Evolutionary Overreach: Midgley suggests that some scientists and science popularizers overreach by making broad philosophical or moral claims based on evolutionary theory. They treat evolution not just as a biological theory but as a complete worldview or ideology.
"Just-so" Stories: Midgley critiques certain evolutionary explanations, especially in the realm of sociobiology, as being akin to Rudyard Kipling's "just-so" stories speculative narratives that seem more about confirming existing biases than rigorous scientific explanations.
Just to be the devil's advocate here, but doesn't it seem plausible that only animals have the capacity for "qualities" (experience, a point of view)? And even amongst animals, doesn't it seem plausible that only animals with some form of nervous system have this capacity of qualities/experience/point of view? That being said, can there be some sort of Transcendental Theory of Neurofauna?
Also, not all evolutionary theories are "Just so", per se, but descriptive. A "just so" story might be something like, "Our ancestor's propensity for favoring the strongest alpha male, is why we have a strong tendency towards fascism". But, a theory that describes how language evolved in humans by examining various models that fit the evidence from artifacts, brain development and anatomy, developmental psychology, etc. might be a legitimately descriptive theory?
Here is a ChatGPT version of the evolution of language for example:
1. Primate Ancestry: Limited Communicative Abilities (Approx. 5-7 million years ago)
Our common ancestors with chimpanzees relied on basic communication skills, primarily using gestures, vocalizations, and facial expressions to convey simple intentions and immediate needs. Their communication was limited in complexity compared to the emerging human capacity.
2. Emergence of Shared Intentionality and Collaborative Foraging (Approx. 2-3 million years ago)
In the Homo lineage, around 2-3 million years ago, Homo habilis and Homo erectus emerged. These early humans started relying on collaborative foraging and tool use, requiring increased coordination and the sharing of intentions to hunt, gather, and cooperate effectively. Shared intentionality began to develop in response to the need for better communication during cooperative activities.
3. Enhanced Cognitive and Motor Skills: Adaptation to Varied Environments (Approx. 2 million years ago)
Around 2 million years ago, the Homo lineage underwent significant developments in brain size, cognitive abilities, and motor skills. Enhanced cognitive and motor capabilities allowed for more intricate coordination and complex motor planning necessary for cooperative activities, setting the stage for the further development of language-related brain regions.
4. Emergence of Basic Language Elements and Chomsky's Universal Grammar (Approx. 1.5 million years ago)
As Homo species faced complex cooperative tasks, basic language elements and rudimentary grammar started to emerge. Chomsky's universal grammar, a theoretical construct proposing inherent grammatical structures in the human brain, played a role in shaping the fundamental structure of early language.
5. Broca's Area Specialization: Language Production and Planning (Approx. 1 million years ago)
Around a million years ago, Homo species faced increasingly complex cooperative tasks that demanded precise planning and articulation of intentions. Broca's area began to specialize, enabling the production of structured language and grammatical rules, surpassing the communication capabilities of other primates.
6. Wernicke's Area Development: Language Comprehension and Understanding Intentions (Approx. 500,000 years ago)
Approximately 500,000 years ago, as cooperative tasks and cultural activities became more intricate, Wernicke's area in Homo sapiens specialized further to interpret nuanced meanings, understand shared intentions, and process an expanding vocabulary associated with complex cooperative tasks and cultural nuances.
7. Development of Self-Talk and Internalized Language (Approx. 100,000 - 50,000 years ago)
As Homo sapiens evolved, the ability to engage in self-talk and internalized language emerged. This capacity allowed for complex thought processes, reflection, and the development of abstract concepts, further enhancing communication and planning for complex cooperative endeavors.
8. Language Explosion and Cultural Transmission: A Distinctive Human Trait (Approx. 70,000 - 50,000 years ago)
Around 70,000 to 50,000 years ago, a significant leap in linguistic complexity occurred. Language exploded in its richness and complexity, enabling abstract thought, storytelling, and the transmission of culture across generations. Michael Tomasello's theory of shared intentionality played a crucial role during this phase, emphasizing the evolution of cooperation and communication, further enhancing the unique linguistic and cultural abilities of Homo sapiens.
First, I'll note that Schopenhauer1's comment above was in response to an extract of a précis I posted of Mary Midgley's book, Evolution as Religion, in the thread Mind-Created World. Details of Midgley's book can be found here.
doesn't it seem plausible that only animals have the capacity for "qualities" (experience, a point of view)? And even amongst animals, doesn't it seem plausible that only animals with some form of nervous system have this capacity of qualities/experience/point of view?
I'm attracted to the philosophical idea that the emergence of even the most simple organisms, is in some sense the appearance of intentionality as a mode of being. As Thomas Nagel argues,
The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order our structure and behavior in space and time but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience how it is from the point of view of its subject without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
I suggest that the 'subjective essence of experience' is one of the connotations of the term 'being' when used as a noun - that 'a being' is precisely the kind of entity that possesses the element of subjectivity, even if in rudimentary form. This is the point at which qualities of being a.k.a qualia start to become manifest.
(There's a paper by Evan Thompson on something similar to this idea, I'll see if I can find it and report back.)
Also, not all evolutionary theories are "Just so", per se, but descriptive. A "just so" story might be something like, "Our ancestor's propensity for favoring the strongest alpha male, is why we have a strong tendency towards fascism". But, a theory that describes how language evolved in humans by examining various models that fit the evidence from artifacts, brain development and anatomy, developmental psychology, etc. might be a legitimately descriptive theory?
For me, the 'just so' is a product of both the orator and listener. It is our quickness to accept scientific statements along with their baggage that is the particular quality that makes them attractive as carriers for non-scientific ideology. More often than not, it seems of a kind of positivity bias, a juxtaposition of scientific imagery that is that it presents itself in a language of form. Primates used logic to express immediate need. This led to further development of x part of the brain that mediates language, etc. Statements like this carry baggage, like for instance the idea of the individual narrative, the modern self, and the accidental. These are not particular to the quality of the science, but inherited by the form of the storytelling.
schopenhauer1October 05, 2023 at 01:23#8428750 likes
I suggest that the 'subjective essence of experience' is one of the connotations of the term 'being' when used as a noun - that 'a being' is precisely the kind of entity that possesses the element of subjectivity, even if in rudimentary form. This is the point at which qualities of being a.k.a qualia start to become manifest.
Sure, but when precisely that being begins, is the hard part. Is intentionality really qualitative? I would say it's a good contender for a point of view, but not necessarily qualities. An amoeba has reactions, but not intentions it would seem. Sponges have the most basic neural nets, but are insufficient for intention. Perhaps the most basic experience is found in the jellyfish and the worm as they perhaps move towards light and chemicals, though that gets murky between experience and stimuli. Perhaps we would have to start at mollusks or arthropods or insects for first real experiences. But then what is the differentiation here?
As you state with your quote, physical descriptions can only capture behaviors and morphology, not internal subjectivity. So I can imagine answer being something like "There has to be differentiation enough in the neural networks, such as to specialize and feedback to itself". But that is all descriptive and doesn't seem to confer why that is subjective, and the causal loop is closed off still.
An amoeba has reactions, but not intentions it would seem.
Not what we understand as 'conscious' intention, but they can learn. I also agree that borderline creatures, like sponges and jellies, don't meaningfully manifest much in the way of intentional action, but even so many quasi-intentional behaviours can be observed on the level of the organic molecules that comprise them. (Take a look at From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning, Steve Talbott.)
schopenhauer1October 06, 2023 at 02:01#8431300 likes
Primates used logic to express immediate need. This led to further development of x part of the brain that mediates language, etc. Statements like this carry baggage, like for instance the idea of the individual narrative, the modern self, and the accidental. These are not particular to the quality of the science, but inherited by the form of the storytelling.
Indeed, I'd agree here. Evolutionary biology and anthropology can be a form of storytelling. You are making inferences that don't necessarily connect in a the way a physics experiment might, for example, But even physics also has the storytelling aspect. For example, what explains various paradoxes in quantum mechanics? There are various theories telling that story. Granted, biology as far as we know, has many more pitfalls of multiple causation due to complexity of organisms, environment, and history, but there are some models that seem to do a better job at organizing the data into a coherent understanding than others. There is getting data and there are theories that interpret that data.
If we are to have any value come out of the sciences, other than technology, it would be getting a better synthesis of what could have happened, or is the case, in regards to nature based on the evidence we have, and honing that or creating a better interpretation. This endeavor is likely to not end in some absolute consensus of interpretation any time soon, however.
If we are to have any value come out of the sciences, other than technology, it would be getting a better synthesis of what could have happened, or is the case, in regards to nature based on the evidence we have, and honing that or creating a better interpretation. This endeavor is likely to not end in some absolute consensus of interpretation any time soon, however.
I'm inclined to think gaining better understanding of our own natures would be more beneficial than more accurate understanding of our history, although the latter would surely contribute to the former.
schopenhauer1October 06, 2023 at 02:47#8431480 likes
I'm inclined to think gaining better understanding of our own natures would be more beneficial than more accurate understanding of our history, although the latter would surely contribute to the former.
:up:
Agree-to-DisagreeOctober 06, 2023 at 09:30#8431850 likes
Just to be the devil's advocate here, but doesn't it seem plausible that only animals have the capacity for "qualities" (experience, a point of view)?
A plant (e.g. a tree) can produce toxic chemicals as a response to being eaten. Isn't this an example of experience?
Some of these trees can communicate with nearby trees and pass on the message about the risk of being eaten. The nearby trees produce the toxic chemical even though they haven't been eaten yet.
Doesn't a Venus flytrap show some of the qualities of an animal carnivore. It just can't walk around. :grin:
There are some fish and animals which work in a similar way to a Venus flytrap. They lure the "food" close and then eat it.
Count Timothy von IcarusOctober 06, 2023 at 15:26#8432360 likes
I think it's a bit of an historical accident that evolutionary biology has become so tied to battles over religion. Basically, you had support for evolution and its popularization firming up around the same time that people began to notice some deep problems with the conception of an eternal universe paired with snowballing evidence for our universe having started to exist at some point in the (relatively) recent past. 14 billion years ain't much compared to infinity after all.
Evolution was seen as a silver bullet to put down creationist dogmas, and because creationists reacted poorly to the building support for evolution, trying to ban it from schools, etc. the two issues became tied together. But then evidence for a "starting point" for the universe was also seen as a big win by proponents of a "first cause," or "prime mover." Popular athiestic opinion had been in favor of an eternal universe to that point precisely because a starting point reeked of God. But aside from evidence for the Big Bang, problems like Boltzmann Brains began to crop up for the eternal universe.
And so the ideas seem to have become tied at the hip. The idea that evolution was a silver bullet for religion is born partly out of the religious reaction to evolutionary theory, partly because it had to become the silver bullet now that first cause was back in the popular mind. You see this today. Theists want to talk about the Fine Tuning Problem, the Cosmological Argument, Cosmic Inflation, etc. and militant atheists, your Dawkinses, etc. want to talk about natural selection.
IMO, these are completely contingent relations, and neither field has any special relation to evidence for or against a God. Plenty of theists have made their peace with evolution and evolution even seems to pair quite nicely with some views of God as unfolding dialectically, or views of natural teleology. But since evolution was historically a battleground over religion, it has remained one by inertia. And this is why we see "evolution as religion," Reply to Wayfarer. It is supposed, dogmatically IMO, that any theory of evolution necessitates that evolution occurs through "blind random chance" and thus it seems to preclude the possibility of purpose, cutting the legs out from most religious claims.
I agree this is a powerful force in modern science/scientism. Neurodarwinism was largely attacked, not because the processes it described weren't isomorphic to the process of natural selection, and not because it lacked predictive power, but precisely because "fire together, wire together and neuronal pruning are inherently interlinked with intentionality," and "evolution simply cannot admit intentionality." And you see this is similar arguments over whether lymphocytes production is "natural selection," if genetic algorithms fail to mimic real selection because they "have a purpose," if lab grown "DNA computers" actually "compute," and in Extended Evolutionary Synthesis.
