Ideas/concepts fundamental to the self
So, the purpose of this thread is to explore those ideas/concepts/mental objects that might be required for the formation and sustenance of the self, assuming the self is contingent on previously formed concepts; I say this last bit because it might be the case that the self depends solely on sensorial input and not at all on its processing or the products of this processing; it could also be the case that the self does not depend on either of these, or conversely it could depend on both of these. So, assuming there are concepts that need to be formed before the self realizes, I would like your help in exploring these concepts with the aim of finding those that are fundamental/basic. For example, one might say that one needs to form a concept of shape before having a concept of self since it might be very difficult to reference/contemplate/visualize/imagine something if one does not comprehend or has the capacity to comprehend that there are shapes (hopefully this is a good example). Now, the concept of shape might depend on more fundamental ones, and the idea is to try to reach the bottom as a group. Please try to be organized and keep the thread on topic. I'm not a good moderator, but if someone is interested in playing that role, I am ok with it, but again try to keep the thread focused on the main topic.
Also, some might think that it could be complicated to explore these concepts without first understanding the true nature of the self, and I agree, but I just want to and want you to give it a try and see what happens.
Also, some might think that it could be complicated to explore these concepts without first understanding the true nature of the self, and I agree, but I just want to and want you to give it a try and see what happens.
Comments (46)
Quoting kudos
Good point. I guess I am thinking of the human self, (according to me) the idea that one is an entity with the capacity to affect and be affected by that which is not oneself (whatever oneself thinks one is).
Let me try another way to put it. The self I am trying to explore is that which is the object of thought when you think of yourself. For example, when you think of a car the object of thought is the concept of a car, no matter the colour, the shape, the size, etc. You can take the concept of a car and play with it; you can give it any colour, any shape (as long as you can still call it a car), any material, etc. You cannot do this if you don't posses the concept of a car. When you think of yourself, there is a concept with which you can play with; I am referring to such concept. The idea would be to explore the concepts necessary for the formation of the concept of the self, whatever the true nature of the self is.
Please let me know if that helps clear things up or not. It is important that what is trying to be explored is understood, so I don't mind deviating from the topic to this end.
However, it is not my intention with this thread to define what the true nature of the self is, but to find the concepts necessary for its conceptualization in the human mind*; those concepts one needs to form before being able to form the concept of the self (sorry if I repeat myself so much, I am trying to say the same in different ways to see if it gets clearer).
Now, I might contradict myself or talk nonsense; please, call me out. Again, the aim of the thread is to explore for the sake of exploration; we don't wanna define anything, at least purposefully.
*(let's say both collective and individual, unless people think it complicates matters too much, in that case let's centre on the individual conceptualization of the self - though the collective idea might be easier to explore, I dunno)
It forms as the infant's pre- and post-natal neural networks forms: gradually. Concepts are a fairly late addition to the mental development of any intelligence. First, there are only physical sensations, then instinctive responses to environment, then emotions, then recognition of external objects, then recognition of one's own limbs as separate from external objects, then recognition of other animate entities, then one's interaction with both kinds of external entity. Everything to this point is discrete, specific, singular: this thumb, this food, this blanket, this mother - non of these perceived external objects has a name or a category. Generalization is a result of many encounters, memory and association. From generalization comes categorization, and then image-retention, conceptualization and abstraction - that is, the ability to 'play with' an idea, aka imagination.
That's right. A sense of self - that is, an awareness that inside here is separate from outside there - precedes any concepts.
Ok, first, I wanna admit that my language so far has been very ambiguous, please bear with me. I'll do my best to explain what I am trying to do/say.
Now, I wanna clarify something, and to that end I'd like you to answer a couple questions; do you believe we posses an idea/concept of our individual self? By this, I mean to ask if you believe that there is a discrete mental representation which is the object of thought when one thinks about oneself. I hope this makes sense. If you believe this concept exists, I would like to focus your attention to this idea and ask you if you think that the existence of such idea is dependent on the formation of some other concepts, or if it can be formed without the need of any other concepts, or if what I am trying to do is just irrelevant or useless (I wanna know if you understand what my purpose is)? Also, if you believe the idea of the self exists in our minds, do you believe it to be separate to the sense of self? Is the self and the idea of it two distinct things?
