is the following argument valid (but maybe not sound)?

Trying to parse into sentential logic:

p = "anything is an appearance"
q = "it is known mediately"
r = "he(or she) acts not-mediately"
K(x) = "A person knows that x", where x is a variable.

p -> q
K(r)
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance.


I think Allison might be rendering the argument like that so that it's basically a non-sequiter. We could, however, read more charitably and attempt to render it in a logical form, something like what you suggest. But the natural language makes it difficult to assign the same variables if we're going to use the words exactly as written. I might render P2 as:

Action is known non-mediately.

Then we could render

p = "anything is an appearance"
q = "it is known mediately"

p -> q
~ q
Therefore, ~ p

as you indicate, a modus tollens. Though there's something funny about counting action as an "anything". "Anything" is a remarkably vague category! That might also be what Allison is getting at -- we started with "Anything", and didn't draw out the deduction that "Action" is an anything.

Quoting Moliere

I think Allison might be rendering the argument like that so that it's basically a non-sequiter

Great answer thanks!
So if we look at the following;

If anything is an appearance it is known mediately,
The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately ("action is known non-mediately")
Thus, action cannot be an appearance.

If p, then q
Not q
Therefore, not p

you said that is a non-sequitur...did you mean appears like a non-sequitur?
my logic is rusty, but a non-sequitur would be, i think, a fallacy of form, and thus invalid.
But I can't see it as being invalid (as a modus tollens it would necessarily be valid)...

so maybe Allison got mixed with validity and soundness?!

Thanks again!

Quoting KantDane21

If p, then q
Not q
Therefore, not p

you said that is a non-sequitur...did you mean appears like a non-sequitur?

Heh sorry. That's the second version I offered, put into plainer language, and I agree that it's in the form of a modus tollens. The first one I offered would be a way of rendering the argument into a non-sequitur.

But there's another complaint you could make that "Anything" is too vague. Sure it includes "Action" but it also includes "A is A", or "Unicorns" or "The present King of France" or "A and not A" (Contradictions are surely a part of the vast set "Anything")

got ya, yep!

glad to know the way Allison presented is VALID (but unsound, at least for him...because of the vagueness I am still trying to work out if it sound or not...).

yes, I agree....certainly is vague, but also the natural language, for me, appears a bit "clumsy"...
he seems to be writing in a shortened form, too....
for example, that first premise...in light of what you said, he should have stated "if anything that is known it is an appearance (because of x, y, z, etc).... then continue with the rest!

Thanks again!!.

Reply to KantDane21 There seems to be an equivocation involving knowing action. I know others' actions as appearances, whereas I know my own actions " from the inside" so to speak, in the sense that I feel them.

However, I also know them as appearances to some degree depending on the action: I can see my legs moving when I walk, my hands closing on things when i pick them up and so on. The question could be resolved by reformulating the argument I think:

[i]Anything that is an appearance is known mediately,
Action is known only non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance.[/i]

This makes it clear that the question is whether action is known only non-mediately, and that would seem to be false, which makes the argument as reformulated valid, but unsound.

Quoting Moliere

"Anything" is a remarkably vague category! That might also be what Allison is getting at -- we started with "Anything", and didn't draw out the deduction that "Action" is an anything.

The argument could also be read syllogistically, in which case 'anything' makes more sense:

1. All appearances are known mediately
2. No first-person actions are known mediately
3. Therefore, no first-person actions are appearances

Of course this is also valid.

Another way to read the first premise would be via quantification: < [math]\forall[/math]x(Appearance(x) [math]\to[/math] KnownMediately(x)) >.

As Janus alluded to, Allison might be thinking that there is a subtle equivocation on 'known'.

Quoting Leontiskos

The argument could also be read syllogistically, in which case 'anything' makes more sense:

All appearances are known mediately
No first-person actions are known mediately
Therefore, no first-person actions are appearances

Of course this is also valid.

True! And that'd be more appropriate for the source material.

Quoting KantDane21

If anything is an appearance it is known mediately,
The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately
Thus, action cannot be an appearance.

This argument isn't technically a modus tollens, but it can definitely be converted into one; in which case, it's most definitely valid; & its rightful conclusion would be: what's not known mediately (which is an "individual's action," in the case of this argument) can't be what's known mediately (which is an "appearance," in this case).

Yet, as to it being sound, I must remain undecided about that until I have a better understanding of how this argument's maker defines its terms.

If anything is an appearance it is known mediately,

One assumes, through the senses?
The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately

Whoa, back up the wagon, Chester! How do I know that my "action" is not just another appearance known mediately? Are we confusing "action" with "the will to action"?

Thus, action cannot be an appearance.