I don't see an explanation for the strength of the dogma accept for the "religion-like" elements of how evolution has been used re: scientism. Maybe there is something I'm missing, but selection processes seem like they could involve intentionality or not and still be largely the same sort of thing.
If we are to have any value come out of the sciences, other than technology, it would be getting a better synthesis of what could have happened, or is the case, in regards to nature based on the evidence we have, and honing that or creating a better interpretation.
Yes, but you have pulled a switcheroo on the word 'value,' which is here supposed to mean 'applications to.' We're not talking about science as having any value beyond analytic and synthetic proposals that convey the essence of a thing. They are not going to be the key that unlocks reason, consciousness, the meaning of life, or any other glossy-eyed delusions.
I think it's a bit of an historical accident that evolutionary biology has become so tied to battles over religion.
It looks to me like a historical inevitability. Religions tell stories that our relatively uninformed ancestors came up with, to explain the nature of ourselves. Scientific investigation into the nature of ourselves yields something quite different. A lot of people like those old stories a lot better than they think they would like the view from a scientifically informed perspective.
People keep saying things like this. Where's the evidence that they really made up those stories, and for those stated purposes?
The evidence is in the multitude of different mutually contradictory stories. They can all be wrong, but they can't all be right.
How implausible the stories are is evidence for them being a product of relatively uninformed thinkers.
I can see how you might have interpreted me as suggesting that the original story tellers told their stories for religion's purposes. That isn't what I intended to convey, so let me try to clarify. I probably should have put "that our relatively uninformed ancestors came up with" in paretheses. Religions (communities of religious followers) propagate claims about the nature of ourselves which are based on stories that the religion originating story tellers told.
What religion doesn't make claims about what we are?
The evidence is in the multitude of different mutually contradictory stories. They can all be wrong, but they can't all be right.
That's assuming that those stories were invented (?) for the purposes that you claim. How do you know they were invented for those purposes?
How implausible the stories are is evidence for them being a product of relatively uninformed thinkers.
Again, that's assuming the purpose you ascribe to them is the true and relevant one.
Religions (communities of religious followers) propagate claims about the nature of ourselves which are based on stories that the religion originating story tellers told.
What religion doesn't make claims about what we are?
Of course. Has it ever occured to you that those stories, even when they are in the form of descriptions or explanations, are actually instructions, statements of the norms of the particular communities that told those stories?
That's assuming that those stories were invented (?) for the purposes that you claim.
No, I tried to make clear that I'm not assuming that the original story tellers had such a purpose, and make clear that I recognize a difference between the purpose of the original storytellers, and the way religions make use of the stories.
Has it ever occured to you that those stories, even when they are in the form of descriptions or explanations, are actually instructions, statements of the norms of the particular communities that told those stories?
Sure. I was a member of such a community when I was young. These days I recommend avoiding such a parochial view. There is a much more evidenced basis for understanding our natures, available to us these days.
I'm saying that I don't think religious narratives are meant for us to "understand" ourselves, but to become a particular type of people. Religions are all about how one *should* be. (Whatever narratives religions have about who we are and where we came from are in the service of how we should be.)
Reply to baker Is not "knowing thyself" the first step to becoming something other than what you already are? I mean, you could merely pay lip service to an imposed injunction, but that would not count as being a real change, but merely an act of self-repression designed to make you appear to others (and perhaps to yourself) to be living up to some introjected ideal. It would only be by understanding or knowing yourself that you would be able to tell the difference.
schopenhauer1October 21, 2023 at 08:16#8473780 likes
Yes, but you have pulled a switcheroo on the word 'value,' which is here supposed to mean 'applications to.' We're not talking about science as having any value beyond analytic and synthetic proposals that convey the essence of a thing. They are not going to be the key that unlocks reason, consciousness, the meaning of life, or any other glossy-eyed delusions.
Im not sure how I pulled a switcheroo, application to is what I meant.
That being said, I proposed focusing on neurofauna in biology as to where the dividing line is between behavior and mental. Whats the fundamental difference between the non-present POV of a sponge and (perhaps) the present POV of a jellyfish or worm?
Reply to schopenhauer1 In the end, doesn't the sponge have just as much to do with consciousness and mentality? Of course the sponge can't have a point of view, if what you mean by that is a mental 'map' of its own conscious life. But I might suggest that the sponge still could be said to have concrete being 'for itself.' Even in terms of its atomic structure, if you want to dabble in the scientific, it is built in such a way as to cohere itself and have a unified being that is continually representing its essential qualities. I might go as far as saying that it might not be possible to talk about mind or spirituality without considering matter not purely in content but also as a whole.
Alkis PiskasOctober 21, 2023 at 16:20#8474250 likes
In the end, doesn't the sponge have just as much to do with consciousness and mentality? Of course the sponge can't have a point of view, if what you mean by that is a mental 'map' of its own conscious life. But I might suggest that the sponge still could be said to have concrete being 'for itself.' Even in terms of its atomic structure, if you want to dabble in the scientific, it is built in such a way as to cohere itself and have a unified being that is continually representing its essential qualities. I might go as far as saying that it might not be possible to talk about mind or spirituality without considering matter not purely in content but also as a whole.
So the big deal I see is that sponges have very basic neural networks that most scientists agree is behavioral but without a mental representation of the world. However, with animals like jellyfish, worms, and insects, the neural nets equates to a mental representation (however basic) of the world. My challenge is to understand what this fundamental difference between the two is. That right there is the essence of the origins of the hard problem of consciousness. However, this seems like an impossible question. It would seem on the surface, there shouldn't be any qualitative difference whereby on one side of the divide a certain number of neurons means no mental representation and on the other side, it does. What does that even mean?
My challenge is to understand what this fundamental difference between the two is.
If this is the aim of your work, an excellent topic. You are onto something here...
That right there is the essence of the origins of the hard problem of consciousness.
This speculation is where a problem of logical extension is occurring. The essence of consciousness may or may not include other components than simple rationality and functional neural networks; if a computer program could read it's own code, would it totally understand from that it's own place in the world as a computer program? You are leveraging this Darwinian outlook to claim a hypothesis that it rests on simple content has already been fulfilled. It has now become ideology and is no longer the scientific inquiry front that it was formerly impersonating. It works because you have made no scientific assumptions, but have included ontological ones instead, that do not affect the structure of the synthetic propositions outlined.
I suggest that the 'subjective essence of experience' is one of the connotations of the term 'being' when used as a noun - that 'a being' is precisely the kind of entity that possesses the element of subjectivity, even if in rudimentary form. This is the point at which qualities of being a.k.a qualia start to become manifest.
Wow! That is a deep philosophical insight. But, like all philosophical intuitions, it may not convince those who require physical evidence. Could subjectivity be evolutionarily associated with some physical development, like Broca's bit of brain? Seriously, I'm just kidding. :joke:
This speculation is where a problem of logical extension is occurring. The essence of consciousness may or may not include other components than simple rationality and functional neural networks
The kind of consciousness I am talking about wouldn't necessitate "rationality" but some sort of "awareness" of the environment, something akin to a "point of view" or "something it is like to be something".
if a computer program could read it's own code, would it totally understand from that it's own place in the world as a computer program?
I guess it is always the debate between map and terrain here. A computer program can behave any number of ways, but it would only be conscious if it had some sort of "something it is likeness" that it "felt".
It has now become ideology and is no longer the scientific inquiry front that it was formerly impersonating. It works because you have made no scientific assumptions, but have included ontological ones instead, that do not affect the structure of the synthetic propositions outlined.
Not sure what you are accusing me of here. But here is an article discussing the scientific propositions (at a high level for a broad audience, but based on harder scientific studies):
The arthropod eye, on the other hand, has one of the best-studied examples of selective signal enhancement. It sharpens the signals related to visual edges and suppresses other visual signals, generating an outline sketch of the world. Selective enhancement therefore probably evolved sometime between hydras and arthropodsbetween about 700 and 600 million years ago, close to the beginning of complex, multicellular life. Selective signal enhancement is so primitive that it doesnt even require a central brain. The eye, the network of touch sensors on the body, and the auditory system can each have their own local versions of attention focusing on a few select signals.
The next evolutionary advance was a centralized controller for attention that could coordinate among all senses. In many animals, that central controller is a brain area called the tectum. (Tectum means roof in Latin, and it often covers the top of the brain.) It coordinates something called overt attentionaiming the satellite dishes of the eyes, ears, and nose toward anything important.
All vertebratesfish, reptiles, birds, and mammalshave a tectum. Even lampreys have one, and they appeared so early in evolution that they dont even have a lower jaw. But as far as anyone knows, the tectum is absent from all invertebrates. The fact that vertebrates have it and invertebrates dont allows us to bracket its evolution. According to fossil and genetic evidence, vertebrates evolved around 520 million years ago. The tectum and the central control of attention probably evolved around then, during the so-called Cambrian Explosion when vertebrates were tiny wriggling creatures competing with a vast range of invertebrates in the sea.
Even if youve turned your back on an object, your cortex can still focus its processing resources on it.
The tectum is a beautiful piece of engineering. To control the head and the eyes efficiently, it constructs something called an internal model, a feature well known to engineers. An internal model is a simulation that keeps track of whatever is being controlled and allows for predictions and planning. The tectums internal model is a set of information encoded in the complex pattern of activity of the neurons. That information simulates the current state of the eyes, head, and other major body parts, making predictions about how these body parts will move next and about the consequences of their movement. For example, if you move your eyes to the right, the visual world should shift across your retinas to the left in a predictable way. The tectum compares the predicted visual signals to the actual visual input, to make sure that your movements are going as planned. These computations are extraordinarily complex and yet well worth the extra energy for the benefit to movement control. In fish and amphibians, the tectum is the pinnacle of sophistication and the largest part of the brain. A frog has a pretty good simulation of itself.
But here in this article we see an example of something I pointed out in a previous thread regarding the mixing of "mental" and "physical" such that there is a "hidden dualism". Notice in that last paragraph the following examples of this switching back and forth (without explanation of how one goes to the other):
An internal model is a simulation that keeps track of whatever is being controlled and allows for predictions and planning.
But what is the "simulation" here? What is that? (the HARD PROBLEM).
And here we see "internal model" is a "simulation" that "keeps track of whatever is being controlled, etc.". But wait, we skipped the good part. How is it the neurons are connected (in fact, the same as) the internal model/simulation?
The tectums internal model is a set of information encoded in the complex pattern of activity of the neurons. That information simulates the current state of the eyes, head, and other major body parts, making predictions about how these body parts will move next and about the consequences of their movement.
What is this "information encoded" "in the complex pattern of the neurons"? That seems like a nice little homunculus.
schopenhauer1October 22, 2023 at 18:57#8476310 likes
I am agnostic as to whether AI will ever be conscious. It was not too long ago that it was generally believed that a computer program and associated hardware could pilot a car. Such a thing was thought to require consciousness.
So the big deal I see is that sponges have very basic neural networks that most scientists agree is behavioral but without a mental representation of the world. However, with animals like jellyfish, worms, and insects, the neural nets equates to a mental representation (however basic) of the world. My challenge is to understand what this fundamental difference between the two is. That right there is the essence of the origins of the hard problem of consciousness. However, this seems like an impossible question. It would seem on the surface, there shouldn't be any qualitative difference whereby on one side of the divide a certain number of neurons means no mental representation and on the other side, it does. What does that even mean?
This 2021 article says that sponges don't have neurons but do have cells that may have some neuron like functionality. However, the investigation is very preliminary.
Also, it is an open question as to what extent very simple creatures like worms might achieve a rudimentary mental representation. Neurons can automate behavior without mental representation and I'm skeptical towards the idea that worms (or jellyfish) have even the most rudimentary mental representations. (Although projects like Open Worm may eventually provide evidence one way or another.)
Sheer quantity of neurons matters. Quantity of neurons plays a significant role in how complex the interconnections between neurons can be. It is (very crudely) analogous to the way that a higher transistor count in a microprocessor can allow for more complex calculations performed within a given unit of time. With 'surplus' neurons available an organism can have neurons which aren't directly involved with getting from sensory input to behavioral output. A network of 'surplus' neurons can sit alongside the neurons which manage basic survival, and instead of monitoring sensory inputs or participating in causing motor responses, the surplus network can monitor both the outputs of sensory neurons and motor neurons and learn about patterns to the organisms own operation that the more primitive I/O networks are not able to learn.