Now in reference to your last response (which concerns the sense of self, which at the moment I am assuming you consider to be different to the idea of the self, just FYI), you mention an awareness that inside here is separate from outside there. In my opinion there is a distinction that must be done for such awareness to occur, namely, here from there. Wouldn't a distinction imply conceptualization? Am I mistaken in assuming that the distinction must be prior to the awareness?
In the language of Kant I guess I am trying to ask if there are any concepts required for the formation of both the intuition and the concept of the (individual) self, I am not concerned about the self as a sensation. And if I understand correctly the intuition, the concept, and the sensation of the self exist, (which I think is not the case for being cold, for example, which can only be a sensation, or for the representation of a car, which can only be either an intuition or a concept).
Its almost incomprehensible that there must be that which is affected by itself. How can it be asked about a thing, when the very thing asked about, is doing the asking?
Nature of the metaphysical human beast: look for answers whether or not there are any.
Yes.
Quoting Daniel
I think it begins as an idea too internal and primitive to articulate. It forms long before the infant acquires language. If that's a concept, then it is the original concept, to which many other concepts - 'me' 'mine', 'you' 'girl' 'dog' 'brother' are later added.
Quoting Daniel
Not entirely. But then, I hardly ever understand why philosophers complicate simple facets of creature existence.
Quoting Daniel
An idea is not a thing. It's a product of the mind. The mind describes - in words and images - what it experiences and encounters, in order to process information to make sense of the world.
Quoting Daniel
Okay, that's a reasonable way to look at a primal sense of being a discrete, self-aware physical entity. But then your whole car analogy is inapplicable; that's a very much more sophisticated concept.
Intuition comes after sensation and before thought or idea. Intuition may be considered as sensation groping for words to describe itself.
:cheer:
I don't see things being affected by themselves as being incomprehensible at all. Can you elaborate on what seems almost incomprehensible to you about things affecting themselves?
I go by the concept that the idea of self is identical to self consciousness. It seems to be a reasonably widely accepted opinion on the topic. I was looking at "A Companion To Metaphysics" Edited by JG Kim and E. Sosa (1995, Blackwell Companion to Philosophy). When searched for self or idea of self, it refers to Self Consciousness.
Idea or concept of self is a type of intuition or Apperception (in Kant's terms), that looks into the Mind. It is embedded or based on all mental perception, feelings, sensations, and bodily and speech acts too.
By that, I mean, one cannot be unsure of one's own thoughts, feelings and sensations in one's own mind and body for them as one's own mental events (because it is, by necessity impossible, for one to have the mental events without the self).
But also when one says, "It is raining outside.", what actually it means is, "I perceive that it is raining outside." "Philosophy is an interesting subject." means that "I think Philosophy is an interesting subject." "Shall we meet for dinner?" is "I would like to ask you, if we shall meet for dinner. What do you think?"
"Shut the bloody door!" would be "I ask/tell/order you to shut the bloody door."
There are implied "I"s in every sentence one utters.
I kind of see what your concern is, and I am gonna say I share it to some extent, and for this reason, in this case, I guess Im trying to separate the idea of the self from the self itself. Although like @Corvus, I'm inclined to believe that the idea of the self and the self are the same thing.
In spite of this last point, I separate the proper self from its conceptualization so one can ask about it. And if the self can be thought of as an idea different from other ideas, that is, a particular mental representation, something separate from other concepts such as up, down, the sky, etc, then I ask if I need to form other concepts before I wonder or ask about or conceptualize the self.
I wasnt being so general, meaning only the self by my comment. See below, if you like.
Quoting Daniel
Which gives rise to my comment. That which is trying to separate is the self, which implies the attempt to separate self from self. Even to separate the idea of self is merely once-removed, and still requires that to which the idea belongs, so you end up with an idea youve created about yourself, you then wish to remove from yourself.
Why does self need to be something to separate, or separable? I fail to understand what could be gained by attempting to conceptualize something, when the device for constructing conceptions, or to which conceptions are spontaneously given, is just .well .me.
There is a Enlightenment- era philosophy addressing this exact dilemma, however much it has subsequently fallen from favor. The argument therein is, the self can be conceptualized in the somewhat normal method, but theres no separability connected to such conception.
