Science is not "The Pursuit of Truth"
It's incorrect and damaging to understand science as a "pursuit of truth", and foolish for those philosophers who take themselves as scientists merely because pursue and care for it. To do science, one must ensure that their question is specific, and aspires for an answer that is specific, measurable, testable/verifiable and repeatable.
Language that contains truth conditions that are not specific, measurable or testable isn't fit for scientific inquiry. Furthermore, its truth isn't representative of something that demands belief or is unobjectionable. If the "proof" or the reason why those words or claims are true isn't irrefutable or compelling evidence.
Surely, science isn't "the pursuit of truth" but "the pursuit of truth under a particular set of circumstances", and these circumstances are what we call science.
Has the view that science is "the pursuit of truth" led to a misunderstanding of truth? Particularly in contexts such as philosophy and politics, where truth may operate under very different circumstances.
Language that contains truth conditions that are not specific, measurable or testable isn't fit for scientific inquiry. Furthermore, its truth isn't representative of something that demands belief or is unobjectionable. If the "proof" or the reason why those words or claims are true isn't irrefutable or compelling evidence.
Surely, science isn't "the pursuit of truth" but "the pursuit of truth under a particular set of circumstances", and these circumstances are what we call science.
Has the view that science is "the pursuit of truth" led to a misunderstanding of truth? Particularly in contexts such as philosophy and politics, where truth may operate under very different circumstances.
Comments (62)
Some methodologies turn into a hagiography of truth, only to find the mystery too great and reject their own god. But truth is a small thing. It's just what statements do.
It would be a puzzle if science were to "organise facts" that were not true. And abduction is a criminal offence.
What is the relevant quality of a scientific result? I would say it's reliability. You need to be able to rely on the prediction of what will happen, so you can base your decisions/ designs on this.
Is that a fundamental attribute of truth? I would say it is. For something to be true it must be a reliable. If something is true, this excludes surprise. It excludes a convincing argument to the contrary.
I think this is accurate. Per Dewey, "Every science is continually learning that its supposed solutions are only "apparent" because the solution solves, not the actual problem, but one which has been made up." (Dewey, "The Relationship of Thought and its Subject Matter" in Essays in Experimental Logic) Science is conducted under conditions which are "constructed."
To distinguish these concepts in a word I figured gnosis/techne might work for easy labeling.
I would argue that techne tends to be what makes us think we've "gotten it right." If a theory enhances our causal powers such that we can do new and extraordinary things, then we are confident that our theories say something true about the world. There is a practical knowledge, "know-how," element to techne as well. Even though our theory of flight hasn't radically changed, we do continually improve the related techne for instance (e.g. thrust vectoring on the F-22, new control surfaces).
I see science as a core part of man's moral mission (to the extent we have one). Prudent judgement on policy requires gnosis and techne. Techne increases our ability to enhance all living things' well being, even if we don't use that information that way. Both make us more free. Further, gnosis seems to be a good in itself, something we enjoy for our own sake. It is a sort of transcendence, the ability to question and go beyond ourselves initial opinions, beliefs, and desires.
Just my $0.2. I think it's a mistake to separate science and technology as much as we tend do currently. Technological development, maintainance of old technology, etc. are all performative parts of the same entity.
Quoting Judaka
I think the key term here is measurable. Specifiability, verifiability and repeatability are not exclusive to science, but the requirement that the objects of study be mathematizable has long been considered to be a prerequisite for empirical investigation.
And here I was, thinking words had meanings.
Under such a definition, we approach truth as our description of the world gets more and more accurate. Thus, we could have multiple true descriptions of something like "how the Titanic sank," but some would provide a more full description than others. Full descriptions eliminate more possible worlds than less full descriptions. The fullest possible description eliminates all possible worlds except for the one that obtains.
Falsity would involve our descriptions eliminating real elements of the world from the set of possible worlds. To be false, a description must say that the set of possible worlds does not include (elements of) the world that actually obtains. So, if there was no widespread voter fraud in the US 2020 election, it would be false to claim that this occurred because such a description is consistent only with a set of possible worlds that does not include the actual world. But we could further say that something is more false when it eliminates more elements of the fullest possible description from the realm of possibility.
