation of us to objects is different from any other descriptor of a thing.
Quoting Bob Ross
Agreed. That was indeed my point. Subjective and objective truths are simple divisions of identity to convey a concept. "Subjective truth" is a colloquial term to get a concept across without difficulty. Of course, this concept does not hold water as truth is truly objective. We're just using "subjective" to quickly summarize the notion of "The truth of your experience." This of course can apply to the truth of others experience, and finally, to the truth beyond experience. Summed all together, these individual concepts both with experience, and outside of experience, is truth.
Quoting Bob Ross
I think its absolutely the crux, because I can see no other reason why you would argue for the notion of truth in such a way. There is zero gained utility in it beyond minor personal preference, unless you have issue with the general idea of "things in themselves".
Quoting Bob Ross
Lets say that I'm walking along a road and I see a pole with a flat board and some lines on it that look like writing. We both agree this is real. I point to "it". I say, "That". Does "that" exist even if I haven't seen it? Yes. Does my definition or conception of "that" exist if I don't experience it. No. You seem to be implying, intentional or not, that if I don't exist, "That" doesn't exist either as real. That "That" is not true. Not the language, concepts, and descriptors, but that "That thing in itself" is not true.
Because Bob, if there are no subjects, then no language or descriptor exists. But we have to use that language, and descriptors to describe an existence where there is no subject. This insistence that there cannot be a tree in a forest if no one is around only has teeth as a grammatical note. And again, these teeth apply to the totality of language; truth has no special place. It does not negate that fact that yes, there's still that thing in itself that we would have called a tree falling in what we would have called a forest.
Quoting Bob Ross
No one ever said reality had to be a material world. Reality and truth are simply what is. Call it material or whatever you want personally. I can just as easily state "Truth is independent of a subject," and I doubt most people on this forum would bat an eye. Of course all words are dependent on subjects viewpoints of the world. But that doesn't suddenly make the former statement wrong.
And finally to circle back on the real main point, even if we are to shuffle the grammar around and make truth a completely separate concept from what is "real", we've solved none of the problems we still have with knowledge. "How do I know that what I know is true?" It sounds like the grammar shuffle is more of a need to let people capture truth. But then "How do I know that what I claim is true, is real?" Its just an extra intermediary with the same end problem.
Hello Philosophim,
Gettier arguments dont demonstrate your theory of truth: it is compatible with both of ours. Gettier was demonstrating the faultiness of justification in relation to truth. I can say that, in any Gettier argument, that the justification failing to prove the truth is because the justification for the claim corresponding to reality was insufficient for demonstrating that it actually does.
Although I know you think it is the crux of our conversation and I will continue to converse about it, I want to disclaim again that our metaphysical differences (with respect to ontology) are irrelevant. Correspondence theories are compatible with metaphysical theories that posit a material world (beyond our conscious experience). As a matter of fact, typically it is viewed that idealists cannot hold correspondence theories; and my only point here is that our conversation about whether a material, mind-independent object exists does not matter for the conversation about truth, no different than how morality doesnt matter either.
It is less parsimonious, incoherent with respect to the basic norms of semantics, and the terms are not merely synonyms (under your view)(as a synonym can be a word which is not equivalent to another word but can be exchange loosely for it).
Again, yours is not referenced in JTB. Secondly, I agree that truth is not contingent on our justification for it: I never claimed that.
Thats false. It is true that I saw an orange ball today, but not that an orange ball exists outside of observation, as color does not exist as a property of the ball in reality (even under your view). So I disagree that it is not contingent upon observations (in a holistic sense): like you even said, truth encompasses observations, but you would be excluding it if you said it if it was independent of observation. If by this you just mean that you either observed X or you didnt, and that isnt contingent on you opinion of the matter, then I totally agree.
Saying that is exists dependent on subjects (to some extent) does not mean that it is contingent on our opinions. Either the claim corresponded to reality or it didnt: independent of our opinions on the matter (i.e., other claims we make about it).
You are making a false analogy between language and (my definition of) truth. You saying that my argument for truth is no different than arguing that objects corresponding to words are subjective because the word is subjectivewhich is obviously false. They are not analogous. The word references something which is not dependent on a subject; but true references a thought and an object and compares them.
Thats why I said its is referring to a thought, and it makes no sense to say its true <...> if that is taken away. I am not merely saying that describing things makes no sense without words. To make it analogous to your language example, it would have to be an analysis of a word and whether it corresponds to the said object (in the sense that the word actually semantically references it). This word-to-object comparison would be contingent on the word (and thusly the subject) and the object, just like truth.
Ive already explained the benefits: it is more parsimonious and captures what we mean (implicitly) by truth better. We only say something is true when relating a thought to something in reality, such that it corresponds: to use your definition (with consistency) one would have to come up with a different way of expressing it with language, which I think just counts in favor of my definition being better suited for colloquial settings.