Anyway .my two or three hapennies.
From my perspective it seems fairly obvious that we affect ourselves. For example, I realize that there is something I am interested in knowing more about, and I study and become more knowledgeable. Is that not affecting myself?
Now I take a perdurantist view towards personal identity, so I would think it somewhat more accurate to say my past self affects my future self. But regardless of that, is not voluntarily learning affecting the self?
And from mine, I find much more parsimony in the notion my self is affected, or, which is the same thing, I am affected. To be affected by my thoughts, it does not follow that because all my thoughts belong to me, I thereby affect myself.
The argument derives from antiquity, in that the conception contained in the subject of a proposition or statement cannot be at the same time the conception contained in the object, in the same proposition.
Perdurantist. New one on me.
I'm surprised the subject hasn't come up around here.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perdurantism:
Again, the purpose of this exercise is not to define the true nature of the self, it is simply to explore a fictitious space, the space of ideas, with relation to the idea of the self. Let me try to explain my line of thought better. One could consider the mind to be a sort of abstract space populated by sensations, intuitions, concepts, and whatever else is found in a human mind; in other words, it could be consider as a set that contains other sets... a collection of (mental) collections. If we focus on the set of ideas/concepts (or the space of ideas), one could say that it is populated by distinct ideas; that is, the set of ideas contains more than one element. Of these, one could say some are simple and others are composite; for example, we could say that the idea of a car and the idea of a shoe are simple ideas, but that the idea of a shoe inside a car is a composite idea, one needs to have an idea of a shoe and an idea of a car before one can have an idea of a shoe in a car. Let me try now a more complex example of what I am trying to convey when I say composite and simple ideas. So, we could say that the ideas of quantity and change are simple ideas, but that the idea of addition is a composite one since a notion of quantity and a notion of change are required to form a notion of the process of addition. In other words, composite ideas require simple ideas to exist, and the space of ideas contains both simple and composite ideas, and composite ideas are different from the simple ideas that make them.
Now, if we assume that the self can be conceptualized, i.e., there is an element in the set/space of ideas which represents the self, then the purpose of this exercise becomes to find if this idea of the self is a simple or a composite idea. And if it is a composite idea, which are the simple ideas required for its existence.
Following this line of thought, I would say @Vera Mont considers the idea of the self to be a simple idea; that is, the idea of the self does not require the prior formation of other ideas to exist.
I think @Corvus and @Mww argue that the idea of the self is not an element of the set of ideas. If I understand correctly, this is because one cannot form an idea of the very thing that supports them (?). I think I am mistaken with my interpretation, but I would like to argue that the self is a subject of this conversation, and I dont think it could be such if it could not be conceptualized.
Not what Im arguing; THE self is a valid general idea, having a myriad of representative conceptualizations from various ways of being understood. MY self is a particular, and as such, is more a logical deduction represented as an object of MY reason, given the name transcendental object in order to distinguish its origin, rather than a conception of the understanding.
Quoting Daniel
This concern is different from your The self I am trying to explore is that which is the object of thought when you think of yourself, insofar as me thinking of myself is incomprehensible. Nothing contradictory in examining the self in general as an object of thought, but to think myself as an object of my own thought, invites the anathema of Cartesian theater.
It would be helpful, if you could clarify, whether your idea of self is purely mental, or physical in nature, or combinations of both. In other words, is the self made of purely perceptions, feelings and sensations? Or is it a combination of body, brain and mental states? Or maybe could it be just functions of brain (There is no mental existence, but only the biological neural state of brain)?
How are they different?
At one moment in time, if I am conscious, I must be conscious of something, there must be an intentionality about my consciousness. For example, at one moment in time, I can be conscious of the concept circular shape, the concept of pain, the concept of the colour red and the concept of an acrid smell.
As regards my consciousnesses of the concept circular shape, at the same time not only am I conscious of a simple concept, a circular shape, but also I am conscious of a set of composite concepts, an arc at the top, an arc to the right, an arc at the bottom and an arc to the left.
As for my consciousness of a single concept, it may be the same for my consciousness of a set of concepts
For a single concept, at the same time I am conscious not only of a simple whole but also a set of composite parts. Similarly, for a set of concepts. At the same time I can be conscious of a simple whole, ie, a self, as well as a set of composite parts, ie, the individual concepts making up the whole.