So this higher level monitoring might recognize something like, 'My automatic response the last time I saw something like that was to eat it, but the result was bad.', and manage to interfere with the behavioral output, so as to avoid a reoccurence of such a bad event.
I'd suggest that neurons available to learn a more complex way of interacting with the world are a prerequisite to mental representation. The more such 'surplus' neurons there are in a brain the more complex the mental representation can be.
schopenhauer1October 22, 2023 at 20:21#8476480 likes
I am agnostic as to whether AI will ever be conscious. It was not too long ago that it was generally believed that a computer program and associated hardware could pilot a car. Such a thing was thought to require consciousness.
Yes sure. But my point was that perhaps there is a difference in kind.
schopenhauer1October 22, 2023 at 20:25#8476490 likes
This 2021 article says that sponges don't have neurons but do have cells that may have some neuron like functionality. However, the investigation is very preliminary.
Also, it is an open question as to what extent very simple creatures like worms might achieve a rudimentary mental representation. Neurons can automate behavior without mental representation and I'm skeptical towards the idea that worms (or jellyfish) have even the most rudimentary mental representations. (Although projects like Open Worm may eventually provide evidence one way or another.)
Sheer quantity of neurons matters. Quantity of neurons plays a significant role in how complex the interconnections between neurons can be. It is (very crudely) analogous to the way that a higher transistor count in a microprocessor can allow for more complex calculations performed within a given unit of time. With 'surplus' neurons available an organism can have neurons which aren't directly involved with getting from sensory input to behavioral output. A network of 'surplus' neurons can sit alongside the neurons which manage basic survival, and instead of monitoring sensory inputs or participating in causing motor responses, the surplus network can monitor both the outputs of sensory neurons and motor neurons and learn about patterns to the organisms own operation that the more primitive I/O networks are not able to learn.
So this higher level monitoring might recognize something like, 'My automatic response the last time I saw something like that was to eat it, but the result was bad.', and manage to interfere with the behavioral output, so as to avoid a reoccurence of such a bad event.
I'd suggest that neurons available to learn a more complex way of interacting with the world are a prerequisite to mental representation. The more such 'surplus' neurons there are in a brain the more complex the mental representation can be.
But whence "mental representation" versus the prior "behavioral inputs/outputs"? How is it this difference in degree at least SEEMS to be a difference in kind? What is it, this change, this "mental representation"?
I suggest that the 'subjective essence of experience' is one of the connotations of the term 'being' when used as a noun - that 'a being' is precisely the kind of entity that possesses the element of subjectivity, even if in rudimentary form. This is the point at which qualities of being a.k.a qualia start to become manifest.
Wayfarer
Wow! That is a deep philosophical insight.
Not of my devising. Its really just an implication of Chalmers facing up to the problem of consciousness. The following is from the précis of Mind and Cosmos published in the NY Times:
[quote=The Core of Mind and Cosmos, Thomas Nagel; https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/the-core-of-mind-and-cosmos/] We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe (i.e. described by the natural sciences), composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.
However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order our structure and behavior in space and time but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience how it is from the point of view of its subject without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained . [/quote]
So it occurred to me on reading this that the appearance of living organisms just is the manifestation of Being, which becomes gradually elaborated and differentiated during the course of evolution. Im sure thats one of the themes found in Henri Bergson and Tielhard du Chardin although I havent read much of them.
But whence "mental representation" versus the prior "behavioral inputs/outputs"? How is it this difference in degree at least SEEMS to be a difference in kind? What is it, this change, this "mental representation"?
I would think an important aspect of it is that more neural net resources allow for more detailed memories. (Somewhat analogous might be the qualitative difference between the eight bit graphics of video games of the 1970s and the CGI we see today.)
By having a greater amount of memory (allowing for more detail in modelling our interactions with the world) we are able to develop more accurate and detailed models of ourselves in the world. That accuracy and detail provide a qualitative difference.
But whence "mental representation" versus the prior "behavioral inputs/outputs"? How is it this difference in degree at least SEEMS to be a difference in kind? What is it, this change, this "mental representation"?
Have a look at From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning Steve Talbott. Argues that organic life is qualitative from the get go, that the processes embodied in organic molecules already transcend the bounds of physical causation.
There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience how it is from the point of view of its subject without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
I agree, but where does the grounds come in to elevate the subject to such ultimate precedence? After all, once consciousness becomes subjective it begins to posit a Cartesian subject, and thus the tables are turned and the scientific explanation is really explaining the manifestations of the subject and leaving out the objective.
I see no reason why not to extend the concept of consciousness to ordinary objects like a rock or a waterfall that are not even able to move themselves. They still constitute subjects in the sense that cues of existence come from conscious perception and are described by the same internal concept of cohesion (ie: having internal self-representing qualities). Why is there nothing of consciousness in a rock? Because we define consciousness by the negation of our determination of a rock, neglecting its real essential continuation to ourselves. Because we seek imagination over analysis.
I see no reason why not to extend the concept of consciousness to ordinary objects like a rock or a waterfall that are not even able to move themselves.
There is much that can be learned about differences between rocks, and organisms which have evolved sense organs and brains. Perhaps a lack of such learning plays a role in your view?
I agree, but where does the grounds come in to elevate the subject to such ultimate precedence?
Because it's fundamental to what organisms are. It's the specific difference between even very simple organisms, and inorganic matter. Even the most simple life-forms encode and transmit information, maintain homeostasis, heal and grow. This is what the essay from Talbott above helps to distinguish.
Not of my devising. Its really just an implication of Chalmers facing up to the problem of consciousness.
OK. But I like your phrasing of the "problem of Consciousness" (psychology) in terms of the problem of Being (ontology) and Becoming (evolution).
First BE (physical instantiation), then Become (animation), then Know (perception), then know-that-you-Know (conception), then study how you know (reduction), then argue incessantly about why you think you Know what's possible-but-not-actual (erudition). :smile:
PS___ That last parenthetical term was supposed to be "philosophy", but I was looking for a word that ended in "---tion". :joke:
I have the idea that, just as energy can be defined as 'the capacity to do work', biological consciousness may be defined as 'the capacity for experience'. And that capacity always inheres in a subject of experience - which is never known as an object of perception.
Not sure what you are accusing me of here. But here is an article discussing the scientific propositions (at a high level for a broad audience, but based on harder scientific studies)
Thanks for sharing, it's an interesting article with a stupid title. But I find this some and what @wonderer1 is saying extremely interesting. What is the point of explaining consciousness? It is a fruitless and useless exercise in vain-glory. Sometimes it feels like the whole point of it is to supply a vehicle for a vain attempt at proclaiming the nature of reality as deterministic; essentially the cinders of post-christian abstraction. Keep in mind, I'm not talking about you specifically here. Just saying so because it is seeming like this is maybe is coming off more trollish than socratic at this point. For instance, what was the meaning of juxtasposing this specific article into our conversation after the line below?
You are leveraging this Darwinian outlook to claim a hypothesis that it rests on simple content has already been fulfilled.
The kind of consciousness I am talking about wouldn't necessitate "rationality" but some sort of "awareness" of the environment, something akin to a "point of view" or "something it is like to be something".
So you agree in the claim an identity of consciousness=subjectivity, so we are back again to 1600's Descartes philosophy.
Metaphysician UndercoverOctober 22, 2023 at 21:58#8476730 likes
Argues that organic life is qualitative from the get go, that the processes embodied in organic molecules already transcend the bounds of physical causation.
That's right, the organization inherent within organic molecules extends to the most fundamental levels of the physical parts of these molecules. This implies that the cause of this type of organization is itself not physical.
Because it's fundamental to what organisms are. It's the specific difference between even very simple organisms, and inorganic matter.
Could you clarify, are you saying subjectivity is fundamental to what organisms are or what is fundamental to what organisms are is subjectivity? In other words, are you simply defining what is fundamental to organisms as subjectivity or stating that what organisms are has the fundamental quality of subjectivity?
What about the subject that observes the subject and equates its subjectivity? I take it we are conveying a fully self-consciously anthropomorphic view of subjectivity. Flies having less subjectivty, humans the most, diatoms none, etc.
What is the point of explaining consciousness? It is a fruitless and useless exercise in vain-glory.
For me it has been a quite fruitful and useful in understanding being on the autism spectrum and understanding humanity more generally.
It's understandable that you haven't felt the need to educate yourself in a similar way, but it would be silly of you to consider yourself meaningfully informed about the topic.
Could you clarify, are you saying subjectivity is fundamental to what organisms are or what is fundamental to what organisms are is subjectivity? In other words, are you simply defining what is fundamental to organisms as subjectivity or stating that what organisms are has the fundamental quality of subjectivity?
What about the subject that observes the subject and equates its subjectivity? I take it we are conveying a fully self-consciously anthropomorphic view of subjectivity. Flies having less subjectivty, humans the most, diatoms none, etc.
The first thing an organism has to do - any organism - is to establish a boundary between itself and the environment. What organic processes then do is all directed by the organism maintaining itself and continuing to exist. Im considering the idea that this constitutes the beginning of subjective awareness - even though very primitive life-forms are not what we would recognise as conscious beings in any meaningful sense, that rudimentary form of subjectivity is implied by the distinction between self and other (at least in a philosophical sense). Plainly humans are then able to interrogate the nature of the subject - who or what am I? - which I dont think other animals are able to do (although many higher animals and birds do possess a sense of self, as is evidenced by the mirror test)
But whence "mental representation" versus the prior "behavioral inputs/outputs"? How is it this difference in degree at least SEEMS to be a difference in kind? What is it, this change, this "mental representation"?
I'd say the difference is a function of memory; the ability to visualize what has been experienced but is no longer present. It seems to make sense that memory and the ability to visualize should be greatly enhanced by symbolic language capability. (By 'visualize' I mean not only recalling visual data but all sensory and somatosensory data: auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, motoric and proprioceptive).
The first thing an organism has to do - any organism - is to establish a boundary between itself and the environment. What organic processes then do is all directed by the organism maintaining itself and continuing to exist. Im considering the idea that this constitutes the beginning of of subjective awareness
You have already posited the subject as existing in the line 'the organism has to establish a boundary...' So the subject is then object, since all these boundaries begin to become established by objective means, as in fertilization from cells created through biological processes. It sounds like you are including the idea of Becoming as referenced by @Gnomon if I am not correct. Care to elaborate?
Could you clarify, are you saying subjectivity is fundamental to what organisms are or what is fundamental to what organisms are is subjectivity? In other words, are you simply defining what is fundamental to organisms as subjectivity or stating that what organisms are has the fundamental quality of subjectivity?
Consider this, quantum mechanics demonstrates to us the real existence of possibilities in the physical world. However, quantum mechanics does not provide for us the means for understanding the subjective capacity to choose from possibilities. This subjective capacity, to choose from possibilities available, is demonstrated by even the most basic life forms.
Reply to wonderer1 You're right, I am not that informed on scientific explanations of consciousness, as opposed to scientific inquiry pertaining to consciousness, because I think there is no point in explaining it scientifically with speculations instead of observations. By all means please prove me wrong by demonstrating the ways in which there is.
Critical reviews of Humphrey by Galen Strawson and Mary Midgley (although I disagree with Strawson's panpsychism, subject of this thread.)
Thanks. However neither of those reviews have to do with the article I linked. So it looks like you are promoting a genetic fallacy:
The genetic fallacy (also known as the fallacy of origins or fallacy of virtue)[1] is a fallacy of irrelevance in which arguments or information are dismissed or validated based solely on their source of origin rather than their content. In other words, a claim is ignored or given credibility based on its source rather than the claim itself.
The fallacy therefore fails to assess the claim on its merit. The first criterion of a good argument is that the premises must have bearing on the truth or falsity of the claim in question.[2] Genetic accounts of an issue may be true, and they may help illuminate the reasons why the issue has assumed its present form, but they are not conclusive in determining its merits.[3]
However neither of those reviews have to do with the article I linked.