Non Sequitur.

By the way, please don't fall into the trap of supposing that Aristotelian logic is a valuable guide to truth in the modern world. By all means study it, if Classicism and Scholasticism are your special areas of interest. But Aristotelian logic in the modern scientific and philosophical world is largely irrelevant. It has long since been superseded by developments in many areas, including set theory, Peano/Dedekind arithmetic, and relational (as opposed to predicate) logic.

Quoting Moliere

there's something funny about counting action as an "anything". "Anything" is a remarkably vague category!

Indeed. :smile:

Quoting KantDane21

as far as i can tell this is a modus tollens argument.
seems perfectly valid. (it does not have the form of a fallacy)

Modus tollens logic is of the form "If A, then B. Not A. Therefore, not B."
Let's see ...
"If I dream, it means I am sleeping. I don't dream. Therefore I'm not sleeping."
"If I can write in English, it means I know English. I can't write in English, Therefore I don't know English."
"If it rains, the pavement is wet. It does not rain. Therefore the pavement is not wet."
...
Even a 10 year old can see that these are totally invalid arguments ...

As for Kant's argument, I can't say anything. If it were in English, maybe I could. :grin:

Quoting Alkis Piskas

Modus tollens logic is of the form "If A, then B. Not A. Therefore, not B."

Check again.

Quoting ItIsWhatItIs

If anything is an appearance it is known mediately,
The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately
Thus, action cannot be an appearance. — KantDane21

Valid and sound.

Reply to L'éléphant
Why are you repeating to me the quote what @KantDane21 has written?
Do you think that he has not said it loud enough or that I am hard of hearing? :grin:

Reply to Alkis Piskas

You mixed up the inference of modus tollens with the fallacy of denying the antecedent. Modus tollens denies the consequent, not the antecedent.

Reply to Leontiskos
Maybe I did. Can you also explain to me why? What did I say exactly that is wrong and why?
(I would be obliged. Because rarely people do that!:smile:)

Quoting Alkis Piskas

What did I say exactly that is wrong and why?

You said this, as Reply to L'éléphant pointed out:

Quoting Alkis Piskas

Modus tollens logic is of the form "If A, then B. Not A. Therefore, not B."

I explained why it is wrong here: Reply to Leontiskos. Modus tollens denies the consequent (B), not the antecedent (A).

Quoting Leontiskos

You said this, as ?L'éléphant pointed out:
Modus tollens logic is of the form "If A, then B. Not A. Therefore, not B."
— Alkis Piskas

I know what I said. I asked what exactly is wrong with that.

Well, I found out what exactly is my mistake. The correct modus tollens scheme is: "If A, then B. Not B. Therefore, not A".
And my examples become:
"If I dream, it means I am sleeping. I'm not sleeping. Therefore I dont dream."
"If I can write in English, it means I know English. I don't know English. Therefore I cannot write in English."
"If it rains, the pavement is wet. The pavement is not wet. Therefore it does not rain."
Which are all valid.

Thank you @Leontiskos and also Reply to L'éléphant for your intervention.

Reply to Alkis Piskas - You're welcome :up:

Reply to Leontiskos Reply to Alkis Piskas
:up:

Wouldn't this be more:

For all AP, KM (appearance; known mediately).
AC is not KM (action; known mediately)
Thus, AC is not AP.

Same as:
All men are mortal.
Zeus is not mortal.
Thus, Zeus is not a man.

"If anything is an appearance it is known mediately,
The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately
Thus, action cannot be an appearance."

It's a containment relationship that fails to obtain. Or we can define it through membership. Action is not in the set of "things known mediately," while "all appearances" are members of that set. Thus, on pain of contradiction, action cannot be a member of the set of appearances as this would entail that it is an element in the set of things that are know mediately (which is rejected in P2).

We could thus set this up as a proof by contradiction by assuming our premises and assuming that "action IS appearance." This results in a contradiction where action both is and is not a member of the set of "things known mediately," if it is a member of the set of "all appearances." If it is not a member of S(Appearances) then we have no problems at all, Action is simply not a member of either.

I would question if the premises hold up though. Work on brain injuries would suggest knowledge of actions is known mediately and incompletely, varying with attention, cognitive resources, etc.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

We could thus set this up as a proof by contradiction by assuming our premises and assuming that "action IS appearance." This results in a contradiction where action both is and is not a member of the set of "things known mediately,"

Except that we can't do it that way. Remember the OP's question is "IS it both valid and sound?"
If "action is appearance" (by proof of contradiction) then you're setting up an absurd argument before you could finish. That's why it's important to know that that argument is coming from Kant because 1) external objects can only be known mediately and 2) humans have freedom of the will.