From Kant, Hegel, and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, by Kourosh Alizadeh, Hegel takes the basic Kantian idea of the original unity of apperception.
It may be that this unity of apperception becomes a single conscious self out of the many different concepts that we are aware of at any one moment in time.
IE, rather than certain ideas/concepts/mental objects pre-existing the self, these ideas/concepts/mental objects are the self.
So instead of attempting a phenomenological approach I would assert certain things that I concluded with as the foundation for the self in previous investigations.
My self is made out of shame, for in want of the means for the power I seek I am able to side with my offenders in times when I can imagine that it benefits those means.
That is, the self were made under the pressure of two equal forces, the will for unquestioned power and the comprehension of my own limited power, shame is the consequence.
Or in other terms still: my self is my social conscience, something I could only be shamed into. Can I induce that this applies to other people? Are we statisticians?
This idea is absurd in that, if all these ideas/concepts/mental objects are the self, then you end up having 1000s of different selfs.
You used Kant's concept of Apperception when you wrote:
Idea or concept of self is a type of intuition or Apperception (in Kant's terms), that looks into the Mind.
The Wikipedia article on Transcendental apperception wrote:
[i]Transcendental apperception is the uniting and building of coherent consciousness out of different elementary inner experiences (differing in both time and topic, but all belonging to self-consciousness).
1) All experience is the succession of a variety of contents (an idea taken from David Hume).
2) To be experienced at all, the successive data must be combined or held together in a unity for consciousness.
3) Unity of experience therefore implies a unity of self.
4) The unity of self is as much an object of experience as anything is.
5) Therefore, experience both of the self and its objects rests on acts of synthesis that, because they are the conditions of any experience, are not themselves experienced.
6) These prior syntheses are made possible by the categories. Categories allow us to synthesize the self and the objects.[/i]
It seems to me that the whole point of Kant's concept of the unity of apperception is the possibility of the unity in the mind of different experiences.
Is your understanding of Kant's apperception different?
I think having all these different perceptions in the mind is evidence for the existence of self, but perceptions, sensations and feelings are not the self itself.
I feel that self is a special perception (apperception of Kant's term), that looks inwards into the mind, whereas all the standard perceptions look outwards into the external world. The mind has two sides, i.e. the inside (self) and outside (perceptions for the external world).
Because the self can only look inwards into the mind, it is invisible to the other perceptions. I am not 100% certain of Kant's idea of self, as I have not read it yet. I did read the definition of Kant's apperception, and borrowed the idea to make up my own thoughts on the self. Could be wrong, but will keep on reading to further clarify and discuss. :)
I think it makes a lot of sense, when I read "it" as "intuition". (or deep learning)
Light enters the eye from outside, is processed in the brain, and "I" perceive the colour red.
When "I" perceive the colour red, where is what I am perceiving exist.
I am indirectly perceiving light that exists outside in the world
But am I directly perceiving light that exists outside in the world, or am I directly perceiving a process happening inside my brain?
I don't think it is a good idea to bring the brain into Epistemology. Brain is, of course, the essential organ for perception, thoughts, and all the mental events to exist and function in the mind. But it is in the realm of Biology and Neurology.
In Neurology and Biology books, they enthusiastically and excitingly talk about how the senses bring in the external data into the retina, and how they get converted into electrical signals, and get fed into brain cells with all the colourful photos and diagrams and graphs in the illustrations. But that's where the story stops.
They all go mute, or say the hard problem explaining where the brain state and the perception binds must go back to 200 - 300 years of time of Kant or Hume. So it is not very fruitful to bring the brain into the epistemological discussion yet until the sciences made some real progress on explaining the hard problems.
If you think your perceived images of the light exist only in your mind, and that is the real existence of the light, then you are an idealist.
If you say that your perceived image of the light is the actual existence in the external world, then you are a realist.
What are you?
Quoting Mww
I think I see why the confusion, and please understand the topic is not easy to articulate, and I might as well contradict myself or fail at conveying my thoughts, but know I am willing to keep trying.