A full description might be something like "all you would need to simulate the universe." In an indeterminate universe, such a description might require infinite amounts of information if it is to include future events, but only a finite amount of information to describe all past events. And in this way, I think the definition might answer something about the truth value of statements about future events. The truth value of hypotheticals can be covered in a similar way, but it's more convoluted and beside the point anyhow.
:up:
But further, not all facts are empirical. Fallibilism isn't used in arithmetic - 1+1 isn't 2 until proven otherwise. Nor does moving the bishop back to the box show that the rules of chess are false.
All I can gather these little discrete pieces of true knowledge called facts, to form a mental mosaic of reality which is my provisional, malleable knowledge of the world.
So you can't have the very large stuff but you can have the small stuff? Then don't worry about the very large stuff.
Some sentences are true. Any epistemology that denies this is... fraught with contradiction.
What other options exist?
What's that, then?
Ordinary science, or anything other branch of knowledge.
It's the way we interpret the data. Not for a dog or anything other species.
It's trivial.
Are we talking about oysters again? You can't taste oysters without using your tongue, and so you can never taste oysters as they taste in themselves?
If not, then what?
Depends on the science. It's a constant approximation, subject to revision and refinement, but not finalized. I would say General Relativity is true and is quantum physics. Yet we know they are incomplete.
I doubt oysters have experience, but I can't be sure.
No, I don't have things in themselves in mind here.
I don't imagine the way we do sociology is the only way any hypothetical alien species would do sociology, or psychology or even botany.
Oh, good.
So we agree that at least some of what science says is true. Turned out nice again, didn't it?
Yes.
For now. :wink:
Yes, if the words they contain actually convey the meaning which is both intended and apprehended.
This is why I'm particular about the use of large, comprehensive words in small, factual sentences. Since those big concepts contain so many possible specifics, the hearer can all to easily interpret a sentence as saying something quite different from what the speaker meant.
And yet there is a pop episteme which claims that there are no truths. Of course, no one here would say anything of the sort - we are all too sophisticated for that!
Accurate science relies on accurate observations. It may not be right to say science taken as a whole pursues truth, but some scientists may understand themselves to be pursuing truth
Quoting Leontiskos
So, there are all of these different types of truths, dozens of them, potentially infinite, and science pursues only one of these. Why not just say that science is the pursuit of "scientific truth" and not truth? Seems quite inefficient to say science is the pursuit of truth, but not political, philosophical, religious, moral, cultural, artistic, personal, and whatever other type of truths there are. All that just to disagree with the title of the OP?
Quoting Echarmion
Reliability isn't the only relevant quality but forgetting that, conceptually, truth should be reliable, but in practice, it depends on the truth conditions. Within your argument, you use words such as "surprise" and "convincing", which are inherently unscientific. You can't measure the "convincingness" of an argument, right? If I find your argument convincing, that's no guarantee that someone else will. You could make the same argument with "reliability" itself.
The quality of truth is dependent upon the truth conditions. Truths can have various truth conditions and have various qualities, right?
"Science" is an abstraction. Right?
It's people who pursue truths. Scientific or otherwise. Right?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
That's definitely not what truth is. Science makes use of language where truths are inherently pragmatic and goal-orientated. We can test the "effectiveness of X" or "compare the effectiveness of X and Y". It might be true that method X is effective if it fulfils the objective, and true that another method is superior because it can be done faster and more cheaply. We want methods that better accomplish our many goals, such as being more environmentally friendly or safer for workers and so on.
I get the sense that you're splitting the impractical and the practical in a way that misrepresents truth, what do you say to that?
"Is it true that X election contained widespread voter fraud" is a question we can ask, but how we understand and measure "voter fraud" is tied to our goals and values, it's practical. We'd want to know if the election was compromised. We'd need to have an understanding of what it meant for it to be true that an "election has been compromised". This is not some kind of worldly truth to uncover.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Power makes one more free, isn't that all it is? And it doesn't necessarily make "us" more free, but just whoever has that power.
I don't think that for one to do science requires any particular reason or motive, and I have a hard time thinking you'd disagree with that, not sure what to make of your comments then.