Action is not an external thing -- it's coming from you.

If one is in a coma or has a brain injury that they cannot act based on their will, then they cannot argue that they know they're acting non-mediately.

Perhaps I should stay away from this. Perhaps other people have recognized what seems to me to be obviously wrong, but I haven't picked it up. So -

Quoting KantDane21

If anything is an appearance it is known mediately,
The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately
Thus, action cannot be an appearance.

Surely, "If anything is an appearance it is known mediately," is ambiguous, because "it" might refer a) to the appearance, or b) the object of the appearance (i.e. what the appearance is an appearance of. The appearance is what is introspectively perceived, that is, however the object appears to me is its appearance. I perceive appearance directly (non-mediately) and the object of the appearance indirectly (through the appearance and so mediately). If the statement means a), it is false. If it means b) it is true.

"The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately". This is ambiguous, depending on the description under which the action is identified. a) I know introspectively that I am trying to turn on the light when I press the switch. b) Whether I succeed in pressing the switch or turning on the light, I only know from perceiving the consequences of my attempt. If the statement means a), I know non-mediately. If the statement means b), I know mediately.

So, without clarification of those ambiguities, nothing can be said as to whether the argument is valid or sound.

"Thus, action cannot be an appearance." Every appearance is an appearance of something. The object of an appearance is distinct from its appearance. In that sense, this is analytically true and trivial. However, in a different sense, an action can appear to be something it is not, as when I pretend to do something or mimic someone doing it or when I misunderstand what someone is doing. ("Not waving but drowning").

So, depending on how it is interpreted, the conclusion is trivially true, independently of the premisses, or false.

Quoting Ludwig V

Perhaps other people have recognized what seems to me to be obviously wrong, but I haven't picked it up.

Perhaps because the OP stipulates a Kantian source indirectly through Allison, which means it should for all intents and purposes be “picked up” in Kantian terms.

A syllogism suffering premises with no relation to each other, is a paralogism;
The conceptions in the premises of a paralogism determine the subset of it, here it is a transcendental paralogism, that is, a remarkable error in content-kind while its form is unexceptional.
A paralogism is an error in reason, a systemic flaw which manifests when the minor treats of its conceptions differently then does the major, and this is called sophisma figurae dictionis, re: Reply to Janus’s equivocation.
It follows that in any case where the conclusion is true but is not derivable from either of the premises because they do not relate to each other, whether the syllogism is valid/invalid, sound/unsound, is completely irrelevant. The whole thing is just a hot mess, but is usually passed over in the everyday use of reason.

The source in Kant for this, is B411, with the explanation in the footnote at B412. Allison uses a different syllogism, but it contains exactly the same error of equivocation.

Reply to Mww

Quoting Janus

This makes it clear that the question is whether action is known only non-mediately, and that would seem to be false, which makes the argument as reformulated valid, but unsound.

Yes, I see that Janus is chasing the same point about action, and has reformulated the first premiss to avoid the ambiguity of "it".

I didn't understand that this was a Kantian discussion. I don't know enough about those texts to contribute.

Thank you for clarifying.

Reply to Ludwig V To be fair I was just trying to parse the argument as is rather than trying to interpret it in terms of Kant.

Quoting Ludwig V

I didn't understand that this was a Kantian discussion.

Ehhhhh…..the discussion begins with, “saw the following in a Kant book”, so makes sense to relate the following to what was actually in the Kant book. Not to mention, what’s wrong with the following, is specified in the Kant book. And from there, the best answer to the query implied in the OP, is given from the Kant book, which is….the stated syllogism is indeed invalid.

There are other ways to prove the error, sure; I just gave the one I knew about.

Reply to L'éléphant

Well yeah, that's the whole point of the reductio, but it's generally considered a valid way to form proofs (exceptions like intuitionist mathematics exist of course). I was just showing different ways you could show the same thing, syllogism, containment, or via and proof by contradiction using sets.

It's valid because "action is mediated" is not our argument. Our argument shows that "action is mediated is a contradiction," and then follows "x is a contradiction, contradictions are not true, thus not x."

Although, I am aware that mathematicians generally prefer direct proofs over the reductio, because a reductio lacks fecundity, it cannot be used to set up new proofs as easily.

https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/240/are-the-proofs-by-contradiction-weaker-than-other-proofs


IMO, the containment relation is the simplist of these and is underappreciated. You can teach proofs like that to a kindergartner, and re the thread on Spencer Brown's Laws of Form, you can do a lot with distinction and containment.

Quoting Mww

There are other ways to prove the error, sure; I just gave the one I knew about

Well, there seems to be a variety ways to prove the error. Something for everyone. Consensus!