Now, I think you have an idea of yourself, an idea that I think allows one to differentiate from other "selves" and other things that exist, allows one to compare oneself to that which one is not, and in such way assert one's position as a particular entity.
I wanna try a thought experiment in order to define the kind of idea I am referring to. So, imagine you are looking at yourself in the mirror, looking right into your eyes. The process of imagining this scenario generates a mental representation unique to the scenario; that is, the same mental representation will not be formed if you imagine something else, so that every time you imagine yourself looking in the mirror only the corresponding mental representation will be formed*.
In this mental representation**, there are at least three components, your reflection (or the reflection of your eyes), the mirror, and what's looking at the reflection***. When you think of each of the previous three components individually (or when you steer your attention to each, individually), I assume you form a mental representation, as accurate as possible, of your reflection, the mirror, or what's looking at the reflection. I am concern with the mental representation of what does the looking, or what calls itself "Mww."
Another attempt. We are capable to ask ourselves about our individual selves, like we are doing in this thread, somehow. We are asking about something. To be able to wonder about that something we must recognize its existence; that is, and please let me know if you disagree with the following statement, we must be able to categorize it as a distinct thing, which I do not think we would be able to do without forming a mental representation of it. So, there must exist a mental representation of something in order to be able to ask about that something. Who am I? What is it to which I refer as I? Again, I think that to reference that which I call I (either in a question or a thought experiment), I must be able to represent it (in some mysterious, elusive, but particular**** way) mentally. Now, we are not concern about the nature of such representation, but in determining what other ideas, representations, concepts, are required for its conception, if any.
Now, I am not concern with the thing that does the looking but with its mental representation when one refers to the thing that does the looking (or the thing that calls itself I).
* If I ask you to imagine an air balloon you are not gonna imagine a cavern (even if you can imagine thousands of different caverns), for example.
** By mental representation I mean a (mental/brain/whatever) state particular to the thing it represents; so that the state that represents idea A is different to the one that represents idea B, and no two ideas have the same state.
*** I am asking you to imagine yourself looking at your reflection in the mirror, not yourself looking at someone looking at their reflection (even if that someone is a "copy" of you).
**** When I refer to that which I call I, I do not think of the direction of the grain in a plank; instead, I am able to refer to and only to that which I call I.
As you wrote: The mind has two sides, i.e. the inside (self) and outside (perceptions for the external world).
The relationship between the mind and body, and how the mind can emerge from a physical brain, is part of the epistemological debate. To say that the physical brain cannot be brought into the epistemological debate is to take the side of Idealism, thereby excluding the possibility of Realism.
The Direct Realist would say that our perceptions of the external world are directly of the external world, rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.
The Indirect Realist would say that our perceptions of the external world are not directly of an external world, but are directly of an internal representation in our mind of an external world. Such a representation may or may not directly correspond with the external world that is causing such representations
The Berkelian Idealist would say that the external world exists in the mind of God.
The Solipsist Idealist would say that the external world only exists in the mind of the perceiver.
The Realist would say that the external world exists independently of the mind. They are not Immaterialists, in that there is such as thing as material substance. They can be either a Monist, where there is only one fundamental substance, the mind/body, or a Dualist, where there are two fundamental substances, the mind and the body.
The idealist would say that there is no external world existing independently of any mind, and are Immaterialists in that there is no such thing as material substance
Personally, I am an Indirect Realist, Neutral Monist and Nominalist.
If Im looking in a mirror, regardless of what I perceive in the seeing, there is a phenomenal representation given to my intellectual system. This is the way the human system works: the senses relay physical information in the form of sensation, the cognitive part of the system operates in conjunction with it, and by which the representations of things perceived become my experiences.
So it is that in the case of me looking into a mirror and seeing myself, the phenomenal representation is just another set of physical information. The senses do not have the ability to discern identity, from which follows the phenomenal representation of the physical information contains no indication that I am seeing myself. As far as this goes, there is merely an appearance of some thing, presented to my senses, as is the case with every single perception of mine, without exception.
So how does it arise that the perception from the mirror is my body? From the information my senses provide, re: movement, the color of the shirt, the haircut, a veritable plethora of representations corresponding exactly with what I already know.