They're both reviews of another of Nicholas Humphrey's books, covering similar theories, and Humphrey being the author of the linked article. Neither of the reviews propagate the 'genetic fallacy', rather they are critical of Humphrey's reductionist account of consciousness. His latest book gets much more positive reviews, but I will concede that as his is straightforwardly physicalist account, I am disinclined towards entertaining the thesis, on philosophical grounds.
Neither of the reviews propagate the 'genetic fallacy'...
I didn't suggest that the reviews were propagating the genetic fallacy. I said, "...it looks like you are promoting a genetic fallacy..." ...by bringing up reviews of an older work, as if they are relevant to the argument more recently presented.
Count Timothy von IcarusOctober 23, 2023 at 09:03#8477550 likes
Sort of what I'd argued for before in other evolution threads. There are very many "selection-like processes." Some, like neural pruning, Hebbian fire together, wire together learning, etc. clearly involve purpose, some don't seem to. Biological evolution involves intentionality to the extent that intentional action affects reproduction. Further, if rocks don't think, dust doesn't think, etc. but life forms do think, then we might suppose that thinking emerges through these very sorts of processes, since they seem to be the source of growing complexity in the world.
It seems like fractal recurrence to me, similar information processes, occurring from nation-states down to crystal formation.
But if conciousness as we know it is something that emerges way down the line in these processes, no wonder it's not hard to find. It's an onion with a very large number of layers.
You're right, I am not that informed on scientific explanations of consciousness, as opposed to scientific inquiry pertaining to consciousness, because I think there is no point in explaining it scientifically with speculations instead of observations. By all means please prove me wrong by demonstrating the ways in which there is.
Speculation has always been part of science. Informed speculation is where hypotheses come from, and consideration of the speculations of scientifically informed people is an important part of how science progresses.
Because of the technological challenges and ethical issues involved in studying working human brains, we have to settle for speculation to a large extent in neuroscience. Of course we might throw up our hands and just say that God wants some people to be autistic, schizophrenic, bipolar, etc. I find considering scientifically informed speculation to be of vastly greater practical and humanistic value.
I'm saying that I don't think religious narratives are meant for us to "understand" ourselves, but to become a particular type of people. Religions are all about how one *should* be. (Whatever narratives religions have about who we are and where we came from are in the service of how we should be.)
Is not "knowing thyself" the first step to becoming something other than what you already are? I mean, you could merely pay lip service to an imposed injunction, but that would not count as being a real change, but merely an act of self-repression designed to make you appear to others (and perhaps to yourself) to be living up to some introjected ideal. It would only be by understanding or knowing yourself that you would be able to tell the difference.
Here we need to bear in mind that people who are born and raised into a religion have their sense of self shaped by the religion. They have no sense of identity apart or outside of their religion.
What you're bringing up applies to prospective adult converts. It's evident that people sometimes do internalize the idea of "who they really are" when this idea is given by someone else. The actual psychological processes underlying this seem to be rather complex.
But my point was that perhaps there is a difference in kind.
The claim that there is a difference in kind between an organism and a computer program is quite different that the claim that there is a difference in kind between organisms. Even so, I suspect that with the continued advances in AI just where those differences lie may become less and less clear.
schopenhauer1October 23, 2023 at 19:09#8478680 likes
Reply to Fooloso4
Well, rather it was trying to point out that computer programs are so far, an example where adding degree to algorithms, functions, signals, and networks doesnt get you any consciousness simply by increasing degree.
We can parse terms and say it does increase its intelligence, but no further for subjective experience.
Here we need to bear in mind that people who are born and raised into a religion have their sense of self shaped by the religion. They have no sense of identity apart or outside of their religion.
I have several friends who were very religious as children and into their teens, who in their later teens firmly rejected their religion.
I agree with you that the psychology of selfhood vis a vis introjected beliefs is complex.
Of course we might throw up our hands and just say that God wants some people to be autistic, schizophrenic, bipolar, etc. I find considering scientifically informed speculation to be of vastly greater practical and humanistic value.
So do you thereby think applying the scientific method to an individual by a scientifically informed individual is superior to being psychoanalyzed by a psychiatrist? Would you prefer mental diagnosis made by an AI algorithm, as is currently being performed with some success, as opposed to another human? Which do you think will understand your condition of life better?
So do you thereby think applying the scientific method to an individual by a scientifically informed individual is superior to being seen and psychoanalyzed by a psychiatrist?
It's rather apples and oranges, and I don't see it as making much sense to compare the value of them. A combination of the two seems likely to be superior to either one alone. For that matter, one might hope the psychiatrist was well informed scientifically.
Would you prefer mental diagnosis made by an AI algorithm, as is currently being performed with some success, as opposed to another human? Which do you think will understand your condition of life better?
Things are too much in flux in the AI world for me to want to venture an opinion. I would think an AI and a human would understand an individual in different ways, and there is likely to be value to both in the near future, if not at present.
Reply to wonderer1 Imagine you were able to develop a scientific model of consciousness that was so effective, you would put all the world's psychiatrists out of business. So you were forced to choose one. What would you choose? Ignore the factor of putting them out of a job for now, and assume they would easily find other jobs.
Reply to wonderer1 The purpose of the question was to ask you, 'do you consider consciousness to be something explainable via the scientific method, or something also actual and not explainable.' From your offence to my earlier posts about lack of explainability I assumed you would immediately choose the AI program, but maybe I was wrong in that judgement.
schopenhauer1October 24, 2023 at 01:22#8479730 likes
So you agree in the claim an identity of consciousness=subjectivity, so we are back again to 1600's Descartes philosophy.
When was it ever not defined as some "interiority"? You can define whatever word you want it to be, but for the purposes I have been using it, it is subjective/experiential/what-it's-likeness. In other words primary consciousness, not necessarily self-consciousness (a kind of consciousness that human beings have).
I hold that there is no such thing as two words that mean the same thing.
What are you using as definition of "consciousness" if not some form of "awareness" or "experience" or "point of view"? For example, the insect's "experience" of the world. If that isn't a thing, try another animal with a more complex neural system (not ok with conscious crabs and snails? how about lampreys, fish, or frogs then?). You see that is the point, where to draw the line from merely behavioral inputs/outputs (reflexive like behavior) to an animal that has some sort of "experience". Where is the divide, and WHAT is that divide? I used the article to show how it is tricky as saying something like "information is encoded in the neurons" is a subtle but apparent homunculus fallacy. What is this "information encoded" then? The observer seems to be assumed by magically saying "information encoded".
You have already posited the subject as existing in the line 'the organism has to establish a boundary...' So the subject is then object, since all these boundaries begin to become established by objective means, as in fertilization from cells created through biological processes. It sounds like you are including the idea of Becoming as referenced by Gnomon if I am not correct. Care to elaborate?
As Im not a materialist, what Im seeking to articulate is the ontological distinction between living and non-living things (or between things and beings). Materialists will generally assume (or insist) that, as living beings are constituted by the same elements as the rest of the Universe, then they are just organised matter, that there is no essential difference between living and non-living. In fact they have to say that, because recognising such an ontological distinction would undermine materialism, which claims there is only one substance (in the philosophical sense of that word) and that living beings are wholly physical in nature. That is also tied to the concept of abiogenesis, the non-biological origin of life, in which it is presumed some specific unique combination of physical circumstances spontaneously gave rise to organic matter and ultimately to the first simple living organisms almost as a kind of complex chemical reaction.
I am trying to articulate an alternative to that which doesnt rely on vitalism (animating spirits) or theistic creation. Thats why I appealed to the text by Thomas Nagel, who is an analytic philosopher and not any kind of religious apologist. His point is that the nature of subjective experience is such that it eludes objective description (articulated in his famous paper What is it Like to be a Bat?) So drawing on that kind of analysis, Im speculating that even the most basic life-forms are in some real sense the appearance of conscious agency - not that a conscious agent made organisms a la theistic creation, but that this is the beginning of the appearance of conscious agents, which then become more elaborate through the course of evolutionary development.
I do notice that in many discussions of evolution there is a tendency to attribute agency to evolution itself - that evolution does this or produces that or isnt evolution marvellous? And so on. But I think the only natural agents that can really be discerned just ARE organisms. Theyre the ones doing and producing and creating (and it involves immense struggle and sacrifice.) Thats why I am drawn to the paper I linked yesterday, From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning. That paper is also non-theistic and naturalist, but not materialist, because it recognises there is a fundamental sense in which biology cannot be reduced to physics, but without appealing to vitalism.
schopenhauer1October 24, 2023 at 14:35#8480600 likes
Reply to Wayfarer I more or less agree, full scale materialism is a bit ridiculous. It sounds like what you are really concerned with is existence itself. When we consider everything from inside a rational structure, do we always have a blind spot?
It seems like your plan is to beat materialism in kind with a material notion of spirit, a consciousness that is essentially the antiquated form of spirit itself, as the divine inside a divine subject. It is the idea of Jesus Christ, the embodiment of the divine in human form. And this whole thing seems caught in this post-Christian paradigm. In it we are constantly avoiding a notion of spirit while still operating within it.
Or maybe this higher level consciousness rests in empty actuality.
It seems like your plan is to beat materialism in kind with a material notion of spirit, a consciousness that is essentially the antiquated form of spirit itself, as the divine inside a divine subject. It is the idea of Jesus Christ, the embodiment of the divine in human form. And this whole thing seems caught in this post-Christian paradigm. In it we are constantly avoiding a notion of spirit while still operating within it.
Or maybe this higher level consciousness rests in empty actuality.
Reply to Wayfarer can speak for himself. In my opinion, he is the wisest poster on this forum, and with the fewest blind-spots.
I don't know where you found the notion of "a material notion of spirit" in his last post. That may be due to a "blind spot" of your own, which interprets everything in the world based on belief in an unproven axiom : PanMaterialism. Which seems caught in a post-Renaissance paradigm. Ironically, 20th century Quantum physics discovered a fundamental inter-connection between Mind and Matter*1. But the role (participation) of an observer's mind was quickly swept under the rug by the dominant class of classical (materialist) physicists.
Way did use the term "substance", but in the Aristotelian sense of Ousia (being ; existence)*2. FWIW, I interpret Wayfarer's use of "substance" as more closely related to Platonic Form (idea ; essence ; design ; concept)*2. Which is abhorrent to Materialists, who denigrate it as a spooky spirit or ghost : a laThe Ghost in the Machine. Materialists seem to have a blind spot for the ancient philosophical concept of an immaterial general quality that makes an individual material thing (quanta) what it is.
Bergson's elan vital referred, not to a ghost, but to an organizing principle in nature. Since the Big Bang, Nature seems to have a self-organizing power that Materialists take for granted, but are loathe to give it a name*3. In the biological sciences it is recognized as essential to evolutionary development, but they label it as "spontaneous"*4 (a chain of accidents tending toward complexity & integration?) to imply that an "external stimulus" was not necessary. Similarly, astrophysicists assume, as an unproven axiom, that the Big Bang was a spontaneous or random event without precedence : pop goes the chaos, which evolves into a cosmos. And yet, some scientists --- bothered by the something-from-nothing implication --- have postulated an imaginary "external stimulus" in the form of an eternal material Multiverse. :smile:
*1. Is Scientific Materialism "Almost Certainly False"? : According to the physicist John Wheeler, quantum mechanics implies that our observations of reality influence its unfolding. We live in a "participatory universe," Wheeler proposed, in which mind is as fundamental as matter.
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/is-scientific-materialism-almost-certainly-false/
*2. What is the difference between substance and essence in Aristotle? : Essence is what makes a thing that particular thing. In other words, essence is what makes that chair. Substance is what makes a thing a general thing. In other words, substance is what makes a chair.
https://o-g-rose-writing.medium.com/essence-substance-and-form-81c2b707c0d8
*3. Self-organization, also called spontaneous order in the social sciences, is a process where some form of overall order arises from local interactions ..
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization
Note --- Quantum physics is characterized by non-locality. Not divine intervention, but holistic inter-action.
*4. Spontaneous : performed or occurring as a result of a sudden inner impulse or inclination and without premeditation or external stimulus.
