I prefer the West translation from Four Texts on Socrates, but I cannot vouch for the security of any PDF copies of this translation.
David Horan's new translation of the dialogues might be a good choice. It has the advantage of being available free online.
In the general introduction he says:
I believe that I unconsciously adopted a method that Friedrich Schleiermacher describes in his great essay On the Different Methods of Translating. Here he subordinates the common designation of translations as being either faithful translations or free translations to a division that is more relevant to philosophic works. He writes:
Either the translator leaves the writer in peace as much as possible and moves the reader toward him; or he leaves the reader in peace as much as possible and moves the writer toward him.[1]
If I were to attempt to capture the overall aspiration of these translations, I would say that they aim to move the reader toward Plato rather than leaving the reader in peace and adjusting the writings of Plato, and his associated language, to conform with modern expectations.
I think the Horan translation might be a better choice for the discussion, but you might find West's translation and notes worth reading and having. I will keep a copy beside me and compare it to Horan.
Another advantage of Horan is that quoting the text by copy and paste is much easier.
I think the Horan translation might be a better choice for the discussion, but you might find West's translation and notes worth reading and having. I will keep a copy beside me and compare it to Horan.
Another advantage of Horan is that quoting the text by copy and paste is much easier.
Ok. I'll go ahead and order the West translation, but we can stick to the Horan for the convenience. Cool!
A little introduction: Crito is a Platonic dialog that's about how the individual relates to society in terms of law and justice. If you receive an unjust verdict from your society, what should you do? Run away? Or face it?
This dialog is traditionally accepted as a legitimate work of Plato, but one in which the real Socrates is allowed to speak. The first time I read it, I found it to be kind of heartbreaking.
Reply to frank If you use the keyboard shortcut Ctrl+C after highlighting it copies to your clipboard and can be pasted here. (At least, that worked for me when I tested it)
Crito: It seems all too clear but, dearest Socrates, even at this stage heed me, and save yourself. For if you die it is not just a single misfortune for me. No, quite apart from being deprived of a friend, the like of whom I shall never find again, many people who do not know you and me at all well will think that I did 44C not care enough to spend some money to save you. And what reputation could be more disgraceful than this, a reputation for setting higher value on money than on friends? For most people will not believe that you yourself were unwilling to leave this place, although we were willing to help.
Soc: But bless you, Crito, why does popular opinion concern us so much? The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration, will believe that we acted exactly as we should have acted.
Crito: 44D But, Socrates, surely you can see that it is indeed necessary to care about popular opinion? The very situation we are now in demonstrates that, if someone is discredited in their eyes, the multitude can do harm, not only on the smallest of scales, but well-nigh the greatest harm of all.
Soc: I really wish the multitude were able to do the greatest harm, Crito, so that they might also be able to do the greatest good, and all would be well. As it is, they are not able to do either, for they cannot make someone either wise or foolish, and they do whatever occurs to them.
There's a tug-of-war going on about popular opinion. Crito says we have to "care" what others think, and I'd fill out his thought with: conform to what others want you to be, because the crowd is dangerous, and at worst, they'll kill you for failing to satisfy their expectations.
Socrates denies that the crowd has the greatest power, which in his view is the power to render others either wise or foolish.
one in which the real Socrates is allowed to speak.
For much of the dialogue he speaks on behalf of the city and its laws. He simply accepts these arguments. This is uncharacteristic. Taking the part of the city and says:
...you make such a habit of asking and answering questions. (50c)
but now he is silent. Two reasons for this might be, first, that he has deliberately avoided politics and so chose not take part in the making and changing of laws, and second, he is not a rhetorician.
...a rhetorician, might have a lot to say about the subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme. (50b)
Socrates' civic mindedness is evident, but he is not speaking in his own name, and this leaves open the question of the extent to which his own opinions coincide with that of city.
There's a tug-of-war going on about popular opinion.
Athens was a democratic regime. Socrates was convicted by a majority decision. His low opinion of public opinion, raises questions about how wise he thought the city and its laws actually were. And yet Socrates defends the city and its laws and abides by them.
one in which the real Socrates is allowed to speak.
frank
For much of the dialogue he speaks on behalf of the city and its laws
I meant that this has traditionally been thought to be about Socrates' real views as opposed to Plato's. The Republic, Phaedo, and Phaedrus are commonly thought to be expressions of Plato's views rather than Socrates'. Of course there isn't anything about Plato that's pinned down. At one time or another the authenticity of every work attributed to him has been questioned by some historian.
For much of the dialogue he speaks on behalf of the city and its laws.
Right, as the dialog emerges, we'll find that Socrates is a strong advocate of the rule of law (although we could ponder whether that's the right way to put it.) We can compare and contrast other prominent views, like the Stoic view. It comes down to how one thinks about one's place in society.
We can see from the beginning of the dialog that the concept of individuality is in clear view, since it seems perfectly reasonable to Crito and his friends that Socrates should reject the judgement and run. That concept of individuality probably won't be eclipsed again until the middle ages.
Athens was a democratic regime. Socrates was convicted by a majority decision. His low opinion of public opinion, raises questions about how wise he thought the city and its laws actually were. And yet Socrates defends the city and its laws and abides by them.
So we'll look into his reasons for abiding by the law and discuss whether this is a proto-form of social contract theory.
Grateful for this discussion. I like to read slowly, all the better to understand and appreciate.
Therefore, my comments will lag behind. Hope you don't mind.
Crito has arrived to visit Socrates and they discuss his coming execution.
It is interesting to read the dialogue in the Introduction. It sets the scene and is quite telling as to the role and character of Crito. The very title of the dialogue.
Socrates: 43A Why have you arrived at this hour, Crito? Isnt it still early?
Crito: It certainly is.
Soc: What time is it, then?
Crito: Just before dawn.
Soc: I am surprised the prison guard was willing to answer the door for you.
Crito: He knows me well at this stage, Socrates, because I visit the place so often and, whats more, I have done him a favour.
Crito is an old, loyal friend of Socrates, a regular visitor and anxious to help. He bribes the prison guard to let him in early. The reader sees him as a good guy but perhaps with questionable or flexible morals.
the name Crito comes from the Greek meaning "discern" or "judge". (This is noted in West's translation.)
Interesting, then, we can ask about whether he lives up to his name.
Discernment: the quality of being able to grasp and comprehend what is obscure : skill in discerning/
I love the humour of Socrates when Crito explains why he didn't wake him earlier:
C: ...I am also amazed at you, when I notice how sweetly you sleep, and I deliberately refrained from waking you so that you might pass the time as pleasantly as possible.
And on many previous occasions, all through your life, I have noted your happy disposition, especially now that I see how easily and calmly you are bearing this present misfortune.
Soc: Actually, Crito, it would be most odd, at my age, to be troubled because I now had to die.
He had a premonition in his dream - 'perhaps when you decided not to wake me' that the day of execution is to take place within 2 or 3 days.
Just another note before moving on, it's good to remember the circumstances in which Socrates was accused of impiety and misguiding the youth of the city. Athens has just lost a war. With hindsight, we know Athens will never fully recover from this loss. The citizens became demoralized and turned to scapegoating.
They've always been irritated by Socrates, but now their feelings have turned to intolerance. There is a sort of blind madness to their desire to punish Socrates.
There's a tug-of-war going on about popular opinion. Crito says we have to "care" what others think, and I'd fill out his thought with: conform to what others want you to be, because the crowd is dangerous, and at worst, they'll kill you for failing to satisfy their expectations.
Crito's offer is to help Socrates escape from jail.
This in itself would break the law. A questionable act. How would it help?
We can examine the words in the dialogue.
Crito's arguments as to why Socrates should escape from prison.
Then Socrates' analysis or response.
How many arguments are there, how convincing are they, and the responses given by Socrates.
The first seems more about Crito, his loss of a friend and reputation; it sounds selfish:
No, quite apart from being deprived of a friend, the like of whom I shall never find again, many people who do not know you and me at all well will think that I did not care enough to spend some money to save you. And what reputation could be more disgraceful than this, a reputation for setting higher value on money than on friends?
This Socrates finds irrelevant. Crito shouldn't be concerned with the opinions of others.
Crito points out that it is very powerful; it can kill. As seen in Socrates current position.
Crito is willing to spend a substantial amount of money to arrange the escape. And beyond that.
Via corruption? I can't see Socrates agreeing to that. Why would his friend?
Socrates was convicted by a majority decision. His low opinion of public opinion, raises questions about how wise he thought the city and its laws actually were. And yet Socrates defends the city and its laws and abides by them.
We can see from the beginning of the dialog that the concept of individuality is in clear view
Speaking on behalf of the city Socrates raises the problem of the relationship between the city and the family as well. I will hold off saying more until we look at that speech more closely.
Interesting, then, we can ask about whether he lives up to his name.
He accepts Socrates' speech on behalf of the city without question. But it does raise questions.
... at my age ...
Note Crito's response. He does have some capacity for discernment:
But, Socrates, other men of your age have been overtaken by similar misfortunes, yet their age does not free them from being troubled over their predicament.
(43c)
Commentators have speculated as to why Socrates did not defend himself at trial. One common explanation has to do with his advanced age.
Note Crito's response. He does have some capacity for discernment:
Indeed. Perhaps, as a long-term and good friend, he was 'ready' for Socrates' reply. Has Socrates talked of his age before; how it factored into his decision not to defend himself?
He accepts Socrates' speech on behalf of the city without question.
I'm not there yet but thanks for the heads-up.
I think it would be helpful to follow the discussion if the various arguments were numbered or named?
As in a kind of Contents page, showing where they arise in the Dialogue.
Crito shouldn't be concerned with the opinions of others.
But given what has happened to Socrates, he should be. Crito makes this point:
But, Socrates, surely you can see that it is indeed necessary to care about popular opinion? The very situation we are now in demonstrates that, if someone is discredited in their eyes, the multitude can do harm, not only on the smallest of scales, but well-nigh the greatest harm of all.
(44d)
Socrates' concerns lie elsewhere:
I really wish the multitude were able to do the greatest harm, Crito, so that they might also be able to do the greatest good, and all would be well. As it is, they are not able to do either, for they cannot make someone either wise or foolish, and they do whatever occurs to them.
@frank Perhaps we can see here one way in which Plato's views differ from Socrates'. Since Socrates did not write his influence was more limited than Plato's. Plato did not simply write, he wrote in a way that heeded Crito's warning to care about the opinion of the many. He did this in two connected ways. He presents a salutary teaching that even though it did not make one wise it helped shape the opinions of the many. He also left some things unsaid that
The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration
(44c)
might discern through careful reading and interpretation.
In this way Plato mitigates against Socrates concern that the written word does not take into consideration who it is addressing and so cannot say what is most appropriate for different readers to hear.
Socrates sought to benefit his friends without harming others. Plato wrote for posterity.
This [argument] Socrates finds irrelevant. Crito shouldn't be concerned with the opinions of others. Crito points out that it is very powerful; it can kill. As seen in Socrates current position.
Crito is willing to spend a substantial amount of money to arrange the escape. And beyond that.
Via corruption? I can't see Socrates agreeing to that. Why would his friend?
1. Personal Argument: 44c-44d
https://www.platonicfoundation.org/crito/
I really wish the multitude were able to do the greatest harm, Crito, so that they might also be able to do the greatest good, and all would be well. As it is, they are not able to do either, for they cannot make someone either wise or foolish, and they do whatever occurs to them.
Don't the majority also have a sense of morality and justice?
I think I see what you mean. If it's not the right or wisest kind, it can be shaped by teaching.
'Crito' is Plato's Dialogue and long-term project:
Since Socrates did not write his influence was more limited than Plato's. Plato did not simply write, he wrote in a way that heeded Crito's warning to care about the opinion of the many. He did this in two connected ways. He presents a salutary teaching that even though it did not make one wise it helped shape the opinions of the many. He also left some things unsaid that
The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration
(44c)
might discern through careful reading and interpretation.
Ah, but wait...is this teaching is only for those already deemed 'the best'...?
It bears repeating and underlying. It will come up again. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the fate of philosophy then and now relies on knowing how to navigate through the dangers.
Are they more likely than the popular majority to carry out the greatest good? How much influence do they have? (philosophers?)
Neither the philosopher nor the people are able to carry out the greatest good, but only the philosopher takes seriously the question of what the greatest good is.
As what we are doing makes evident, Plato continues to have a great deal of influence. Some might say that this is to the detriment of philosophy, but others see it as a way for philosophy to once again find its way.
Ah, but wait...is this teaching is only for those already deemed 'the best'...?
It is a self-selective process. Most have no interest or patience to work through the arguments, and so, if they do have this interest and are of moderate temperament will match with my suggestion above about who the best people might be.
erhaps we can see here one way in which Plato's views differ from Socrates'. Since Socrates did not write his influence was more limited than Plato's. Plato did not simply write, he wrote in a way that heeded Crito's warning to care about the opinion of the many. He did this in two connected ways. He presents a salutary teaching that even though it did not make one wise it helped shape the opinions of the many. He also left some things unsaid that
The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration
(44c)
might discern through careful reading and interpretation.
In this way Plato mitigates against Socrates concern that the written word does not take into consideration who it is addressing and so cannot say what is most appropriate for different readers to hear.
Socrates sought to benefit his friends without harming others. Plato wrote for posterity.
So we'll look into his reasons for abiding by the law and discuss whether this is a proto-form of social contract theory.
That is an interesting observation. Plato does talk about how the relationships between classes and skills compose a city. The Republic presents the idea of building one from scratch. And that brings out some of the problems of inheriting what we have.
In that regard, I have long thought the following passage in Crito to be the most striking:
Harmon, 53C: But what if you avoid the well-regulated cities, and the men who are most orderly? But if you do this, will you have any reason to live on? Or will you associate with these people and, without any shame, discuss what propositions, Socrates? The same ones you discuss here, that excellence and justice, regulations and the laws, are of the utmost value to people? And dont you think that the conduct 53D of Socrates will appear unseemly? You should think so.
I read this to say Socrates is owned by the City to the extent he has the power to be Socrates. The Republic is not only a start-up idea where policies can be argued about but is the element bringing the new City into life.
So, not either a Hobbes or Rousseau point of view.
But just tell me, if you escape from here are you concerned for me and for your other associates, in case the informers make trouble for us and we have to forfeit all our property, or incur a large fine, or suffer some worse fate at their hands? For if you are afraid of any such outcome, bid it farewell, for it is only right that we run these risks to save you, and even greater risks if necessary. So, heed me and just do as I say.
Then more forcefully, arguments related to:
Allowing his enemies to win by destroying him; and then his obligations to sons and friends.
Basically, he accuses Socrates of betrayal and cowardice. 45d-46a.
[b] And I think you are choosing the easy way out, when you should choose whatever a good and courageous man would choose, especially when you spend your entire life speaking of concern for excellence.
So, I am ashamed both on your behalf and on behalf of ourselves, your associates, lest this entire situation in which you are involved may seem to have developed because of some cowardice on our part:[/b] the fact that the action went to court when it was possible that it not go to court, how the trial of the action itself unfolded, and to cap it all, as the most absurd aspect of the matter, people will think that an opportunity escaped us, due to our own baseness and cowardice, since we did not save you, nor did you save yourself, when we were well able to do so if we were of any use at all. So beware, Socrates, in case these matters bring not just evil upon yourself and others, but disgrace too. So make your decision.
[emphasis added]
To take it to these extremes, we can see Crito's passion to save Socrates from death.
He sees a contradiction, a lack of consistency in Socrates - isn't Socrates being a hypocrite, given his 'concern for excellence'?
He begs Socrates not only to think of himself but family and friends.
[As if Socrates hasn't already considered his duties to family]
Did it not matter if his enemies would win by this capitulation and cowardice?
How will Socrates respond?
How different are his values and life/death philosophy from those of Crito?
Haven't they previously discussed such issues of harm, judgement and justice...and more?
How does Crito not know Socrates? Has he learned nothing?!
Or is his own fear (of death?) clouding his judgement?
Reply to Amity
I think there is an expression of fear in Crito's argument here. There is also an element of corruption being suggested. The dialogue begins with Crito noting he bribed the jail keeper to get in early. Is the disgrace Crito fears a loss of power at the same time?
The discussion of cowardice reminds me of the following from Cratylus:
What remains to consider after justice? I think we have not yet discussed courage. [413e] It is plain enough that injustice (??????) is really a mere hindrance of that which passes through (??? ?????????, but the word ?????? (courage) implies that courage got its name in battle, and if the universe is flowing, a battle in the universe can be nothing else than an opposite current or flow (???). Now if we remove the delta from the word ???????, the word ?????? signifies exactly that activity. Of course it is clear that not the current opposed to every current is courage, but only that opposed to the current which is contrary to justice;
Socrates is using the vocabulary of Heraclitus and connects "manliness" to the willingness to leap into battle against a 'current' that needs to be opposed.
In fact, one should either not beget children at all, or else face the difficulties of rearing and educating them.
