Argument as Transparency

Leontiskos August 29, 2023 at 18:08 9300 views 49 comments
Introduction

A mother walks into the kitchen and is surprised to find her children hard at work. The cupboards are ajar, the mixing bowls and measuring cups are scattered across the countertop, and flour, butter, sugar, and eggs have all found their way out into the open. “What are you doing!?” she asks. The children, giggling, reply coyly, “Kneading dough!” “No! What are you doing?” After a brief pause they announce merrily, “We are baking cookies!”

What if the mother, finding herself on a philosophy forum, asked the same question? “What are you doing!?” “Arguing!” “No! What are you doing?” *

I hope the answer would have something to do with truth, knowledge, understanding, or wisdom. We knead dough to bake cookies and we argue to get at these sorts of things. But a philosophy forum involves dialogue, and hence what is involved is a shared pursuit of things like truth, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom. In this thread I am concerned with a key component of this shared pursuit: transparency, and in particular transparency as an essential part of good argument.


Transparency in Argument

There are two basic ways that an argument can get at truth[sup]?[/sup]: by being right and by being wrong. Yet in order for this to work the argument must be seen to be right or wrong. If it is seen to be right then it will lead the one who sees it into the truth of its conclusion. If it is seen to be wrong then it will lead the one who sees it away from specious reasoning and away from an unsound conclusion. In each case the crucial factor is that it be seen, that it be transparent.

This telos of truth can be impeded in various ways. One such temptation is eristic, the practice of mere disputation and winning an argument simply for the sake of winning. A more subtle temptation is rhetorical excess, where one focuses so strongly on persuasion that they end up neglecting truth in the process. A third and very common temptation is captured by Aaron Burr’s line in Lin Manuel Miranda’s Hamilton, “Talk less, smile more. Don’t let them know what you’re against or what you’re for.” Whether it is silence, sheepishness, or dissimulation, this is rooted in the fear of being criticized or being wrong. All of these temptations are aided by arguments which are opaque and difficult to discern. Transparency is a useful remedy.


Transparency in need of Courage

Transparent arguments require a certain amount of courage. Everyone knows that a clear and transparent argument is better at getting the job done. If an argument is transparent, illuminating, and sound, then it will also be cogent and will carry the interlocutor along to the destination. On the other hand, if an argument is unsound then transparency will only make it easier to see that it is wrong, and no one likes to be wrong. So transparency is a double-edged sword, much like transparent clothing that makes attractive people more attractive and unattractive people more unattractive.

If the proper telos of truth is maintained, then the courage for transparent arguments will be ready to hand. This is because the risk of being wrong will be easily undertaken for a higher cause. As noted above, a pathway to truth is opened up when bad arguments are seen to be bad. Disguising or veiling arguments is a bit like going to the doctor and lying about one’s health in order to avoid an unpleasant diagnosis. It defeats the whole point. Arguments don’t exist to make us feel good about ourselves; they exist to help us pursue truth, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom. It is worth paying the price of vulnerability for the sake of truth.


Example: Assertions vs. Arguments

One very basic and concrete way towards transparency is replacing assertions with arguments, especially when an assertion has been questioned or has become contentious. Even simple syllogisms can make a difference.

Consider the assertion, “David Hume was a nut.” This provides nothing for the interlocutor to grab on to, and the only available options are affirmation or denial. There is no path to truth, knowledge, understanding, or wisdom. But a simple syllogism alters the landscape, “David Hume undermined the scientific enterprise; Anyone who undermines the scientific enterprise is a nut; Therefore David Hume was a nut.” The transition from the assertion to the argument makes the reasoning and rationale visible. Other paths have been opened up beyond mere affirmation or denial. The interlocutor could become convinced, they could question premises or inferences, the person giving the argument might realize that they are mistaken, etc.

It is perhaps worth noting that the formalization of an argument can sometimes help transparency, but it can sometimes hinder transparency. The goal of transparency must be held in mind during the formalization process, but also, the capacity of one’s interlocutor must be taken into account when deciding whether and how to formalize an argument.[sup]?[/sup]


To revise Burr’s line, “Talk more. Let them know what you’re against and what you’re for.”

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This question is an inquiry into what Aristotle calls a final cause.
[sup]?[/sup] “Truth” will henceforth be used as a shortened version of “Truth, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom.”
[sup]?[/sup] There are perhaps cases where one wishes to restrict access to an argument to those with a certain level of aptitude. A tricky balance is at play in such a maneuver, but it should be stressed that the argument should still be transparent to those with the desired aptitude.

[hide="Reveal"]Addendum

I drafted a different version of this thread a few weeks ago, and I wanted to include the two central paragraphs in a sort of postscript. They may help elucidate one thing or another:

It seems to me that the proximate telos of argument qua dialogue is a kind of transparency, namely that transparency by which the reasons and grounds for our position or conclusion become clear to our interlocutor. When we set out an argument we are attempting to show our interlocutor, first, why a conclusion is true, and second, either why we hold to it or why they should hold to it (or both). If a claim or an assertion is a black box, then an argument is the revealing and making-known of the contents of that box. Some arguments unravel our own reasons for a conclusion or postulate, while others are tailored to the specific characteristics of our interlocutor, but in each case transparency is the first thing aimed at. The more proper (remote) telos is of course the telos of rational dialogue: coming to better know truth.

There are two important effects of this transparency. The primary effect is to provide an occasion for another mind to assent to what is true, via the argument we have set out. An argument provides another person with a concrete path to the truth of our claim, if indeed it be true. The second effect is equally important for dialogue, and it is the making vulnerable of our position. The path that we open up for the sake of truth turns out to be a two-way highway, suitable not only for assent but also for denial, critique, and even assault. The transparency of an argument, then, brings with it both an invitation and a risk. Both paths serve truth, the telos of rational dialogue; the first by providing an opportunity to assent to what is true, and the second by providing an opportunity to deny what is false.[/hide]

Comments (49)

NotAristotle September 01, 2023 at 23:36 #835145
Transparency is important in argumentation because it leads to truth and is an example of the virtue of courage.
NotAristotle September 01, 2023 at 23:38 #835146
Additionally, transparent argumentation makes for a more productive argument because one's views will be more clearly presented and because the actual beliefs of the individuals will be honestly assessed.
Moliere September 02, 2023 at 02:23 #835159
Reply to Leontiskos Good stuff.

I especially like the connection between vulnerability and transparency: forthrightness can be a boast, but if you're really at your limit of certainty then it's a good idea to let go of the desire for certainty -- especialy the certainty that you'll win the argument ;).

Transparency, though, is a way to subject yourself to the criticism of philosophy.
Leontiskos September 03, 2023 at 03:18 #835313
Quoting Moliere
Good stuff.

I especially like the connection between vulnerability and transparency: forthrightness can be a boast, but if you're really at your limit of certainty then it's a good idea to let go of the desire for certainty


Thanks! Yes, I very much agree with this as well. Last year I wrote a thread on this topic on a different forum, "The Philosophical Virtue of Certitude Shifting." I hadn't thought about the way it is related to transparency until you brought it up.

I think some of these points seem obvious, and they probably are obvious, but at least for me it is helpful to have reminders from time to time.

Quoting Moliere
Transparency, though, is a way to subject yourself to the criticism of philosophy.


Yep, and I also think of it as a means to the common good of truth, knowledge, wisdom, etc. When there is transparency there is a better chance that everyone involved will enjoy these benefits.

---

Quoting NotAristotle
Transparency is important in argumentation because it leads to truth and is an example of the virtue of courage.


Quoting NotAristotle
Additionally, transparent argumentation makes for a more productive argument because one's views will be more clearly presented and because the actual beliefs of the individuals will be honestly assessed.


Yes, that's just how I would put it @NotAristotle. :up:
Hailey September 03, 2023 at 06:46 #835315
Thank you for what you brought us there, very thought-provoking. It reminds me of a speech Chimamanda Ngozi Aldichie gave, the Freedom of Speech, in the Reith Lecture, where she stressed the importance of allowing ourselves to say something wrong and warned people of the danger of self-censorship. Apart from arguing that people, especially youngsters should engage more in conversations, she also pointed out the damage that cancel culture would do to the society, which would all impair transparency of arguments and hinder the freedom of speech. To seek truth, we should avoid getting emotional and argue for the sake of persuading the other side, instead, we should be open-minded and unbiased and use logic to fully dissect the issue at hand, where neither concealing our own ignorance nor keeping silent to avoid conflicts would do anything good.
Jack Cummins September 03, 2023 at 11:02 #835324
Reply to Leontiskos
Transparency in arguments is important in seeking the rational explanations and justifications. It involves honesty about the basis for acceptance of ideas and goes far beyond winning arguments.