"The contention that science reveals a perfectly objective reality is more theological than scientific"
What these viewpoints have in common is a propensity to stop short at an end. To exist within an idea and to know it from within. I feel as though giving religion and science a name was a bad idea. They have become a red herring in philosophy.
The purpose of the question was to ask you, 'do you consider consciousness to be something explainable via the scientific method...
I don't know the limits of scientific investigation, but I certainly think it can be much better understood than it is now. It's a heavily interdisciplinary area of study.
schopenhauer1October 25, 2023 at 00:49#8481750 likes
No one cares about that last post? :D. I really meant it seriously. It seems like some people think that magically behavioral processes at some dividing line of species has some sort of "what it's likeness". Whence this divide without committing homuncular funkular?
It seems like your plan is to beat materialism in kind with a material notion of spirit, a consciousness that is essentially the antiquated form of spirit itself, as the divine inside a divine subject. It is the idea of Jesus Christ, the embodiment of the divine in human form. And this whole thing seems caught in this post-Christian paradigm. In it we are constantly avoiding a notion of spirit while still operating within it.
Dont know what to make of this, really. Mine is more to approach the subject through philosophy - to expose the hidden assumptions behind the taken-for-granted view. I frequently cite Thomas Nagel for that reason - hes a mainstream philosopher, a tenured academic, who has had the guts to question the materialist consensus (and was heavily criticized for it). The other guy I cited, Stephen L. Talbott, is an independent scholar and philosopher of biology. I learned of his work through a great series of essays on The New Atlantis. Neither of them are specifically religious in orientation, but once you call the materialist consensus into question, alternative perspectives open up.
But youre right in saying that my approach is existential. Im only coming to realise that myself, after a lot of study.
?Gnomon
What is PanMaterialism? I Googled it and found nothing.
All-matter-all-the time-every-where. I just made-up a name to serve as an analogy with PanPsychism (all mind) or PanTheism (all god). My tongue-in-cheek intention was not to propose a new religion, but to draw attention to the secular "religion of our times"*1. :joke:
Materialism is not a synonym for "science", but an unprovable assumption or belief system or worldview*2. It began as the ancient philosophy/science of Atomism, not as a substitute for pagan religions*3. Even after thousands of years of argumentation, Atomism still has no explanation for such "hard" questions as the emergence of Consciousness in a material world.
Darwin's evolutionary theory did not require any divine intervention, but it did not assert that matter-is-all-there-is, and left open the question of Causation*4. It did however posit a replacement for direct divine intervention with random (statistical) accidents & innate selection criteria (specifications). The all-powerful-matter interpretation was added by those who wanted a secular alternative to Christian Creationism*5. But Materialism has also been used to fill all open & abstract philosophical questions with objective concrete stuff. Unfortunately, it tends to be leaky in the joints around subjective ideas, opinions & feelings. :smile:
*1. Materialism as a Worldview : John Searle, the eminent professor of philosophy at U.C. Berkeley, once said that "there is a sense in which materialism is the religion of our time." . . . . Perhaps we can see how relevant materialism is to Darwinian evolution. For if materialism is true then something very much like Darwinism must be true. . . . . The explicit materialism of the Darwinians is the mirror image of creationism.
https://evolutionnews.org/2013/09/what_is_the_wor/
*2. Definitions of "-ism" : a belief (or system of beliefs) accepted as authoritative by some group or school. synonyms: doctrine, philosophical system, philosophy, school of thought.
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/ism
*3. Atomismis a metaphysical doctrine that asserts the existence of indivisible material unities that constitute all other material objects. This was suggested by several ancient philosophers and was revived by physicists when they discovered what we now call atoms (though they arent indivisible) . . . . Materialismis a broad term in philosophy which posits that the subject at hand is material or physically grounded. This usually takes the form of a metaphysical position on the nature of reality which contrasts with immaterialism or idealism.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomism
*4. Darwin's First Cause : On the Origin of Species reflects theological views. Though he thought of religion as a tribal survival strategy, Darwin still believed that God was the ultimate lawgiver, and later recollected that at the time he was convinced of the existence of God as a First Cause and deserved to be called a theist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_views_of_Charles_Darwin
*5. Materialism in academia is a fundamentalist belief system : Materialism is the worldview that the only thing that exists is matter. Everything is matter. Not just tea cups and horses, but feelings of love and joy, thoughts and emotions, the taste of an apple, the beauty of a sunset. They are all matter.
https://www.essentiafoundation.org/materialism-in-academia-is-a-fundamentalist-belief-system/reading/
Reply to schopenhauer1 OK, are you singling me out now for not getting homunculus funkulus? I think I should be forgiven for said transgression.
schopenhauer1October 25, 2023 at 17:31#8483250 likes
Reply to kudos
So I was asking the serious question:
How many behaviors makes a feeling? And no one cared about that, and it's crucial. Notice how the article I referenced tried to answer this kind of question by saying "information is encoded in the neurons", as if this then answers that hard problem question. But it doesn't. It is just a stand-in for how it is that at a sufficient amount of neurons, consciousness comes on the scene. It pushes the question back to "information" which itself has to be explained as to "what" that is as to its identity as conscious experience.
Earlier, @Fooloso4 thought it was simply about degree, and this was also addressing how much degree becomes what appears to be a difference in kind. Either you are proposing panpsychism or your are not.
Reply to schopenhauer1 I am not proposing it, everyone more or less already uses this category. It would be ridiculous to suggest your experience of reality was true and unfiltered projection of an exterior world. That green was in the leaf is sort of silly, no?
So I was asking the serious question:
How many behaviors makes a feeling? And no one cared about that, and it's crucial.
Having a behaviour implies an observational objective, but observation is also a competing objective in itself. And homunculus returns.
schopenhauer1October 25, 2023 at 18:36#8483350 likes
It would be ridiculous to suggest your experience of reality was true and unfiltered projection of an exterior world. That green was in the leaf is sort of silly, no?
Panpsychism means that there is some sort of experiential-ness to matter/energy at some level (where these "occasions of experience" inhere or at what level is a different story).
Having a behaviour implies an observational objective, but observation is also a competing objective in itself. And homunculus returns.
Can you elaborate? If a sponge reacts to its environment, this is a behavior. But most don't think it's conscious or has feeling associated with it. A snail might react to light perhaps this is purely behavior or perhaps there is a "feeling" associated. At what point is the divide? And hence the question "How many behaviors makes a feeling?".
Can you elaborate? If a sponge reacts to its environment, this is a behavior. But most don't think it's conscious or has feeling associated with it. A snail might react to light perhaps this is purely behavior or perhaps there is a "feeling" associated. At what point is the divide?
The problem here is we are utilizing and extending the word 'Consciousness' synchronically to mean more than it means diachronically. It is now an umbrella term that means the whole lot of subjectivity, spirit, existence, autonomy, intelligence, right, citizenship, etc. It's used as if to suggest that because something is conscious it deserves to be treated with essential rights. We respect the lives of humans more than animals and sponges, because of factors extending beyond the idea that they have consciousness. It is just for the very reason that one cannot tell what beings are conscious agents except by certain cues, and that's really all we mean when we use the word; it is a word for a phenomenological agent by definition.
Panpsychism means that there is some sort of experiential-ness to matter/energy at some level (where these "occasions of experience" inhere or at what level is a different story).
Which we now consider common sense. Unless you take the view that the activity of matter depends on or is directed by it, which is another story. To suggest otherwise would be as homunculus as you can possibly get. That there is a little man with the controls inside who is seeing existence unfiltered, and he decides whether or not to think or consider things independently, and is thus controlled by another homunculus ad infinitum as far as I understand the concept.
It's used as if to suggest that because something is conscious it deserves to be treated with essential rights. We respect the lives of humans more than animals and sponges, because of factors extending beyond the idea that they have consciousness.
I am not using "panpsychism" in such a way. I am using it in its usual sense that "experientialness" is spread across matter in some way (whether through simple "occasions of experience" all the way up to something like Schopenhauer-style neutral monism).
It is just for the very reason that one cannot tell what beings are conscious agents except by certain cues, and that's really all we mean when we use the word; it is a word for a phenomenological agent by definition.
Well sure. "What" counts as the most basic existing phenomenological agent and why are the relevant questions I am asking. When @Wayfarer created this thread from another one, I actually said if he was going to do that, it would be better to specifically name it "Transcendentalism of Neurofauna". I meant it. That is to say, we should take a deep dive into what it is about certain animals that have neurons/neural systems for why they have internal "what it's like" experiences. The dividing line is somewhere between sponges/worms/jellyfish/insects. Well, having an "eye spot" for example. WHENCE is that? We can describe it, but what is it about this sensory physical feature that now has an animal "online" if you will (has phenomenal experiences)?
Which we now consider common sense. Unless you take the view that the activity of matter depends on or is directed by it, which is another story. To suggest otherwise would be as homunculus as you can possibly get. That there is a little man with the controls inside who is seeing existence unfiltered, and he decides whether or not to think or consider things independently, and is thus controlled by another homunculus ad infinitum as far as I understand the concept.
Common sense? Ask any "common sense" scientist or even non-scientist, most people are inclined not to give "dead" matter any form of experiential qualities. That comes with biological systems (and neural ones at that), or at the least sufficiently complex functional systems (e.g. the possibility for AI, for example).
Well sure. "What" counts as the most basic existing phenomenological agent and why are the relevant questions I am asking.
So you are interested in right. What right we grant such an agent, and what constitutes right to such an agent. We are talking about agreement between humans about whats like us, and whats not like us. The only way to know what its like, would be to define said quality based on human experience and determine if it is there or not. There is no way to tell if we have actually captured any sort of moral what its likeness. That would be the kind of knowledge that actually means something.
I have great trepidation about what would happen if people really thought they knew what its like to be another being. Namely because there is no a way for a computer program to truly know its own errors in the sense that humans do. It entails actuality.
Comments (94)
Just to be the devil's advocate here, but doesn't it seem plausible that only animals have the capacity for "qualities" (experience, a point of view)? And even amongst animals, doesn't it seem plausible that only animals with some form of nervous system have this capacity of qualities/experience/point of view? That being said, can there be some sort of Transcendental Theory of Neurofauna?
Also, not all evolutionary theories are "Just so", per se, but descriptive. A "just so" story might be something like, "Our ancestor's propensity for favoring the strongest alpha male, is why we have a strong tendency towards fascism". But, a theory that describes how language evolved in humans by examining various models that fit the evidence from artifacts, brain development and anatomy, developmental psychology, etc. might be a legitimately descriptive theory?
Here is a ChatGPT version of the evolution of language for example:
1. Primate Ancestry: Limited Communicative Abilities (Approx. 5-7 million years ago)
Our common ancestors with chimpanzees relied on basic communication skills, primarily using gestures, vocalizations, and facial expressions to convey simple intentions and immediate needs. Their communication was limited in complexity compared to the emerging human capacity.
2. Emergence of Shared Intentionality and Collaborative Foraging (Approx. 2-3 million years ago)
In the Homo lineage, around 2-3 million years ago, Homo habilis and Homo erectus emerged. These early humans started relying on collaborative foraging and tool use, requiring increased coordination and the sharing of intentions to hunt, gather, and cooperate effectively. Shared intentionality began to develop in response to the need for better communication during cooperative activities.
3. Enhanced Cognitive and Motor Skills: Adaptation to Varied Environments (Approx. 2 million years ago)
Around 2 million years ago, the Homo lineage underwent significant developments in brain size, cognitive abilities, and motor skills. Enhanced cognitive and motor capabilities allowed for more intricate coordination and complex motor planning necessary for cooperative activities, setting the stage for the further development of language-related brain regions.
4. Emergence of Basic Language Elements and Chomsky's Universal Grammar (Approx. 1.5 million years ago)
As Homo species faced complex cooperative tasks, basic language elements and rudimentary grammar started to emerge. Chomsky's universal grammar, a theoretical construct proposing inherent grammatical structures in the human brain, played a role in shaping the fundamental structure of early language.