Quoting Mww

A syllogism suffering premises with no relation to each other, is a paralogism

But it is quite odd to claim that the two knowledge-predicates have no relation to each other. Metabasis eis allo genos does preclude a strict demonstration because not all premises apply per se, but it does not preclude a looser and less exact syllogism. I think that's exactly what is happening here. The conclusion, "Therefore, no first-person actions are appearances," is sound vis-a-vis the metabasis. The error or lapse does not preclude a non-demonstrative kind of inference. The genus-predications map to one another in an inexact way, but they are not wholly equivocal. We can quibble about what invalidity means, but I don't think the syllogism is "just a hot mess."

In other words, Reply to Janus' two terms are not strictly equivocal; they are pros hen homonyms.

Quoting Leontiskos

I don't think the syllogism is "just a hot mess."

What do we wish, by means of proper reason, to extract from a syllogism? If it is truth, the syllogism at hand contains a true conclusion, but that conclusion is not possible from the premises constructed to obtain it. Hence…the hot mess.

As to equivocation, I was thinking more regarding mediate/non-mediate, rather than distortions of the singular conception, knowledge. If it is the case no knowledge is at all possible that is not mediated, the term non-mediate cannot serve as ground for a judgement concerning knowledge.

It follows that while the major is true in its use of “mediately”, the minor remains equivocal insofar as “non-mediately” has a different relation to knowledge than the relation in the major, hence is a fallacious sophisma figurae dictionis, especially if “non-mediately” doesn’t relate to knowledge at all.

As to demonstration, if we exchange “non-mediate” for “immediate”, as one might reasonably expect, the minor transforms to, “an individual knows his acts immediately”, in which case the error….errors, there are two…..becomes quite clear.

Having said all that, what do you think “non-mediately” means, and do you think knowledge is possible by it?

Quoting Mww

What do we wish, by means of proper reason, to extract from a syllogism?

Knowledge, and knowledge is not univocal.

Quoting Mww

If it is the case no knowledge is at all possible that is not mediated...

If this were the case then the minor would simply be false. But it is not false, because we do have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner. I don't think anyone in the thread has claimed that the minor is false.

Quoting Mww

It follows that while the major is true in its use of “mediately”, the minor remains equivocal insofar as “non-mediately” has a different relation to knowledge than the relation in the major, hence is a fallacious sophisma figurae dictionis, especially if “non-mediately” doesn’t relate to knowledge at all.

This is the metabasis that I referred to. Because "non-mediately" does relate to knowledge—as everyone in the thread concedes—the conclusion manages to convey a form of knowledge, albeit not demonstrative knowledge. The relationship between the subject and the predicate of the major is not identical to the relationship between the subject and the predicate of the minor, but neither is it equivocal. A pros hen relationship obtains (between mediated knowledge and non-mediated knowledge).

Quoting Mww

Having said all that, what do you think “non-mediately” means, and do you think knowledge is possible by it?

I think the reason no one has challenged the minor is because we all believe that we possess a knowledge of our acts which is not mediated. This is different from our knowledge of the acts of others.

Note: I have in mind the formalized version of the syllogism (Reply to Leontiskos).

Quoting Leontiskos

I think the reason no one has challenged the minor is because we all believe that we possess a knowledge of our acts which is not mediated. This is different from our knowledge of the acts of others.

If all knowledge of action is mediated by neural processes, then we may well all be mistaken in thinking that we possess non-mediated knowledge of our own actions. We "feel" our own actions "from the inside" it seems, and we see, or hear the actions of others, but if feeling as well as seeing and hearing is mediated by prior neuronal activity, the immediacy may be merely phenomenological, which then just be to say that knowledge of our actions seems immediate, which is of course true.

Quoting Janus

We "feel" our own actions "from the inside" it seems, and we see, or hear the actions of others, but if feeling as well as seeing and hearing is mediated by prior neuronal activity, the immediacy may be merely phenomenological, which then just be to say that knowledge of our actions seems immediate, which is of course true.

I do not think it is a question of feeling. Feeling is a passion, not an action, and therefore to feel is not to act. Acting goes beyond feeling, and when one acts they know they have done so. The mediacy of perception pertains to the major premise, not the minor.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

It's valid because "action is mediated" is not our argument.

It's valid because of the form of the argument.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Although, I am aware that mathematicians generally prefer direct proofs over the reductio, because a reductio lacks fecundity, it cannot be used to set up new proofs as easily.

Proof by contradiction works in math -- and it was built as a mathematical argument.
We can't use the argument by contradiction here because.....

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

It's a containment relationship that fails to obtain. Or we can define it through membership. Action is not in the set of "things known mediately," while "all appearances" are members of that set. Thus, on pain of contradiction, action cannot be a member of the set of appearances as this would entail that it is an element in the set of things that are know mediately (which is rejected in P2).