Perhaps, the need to win an argument stems from uncertainty about one's own position and the need for validation from others. This involves the transparency with oneself as opposed to self deception. It is possible to hold a view and not be aware why one adopts it. Some ideas may accepted from others unquestioningly and there may also be psychological factors involved.

A certain amount of transparency with oneself may be beneficial and it may not that once this achieved there may be less need to argue one's position. However, ongoing interaction, such as on a philosophy forum, may be useful for fluidity in thinking and ongoing modification of ideas in the light of new perspectives and development of knowledge.
NotAristotle September 03, 2023 at 19:56 #835411
Quoting Jack Cummins
It is possible to hold a view and not be aware why one adopts it. Some ideas may accepted from others unquestioningly and there may also be psychological factors involved.


That being the case, I don't necessarily think someone should be criticized for not being able to articulate their view well. Like you said, understanding is a part of philosophy, and so the virtue of patience with oneself and others is also important.
Jack Cummins September 03, 2023 at 21:29 #835427
Reply to NotAristotle
It may be that philosophy itself is the art of being able to articulate one's views. Patience with oneself is important but I find a certain amount of self criticism useful in seeing the gaps in my own logic and leaning towards certain ideas. A certain amount of rigour in being able to analyse one's own thinking may enable transparency of oneself and being able to realise and go beyond one's own philosophical blindspots.
Leontiskos September 03, 2023 at 22:24 #835438
It is true that some views are held uncritically or unreflectively, but oftentimes the most interesting philosophy occurs precisely at the point when these views come under question:

Quoting Leontiskos
One very basic and concrete way towards transparency is replacing assertions with arguments, especially when an assertion has been questioned or has become contentious.


So I think @Jack Cummins makes a good point when he talks about "going beyond one's philosophical blindspots."

We all have certain views that we suppose do not need justification (and often they may not need justification). But the crucial thing is the ability to pivot and justify these views when they come into question.
NotAristotle September 04, 2023 at 00:24 #835459
Humility is another virtue of the philosopher. It's important to acknowledge, at least to oneself, when one's own views are contradictory or inconsistent. Relatedly, the philosopher must persevere in their quest for truth.
Leontiskos September 08, 2023 at 04:56 #836297
Quoting Hailey
It reminds me of a speech Chimamanda Ngozi Aldichie gave, the Freedom of Speech, in the Reith Lecture, where she stressed the importance of allowing ourselves to say something wrong and warned people of the danger of self-censorship.


This sounds interesting. I found a link to it <here>. I will have to check it out when I get a chance.

Quoting Hailey
Apart from arguing that people, especially youngsters should engage more in conversations, she also pointed out the damage that cancel culture would do to the society, which would all impair transparency of arguments and hinder the freedom of speech.


Exactly. :up:

Quoting Hailey
...neither concealing our own ignorance nor keeping silent to avoid conflicts would do anything good.


Right. Perhaps social media has raised vanity to such a pitch that it has become exceptionally difficult to overcome. We are often more concerned with how others will react and view us than with whether our contribution will further the conversation.
Leontiskos September 16, 2023 at 05:07 #837944
Quoting Jack Cummins
A certain amount of transparency with oneself may be beneficial and it may not that once this achieved there may be less need to argue one's position. However, ongoing interaction, such as on a philosophy forum, may be useful for fluidity in thinking and ongoing modification of ideas in the light of new perspectives and development of knowledge.


Yes, there is something interesting about philosophy as fulfilling a need versus philosophy as abundance or overflow, and the various shades of both. Argument and philosophical dialogue can be a crutch; it can be a response to a legitimate need for investigation and intercourse; it can be a genuine and unselfish sharing; and sometimes it can even be the consequence of an overflow of our grasped participation in the intelligibility of creation.
J September 26, 2023 at 13:02 #840459
(This is my first post – thanks for welcoming me to the forum!)

Reading this thread, I was reminded of an insight from Richard J. Bernstein in his essay, “The Rage Against Reason” (collected in The New Constellation, 1992). Bernstein notes some similarities between modernist philosopher Jurgen Habermas and the American pragmatists. He writes, “Both [Habermas and the pragmatists] share an understanding of rationality as instrinsically dialogical and communicative. And both pursue the ethical and political consequences of this form of rationality and rationalization. It was Peirce who first developed the logical backbone of this thought in his idea of the fundamental character of a self-corrective critical community of inquirers [my itals] without any absolute beginning points or finalities. . .”

Bernstein has a lot more that’s interesting to say about the connection of rational inquiry with democratic values. But for our purposes, I think what he’s describing is quite close to this concept of transparency and philosophical humility. What is often challenging, of course, is to take seriously the idea that such inquiry might truly be “without any absolute beginning points or finalities.” But that’s another subject.
Leontiskos September 27, 2023 at 01:57 #840663
Welcome to the forum, Reply to J!

Good points. I am not familiar with Bernstein, but I can definitely see what you are saying with regard to Habermas and Peirce, and I admire their dialogical approach.

Quoting J
a self-corrective critical community of inquirers


I think this is an important point: that the inquiry is in some way attached to the community itself and not only to the individual, and this fact leads the members of the community to relate to one another in a different way, as partners in a common purpose.

Quoting J
Bernstein has a lot more that’s interesting to say about the connection of rational inquiry with democratic values.


I hadn't actually considered that idea, but it does make sense. In a democracy one probably has more modest expectations for their ideas and arguments, and surely dialogue is opened up when the participants are considered equals. What are some of Bernstein's thoughts on the topic?
J September 27, 2023 at 20:48 #840872
Quoting Leontiskos
What are some of Bernstein's thoughts on the topic?


One of Bernstein’s concerns that interests me on this topic: What happens to liberal-democratic values (including the value of political discussion among equals) when certain post-modern challenges to rationality are either misconstrued or taken too far? Bernstein was sympathetic to post-modern philosophers, but he saw this danger coming from both the left and the right, and perhaps most distressingly from philosophers (such as Rorty, Foucault, and Derrida) whose politics were resolutely humane and progressive, but who didn’t seem to realize what the disparagement of rationality can do in the wrong political hands. Bernstein wrote mostly in the last decades of the 20th century, but he lived to see many of his warnings come true, in our current U.S. culture where “truthiness” is good enough for so many people, and there is less and less faith in a “common practice” or tradition that includes appeals to fact and reason.

His several essays on Richard Rorty give a good flavor of RJB’s concerns. Two of them are collected in The New Constellation. RJB discusses Rorty’s pragmatist appeal to “we” citizens of a democracy to stop trying to justify liberal-democratic values and simply get on with “making them look good” so others will want to adopt them. But without rational justification – without a fallibilistic, self-correcting, consensus-building approach to political argument -- “Rorty seems to be insensitive to the dark side of appealing to ?we’ when it is used as an exclusionary tactic – as the ?rationalization’ for fostering intolerance.” He goes on, “[On this sort of view], tradition, including the tradition of liberal democracy, does not seem to have any determinate content other than the ways in which we (I) interpret it. And our interpretations, our self-creations, seem to be little more than an expression of our idiosyncratic will to power, our will to self-assertion.” In other words, RJB sees the Nietzschean danger that, if rational argument among equals is abandoned, all that’s left is persuasion – making a position “look attractive,” in Rorty’s words – or else a literal use of coercive power.

Hope this gives you a sense of Bernstein’s interests in this area. He was a modernist philosopher in the Kantian, Frankfurt-School, Habermas tradition, and strove throughout his writings to defend and justify a rationalism that is not a metaphysical foundationalism, and that also does not produce Weberian “rationalization” and oppression. He and Rorty were lifelong friends, I believe; both called themselves pragmatists; but Bernstein was very reluctant to accept Rorty’s claim to the title.
Leontiskos October 02, 2023 at 17:10 #842161
Quoting J
Hope this gives you a sense of Bernstein’s interests in this area.


It does, thank you! That’s actually very interesting and it seems like I would have a lot of sympathies with Bernstein’s project. In fact at this point I doubt anyone could look around at the state of our culture and deny that his foretellings had come to pass.

I am fond of Joseph Ratzinger, who seems to come from a similar school, and who was in dialogue with Habermas on many of these issues. Actually Ratzinger seems to align very nearly with the position you’ve outlined. The difficulty for Ratzinger (and presumably also for Berstein) is that it is not clear whether one can complete the project without a “metaphysical foundationalism.” I don’t know that he ever moved beyond vacillation on this point.

What then is Berstein’s alternative to metaphysical foundationalism? Does he attempt to go the way of a coherentism that could resist the “will to self-assertion”? Does he attempt to avoid metaphysics altogether?
J October 03, 2023 at 15:50 #842384
Quoting Leontiskos
What then is Bernstein’s alternative to metaphysical foundationalism? Does he attempt to go the way of a coherentism that could resist the “will to self-assertion”? Does he attempt to avoid metaphysics altogether?