(45d)
This should be compared to what, in Socrates words, the city claims regarding education and rearing. It may seem like a minor point but it has direct bearing on the question of what his responsibility to the city is based on the claim of what it is responsible for.
Crito is not able to give a better argument for why Socrates should not comply with the court's decision. Can we?
Sure. The court in this case is the judicial arm of a democracy. A democracy is like a ship whose owner has been tricked and manipulated into giving the helm over to sailors who know nothing about navigation. This ship of fools is more likely to end up at the bottom of the Aegean than any where close to where the owner wanted it to go. Where did I hear that argument? :razz:
Since democracies are poorly run, there's no obligation to adhere to their judgments.
I think there is an expression of fear in Crito's argument here. There is also an element of corruption being suggested. The dialogue begins with Crito noting he bribed the jail keeper to get in early. Is the disgrace Crito fears a loss of power at the same time?
Yes, perhaps all of the above and more. A fascinating story. One that I will have to leave for a few days - for a sunny September break.
[s]If/[/s]when Socrates dies, what will Crito do? He will grieve his sad loss.
Without his good friend and mentor, who will keep his thinking straight? What or who will follow?
Socrates will not leave him without talking things through, perhaps with wise words to hold on to.
Will that console Crito? Will he be convinced or let things lie in peace as Socrates desires?
Can you imagine the emotional charge in this prison setting? Intense. This long goodbye.
There's quite a lot to be getting on with, isn't there? Crito is a piece of work!
There is. I've read this dialog a couple of times. I'm rereading it thinking about what it says about normativity: Crito is giving all sorts of das Man type reasons to ignore the court's judgement and sentence. If the crowd gives us ethical normativity, then Crito is right. But the court is part of the foundation of the lives of the members of the crowd. The court is ordained, so to speak, remember the law court is a gift of Athena. The court helps us avoid mob action, so it's about stopping to think things through. The court means our judgments at least have a change to be tempered by reason. So Crito is advising Socrates to forget about rationality.
Except the whole situation shows that the court can be subverted by passions of the day, like with McCarthy. So where does that leave us? It's not the crowd, it's not reason. Then where is normativity really coming from? And since I'm applying all of this to normativity as it related to meaning, Crito suggests that meaning doesn't arise from the whims of the crowd, it doesn't arise from rationality. So from where? With the last two points, Kripke would agree. Meaning is not conventional if we define that as rule following. There is nothing in the world, all the way down to the intimacies of mental states that constitutes rule following in our communication, which is wild.
So if you haven't read Crito before, feel free to read further along. We'll catch up.
For those interested in where, Socrates presents this image in the Republic 488a in support of his argument that the philosophers should rule.
For the sake of the argument I am going to put aside the historical question and treat Plato's Socrates as the same man who defends Athenian democracy in the Crito and criticizes democracy elsewhere.
With this in mind, we can conclude that Socrates is not persuaded by this argument. In the argument he makes in the Crito he is silent on the fact that Athens is a democracy. It is the laws of the city that he must answer to (50a). Although not mentioned by name, the Athenian lawgiver the "wise Solon", stand above the multitude as one capable of doing great things, and thus as one to be heeded.
Solon was no longer alive and could not address Socrates, but the wise laws he established can. The question arises as to the status of those laws and their administration. In more general terms the question is whether the claims Socrates makes on behalf of the laws hold up to critical examination.
I think Socrates gives us reason to think they don't. I will address some of them, but first, if this is right, if the city and the laws are not as just as he makes them out to be, why does he think it is still his duty to obey them?
I've read this dialog a couple of times. I'm rereading it thinking about what it says about normativity: Crito is giving all sorts of das Man type reasons to ignore the court's judgement and sentence
OK. Then you already have a firm grasp of Crito and at a deeper level.
[I need to know more about 'Normativity', a quick google:
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/normativity/v-1]
So if you haven't read Crito before, feel free to read further along. We'll catch up.
Unfortunately, I need to leave the discussion for about 5dys.
You guys are providing food for thought. It's all good! Will see if I can add anything later...
Unfortunately, I need to leave the discussion for about 5dys.
You guys are providing food for thought. It's all good! Will see if I can add anything later...
In the argument he makes in the Crito he is silent on the fact that Athens is a democracy.
Plato does make one comment that connects to other texts. The following from Crito :
Soc: I really wish the multitude were able to do the greatest harm, Crito, so that they might also be able to do the greatest good, and all would be well.
Stranger: Then again, just as few are intermediate between one and many, so the rule of the not many should be regarded accordingly as intermediate in both respects. The rule of the many, for its part, is weak in every respect and, in comparison with the others, is capable neither of great good nor of great evil, because public offices therein are distributed in minute subdivisions to many people. Therefore, when all of the constitutions are lawful, this proves to be the worst of them, and when they are all at variance with the law, it is the best, 303B and when all of them lack restraint, the life in a democracy wins out, but when they are orderly, this is the last one you should live in. But life in the first is by far the best, with the exception of the seventh, for we must separate that one from all of the other constitutions, as we would separate a god from human beings.
The seventh one is that of the Philosopher King. It is deemed the best but most unlikely to ever appear:
ibid. 301c:Str: So we are saying that a tyrant arises in this way, a king too, and an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy; from the disgust of humanity with that one sole ruler, and their disbelief that anyone worthy of such rule could ever arise; someone who would be willing and able to rule with knowledge and excellence, 301D dispensing just and sacred ordinances properly to everyone, rather than maltreating, murdering and inflicting evil upon whomsoever he wants, whenever he wants. But if a person such as we are describing were to arise, he would be loved, and would dwell there as the benevolent helmsman of what is, strictly speaking, the only proper constitution.
To your point regarding the rule of law, Plato distinguishes between good and bad forms of the regimes accordingly:
Statesman, translated by J.K. Skemp:Stranger: Under the rule of one we get kingly rule and tryanny; under the rule of the few, as we said, come the auspicious form of it, aristocracy and also oligarchy. As for the subdividing of democracy, though we gave both forms of it previously, we must now treat is as twofold.
Young Socrates: How is this: How can it be divided?
Stranger: By the same division as the others, even though the word 'democracy' to be doing double duty. Rule according to law is as possible under democracy as under the other constitutions.
The distinction between regimes raises problems for Socrates' song. The city and laws ask:
... do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?
(50b)
The key phrase here is "just enactment". Here he ignores the distinction between just and unjust cities and laws. He states that he refuses to play the part of the rhetorician who:
... might have a lot to say about the subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme.
(50b)
but does take the part of the rhetorician in his defense of the city and its laws. Like the rhetorician his concern does not seem to be with the truth but with being persuasive. He even asks Crito:
Are the laws speaking the truth, or not?
(51c)
The best argument here is not the one that is true but the one that will persuade him to be obedient to the law. A noble lie may be preferable to the truth.
That leaves open the question of whether this should be the case in all regimes, even the most unjust. Should judgments always stand supreme? Is the fact that the city can be overthrown if the laws are not obeyed sufficient reason to obey?
Reply to Fooloso4
The role of rhetoric may not lead to a 'truth' that cannot be put into question by facts. Crito does, however, put a lot of emphasis on distinguishing persuasion from coercion. Socrates ties his argument with Crito to his argument with Athens:
ibid. 48d:Soc: Lets consider this together, good man, and if you are able to contradict 48E what I am saying in any way, do so, and I shall heed you. Otherwise, at this stage, blessed man, please stop presenting the same argument to me over and over, that I need to get out of here without the permission of the Athenians, for it is very important to me that I do all this with your approval and not against your will.
And that picture of coercion is said to destroy what was formerly trying to be saved:
ibid. 50a:Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? Do you have anything else in mind, for your part, than to destroy us, the laws, and the entire city too, by 50B your plan of action?"
The emphasis upon persuasion is twice compared with coercion in the following:
ibid. 51a:Or have you, as wise as you are, overlooked the following facts: that your homeland is more worthy of respect than your mother or father or all of your other ancestors, and is more august, and sacred, 51B and more exalted in status, in the eyes of the gods, and of men of intelligence; that when your homeland is angry she should be revered, obeyed and assuaged, even more than an angry father, and you should either persuade her otherwise, or do as she commands, and suffer in silence if she prescribes any suffering by being beaten or imprisoned; that if she sends you to war to be wounded or slain, this is what you must do, for justice consists in this, and you must not surrender or withdraw or desert your post; that in war, in a courtroom, or anywhere else, you must do what your city and your homeland commands, or else persuade 51Cher as to where justice lies; that it is unholy to use force against your father or mother, but much more so against your homeland?
This does not answer your question of when judgements should (or should not) "stand supreme'. And the account does employ the 'noble lie' of our birthplace being said to be prior to our parents. But maybe persuasion has its own laws. Socrates claiming rights within certain conditions.
Reply to frank
In so far as I understand Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein, the rule following aspect of language games is seen as troubling the view that such games involve the description of facts.
I see how that engages the theories of Quine, Davidson, Chomsky, etcetera. But I don't understand how that implicates the treatment of facts in law.
And if this is the case, do you think that justice between you and us is on an equal basis, and that you are justified in retaliating against anything we set about doing to you?
(50e)
This is straight out of Aristophanes' Clouds, where Pheidippides beats his father Strepsiades. (1330) Here persuasion and coercion are comically joined.
Is the distinction always clear? If I can persuade you by making the weaker argument stronger, isn't that a form of coercion? Note how the song of the law, as I think you pointed out, demands submission.
Reply to Fooloso4
From 48-50 Socrates addresses Crito's argument that it's right to flee because so many aspects of public opinion support it. Socrates points out that we usually only pay attention to worthy opinions, which are those which aim to improve our lives (little bit of consequentialism). He asks a couple of times if adults suddenly change their values when the shit hits the fan and execution awaits.
One of the threads running through 48-50 is the question of whether the ends justify the means. Per Socrates, only children live that way.
In so far as I understand Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein, the rule following aspect of language games is seen as troubling the view that such games involve the description of facts.
Not to put too fine a point on it, but Kripke's point is that it ends up being an empty claim that communication involves rule following. This idea that we follow rules when we speak is an interesting hypothesis. It's not something supported by any facts (of the kind Kripke specifies).
Reply to Fooloso4
I cannot argue that the distinction is always clear. The Aristophanes reference is well taken.
I admire Thomas Paine, as my forum handle suggests. His arguments for democracy are in tune with the problem of absolute power as described in Statesman. I wonder if our present condition is one where we cannot distinguish the regimes so clearly. Maybe the tyrannical, the oligarchs, and the dynamic of unfortunate public opinion coexist simultaneously.
It is interesting that you mention Thomas Paine. On the one hand Socrates might have regarded him as someone whose opinions in general should be considered, but his efforts, as an Englishman to become independent, would not have persuaded the law. We are servants of the city and its law, as Socrates speaking for it, demands.
As you point out, not all cities and all laws are the same. But Socrates said he found no fault with the Athenian laws of marriage or the education he received. (50-e) And yet, Socrates own teachings were deemed contrary to those of the city.
I wonder if our present condition is one where we cannot distinguish the regimes so clearly.
Our democratic republic is by design a mixed regime. In practice there is always the danger of it becoming something else. This raises the question of whether when the city and its laws devolve what allegiance do we still owe to it?
if she sends you to war to be wounded or slain, this is what you must do, for justice consists in this
(51b)
Earlier Socrates said that:
Presumably because doing harm to people is no different from acting unjustly.
(49c)
How much weight should we put on presumably? (West translates this as "surely") Is the presumption wrong?
He goes on to ask:
In leaving this place without having convinced the city, are we doing harm, even to those we should harm least of all?
(49e)
Socrates concern is twofold. Doing harm to people and doing harm to the city. By doing harm to the city he would be doing harm to the people of the city. By obeying the city, however, he would be doing harm to the enemy, which, according to what has been said, would be unjust.
In the Euthyphro a similar tension occurs. Euthyphro prosecutes his father on behalf of the gods. Although both dialogues are about justice, here there is no mention of either the laws or the city. In the Crito there is no mention of piety. In the Crito the laws are our master, here the gods are our master. In both there is the question of who is harmed by what is being proposed to be done.
Reply to Fooloso4
The surrounding of a city seems to be bound up with what it is. The in between places are the premise of many wars. Outside the boundaries, as it is often described, is either a material claim or an existential struggle as Hegel described.
Or do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?
(50b)
Would it be that there would be no city or would it become a different city, one with laws without their just enactment, or a city without law?
Put differently, is it a question of justice or survival? If, as the laws claim, the citizens are its servants or slaves, then what part does justice serve? Isn't justice replaced by obedience? Would it still the same city, still a democratic regime?
Contrary to the way Socrates frames it, the city in question is not just "any city". It is one whose laws are said to be enacted justly. The problem, however, is not simply justice but the force needed to prevent the law from being overthrown. Although Socrates talks as if it is a matter of persuasion, of convincing the city, that too would be a:
subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme.
Philosophy poses a threat to the city. Socrates is silenced by force. The law proclaims that he does not stand on an equal footing with the law. To convince them would require doing the very thing they want to prevent him from doing, that is, philosophizing.
Added: West's translation has "judgments" and the following note:
The words "judgments" and "trials" in this speech render the Greekdikai, the plural of dike, "justice".
In effect the claim is that the judgment of the law is just because it is the judgment of the law. But, of course, even the personification of the laws should not obscure the fact that the judgment was that of the many.
Or do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?
(50b)
Would it be that there would be no city or would it become a different city, one with laws without their just enactment, or a city without law?
The laws say:
50C:Socrates, dont be surprised at the question, just answer it, since you make such a habit of asking and answering questions. Come on,you are attempting to destroy ourselves and the city. On what grounds?"
This is stated in the context of the claim that Socrates wouldn't have been born without the law. He was raised and flourished in the stability provided by the city. I'd add that city was an integral part of identities of Athenian citizens. In a number of ways, the citizens and the city are inextricable. You can't really have an Athenian without an Athens and vice versa. Since it was a democracy, rule of law was also inseparable from the city.
So the point was that by breaking the city's law, Socrates would be undermining the foundation of his own existence. Quoting Fooloso4
Put differently, is it a question of justice or survival? If, as the laws claim, the citizens are its servants or slaves, then what part does justice serve? Isn't justice replaced by obedience? Would it still the same city, still a democratic regime?
Well, you have to survive in order to act justly. This represents a challenge to any ideology, for instance if I'm a conservative and I stand against change, it would behoove me to recognize that sometimes societies need to evolve and standing against that is to oppose life itself. If my choice is between my beautiful conservative values and the very life of my society, which do I choose?
But the challenge is even more acute for an ideology that aims to destroy the existing social order without any plan for an alternative, which I think fairly describes the average leftist perspective.
But on a more materialistic note, historians claim that the very idea of living alone beyond the safety of a city was unthinkable for the average Greek. So if Socrates leaves, it certainly wouldn't be to wander. It would be to find another home in a city.
Philosophy poses a threat to the city. Socrates is silenced by force. The law proclaims that he does not stand on an equal footing with the law. To convince them would require doing the very thing they want to prevent him from doing, that is, philosophizing.
Socrates was blamed for Athens' defeat at the hands of the Spartans. He had previously publicly lauded the Spartan way of life, which probably wasn't the smartest thing to do. He irritated the crap out of the Athenians, so he became a target. More philosophizing probably wouldn't have helped. Our own local Socrates is @Banno. Imagine that he's now being tried for corrupting the minds of the youth. It's that kind of thing.
This is stated in the context of the claim that Socrates wouldn't have been born without the law.
Good point. The law says:
... didnt we bring you to birth (West: beget), since through us your father married your mother and begot you (West: bring you forth through us).
(50d)
The question of paternity and paternalism becomes even more evident in the West translation when later in the same speech when the laws refer several times to the "fatherland". Horan translates it as homeland.
The speech of the laws should be compared to what Socrates says in the Apology:
Men of Athens, I embrace you and I love you, but I shall heed the god rather than you, and as long as I am alive, and able to do so, I shall not cease engaging in philosophy
(29c)
For I know full well that wherever I go, the young people will listen to what I say, just as they do here ...
(37d)
Whatever allegiance he might have to the city, when it comes to philosophy he will not be obedient to it. According to the laws, to do so would be to subvert the judgment of the law, and thus would be to act unjustly. But Socrates says he would never knowingly do harm or act unjustly.
Note that at 29c he is addressing the men of Athens. At best only a few
whose opinions are more worthy of consideration
(44c)
It is the opinion of the men of Athens that Socrates is doing harm to the young people. His disobedience suggests that he thinks that whatever harm and injustice to the city and its laws his disobedience may cause, the suppression of philosophy is a greater harm.
t is the opinion of the men of Athens that Socrates is doing harm to the young people. His disobedience suggests that he thinks that whatever harm and injustice to the city and its laws his disobedience may cause, the suppression of philosophy is a greater harm.
But he wasn't disobedient. He stayed and drank the hemlock.
But the challenge is even more acute for an ideology that aims to destroy the existing social order without any plan for an alternative, which I think fairly describes the average leftist perspective.