...there's not a containment relationship that exists in the argument. "Setting a set of things" itself is part of theory of action, which is about critical judgment -- see Kant's theory of action. If you notice, the argument provided includes that critical judgment on judgment about appearances:

If anything is an appearance it is known mediately,
The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately
Thus, action cannot be an appearance.

So, action is a universal set, which can also be a urelement, in ZF theory. (Now I'm matching your proof by contradiction for lack of a better communication alternative. If we're gonna be wayward, let us, at least, be consistently wayward).

Quoting Leontiskos

If it is the case no knowledge is at all possible that is not mediated...
— Mww

If this were the case then the minor would simply be false. But it is not false, because we do have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner.

Which is the whole point, as far back as your metabasis eis allo genos in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, in which there is found in the minor a “change into some other genus” other than the major, which doesn’t affect the form of the syllogism itself, which remains unexceptional, but renders the argument invalid at the level of individual instances.

Aristotle calls this an error in scientific reasoning, meaning it only shows up in demonstrations of the premises. Here, the major premise, that appearances are known mediately, is true as demonstrated by means of some theory, but the minor, an individual knows his actions non-mediately, is demonstrated as false by that same theory. Or, upon demonstration by a different theory, contradicts the major, which is like using geometry to prove arithmetic propositions. Or, the judgement relating the price of gas going up/down in the major, is judged in the minor as a function of butterfly migration. Either is an example of turning a legitimate syllogism into a mere sophism.
(Ever listened to speeches on the floor of the U.S. House? Yikes, I tell ya; one instance of illegitimate reasoning right after another. The more serious the topic, potentially the more silly the logic)

And perhaps this is why the OP references Kant via Allison, in that Kant posits that this kind of logical error is the fault of reason itself, and not the thinking subject, who is seldom conscious of his mistake.

Bottom line….knowledge of any kind, is necessarily mediated by the system which makes knowledge possible. There is no such thing as immediate or non-mediate knowledge, or, that knowledge given to a subject without the intervention of his own systemic intellectual methodology. And if one wishes to sharpen to a finer point, even in the case of sheer accident or pure reflex, a subject’s knowledge, without methodological intervention, and thereby merely a harmless post hoc ergo propter hoc deduction, is still mediated by time.

Again I’ll ask….how do you think it is possible to have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner?

Quoting Mww

(Ever listened to speeches on the floor of the U.S. House? Yikes, I tell ya; one instance of illegitimate reasoning right after another. The more serious the topic, potentially the more silly the logic)

Ha!

Quoting Mww

Aristotle calls this an error in scientific reasoning, meaning it only shows up in demonstrations of the premises.

Well, it means that the error is fatal precisely to a demonstration. My point is that the OP is not a demonstration, and need not be a demonstration (in the Aristotelian sense).

Quoting Mww

Here, the major premise, that appearances are known mediately, is true as demonstrated by means of some theory, but the minor, an individual knows his actions non-mediately, is demonstrated as false by that same theory.

A Kantian theory? I would say that if Kant thinks that one's own actions are known by the same mediation that others' actions are known, so much the worse for Kant.

Quoting Mww

Again I’ll ask….how do you think it is possible to have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner?

My point in indicating that everyone in the thread accepts it is to say that this burden is on you. To everyone in the thread it is accepted that we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions, and if you disagree then you will have to provide an argument.

The commonsensical idea is that when I see someone else flip a coin my knowledge is mediated by sense data; but when I flip a coin my knowledge that I am acting is in no way limited to sense data. Because I am the one effecting the act, therefore I know that the act is being effected. The mediation of the former is not present in the latter.

Quoting Mww

Bottom line….knowledge of any kind, is necessarily mediated by the system which makes knowledge possible.

I would not say that abstract systems mediate knowledge. "Systemic intellectual methodology" is an afterthought, an epistemic hanger-on that follows after knowledge is already had. It is an attempt to explain what has already occurred.

There are two questions here: first, whether the mediation of the knowledge of appearances and the mediation of the knowledge of first-person acts are different kinds of mediation; and second, whether the knowledge of first-person acts are mediated.

Quoting Leontiskos

My point in indicating that everyone in the tread accepts it is to say that this burden is on you. To everyone in the thread it is accepted that we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions, and if you disagree then you will have to provide an argument. The commonsensical idea is that when I see someone else flip a coin my knowledge is mediated by sense data; but when I flip a coin my knowledge that I am acting is in no way limited to sense data. Because I am the one effecting the act, therefore I know that the act is being effected. The mediation of the former is not present in the latter.