Yes, important questions. Bernstein’s magnum opus, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, addresses them in full, though it was an “inquiry in progress” and didn’t necessarily provide firm answers. I don’t know if I can do it justice, but here are a few points.

RJB’s response to “anti-foundationalism” is subtle. He is constantly drawing a distinction between a critique of foundational metaphysical starting points for inquiry – which he thinks is a legitimate and significant concern – and a critique that amounts to “a polemical attack on the very idea of philosophy” -- which he disputes vigorously, along with Habermas (probably his closest philosophical ally).

Another way to make this distinction might be to say that, for RJB, the adoption of rational inquiry, or “communicative action” a la Habermas, or a quest for genuine phronesis, is not “foundationalist” in some naive or dogmatic way. You ask whether RJB gives up metaphysics entirely. I think the right answer is, If you include rationality and all its cognates (including a transparent process that can result in genuine phronesis), then no, RJB very much sticks up for this. But I suspect he’d be more likely to draw a distinction between this kind of practice and “metaphysics” understood as an a priori search for certainty about ontology and epistemology, which he does abandon. One of his trademark terms is “Cartesian anxiety,” by which he means the desire of philosophers for a clear and distinct starting place for inquiry.

How then does philosophy get off the ground? Here RJB’s approach is generally that of Peirce, I would say. He endorses (with some reservations) Peirce’s idea that a community of inquirers will in time converge on philosophical truths – or at least that this has to be our goal. Peirce believed this process had to start without foundations, on the open sea, as it were. If any foundational metaphysics are on offer, we could only find them after the journey, not as a place from which to set sail. Or this is how I read Peirce, anyway. RJB talks approvingly of Habermas’ idea of “a project of reconstruction and critique that points to the telos that should guide our praxis.” In short, we have no choice but to begin, philosophically, where we are, using the tools that best recommend themselves to this style of inquiry – which is an ethical as well as a rational style, since it insists on an equal community of inquirers who share, if only hazily, a kind of endpoint or telos for philosophy and for humankind.

The big problem I see as largely unresolved in Bernstein, and that he continued to wrestle with all his life, concerns the proper understanding of “objective” and “subjective.” RJB was sure that hermeneutics could forge a synthesis between these two concepts, which he regarded as a false either/or. He was suspicious of any approach in which “the subjective becomes virtually synonymous with the private, idiosyncratic, and arbitrary” and “the very idea of phronesis seems like a confused concept.” This misguided approach also has the effect of seducing us into believing that “knowledge must be objective – or else it is only pseudo-knowledge.”

I haven’t read everything Bernstein wrote, but if he ever found a completely satisfying resolution here, I don’t know of it. Nor am I entirely satisfied myself with treating rationality as involving no pre-commitments to a metaphysical position – but I may not be reading RJB accurately here.

Well, perhaps more than you wanted, but these meta-philosophical questions are deeply engaging for me.
baker October 03, 2023 at 21:07 #842488
Quoting Leontiskos
A third and very common temptation is captured by Aaron Burr’s line in Lin Manuel Miranda’s Hamilton, “Talk less, smile more. Don’t let them know what you’re against or what you’re for.” Whether it is silence, sheepishness, or dissimulation, this is rooted in the fear of being criticized or being wrong. All of these temptations are aided by arguments which are opaque and difficult to discern. Transparency is a useful remedy.


Surely that line wasn't meant in the context of a private (!) philosophy forum, was it?

In any interaction, it is vital to discern what type of interaction it (potentially) is. Is it a philosophical discussion? Is it a conversation behind closed doors in the boss' office? Is it an inquiry by the police? Is it something the priest is saying in a church? A teacher at school? And so on.

For every type of interaction, different rules about transparency apply. Not in the least because one feared being wrong, but because what one says or fails to say can have tangible adverse consequences, depending on the context of the interaction.
Judaka October 05, 2023 at 04:41 #842905
Reply to Leontiskos
I think you've largely just used the word "transparency" to refer to having an argument. Having reasons for one's assertions. Which is itself an argument.

Quoting Leontiskos
One very basic and concrete way towards transparency is replacing assertions with argument


An assertion with no argument = there was no argument, surely.

Otherwise, transparency isn't a prerequisite to a good argument, completely irrelevant really. I could say "I think X" and have a brilliant argument for justifying that even if I refuse to share it.

It would be just semantics, but it's the entire premise of your OP. That transparency, which seems to be nothing more than sharing/giving your argument, is a prerequisite for a good argument, and by your own logic, it isn't.

Quoting Leontiskos
There are two basic ways that an argument can get at truth?: by being right and by being wrong.


This is such a drastic oversimplification that it's misrepresentative and incorrect.

The entire OP treats truth like it's a thing divorced from an argument/conclusion, like we "seek" truth, rather than create it, and this is a mistake. Truth conditions relate to one's objectives, one's interpretations, and one's claims, which are influenced by their arguments and the context.

If I argue that "This is the best way of doing X", then what determines the truth of that claim are things like: What are we trying to accomplish? How do we measure which way is best? Which factors, such as outcomes, consequences or resources are important? If you measure which way is best different from I, then you may end up with a different conclusion than I. One route, the one I argue is best, might be best when using my priorities and methods, but not when using yours. The "truth" relies on such things, and such things are established in one's argument.

The truth of what's moral, what's true, and what's right and most areas of philosophy are dependant on one's values, priorities, interpretations, methods and so on.

This means that in order to change someone else's mind, or to have an interesting discussion, talking about what's "true" is pointless. To change what someone else thinks is true requires one to be compelling, intellectually and emotionally, to help someone see the merits of a different approach or flaws in theirs.

One could argue that David Hume is a nut in reference to a flaw in his thinking, but the criteria to be met for someone being "a nut" are vague. Perhaps the flaw of his thinking could be true, whether that makes David Hume a nut or not, surely that's not a "truth" worth worrying about. I could go on, truth is context-dependent, even to the very argument being made. David Hume could be a nut in reference to his positions on X, but a genius in reference to his positions on Y. An argument is part of the assertion, instead of merely justifying it.

To sum up, truth without an argument is useless and irrelevant. If one doesn't know why something is true, and they don't feel those reasons are compelling, then they won't care. A truth's value is dependent upon the quality of the argument, and what the argument succeeds in doing.
Leontiskos October 06, 2023 at 19:39 #843317
Quoting baker
Surely that line wasn't meant in the context of a private (!) philosophy forum, was it?


I would say that in Burr’s context and mine the proximate motivation is fear of criticism. Criticism is of course feared because of its connection with adverse consequences. That is itself a perfectly workable definition of fear: anticipation of future evil.

Quoting baker
In any interaction, it is vital to discern what type of interaction it (potentially) is.


The topic of this thread is argument, particularly in the context of a philosophy forum.
Leontiskos October 06, 2023 at 20:19 #843330
Quoting Judaka
I think you've largely just used the word "transparency" to refer to having an argument.


No, I don't think that's right at all.

Quoting Judaka
An assertion with no argument = there was no argument, surely.


That claim was that to move from asserting to arguing involves an increase in transparency.

Quoting Judaka
It would be just semantics, but it's the entire premise of your OP. That transparency, which seems to be nothing more than sharing/giving your argument, is a prerequisite for a good argument, and by your own logic, it isn't.


I don't think you will find anything in the OP to support these ideas of yours.

Quoting Judaka
If I argue that "This is the best way of doing X",


You're conflating practical knowledge with truth. Not all propositions are about how to get something done.

Quoting Judaka
To change what someone else thinks is true requires one to be compelling, intellectually and emotionally, to help someone see the merits of a different approach or flaws in theirs.


Yes, and that requires transparency.

Quoting Judaka
This is such a drastic oversimplification that it's misrepresentative and incorrect.


Then name the third way instead of being opaque and contentious.

Quoting Judaka
To sum up, truth without an argument is useless and irrelevant. If one doesn't know why something is true, and they don't feel those reasons are compelling, then they won't care. A truth's value is dependent upon the quality of the argument, and what the argument succeeds in doing.


I could grant this naive epistemology for the sake of argument. So what? What does it have to do with the OP? You are trying to oppose my claim that argument helps us arrive at truth, but your arguments are invalid. Your claim that <only argument is able to arrive at truth> is not at odds with my claim that argument helps us arrive at truth. You're engaging in eristic, and you're not even addressing the OP. Bad day?

Edit: If you want a real-time example of what I am talking about, look at my post <here>. What I am proposing in that post is a means to transparency, a transparency that I propose is severely lacking in the previous two pages. If you read those two pages and agree that my suggestion would aid the dialogue by introducing more transparency, then you should have a key to the meaning of the OP, which you seem to have misunderstood.
Leontiskos October 08, 2023 at 00:41 #843699
Quoting J
Well, perhaps more than you wanted, but these meta-philosophical questions are deeply engaging for me.