The description is of a revolutionary ideology, so people like Bolsheviks, Chinese and American communists, etc., and of course anyone who sympathizes with that crowd.
But he wasn't disobedient. He stayed and drank the hemlock.
This is something we need to try and make sense of. In order to do so, I think we need to go back to the problem of the greatest good and the greatest harm.
As it is, they [the multitude] are not able to do either [the greatest harm or greatest good], for they cannot make someone either wise or foolish ...
(44d)
It would seem that the laws they make cannot either. For if they could Socrates would have been able to find one or more in Athens who are wise. As we know from the Apology, he did not.
Socrates' concern with the greatest good led to the rejection of the laws as the greatest good. He puts the pursuit of wisdom above the law. The laws can vary from place to place, but the truth does not. For Socrates living well, that is, living the examined life, was a greater good than simply living; and the threat to philosophy a greater harm than the threat to his life. The end of his life would not be the end of philosophy.
The law cannot make one wise, but perhaps the pursuit of wisdom can lead to making wiser laws. In the Apology Socrates says:
... anyone who is actually fighting on the side of justice and who intends to be safe, even for a short time, must act privately rather than publicly.
(32a)
If the men who make laws are to be persuaded it would not be through political speech and action, but by the very thing they are trying to prevent Socrates from doing. By silencing Socrates they harm themselves for they lose the opportunity to be made wiser.
The law claims:
... you have agreed, by your actions if not by your words, to live as a citizen in accordance with us
(52d)
As Socrates pointed out in the Apology, it was not until now that his philosophical pursuits are being judged to be illegal. The argument could be turned around. For much of his life, doing what he does and saying what he says was not prevented by the law. By its actions or lack of action the law agreed to allow him to engage in philosophy.
Crito's attempt to persuade him to flee comes too late. We can only speculate as why Socrates did not choose exile. In the Apology (37d) he says it is because the same thing would happen, the young people will listen to him and this will lead to banishment by their fathers and relations. (37e) He does not say the fatherland, that is, the laws, but the men of whatever city he is in. Philosophy is at odds with the ancestral ways, the ways of one's father, the ways of the family.
Given his advanced age perhaps the most important thing he had left to give philosophy is not more words but a final demonstration of something he has often said: philosophy is preparation for death. If in death he arrives in Hades he will meet his final judgment. He is confident that those who rule there will not judge the life of philosophy as harmful or unjust. The laws agree, putting the blame not on themselves but on the men of Athens.
... as matters stand, if you depart this world you depart unjustly treated by your fellow men, and not by us, the laws.
(54b-c)
When Socrates says in the Apology that he will not cease engaging in philosophy he is addressing the men of Athens. (29d) In line with the distinction the laws have made, his disobedience would not be to the law but to the men of Athens. The distinction is problematic, but leads to another consideration.
Perhaps Socrates was wrong in disregarding the opinions of the multitude, for they have decided his fate. Although he may not care about what they will do to him, he should care about the tension between philosophy and the city. The many will never become philosophers, but the philosophers can and should learn how to speak to the people in order to persuade them that philosophy, with its concern for what is just, and noble, and good, benefits the city.
But what do you think of the case Socrates' Law has made in Crito? Are you convinced or not?
I am convinced of the importance of just law, but not that he is the slave (West translation) of the law. The Greek term is "doulos". I don't know why Horan translates it as servant, but possibly because a servant is able to leave (51d). This would be a kind of social contract, but there is no contract or agreement between master and slave. As the argument progresses this claim is dropped, in favor of the idea of an agreement.
Leaving this aside, we can consider the rest of the claim in this passage, that he is the offspring or son of the law. While a son may have an obligation to obey a father who is just and good, what is his obligation to a father who is not? The speech of the law does not make this critical distinction.
The distinction and blurring of the distinction between the law and the people who make, decide, and administer the law is also problematic.
As quoted above, the law, so to speak, washes its hands of the matter by admitting that Socrates was treated unjustly, only not by the law but by men.
I don't know why Horan translates it as servant, but possibly because a servant is able to leave (51d).
That's a very good question - and what difference does it make to our reading or understanding?
As to the choices available to Socrates or anyone in life, how much freedom do we really have?
When we can imagine, or research, any alternative life does it fit with who we are, or think we are? What would convince us that it would be better to leave - 'the grass is always greener' - (slave to emotion?). Or to stay - 'no matter where you go, there you are' - (mastery of self?).
Master/Slave is a mental system, no?
[Another thing, could this be related to the old dichotomy of female(emotion)/male(reason). With all the male characters, dancing and fighting, in Plato's dialogues, how much 'eros' is present?
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-friendship/#toc ]
Laws of the state change from just to unjust and back again.
When it comes to civil rights, the speed at which change occurs can be excruciatingly slow (to build and progress) or appallingly quick (to destroy and regress). How much control does the individual have? What is at stake for present and future generations? What is Plato's overall agenda re Philosophy?[*]
***
I looked for the West translation you mentioned earlier (did you leave a link?)
This morning, I found this free downloadable pdf:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1023142
Socrates of Athens: Euthyphro, Socrates' Defense, Crito and the Death Scene from Phaedo
58 Pages
Cathal Woods
Virginia Wesleyan College; Virginia Wesleyan University
Ryan Pack
Virginia Wesleyan College
A quick search through 'Crito' (starts p44/58), the word 'slave' is mentioned 3 times:
At 50e, 52d and 53e.
***
[*] Crito, then can be seen as the Emotional beaten by the Rational (Socrates). Nevertheless, here we have the art/creativity of the dialogue along with logical steps/argument process and... a barely mentioned spiritual element. The presence of Socrates' daimonion?
Plato incorporates all. The struggles between the master and slave; state and the individual; art and logic. Drama and humour. Mind, body and soul. The whole and the interrelated parts. Tragedy and comedy.
Doesn't the start of philosophy lie in the wondering...and communicating...I suppose 'eros'...?
203B The story is somewhat lengthy but I will tell you nevertheless, she replied. When Aphrodite was born, the gods held a feast, and among them was Resource, the son of Cunning. Once they had dined, Poverty arrived, begging as she usually did at such festivities, and she hung about the doorways. Resource was drunk on nectar indeed there was no wine in those days so he went out into the garden of Zeus, was overcome with heaviness and fell asleep. Now Poverty, because she herself was devoid of resource, contriving to have a child by Resource, lies down 203C beside him, thus conceiving Love. That is why Love is also a follower and attendant of Aphrodite. Begotten at her birthday festivities, he is a lover by nature, drawn to beauty because Aphrodite is beautiful.
Now, since Love is the son of Resource and Poverty, he finds himself in the following circumstances. Firstly, he is always poor and far from being delicate and beautiful as so many people believe; rather he is hard, squalid, 203D barefoot and homeless, always sleeping on the ground without covers, lying in the open air in doorways or on the streets, possessed of his mothers nature, dwelling ever alongside lack. Then again, because of his father, he has designs upon anything beautiful and good; he is courageous, energetic and intense, a formidable hunter, always devising some schemes. He desires understanding and is resourceful in obtaining it. He is a life-long lover of wisdom,[45] a clever enchanter, sorcerer, and sophist, by nature neither immortal 203E nor mortal. Rather, on the self-same day he thrives and is alive at one moment whenever he is well-resourced, but the next moment he is dying; yet he comes back to life again because of his fathers nature. Whatever resources he obtains are constantly slipping away, and so he is neither devoid of resources nor wealthy, and what is more he is midway between wisdom and ignorance.
This view puts Socrates turning down the wealth of Crito as a resource into a certain light. It does not fix the kind of poverty that has befallen Socrates.
For all wars arise on account of the possession of wealth, and we are compelled to acquire wealth because of the body, as we are slaves in its service.
Or rather, its conspicuous absence. It plays a significant role in the charges brought against Socrates in the Apology, where he is accused of believing in:
... other novel divine forces.
(24b-c)
Here Socrates claims:
I am, now and always, the sort of person who heeds nothing else but the reasoning that on reflection appears best to me.
(46b)
His daemon, however, does not provide any reasons when warning him against doing something.
His daemon, however, does not provide any reasons when warning him against doing something.
I don't think he refers to this divine force as a 'daemon'.
It is his daemonion, a 'voice' he hears.
A special, spiritual consciousness or 'being' to save him from anything that might harm his moral or intellectual values/beliefs.
For most of the argumentation, Socrates takes his time, seeking agreement from Crito.
Then, from 52e until the end, there is no breathing space.
The personalised voice of the accusatory laws takes over. It is unrelenting, even referring to the laws of Hades. The next world will not receive Socrates graciously...
This voice stems from Socrates. [Perhaps directed by his daemonion?]
It seems to come from a higher self or self-consciousness.
When I read it, it felt like a 'stream-of-consciousness'. Is it?
If we read the dialogue aloud, might we better hear the increased pace of Socrates' thought processes.
His inner voice and external voice letting rip? The sounds of frenzy:
So take note, dear friend Crito. These are the words I seem to be hearing, just as the frenzied dancers seem to be hearing the pipes, and the very sound of these words is reverberating within me, and makes me incapable of hearing anything else. Mark my words then.
It seems his mind is overwhelmed by a mix of reason and a spiritual element; his daemonion warning him against escape.
It left Crito with nothing to say.
Socrates has the final word in the Dialogue but leaves us with more questions.
This view puts Socrates turning down the wealth of Crito as a resource into a certain light. It does not fix the kind of poverty that has befallen Socrates.
I will need more time to read and reflect on that and this (or this and that):
However, this latest made me wonder as to the importance of the use of the word 'slave'.
Amity
What is at issue can be seen if we put it in the form of a question: are the laws for the benefit of man or is man for the benefit of the laws?
I need to read Crito to fill in more than a few of my gaps in understanding.
In other words, I'm perplexed, puzzled and pleased to participate in Plato's piece.
In 54 the Law refers to the weight of posterity as a reason to put justice above all else:
Horan translation :Socrates, heed us, we who reared you, and do not reckon children or life or anything else to be more important than justice, so that when you arrive in Hades, you will be able to say all this in your own defence to those who rule there. For even here, if you do this, it will not prove better, more just, or more holy, either for you or any of those who belong to you, nor will it be better when you arrive there. Rather, as matters stand, if you depart this world you depart 54C unjustly treated by your fellow men, and not by us, the laws. But if you escape, having returned injustice for injustice and evil for evil in such a disgraceful manner, contravening your own agreements and contracts with ourselves, and inflicting harm upon those whom you should harm least yourself, your friends, your homeland and us
I don't think he refers to this divine force as a 'daemon'.
It is his daemonion, a 'voice' he hears.
You are right, he always refers to it as his daemonion. I have not paid much attention to this and do not feel qualified to say much about it. There is no consensus, however, as to who or what it is the voice of. Here is a brief discussion of his divine sign.
Horan translation: ... do not reckon children or life or anything else to be more important than justice
Justice (dike) is more important than law (nomos). Law is in the service of justice, but they can be in conflict. Consider, for example, the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens. There can be unjust laws and unjust administration of the law. The speech of the law glosses over this problem.
Horan translation:those who rule there.
Gods, not men, rule in Hades. As the law says in this passage, Socrates was treated unjustly by Athens. It does not claim that he was treated unlawfully. But justly or not, for Socrates to disobey the judgment of the city would be unjust. More important than any specific judgment by the city is the preservation of the law. Unjust laws cannot be changed and made just if law is discarded.
According to the law, man in the service of justice rather than justice being in the service of man. But does the law overstate its case?
Justice (dike) is more important than law nomos). Law is in the service of justice, but they can be in conflict. Consider, for example, the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens. There can be unjust laws and unjust administration of the law. The speech of the law glosses over this problem.
Absolutely. But the speech Law has been giving (through Socrates) puts Law as the source of both Athens and Socrates himself. Since there can be no justice without an Athens or citizens, Law trumps justice in this case. The Law says that even if it is unjust, the citizens should still bow to it. It says the citizens had a chance to influence the law, and now they must submit to it for the sake of the city.
It's hard not to see this as proto-social-contract theory. Society is the foundation of your existence, so you owe it obedience. And this is linked in some ways to the Stoic view that normativity is built into nature itself. The tree that grows toward the light thrives. The citizen who supports the Law (in a democracy) will thrive. It should be in your nature to support that which gives you life.
But the speech Law has been giving (through Socrates) puts Law as the source of both Athens and Socrates himself.
I think the law has it backwards. There would be no human nomos, that is, not simply laws and statutes, but custom or convention or norms, without men. Prior to cities there were families and tribes. If whatever the head or chief ruled was law then the distinction between the rule of law and the rule of men collapses.
Plato recognized the conflicting demands of the family and the city. This is why in the Republic the just city abolishes the family by hiding who one's biological parents and children are.
The distinction between just and unjust laws raises the problem of the source or standard of justice. The speech of the law, however, does not make such a distinction.
The ancient Greeks distinguished between nature (physis) and convention (nomos). If, along with the Stoics, we accept the claim that man is the rational animal, then to live according to nature is to live according to reason not according to conventions or norms.
It's hard not to see this as proto-social-contract theory.
If there was a contract then what was the obligation on the side of the law? For his whole adult life Socrates practiced what he is now forbidden to do. Did the city break the contract? When the Thirty briefly came to power was there a contract agreed to or did the new law simply impose its power?
Society is the foundation of your existence, so you owe it obedience.
Does this mean that we owe obedience even when there is a radical change to the laws of a society? Suppose a regime comes to power that abolishes private property and declares that we are all the property of the state without any human rights. Suppose further that it restricts emigration. What do we owe it?
It should be in your nature to support that which gives you life.
Unless we are by nature slaves to the state and not free, then there must be limits to the demands of the state. If there is to be a social contract then one side cannot hold all the power.
I think the law has it backwards. There would be no human nomos, that is, not simply laws and statutes, but custom or convention or norms, without men. Prior to cities there were families and tribes. If whatever the head or chief ruled was law then the distinction between the rule of law and the rule of men collapses.
Plato recognized the conflicting demands of the family and the city. This is why in the Republic the just city abolishes the family by hiding who one's biological parents and children are.
The distinction between just and unjust laws raises the problem of the source or standard of justice. The speech of the law, however, does not make such a distinction.
The ancient Greeks distinguished between nature (physis) and convention (nomos). If, along with the Stoics, we accept the claim that man is the rational animal, then to live according to nature is to live according to reason not according to conventions or norms.
We could definitely argue against the speech the Law has given, but it's clear within the context of this dialog that Socrates does accept what the law has said:
Horan translation:So take note, dear friend Crito. These are the words I seem to be hearing, just as the frenzied dancers seem to be hearing the pipes, and the very sound of these words is reverberating within me, and makes me incapable of hearing anything else. Mark my words then. If you say anything contrary to the views I now hold, you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you think it will achieve anything, speak.
Crito: No, Socrates, I have nothing to say.
Soc: 54E Well then, Crito, let it be, and lets act accordingly, since this is the way god leads us.
If there was a contract then what was the obligation on the side of the law? For his whole adult life Socrates practiced what he is now forbidden to do. Did the city break the contract? When the Thirty briefly came to power was there a contract agreed to or did the new law simply impose its power?
In modern times we tend to think of the social contract as between citizens. We don't personify the Law the way Socrates has. As the IEP explains in its essay on the social contract, the binding elements of the contract show up in Crito in that the citizen stayed when they could have left:
IEP:In the early Platonic dialogue, Crito, Socrates makes a compelling argument as to why he must stay in prison and accept the death penalty, rather than escape and go into exile in another Greek city. He personifies the Laws of Athens, and, speaking in their voice, explains that he has acquired an overwhelming obligation to obey the Laws because they have made his entire way of life, and even the fact of his very existence, possible. They made it possible for his mother and father to marry, and therefore to have legitimate children, including himself. Having been born, the city of Athens, through its laws, then required that his father care for and educate him. Socrates life and the way in which that life has flourished in Athens are each dependent upon the Laws. Importantly, however, this relationship between citizens and the Laws of the city are not coerced. Citizens, once they have grown up, and have seen how the city conducts itself, can choose whether to leave, taking their property with them, or stay. Staying implies an agreement to abide by the Laws and accept the punishments that they mete out. And, having made an agreement that is itself just, Socrates asserts that he must keep to this agreement that he has made and obey the Laws, in this case, by staying and accepting the death penalty. Importantly, the contract described by Socrates is an implicit one: it is implied by his choice to stay in Athens, even though he is free to leave.
Unless we are by nature slaves to the state and not free, then there must be limits to the demands of the state. If there is to be a social contract then one side cannot hold all the power.
We could definitely argue against the speech the Law has given, but it's clear within the context of this dialog that Socrates does accept what the law has said
I think that it is clear that Socrates wants Crito to accept it. It is also clear that Socrates abides by the decision of the court. Before imagining what the law will say he was already convinced that to flee would be unjust and to return an injustice with an injustice is unjust. This is not the same as accepting the words he puts in the mouth of the law.