Hrm! I don't know that I'd accept "we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions" as a true sentence, but it'd be for boring reasons: I simply wouldn't use the predicate "...immediate" with respect to knowledge in general.

Quoting Janus

Anything that is an appearance is known mediately,
Action is known only non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance.

This makes it clear that the question is whether action is known only non-mediately, and that would seem to be false, which makes the argument as reformulated valid, but unsound.

Using this approach, you can get true premises in the following way:

[i]Anything that is an appearance is known only mediately
Action is known non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance[/i]

(The point is not that action is known only non-mediately, but rather that action is known non-mediately (and mediately), whereas appearance is only known mediately.)

Quoting Leontiskos

To everyone in the thread it is accepted that we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions,

We know our actions in a direct way -- no input from the outside world. If I walked over to the kitchen, I knew it without waiting for an object to hit my eyes. My action is within me. My being is within me. A ball is outside of me, I can perceive it. I can perceive its qualities. If I lay down and imagine aliens, only I could know I am imagining. The act of imagining is not something that I perceive like I am perceiving a tree. In fact, compared to the perception of a tree, my imagination can take many forms; whereas a tree is a tree is a tree. Seven billion people could confirm that a pine tree is a pine tree.

Quoting Leontiskos

….we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions, and if you disagree then you will have to provide an argument.

That was never a contention simply from the fact it was never submitted as such, in the original syllogism, which doesn’t even suggest community as a determinant condition. The contention remains, that no one, as individual subject to whom the syllogism is properly addressed, knows anything at all that isn’t mediated by the system by which knowledge itself is possible. Give that system any name you wish, determine its methodology by whatever means…..whatever it is, if knowledge is impossible without it it is necessarily the case knowledge is mediated by it, and consequently, no knowledge is at all possible non-mediately.

That’s my argument, and if it is true, the minor in the original syllogism is demonstrably false because of it, while there being nothing wrong with its form.

So, yes, we know our own actions in a more immediate way that we know others’ actions, but that says nothing about the mediacy/non-mediacy of the our own knowledge of our own actions, which is the implication the syllogism carries.
————-

Quoting Leontiskos

There are two questions here: first, whether the mediation of the knowledge of appearances and the mediation of the knowledge of first-person acts are different kinds of mediation; and second, whether the knowledge of first-person acts are mediated.

Absolutely, different kinds of mediation, and thereby, the second question is redundant.
————-

Quoting Leontiskos

It is an attempt to explain what has already occurred.

Ever tied to explain what hasn’t occurred? That isn’t, instead, a prediction?

Fun talkin’ to ya, but let’s not get too carried away, huh?

Quoting Moliere

Hrm! I don't know that I'd accept "we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions" as a true sentence, but it'd be for boring reasons: I simply wouldn't use the predicate "...immediate" with respect to knowledge in general.

But what about "more immediate"? Are there different levels of mediation here? I think that question presents the first step.

Quoting Leontiskos

Anything that is an appearance is known mediately,
Action is known only non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance.

This makes it clear that the question is whether action is known only non-mediately, and that would seem to be false, which makes the argument as reformulated valid, but unsound.
— Janus

Using this approach, you can get true premises in the following way:

Anything that is an appearance is known only mediately
Action is known non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance

(The point is not that action is known only non-mediately, but rather that action is known non-mediately (and mediately), whereas appearance is only known mediately.)

I'm not convinced those premises are true. I mean I think it is fair to say, thinking about it one way, that nothing is known non-mediately, and from another way of thinking, that everything is known immediately. The first highlights the fact that there are always processes of awareness going on in all kinds of knowing, and the latter highlights that fact that knowing always feels immediate.

Quoting L'éléphant

We know our actions in a direct way -- no input from the outside world. If I walked over to the kitchen, I knew it without waiting for an object to hit my eyes. My action is within me. My being is within me. A ball is outside of me, I can perceive it. I can perceive its qualities. If I lay down and imagine aliens, only I could know I am imagining. The act of imagining is not something that I perceive like I am perceiving a tree. In fact, compared to the perception of a tree, my imagination can take many forms; whereas a tree is a tree is a tree. Seven billion people could confirm that a pine tree is a pine tree.

Yes, quite right. :up:

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Quoting Mww

That was never a contention...

We're taking baby steps here.

Quoting Mww

So, yes, we know our own actions in a more immediate way that we know others’ actions...

Okay great, so we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions. Now we can move to the question of the minor: whether we know our own acts immediately.

Some questions: Do you act? When you act do you know you are acting, or are you not sure whether you are acting? Do you disagree with L'éléphant about his knowledge of walking over to the kitchen? Finally, if you think this knowledge is mediate, then what is it mediated by?