This is great stuff, @J, thank you. Bernstein is definitely on my reading list by now, as everything you are bringing up resonates with me. I am not going to try to give a response here, in part because I am short on time and in part because we are getting off-topic for this thread. To be clear, I am not worried about derailing my thread, but I see no use hiding this topic in a thread where people will not be able to find it. I think there is a new thread to be had (or five). :wink: I have bookmarked your post, and will return to it in time.

That said, any new thread(s) would need to be carefully constructed and contained. I am fairly new here, but I haven't seen anyone delve into the complex realities that someone like Habermas was interested in. I haven't seen many threads on these sorts of deep cultural issues.
Janus October 08, 2023 at 00:57 #843705
Quoting Leontiskos
There are two basic ways that an argument can get at truth?: by being right and by being wrong. Yet in order for this to work the argument must be seen to be right or wrong. If it is seen to be right then it will lead the one who sees it into the truth of its conclusion. If it is seen to be wrong then it will lead the one who sees it away from specious reasoning and away from an unsound conclusion. In each case the crucial factor is that it be seen, that it be transparent.


I just came across this thread, so apologies if I repeat what has already been said. I don't see philosophical arguments as being true or false, but rather valid or invalid; that is consistent with their premises or inconsistent with their premises.

I think only in phenomenology, which is descriptive rather than argumentative, can truth be somewhat more determinable, and then only by common assent.

You might object that people can come to see the conclusion of an argument as true, but that would entail their assenting to the premises, and the conclusion being true to, that is consistent with, those. And the problem is that when it comes to metaphysics there is much more scope for polemical understandings than there is with phenomenological reflections on what seems to be the case with human experience.
Leontiskos October 08, 2023 at 01:23 #843713
Quoting Janus
I just came across this thread, so apologies if I repeat what has already been said. I don't see philosophical arguments as being true or false, but rather valid or invalid; that is consistent with their premises or inconsistent with their premises.


I agree, although I don't really mind if people predicate truth of arguments. I don't think I've spoken about arguments as true or false anywhere in the OP.

Quoting Janus
I don't see philosophical arguments as being true or false, but rather valid or invalid


Can they be sound or unsound? I hold to the common view that they can.
Janus October 08, 2023 at 01:50 #843723
Quoting Leontiskos
Can they be sound or unsound? I hold to the common view that they can.


I understand "sound or unsound" to be equivalent to "true or untrue". Premises can be sound or unsound, true or untrue, but when it comes to metaphysical arguments the truth is not determinable. For example, two metaphysical postulates are "being is fundamentally physical" and "being is fundamentally mental"; these two polemical posits are the basic presuppositions of materialism and idealism respectively. Can we determine which is true? No.

Empirical propositions, and arguments based on them, can be sound or unsound, when their truth is determinable by observation. That's my take, anyway.
Leontiskos October 08, 2023 at 02:22 #843738
Quoting Janus
I understand "sound or unsound" to be equivalent to "true or untrue".


Classically, a sound argument is an argument that possess both validity and true premises. An unsound argument lacks one or both.

Quoting Janus
For example, two metaphysical postulates are "being is fundamentally physical" and "being is fundamentally mental"; these two polemical posits are the basic presuppositions of materialism and idealism respectively. Can we determine which is true? No.

Empirical propositions, and arguments based on them, can be sound or unsound, when their truth is determinable by observation. That's my take, anyway.


Fair enough. I understand what you are saying. It's a common take. I am not going to engage it here, but I have said one or two things about it in "What is the nature of intuition?"

Given your perspective, I would suggest reading the OP in terms of what you call "empirical propositions" (or "empirical arguments").
Janus October 08, 2023 at 03:01 #843744
Quoting Leontiskos
Classically, a sound argument is an argument that possess both validity and true premises. An unsound argument lacks one or both.


Fair enough, I am stretching the conventional meaning of "sound" somewhat to apply to premises as well as arguments. I think it is fair to say that when an argument is claimed to be sound, we mean it is taken to be true, because every part of a sound argument, if it is valid, must be true, that is true premises and true conclusions consistent with those premises. But idiosyncratic terminology aside, I think my point stands; metaphysical arguments cannot be determined to be true or false (or if you prefer, sound or unsound), whereas empirical arguments can be.

You may not want to engage this take, but I think it is apposite in that you speak of people coming to understand that philosophical arguments are true or false.

Quoting Leontiskos
There are two basic ways that an argument can get at truth?: by being right and by being wrong. Yet in order for this to work the argument must be seen to be right or wrong. If it is seen to be right then it will lead the one who sees it into the truth of its conclusion. If it is seen to be wrong then it will lead the one who sees it away from specious reasoning and away from an unsound conclusion. In each case the crucial factor is that it be seen that it be transparent.


Now, if all you meant was that people can come to believe that philosophical arguments are true or false, then there would be no problem, but you seemed to be claiming that the truth of philosophical arguments is determinable and that is what I have been taking issue with.

That is why I acknowledged that in the case of phenomenological arguments, which are quasi-empirical, it might be more appropriate to speak of arguments (well, descriptions really) being true or false.

Leontiskos October 08, 2023 at 03:19 #843746
Quoting Janus
Fair enough, I am stretching the conventional meaning of "sound" somewhat to apply to premises as well as arguments. I think it is fair to say that when an argument is claimed to be sound, we mean it is taken to be true, because every part of a sound argument, if it is valid, must be true, that is true premises and true conclusions consistent with those premises.


The first reason I would resist such a re-naming is because I think it is better for truth and soundness to be separate and distinct, rather than overlapping and superfluous. The second reason is that validity is not reducible to truth, because it has to do with forms and rules (which are necessarily true).

Quoting Janus
But idiosyncratic terminology aside, I think my point stands; metaphysical arguments cannot be determined to be true or false (or if you prefer, sound or unsound), whereas empirical arguments can be.


Well, you've asserted that and I've said I am not going to engage it in this thread, and that's still where things stand. :razz: (I hope it wouldn't come as a surprise that I disagree.)

Quoting Janus
You may not want to engage this take, but I think it is apposite in that you speak of people coming to understand that philosophical arguments are true or false.


I think it only commits you to the conclusion that metaphysical propositions are not truth-apt. I'm not convinced it is related to this thread.

Quoting Janus
Now, if all you meant was that people can come to believe that philosophical arguments are true or false, then there would be no problem, but you seemed to be claiming that the truth of philosophical arguments is determinable and that is what I have been taking issue with.


This thread is about inquiry. It is about transparency as an aid to argument; as an aid to dialogue. So perhaps that is "all I meant," or all I require. I am certainly not claiming that every subject anyone argues about is necessarily determinable.

If you and I are arguing about something, then we must believe that the thing we are arguing about is truth-apt. If you don't believe metaphysics is truth-apt then presumably you don't get into a lot of arguments about metaphysics. Similarly, because we don't believe taste is truth-apt, we don't argue about taste ("de gustibus non disputandum est"). My advice in the OP applies to arguments, and people argue about theses that they believe are susceptible of truth and falsity.
Janus October 08, 2023 at 03:27 #843747
Quoting Leontiskos
If you don't believe metaphysics is truth-apt then presumably you don't get into a lot of arguments about metaphysics. Similarly, because we don't believe taste is truth-apt, we don't argue about taste ("de gustibus non disputandum est"). My advice in the OP applies to arguments, and people argue about theses that they believe are susceptible of truth and falsity.


Well, I do get into arguments about whether metaphysical arguments are truth-apt, and I think it is true that they are not, for the simple reason that their premises cannot be determined to be true or false. I think acceptance or rejection of metaphysical premises cannot but be a matter of taste, and as you say we don't argue about taste. People believing metaphysical premises are susceptible of truth and falsity and their actually being so are two different things, at least if you mean by "susceptible of truth and falsity" that their truth or falsity is determinable.
Leontiskos October 08, 2023 at 03:32 #843748
Quoting Janus
Well, I do get into arguments about whether metaphysical arguments are truth-apt, and I think it is true that they are not, for the simple reason that their premises cannot be determined to be true or false.


Right.

Quoting Janus
I think acceptance or rejection of metaphysical premises cannot but be a matter of taste, and as you say we don't argue about taste.


And thus, as I said, you do not enter into metaphysical disputes. The closest you get is disputing metaphysics itself.

Quoting Janus
People believing metaphysical premises are susceptible of truth and falsity and their actually being so are two different things...