At the risk of stating the obvious, it is Plato who imagines what Socrates imagines the law would say. Socrates fashioning this argument to convince Crito is not the same as Socrates being convinced by the argument. From the perspective of the reader the question is whether Plato is trying to convince
us. If we can argue against the speech I think it likely that Plato's Socrates could have as well. What is at issue is not simply why Socrates did what he did, which admittedly is puzzling, but what philosophers who come after him have to think about and do. In this case it means, at least in part, to learn what Socrates did not, but Plato and Aristotle did, that is, how to speak to the city and the law.
A couple of reasons to think that Socrates did not put the law above justice. In the Apology he says he would not stop engaging in philosophy even if the law prohibits it. He also refused to comply with the Thirty and arrest Leon of Salamis.
Horan translation:These are the words I seem to be hearing, just as the frenzied dancers seem to be hearing the pipes, and the very sound of these words is reverberating within me, and makes me incapable of hearing anything else.
I don't think Socrates, who devoted his life to the truth based on giving a reasoned account, would be persuaded by words that resembled frenzied dancers and pipes.
IEP: ... he has acquired an overwhelming obligation to obey the Laws because they have made his entire way of life, and even the fact of his very existence, possible.
His entire way of life is exactly what the law now demands he no longer practice.
For much of his life, doing what he does and saying what he says was not prevented by the law. By its actions or lack of action the law agreed to allow him to engage in philosophy.
The law has violated the terms of the agreement. But even so Socrates is unwilling to break the law.
It is true that Socrates was free to leave, but Athens was for him not simply where he lived. Although by leaving when that option was open he would not have broken the law, it would have broken his bond to the city which was not simply a legal one.
Reply to Fooloso4
Food for thought. Your take is a little unorthodox, but that's fine.
Since my purpose was to focus on normativity, I'd say the take away is this:
Crito says that the foundation of normativity is the well-being of human social groups. So there's an element of selfishness to it, but it's not what I want. It's what we need to survive.
Do you give your life that your city might live? According to Lincoln, yes, you do.
?Fooloso4
Food for thought. Your take is a little unorthodox, but that's fine.
Can you explain what you mean by a 'little unorthodox' in the way @Fooloso4 has tackled or read 'Crito'? It is only one of many ways to consider this piece.
You will know of them no doubt. Various analytic approaches sometimes run the risk of ignoring the literary and dramatic features. There is a complex and memorable interplay of voices - those of Plato, Socrates, Crito, the Laws, moral principles, family, friends, the city, and other states. Norms.
Developments of arguments and sub-arguments to disentangle and tease out.
Conflicting attitudes of translators/readers regarding textual ambiguities, like the word 'slave', 'the many'.
Just as Plato intended, even with a hint of irony and subtle humour.
***
[ An aside: talking about 'unorthodox', your OP is not exactly 'orthodox', is it? Quoting frank
As part of a dive into normativity, I'm going to read Crito. Would you have time to moderate it?
Different from what is expected. It is more like a PM invitation.
It doesn't meet the usual guidelines, but that's fine.
The mods usually let such stand if it results in a productive discussion. And it has, thanks! ]
***
[quote="frank;836996]
Since my purpose was to focus on normativity, I'd say the take away is this:
Crito says that the foundation of normativity is the well-being of human social groups. So there's an element of selfishness to it, but it's not what I want. It's what we need to survive.[/quote]
Where in the dialogue does it say this?
Is that all that it says?
What does Plato want us to 'take away' from a reading?
What is his goal?
Questions for a general and a specific 'you':
What happens to your mind when you are reading this carefully?
Do you accept all that is said - or do you continually ask questions of it?
Or is it simply a case of cherry-picking certain aspects for another project?
I hope the discussion continues to produce more questions/ideas than set answers.
I have plenty, still to sift through.
Isn't that what reading 'Crito' is all about? Developing capacities of mental discernment?
Reply to Fooloso4Reply to Fooloso4
I hope to read and respond to these substantive and thought-provoking posts later, thanks.
But for now, I think you have this spot on:
I think that it is clear that Socrates wants Crito to accept it. It is also clear that Socrates abides by the decision of the court. Before imagining what the law will say he was already convinced that to flee would be unjust and to return an injustice with an injustice is unjust. This is not the same as accepting the words he puts in the mouth of the law.
Reply to Fooloso4
The review of the Divine Sign book review is very interesting. It strikes me that the question of the daimonion is a looking glass for different approaches to Plato as a whole.
One example of that in the review is:
Book review:Thus when Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith refute Gregory Vlastos's reductionist reading of the divine sign -- the voice as a rational hunch -- they are helping to bring a suppressed side of Socrates back into the picture. Socrates' experience was genuinely religious -- which as Brickhouse and Smith also point out does not make it irrational.
This expresses a problem I have with Vlastos' method in general, where analysis can make all matters into either/or conditions. Wrestling with either/or conditions in reference to the divine has also been a large component of the discussions in your OPs on Plato. In reading Crito, how to understand 'intuition' is a question when you observed:
The first mention of law does not occur until 50a. It is also here that we find the first mention of the city.
The first mention of justice occurs earlier:
Thats right. And without going through them all, Crito, doesnt the same issue arise in other cases too, and especially when it comes to justice and injustice, disgrace and nobility, good and bad, with which our deliberations are now concerned? Should we follow the opinion of the majority and fear it, or the opinion of one person, someone who is knowledgeable, and feel more shame and fear before him than before all the others put together? And if we do not follow him, shant we corrupt and maim that which we agreed is made better by justice, and ruined by injustice? Or is this nothing?
I don't know what might stand as an orthodox reading today but, to quote Marx:
Whatever it is I'm against it
(Groucho)
:razz: I don't know how philosophers are seeing it today either. I think of the orthodox reading as having come from Cambridge in 1927 or something.
What I like about your view is that it makes me think. My own view is like just analyzing the chessboard. Yours is more like actually playing the game. Very different approaches.
We tend to impose our own beliefs and ideas on what this term means. I think it helpful to consider something Homer, who in the Phaedo Socrates calls the Divine Poet (95a) says. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)
[i]Thats right. And without going through them all, Crito, doesnt the same issue arise in other cases too, and especially when it comes to justice and injustice, disgrace and nobility, good and bad, with which our deliberations are now concerned? Should we follow the opinion of the majority and fear it, or the opinion of one person, someone who is knowledgeable, and feel more shame and fear before him than before all the others put together? And if we do not follow him, shant we corrupt and maim that which we agreed is made better by justice, and ruined by injustice? Or is this nothing? (47c-d)[/i]
This simple and stark contrast between the 'majority' (the unknowing) and the 'one' (knowing) runs through the entire dialogue. And is open to question.
The different contexts and circumstances:
1. The expert should be valued more than the many.
The Opinions of the Many v Experts Argument, from 46d-47c.
Horan's translation: https://www.platonicfoundation.org/critias/
Who is the expert in Socrates' story? He is. And how do/could the majority of citizen voters know him? How did the court system work?
2. It leaves out groups who might not be deemed 'citizens'. The multitude of missing voices of the community. To understand better, some research is required into the complex social picture and structures of Ancient Athens.
The first was that between free and slave. The second focused on a clear dividing line between adult male citizens, who were full members of the Athenian political community and its institutions, and various excluded others (slaves, metics, women).
Finally, within the citizen community itself there was a marked division between plousioi, the wealthy who did not need to work, and pen?tes, who had to work for their living, irrespective of whether they were well-off or destitute.
Emphasis added: did the same civic rules apply to other Greek cities?
This is relevant to Socrates' decision to live and remain in Athens. If he moved elsewhere would he be considered a 'metic'? We previously considered the use of the word 'slave' compared to 'servant' as applied to Socrates and his behaviour.
Metics: In Ancient Greece, a metic (Greek: metoikos) was a foreigner living in a Greek city-state (polis). The metic did not have the same citizen rights as a citizen who was born in the state he was living in.
The term 'metic' was especially used in ancient Athens in the 4th and 5th centuries BC.
A notable metic was Aristotle, who was born in Stageira but lived in Athens for a long time.
Regardless of how many generations of the family had lived in the city, metics did not become citizens unless the city chose to bestow citizenship on them as a gift. This was rarely done. Citizenship at Athens brought eligibility for numerous state payments such as jury and assembly pay, which could be significant to working people. During emergencies the city could distribute rations to citizens. None of these rights were available to metics. They were not permitted to own real estate in Attica, whether farm or house, unless granted a special exemption.
Metics shared the burdens of citizenship without any of its privileges. Like citizens, they had to perform military service and, if rich enough, were subject to special tax contributions.
We can consider how fair or just this system is...to exclude so many from citizenship.
The idea of the 'social contract' appears central to the argument whereby citizens and state/city have a mutual understanding of what benefits entail.
But even then questions can be asked: Loyalty to who, at what cost?
His entire way of life is exactly what the law now demands he no longer practice.
The law claims:
... you have agreed, by your actions if not by your words, to live as a citizen in accordance with us
(52d)
Fooloso4
For much of his life, doing what he does and saying what he says was not prevented by the law. By its actions or lack of action the law agreed to allow him to engage in philosophy.
Fooloso4
The law has violated the terms of the agreement. But even so Socrates is unwilling to break the law.
It is true that Socrates was free to leave, but Athens was for him not simply where he lived. Although by leaving when that option was open he would not have broken the law, it would have broken his bond to the city which was not simply a legal one.
The Greek term ?????, from which we get the term 'norm', means custom, law, and also song (?????).
There is a spirit of custom and law that encompasses more than objective, generalised legal rules.
We find it in the subjective personal story of Socrates. The philosopher of Athens with soul.
But he denies knowing anything noble and good (Apology 21d). We should be open to the possibility that no such expert exists. He does say that we should pay attention to some opinions but not others, but without knowledge on what basis can we determine which opinions are to be valued?
We should be open to the possibility that no such expert exists.
You are right. Even if we think we know our own 'story' better than anyone else, there is room for error.
Opinions, even of self, should be gleaned from what 'knowledge' is available.
Self-knowledge: we can have false beliefs about who or how we are.
We put on a face to self and others. Often surprised by their reflections right back at us.
When we point out that what someone says is sarcastic, they can respond by saying:
"That's not who I am!". Then, our opinion as stated is not valued. It doesn't fit the self-image.
Even if we try to explain that we didn't mean they are sarcastic, only what they said.
The damage has been done!
We can be rational, irrational or non-rational in choosing what we present or accept as evidence.
But as a juror, in a court of law, with life or death decisions - the best available evidence matters.
We rely on experts and witnesses - to do the best they can, in the circumstances.
When it comes to opinions, remember to cut them with care. No tears!
I returned to my 'Opinions' thread ( a year ago!) to re-read the exchanges:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13340/how-to-cut-opinions-without-tears/p1
'Knowing' people from previous posts, I put out a request to you and @Ciceronianus as 'experts':
Platos views on love are a meditation on Socrates and the power his philosophical conversations have to mesmerize, obsess, and educate.
1. Socrates and the Art of Love
The only thing I say I know, Socrates tells us in the Symposium, is the art of love (ta erôtika) (177d89). Taken literally, it is an incredible claim.
Are we really to believe that the man who affirms when on trial for his life that he knows himself to be wise in neither a great nor a small way (Apology 21b45) knows the art of love? In fact, the claim is a nontrivial play on words facilitated by the fact that the noun erôs (love) and the verb erôtan (to ask questions) sound as if they are etymologically connecteda connection explicitly exploited in the Cratylus (398c5-e5).
Socrates knows about the art of love in thatbut just insofar ashe knows how to ask questions, how to converse elenctically.
SEP: Plato on Friendship and Eros
What does that even mean?
To converse elenctically...especially on a philosophy forum?
I know who to ask, but will my friend @Fooloso4 respond?
And others, like @Ciceronianus....
Expertise is relative, as is wisdom.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wisdom/#WisRat
One problem is that if we are not experts or wise how can we evaluate whether someone else is? Socrates uses the example of a trainer. If he is able to improve someone's strength, endurance, and speed then we have good reason to think the opinion of the trainer regarding such matters is worth heeding.
What about Socrates? Was he guilty of corrupting the young? By the measure of the many who value the ancestral ways he was. His followers though will say that they have been made better. And yet, if they had been corrupted they might imagine they have been improved.
The article first specifies which real-life situations require wisdom and discusses characteristics of wise behavior. The core proposition of the model is that in challenging real-life situations, noncognitive wisdom components (an exploratory orientation, concern for others, and emotion regulation) moderate the effect of cognitive components (knowledge, metacognitive capacities, and self-reflection) on wise behavior. The model can explain the situation specificity of wisdom and the commonalities and differences between personal and general wisdom. Empirically, it accounts for the considerable variation in correlations among wisdom measures and between wisdom measures and other variables. The model has implications for the design of wisdom-fostering interventions and new wisdom measures.
The only thing I say I know, Socrates tells us in the Symposium, is the art of love (ta erôtika) (177d89). Taken literally, it is an incredible claim.
I think that the claim has something to do with the story Socrates recounts in the passage I quoted above saying "Love is the son of Resource and Poverty." It is a view that encompasses all those who make, whether they practice philosophy, poetry, or making material goods through skilled arts.
The dialogue is filled with claims this person or that is wise and the honored one denying it is true. Philosophy must attract lovers in that environment.
I read Socrates taking up music during his confinement as one way to keep alive when deprived of his preferred 'medium.'
Oh, but you are. There is no denying that...relatively speaking!
I enjoy and learn from all your posts. I've still to give them the time they deserve.
The most recent: Reply to PaineReply to Paine
You were an early and consistent responder in my very first 'Discussion' about willpower.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4796/willpower-is-it-an-energy-thing/p1
5yrs ago. Now, I wonder at my audacity and remember my struggles to understand and reply.
I return to it slightly red-faced and grateful to those, like you, who must have been shaking their heads but persevered. I never did have the willpower to finish reading The Republic and didn't follow through on all suggestions. Tsk, tsk!
But I am more interested in the listening part of my own idea than ruling out other readings...
I get this now. And thank you for your clear articulation and patience.
[quote=Valentinus;244172"]
Well, this is why I brought up the topic of thumos in the previous discussion. The closest parallel I can find between how it was discussed back then and later on is related to the experience of getting really pissed off.
[/quote]
Unfortunately, I left it there. With you seemingly pissed off! Oh, dear...
You are the problem. No scholar to be found far and wide.
Meaning: You must solve yourself, if no one else seems to have taken up the task. If there is no scholar of you 'far and wide', you must become that scholar. If you are Kafka, you have not stinted that 'must,' and should it come to proof, you will be able to stand before any judgment seat clear of conscience. All those close written pages were for what if not to solve the problem that you were to yourself?
But, did you solve the problem of yourself? No, of course you did not. Thinking cannot solve the problems of thought. Thought only creates more thought. Thought cannot carry thought past itself. If you are Kafka, your voluminous writings are a good indicator of that. (But also of the positive qualities that thought returning to thought, over and over, do give rise to, namely: condensation of idea, excellence of conception, and brilliance of realization. In other words: poetry).
To be a scholar of yourself. To know yourself. To the best of your ability.
Then, like Socrates, you can 'stand before any judgement seat clear of conscience'?
But, even though his intentions seem pure, he didn't write the poetry of the Dialogues, did he?
It was Plato. He returned to certain thoughts, over and over. The repetition interspersed with humour.
Crito: What you are saying is all very well, Socrates, but you still need to decide what we should do.
Soc: Lets consider this together, good man, and if you are able to contradict 48E what I am saying in any way, do so, and I shall heed you. Otherwise, at this stage, blessed man, please stop presenting the same argument to me over and over, that I need to get out of here without the permission of the Athenians, for it is very important to me that I do all this with your approval and not against your will. Now look at the principle of the inquiry, and whether it is stated adequately,49A and try to answer the questions you are asked, as you think best.
Crito: Well, Ill try.
There will be further repetitions of the arguments in one form or another. Plato is having fun!
Crito is perhaps not Plato's Academy material but he, and his like, were important to Socrates.
Is this when philosophy became full of experts? A more formal public and private arena.
With this Academy would Socrates have survived any trial and votes by those who didn't know?
... a place for intellectual discussion as well as for exercise and religious activities. This addition to the gymnasias purpose was due to the changing currents in Athenian education, politics, and culture, as philosophers and sophists came from other cities to partake in the ferment and energy of Athens. Gymnasia became public places where philosophers could congregate for discussion and where sophists could offer samples of their wisdom to entice students to sign up for private instruction.
I think that the claim has something to do with the story Socrates recounts in the passage I quoted above saying "Love is the son of Resource and Poverty." It is a view that encompasses all those who make, whether they practice philosophy, poetry, or making material goods through skilled arts.
I haven't given the quote from the Symposium enough attention. Way back, I think I asked someone if they would start a discussion on that particular favourite! Or was I trying to re-create or imagine the place and people? Perhaps @Fooloso4 or yourself?
Rather, on the self-same day he thrives and is alive at one moment whenever he is well-resourced, but the next moment he is dying; yet he comes back to life again because of his fathers nature. Whatever resources he obtains are constantly slipping away, and so he is neither devoid of resources nor wealthy, and what is more he is midway between wisdom and ignorance.