I keep floating that one, with little success. People insist on anthropomorphizing abstract ideas; insisting that religion "says" or science "does" something, as if these concepts had volition and agency. It can become very confusing when coupled with with other big abstract ideas like Truth and Knowledge. You can almost see them pricked out in stars in the night sky: Science in Pursuit of Truth, an eternally incomplete pass.
:rofl:
What do you mean by "in practice"? Truth is a concept we apply to statements.
Quoting Judaka
Yes, I intentionally used "unscientific" terms because they should apply to all kinds of contexts.
Is an element of truth that people agree on it? If not I don't see how it matters that people can argue about it. But if *you* believe something is true, then there cannot be a convincing argument to the contrary for you.
Quoting Judaka
I have no idea what this would mean.
Quoting Echarmion
Your comment was about reliability, and that was my focus.
Quoting Echarmion
Surely, neither merely believing something is true nor believing that no arguments against one's position are convincing does anything to guarantee reliability. It's one's reasons for believing something is true that determine that truth's reliability. Reasons that are measurable, and have been repeatedly verified are reliable, aren't such factors like these determinative of reliability?
I might think that dreams are a very reliable source of information, "X is true because I dreamt it was", and I'm not convinced by any argument that suggests X is false.
Words and ideas must be redefined within the context of science, and adhere to scientific standards, that's a prerequisite for doing science.
Quoting Echarmion
I agree that we must be convinced that something is true to call it true. "For someone to call something true, they must believe it is", sure I agree with that. But how does that give us reliability?
Quoting Echarmion
It means that within the context of science, someone saying X is true means it has met the prerequisites set out by the modern approach to science, and within the context of something else, like art, X is beautiful because it met the prerequisites for one to find it beautiful. Those prerequisites were just that they found X beautiful, and their belief just reflects their personal interpretation and experience. It wouldn't even cross our minds to challenge the "reliability" of the truth about X's beauty as it would in the scientific context. I was just saying that we don't treat truths the same across all contexts. It's the scientific process that gives truth its reliability in the scientific context, rather than truth being necessarily reliable. Some questions have concrete answers, others don't. This is what my OP is about.
Right, I see what you mean, but I wasn't intending to go that far yet. I was merely looking at what we wish to express when we say "X is true".
If X is true, we can use it as a premise for further argument. We can assume it for the purpose of building some machine.
We would also expect it not to change arbitrarily. That is, we expect that we can give reasons for why something is true. Hence why many people don't think tastes or preferences have a truth value.
The next question is then why we believe something is true.
Quoting Judaka
But I'm not doing science here.
Quoting Judaka
Reliability means more than simply believing it. It means you're willing to risk something. It means that if everyone in the room believes that X is true, you can safely base your argument on it.
Quoting Judaka
I think the art example is problematic because not everyone would agree that "this picture is beautiful" has a truth value.
I'd like to instead use a moral argument. Say: "Murder is immoral". I think most people would agree that this statement has a truth value. It's not scientific though. Or take: "The sum of the interior angle measures of a triangle always adds up to 180°."
If we take these statements and compare this to something empirical, say "the gravity on earth has an acceleration of 9,81 m/s²", what do these statements have in common?
That's how I arrived at my conclusion that there are commonalities among things we deem true.
And I would further add that another common element is that the truth can be argued for in a specific way. The argument has to take a specific form, fulfill specific criteria to result is a true statement.
It seems to me what's different among the different contexts is the prerequisites of the argument.
The cause/effect relationship between means and ends deserves analysis. The basic representation is as you outline here, methods are employed as the means for achieving the goals, ends. So there is a cause/effect relation whereby the means are the efficient cause of the ends. However, there is obviously an inverse relation whereby the goals are the cause of the coming into being of the means, as the means are judged as what is needed to achieve the desired end. This is known as the causal affect of intention, final cause. So for example, if "truth" is the goal or end of the scientific method, then "truth" as an ideal (the desire for truth), as such, is the cause (final cause) of the coming into being of the scientific method. The scientific method is then represented as the potential cause (efficient cause) of truth, and may be judged as to whether it actually causes truth, based on the successfulness of its outcomes, results, in relation to the guiding end, which was the ideal, "truth".