Right, but the former is all that is required for an argument. As long as two people believe that a subject is susceptible of truth and falsity, they can argue about it. And my OP pertains to the arguments that people have. It pertains to empirical arguments and metaphysical arguments and arguments about astrology and homeopathy and alien abductions. The advice given in the OP is meant to aid arguments of all kinds.
Janus October 08, 2023 at 04:12 #843755
Quoting Leontiskos
It pertains to empirical arguments and metaphysical arguments and arguments about astrology and homeopathy and alien abductions. The advice given in the OP is meant to aid arguments of all kinds.


OK, fair enough...I guess I misunderstood where you were going with it.
Leontiskos October 08, 2023 at 04:20 #843759
Reply to Janus - :up:

When I came to this forum I was in the process of creating my own philosophy forum, and very nearly did so. For this reason a lot of my thread ideas pertain to pedagogy, how to aid people in philosophy, and how to keep a philosophical community well-oiled, so to speak. This thread is just one product of that sort of thinking, for a lack of transparency in argument leads to a weakening and breakdown of philosophical communities.
Janus October 08, 2023 at 04:33 #843764
Quoting Leontiskos
a lack of transparency in argument leads to a weakening and breakdown of philosophical communities.


I agree with that, assuming that you mean everything should be out in the open and that there should be no hidden or unacknowledged premises at work in philosophical discussions.
Leontiskos October 08, 2023 at 05:22 #843770
Quoting Janus
I agree with that, assuming that you mean everything should be out in the open and that there should be no hidden or unacknowledged premises at work in philosophical discussions.


Yes: no concealed premises or motivations, and no lack of clarity about one's position. For example, <this post> was an urging towards transparency.

But my other point is teleological. Sometimes when people engage in argument they are doing the wrong thing or aiming at the wrong thing. Just as the children kneading dough have an ulterior end, so too do those who engage in argument have an ulterior end. Often a lack of transparency pertains to an inappropriate ulterior end, or telos. "If the proper telos of truth is maintained, then the courage for transparent arguments will be ready to hand." I gave some examples of errors in the OP, but a common one is vainglory, where someone will engage in argument for the ulterior end of being praised, or being thought intelligent. In that case transparency is quickly obscured.

The interesting thing is that two instances of argument can reflect entirely different realities. The material fact that someone is engaging in argument is not enough to understand what they are doing. We also need to understand their telos. Oftentimes when two people are arguing with each other, they are each engaged in entirely different acts, even though they might both assume that the other one is engaged in the same act that they are engaged in. This can lead to strange and frustrating encounters.

Transparency can therefore act as a gauge which tells us whether we are going astray. When it is no longer present we have very likely ceased to argue for the sake of truth, and one or more of the conditions for legitimate dialogue noted below have evaporated.

Plato comes at this at one point in the Meno. After brushing aside a bit of eristic, Socrates gives the conditions for philosophical dialogue:

Meno, 75c-d, (tr. Grube):Then, if they are friends as you and I are, and want to discuss with each other, they must answer in a manner more gentle and more proper to discussion. By this I mean that the answers must not only be true, but in terms admittedly known to the questioner. I too will try to speak in these terms.


That is:

  1. Friendliness or goodwill
  2. A desire to discuss
  3. One's answers must be (believed to be) true
  4. One's answers must be given in terms that are able to be understood and accepted by the questioner


Pierre Hadot comments on this:

Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy, pp. 62-3 (footnotes omitted):Training in dialectics was absolutely necessary, insofar as Plato's disciples were destined to play a role in their city. In a civilization where political discourse was central, young people had to be trained to have a perfect mastery of speech and reasoning. Yet, in Plato's eyes, such mastery was dangerous, for it risked making young people believe that any position could be either defended or attacked. That is why Platonic dialectics was not a purely logical exercise. Instead, it was a spiritual exercise which demanded that the interlocutors undergo an askesis, or self-transformation. It was not a matter of a combat between two individuals, in which the more skillful person imposed his point of view, but a joint effort on the part of two interlocutors in accord with the rational demands of reasonable discourse, or the logos. Opposing his method to that of contemporary eristics, which practiced controversy for its own sake, Plato says: "When two friends, like you and me, are in the mood to chat, we have to go about it in a gentler and more dialectical way. By 'more dialectical,' I mean not only that we give real responses, but that we base our responses solely on what the interlocutor admits that he himself knows."

A true dialogue is possible only if the interlocutors want to dialogue. Thanks to this agreement between the interlocutors, which is renewed at each stage of the discussion, neither one of the interlocutors imposes his truth upon the other. On the contrary, dialogue teaches them to put themselves in each other's place and thereby transcend their own point of view. By dint of a sincere effort, the interlocutors discover by themselves, and within themselves, a truth which is independent of them, insofar as they submit to the superior authority of the logos. Here, as in all ancient philosophy, philosophy consists in the movement by which the individual transcends himself toward something which lies beyond him. For Plato, this something was the logos: discourse which implies the demands of rationality and universality. This logos, moreover, did not represent a kind of absolute knowledge; instead, it was equivalent to the agreement which is established between interlocutors who are brought to admit certain positions in common, and by this agreement transcend their particular points of view.


For example, a personal fault I have is that, when I am getting tired, I will recast proposals as assertions. If I know that my interlocutor disagrees with X I may impatiently say something which means, "X is true!", rather than something which means, "I myself hold/propose X and I am willing to give arguments on its behalf." This can be a very subtle difference and a very subtle fault, but if it occurs frequently enough then tensions will rise and the dialogue will implode. It is a violation of Socrates' fourth condition, and it also happens to involve a lack of transparency of intent.
Janus October 08, 2023 at 06:04 #843777
Reply to Leontiskos :up: All you say there makes good sense to me.
Judaka October 08, 2023 at 06:29 #843778
Reply to Leontiskos
Quoting Leontiskos
That claim was that to move from asserting to arguing involves an increase in transparency.


There's certainly a relationship between being transparent and giving arguments, but surely it's just that an argument is a prerequisite to transparency. Refusing to give one's reasonings is antithetical to being transparent.

Quoting Judaka
It would be just semantics, but it's the entire premise of your OP. That transparency, which seems to be nothing more than sharing/giving your argument, is a prerequisite for a good argument, and by your own logic, it isn't.

Quoting Leontiskos
I don't think you will find anything in the OP to support these ideas of yours.


Which part?

Firstly, defending my assertion of transparency as giving one's argument.

Quoting Leontiskos
The transition from the assertion to the argument makes the reasoning and rationale visible.


Quoting Leontiskos
Yet in order for this to work the argument must be seen to be right or wrong


Quoting Leontiskos
Disguising or veiling arguments is a bit like going to the doctor and lying about one’s health in order to avoid an unpleasant diagnosis. It defeats the whole point. Arguments don’t exist to make us feel good about ourselves; they exist to help us pursue truth, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom.


Quoting Leontiskos
In each case the crucial factor is that it be seen, that it be transparent.


Secondly, you claim that transparency is an essential part of a good argument.

Quoting Leontiskos
n this thread I am concerned with a key component of this shared pursuit: transparency, and in particular transparency as an essential part of good argument


I can't remember why I said "By your logic, it isn't", but surely if being transparent means giving your reasons for belief, then that implies you had such reasons to give in the first place. If I give my argument, my real feelings for why I assert X, then I am being completely transparent, right? To be transparent I mustn't conceal my reasons or give false reasons.

Quoting Leontiskos
Yes, and that requires transparency.


As in it requires one to provide arguments and reasonings?

Quoting Leontiskos
You're conflating practical knowledge with truth. Not all propositions are about how to get something done.


Very little to go on here.

Quoting Leontiskos
Then name the third way instead of being opaque and contentious.


I disputed the first "two ways" by going into detail about the simplicity of thinking that one is right or wrong. That which determines what is right or wrong is part of the argument/discussion. One must strive to be compelling or convincing, rather than right or wrong, even when dealing with truth. A claim found right by means we deem flawed has no value to us.

Quoting Leontiskos
What does it have to do with the OP?


The OP depicts an argument as a tool used in the "pursuit of truth", and good arguments as being necessary for success in that pursuit.

Quoting Leontiskos
I hope the answer would have something to do with truth, knowledge, understanding, or wisdom. We knead dough to bake cookies and we argue to get at these sorts of things.


I am claiming that truths are dependent upon claims and arguments, a good argument creates truth. For instance, if you provide a compelling argument for why "X is immoral", and I'm convinced by it, then it becomes true for me that X is immoral. What is determinative of whether X is immoral or not is still subjective, it still depends on how we interpret it, and perhaps your hypothetical argument addressed that.

Quoting Leontiskos
Your claim that is not at odds with my claim that argument helps us arrive at truth. You're engaging in eristic, and you're not even addressing the OP


I am understanding truth and the relationships between truths and arguments differently than you, and that's part of my criticism of the OP.