Symposium, 203b, translated by Horan
This view puts Socrates turning down the wealth of Crito as a resource into a certain light. It does not fix the kind of poverty that has befallen Socrates.
What would you say is the kind of poverty that felled Socrates?
The ignorance of the voting majority? Devoid of knowledge or desire/love for wisdom?
Socrates, then, sees the richness of the situation as being a way to learn and enlighten...
Is being imprisoned more conducive to thought/insight than an Academy?
In Socratess eighteenth year, Sophroniscus presented him to the deme in a ceremony called dokimasia. He was there examined and entered onto the citizens roll, making him eligiblesubject to age or class restrictionsfor the many tasks of government determined by lot or required of all citizens, beginning with two years of compulsory training in the Athenian militia. In an important sense, the dokimasia marked a young mans allegiance to the laws of Athens.
Socrates, as portrayed by Nietzsche, is a figure who is very different to Dionysus. During most of his life Socrates was the personification of a theoretical man (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 98). He practiced neither music, nor poetry, nor did he have a high opinion of either. Only when he was in his death cell did he start to discover his musical side. Nietzsche attributes great importance to this observation (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 92-96). From this brief description alone we can see that Nietzsches Socrates is very much influenced by Platos, for it was in Platos Phaedo that this story of Socrates was told Plato (Phaedo 60c-61d). However, it will soon be clear that Nietzsches Socrates is far from identical with Platos. Still it is much closer to Platos than it is to Xenophons or Aristophanes Socrates who are the other major literary versions of Socrates.
[...]
Since Socrates never appreciated tragedy, i.e. music and poetry, during most of his life, and as he only went to the theatre when the plays of the logical poet Euripides were performed, it was strange that in his death cell Socrates suddenly devoted himself to music and poetry.
According to Nietzsche, then an important part of Socrates character, which he normally oppressed, was set free (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 92-96).
I don't understand why it's thought that Socrates 'oppressed' this kind of mystical communication.
It doesn't fit in with how I imagined him to be...appreciative of all the senses. A higher awareness.
Listening to his daemonion. And so on. Wasn't music played in the Symposium?
Ah - do I remember the lyre players being dismissed? All the better to think?
The Greek term ?????, from which we get the term 'norm', means custom, law, and also song (?????).
Socrates sings the song of the law.
A song that he composes for Crito, but he does not write it down. It is not the equivalent of the written law. Perhaps there is a connection between Socrates taking Aesop, something already written and turning it into verse, and taking the law of Athens and turning it into music in the popular sense. In other words, a song for the many.
In the Phaedo, in response to his friend's fear of death Socrates says:
What you should do is to sing him incantations each day until you sing [charm] away his fears.
(77e)
Socrates' own music consists of arguments, but that will not do for the many who need to be charmed.
Reply to Amity
Thank you for your kind words. As you typically open up many more paths than I can follow, our "relative" wisdom will have to be placed side by side in the way described in Symposium:
Then Agathon, who was reclining alone on the last couch, said, Come here, Socrates, and recline beside me so that, through contact with you, I may enjoy 175D that piece of wisdom that came to you in the porch. Of course you found it and you have it, for you would not have come away without it.
Socrates then sat down and said, It would be nice, Agathon, if wisdom were the sort of thing that flowed between us, from the fuller to the emptier once we were in contact with one another, just as water in cups flows through wool from the fuller to the emptier one. Yes, if wisdom 175E is like this too, then I greatly prize my position alongside you, for I believe I will be filled with a copious beautiful wisdom by your side. For my wisdom would be ordinary, even as questionable as a dream, while yours would be resplendent and would hold great promise, young as you are; and this shone forth mightily from you, just the other day, and was put on display before the eyes of more than thirty thousand Greeks.
Socrates, you are being contemptuous! said Agathon. Yet in due course, you and I shall submit these matters to judgement on the issue of wisdom, resorting to Dionysus[10] as our judge. For the moment, you should turn your attention to your supper.
I think Fooloso4's approach is a fruitful and rigorous way to compare texts in order to understand: Quoting Fooloso4
Socrates' own music consists of arguments, but that will not do for the many who need to be charmed.
Without addressing the question of how much Socrates enjoyed the arts of the "many" (or the arguments in the Sorgner essay), I will observe Socrates is a character in Plato's plays. They are obviously more than plays, consisting of fixed characters being expressed through actors on a stage. Nonetheless, they are also artistic compositions. I have long found it interesting that Aristotle referred to Socrates as a 'moralist', suggesting that all the philosophy that can be found in the character is of Plato's making. That statement itself could be an urban myth shared amongst metics.
Continuing my suspension of how those dynamics relate to the arguments concerning the highest arts, I would like to make some observations about Socrates as a participant in audiences.
I start with the above passage from Symposium given above. I can only presume that Socrates was one amongst the "thirty thousand Greeks" who attended.
In the Index to my old collection of the Dialogues, there are over a hundred references to Homer, thirteen to Aeschylus, fourteen to Pindar, forty-seven to Hesiod, four to Sophocles, and I am sure I have left out others. There are the countless rituals and festivals Socrates takes part in. And there is the beginning of the Republic where Socrates makes an aesthetic judgement upon the procession he came to witness. The guy was no shut in nor likely to plug his ears when nearing the Sirens.
This is a long way to say that Socrates is sometimes found playing a role that does not reflect his understanding and other times puts that into the mouths of other people. So he speaks in the voice of the Law to satisfy Crito when he just can't get it. (I agree with you that there is comic element at that moment). The wisdom Socrates reports receiving from Diotima sure sounds an awful lot like the arguments Socrates makes on his own account.
Socrates says he has had this dream before and had always understood it to mean doing what he is always doing:
since philosophy is the greatest music. (61a)
Now he thinks the dream meant:
make music in the popular sense of the word.
So he:
took whatever stories were to hand, the fables of Aesop which I know, and turned the first ones I came upon into verse.
Taking whatever stories that were at hand suggests that the content of music in the popular sense did not much matter.
Interesting that at the start and end of Crito, Plato invokes a sense of mystery; soul and mysticism.
Socrates takes his dream world as clear evidence. This adds to his dramatic character, someone with special, perhaps divine, knowledge. More than a logical, rational thinker.
Also, he suggests that Crito's watching and not wakening him is a serendipitous stimulus for his noble, beautiful prophetic woman. Ah, Fortuna! as a Roman might say. Fate.
Soc: Well, Crito, may it be for the best. If this pleases the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will be here today.
Crito: 44A What is your evidence for that?
Soc: Ill tell you. Presumably I am to die the day after the ship arrives.
Crito: That is what the authorities say, in any case.
Soc: Well, I do not think it will be here today, but tomorrow. My evidence is a dream I had a little earlier, during the night, perhaps when you decided not to wake me.
Crito: What was the dream?
Soc: I thought that a noble and beautiful 44B woman wearing a white robe approached me, called out and said: Socrates, on the third day thou shalt reach fertile Phthia.[3]
Crito: What a strange dream, Socrates.
Soc: Well now, Crito, it seems clear enough to me anyway
***
It seems Socrates is visited by a creative spirit or muse when he turns fables into verse. Also, there is a hymn to Apollo. Other people, including a poet. are talking about and wondering as to its meaning.
Then Cebes took this up and said, By Zeus, it is just as well you jogged my memory, Socrates. A number of people have been asking me about your compositions, 60D the setting of Aesops fables to verse and the hymn to Apollo.
Might this be the brain's reaction to forthcoming death? Sing now, or forever hold your peace. He is superstitious and needs to heed the call of his dreams. Socrates/Plato gives us musicality in poetry, music and philosophy.
Remember I mused earlier about the quickening, breathless pace of the final argument as a kind of stream of consciousness? Now I'm thinking of a jazzy vocal improv! The bookends of Crito as a reprise.
The repetitions are a rhythmic beat; a popular song that Crito might understand.
Reply to Paine Thank you so much for this. Together we will take time to mull over the music!
The characters dance before us as they sing...
Or something like that!
In the Index to my old collection of the Dialogues, there are over a hundred references to Homer, thirteen to Aeschylus, fourteen to Pindar, forty-seven to Hesiod, four to Sophocles, and I am sure I have left out others. There are the countless rituals and festivals Socrates takes part in. And there is the beginning of the Republic where Socrates makes an aesthetic judgement upon the procession he came to witness. The guy was no shut in nor likely to plug his ears when nearing the Sirens.
No. I plead ignorance. Perhaps you can persuade me.
I see that they are alike in so far as many voices sing as one, but my impression is that the chorus stands apart and is not a participant that speaks to the characters.
Socrates' own music consists of arguments, but that will not do for the many who need to be charmed.
Fooloso4
Without addressing the question of how much Socrates enjoyed the arts of the "many" (or the arguments in the Sorgner essay), I will observe Socrates is a character in Plato's plays. They are obviously more than plays, consisting of fixed characters being expressed through actors on a stage. Nonetheless, they are also artistic compositions.
I will observe Socrates is a character in Plato's plays.
Paine
The first thing that comes to mind in making that comparison is that unlike the works of the playwrights the dialogues do not contain a chorus.
I see that they are alike in so far as many voices sing as one, but my impression is that the chorus stands apart and is not a participant that speaks to the characters.
The dialogues are not just like plays, they are plays with arguments, arguably Socrates' music.
Where might any 'chorus' be found? First, its usual setting:
Follow the links and all will be revealed:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_chorus
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Wasps
We can see that the chorus can help both the spectator/audience and the other characters with insight. Crito is the one to be persuaded but Socrates too, in a sense.
The members sang, danced, narrated and acted in unison; organised and in harmony.
And yet, in reality - who makes up the laws? Are there not conflicts of interest and tension?
Open and vulnerable to interpretation and corruption. T
So, this Chorus is like the Voice of the Laws in Crito. Even if spoken by Socrates, it is another participating character or actor. With strong, rhythm, repetitions - part of the song displaying persistent themes.
Aristotle stated in his Poetics:
The chorus too must be regarded as one of the actors. It must be part of the whole and share in the action, not as in Euripides but as in Sophocles.
In Aeschylus' The Eumenides, however, the chorus takes the part of a host of avenging Furies.
The chorus had to work in unison to help explain the play as there were only one to three actors on stage who were already playing several parts each.
Aristophanes uses the chorus of the elderly for varying reasons within his comedies. For example, the chorus of the elderly within The Wasps plays both a comedic role and also serves as a political counterfoil to the young, cosmopolitans of Athens.
As in his other early plays, Aristophanes satirizes the Athenian general and demagogue Cleon. He also ridicules the law courts, one of the institutions that provided Cleon his power
Given the the addiction of old jurors, the fun trial and the chorus, the Wasps sounds fascinating.
My next read...
It is an interesting question to what extent the voice of the law in the Crito differ from that of the law itself.
Yes. I think the first difference is clear.
The verbal expression by Socrates/Plato v the written laws of the constitution.
Whoever wrote it and when:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Athenians
Another article: Quoting Draco - wiki
The laws (?????? thesmoi) that [Draco] laid were the first written constitution of Athens. So that no one would be unaware of them, they were posted on wooden tablets (?????? axones), where they were preserved for almost two centuries on steles of the shape of four-sided pyramids (??????? kyrbeis).[8] The tablets were called axones, perhaps because they could be pivoted along the pyramid's axis to read any side.[9][10]
The constitution featured several major innovations:
Instead of oral laws known to a special class, arbitrarily applied and interpreted, all laws were written, thus being made known to all literate citizens (who could appeal to the Areopagus for injustices): "the constitution formed under Draco, when the first code of laws was drawn up". (Aristotle: Athenian Constitution, Part 5, Section 41)
The laws distinguish between murder and involuntary homicide, a novel concept at that time.[11]
The dialogic drama lies in 1. 'the act of singing a song'; the characters are 2. 'a group of singers'. Both synonyms for 'chorus' as per wordhippo thesaurus.
From the mind of Plato > Socrates, Crito, the laws speaking via Socrates' mind.
The importance of internal and external communication to clarify or confuse. Or both in a cacophony.
The chorus is a 'refrain' of the song - the much-repeated comments and themes.
Justice, harm and retribution. Morality of the contract. The main theme of obedience to law.
Interesting to read of the final overwhelming music mix in Socrates' mind, even as he is calm.
These are the words I seem to be hearing, just as the frenzied dancers seem to be hearing the pipes, and the very sound of these words is reverberating within me, and makes me incapable of hearing anything else.
A striking mixture - even as he concludes:
"Well then, Crito, let it be, and lets act accordingly, since this is the way god leads us."
He does not agree with all aspects of the laws. More can be said on this.
Socrates' raison d'être is in keeping philosophy alive. It lives on after his body dies.
The laws can and will be changed.
The chorus too must be regarded as one of the actors. It must be part of the whole and share in the action, not as in Euripides but as in Sophocles.
This prompted me to check Oedipus the King (by Sophocles) and Aristotle gets this right. Oedipus acknowledges hearing the Chorus and converses with their Leader. This situation becomes pivotal to the drama because Oedipus insists that Tiresias speak in front of the assembly rather than take the option to hear from Tiresias privately.
The chorus is a 'refrain' of the song - the much-repeated comments and themes.
Justice, harm and retribution. Morality of the contract. The main theme of obedience to law.
To review previous posts and return to the question of when is it right to break the law:
[emphases added]
But does the law overstate its case?
Fooloso4 I'm not really interested in sorting out who's right or wrong here. It's just opposing views orbiting the idea of normativity.
You swerved the question. Almost as if you had no interest in the main theme of Crito. Or the imagination to consider what arguments/opposing views matter more.
It's not 'just' about orbiting views. The question continues to have relevance.
We would do well to consider it.
I admire Thomas Paine, as my forum handle suggests. His arguments for democracy are in tune with the problem of absolute power as described in Statesman.I wonder if our present condition is one where we cannot distinguish the regimes so clearly. Maybe the tyrannical, the oligarchs, and the dynamic of unfortunate public opinion coexist simultaneously.
Perhaps our 'present condition' (national/global politics?) is due not only to increased power and riches in a few hands but lack of knowledge, education and more than a little complacency. Sometimes we only know 'what is going on' far too late. Laws are passed without due and careful process. We only know what 'public opinion' is by being told of it via the media and polls. Politicians on all sides manipulate and deepen the divides between 'the people' as they see fit.
Contrary to the way Socrates frames it, the city in question is not just "any city". It is one whose laws are said to be enacted justly. The problem, however, is not simply justice but the force needed to prevent the law from being overthrown. Although Socrates talks as if it is a matter of persuasion, of convincing the city, that too would be a:
subversion of the law wherebyjudgements, once delivered, stand supreme.
Philosophy poses a threat to the city. Socrates is silenced by force. The law proclaims that he does not stand on an equal footing with the law. To convince them would require doing the very thing they want to prevent him from doing, that is, philosophizing.
Yes and yet the laws proclaim that they encourage and tolerate 'persuasion' from about 51b-52b:
Horan:Anyone who disobeys commits a 3-fold injustice: he disobeys us, we who nurtured him; and having agreed to obey us, he neither obeys us, nor persuades us otherwise if we are not acting aright, even though we lay 52A the options before him and do not issue rough commands to do what we tell him. No, we offer two alternatives: either do as we say, or persuade us otherwise. But he does neither of these.'
It is the opinion of the men of Athens that Socrates is doing harm to the young people. His disobedience suggests that he thinks that whatever harm and injustice to the city and its laws his disobedience may cause, the suppression of philosophy is a greater harm.
It is men fearing a loss of power, position and riches who have manipulated opinion in certain quarters.
I wonder how Socrates would react in today's political environment. For example:
This article about the climate crisis and Chris Packham's 'extraordinary, anguished think piece opens with an audio montage of Packhams desperate thoughts about the climate crisis, arranged so they chaotically overlap'. Is it time to break the law?
The problem is crystallised by a chat with John Gummer, Lord Deben. He chaired the governments Climate Change Committee and co-authored a report that slammed Britains green initiatives as dangerously inadequate: We should be on a war footing, he tells Packham, noting that a 1C rise in global temperatures is already causing mayhem, and we are headed for 2C or 3C. But when asked about radical protests, Gummer bristles, warning against counter-productive action and insisting, We have to have the rule of law.
"We should be on a war footing" v "We have to have the rule of law"
Radical protests being 'counter-productive'.
So, being on a 'war footing' is fine - that is the preferred language.
Who is the enemy here?
When laws ban the right to protest and more besides, are 'they' asking for trouble?
Comments (108)
I don't know what you have in mind in terms of moderating, but I look forward to participating.
Like pick a translation you like and set pace?
Perhaps you know that the name Crito comes from the Greek meaning "discern" or "judge". (This is noted in West's translation.)
Quoting frank.
I prefer the West translation from Four Texts on Socrates, but I cannot vouch for the security of any PDF copies of this translation.
David Horan's new translation of the dialogues might be a good choice. It has the advantage of being available free online.