But no matter what, that which is not a representation from the mirror, is that to which the manifold of representations that are from the mirror, are given. The senses can never enable a representation of that which operates on, and because of, them. There can be no representation of the self given from the perception in the mirror.
I cannot see my self in a mirror. I cannot see my self, ever. And the myself I do see, is nothing but my personal empirical object, which is just my body.
But forget all that; youre asking me to imagine. Fine. To imagine is to make the senses irrelevant, insofar as I can imagine looking at myself in the mirror while skydiving, in which case there is no phenomenal representation of my body, because Im not actually perceiving it. Nevertheless, imagination does present its own representations, otherwise I wouldnt have the mere mental image of looking in a mirror while not actually looking.
Ok, so the imagined image of me looking in the mirror corresponds precisely to the image given from the actual looking, which makes explicit the representations from imagination have at least some of their origins in experience. If I didnt already know what a mirror is, how could I imagine looking into it? Which implies a sort of mental storage facility, which we common folk call memory, philosophers call intuition, and metaphysicians call consciousness.
Long story short ..guess what representation cannot be found in memory/intuition/consciousness, but serves as its representation? And if, even just for the sake of argument and in keeping with pure logical law, consciousness is the sum total of every representation belonging to an individual subject, and, it is thereby impossible for self to be contained in that which it represents as containing all representations, there arises an impasse, in attempting to represent the self as such.
There is a expression representing that which encompasses consciousness as the totality of representations, called ego. Ego, then, is a complexity, and in turn is conceptually represented by the simple, called I. All three of these together entail the conception of self, whereas any one of them alone does not. Hence the incomprehensibility of attempts to conceptualize a self without the apprehension of that conjunction, and upon that apprehension, the self is given, but not as a representation.
There is no thing that does the looking. There is only a systematic process by which there is that which is its object.
I am not denying the existence of the brain, or the involvement of the brain in mental events. But dragging the brain into the Epistemic discussion has been always the same - nothing much in essence and nothing really fruitful to add into the conclusion apart from just muddling up the points.
We all know it is the brain which is responsible for all the mental events. That is just common knowledge, but the rest is unknown how the brain state generates mental events or what are the mental states or events we have in nature. We know we have mental events such as perceptions, feelings and sensations ... that is all we have to work with in Epistemology and Metaphysics. And there are plenty to investigate and discuss in the conceptual level of the topic.
There are some interesting theories by scientists that mental events may not be all 100% from the brain. There are some Amoeba species, which don't have brains. Just visual sensors in their body, but they make movements towards their prey, eat the prey, and then return to their original location using the sensors. Knowing the preys and returning to their original location by their willed movement are looked upon as mental discernment by the Ecologists. If this is the case, then are all the mental events from the brain functions? Could brain then totally be eliminated in investigating mental events?
Most of the classic philosophers have been talking about the nature of the mind without mentioning brain. And the ancients used to think hearts are the source of mental events, not brain, and breaths are the minds and souls of the living.
Quoting RussellA
Indirect realist sounds like an idealist in disguise under the mask of the realist. If you say, it is just a representation of your mind, then it looks to me idealist, even if you say it is indirectly from the external world (it gave impression that the external world bit was added to try to assert you are a realist as well, not the disguised idealist :) ).
Do you believe that the external world objects are real, or just a representation of your mind? I mean do the external world and objects keep existing even if while you are asleep, or they don't exist anymore when you are out for the count?
I still think that these individual perceptions, sensations, emotions and feelings and all the mental events are not the self, but they are just a logical evidence that those mental events are under your own ownership.
The self is a special form of perception which looks inward into your mind, being conscious of all the mental events taking place in your mind. The self perception would be invisible or unknowable by all your outward perceptions. It can only be intuited via mediation or self introspection. In that sense, it is transcendental in nature.
I would like to ask you some more basic questions regarding the topic.
1. Do you claim that "I" is the same as the "self"? or is "I" a human being?
2. Do you claim that the "self" exists?
3. If the self exists, then is it a physical or mental substance?
4. Can substance be mental? or is it only physical?
I answer the questions fully aware they might make things even more confusing.
1. Something inside my body (and therefore a part of) is aware of it (my body) and its surroundings. My body plus that which is aware is referred by me as "I".