This is too vague. For example, I take it that you agree that color is not objective, in the sense that the object does not contain the property of color which we attribute to it (e.g., I see a red ball, but that ball isnt red: it is reflected a wavelength that my eye interprets as red). Imagine the pole is red, and you point it out with that and ask is that real despite my conscious experience of it?. Well, no, the redness is not a property of the that in reality. Now, imagine extending that for all qualitative properties, which is all conscious experience, of the objects. E.g., does that, as a tangible pole, exist despite me consciously experiencing it? Well, if we grant (which I know you wont) that it is analogous to color, then no. Does it not exist at all beyond our conscious experience of it: no, I would say the information about it is accurate enough: it just isnt ontologically a tangible, red pole.
I am not sure why this would be true. I am not arguing that a tree doesnt fall (literally as a material object) beyond conscious experience because language is dependent on subjects: thats a horrible argument.
But the thing-in-itself does not have to literally fall to still objectively exist, no different than color doesnt have to literally be a property of the thing-in-itself.
I never said it did, and this is why I didnt find it relevant for us to get into our metaphysical differences. My theory of truth is independent of my idealism. As a matter of fact, I developed it when I was still a physicalist.
Although we can get into trying to tackle gettier problems, and such, I never was claiming that my theory of truth (nor yours) solves them. Ones theory of truth is a prerequisite for their theory of knowledge: not vice-versa.
I just thought of a clearer way of expressing the implicit use of correspondence theory of truth in colloquial speech, and just wanted to briefly share (and hear your thoughts).
Let's take your statement "Its true that the universe would exist without me.", which is, from your point of view, an expression of truth which is not contingent on thought. There are two aspects of my interpretation of that sentence that I think are worth elucidating to you:
1. "Its" is referencing a thought (i.e., a claim); and
2. "true" is signifying the reality of what is referenced as "its".
I think this is important to our conversation because I think, for your theory to be compatible with this colloquial sentence, one of the above must be false (i.e., either "its" does not reference a thought or "true" is not signifying the reality of whatever is referenced by "its"). Of course, this is presupposing that one is trying to fit their theory of truth into common language, which I believe you are definitely a proponent of that (based off of what you have said).
By my lights, if both of the above are true, then 'true' is signifying the reality of what is referenced in a thought which, in turn, directs the person interpreting the sentence to examine the thought and take its claim about reality to agree with reality: thusly, it entails that truth is not merely 'what is' but signifies the process of correspondence of a thought with reality.
I don't see it very plausible that either of the above are false, let alone one of them; so if, for you, one is (by your lights) false then it would help understand your view better if you elaborated on it. If I am just completely missing the mark, then perhaps elaborating on that would help me better orientate towards whatever you are thinking.
I think our conversation has narrowed now to language. Again, you're using the fact that we reference things through language to indicate that truth requires a subject. Let me take your second post as an example.
"Its real that the universe would exist without me".
1. "Its" is referencing a thought (i.e., a claim); and
2. "real" is signifying the reality of what is referenced as "its".
And yet we've already established that what is real does not depend upon a subject. As I noted earlier, this argument that truth requires a subject is just the nature of a subject using language to describe objects. That's just grammar. That doesn't have any impact on the intent of what the word is conveying.
Bob, very simply does the thing that we reference still exist despite us not seeing it? Not the word "thing". Not the concept of us thinking about a "thing". Not our relation to the "thing". Does the "thing itself that we are referencing" exist apart from a subject?
Quoting Bob Ross
Here is a breakdown of the normative idea of truth under JTB from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"Somethings truth does not require that anyone can know or prove that it is true. Not all truths are established truths. If you flip a coin and never check how it landed, it may be true that it landed heads, even if nobody has any way to tell. Truth is a metaphysical, as opposed to epistemological, notion: truth is a matter of how things are, not how they can be shown to be. So when we say that only true things can be known, were not (yet) saying anything about how anyone can access the truth. "
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#TrutCond
Quoting Bob Ross
Then I have no idea and see no value in defining truth as you do. Why are you defining it this way Bob?
Quoting Bob Ross
But its not. I've listened to you trying to understand your viewpoint, and it is neither of those things. It dose not capture implicitly what I mean by truth. It upends a traditional notion of truth. Perhaps I am outside of the norm. Regardless, surely there must be some other benefit in defining it this way despite these reasons.
Quoting Bob Ross
Then you agree with me. If I observe or have an opinion that I believe is true, yet you tell me that it is false, then you are telling me truth does not care about my opinion or observation. Your definition of truth does not lead to parsimony, but contradiction.
Quoting Bob Ross
It is true that something exists which you observed to be an orange ball. There is the truth of your observation "seeing orange" and the truth of the light which entered into your eyes. Yes, if you as a subject did not exist, then the truth of your subjective experience would not exist. That does not mean that the objective reality that was necessary for you to have that subjective experience from, is not true.
Quoting Bob Ross
But this is how you are coming across, intentional or not. I understand that you want this outcome, but your claims don't lead to this outcome. I am trying to give you all the benefit I can in this, but I do not see any other claim when you state: Quoting Bob Ross
when I am pointing out the thing-in-itself in the context of the conversation. We both understand that yes, all words that represent things in themself, represent things and are not the things in themselves. But if I have not been clear enough from the context of the conversation, I am not referring to the "tree" as a representation of the thing in itself. This is the denotation, the finger point, to the thing in itself that is necessary to exist. The truth of that thing in itself's existence does not depend upon myself as a subject.