Quoting Leontiskos
If you read those two pages and agree that my suggestion would aid the dialogue by introducing more transparency, then you should have a key to the meaning of the OP, which you seem to have misunderstood.


I did as you requested. I'd rather describe your post as a request for clarity, not transparency. What you're asking for is for CreativeSoul to clarify their position because you feel their arguments and reasonings aren't clear. CS seems to be attempting to be as transparent as possible, it could be viewed as unfair and offensive to request they be more transparent.

By the way, though I aspire to disagree with Banno whenever I can, I share his view that truth is a product of language and grammar, the one he is arguing for in this thread. His stance could be a good template for understanding mine.

Quoting Leontiskos
Bad day?


I was in the mood for antagonising, apologies.
baker October 08, 2023 at 19:03 #843903
Quoting Leontiskos
Criticism is of course feared because of its connection with adverse consequences. That is itself a perfectly workable definition of fear: anticipation of future evil.


Dou you think that posting at a public forum should involve no such fear?
Leontiskos October 08, 2023 at 19:47 #843919
Quoting baker
Dou you think that posting at a public forum should involve no such fear?


I said:

Quoting Leontiskos
On the other hand, if an argument is unsound then transparency will only make it easier to see that it is wrong, and no one likes to be wrong. So transparency is a double-edged sword, much like transparent clothing that makes attractive people more attractive and unattractive people more unattractive.


Courage is the ability to overcome fear. If there were no fear, there could be no courage. We often think about courage as overcoming irrational fears, but in fact there are also rational fears that need to be overcome by courage, and this is one of those.

The OP is talking about the fear of criticism that leads people into sophistry and opaque argumentation. There is also a fear of criticism that that leads us to write write quality posts (checking our spelling, proofreading, considering counterarguments, etc.). That latter kind of fear is healthy and praiseworthy.
baker October 08, 2023 at 19:52 #843920
Quoting Leontiskos
but in fact there are also rational fears that need to be overcome by courage, and this is one of those.

The OP is talking about the fear of criticism that leads people into sophistry and opaque argumentation. There is also a fear of criticism that that leads us to write write quality posts (checking our spelling,


How about being aware that your posts here might someday be read by, say, an FBI agent or an IRS agent? Or your boss?
Leontiskos October 08, 2023 at 19:55 #843922
Quoting Leontiskos
The OP is talking about the fear of criticism that leads people into sophistry and opaque argumentation.


Quoting baker
How about being aware that your posts here might someday be read by, say, an FBI agent or an IRS agent? Or your boss?


Well, is that a "fear of criticism that leads people into sophistry and opaque argumentation"?
baker October 08, 2023 at 20:03 #843924
Reply to Leontiskos Of course.

The US Miranda warning:
[i]You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer questions.
If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.[/i]

The equivalent for England and Wales:
You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.


Posters are still citizens and subject to laws.

Leontiskos October 08, 2023 at 23:51 #844032
Quoting Judaka
I was in the mood for antagonising, apologies.


Thanks. That's alright. I'm not sure how long I can carry on this conversation, but let me reply:

Quoting Judaka
There's certainly a relationship between being transparent and giving arguments, but surely it's just that an argument is a prerequisite to transparency.


If X is a prerequisite for Y, then X must be in place before Y can occur. So you seem to be saying that argument must be in place before transparency can occur. But I don't think that's right, because transparency very often occurs without argument. For example, if a wife tells a husband that his father's words have made her sad, she is being transparent and yet there is no argument in sight.

Quoting Judaka
Refusing to give one's reasonings is antithetical to being transparent.


Can some arguments be more transparent than others?

Quoting Judaka
Secondly, you claim that transparency is an essential part of a good argument.


It is an essential part, but that does not mean that transparency is "nothing more than sharing/giving your argument." Likewise, dough is an essential ingredient in cookies, but cookies are more than dough.

Quoting Judaka
I can't remember why I said "By your logic, it isn't", but surely if being transparent means giving your reasons for belief


But "transparent" does not mean "giving your reasons for belief." A dictionary will attest to this.

Quoting Judaka
If I give my argument, my real feelings for why I assert X, then I am being completely transparent, right?


I would say that if you give all of your reasons, motives, intentions, feelings that you have in relation to some proposition, then you are being transparent about your relation to that proposition. But an argument is an attempt to persuade, not just an explanation of why you believe something. So for example, if you give all of these reasons, motives, intentions, and feelings within an argument, the sheer length of the argument may well make it hard to perceive, thus impeding transparency.

Quoting Judaka
As in it requires one to provide arguments and reasonings?


Yes, and clarity of terms, definitions, intention, conclusions, etc.

Quoting Judaka
One must strive to be compelling or convincing, rather than right or wrong, even when dealing with truth.


Right, and in this I think you are only agreeing with the OP. It is basically a paraphrase of the OP. So I'm not sure which part of the OP you believe yourself to be disagreeing with. (And merely listing a bunch of quotes from the OP gives no insight as to what you believe these quotes demonstrate.)

Note that I said that arguments can get at truth in two basic ways: by being right and by being wrong. I never said that persons should aim solely at being right or being wrong (and in any case, who would aim at being wrong?). I said just the opposite: "Arguments don’t exist to make us feel good about ourselves; they exist to help us pursue truth, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom. It is worth paying the price of vulnerability for the sake of truth."

Quoting Judaka
I am claiming that truths are dependent upon claims and arguments, a good argument creates truth. For instance, if you provide a compelling argument for why "X is immoral", and I'm convinced by it, then it becomes true for me that X is immoral. What is determinative of whether X is immoral or not is still subjective, it still depends on how we interpret it, and perhaps your hypothetical argument addressed that.


Yes, I agree.

Quoting Judaka
I am understanding truth and the relationships between truths and arguments differently than you, and that's part of my criticism of the OP.


Then why not do the same thing I asked in that other thread? Say, "Leontiskos believes X. Judaka believes Y. X contradicts Y." Be transparent.

Quoting Judaka
I did as you requested. I'd rather describe your post as a request for clarity, not transparency.


'Clarity' and 'transparency' are synonyms.

Quoting Judaka
CS seems to be attempting to be as transparent as possible, it could be viewed as unfair and offensive to request they be more transparent.


Do you think anyone ever fails at being transparent? The three other participants in that discussion confessed that they did not understand what CS was saying (and that there was therefore a lack of clarity/transparency). I think all three of us presume that an increase in clarity and transparency is not only desirable, but possible.

Quoting Judaka
By the way, though I aspire to disagree with Banno whenever I can...


lol...

Quoting Judaka
I share his view that truth is a product of language and grammar, the one he is arguing for in this thread


That thread is about belief, not truth...?
Judaka October 09, 2023 at 08:40 #844096
Reply to Leontiskos
Quoting Leontiskos
But I don't think that's right, because transparency very often occurs without argument. For example, if a wife tells a husband that his father's words have made her sad, she is being transparent and yet there is no argument in sight.


I was imagining philosophy as the context for my statement, and these things are context-dependent. Transparency in your example isn't the same as the transparency of a government, or the transparency of a business, or the transparency of an interlocutor in philosophy.

What a business is expected to disclose to be transparent is completely different from what a doctor must disclose to be transparent, and so on.

Though the transparency you refer to was never explicitly outlined, as I understood it, the context is of debates and arguments. In a discussion, refusing to give an argument for your beliefs is antithetical to being transparent. Though, now that you've brought up a completely different context as your example, I suspect even you don't have a clear picture of the transparency you're referring to.

Quoting Leontiskos
'Clarity' and 'transparency' are synonyms.


I disagree. Transparency involves being open and honest, disclosing information, and allowing others to access, particularly because you believe they have a right to it. It's useful to hear you think they're synonyms though, since your usage generally felt inappropriate but I couldn't tell exactly why.

Clarity just involves being clear and easy to understand. The goal of clarification is to make the information more accessible and comprehensible. Clarifying involves explaining or simplifying complex or unclear concepts, ideas, or statements to enhance understanding. You're asking CS to clarify their position, to disambiguate it so that others can understand better what they're saying.

Unlike transparency, clarity isn't about disclosing information, it's about the way in which information is conveyed. CS doesn't appear to be failing to disclose anything, they're being open and honest, and so they're being completely transparent. They're just failing to be clear, concise and easy to understand.

Quoting Leontiskos
Can some arguments be more transparent than others?


They can be clearer and easier to understand if that's what you mean. In this context, the term transparency to me, involves disclosing relevant information, like some bias or conflict of interest. For instance, we might be talking about the morality of arranged marriages, and for transparency, I might admit that I'm quite unfamiliar with the subject.

Admitting that weakens my argument, but I felt like it was important to be upfront about it. That's an example of transparency. Outside of disclosing information that would weaken one's position, I don't think arguments themselves can be transparent.