5. Broca's Area Specialization: Language Production and Planning (Approx. 1 million years ago)
Around a million years ago, Homo species faced increasingly complex cooperative tasks that demanded precise planning and articulation of intentions. Broca's area began to specialize, enabling the production of structured language and grammatical rules, surpassing the communication capabilities of other primates.
6. Wernicke's Area Development: Language Comprehension and Understanding Intentions (Approx. 500,000 years ago)
Approximately 500,000 years ago, as cooperative tasks and cultural activities became more intricate, Wernicke's area in Homo sapiens specialized further to interpret nuanced meanings, understand shared intentions, and process an expanding vocabulary associated with complex cooperative tasks and cultural nuances.
7. Development of Self-Talk and Internalized Language (Approx. 100,000 - 50,000 years ago)
As Homo sapiens evolved, the ability to engage in self-talk and internalized language emerged. This capacity allowed for complex thought processes, reflection, and the development of abstract concepts, further enhancing communication and planning for complex cooperative endeavors.
8. Language Explosion and Cultural Transmission: A Distinctive Human Trait (Approx. 70,000 - 50,000 years ago)
Around 70,000 to 50,000 years ago, a significant leap in linguistic complexity occurred. Language exploded in its richness and complexity, enabling abstract thought, storytelling, and the transmission of culture across generations. Michael Tomasello's theory of shared intentionality played a crucial role during this phase, emphasizing the evolution of cooperation and communication, further enhancing the unique linguistic and cultural abilities of Homo sapiens.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I'm attracted to the philosophical idea that the emergence of even the most simple organisms, is in some sense the appearance of intentionality as a mode of being. As Thomas Nagel argues,
I suggest that the 'subjective essence of experience' is one of the connotations of the term 'being' when used as a noun - that 'a being' is precisely the kind of entity that possesses the element of subjectivity, even if in rudimentary form. This is the point at which qualities of being a.k.a qualia start to become manifest.
(There's a paper by Evan Thompson on something similar to this idea, I'll see if I can find it and report back.)
For me, the 'just so' is a product of both the orator and listener. It is our quickness to accept scientific statements along with their baggage that is the particular quality that makes them attractive as carriers for non-scientific ideology. More often than not, it seems of a kind of positivity bias, a juxtaposition of scientific imagery that is that it presents itself in a language of form. Primates used logic to express immediate need. This led to further development of x part of the brain that mediates language, etc. Statements like this carry baggage, like for instance the idea of the individual narrative, the modern self, and the accidental. These are not particular to the quality of the science, but inherited by the form of the storytelling.
Sure, but when precisely that being begins, is the hard part. Is intentionality really qualitative? I would say it's a good contender for a point of view, but not necessarily qualities. An amoeba has reactions, but not intentions it would seem. Sponges have the most basic neural nets, but are insufficient for intention. Perhaps the most basic experience is found in the jellyfish and the worm as they perhaps move towards light and chemicals, though that gets murky between experience and stimuli. Perhaps we would have to start at mollusks or arthropods or insects for first real experiences. But then what is the differentiation here?
As you state with your quote, physical descriptions can only capture behaviors and morphology, not internal subjectivity. So I can imagine answer being something like "There has to be differentiation enough in the neural networks, such as to specialize and feedback to itself". But that is all descriptive and doesn't seem to confer why that is subjective, and the causal loop is closed off still.
Not what we understand as 'conscious' intention, but they can learn. I also agree that borderline creatures, like sponges and jellies, don't meaningfully manifest much in the way of intentional action, but even so many quasi-intentional behaviours can be observed on the level of the organic molecules that comprise them. (Take a look at From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning, Steve Talbott.)
Indeed, I'd agree here. Evolutionary biology and anthropology can be a form of storytelling. You are making inferences that don't necessarily connect in a the way a physics experiment might, for example, But even physics also has the storytelling aspect. For example, what explains various paradoxes in quantum mechanics? There are various theories telling that story. Granted, biology as far as we know, has many more pitfalls of multiple causation due to complexity of organisms, environment, and history, but there are some models that seem to do a better job at organizing the data into a coherent understanding than others. There is getting data and there are theories that interpret that data.
If we are to have any value come out of the sciences, other than technology, it would be getting a better synthesis of what could have happened, or is the case, in regards to nature based on the evidence we have, and honing that or creating a better interpretation. This endeavor is likely to not end in some absolute consensus of interpretation any time soon, however.
I'm inclined to think gaining better understanding of our own natures would be more beneficial than more accurate understanding of our history, although the latter would surely contribute to the former.
:up:
A plant (e.g. a tree) can produce toxic chemicals as a response to being eaten. Isn't this an example of experience?
Some of these trees can communicate with nearby trees and pass on the message about the risk of being eaten. The nearby trees produce the toxic chemical even though they haven't been eaten yet.
Doesn't a Venus flytrap show some of the qualities of an animal carnivore. It just can't walk around. :grin:
There are some fish and animals which work in a similar way to a Venus flytrap. They lure the "food" close and then eat it.
Evolution was seen as a silver bullet to put down creationist dogmas, and because creationists reacted poorly to the building support for evolution, trying to ban it from schools, etc. the two issues became tied together. But then evidence for a "starting point" for the universe was also seen as a big win by proponents of a "first cause," or "prime mover." Popular athiestic opinion had been in favor of an eternal universe to that point precisely because a starting point reeked of God. But aside from evidence for the Big Bang, problems like Boltzmann Brains began to crop up for the eternal universe.
And so the ideas seem to have become tied at the hip. The idea that evolution was a silver bullet for religion is born partly out of the religious reaction to evolutionary theory, partly because it had to become the silver bullet now that first cause was back in the popular mind. You see this today. Theists want to talk about the Fine Tuning Problem, the Cosmological Argument, Cosmic Inflation, etc. and militant atheists, your Dawkinses, etc. want to talk about natural selection.
IMO, these are completely contingent relations, and neither field has any special relation to evidence for or against a God. Plenty of theists have made their peace with evolution and evolution even seems to pair quite nicely with some views of God as unfolding dialectically, or views of natural teleology. But since evolution was historically a battleground over religion, it has remained one by inertia. And this is why we see "evolution as religion," . It is supposed, dogmatically IMO, that any theory of evolution necessitates that evolution occurs through "blind random chance" and thus it seems to preclude the possibility of purpose, cutting the legs out from most religious claims.
I agree this is a powerful force in modern science/scientism. Neurodarwinism was largely attacked, not because the processes it described weren't isomorphic to the process of natural selection, and not because it lacked predictive power, but precisely because "fire together, wire together and neuronal pruning are inherently interlinked with intentionality," and "evolution simply cannot admit intentionality." And you see this is similar arguments over whether lymphocytes production is "natural selection," if genetic algorithms fail to mimic real selection because they "have a purpose," if lab grown "DNA computers" actually "compute," and in Extended Evolutionary Synthesis.
I don't see an explanation for the strength of the dogma accept for the "religion-like" elements of how evolution has been used re: scientism. Maybe there is something I'm missing, but selection processes seem like they could involve intentionality or not and still be largely the same sort of thing.
Yes, but you have pulled a switcheroo on the word 'value,' which is here supposed to mean 'applications to.' We're not talking about science as having any value beyond analytic and synthetic proposals that convey the essence of a thing. They are not going to be the key that unlocks reason, consciousness, the meaning of life, or any other glossy-eyed delusions.
It looks to me like a historical inevitability. Religions tell stories that our relatively uninformed ancestors came up with, to explain the nature of ourselves. Scientific investigation into the nature of ourselves yields something quite different. A lot of people like those old stories a lot better than they think they would like the view from a scientifically informed perspective.
People keep saying things like this. Where's the evidence that they really made up those stories, and for those stated purposes?
The evidence is in the multitude of different mutually contradictory stories. They can all be wrong, but they can't all be right.
How implausible the stories are is evidence for them being a product of relatively uninformed thinkers.
I can see how you might have interpreted me as suggesting that the original story tellers told their stories for religion's purposes. That isn't what I intended to convey, so let me try to clarify. I probably should have put "that our relatively uninformed ancestors came up with" in paretheses. Religions (communities of religious followers) propagate claims about the nature of ourselves which are based on stories that the religion originating story tellers told.
What religion doesn't make claims about what we are?
That's assuming that those stories were invented (?) for the purposes that you claim. How do you know they were invented for those purposes?
Again, that's assuming the purpose you ascribe to them is the true and relevant one.
Of course. Has it ever occured to you that those stories, even when they are in the form of descriptions or explanations, are actually instructions, statements of the norms of the particular communities that told those stories?
No, I tried to make clear that I'm not assuming that the original story tellers had such a purpose, and make clear that I recognize a difference between the purpose of the original storytellers, and the way religions make use of the stories.
Quoting baker
Sure. I was a member of such a community when I was young. These days I recommend avoiding such a parochial view. There is a much more evidenced basis for understanding our natures, available to us these days.
I'm saying that I don't think religious narratives are meant for us to "understand" ourselves, but to become a particular type of people. Religions are all about how one *should* be. (Whatever narratives religions have about who we are and where we came from are in the service of how we should be.)
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2023/oct/16/survival-of-the-fittest-may-also-apply-to-the-nonliving-report-finds
Im not sure how I pulled a switcheroo, application to is what I meant.
That being said, I proposed focusing on neurofauna in biology as to where the dividing line is between behavior and mental. Whats the fundamental difference between the non-present POV of a sponge and (perhaps) the present POV of a jellyfish or worm?
I launched a discussion under the title "'Survival of the Fittest': Its meaning and its implications for our life, about 8 months ago.
(See https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14045/survival-of-the-fittest-its-meaning-and-its-implications-for-our-life/p1). You can find in there my position on the subject, together with those of other members.)
So the big deal I see is that sponges have very basic neural networks that most scientists agree is behavioral but without a mental representation of the world. However, with animals like jellyfish, worms, and insects, the neural nets equates to a mental representation (however basic) of the world. My challenge is to understand what this fundamental difference between the two is. That right there is the essence of the origins of the hard problem of consciousness. However, this seems like an impossible question. It would seem on the surface, there shouldn't be any qualitative difference whereby on one side of the divide a certain number of neurons means no mental representation and on the other side, it does. What does that even mean?
If this is the aim of your work, an excellent topic. You are onto something here...
This speculation is where a problem of logical extension is occurring. The essence of consciousness may or may not include other components than simple rationality and functional neural networks; if a computer program could read it's own code, would it totally understand from that it's own place in the world as a computer program? You are leveraging this Darwinian outlook to claim a hypothesis that it rests on simple content has already been fulfilled. It has now become ideology and is no longer the scientific inquiry front that it was formerly impersonating. It works because you have made no scientific assumptions, but have included ontological ones instead, that do not affect the structure of the synthetic propositions outlined.
Wow! That is a deep philosophical insight. But, like all philosophical intuitions, it may not convince those who require physical evidence. Could subjectivity be evolutionarily associated with some physical development, like Broca's bit of brain? Seriously, I'm just kidding. :joke:
:up:
Quoting kudos
The kind of consciousness I am talking about wouldn't necessitate "rationality" but some sort of "awareness" of the environment, something akin to a "point of view" or "something it is like to be something".
Quoting kudos
I guess it is always the debate between map and terrain here. A computer program can behave any number of ways, but it would only be conscious if it had some sort of "something it is likeness" that it "felt".
Quoting kudos
Not sure what you are accusing me of here. But here is an article discussing the scientific propositions (at a high level for a broad audience, but based on harder scientific studies):
Quoting A New Theory Explains How Consciousness Evolved A neuroscientist on how we came to be aware of ourselves By Michael Graziano
But here in this article we see an example of something I pointed out in a previous thread regarding the mixing of "mental" and "physical" such that there is a "hidden dualism". Notice in that last paragraph the following examples of this switching back and forth (without explanation of how one goes to the other):
But what is the "simulation" here? What is that? (the HARD PROBLEM).
And here we see "internal model" is a "simulation" that "keeps track of whatever is being controlled, etc.". But wait, we skipped the good part. How is it the neurons are connected (in fact, the same as) the internal model/simulation?
What is this "information encoded" "in the complex pattern of the neurons"? That seems like a nice little homunculus.