Now, when we understand this inversible relationship between the means as efficient cause, and the end as final cause, we can move toward understanding a deeper, more significant and impactful inversion of the relationship between means and ends. When the means (methods) are judged as successful for bringing about the desired end, they are put into practise, production, and the methods are employed on a regular basis, toward bringing about the desired end. The successfulness and effectiveness of the method for bringing about the desired end, has been judged, and this judgement is now taken for granted.
So we have a practise of repeated employing the same means, and its successfulness is taken for granted. We can understand this practise of repeatedly employing the same means for the sake of producing an end which is taken for granted, as a sort of "habit", and we can understand this type of activity through that concept "habit". The inversion I am speaking of here, occurs when the method which is the habit, becomes the end itself, as a habit may get to the point of being. The addictive habit is chosen for the sake of itself only, because its effectiveness for achieving the end is taken for granted therefore it is actually desired for the sake of itself only.
If, on reflection, the ends which are taken for granted are revisited, and the habit is very addictive, such that the desire for it is strong, then the ends get shaped to fit the needs of the means, as the means are the addictive habit and have become desired for the sake of themselves. This is commonly known as "rationalizing". At this point, the method is actually the end, as that which is desired, and the stated goals are pseudo-ends. They are created, shaped, and stated, in a way which is subservient to the desire for the means as the addictive habit, which being desired for the sake of itself is the true goal here.
For example. We start with the goal of "truth", as the ideal which is desired, and we create the scientific method as the means to that end. The means are judged as effective and successful, and therefore become habitual. Then, as an addiction, the habit itself has become the desired end. Now the original goal, which was the ideal "truth", is replaced with the new goal, the scientific method as the addiction, and any reference back to the original goal must ensure that the status of "taken for granted" is well maintained. Now the original goal, the ideal "truth", must become subservient to the means, which is the scientific method, such that the means will always be judged as successful and effective at bringing about the end, so that the method will be continued to be employed. That results in a manipulation of the definition of "truth", because of the irrational desire due to addiction. At this point, it is required to adjust the definition of "truth" according to circumstances, to ensure that the scientific method is always successful and effective at bringing about the desired end, "truth". In reality though, the rationalized "ends" have become subservient to the means, the addictive habit, which has actually become the end itself.
This reality is very evident in the following exchange:
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Judaka
Science is a tool to discover "some" of the truth. But not all of it. Art, music, dance, spirituality, personal perspective, individuality/personhood and self expression, morality, none of these things are both testable, quantifiable, repeatable nor provable by any scientific means of investigation. And yet they exist nonetheless and are true nonetheless.
Science is an investigation, but it is not an answer. It can never confirm with 100% certainty the truth of anything as its very progress involves recapitulation, paradigm shift and discrediting previously accepted scientific "truths" in favour of more plausible, accurate or explanatory ones.
---
Quoting Judaka
Science pursues truth. It does not pursue expediency, or the promotion of special interests, or the winning of the arms race, etc. (and yet many are deeply confused on this point today).
Scientific truth is one kind of truth, and therefore scientists pursue truth. Apparently you ran into someone who thinks that only scientists pursue truth, and you reacted by claiming that, "It's incorrect [...] to understand science as a 'pursuit of truth'." The person you ran into is wrong. So are you. You overcorrected. Science is not the only pursuit of truth, but it is a pursuit of truth.
are not the same. I would agree that science is not "the" pursuit of truth.
If knowledge is taken as "know-how" then it pursues knowledge in that sense too, since it seems obvious that science also pursues know-how.
Your logic goes way too quickly for me to follow, abruptly jumping to assertions of habit, addiction, rationalisation, and irrational desires, but no examples or justifications are offered.
I could ask a dozen questions and ask for clarification on how you're using many words, I'm not sure of the context or your goals, you're going too fast for me. I had a go at responding but I wasn't getting anywhere, so I'll have to pass on responding to the comment, my apologies.
Quoting Echarmion
Well, again, one's willingness to risk something doesn't seem to do anything to guarantee reliability.
Quoting Echarmion
Conceptually, it makes sense that it wouldn't since that example betrays what truth should be. As a binary, something that warrants belief. Nonetheless, it's a legitimate use of the word, grammatically and logically. I'd argue that grammar is determinative of what's correct in language use, and not the philosophical views of what truth "should" be. Anyway, I agree that it's a controversial topic if that's your only point.