Quoting Leontiskos
Yes, and clarity of terms, definitions, intention, conclusions, etc.


Unless a lack of clarity is motivated by some ulterior motive, the term transparency seems irrelevant.

Quoting Leontiskos
But "transparent" does not mean "giving your reasons for belief." A dictionary will attest to this.


What do you mean, a dictionary will attest to it? Word meaning is context-dependent, I'm referring to "transparent" in the context of your OP. What transparency involves depends on a wide variety of factors. Such as what information should be disclosed, which depends on the context and how "what should be disclosed" is interpreted. It could be broadened further though. I wasn't even referring to my own opinions on the subject, I was referring to how I interpreted the way the OP was using the term.

Quoting Leontiskos
Right, and in this I think you are only agreeing with the OP. It is basically a paraphrase of the OP. So I'm not sure which part of the OP you believe yourself to be disagreeing with.


Well, I interpreted your OP very differently, but if you understand and agree with all of my "criticism", then great. Not sure if there's any point in debating whether the confusion is my fault or yours.

Quoting Leontiskos
Then why not do the same thing I asked in that other thread? Say, "Leontiskos believes X. Judaka believes Y. X contradicts Y." Be transparent.


That's pretty much what all discussions involve, I'm not clear on what you're asking change. Are you arguing for that exact format? For example, you said clarity and transparency are synonyms, I replied and said you're wrong, and gave my reasonings for why I think that. What should I have done differently?

Quoting Leontiskos
That thread is about belief, not truth...?


It's about both. I'm confident the thread contains multiple explanations of how Banno understands the truth. Nonetheless, if you're unaware of his views then don't worry about it. In summary, that which is grammatically and linguistically correct to say is also true. If It's correct to refer to a shape as a triangle, then it's true that shape is a triangle. The rules for the word "triangle" determine when it's correct to refer to a shape as a triangle.

If I believe a shape is a triangle, then I believe it's true that shape is a triangle. "Truth" affirms the conditions for the applicability of the word were met. I may believe the conditions for truth were met, "The clock is working", but upon closer inspection, I realise I was mistaken, and that the clock is broken. The conditions for the clock to be "broken" were met, therefore it was broken.

Say it's because the time isn't moving that I believe the clock is broken, that seems justified, a working clock wouldn't be stuck like that. However, what if the clock only stopped moving because the batteries died? It's probably not correct to say something is broken when it's only not working because it was unpowered, but maybe it's also incorrect to say that an unpowered clock is working. The semantics determine what is and isn't true.

You said earlier:Quoting Leontiskos
You're conflating practical knowledge with truth. Not all propositions are about how to get something done.


In this view, truth is just correct language use, if it's correct to refer to a method as "the best", then it's true that method is the best. The rules for what's best aren't written in a dictionary, they're context-dependent, and they're rules we must establish. It's a complicated topic and my comment's already too long, so I'll wrap up, hopefully you get the gist.

Feel free to select what to respond to or to answer my comments indirectly, in order to move things forward. And respond at your leisure, no rush.
Antony Nickles October 10, 2023 at 04:35 #844386
Quoting Leontiskos
There are two basic ways that an argument can get at truth: by being right and by being wrong. Yet in order for this to work the argument must be seen to be right or wrong... that it be transparent.


I think there is something unrevealed here (perhaps a specific gripe), for which--a now contextless--"transparency" is seen as the answer (which would be ironic). But, in claiming I am right (about the existence of this hidden want), I am not claiming that @Leontiskos is wrong or osbcure (though perhaps blind to themselves), or that I will be arguing that I have the right presumption. I will only assert some possibilities to, in a way, help, I hope, by putting "words in their mouth" (and those perhaps not correct through no fault of mine, as I am here guessing), which is to say, drawing out some possibilities, in investigating what they might be saying before assuming I know what they mean at first glance.

Framing it that one making an argument may not be transparent appears to ignore that someone hearing it may not see the gist--be able to grasp why it is right--not because they have not been shown everything, but because of their own inability to see it, see how it is right (setting aside lack of experience and nature ability). If I try to argue that the quality of reality was created by philosophy out of the desire for certainty, and you can't get past thinking that I mean that nothing is real, is it really my fault in somehow not putting all my cards on the table? That is to say, sometimes "arguments... are opaque and difficult to discern" but not because of me, but because of another's unwillingness see something on someone else's terms, open their mind, map out the implications, account for the possibilities of misunderstanding, etc. This will lead to someone reading (some of) a post with which they are pretty sure they will disagree, finding the one murky point, and throwing out the baby as well. Here there is no offering of grace, which @NotAristotle rightly points out as a lack of humility, but also a lack of collegiality, as we are to be both searching for the truth (imagine Socrates and (some of) his interlocutors). In the Meno, Socrates at one point is basically telling us that we must walk in another's shoes in order to see what they are saying (the basis of Wittgenstein's method of Ordinary Language Philosophy).

Because people sometimes stick their heads up only their own context, not everything can be shown by being direct; sometimes the truth cannot simply be told, or is something that can be merely explained and then known. As if Nietszche and Emerson and Wittgenstein were just bad writers or being mystical or that it is not philosophy but just social commentary or common sense. Sometimes, you must change how you think (not just what you think) in order to understand; Nietzsche said his audience had yet to be born (that you have to turn into someone else to be able to read him). Heidegger can only point the way to Thinking, and you must, as it were, walk through the door into a totally new world, shed your presumptions, turn on the "picture" which holds you captive Wittgenstein says. Sometimes this is just ships passing in the night; sometimes people simply do not share the same interests (beyond when someone just wants to look smart, win, dismiss the other, etc.). And if you have no interest in what I am trying to say, that is fine; philosophy has lots of concerns.

Now, having gotten through my own axes to grind, I may be able to better see what @Leontiskos is getting at (or left unsaid, but let's not quibble). Maybe it is not courageously leaving myself open to misunderstanding, nor is it addressing everything up front that may need to be made intelligible, but it's that some people say things and then do not stand behind them. They are cowards who don't stand still and take their lumps. As our OP author says, if I "could question premises or inferences, the person giving the argument might realize that they are mistaken, etc." So it is not cases where someone says, "Sorry, I meant to say...", or "You're right, I hadn't realized that would mean...", but cases where someone dodges the implications of what they have said. As if I have a “meaning” that I communicate in words, that everyone has their own "perception", that "interpretation" is without context, that you can just retreat to "your opinion" in the pursuit of truth. (Unfortunately talking out of school, but for example there was just no nailing down @RussellA and @schopenhauer1 in a recent discussion of Wittgenstein.)

To say something is to commit to it, to be subject to be read by it, to be responsible to making it intelligible to me, to have to stand behind it, to be held to the implications of it being said to me, here, now, which dictate how it can and cannot be taken (even if there are multiple implications, there is no getting out from under the obligation of its being taken one way or the other). Now of course you CAN slip out, but your word is your bond, as: who you ARE (to be) is bound to your ongoing responsiveness. As Cavell will say, "...if I say truly and appropriately, "You must [mean what you say]" then in a perfectly good sense nothing you then do can prove me wrong. [If I say you must move the queen in diagonal lines, y]ou CAN push the little object called the Queen in many ways, as you can lift it or throw it across the room; not all of these will be moving the Queen [in a game of chess]. Must We Mean What We Say?, p. 31

What I then take the point as, here, is to handle ourselves in a way that provides something for the other to grab onto, of the available options (here @Leontiskos being most interested in right and wrong).
Antony Nickles October 10, 2023 at 16:06 #844510
Quoting Leontiskos
I agree with that, assuming that you mean everything should be out in the open and that there should be no hidden or unacknowledged premises at work in philosophical discussions.
— @Janus

Yes: no concealed premises or motivations, and no lack of clarity about one's position.


I would point out that, although we may try to place what we say in a context of assumptions and contingencies, we cannot think of everything that might apply (although Mill tries), nor can we anticipate the expectations that concern you, nor all the features of the possible (or imagined) contexts that qualify the matter.

Imagining we can reveal all the premises ahead of saying something comes from a picture of argument in a logical vacuum (our desire to make “everything” clear beforehand drives us to an abstracted answer--as with the sophists). The criteria for judging something (its "truth") reveal our shared interests, expectations, possible interpretations, etc., but it is the process of philosophy to draw out those criteria, how we determine what is what (thus Socrates' back and forth trying to get at how we can tell, say, what is good, or knowledge); the conditions and possibilities Kant and Wittgenstein discuss.

This is also seeing the self as something that is complete, constant, and knowable (even setting aside the psychological) rather than as revealed more than I can know in what I say, or even more than I may want. Thus the duty to continued responsiveness, to make myself intelligible, and bound to the implications of what I say.