You can have degrees of computer programming that gives you really good responses, but as good as those outputs are, it may never truly be conscious.
I am agnostic as to whether AI will ever be conscious. It was not too long ago that it was generally believed that a computer program and associated hardware could pilot a car. Such a thing was thought to require consciousness.
This 2021 article says that sponges don't have neurons but do have cells that may have some neuron like functionality. However, the investigation is very preliminary.
Also, it is an open question as to what extent very simple creatures like worms might achieve a rudimentary mental representation. Neurons can automate behavior without mental representation and I'm skeptical towards the idea that worms (or jellyfish) have even the most rudimentary mental representations. (Although projects like Open Worm may eventually provide evidence one way or another.)
Sheer quantity of neurons matters. Quantity of neurons plays a significant role in how complex the interconnections between neurons can be. It is (very crudely) analogous to the way that a higher transistor count in a microprocessor can allow for more complex calculations performed within a given unit of time. With 'surplus' neurons available an organism can have neurons which aren't directly involved with getting from sensory input to behavioral output. A network of 'surplus' neurons can sit alongside the neurons which manage basic survival, and instead of monitoring sensory inputs or participating in causing motor responses, the surplus network can monitor both the outputs of sensory neurons and motor neurons and learn about patterns to the organisms own operation that the more primitive I/O networks are not able to learn.
So this higher level monitoring might recognize something like, 'My automatic response the last time I saw something like that was to eat it, but the result was bad.', and manage to interfere with the behavioral output, so as to avoid a reoccurence of such a bad event.
I'd suggest that neurons available to learn a more complex way of interacting with the world are a prerequisite to mental representation. The more such 'surplus' neurons there are in a brain the more complex the mental representation can be.
Yes sure. But my point was that perhaps there is a difference in kind.
Nice, very cool stuff thanks.
Quoting wonderer1
But whence "mental representation" versus the prior "behavioral inputs/outputs"? How is it this difference in degree at least SEEMS to be a difference in kind? What is it, this change, this "mental representation"?
Not of my devising. Its really just an implication of Chalmers facing up to the problem of consciousness. The following is from the précis of Mind and Cosmos published in the NY Times:
[quote=The Core of Mind and Cosmos, Thomas Nagel; https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/the-core-of-mind-and-cosmos/] We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe (i.e. described by the natural sciences), composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.
However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order our structure and behavior in space and time but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience how it is from the point of view of its subject without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained . [/quote]
So it occurred to me on reading this that the appearance of living organisms just is the manifestation of Being, which becomes gradually elaborated and differentiated during the course of evolution. Im sure thats one of the themes found in Henri Bergson and Tielhard du Chardin although I havent read much of them.
I would think an important aspect of it is that more neural net resources allow for more detailed memories. (Somewhat analogous might be the qualitative difference between the eight bit graphics of video games of the 1970s and the CGI we see today.)
By having a greater amount of memory (allowing for more detail in modelling our interactions with the world) we are able to develop more accurate and detailed models of ourselves in the world. That accuracy and detail provide a qualitative difference.
Have a look at From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning Steve Talbott. Argues that organic life is qualitative from the get go, that the processes embodied in organic molecules already transcend the bounds of physical causation.
I agree, but where does the grounds come in to elevate the subject to such ultimate precedence? After all, once consciousness becomes subjective it begins to posit a Cartesian subject, and thus the tables are turned and the scientific explanation is really explaining the manifestations of the subject and leaving out the objective.
I see no reason why not to extend the concept of consciousness to ordinary objects like a rock or a waterfall that are not even able to move themselves. They still constitute subjects in the sense that cues of existence come from conscious perception and are described by the same internal concept of cohesion (ie: having internal self-representing qualities). Why is there nothing of consciousness in a rock? Because we define consciousness by the negation of our determination of a rock, neglecting its real essential continuation to ourselves. Because we seek imagination over analysis.
There is much that can be learned about differences between rocks, and organisms which have evolved sense organs and brains. Perhaps a lack of such learning plays a role in your view?
Because it's fundamental to what organisms are. It's the specific difference between even very simple organisms, and inorganic matter. Even the most simple life-forms encode and transmit information, maintain homeostasis, heal and grow. This is what the essay from Talbott above helps to distinguish.
OK. But I like your phrasing of the "problem of Consciousness" (psychology) in terms of the problem of Being (ontology) and Becoming (evolution).
First BE (physical instantiation), then Become (animation), then Know (perception), then know-that-you-Know (conception), then study how you know (reduction), then argue incessantly about why you think you Know what's possible-but-not-actual (erudition). :smile:
PS___ That last parenthetical term was supposed to be "philosophy", but I was looking for a word that ended in "---tion". :joke:
I have the idea that, just as energy can be defined as 'the capacity to do work', biological consciousness may be defined as 'the capacity for experience'. And that capacity always inheres in a subject of experience - which is never known as an object of perception.
Thanks for sharing, it's an interesting article with a stupid title. But I find this some and what @wonderer1 is saying extremely interesting. What is the point of explaining consciousness? It is a fruitless and useless exercise in vain-glory. Sometimes it feels like the whole point of it is to supply a vehicle for a vain attempt at proclaiming the nature of reality as deterministic; essentially the cinders of post-christian abstraction. Keep in mind, I'm not talking about you specifically here. Just saying so because it is seeming like this is maybe is coming off more trollish than socratic at this point. For instance, what was the meaning of juxtasposing this specific article into our conversation after the line below?
You are leveraging this Darwinian outlook to claim a hypothesis that it rests on simple content has already been fulfilled.
So you agree in the claim an identity of consciousness=subjectivity, so we are back again to 1600's Descartes philosophy.
That's right, the organization inherent within organic molecules extends to the most fundamental levels of the physical parts of these molecules. This implies that the cause of this type of organization is itself not physical.
Could you clarify, are you saying subjectivity is fundamental to what organisms are or what is fundamental to what organisms are is subjectivity? In other words, are you simply defining what is fundamental to organisms as subjectivity or stating that what organisms are has the fundamental quality of subjectivity?
What about the subject that observes the subject and equates its subjectivity? I take it we are conveying a fully self-consciously anthropomorphic view of subjectivity. Flies having less subjectivty, humans the most, diatoms none, etc.
For me it has been a quite fruitful and useful in understanding being on the autism spectrum and understanding humanity more generally.
It's understandable that you haven't felt the need to educate yourself in a similar way, but it would be silly of you to consider yourself meaningfully informed about the topic.
The first thing an organism has to do - any organism - is to establish a boundary between itself and the environment. What organic processes then do is all directed by the organism maintaining itself and continuing to exist. Im considering the idea that this constitutes the beginning of subjective awareness - even though very primitive life-forms are not what we would recognise as conscious beings in any meaningful sense, that rudimentary form of subjectivity is implied by the distinction between self and other (at least in a philosophical sense). Plainly humans are then able to interrogate the nature of the subject - who or what am I? - which I dont think other animals are able to do (although many higher animals and birds do possess a sense of self, as is evidenced by the mirror test)
I'd say the difference is a function of memory; the ability to visualize what has been experienced but is no longer present. It seems to make sense that memory and the ability to visualize should be greatly enhanced by symbolic language capability. (By 'visualize' I mean not only recalling visual data but all sensory and somatosensory data: auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, motoric and proprioceptive).
You have already posited the subject as existing in the line 'the organism has to establish a boundary...' So the subject is then object, since all these boundaries begin to become established by objective means, as in fertilization from cells created through biological processes. It sounds like you are including the idea of Becoming as referenced by @Gnomon if I am not correct. Care to elaborate?
But you aren't informed about rigorous scientific inquiry on this subject. So your point is moot, and you can only offer your ignorant opinion.
Consider this, quantum mechanics demonstrates to us the real existence of possibilities in the physical world. However, quantum mechanics does not provide for us the means for understanding the subjective capacity to choose from possibilities. This subjective capacity, to choose from possibilities available, is demonstrated by even the most basic life forms.
Thanks. However neither of those reviews have to do with the article I linked. So it looks like you are promoting a genetic fallacy:
They're both reviews of another of Nicholas Humphrey's books, covering similar theories, and Humphrey being the author of the linked article. Neither of the reviews propagate the 'genetic fallacy', rather they are critical of Humphrey's reductionist account of consciousness. His latest book gets much more positive reviews, but I will concede that as his is straightforwardly physicalist account, I am disinclined towards entertaining the thesis, on philosophical grounds.
I didn't suggest that the reviews were propagating the genetic fallacy. I said, "...it looks like you are promoting a genetic fallacy..." ...by bringing up reviews of an older work, as if they are relevant to the argument more recently presented.
Sort of what I'd argued for before in other evolution threads. There are very many "selection-like processes." Some, like neural pruning, Hebbian fire together, wire together learning, etc. clearly involve purpose, some don't seem to. Biological evolution involves intentionality to the extent that intentional action affects reproduction. Further, if rocks don't think, dust doesn't think, etc. but life forms do think, then we might suppose that thinking emerges through these very sorts of processes, since they seem to be the source of growing complexity in the world.
It seems like fractal recurrence to me, similar information processes, occurring from nation-states down to crystal formation.
But if conciousness as we know it is something that emerges way down the line in these processes, no wonder it's not hard to find. It's an onion with a very large number of layers.
Speculation has always been part of science. Informed speculation is where hypotheses come from, and consideration of the speculations of scientifically informed people is an important part of how science progresses.
Because of the technological challenges and ethical issues involved in studying working human brains, we have to settle for speculation to a large extent in neuroscience. Of course we might throw up our hands and just say that God wants some people to be autistic, schizophrenic, bipolar, etc. I find considering scientifically informed speculation to be of vastly greater practical and humanistic value.
Quoting Janus
Here we need to bear in mind that people who are born and raised into a religion have their sense of self shaped by the religion. They have no sense of identity apart or outside of their religion.
What you're bringing up applies to prospective adult converts. It's evident that people sometimes do internalize the idea of "who they really are" when this idea is given by someone else. The actual psychological processes underlying this seem to be rather complex.
The claim that there is a difference in kind between an organism and a computer program is quite different that the claim that there is a difference in kind between organisms. Even so, I suspect that with the continued advances in AI just where those differences lie may become less and less clear.
Well, rather it was trying to point out that computer programs are so far, an example where adding degree to algorithms, functions, signals, and networks doesnt get you any consciousness simply by increasing degree.
We can parse terms and say it does increase its intelligence, but no further for subjective experience.
I have several friends who were very religious as children and into their teens, who in their later teens firmly rejected their religion.
I agree with you that the psychology of selfhood vis a vis introjected beliefs is complex.
So do you thereby think applying the scientific method to an individual by a scientifically informed individual is superior to being psychoanalyzed by a psychiatrist? Would you prefer mental diagnosis made by an AI algorithm, as is currently being performed with some success, as opposed to another human? Which do you think will understand your condition of life better?
It's rather apples and oranges, and I don't see it as making much sense to compare the value of them. A combination of the two seems likely to be superior to either one alone. For that matter, one might hope the psychiatrist was well informed scientifically.
Quoting kudos
Things are too much in flux in the AI world for me to want to venture an opinion. I would think an AI and a human would understand an individual in different ways, and there is likely to be value to both in the near future, if not at present.
I don't know.
When was it ever not defined as some "interiority"? You can define whatever word you want it to be, but for the purposes I have been using it, it is subjective/experiential/what-it's-likeness. In other words primary consciousness, not necessarily self-consciousness (a kind of consciousness that human beings have).
What are you using as definition of "consciousness" if not some form of "awareness" or "experience" or "point of view"? For example, the insect's "experience" of the world. If that isn't a thing, try another animal with a more complex neural system (not ok with conscious crabs and snails? how about lampreys, fish, or frogs then?). You see that is the point, where to draw the line from merely behavioral inputs/outputs (reflexive like behavior) to an animal that has some sort of "experience". Where is the divide, and WHAT is that divide? I used the article to show how it is tricky as saying something like "information is encoded in the neurons" is a subtle but apparent homunculus fallacy. What is this "information encoded" then? The observer seems to be assumed by magically saying "information encoded".
