Fractal Geometry in the Natural Selection
A big question in the philosophy of biology is: "at what level does natural selection occur?"
The most common answer is that genes are the basic unit of selection. However, biologists always questioned if selection is reducible to gene selection, and this disagreement seems more pronounced today. Note that those who say that genes are the fundamental unit of selection do not say that individual or group selection doesn't occur under any condition, but rather they say that such selection is primarily "reducible to" gene selection. For example, altruism can be explained solely in terms of the % chance that the genes of the altruist are passed on based on the altruistic behavior.
Part of the reason gene selection is so popular is because it is fairly easy to identify the physical substrate that makes up a gene, whereas defining a biological individual or species can get quite dicey in some situations.
To borrow a quote from Brown University:
To this list we can also add "form" and even "niche" as a unit of selection. More recently, biologists who view evolution as a computation through which the "sample space" of possible solutions to the problem of reproduction are tested, have suggested that forms can also be a unit of selection. For example, the forms that allow "heavier than air flight" or even the capability of "heavier than air flight" itself can be seen as a factor in selection. Because heavier than air flight gives a species/individual a huge benefit in reproduction, it is a solution that is explored. In this way, it is the final phenotype, or moreover, what that phenotype can do, that determines selection in the long run.
My question is, has anyone come across ways this is explored as a fractal process? It seems like reduction might not cut it here. We're looking at a process here and in processes "more is different," and thus reduction is not sure to work. It seems like it should be possible to see selection as the result of all these levels, including phenotype and epigenetic effects. After all, some species radically differ in their phenotype based on their early environment (enough to be mistaken for different species), and a radically different phenotype is going to inevitably have a massive effect on which genes get produced. Genes as the locus of all selection seems especially problematic when you consider than genes don't vary by cell. The fact that a human evolves to have a brain, liver, hands, eyes, etc. is all due to epigenetic effects where cells impose constraints on other cells in how they express those genes. Throw the genes in a different environment and you can grow nothing but liver cells or nothing but heart cells. This makes it look like genes are at best half the story.
The problem with the above view is that it seems to look for "either or" instead of "yes, and..." We can well imagine that in the long run group selection effects could purge a genome of cheating behavior even if cheating behavior is better for reproduction, although the more common outcome will of course be some sort of equilibrium where cheating behavior grows until there is too much, there is a die off, and then non-cheating behavior becomes ascendent for a period (periodicity in dynamical systems).
The most common answer is that genes are the basic unit of selection. However, biologists always questioned if selection is reducible to gene selection, and this disagreement seems more pronounced today. Note that those who say that genes are the fundamental unit of selection do not say that individual or group selection doesn't occur under any condition, but rather they say that such selection is primarily "reducible to" gene selection. For example, altruism can be explained solely in terms of the % chance that the genes of the altruist are passed on based on the altruistic behavior.
Part of the reason gene selection is so popular is because it is fairly easy to identify the physical substrate that makes up a gene, whereas defining a biological individual or species can get quite dicey in some situations.
To borrow a quote from Brown University:
Nature is organized in a hierarchical fashion. In terms of entities that can be heritable we can consider genes, chromosomes, genomes, individuals, groups, demes, populations, species, etc. Each of these entities meets the requirements of units that can be acted upon by selection. At which level(s) does selection act? Answer: all of them. What then is the important unit of selection? Answer: it depends.
To this list we can also add "form" and even "niche" as a unit of selection. More recently, biologists who view evolution as a computation through which the "sample space" of possible solutions to the problem of reproduction are tested, have suggested that forms can also be a unit of selection. For example, the forms that allow "heavier than air flight" or even the capability of "heavier than air flight" itself can be seen as a factor in selection. Because heavier than air flight gives a species/individual a huge benefit in reproduction, it is a solution that is explored. In this way, it is the final phenotype, or moreover, what that phenotype can do, that determines selection in the long run.
My question is, has anyone come across ways this is explored as a fractal process? It seems like reduction might not cut it here. We're looking at a process here and in processes "more is different," and thus reduction is not sure to work. It seems like it should be possible to see selection as the result of all these levels, including phenotype and epigenetic effects. After all, some species radically differ in their phenotype based on their early environment (enough to be mistaken for different species), and a radically different phenotype is going to inevitably have a massive effect on which genes get produced. Genes as the locus of all selection seems especially problematic when you consider than genes don't vary by cell. The fact that a human evolves to have a brain, liver, hands, eyes, etc. is all due to epigenetic effects where cells impose constraints on other cells in how they express those genes. Throw the genes in a different environment and you can grow nothing but liver cells or nothing but heart cells. This makes it look like genes are at best half the story.