I would say I should make myself “out in the open” as in ready to "acknowledge" premises you point out are implied, on an ongoing basis.
Leontiskos October 11, 2023 at 02:41 #844679
Quoting Judaka
I was imagining philosophy as the context for my statement, and these things are context-dependent.


So when you said, "it's just that an argument is a prerequisite to transparency," what you meant was apparently either, "it's just that an argument is a prerequisite to transparency-in-the-context-of-philosophy," or else, "it's just that an argument is a prerequisite to transparency-in-the-context-of-philosophical-argument."

If you meant the first, then my exact same objection applies, because not all philosophy-transparency requires argument. If you meant the second, then your claim is tautological, where argument is a prerequisite to some-form-of-argument.

What you probably meant in the first place was that transparency is a prerequisite for argument, and of course that's true in the sense that argument itself carries with it some degree of transparency, but you haven't managed to produce an argument for your view that every argument possesses the exact same level of transparency. If not every argument possesses the exact same level of transparency, then your criticism of the OP fails. Given that you haven't managed to give such an argument, you are failing to be transparent. As the OP notes, you should replace your assertion with an argument, and thereby achieve a greater level of transparency and philosophical rigor.

Quoting Judaka
Transparency in your example isn't the same as the transparency of a government, or the transparency of a business, or the transparency of an interlocutor in philosophy.

What a business is expected to disclose to be transparent is completely different from what a doctor must disclose to be transparent, and so on.

Though the transparency you refer to was never explicitly outlined, as I understood it, the context is of debates and arguments. In a discussion, refusing to give an argument for your beliefs is antithetical to being transparent. Though, now that you've brought up a completely different context as your example, I suspect even you don't have a clear picture of the transparency you're referring to.


Well I am talking about transparency in argument, but "transparency" means transparency. It is a concept that can be applied to all sorts of different contexts, and it retains a similar meaning in each context. That's how words work, and that's why predications have meaning. When I say, "This cat is black," the predicate 'black' has a universal meaning that can be applied to all sorts of different things, and the predication is meaningful precisely because not every cat is black. If you were right and 'black' was entirely context-dependent, then such predications would be meaningless.

When I say, "This argument is transparent," the predicate 'transparent' has a universal meaning that can be applied to all sorts of different things, and the predication is meaningful precisely because not every argument is (equally) transparent. For example, an enthymeme is less transparent than an argument in which every premise is explicitly stated. For a second example, an argument which contains a complex and difficult inference is less transparent than an otherwise identical argument which develops and explicates that inference. So you are still wrong, even if we limit ourselves to the formal characteristics of the arguments themselves and pass over the dispositions of the subjects who are making the arguments.

Finally, we must consider the breadth of the term 'argument'. When someone strolls into a thread and produces a bunch of contentious assertions, we might say that they are arguing or being argumentative, despite the fact that they have not produced any true arguments. Hence my point about moving from (argumentative) assertions to (syllogistic) arguments. So if we think of arguments in a very formal sense, then your claim is still wrong but achieves a shade of plausibility; but if we think of arguments in this sense of "The utterances of people who are arguing with each other," then the claim loses all plausibility. Arguments in this latter sense have an even wider range of transparency than arguments in the former sense, and internet forums are filled with argument in this looser sense.
Leontiskos October 11, 2023 at 03:11 #844690
Quoting Antony Nickles
Framing it that one making an argument may not be transparent appears to ignore that someone hearing it may not see the gist...


This does not follow, and I do not deny that an argument can fall on deaf ears. We should still be transparent in argument, even though arguments can fall on deaf ears.

But you are right to emphasize the other side of the coin. To use a football analogy, I am talking about the virtues of the quarterback and you are bringing up the virtues of the wide receiver. But note that as soon as you respond to a post you have instantly become a quarterback, and transparency is back in the game. So if someone does not understand an argument, an honest response to that effect goes a long ways. And if someone misses your pass then they might be a bad receiver, but if everyone misses your pass then it was a bad pass, and you might be a bad quarterback. (Some folks seem to think they are a baseball pitcher rather than a football quarterback. :grin:)

Quoting Antony Nickles
They are cowards who don't stand still and take their lumps. As our OP author says, if I "could question premises or inferences, the person giving the argument might realize that they are mistaken, etc." So it is not cases where someone says, "Sorry, I meant to say...", or "You're right, I hadn't realized that would mean...", but cases where someone dodges the implications of what they have said.


That part of the OP was about "[Opening up other paths] beyond mere affirmation or denial." Moving from assertions to arguments has this beneficial effect. But I agree with you that people also need to stand behind what they have said.

Quoting Antony Nickles
What I then take the point as, here, is to handle ourselves in a way that provides something for the other to grab onto...


Yes, that is a large part of it.

Quoting Antony Nickles
Imagining we can reveal all the premises ahead of saying something comes from a picture of argument in a logical vacuum...


Yes, I agree. But you seem to have moved from the idea that concealing premises belies a lack of transparency, to the idea that every conceivable premise needs to be set out. That doesn't follow, for an unspoken premise is not necessarily a concealed premise.

Good thoughts. Thanks. :up:
Judaka October 11, 2023 at 07:00 #844729
Reply to Leontiskos
Quoting Leontiskos
If you meant the first, then my exact same objection applies, because not all philosophy-transparency is argument.


My claim was that arguments are a pre-requisite for transparency in philosophy (discussion), not the only pre-requisite or only factor. How can one be transparent in a discussion while refusing to explain their reasons for thinking as they do? "I believe X is immoral!", "Why?", "Well, it just is", how can that ever be described as being transparent?

Quoting Leontiskos
What you probably meant in the first place was that transparency is a prerequisite for argument


I wouldn't know what that meant, but what I will say, is that arguments don't have to contain one's true feelings to be compelling. One can also hide key details and still make a compelling argument. For example, a doctor could try to convince you to use drug X, without telling you that they'd receive financial compensation for prescribing you drug X. The argument could be compelling, but the doctor isn't being transparent. If we're not talking about the one giving the argument being transparent, but the argument itself, that just seems like a misuse of the word to me.

Quoting Leontiskos
The transition from the assertion to the argument makes the reasoning and rationale visible.


The reasons why the doctor wants to prescribe you drug X seem to be the merits he's explicating, but they're concealing the financial motivation, which may be their real motivation. Or you're just happy with any reasoning/rationale?

Quoting Leontiskos
Given that you haven't managed to give such an argument, you are failing to be transparent.


I just didn't give an argument for a position that I don't have, not sure who gets to judge whether my critique of the OP fails or not. I don't imagine you'd be able to explain my critique in a way that satisfied me, and true, that might be more my fault than yours, hard to say. I certainly have given arguments, though we may just be too far apart on language and what the word "transparency" refers to.

Quoting Leontiskos
Well I am talking about transparency in argument, but "transparency" means transparency. It is a concept that can be applied to all sorts of different contexts, and it retains a similar meaning in each context.


What it entails is different according to context, as well as how it's interpreted and understood, as my examples illustrate.

Words are in of themselves assertions, to say someone is being transparent is to assert that they are being transparent. To call a cat black is to assert that that cat is black.

The truth conditions or prerequisites for words mightn't change based on context, such as the word "triangle" which never changes. To correctly assert that something is a triangle requires it to be a shape with three sides, end of story.

The word "transparency" doesn't have such straightforward truth conditions or prerequisites as "triangle".
The rules and meaning change based on the context, because interpretation of the concept and the prerequisites change based on the context. I don't see how you can look at my list of examples and dispute that. A business, a government, a doctor, and an interlocutor on a philosophy forum are not held to the same standards, and the things they must do are completely different.

Where the word is used, who uses it, the context of the usage, and what the speaker was trying to express or accomplish, all of these things influence word meaning.

The word "black" was a poor example. I can think of hundreds of ways to use this word in a way that means something beyond mere colour. While playing chess, is the sentence, "You don't move first since you're black", illogical? It's not, right? Because the context is chess, and you understand the rules of chess, and so you understand the meaning of what's being said. It's the same for the word transparency, depending on what one wants to convey, the meaning of the word and its prerequisites change.

Language is very flexible and adaptable, it allows people to express their own opinions and ideas, and adjust to context. It's easy to miss if you use examples like "triangle", so I'd prefer it if you avoided it.
Fooloso4 October 11, 2023 at 13:40 #844792
Reply to Leontiskos

I am reminded of the following:

Wittgenstein, Culture and Value:When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.


I agree that in general if wish to be understood we we should strive for transparency, but things are not always as clear as we might want them to be. Where there is a lack clarity we should be
transparent about that too.

Quoting Antony Nickles
(our desire to make “everything” clear beforehand drives us to an abstracted answer


Good point.