As Im not a materialist, what Im seeking to articulate is the ontological distinction between living and non-living things (or between things and beings). Materialists will generally assume (or insist) that, as living beings are constituted by the same elements as the rest of the Universe, then they are just organised matter, that there is no essential difference between living and non-living. In fact they have to say that, because recognising such an ontological distinction would undermine materialism, which claims there is only one substance (in the philosophical sense of that word) and that living beings are wholly physical in nature. That is also tied to the concept of abiogenesis, the non-biological origin of life, in which it is presumed some specific unique combination of physical circumstances spontaneously gave rise to organic matter and ultimately to the first simple living organisms almost as a kind of complex chemical reaction.
I am trying to articulate an alternative to that which doesnt rely on vitalism (animating spirits) or theistic creation. Thats why I appealed to the text by Thomas Nagel, who is an analytic philosopher and not any kind of religious apologist. His point is that the nature of subjective experience is such that it eludes objective description (articulated in his famous paper What is it Like to be a Bat?) So drawing on that kind of analysis, Im speculating that even the most basic life-forms are in some real sense the appearance of conscious agency - not that a conscious agent made organisms a la theistic creation, but that this is the beginning of the appearance of conscious agents, which then become more elaborate through the course of evolutionary development.
I do notice that in many discussions of evolution there is a tendency to attribute agency to evolution itself - that evolution does this or produces that or isnt evolution marvellous? And so on. But I think the only natural agents that can really be discerned just ARE organisms. Theyre the ones doing and producing and creating (and it involves immense struggle and sacrifice.) Thats why I am drawn to the paper I linked yesterday, From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning. That paper is also non-theistic and naturalist, but not materialist, because it recognises there is a fundamental sense in which biology cannot be reduced to physics, but without appealing to vitalism.
It seems like your plan is to beat materialism in kind with a material notion of spirit, a consciousness that is essentially the antiquated form of spirit itself, as the divine inside a divine subject. It is the idea of Jesus Christ, the embodiment of the divine in human form. And this whole thing seems caught in this post-Christian paradigm. In it we are constantly avoiding a notion of spirit while still operating within it.
Or maybe this higher level consciousness rests in empty actuality.
The blind spot of science is the neglect of lived experience.
can speak for himself. In my opinion, he is the wisest poster on this forum, and with the fewest blind-spots.
I don't know where you found the notion of "a material notion of spirit" in his last post. That may be due to a "blind spot" of your own, which interprets everything in the world based on belief in an unproven axiom : PanMaterialism. Which seems caught in a post-Renaissance paradigm. Ironically, 20th century Quantum physics discovered a fundamental inter-connection between Mind and Matter*1. But the role (participation) of an observer's mind was quickly swept under the rug by the dominant class of classical (materialist) physicists.
Way did use the term "substance", but in the Aristotelian sense of Ousia (being ; existence)*2. FWIW, I interpret Wayfarer's use of "substance" as more closely related to Platonic Form (idea ; essence ; design ; concept)*2. Which is abhorrent to Materialists, who denigrate it as a spooky spirit or ghost : a la The Ghost in the Machine. Materialists seem to have a blind spot for the ancient philosophical concept of an immaterial general quality that makes an individual material thing (quanta) what it is.
Bergson's elan vital referred, not to a ghost, but to an organizing principle in nature. Since the Big Bang, Nature seems to have a self-organizing power that Materialists take for granted, but are loathe to give it a name*3. In the biological sciences it is recognized as essential to evolutionary development, but they label it as "spontaneous"*4 (a chain of accidents tending toward complexity & integration?) to imply that an "external stimulus" was not necessary. Similarly, astrophysicists assume, as an unproven axiom, that the Big Bang was a spontaneous or random event without precedence : pop goes the chaos, which evolves into a cosmos. And yet, some scientists --- bothered by the something-from-nothing implication --- have postulated an imaginary "external stimulus" in the form of an eternal material Multiverse. :smile:
*1. Is Scientific Materialism "Almost Certainly False"? :
According to the physicist John Wheeler, quantum mechanics implies that our observations of reality influence its unfolding. We live in a "participatory universe," Wheeler proposed, in which mind is as fundamental as matter.
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/is-scientific-materialism-almost-certainly-false/
*2. What is the difference between substance and essence in Aristotle? :
Essence is what makes a thing that particular thing. In other words, essence is what makes that chair. Substance is what makes a thing a general thing. In other words, substance is what makes a chair.
https://o-g-rose-writing.medium.com/essence-substance-and-form-81c2b707c0d8
*3. Self-organization, also called spontaneous order in the social sciences, is a process where some form of overall order arises from local interactions ..
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization
Note --- Quantum physics is characterized by non-locality. Not divine intervention, but holistic inter-action.
*4. Spontaneous : performed or occurring as a result of a sudden inner impulse or inclination and without premeditation or external stimulus.
What these viewpoints have in common is a propensity to stop short at an end. To exist within an idea and to know it from within. I feel as though giving religion and science a name was a bad idea. They have become a red herring in philosophy.
I don't know the limits of scientific investigation, but I certainly think it can be much better understood than it is now. It's a heavily interdisciplinary area of study.
Do you know what a homunculus fallacy is?
Dont know what to make of this, really. Mine is more to approach the subject through philosophy - to expose the hidden assumptions behind the taken-for-granted view. I frequently cite Thomas Nagel for that reason - hes a mainstream philosopher, a tenured academic, who has had the guts to question the materialist consensus (and was heavily criticized for it). The other guy I cited, Stephen L. Talbott, is an independent scholar and philosopher of biology. I learned of his work through a great series of essays on The New Atlantis. Neither of them are specifically religious in orientation, but once you call the materialist consensus into question, alternative perspectives open up.
But youre right in saying that my approach is existential. Im only coming to realise that myself, after a lot of study.
All-matter-all-the time-every-where. I just made-up a name to serve as an analogy with PanPsychism (all mind) or PanTheism (all god). My tongue-in-cheek intention was not to propose a new religion, but to draw attention to the secular "religion of our times"*1. :joke:
Materialism is not a synonym for "science", but an unprovable assumption or belief system or worldview*2. It began as the ancient philosophy/science of Atomism, not as a substitute for pagan religions*3. Even after thousands of years of argumentation, Atomism still has no explanation for such "hard" questions as the emergence of Consciousness in a material world.
Darwin's evolutionary theory did not require any divine intervention, but it did not assert that matter-is-all-there-is, and left open the question of Causation*4. It did however posit a replacement for direct divine intervention with random (statistical) accidents & innate selection criteria (specifications). The all-powerful-matter interpretation was added by those who wanted a secular alternative to Christian Creationism*5. But Materialism has also been used to fill all open & abstract philosophical questions with objective concrete stuff. Unfortunately, it tends to be leaky in the joints around subjective ideas, opinions & feelings. :smile:
*1. Materialism as a Worldview :
John Searle, the eminent professor of philosophy at U.C. Berkeley, once said that "there is a sense in which materialism is the religion of our time." . . . . Perhaps we can see how relevant materialism is to Darwinian evolution. For if materialism is true then something very much like Darwinism must be true. . . . . The explicit materialism of the Darwinians is the mirror image of creationism.
https://evolutionnews.org/2013/09/what_is_the_wor/
*2. Definitions of "-ism" :
a belief (or system of beliefs) accepted as authoritative by some group or school. synonyms: doctrine, philosophical system, philosophy, school of thought.
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/ism
*3. Atomism is a metaphysical doctrine that asserts the existence of indivisible material unities that constitute all other material objects. This was suggested by several ancient philosophers and was revived by physicists when they discovered what we now call atoms (though they arent indivisible) . . . .
Materialism is a broad term in philosophy which posits that the subject at hand is material or physically grounded. This usually takes the form of a metaphysical position on the nature of reality which contrasts with immaterialism or idealism.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomism
*4. Darwin's First Cause :
On the Origin of Species reflects theological views. Though he thought of religion as a tribal survival strategy, Darwin still believed that God was the ultimate lawgiver, and later recollected that at the time he was convinced of the existence of God as a First Cause and deserved to be called a theist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_views_of_Charles_Darwin
*5. Materialism in academia is a fundamentalist belief system :
Materialism is the worldview that the only thing that exists is matter. Everything is matter. Not just tea cups and horses, but feelings of love and joy, thoughts and emotions, the taste of an apple, the beauty of a sunset. They are all matter.
https://www.essentiafoundation.org/materialism-in-academia-is-a-fundamentalist-belief-system/reading/
So I was asking the serious question:
How many behaviors makes a feeling? And no one cared about that, and it's crucial. Notice how the article I referenced tried to answer this kind of question by saying "information is encoded in the neurons", as if this then answers that hard problem question. But it doesn't. It is just a stand-in for how it is that at a sufficient amount of neurons, consciousness comes on the scene. It pushes the question back to "information" which itself has to be explained as to "what" that is as to its identity as conscious experience.
Earlier, @Fooloso4 thought it was simply about degree, and this was also addressing how much degree becomes what appears to be a difference in kind. Either you are proposing panpsychism or your are not.
Having a behaviour implies an observational objective, but observation is also a competing objective in itself. And homunculus returns.
Panpsychism means that there is some sort of experiential-ness to matter/energy at some level (where these "occasions of experience" inhere or at what level is a different story).
Quoting kudos
Can you elaborate? If a sponge reacts to its environment, this is a behavior. But most don't think it's conscious or has feeling associated with it. A snail might react to light perhaps this is purely behavior or perhaps there is a "feeling" associated. At what point is the divide? And hence the question "How many behaviors makes a feeling?".
The problem here is we are utilizing and extending the word 'Consciousness' synchronically to mean more than it means diachronically. It is now an umbrella term that means the whole lot of subjectivity, spirit, existence, autonomy, intelligence, right, citizenship, etc. It's used as if to suggest that because something is conscious it deserves to be treated with essential rights. We respect the lives of humans more than animals and sponges, because of factors extending beyond the idea that they have consciousness. It is just for the very reason that one cannot tell what beings are conscious agents except by certain cues, and that's really all we mean when we use the word; it is a word for a phenomenological agent by definition.
Which we now consider common sense. Unless you take the view that the activity of matter depends on or is directed by it, which is another story. To suggest otherwise would be as homunculus as you can possibly get. That there is a little man with the controls inside who is seeing existence unfiltered, and he decides whether or not to think or consider things independently, and is thus controlled by another homunculus ad infinitum as far as I understand the concept.
Sorry. I didn't mean to embarrass you with deep-felt praise. But, on this forum, you're my hero. :blush:
I am not using "panpsychism" in such a way. I am using it in its usual sense that "experientialness" is spread across matter in some way (whether through simple "occasions of experience" all the way up to something like Schopenhauer-style neutral monism).
Quoting kudos
Well sure. "What" counts as the most basic existing phenomenological agent and why are the relevant questions I am asking. When @Wayfarer created this thread from another one, I actually said if he was going to do that, it would be better to specifically name it "Transcendentalism of Neurofauna". I meant it. That is to say, we should take a deep dive into what it is about certain animals that have neurons/neural systems for why they have internal "what it's like" experiences. The dividing line is somewhere between sponges/worms/jellyfish/insects. Well, having an "eye spot" for example. WHENCE is that? We can describe it, but what is it about this sensory physical feature that now has an animal "online" if you will (has phenomenal experiences)?
Quoting kudos
Common sense? Ask any "common sense" scientist or even non-scientist, most people are inclined not to give "dead" matter any form of experiential qualities. That comes with biological systems (and neural ones at that), or at the least sufficiently complex functional systems (e.g. the possibility for AI, for example).
So you are interested in right. What right we grant such an agent, and what constitutes right to such an agent. We are talking about agreement between humans about whats like us, and whats not like us. The only way to know what its like, would be to define said quality based on human experience and determine if it is there or not. There is no way to tell if we have actually captured any sort of moral what its likeness. That would be the kind of knowledge that actually means something.
I have great trepidation about what would happen if people really thought they knew what its like to be another being. Namely because there is no a way for a computer program to truly know its own errors in the sense that humans do. It entails actuality.