(Reply to Janus)

Quoting Mww

Give that system any name you wish...

Do you think people without "systems" are also capable of knowledge?

Quoting Mww

Ever tied to explain what hasn’t occurred?

Knowledge is not an act of explanation.

Quoting Leontiskos

Some questions: Do you act? When you act do you know you are acting, or are you not sure whether you are acting? Do you disagree with L'éléphant about his knowledge of walking over to the kitchen? Finally, if you think this knowledge is mediate, then what is it mediated by?

I think the salient question is not whether you know you are acting, but whether the awareness that you are acting is immediate, or whether it is mediated by processes that give rise to that awareness. Of course, the awareness is, or at least seems to be, from the percipient's point of view, felt immediately. But this is also equally the case when it comes to extrasomatic perceptions.

As I said in my previous post, I think there is an ambiguity in the notions of mediacy and immediacy; so perhaps we are merely arguing about different ways of thinking, ways which cannot meaningfully be opposed because they find their senses in different contexts.

Reply to Janus - Are we agreed that there is a difference between acting and observing, even though it is also possible to observe one's own actions?

Reply to Leontiskos Yes, I agree with that. We can act without being aware of acting and we can also act with awareness.

Reply to Janus - Well, that might be slightly different than what I want to posit. It seems that if Ernie sees Bert flip a coin, then he has knowledge of Bert's action through observation. If Ernie flips a coin himself, then he has knowledge of his own act through observation, but he also has knowledge of his own act qua actor.

So through observation Ernie has knowledge, but he also has a different kind of knowledge when he is the one doing the acting. When Ernie flips a coin he does not need to observe the coin flip—like when he is watching Bert—in order to know that he is flipping a coin. As an actor he is able to act, and when he puts this ability into play and acts he knows he is acting. This is a sort of knowledge that we only have of our own acts.

This is what I mean by the difference between acting and observing. Are we agreed on that difference?

Reply to Leontiskos Sure, when we are aware we feel our body acting, moving and we feel the ease or the effort. We can act and be completely unaware of it, though. When we feel it, it feels immediate, just as it seems immediate when we see others acting, so I'm still not seeing a real difference beyond the difference between feeling and seeing.

Quoting Janus

I think the reason no one has challenged the minor is because we all believe that we possess a knowledge of our acts which is not mediated. This is different from our knowledge of the acts of others.
— Leontiskos

If all knowledge of action is mediated by neural processes, then we may well all be mistaken in thinking that we possess non-mediated knowledge of our own actions. We "feel" our own actions "from the inside" it seems, and we see, or hear the actions of others, but if feeling as well as seeing and hearing is mediated by prior neuronal activity, the immediacy may be merely phenomenological, which then just be to say that knowledge of our actions seems immediate, which is of course true.

:100:

@Leontiskos

The reason I haven't challenged the minor is because I am lazy. Not because there is not good reason to.

Quoting Leontiskos

Some questions:….

Oh cool. Socratic dialectics. I’ll play along. Briefly.

Quoting Leontiskos

Do you act?

Yes.

Quoting Leontiskos

When you act do you know you are acting….

Not always.

Quoting Leontiskos

…..or are you not sure whether you are acting?

Yes, I’m sure I’m acting, iff I’m in the act of doing something and aware of it.

Quoting Leontiskos

Do you disagree with L'éléphant about his knowledge of walking over to the kitchen?

Yes.

Quoting Leontiskos

Finally, if you think this knowledge is mediate, then what is it mediated by?

Why, the knowledge that I have walked to the kitchen, is mediated by my understanding of what a kitchen is. How else would it be determinable that I didn’t walk to the bathroom? If I say I did a particular thing, I must already know what that thing was before I did it. If that was not the case, all I’m justified in saying is that I walked into a different space.

And yes, you actually do need a kitchen-type object to hit your eyes, or, possibly but not as definitively, some particular kitchen-like perception, in order to KNOW you’ve arrived in the kitchen. No stoves in the office, no toilets in the pantry.
—————

Quoting Leontiskos

Do you think people without "systems" are also capable of knowledge?

No. But still, if ALL people have a system, regardless of what kind of system it may be, then to ask about people without one, is unintelligible.

.

Quoting Leontiskos

When you act do you know you are acting, or are you not sure whether you are acting?

So, if one is doubting whether they're acting, then the doubting itself is an act that they're not sure of. This has a funny consequence -- I'm not sure I'm walking, but I'm also not sure that I'm not sure I'm walking, and I really can't be sure at all of anything, which means there is one thing I know non-mediately: that I don't know anything. So, there IS ONE THING I know for sure!!
:sweat:

The continuation of this argument is -- so if there is one thing one knows non-mediately, surely there could other things one can know non-mediately. Why is there only one thing that occupies a special place of knowing non-mediately? Is it because one is trying to win an argument? Is it because one hasn't put a lot of thought into this argument and does not know how to end it?