In the general introduction he says:
I don't have that translation, but I can get it from Amazon. Up to you.
I think the Horan translation might be a better choice for the discussion, but you might find West's translation and notes worth reading and having. I will keep a copy beside me and compare it to Horan.
Another advantage of Horan is that quoting the text by copy and paste is much easier.
Ok. I'll go ahead and order the West translation, but we can stick to the Horan for the convenience. Cool!
This dialog is traditionally accepted as a legitimate work of Plato, but one in which the real Socrates is allowed to speak. The first time I read it, I found it to be kind of heartbreaking.
I'm not sure how to quote from the Horan translation. I just get a little envelope when I try. Do you know how that works?
Yes, this is how I am doing it.
I see. Thank you!
Quoting Horan translation
There's a tug-of-war going on about popular opinion. Crito says we have to "care" what others think, and I'd fill out his thought with: conform to what others want you to be, because the crowd is dangerous, and at worst, they'll kill you for failing to satisfy their expectations.
Socrates denies that the crowd has the greatest power, which in his view is the power to render others either wise or foolish.
For much of the dialogue he speaks on behalf of the city and its laws. He simply accepts these arguments. This is uncharacteristic. Taking the part of the city and says:
but now he is silent. Two reasons for this might be, first, that he has deliberately avoided politics and so chose not take part in the making and changing of laws, and second, he is not a rhetorician.
Socrates' civic mindedness is evident, but he is not speaking in his own name, and this leaves open the question of the extent to which his own opinions coincide with that of city.
Quoting frank
Athens was a democratic regime. Socrates was convicted by a majority decision. His low opinion of public opinion, raises questions about how wise he thought the city and its laws actually were. And yet Socrates defends the city and its laws and abides by them.
I meant that this has traditionally been thought to be about Socrates' real views as opposed to Plato's. The Republic, Phaedo, and Phaedrus are commonly thought to be expressions of Plato's views rather than Socrates'. Of course there isn't anything about Plato that's pinned down. At one time or another the authenticity of every work attributed to him has been questioned by some historian.
Quoting Fooloso4
Right, as the dialog emerges, we'll find that Socrates is a strong advocate of the rule of law (although we could ponder whether that's the right way to put it.) We can compare and contrast other prominent views, like the Stoic view. It comes down to how one thinks about one's place in society.
We can see from the beginning of the dialog that the concept of individuality is in clear view, since it seems perfectly reasonable to Crito and his friends that Socrates should reject the judgement and run. That concept of individuality probably won't be eclipsed again until the middle ages.
Quoting Fooloso4
So we'll look into his reasons for abiding by the law and discuss whether this is a proto-form of social contract theory.
Therefore, my comments will lag behind. Hope you don't mind.
Quoting frank
It is interesting to read the dialogue in the Introduction. It sets the scene and is quite telling as to the role and character of Crito. The very title of the dialogue.
Quoting Crito - trans byHoran
Crito is an old, loyal friend of Socrates, a regular visitor and anxious to help. He bribes the prison guard to let him in early. The reader sees him as a good guy but perhaps with questionable or flexible morals.
Quoting Fooloso4
Interesting, then, we can ask about whether he lives up to his name.
Discernment: the quality of being able to grasp and comprehend what is obscure : skill in discerning/
I love the humour of Socrates when Crito explains why he didn't wake him earlier:
He had a premonition in his dream - 'perhaps when you decided not to wake me' that the day of execution is to take place within 2 or 3 days.
They've always been irritated by Socrates, but now their feelings have turned to intolerance. There is a sort of blind madness to their desire to punish Socrates.
Crito's offer is to help Socrates escape from jail.
This in itself would break the law. A questionable act. How would it help?
We can examine the words in the dialogue.
Crito's arguments as to why Socrates should escape from prison.
Then Socrates' analysis or response.
How many arguments are there, how convincing are they, and the responses given by Socrates.
The first seems more about Crito, his loss of a friend and reputation; it sounds selfish:
This Socrates finds irrelevant. Crito shouldn't be concerned with the opinions of others.
Crito points out that it is very powerful; it can kill. As seen in Socrates current position.
Crito is willing to spend a substantial amount of money to arrange the escape. And beyond that.
Via corruption? I can't see Socrates agreeing to that. Why would his friend?
Quoting Fooloso4
Good point.
Speaking on behalf of the city Socrates raises the problem of the relationship between the city and the family as well. I will hold off saying more until we look at that speech more closely.
Quoting frank
This is complicated by the fact that he was given the opportunity to do go under the law but rejected that option.
He accepts Socrates' speech on behalf of the city without question. But it does raise questions.
Note Crito's response. He does have some capacity for discernment:
(43c)
Commentators have speculated as to why Socrates did not defend himself at trial. One common explanation has to do with his advanced age.
Indeed. Perhaps, as a long-term and good friend, he was 'ready' for Socrates' reply. Has Socrates talked of his age before; how it factored into his decision not to defend himself?
Quoting Fooloso4
I'm not there yet but thanks for the heads-up.
I think it would be helpful to follow the discussion if the various arguments were numbered or named?
As in a kind of Contents page, showing where they arise in the Dialogue.
But given what has happened to Socrates, he should be. Crito makes this point:
(44d)
Socrates' concerns lie elsewhere:
@frank Perhaps we can see here one way in which Plato's views differ from Socrates'. Since Socrates did not write his influence was more limited than Plato's. Plato did not simply write, he wrote in a way that heeded Crito's warning to care about the opinion of the many. He did this in two connected ways. He presents a salutary teaching that even though it did not make one wise it helped shape the opinions of the many. He also left some things unsaid that
(44c)
might discern through careful reading and interpretation.
In this way Plato mitigates against Socrates concern that the written word does not take into consideration who it is addressing and so cannot say what is most appropriate for different readers to hear.
Socrates sought to benefit his friends without harming others. Plato wrote for posterity.
Yes. As noted in my full quote (now underlined):
Quoting Amity
1. Personal Argument: 44c-44d
https://www.platonicfoundation.org/crito/
Who are those 'best people'? The wise? Those concerned with morality and carrying out justice?
Are they more likely than the popular majority to carry out the greatest good? How much influence do they have? (philosophers?)
Quoting Crito - trans. Horan
Don't the majority also have a sense of morality and justice?
I think I see what you mean. If it's not the right or wisest kind, it can be shaped by teaching.
'Crito' is Plato's Dialogue and long-term project:
Quoting Fooloso4
Ah, but wait...is this teaching is only for those already deemed 'the best'...?
It bears repeating and underlying. It will come up again. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the fate of philosophy then and now relies on knowing how to navigate through the dangers.
Quoting Amity
I think Socrates might say, those who wish to be wise and live toward that end through thoughtfulness and moderation.
Quoting Amity
Neither the philosopher nor the people are able to carry out the greatest good, but only the philosopher takes seriously the question of what the greatest good is.
As what we are doing makes evident, Plato continues to have a great deal of influence. Some might say that this is to the detriment of philosophy, but others see it as a way for philosophy to once again find its way.
Quoting Amity
They have opinions and assume they are right and true.
Quoting Amity
It is a self-selective process. Most have no interest or patience to work through the arguments, and so, if they do have this interest and are of moderate temperament will match with my suggestion above about who the best people might be.
Yes, I can see that.
That is an interesting observation. Plato does talk about how the relationships between classes and skills compose a city. The Republic presents the idea of building one from scratch. And that brings out some of the problems of inheriting what we have.
In that regard, I have long thought the following passage in Crito to be the most striking:
I read this to say Socrates is owned by the City to the extent he has the power to be Socrates. The Republic is not only a start-up idea where policies can be argued about but is the element bringing the new City into life.
So, not either a Hobbes or Rousseau point of view.
Crito persists with his Personal Arguments: 44e-45c
Quoting Horan
Then more forcefully, arguments related to:
Allowing his enemies to win by destroying him; and then his obligations to sons and friends.
Basically, he accuses Socrates of betrayal and cowardice. 45d-46a.
Quoting Horan
[emphasis added]
To take it to these extremes, we can see Crito's passion to save Socrates from death.
He sees a contradiction, a lack of consistency in Socrates - isn't Socrates being a hypocrite, given his 'concern for excellence'?
He begs Socrates not only to think of himself but family and friends.
[As if Socrates hasn't already considered his duties to family]
Did it not matter if his enemies would win by this capitulation and cowardice?
How will Socrates respond?
How different are his values and life/death philosophy from those of Crito?
Haven't they previously discussed such issues of harm, judgement and justice...and more?
How does Crito not know Socrates? Has he learned nothing?!
Or is his own fear (of death?) clouding his judgement?
I think there is an expression of fear in Crito's argument here. There is also an element of corruption being suggested. The dialogue begins with Crito noting he bribed the jail keeper to get in early. Is the disgrace Crito fears a loss of power at the same time?
The discussion of cowardice reminds me of the following from Cratylus:
Quoting Plato, Cratylus, 413
Socrates is using the vocabulary of Heraclitus and connects "manliness" to the willingness to leap into battle against a 'current' that needs to be opposed.
This should be compared to what, in Socrates words, the city claims regarding education and rearing. It may seem like a minor point but it has direct bearing on the question of what his responsibility to the city is based on the claim of what it is responsible for.
Crito is not able to give a better argument for why Socrates should not comply with the court's decision. Can we?
Sure. The court in this case is the judicial arm of a democracy. A democracy is like a ship whose owner has been tricked and manipulated into giving the helm over to sailors who know nothing about navigation. This ship of fools is more likely to end up at the bottom of the Aegean than any where close to where the owner wanted it to go. Where did I hear that argument? :razz:
Since democracies are poorly run, there's no obligation to adhere to their judgments.
Yes, perhaps all of the above and more. A fascinating story. One that I will have to leave for a few days - for a sunny September break.
[s]If/[/s]when Socrates dies, what will Crito do? He will grieve his sad loss.
Without his good friend and mentor, who will keep his thinking straight? What or who will follow?
Socrates will not leave him without talking things through, perhaps with wise words to hold on to.
Will that console Crito? Will he be convinced or let things lie in peace as Socrates desires?
Can you imagine the emotional charge in this prison setting? Intense. This long goodbye.
Thanks for the pointers and questions.
There's quite a lot to be getting on with, isn't there? Crito is a piece of work!
There is. I've read this dialog a couple of times. I'm rereading it thinking about what it says about normativity: Crito is giving all sorts of das Man type reasons to ignore the court's judgement and sentence. If the crowd gives us ethical normativity, then Crito is right. But the court is part of the foundation of the lives of the members of the crowd. The court is ordained, so to speak, remember the law court is a gift of Athena. The court helps us avoid mob action, so it's about stopping to think things through. The court means our judgments at least have a change to be tempered by reason. So Crito is advising Socrates to forget about rationality.
Except the whole situation shows that the court can be subverted by passions of the day, like with McCarthy. So where does that leave us? It's not the crowd, it's not reason. Then where is normativity really coming from? And since I'm applying all of this to normativity as it related to meaning, Crito suggests that meaning doesn't arise from the whims of the crowd, it doesn't arise from rationality. So from where? With the last two points, Kripke would agree. Meaning is not conventional if we define that as rule following. There is nothing in the world, all the way down to the intimacies of mental states that constitutes rule following in our communication, which is wild.
So if you haven't read Crito before, feel free to read further along. We'll catch up.
For those interested in where, Socrates presents this image in the Republic 488a in support of his argument that the philosophers should rule.
For the sake of the argument I am going to put aside the historical question and treat Plato's Socrates as the same man who defends Athenian democracy in the Crito and criticizes democracy elsewhere.
With this in mind, we can conclude that Socrates is not persuaded by this argument. In the argument he makes in the Crito he is silent on the fact that Athens is a democracy. It is the laws of the city that he must answer to (50a). Although not mentioned by name, the Athenian lawgiver the "wise Solon", stand above the multitude as one capable of doing great things, and thus as one to be heeded.
Solon was no longer alive and could not address Socrates, but the wise laws he established can. The question arises as to the status of those laws and their administration. In more general terms the question is whether the claims Socrates makes on behalf of the laws hold up to critical examination.
I think Socrates gives us reason to think they don't. I will address some of them, but first, if this is right, if the city and the laws are not as just as he makes them out to be, why does he think it is still his duty to obey them?
OK. Then you already have a firm grasp of Crito and at a deeper level.
[I need to know more about 'Normativity', a quick google:
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/normativity/v-1]
Quoting frank
Unfortunately, I need to leave the discussion for about 5dys.
You guys are providing food for thought. It's all good! Will see if I can add anything later...
Cool.
Socrates sings the song of the law. A nomos nomos, a song of songs, in which the law lays claim to us.
Plato does make one comment that connects to other texts. The following from Crito :
is echoed in the Statesman:
Quoting Statesman, Horan translation, 303b
The seventh one is that of the Philosopher King. It is deemed the best but most unlikely to ever appear:
To your point regarding the rule of law, Plato distinguishes between good and bad forms of the regimes accordingly:
The distinction between regimes raises problems for Socrates' song. The city and laws ask:
(50b)
The key phrase here is "just enactment". Here he ignores the distinction between just and unjust cities and laws. He states that he refuses to play the part of the rhetorician who:
(50b)
but does take the part of the rhetorician in his defense of the city and its laws. Like the rhetorician his concern does not seem to be with the truth but with being persuasive. He even asks Crito:
(51c)
The best argument here is not the one that is true but the one that will persuade him to be obedient to the law. A noble lie may be preferable to the truth.
That leaves open the question of whether this should be the case in all regimes, even the most unjust. Should judgments always stand supreme? Is the fact that the city can be overthrown if the laws are not obeyed sufficient reason to obey?
The role of rhetoric may not lead to a 'truth' that cannot be put into question by facts. Crito does, however, put a lot of emphasis on distinguishing persuasion from coercion. Socrates ties his argument with Crito to his argument with Athens:
And that picture of coercion is said to destroy what was formerly trying to be saved:
The emphasis upon persuasion is twice compared with coercion in the following:
This does not answer your question of when judgements should (or should not) "stand supreme'. And the account does employ the 'noble lie' of our birthplace being said to be prior to our parents. But maybe persuasion has its own laws. Socrates claiming rights within certain conditions.
In so far as I understand Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein, the rule following aspect of language games is seen as troubling the view that such games involve the description of facts.
I see how that engages the theories of Quine, Davidson, Chomsky, etcetera. But I don't understand how that implicates the treatment of facts in law.
(50e)
This is straight out of Aristophanes' Clouds, where Pheidippides beats his father Strepsiades. (1330) Here persuasion and coercion are comically joined.
Is the distinction always clear? If I can persuade you by making the weaker argument stronger, isn't that a form of coercion? Note how the song of the law, as I think you pointed out, demands submission.
From 48-50 Socrates addresses Crito's argument that it's right to flee because so many aspects of public opinion support it. Socrates points out that we usually only pay attention to worthy opinions, which are those which aim to improve our lives (little bit of consequentialism). He asks a couple of times if adults suddenly change their values when the shit hits the fan and execution awaits.
One of the threads running through 48-50 is the question of whether the ends justify the means. Per Socrates, only children live that way.
Not to put too fine a point on it, but Kripke's point is that it ends up being an empty claim that communication involves rule following. This idea that we follow rules when we speak is an interesting hypothesis. It's not something supported by any facts (of the kind Kripke specifies).
I cannot argue that the distinction is always clear. The Aristophanes reference is well taken.
I admire Thomas Paine, as my forum handle suggests. His arguments for democracy are in tune with the problem of absolute power as described in Statesman. I wonder if our present condition is one where we cannot distinguish the regimes so clearly. Maybe the tyrannical, the oligarchs, and the dynamic of unfortunate public opinion coexist simultaneously.
It is interesting that you mention Thomas Paine. On the one hand Socrates might have regarded him as someone whose opinions in general should be considered, but his efforts, as an Englishman to become independent, would not have persuaded the law. We are servants of the city and its law, as Socrates speaking for it, demands.
As you point out, not all cities and all laws are the same. But Socrates said he found no fault with the Athenian laws of marriage or the education he received. (50-e) And yet, Socrates own teachings were deemed contrary to those of the city.
Quoting Paine
Our democratic republic is by design a mixed regime. In practice there is always the danger of it becoming something else. This raises the question of whether when the city and its laws devolve what allegiance do we still owe to it?
Earlier Socrates said that:
(49c)
How much weight should we put on presumably? (West translates this as "surely") Is the presumption wrong?
He goes on to ask:
(49e)
Socrates concern is twofold. Doing harm to people and doing harm to the city. By doing harm to the city he would be doing harm to the people of the city. By obeying the city, however, he would be doing harm to the enemy, which, according to what has been said, would be unjust.
In the Euthyphro a similar tension occurs. Euthyphro prosecutes his father on behalf of the gods. Although both dialogues are about justice, here there is no mention of either the laws or the city. In the Crito there is no mention of piety. In the Crito the laws are our master, here the gods are our master. In both there is the question of who is harmed by what is being proposed to be done.