That something inside my body, which is aware, at some point during my life gains the ability to refer to itself - as I am doing right now. To do this, I think it must recognize its existence as a particular thing, it must be able to separate itself from the world, in the sense that there is an inside here and an outside there, as Vera Mont said earlier. This separation must be represented mentally so that there is a mental representation for the world and one for what is not the world. The mental representation of that something which is aware inside my body being separate from a world "background" is the self, which is different from that which is aware.
2. Yes.
3. and 4. I believe all mental substances to be physical because there is a corresponding physical process responsible for the formation of each mental substance (in addition, they occupy a physical space).
It seems that to me the self is a mental representation of that which is aware; it is an idea. However, I thought they should be considered separate (i.e., the self and its idea are different) so as to avoid going into the topic of what is or what is not the self. Again, the idea here is to focus on that mental representation of the self, the one that allows us to refer to ourselves when we do things such as describing ourselves, talking to ourselves, imagining about ourselves, etc. Like when you get angry, there is usually an object you get angry at, what do you get angry at when you get angry at yourself?
Quoting Corvus
Quoting Corvus
If I correctly understand your position:
1) You distinguish between standard perceptions looking outwards into the external world, and special perceptions that look inwards into the mind
2) Within the mind are both inward and outward looking perceptions
3) The mind is somehow generated by the brain
4) The self is known by inward perception, and the self knows both inward and outward perceptions.
As both inward and outward perceptions are part of the self, then one would expect that the outward perceptions would know the inward perceptions, as they are both part of the same self. Yet you say that the outward perceptions don't know the inward perceptions.
Kant's apperception is not a special kind of perception, but is a unity of apperception that applies to all perceptions, whether inwards or outward looking.
A common epistemological question is the relationship between the mind and brain, the relationship between the mental and the physical, in asking how can the mental emerge from the physical.
If the physical brain is excluded from the epistemological discussion, then Realism is also being excluded from the epistemological discussion, as, in Realism, a material substance such as the brain does exist outside the mind.
The discussion then reduces to that of Idealism, in that there is no material substance outside the mind, no physical brain outside the mind.
When you say "all the standard perceptions look outwards into the external world.", if epistemology has been reduced to Idealism, then the external world would exist in the mind, meaning that all perceptions look inwards into the mind. In that event, any distinction between inward and outward looking perceptions disappears, such that the self does then become available to Kant's unity of apperception.
However, Realism and the physical brain cannot be excluded from the epistemological discussion.
Quoting RussellA
Could you then please explain how the brain generates the mind? Please explain in detail how can the mental can emerge from the physical.
When you say something inside your body, is it a physical object? Or is it something non-physical? Can you see or touch it?
From your answers on 3 & 4, it seems that all your mental objects are also physical. I hope I am understanding your points correctly. Could you please explain on that? How can mental substance be also physical?
Is it even correct to say mental substance? What is substance? Can mental events be substance?
If I could explain that, then I would be world famous.
I bought a half dozen Neurology and Psychology books on the Brain and Perception, and scanned through them over and over again for days, but none of them gave the answers. That was what I was saying in my previous posts.
Brain is the foundation of all mental events, but we still don't know answers to the hard problems. But we still have mental events, so we can discuss and investigate them in conceptual level.
Here I take you to be assuming that having vision, self-awareness, memory, focus, self-direction, etc.; in other words, in just being a human, that we have a self, and that that is what the self consists of. But this is an assumption and an extrapolation backwards.
Yes, you are separate from others, but the way you work is not different than me, and we have the same possibilities of experience, meaning you do not experience anything I cannot also. Of course there are exceptions, but the point is that this imposed picture is that we are a constant self (your consciousness) and that we are always special (your perception), not just rarely, having something we would ordinarily call: personal or secret.
Now we can speak of brains and processes but that is just how a human works (even including the unconscious), not how the self does (studying the human does not elucidate what it is to have a self; how that works is the task of philosophy). Classic philosophy (Descartes) created this picture of me out of a need for something undoubtable (as: pure), and thus this constant picture of the self is just a projection of the desire for something certain.
I dont want to bring up my argument for the self here, as I started a discussion here claiming that the self is only formed (if at all) at times in relation to our common culture, most relevant here as taken up by @Manuel starting Here and @Astrophel here.