Quoting L'éléphant

So, if one is doubting whether they're acting, then the doubting itself is an act that they're not sure of. This has a funny consequence -- I'm not sure I'm walking, but I'm also not sure that I'm not sure I'm walking, and I really can't be sure at all of anything, which means there is one thing I know non-mediately: that I don't know anything. So, there IS ONE THING I know for sure!!
:sweat:

Quite right. :lol:

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Quoting Janus

Sure, when we are aware we feel our body acting, moving and we feel the ease or the effort.

When we are riding an ass we feel the ass acting, moving, and we feel the ease or the effort. But to act is not to be carried around by an ass. ...Not even St. Francis' "brother ass"!

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Quoting Mww

Yes, I’m sure I’m acting, iff I’m in the act of doing something and aware of it.

Okay.

Quoting Mww

Why, the knowledge that I have walked to the kitchen, is mediated by my understanding of what a kitchen is.

Of course to have knowledge of a proposition involves having knowledge of the terms of the proposition, but the knowledge of the proposition is not mediated by the terms. The proposition presupposes and is constituted by the terms, just as the knowledge that you are walking into a kitchen presupposes knowledge of the kitchen. I think it would be quite odd to call this mediation, particularly in the sense of the "appearances" of the OP.

Quoting Mww

And yes, you actually do need a kitchen-type object to hit your eyes, or, possibly but not as definitively, some particular kitchen-like perception, in order to KNOW you’ve arrived in the kitchen.

But you've confused the topic. We are not talking about knowledge of arrival, we are talking about knowledge of acting. Transeunt acts will be easier (acts that have no exterior term). Kant thinks we should legislate for ourselves the categorical imperative, and it turns out that this legislating is an act. Well how do we know that we have so legislated? That we have so acted?

For the sake of argument, if you know you are acting iff you are "in the act of doing something and aware of it," then when you are consciously walking you have knowledge that you are walking. And if you are consciously thinking then you have knowledge that you are thinking. This knowledge is immediate.

Quoting Leontiskos

When we are riding an ass we feel the ass acting, moving, and we feel the ease or the effort. But to act is not to be carried around by an ass. ...Not even St. Francis' "brother ass"!

We don't feel the effort or the ease of the ass in the same way we feel our own, but that feeling of our own ease and effort in action or at rest is presumably made possible by neuronal activity that is prior to the feeling, just at when we see or hear things, that seeing or hearing is presumable made possible by antecedent neuronal activity.

So, to reiterate, for me, seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling and tasting seem just as immediate as somatosensory or proprioceptive awareness, but they are all presumably mediated by neuronal activity.

Quoting Leontiskos

Quite right

So Descartes was wrong, re: when he said the one thing he couldn’t doubt was his doubting yet you affirm doubting is an act one can be uncertain about.
————

Quoting Leontiskos

Of course to have knowledge of a proposition involves having knowledge of the terms of the proposition, but the knowledge of the proposition is not mediated by the terms.

Correct, but irrelevant and beside the point. When I’m walking to the kitchen I’m not concerned with the construction of propositions. To inform you of my activities it may be necessary to construct speech acts with words and in a fashion you can understand, but it is certainty not necessary to inform myself.

Quoting Leontiskos

…..the knowledge that you are walking into a kitchen presupposes knowledge of the kitchen. I think it would be quite odd to call this mediation, particularly in the sense of the "appearances" of the OP.

The presupposition JUST IS the mediation, with respect to the major in the OP. All that’s required is an exposition of the origin of the presupposition in order to justify mediation as properly obtainable from it. Which is the bone of contention overall, insofar as mediation via presupposition cannot be justified in the minor without stipulation that the act the individual knows is itself an appearance, which is the condition met by walking into that which appears as “kitchen”. But, on the one hand, if he knows his act as appearance, the minor contradicts the major, and on the other, it is not necessary an individual knows his act by appearance, insofar as he can know what his act will be without it ever manifesting in the world, which makes explicit his act is necessarily mediated by something other than experience, in which case the minor contradicts itself.

It’s really not that difficult, is it?
———-

Quoting Leontiskos

…..consciously thinking (….) consciously walking….

Consider that for a second.

An error in reason perfectly congruent with the syllogism in the OP.

Now, while it is true Everydayman doesn’t give even half a hoot about such seemingly innocuous rationality, the philosopher should recognize it for what it is.

I’ll leave you to it. Or not.