The surrounding of a city seems to be bound up with what it is. The in between places are the premise of many wars. Outside the boundaries, as it is often described, is either a material claim or an existential struggle as Hegel described.
The laws ask:
(50b)
Would it be that there would be no city or would it become a different city, one with laws without their just enactment, or a city without law?
Put differently, is it a question of justice or survival? If, as the laws claim, the citizens are its servants or slaves, then what part does justice serve? Isn't justice replaced by obedience? Would it still the same city, still a democratic regime?
Contrary to the way Socrates frames it, the city in question is not just "any city". It is one whose laws are said to be enacted justly. The problem, however, is not simply justice but the force needed to prevent the law from being overthrown. Although Socrates talks as if it is a matter of persuasion, of convincing the city, that too would be a:
Philosophy poses a threat to the city. Socrates is silenced by force. The law proclaims that he does not stand on an equal footing with the law. To convince them would require doing the very thing they want to prevent him from doing, that is, philosophizing.
Added: West's translation has "judgments" and the following note:
In effect the claim is that the judgment of the law is just because it is the judgment of the law. But, of course, even the personification of the laws should not obscure the fact that the judgment was that of the many.
The laws say:
This is stated in the context of the claim that Socrates wouldn't have been born without the law. He was raised and flourished in the stability provided by the city. I'd add that city was an integral part of identities of Athenian citizens. In a number of ways, the citizens and the city are inextricable. You can't really have an Athenian without an Athens and vice versa. Since it was a democracy, rule of law was also inseparable from the city.
So the point was that by breaking the city's law, Socrates would be undermining the foundation of his own existence. Quoting Fooloso4
Well, you have to survive in order to act justly. This represents a challenge to any ideology, for instance if I'm a conservative and I stand against change, it would behoove me to recognize that sometimes societies need to evolve and standing against that is to oppose life itself. If my choice is between my beautiful conservative values and the very life of my society, which do I choose?
But the challenge is even more acute for an ideology that aims to destroy the existing social order without any plan for an alternative, which I think fairly describes the average leftist perspective.
But on a more materialistic note, historians claim that the very idea of living alone beyond the safety of a city was unthinkable for the average Greek. So if Socrates leaves, it certainly wouldn't be to wander. It would be to find another home in a city.
Quoting Fooloso4
Socrates was blamed for Athens' defeat at the hands of the Spartans. He had previously publicly lauded the Spartan way of life, which probably wasn't the smartest thing to do. He irritated the crap out of the Athenians, so he became a target. More philosophizing probably wouldn't have helped. Our own local Socrates is @Banno. Imagine that he's now being tried for corrupting the minds of the youth. It's that kind of thing.
Good point. The law says:
(50d)
The question of paternity and paternalism becomes even more evident in the West translation when later in the same speech when the laws refer several times to the "fatherland". Horan translates it as homeland.
Quoting frank
Yes, but can a city survive and not be just? Is it sometimes necessary to act unjustly in order to survive?
Quoting frank
It might be worth looking at what he (Plato's Socrates) said and compare it to what the law says here.
I don't know :grimace:
(29c)
(37d)
Whatever allegiance he might have to the city, when it comes to philosophy he will not be obedient to it. According to the laws, to do so would be to subvert the judgment of the law, and thus would be to act unjustly. But Socrates says he would never knowingly do harm or act unjustly.
Note that at 29c he is addressing the men of Athens. At best only a few
(44c)
It is the opinion of the men of Athens that Socrates is doing harm to the young people. His disobedience suggests that he thinks that whatever harm and injustice to the city and its laws his disobedience may cause, the suppression of philosophy is a greater harm.
But he wasn't disobedient. He stayed and drank the hemlock.
Who do you include in this description?
The description is of a revolutionary ideology, so people like Bolsheviks, Chinese and American communists, etc., and of course anyone who sympathizes with that crowd.
This is something we need to try and make sense of. In order to do so, I think we need to go back to the problem of the greatest good and the greatest harm.
(44d)
It would seem that the laws they make cannot either. For if they could Socrates would have been able to find one or more in Athens who are wise. As we know from the Apology, he did not.
Socrates' concern with the greatest good led to the rejection of the laws as the greatest good. He puts the pursuit of wisdom above the law. The laws can vary from place to place, but the truth does not. For Socrates living well, that is, living the examined life, was a greater good than simply living; and the threat to philosophy a greater harm than the threat to his life. The end of his life would not be the end of philosophy.
The law cannot make one wise, but perhaps the pursuit of wisdom can lead to making wiser laws. In the Apology Socrates says:
(32a)
If the men who make laws are to be persuaded it would not be through political speech and action, but by the very thing they are trying to prevent Socrates from doing. By silencing Socrates they harm themselves for they lose the opportunity to be made wiser.
The law claims:
(52d)
As Socrates pointed out in the Apology, it was not until now that his philosophical pursuits are being judged to be illegal. The argument could be turned around. For much of his life, doing what he does and saying what he says was not prevented by the law. By its actions or lack of action the law agreed to allow him to engage in philosophy.
Crito's attempt to persuade him to flee comes too late. We can only speculate as why Socrates did not choose exile. In the Apology (37d) he says it is because the same thing would happen, the young people will listen to him and this will lead to banishment by their fathers and relations. (37e) He does not say the fatherland, that is, the laws, but the men of whatever city he is in. Philosophy is at odds with the ancestral ways, the ways of one's father, the ways of the family.
Given his advanced age perhaps the most important thing he had left to give philosophy is not more words but a final demonstration of something he has often said: philosophy is preparation for death. If in death he arrives in Hades he will meet his final judgment. He is confident that those who rule there will not judge the life of philosophy as harmful or unjust. The laws agree, putting the blame not on themselves but on the men of Athens.
(54b-c)
When Socrates says in the Apology that he will not cease engaging in philosophy he is addressing the men of Athens. (29d) In line with the distinction the laws have made, his disobedience would not be to the law but to the men of Athens. The distinction is problematic, but leads to another consideration.
Perhaps Socrates was wrong in disregarding the opinions of the multitude, for they have decided his fate. Although he may not care about what they will do to him, he should care about the tension between philosophy and the city. The many will never become philosophers, but the philosophers can and should learn how to speak to the people in order to persuade them that philosophy, with its concern for what is just, and noble, and good, benefits the city.
I agree. But what do you think of the case Socrates' Law has made in Crito? Are you convinced or not?
I am convinced of the importance of just law, but not that he is the slave (West translation) of the law. The Greek term is "doulos". I don't know why Horan translates it as servant, but possibly because a servant is able to leave (51d). This would be a kind of social contract, but there is no contract or agreement between master and slave. As the argument progresses this claim is dropped, in favor of the idea of an agreement.
Leaving this aside, we can consider the rest of the claim in this passage, that he is the offspring or son of the law. While a son may have an obligation to obey a father who is just and good, what is his obligation to a father who is not? The speech of the law does not make this critical distinction.
The distinction and blurring of the distinction between the law and the people who make, decide, and administer the law is also problematic.
As quoted above, the law, so to speak, washes its hands of the matter by admitting that Socrates was treated unjustly, only not by the law but by men.
I've still to read through all the posts and re-read Crito.
However, this latest made me wonder as to the importance of the use of the word 'slave'.
Quoting Fooloso4
That's a very good question - and what difference does it make to our reading or understanding?
As to the choices available to Socrates or anyone in life, how much freedom do we really have?
When we can imagine, or research, any alternative life does it fit with who we are, or think we are? What would convince us that it would be better to leave - 'the grass is always greener' - (slave to emotion?). Or to stay - 'no matter where you go, there you are' - (mastery of self?).
Master/Slave is a mental system, no?
[Another thing, could this be related to the old dichotomy of female(emotion)/male(reason). With all the male characters, dancing and fighting, in Plato's dialogues, how much 'eros' is present?
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-friendship/#toc ]
Laws of the state change from just to unjust and back again.
When it comes to civil rights, the speed at which change occurs can be excruciatingly slow (to build and progress) or appallingly quick (to destroy and regress). How much control does the individual have? What is at stake for present and future generations? What is Plato's overall agenda re Philosophy?[*]
***
I looked for the West translation you mentioned earlier (did you leave a link?)
This morning, I found this free downloadable pdf:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1023142
Socrates of Athens: Euthyphro, Socrates' Defense, Crito and the Death Scene from Phaedo
58 Pages
Cathal Woods
Virginia Wesleyan College; Virginia Wesleyan University
Ryan Pack
Virginia Wesleyan College
A quick search through 'Crito' (starts p44/58), the word 'slave' is mentioned 3 times:
At 50e, 52d and 53e.
***
[*] Crito, then can be seen as the Emotional beaten by the Rational (Socrates). Nevertheless, here we have the art/creativity of the dialogue along with logical steps/argument process and... a barely mentioned spiritual element. The presence of Socrates' daimonion?
Plato incorporates all. The struggles between the master and slave; state and the individual; art and logic. Drama and humour. Mind, body and soul. The whole and the interrelated parts. Tragedy and comedy.
Doesn't the start of philosophy lie in the wondering...and communicating...I suppose 'eros'...?
Quoting SEP - Plato on Friendship and Eros
The following picture drawn by Socrates captures some of the tension symbolized through gender roles:
Quoting Symposium, 203b, translated by Horan
This view puts Socrates turning down the wealth of Crito as a resource into a certain light. It does not fix the kind of poverty that has befallen Socrates.
What is at issue can be seen if we put it in the form of a question: are the laws for the benefit of man or is man for the benefit of the laws?
Quoting Amity
From the Phaedo:
(66c-d)
Quoting Amity
Or rather, its conspicuous absence. It plays a significant role in the charges brought against Socrates in the Apology, where he is accused of believing in:
(24b-c)
Here Socrates claims:
(46b)
His daemon, however, does not provide any reasons when warning him against doing something.
I don't think he refers to this divine force as a 'daemon'.
It is his daemonion, a 'voice' he hears.
A special, spiritual consciousness or 'being' to save him from anything that might harm his moral or intellectual values/beliefs.
For most of the argumentation, Socrates takes his time, seeking agreement from Crito.
Then, from 52e until the end, there is no breathing space.
The personalised voice of the accusatory laws takes over. It is unrelenting, even referring to the laws of Hades. The next world will not receive Socrates graciously...
This voice stems from Socrates. [Perhaps directed by his daemonion?]
It seems to come from a higher self or self-consciousness.
When I read it, it felt like a 'stream-of-consciousness'. Is it?
If we read the dialogue aloud, might we better hear the increased pace of Socrates' thought processes.
His inner voice and external voice letting rip? The sounds of frenzy:
Quoting Horan
It seems his mind is overwhelmed by a mix of reason and a spiritual element; his daemonion warning him against escape.
It left Crito with nothing to say.
Socrates has the final word in the Dialogue but leaves us with more questions.
Quoting Horan
The way god, or 'the god' leads us.
Apollo? Or philosophy?
I will need more time to read and reflect on that and this (or this and that):
Quoting Fooloso4
I need to read Crito to fill in more than a few of my gaps in understanding.
In other words, I'm perplexed, puzzled and pleased to participate in Plato's piece.
You are right, he always refers to it as his daemonion. I have not paid much attention to this and do not feel qualified to say much about it. There is no consensus, however, as to who or what it is the voice of. Here is a brief discussion of his divine sign.
Justice (dike) is more important than law (nomos). Law is in the service of justice, but they can be in conflict. Consider, for example, the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens. There can be unjust laws and unjust administration of the law. The speech of the law glosses over this problem.
Gods, not men, rule in Hades. As the law says in this passage, Socrates was treated unjustly by Athens. It does not claim that he was treated unlawfully. But justly or not, for Socrates to disobey the judgment of the city would be unjust. More important than any specific judgment by the city is the preservation of the law. Unjust laws cannot be changed and made just if law is discarded.
According to the law, man in the service of justice rather than justice being in the service of man. But does the law overstate its case?
Absolutely. But the speech Law has been giving (through Socrates) puts Law as the source of both Athens and Socrates himself. Since there can be no justice without an Athens or citizens, Law trumps justice in this case. The Law says that even if it is unjust, the citizens should still bow to it. It says the citizens had a chance to influence the law, and now they must submit to it for the sake of the city.
It's hard not to see this as proto-social-contract theory. Society is the foundation of your existence, so you owe it obedience. And this is linked in some ways to the Stoic view that normativity is built into nature itself. The tree that grows toward the light thrives. The citizen who supports the Law (in a democracy) will thrive. It should be in your nature to support that which gives you life.
Quoting Fooloso4
I'm not really interested in sorting out who's right or wrong here. It's just opposing views orbiting the idea of normativity.
I think the law has it backwards. There would be no human nomos, that is, not simply laws and statutes, but custom or convention or norms, without men. Prior to cities there were families and tribes. If whatever the head or chief ruled was law then the distinction between the rule of law and the rule of men collapses.
Plato recognized the conflicting demands of the family and the city. This is why in the Republic the just city abolishes the family by hiding who one's biological parents and children are.
The distinction between just and unjust laws raises the problem of the source or standard of justice. The speech of the law, however, does not make such a distinction.
The ancient Greeks distinguished between nature (physis) and convention (nomos). If, along with the Stoics, we accept the claim that man is the rational animal, then to live according to nature is to live according to reason not according to conventions or norms.
Quoting frank
If there was a contract then what was the obligation on the side of the law? For his whole adult life Socrates practiced what he is now forbidden to do. Did the city break the contract? When the Thirty briefly came to power was there a contract agreed to or did the new law simply impose its power?
Quoting frank
Does this mean that we owe obedience even when there is a radical change to the laws of a society? Suppose a regime comes to power that abolishes private property and declares that we are all the property of the state without any human rights. Suppose further that it restricts emigration. What do we owe it?
Quoting frank
Unless we are by nature slaves to the state and not free, then there must be limits to the demands of the state. If there is to be a social contract then one side cannot hold all the power.
We could definitely argue against the speech the Law has given, but it's clear within the context of this dialog that Socrates does accept what the law has said:
Quoting Fooloso4
In modern times we tend to think of the social contract as between citizens. We don't personify the Law the way Socrates has. As the IEP explains in its essay on the social contract, the binding elements of the contract show up in Crito in that the citizen stayed when they could have left:
Quoting Fooloso4
True.
I think that it is clear that Socrates wants Crito to accept it. It is also clear that Socrates abides by the decision of the court. Before imagining what the law will say he was already convinced that to flee would be unjust and to return an injustice with an injustice is unjust. This is not the same as accepting the words he puts in the mouth of the law.
At the risk of stating the obvious, it is Plato who imagines what Socrates imagines the law would say. Socrates fashioning this argument to convince Crito is not the same as Socrates being convinced by the argument. From the perspective of the reader the question is whether Plato is trying to convince
us. If we can argue against the speech I think it likely that Plato's Socrates could have as well. What is at issue is not simply why Socrates did what he did, which admittedly is puzzling, but what philosophers who come after him have to think about and do. In this case it means, at least in part, to learn what Socrates did not, but Plato and Aristotle did, that is, how to speak to the city and the law.
A couple of reasons to think that Socrates did not put the law above justice. In the Apology he says he would not stop engaging in philosophy even if the law prohibits it. He also refused to comply with the Thirty and arrest Leon of Salamis.
I don't think Socrates, who devoted his life to the truth based on giving a reasoned account, would be persuaded by words that resembled frenzied dancers and pipes.
His entire way of life is exactly what the law now demands he no longer practice.
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
The law has violated the terms of the agreement. But even so Socrates is unwilling to break the law.
It is true that Socrates was free to leave, but Athens was for him not simply where he lived. Although by leaving when that option was open he would not have broken the law, it would have broken his bond to the city which was not simply a legal one.
Food for thought. Your take is a little unorthodox, but that's fine.
Since my purpose was to focus on normativity, I'd say the take away is this:
Crito says that the foundation of normativity is the well-being of human social groups. So there's an element of selfishness to it, but it's not what I want. It's what we need to survive.
Do you give your life that your city might live? According to Lincoln, yes, you do.
Can you explain what you mean by a 'little unorthodox' in the way @Fooloso4 has tackled or read 'Crito'? It is only one of many ways to consider this piece.
You will know of them no doubt. Various analytic approaches sometimes run the risk of ignoring the literary and dramatic features. There is a complex and memorable interplay of voices - those of Plato, Socrates, Crito, the Laws, moral principles, family, friends, the city, and other states. Norms.
Developments of arguments and sub-arguments to disentangle and tease out.
Conflicting attitudes of translators/readers regarding textual ambiguities, like the word 'slave', 'the many'.
Just as Plato intended, even with a hint of irony and subtle humour.
***
[ An aside: talking about 'unorthodox', your OP is not exactly 'orthodox', is it?
Quoting frank
Different from what is expected. It is more like a PM invitation.
It doesn't meet the usual guidelines, but that's fine.
The mods usually let such stand if it results in a productive discussion. And it has, thanks! ]
***
[quote="frank;836996]
Since my purpose was to focus on normativity, I'd say the take away is this:
Crito says that the foundation of normativity is the well-being of human social groups. So there's an element of selfishness to it, but it's not what I want. It's what we need to survive.[/quote]
Where in the dialogue does it say this?