I think that about covers your points, let me know if I missed anything.
Hello Philosophim,
The problem is that you are saying your definition fits the colloquial settings better (which you strongly advocate that we stick to the colloquial definitions), which I broke down, in my second post, why it is not. Secondly, you are still conflating a sentence being contingent on a subject and a sentence referencing something which is contingent on a subject, which you insist is a mere grammatical issue.
So, how do you go about reconciling your definition with its alleged incompatibility with a sentence such as its real that the universe would exist without me? I dont think you adequately responded to that part.
It depends on what you are referencing. If I reference another thought with a thought, then no. If I reference a tree-in-itself with a thought, then yes.
Everything in that paragraph and section in the standard encyclopedia is compatible with every major theory of truth (e.g., pragmatic, correspondence, coherentist, etc.): it simply noted that (1) truth is independent of our opinions, (2) truth is independent of our justification for it being true, (3) truth is is independent of our knowledge, and (4) truth, within the context of JTB, is being deployed in a metaphysical as opposed to epistemological sense (viz., it is about how things are, as opposed to how we come to know them).
Which part of that did you find incompatible with my theory? And where did you think it referenced your theory?
I think I have already stated my reasons, but here they are again:
1. Captures better what people mean by truth (e.g., the truth of the matter is always, within a claim, a referencing of a thought corresponding to reality).
2. Something that simply exists, simply exists: it is redundant to say it is true and incoherent (since one is referencing a claim with it while simultaneously claiming true signifies nothing about thought). Asking what it means for something to be true presupposes that something as a proposition, which is a thought (in the form of a truth-apt sentence).
Truth is independent of opinion. But this doesnt entail specifically your theory of truth.
Yes, but this response is missing the mark: you were asking if that existed independently of observation, which you are now agreeing it doesnt (completely).
What you quoted here does not in any way entail any sort of argument of semantic dependency on subjects: I am not following why you think that: could you elaborate? Things-in-themselves vs. representations is a metaphysical distinction, not semantic.
Also, metaphysically, I don't think trees are a combination of matter and energy. Scientifically, that is the model we have of reality, but I don't think science is capable of penetrating reality far enough to give us metaphysical insight.
Ahh, I see. So I am using things-in-themselves in the traditional way: they are whatever exist as themselves and are never directly perceived by us. The tree-for-you is a representation of the tree-in-itself, and they dont necessarily match 1:1 (e.g., the tree-in-itself does not have green leaves, but the tree-for-you does).
The thing-in-itself, as opposed to the thing of which you experience, does not depend on yourself as a subject, but object within your experience of it (which is a representation of it and the only candidate that you could single out as a that) is.
Quoting Bob Ross
I believe this has been the source of our contention. I knew from your initial post that we had a slightly different take on some small thing. My view on "things-in-themselves" is both the way you view it, and the way you see me viewing it.
Now you can see why truth as a subjective concurrence with reality doesn't work for me. What is true about the thing-in-itself is something which is beyond my ability to know. The thing-in-itself as perceived by me is a representation that cannot exist without me. That is what I believe/know the thing in itself as. It is truth that this is a representation only. It is not necessarily true that my representation is an accurate assessment of the thing-in-itself. It is true that the thing-in-itself exists.
As you can see, I'm using the language of truth outside of my own subject. My concurrence of belief or representation is irrelevant. But I can also use truth within my subject, which I agree with you on. My major point is that your use of truth either disregards are eliminates the colloquial understanding of "truth outside of our subject". If you wish to delineate the two, I would add some adjective to truth to mark the difference, but I would not simply eliminate truth as describing a situation that does not require our subject.
And truly, I think this is it. If its the case that your redefinition of truth is only for the reasons you've described, then it is semantics. My point is that I feel you're going to get a strong push back from others, and you're making truth unnecessarily complex. If you feel that its not, then I have heard your points, and you have heard mine. Good discussion Bob! I will try to get back soon on replies going forward.
Hello Philosophim,
Absolutely no worries my friend! Take all the time you need: I always appreciate your substantive responses.
Demonstrating that we cannot know the truth about things-in-themselves does not demonstrate that truth, as a concept, should be deployed as equivalent to reality. I have no problem, under my theory of truth, also claiming that we cannot know the truth about the things-in-themselves. So I dont think this is a valid reason for why you would, as noted in your first sentence above, use truth as non-subjective.
To you, this would be an inconcise sentence, since it is true and it exists are both expresses the same thing.
For me, it is true denotes the accuracy of the claim, which is that the thing-in-itself exists.
I think we may be using the term non-subjective differently as well; because I have no problem noting that the truth of the matter is independent of my beliefs and perceptionsbut not independent of my thought, because I cannot express anything is true other than a thought corresponding to reality.
My definition does not eliminate the fact that truth is independent of the content of our thoughts, of our beliefs, and our perceptions: it just notes that the thought is required for there to be truth at all, since what is true is a claim that corresponds to reality. You seem to be eliminating the correspondence aspect of claims, and noting that truth is just what is.
You too! I look forward to any future discussions we have!