First, some historical context. Serious consideration of a unit of selection other than the individual was advanced by V. C. Wynne-Edwards (1962, Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior). Populations have their own rates of origination and extinction and selection could thus operate at the level of the group. This idea is based on observation that many species tend to curb their reproductive rate/output when population densities are high. This behavior would favor groups that exhibited the behavior and select against those that did not; i.e., there would be group selection.
G. C. Williams responded to this idea with Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966) arguing that this behavior would be less fit than a cheating behavior where individuals did not reduce their reproductive output at times of high density/low food availability. In general selection at the level of the individual would be much stronger than selection at the level of groups. In keeping with Williams' claim that one should always seek the simplest explanation for selective/adaptive explanations, individual selection is usually sufficient to account for patterns.
The problem with the above view is that it seems to look for "either or" instead of "yes, and..." We can well imagine that in the long run group selection effects could purge a genome of cheating behavior even if cheating behavior is better for reproduction, although the more common outcome will of course be some sort of equilibrium where cheating behavior grows until there is too much, there is a die off, and then non-cheating behavior becomes ascendent for a period (periodicity in dynamical systems).
Comments (5)
But of course, phenotypes also get replicated, as do broad forms like wings, eyes, etc. Ants represent 20% of terrestrial animal biomass. That's a lot of replicated form, function, and phenotype in our world. Trees all share key formal features (hence how we can define them) and represent 80% of all terrestrial biomass period and shape the entire atmosphere's chemistry to a large degree. Trees have phenotypes that are construct the larger planetary environment that allows their genes to reproduce.
I think these days it is fairly widely understood, amongst those who have looked into the subject beyond high school biology, that there are selection effects that take place through changes in DNA outside the boundaries of genes. (Gene expression promoting regions of DNA, which are not themselves part of a gene, for example.)
So there is a sense in which definitions of evolution in terms of change in allele frequency over time is simplistic. However, perhaps when looked at on geological time scales, changes in allele frequency over time are such a dominant factor that such simplistic definitions are pragmatic for introducing people to the subject?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I haven't come across anything like that.
Right, that's what the debate is generally about; is the simplification pragmatically warranted or does it obscure important facts. It's pretty rare to see a denial of the fact that group selection can occur. It's not generally an argument about absolutes, but rather one about "what is most fundamental?" and what is "interesting, but not a central variation on the process."
That said, arguments about selection on the basis of form, defined broadly as "developing echolocation," or "developing the ability to fly" do seem fairly controversial. At least part of the fear here is that it introduces too much teleology in to biology, making it seem like purposeful development. But I've certainly seen arguments for selection on the basis of broad form/function made in ways that don't seem, at first glance, to be teleological at all. Generally, their framed as in terms of evolution as a scan of a sample space, and broad functional/formal adaptations being attractor regions in that sample space.
So, answers like this are pretty common:
But they seem messy. A sort of fractal model seems like it could address how different levels can look more primary depending on how you do your analysis.
https://www.nature.com/articles/514161a
Whereas many of the rebuttals (in this article or this one: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5329086/) focus on "predictive power."
The problem here is that genes only reproduce by virtue of the bodies they are in. Bodies do the replicating. Thus, if it was as easy to catalog and quantify variances in phenotype, in all observable properties of an organism, across a population (which would of course include all differences in genotype, since it is part of the body), it is prima facie reasonable to assume that any such models would be more predictive than gene-based models. We don't do tend to do modeling based on phenotypes in this way because it's incredibly difficult and you can't trace lineages the same way. That's not a good argument against their relevance though. This particular counter argument like saying the keys must be under the streetlight because you couldn't see them if they fell anywhere else.
Because you can make predictive models based on a host of factors, and it's unclear that "most important" = "most predictive," given problems with data collection and accurate modeling.
Anyhow, my inclination is to think that, if different levels of a hierarchical phenomenon can all recommend themselves to being "the/a big mover," then what you really might have is a fractal type problem where the same pattern is reasserting itself of different levels. Each one can show up in a model as predictive because it is following the same pattern as other levels. Then it's the overall pattern you really want to look at in the end. Whether or not this is feasible for experimental science is another question.
Thanks for the very substantive reaponse!
It will take me awhile to respond. I'm envious of your fluency.
For now I'm just going to nitpick. (I'm kind of a professional nitpicker, so I'm fluent in nitpicky.) :razz:
In the case of working evolutionary biologists, I don't see it as a matter of fear that "it introduces too much teleology in to biology". It seems to me that it is more a matter of such scientists being inclined to curiosity as to what sequence of events resulted in such a phenotype - what might be developed by way of a best explanation?