Is that all that it says?
What does Plato want us to 'take away' from a reading?
What is his goal?
Questions for a general and a specific 'you':
What happens to your mind when you are reading this carefully?
Do you accept all that is said - or do you continually ask questions of it?
Or is it simply a case of cherry-picking certain aspects for another project?
I hope the discussion continues to produce more questions/ideas than set answers.
I have plenty, still to sift through.
Isn't that what reading 'Crito' is all about? Developing capacities of mental discernment?
Quoting Fooloso4
I hope to read and respond to these substantive and thought-provoking posts later, thanks.
But for now, I think you have this spot on:
Quoting Fooloso4
[emphasis added]
The review of the Divine Sign book review is very interesting. It strikes me that the question of the daimonion is a looking glass for different approaches to Plato as a whole.
One example of that in the review is:
This expresses a problem I have with Vlastos' method in general, where analysis can make all matters into either/or conditions. Wrestling with either/or conditions in reference to the divine has also been a large component of the discussions in your OPs on Plato. In reading Crito, how to understand 'intuition' is a question when you observed:
Quoting Fooloso4
I don't know what might stand as an orthodox reading today but, to quote Marx:
(Groucho)
I take responsibility for my interpretation but I don't think there is anything there that is original.
The first mention of law does not occur until 50a. It is also here that we find the first mention of the city.
The first mention of justice occurs earlier:
(47c-d)
:razz: I don't know how philosophers are seeing it today either. I think of the orthodox reading as having come from Cambridge in 1927 or something.
What I like about your view is that it makes me think. My own view is like just analyzing the chessboard. Yours is more like actually playing the game. Very different approaches.
We tend to impose our own beliefs and ideas on what this term means. I think it helpful to consider something Homer, who in the Phaedo Socrates calls the Divine Poet (95a) says. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)
Sometimes when someone tells me that I apologize. (A serious joke.)
:up:
This simple and stark contrast between the 'majority' (the unknowing) and the 'one' (knowing) runs through the entire dialogue. And is open to question.
The different contexts and circumstances:
1. The expert should be valued more than the many.
The Opinions of the Many v Experts Argument, from 46d-47c.
Horan's translation: https://www.platonicfoundation.org/critias/
Who is the expert in Socrates' story? He is. And how do/could the majority of citizen voters know him? How did the court system work?
2. It leaves out groups who might not be deemed 'citizens'. The multitude of missing voices of the community. To understand better, some research is required into the complex social picture and structures of Ancient Athens.
Three major distinctions:
Quoting What do we really know about Athenian society - Cambridge Core
Emphasis added: did the same civic rules apply to other Greek cities?
This is relevant to Socrates' decision to live and remain in Athens. If he moved elsewhere would he be considered a 'metic'? We previously considered the use of the word 'slave' compared to 'servant' as applied to Socrates and his behaviour.
From wiki:
Quoting Metic - wiki
We can consider how fair or just this system is...to exclude so many from citizenship.
The idea of the 'social contract' appears central to the argument whereby citizens and state/city have a mutual understanding of what benefits entail.
But even then questions can be asked: Loyalty to who, at what cost?
Quoting Fooloso4
Exactly this.
***
Quoting Fooloso4
There is a spirit of custom and law that encompasses more than objective, generalised legal rules.
We find it in the subjective personal story of Socrates. The philosopher of Athens with soul.
There is more to be said. Later...
But he denies knowing anything noble and good (Apology 21d). We should be open to the possibility that no such expert exists. He does say that we should pay attention to some opinions but not others, but without knowledge on what basis can we determine which opinions are to be valued?
You are right. Even if we think we know our own 'story' better than anyone else, there is room for error.
Opinions, even of self, should be gleaned from what 'knowledge' is available.
Self-knowledge: we can have false beliefs about who or how we are.
We put on a face to self and others. Often surprised by their reflections right back at us.
When we point out that what someone says is sarcastic, they can respond by saying:
"That's not who I am!". Then, our opinion as stated is not valued. It doesn't fit the self-image.
Even if we try to explain that we didn't mean they are sarcastic, only what they said.
The damage has been done!
We can be rational, irrational or non-rational in choosing what we present or accept as evidence.
But as a juror, in a court of law, with life or death decisions - the best available evidence matters.
We rely on experts and witnesses - to do the best they can, in the circumstances.
When it comes to opinions, remember to cut them with care. No tears!
I returned to my 'Opinions' thread ( a year ago!) to re-read the exchanges:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13340/how-to-cut-opinions-without-tears/p1
'Knowing' people from previous posts, I put out a request to you and @Ciceronianus as 'experts':
Quoting Amity
Expertise is relative, as is wisdom.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wisdom/#WisRat
One problem is that if we are not experts or wise how can we evaluate whether someone else is? Socrates uses the example of a trainer. If he is able to improve someone's strength, endurance, and speed then we have good reason to think the opinion of the trainer regarding such matters is worth heeding.
What about Socrates? Was he guilty of corrupting the young? By the measure of the many who value the ancestral ways he was. His followers though will say that they have been made better. And yet, if they had been corrupted they might imagine they have been improved.
Ah, so many 'elephants and blind men'.
So many aspects of a concept, behaviour and perspectives:
The Wisdom Researchers and the Elephant: An Integrative Model of Wise Behavior
Quoting An Integrative Model of Wise Behaviour - Sage Journals
I am no expert, but the situation makes me think of Kafka:
Quoting Amity
I think that the claim has something to do with the story Socrates recounts in the passage I quoted above saying "Love is the son of Resource and Poverty." It is a view that encompasses all those who make, whether they practice philosophy, poetry, or making material goods through skilled arts.
The dialogue is filled with claims this person or that is wise and the honored one denying it is true. Philosophy must attract lovers in that environment.
I read Socrates taking up music during his confinement as one way to keep alive when deprived of his preferred 'medium.'
Oh, but you are. There is no denying that...relatively speaking!
I enjoy and learn from all your posts. I've still to give them the time they deserve.
The most recent:
You were an early and consistent responder in my very first 'Discussion' about willpower.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4796/willpower-is-it-an-energy-thing/p1
5yrs ago. Now, I wonder at my audacity and remember my struggles to understand and reply.
I return to it slightly red-faced and grateful to those, like you, who must have been shaking their heads but persevered. I never did have the willpower to finish reading The Republic and didn't follow through on all suggestions. Tsk, tsk!
Quoting Valentinus
I get this now. And thank you for your clear articulation and patience.
[quote=Valentinus;244172"]
Well, this is why I brought up the topic of thumos in the previous discussion. The closest parallel I can find between how it was discussed back then and later on is related to the experience of getting really pissed off.
[/quote]
Unfortunately, I left it there. With you seemingly pissed off! Oh, dear...
***
Quoting Paine
OK. No great knowledge of Kafka - so what does that mean?
I couldn't think, or was too lazy to - so looked it up:
Quoting Franz Kafka's Blue Period - Appreciating the Octavo Notebook Aphorisms By Alex Stein
To be a scholar of yourself. To know yourself. To the best of your ability.
Then, like Socrates, you can 'stand before any judgement seat clear of conscience'?
But, even though his intentions seem pure, he didn't write the poetry of the Dialogues, did he?
It was Plato. He returned to certain thoughts, over and over. The repetition interspersed with humour.
I had to laugh at this:
Quoting Horan translation
There will be further repetitions of the arguments in one form or another. Plato is having fun!
Crito is perhaps not Plato's Academy material but he, and his like, were important to Socrates.
Is this when philosophy became full of experts? A more formal public and private arena.
With this Academy would Socrates have survived any trial and votes by those who didn't know?
Quoting Plato: The Academy - IEP
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Quoting Paine
I haven't given the quote from the Symposium enough attention. Way back, I think I asked someone if they would start a discussion on that particular favourite! Or was I trying to re-create or imagine the place and people? Perhaps @Fooloso4 or yourself?
Quoting Paine
What would you say is the kind of poverty that felled Socrates?
The ignorance of the voting majority? Devoid of knowledge or desire/love for wisdom?
Socrates, then, sees the richness of the situation as being a way to learn and enlighten...
Is being imprisoned more conducive to thought/insight than an Academy?
Quoting Kafka - The Philosopher
Quoting Socrates - SEP
Interesting. I didn't know of this 'music-playing' Socrates.
According to a quick search:
Quoting Socrates - Minerva
I don't understand why it's thought that Socrates 'oppressed' this kind of mystical communication.
It doesn't fit in with how I imagined him to be...appreciative of all the senses. A higher awareness.
Listening to his daemonion. And so on. Wasn't music played in the Symposium?
Ah - do I remember the lyre players being dismissed? All the better to think?
A few quick comments:
Socrates says he has had this dream before and had always understood it to mean doing what he is always doing:
Now he thinks the dream meant:
So he:
Taking whatever stories that were at hand suggests that the content of music in the popular sense did not much matter.
Quoting Fooloso4
A song that he composes for Crito, but he does not write it down. It is not the equivalent of the written law. Perhaps there is a connection between Socrates taking Aesop, something already written and turning it into verse, and taking the law of Athens and turning it into music in the popular sense. In other words, a song for the many.
In the Phaedo, in response to his friend's fear of death Socrates says:
(77e)
Socrates' own music consists of arguments, but that will not do for the many who need to be charmed.
Thank you for your kind words. As you typically open up many more paths than I can follow, our "relative" wisdom will have to be placed side by side in the way described in Symposium:
Quoting Symposium, 175c, translated by Horan
I think Fooloso4's approach is a fruitful and rigorous way to compare texts in order to understand: Quoting Fooloso4
Without addressing the question of how much Socrates enjoyed the arts of the "many" (or the arguments in the Sorgner essay), I will observe Socrates is a character in Plato's plays. They are obviously more than plays, consisting of fixed characters being expressed through actors on a stage. Nonetheless, they are also artistic compositions. I have long found it interesting that Aristotle referred to Socrates as a 'moralist', suggesting that all the philosophy that can be found in the character is of Plato's making. That statement itself could be an urban myth shared amongst metics.
Continuing my suspension of how those dynamics relate to the arguments concerning the highest arts, I would like to make some observations about Socrates as a participant in audiences.
I start with the above passage from Symposium given above. I can only presume that Socrates was one amongst the "thirty thousand Greeks" who attended.
In the Index to my old collection of the Dialogues, there are over a hundred references to Homer, thirteen to Aeschylus, fourteen to Pindar, forty-seven to Hesiod, four to Sophocles, and I am sure I have left out others. There are the countless rituals and festivals Socrates takes part in. And there is the beginning of the Republic where Socrates makes an aesthetic judgement upon the procession he came to witness. The guy was no shut in nor likely to plug his ears when nearing the Sirens.
This is a long way to say that Socrates is sometimes found playing a role that does not reflect his understanding and other times puts that into the mouths of other people. So he speaks in the voice of the Law to satisfy Crito when he just can't get it. (I agree with you that there is comic element at that moment). The wisdom Socrates reports receiving from Diotima sure sounds an awful lot like the arguments Socrates makes on his own account.
I will mull over your other comments.
The first thing that comes to mind in making that comparison is that unlike the works of the playwrights the dialogues do not contain a chorus.
Good observation!
No hoi polloi. By that measure, the audience has less representation in the scenes.
Interesting that at the start and end of Crito, Plato invokes a sense of mystery; soul and mysticism.
Socrates takes his dream world as clear evidence. This adds to his dramatic character, someone with special, perhaps divine, knowledge. More than a logical, rational thinker.
Also, he suggests that Crito's watching and not wakening him is a serendipitous stimulus for his noble, beautiful prophetic woman. Ah, Fortuna! as a Roman might say. Fate.
Quoting Horan's Crito
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It seems Socrates is visited by a creative spirit or muse when he turns fables into verse. Also, there is a hymn to Apollo. Other people, including a poet. are talking about and wondering as to its meaning.
Quoting Horan's translation - Phaedo
Might this be the brain's reaction to forthcoming death? Sing now, or forever hold your peace. He is superstitious and needs to heed the call of his dreams. Socrates/Plato gives us musicality in poetry, music and philosophy.
Remember I mused earlier about the quickening, breathless pace of the final argument as a kind of stream of consciousness? Now I'm thinking of a jazzy vocal improv! The bookends of Crito as a reprise.
The repetitions are a rhythmic beat; a popular song that Crito might understand.
The characters dance before us as they sing...
Or something like that!
Are you sure about that?
What about the repeated refrains of the laws...
A quick response.
Impressive.
No. I plead ignorance. Perhaps you can persuade me.
I see that they are alike in so far as many voices sing as one, but my impression is that the chorus stands apart and is not a participant that speaks to the characters.
Oh, hell, you're not doing a Socrates on me, are you?!
What have I to persuade you of? I need to backtrack and underline the relevant:
Quoting Paine
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Amity
Quoting Fooloso4
The dialogues are not just like plays, they are plays with arguments, arguably Socrates' music.
Where might any 'chorus' be found? First, its usual setting:
Follow the links and all will be revealed:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_chorus
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Wasps
We can see that the chorus can help both the spectator/audience and the other characters with insight. Crito is the one to be persuaded but Socrates too, in a sense.
The members sang, danced, narrated and acted in unison; organised and in harmony.
And yet, in reality - who makes up the laws? Are there not conflicts of interest and tension?
Open and vulnerable to interpretation and corruption. T
So, this Chorus is like the Voice of the Laws in Crito. Even if spoken by Socrates, it is another participating character or actor. With strong, rhythm, repetitions - part of the song displaying persistent themes.
Quoting Greek chorus - wiki
Quoting The Wasps - wiki
Given the the addiction of old jurors, the fun trial and the chorus, the Wasps sounds fascinating.
My next read...
No. I thought the chorus did not speak directly to the actors.
There is another difference. The laws are not a separate character or entity, but Socrates speaking on behalf of the laws.
That just goes to show the sheer creative brilliance and imagination of Plato.
How clever was he. Russian doll ventriloquism.
The chorus is an independent voice. Part of the ventriloquist's joke is that the dummy has an independent voice.
It is an interesting question to what extent the voice of the law in the Crito differ from that of the law itself.
Yes. I think the first difference is clear.
The verbal expression by Socrates/Plato v the written laws of the constitution.
Whoever wrote it and when:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Athenians
Another article:
Quoting Draco - wiki
The dialogic drama lies in 1. 'the act of singing a song'; the characters are 2. 'a group of singers'. Both synonyms for 'chorus' as per wordhippo thesaurus.
From the mind of Plato > Socrates, Crito, the laws speaking via Socrates' mind.
The importance of internal and external communication to clarify or confuse. Or both in a cacophony.
The chorus is a 'refrain' of the song - the much-repeated comments and themes.
Justice, harm and retribution. Morality of the contract. The main theme of obedience to law.
Interesting to read of the final overwhelming music mix in Socrates' mind, even as he is calm.
Quoting Horan's translation
A striking mixture - even as he concludes:
"Well then, Crito, let it be, and lets act accordingly, since this is the way god leads us."
He does not agree with all aspects of the laws. More can be said on this.
Socrates' raison d'être is in keeping philosophy alive. It lives on after his body dies.
The laws can and will be changed.
This prompted me to check Oedipus the King (by Sophocles) and Aristotle gets this right. Oedipus acknowledges hearing the Chorus and converses with their Leader. This situation becomes pivotal to the drama because Oedipus insists that Tiresias speak in front of the assembly rather than take the option to hear from Tiresias privately.
Whoopsie.
To review previous posts and return to the question of when is it right to break the law:
[emphases added]
Quoting frank
You swerved the question. Almost as if you had no interest in the main theme of Crito. Or the imagination to consider what arguments/opposing views matter more.
It's not 'just' about orbiting views. The question continues to have relevance.
We would do well to consider it.
Quoting Paine
Perhaps our 'present condition' (national/global politics?) is due not only to increased power and riches in a few hands but lack of knowledge, education and more than a little complacency. Sometimes we only know 'what is going on' far too late. Laws are passed without due and careful process. We only know what 'public opinion' is by being told of it via the media and polls. Politicians on all sides manipulate and deepen the divides between 'the people' as they see fit.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes and yet the laws proclaim that they encourage and tolerate 'persuasion' from about 51b-52b:
Quoting Fooloso4
It is men fearing a loss of power, position and riches who have manipulated opinion in certain quarters.
I wonder how Socrates would react in today's political environment. For example:
This article about the climate crisis and Chris Packham's 'extraordinary, anguished think piece opens with an audio montage of Packhams desperate thoughts about the climate crisis, arranged so they chaotically overlap'. Is it time to break the law?
Quoting Is it time to break the law? - The Guardian
"We should be on a war footing" v "We have to have the rule of law"
Radical protests being 'counter-productive'.
So, being on a 'war footing' is fine - that is the preferred language.
Who is the enemy here?
When laws ban the right to protest and more besides, are 'they' asking for trouble?