Quoting Echarmion
I agree that's part of it, and I believe the same as what I referred to as the "truth conditions".
Quoting Echarmion
Is there a truth value to "This box is too heavy to carry"? If "this box" weighs 5kg or 50kg, or if one person is carrying it, or eight, would you agree that such factors are relevant? The box might be "too heavy" to carry without risk of injury, but not "too heavy" to carry if we disregard the risk of injury. My point is that the statement has multiple truth values. That's kind of awkward for the concept of "truth".
"Murder is immoral, unless...", and "Murder is immoral, if....", are such additions unreasonable? Must we answer if "Murder is immoral" and we're forbidden from wanting more information or context? It can't be true in some conditions, false in others. True by one person's logic, false by another's? I hope you can agree.
Quoting Echarmion
In contrast, what contextual information, or perspectival information can we add, that changes the truth of this statement? Does it matter what type of triangle? Nope. Does it matter how big the triangle is? Nope. Does it matter who measures the triangle? Nope. There's nothing we can add to change it.
The qualities truth is supposed to have, this "reliability", it works sometimes, and not always. Part of ensuring that your statement is like the latter and not the former is part of science. It's not an inherent quality of truth, one must take steps to ensure reliability. Though, "reliability" implies some purpose, and not every truth even has that.
Quoting Arne
Quoting Janus
I believe my intention was to say it wasn't "a pursuit of truth" as in, it wasn't merely a pursuit of truth. But, I take your point and can agree.
Quoting Arne
Who/what is this in response to?
Quoting Leontiskos
I agree with others that it's wrong to say "Science pursues truth", since science has no will of its own.
Quoting Leontiskos
What makes you insist that there are multiple "kinds" of truth? To be clear, I was just humouring you earlier.
I can agree that it's reasonable to say "science is a pursuit of truth". I concluded that:
Quoting Judaka
Isn't your argument with me just semantics? By claiming that there's this "scientific truth", you're pretty much saying the same thing as me. My OP is a response to a concern that "truth" is being overly understood as the domain of science. If you want to say "Science pursues scientific truth", at least, that leaves me with nothing to be concerned about in that regard.
I'm not sure where this conversation is going. It seems to me this is turning more towards a general conversation about language and meaning rather than about truth specifically.
It seems to me that, taken to the extreme, your argument would be that "truth" really does not refer to anything specific, and is rather just a way to emphasize a statement. So it's just a language tool.
The contrary argument would be that "truth" is a fundamental category in the human mind. That would mean that regardless of the precision or imprecision of language, saying "X is true" would be an attempt to address this category.
My position is indeed that "truth" is just a language tool. To discuss truth is to discuss language. It's not "a way to emphasise a statement", it refers to "correct reference", or "the correct answer" or it affirms a statement.
We can change a word in a sentence from "Murder is immoral" to "Murder is cruel" and "the truth" is entirely responsive. It's also responsive to how you interpret what it means for something to be "immoral" or just merely how you interpret the word. Precision in language is always relevant, how could it not be?
I don't see what I wrote in my last response that wasn't directly relevant to "truth" though, I thought I was staying on the topic that you started, but perhaps I misunderstood something. Even if you feel truth isn't just a function of language and logic, the issues I brought up should still be relevant to truth's reliability.
Well, to discuss anything is to discuss language. But the buck must stop somewhere. Language must at some point reference back to a mental concept. Otherwise I don't see how communication would be possible. At some point thoughts must turn to language, and language back to thoughts.
So the question is is there some mental concept we (usually) address with the term "truth"? I'd say there is. It seems to be pretty obvious that we must have a mental concept for "things we actually expect to be real".
If truth is a language tool then I think mental concept is equally a language tool. Science is just a biological activity, a special case of the same biological activity that allows the use of words like "truth" and "mental concept".
What is a "mental concept"? Aren't all concepts linguistic?
We use language to express our thoughts and feelings, a view I'm not convinced you oppose. Language is public, words are used by all, and so even when you say "things we actually expect to be real", you have to be more specific, what makes something real? Is beauty not real? What about kindness, or wisdom or whatever else? Is it not true that some movies are better than others? Or that someone can sing better than someone else? Is it true that I'm as good as Messi at soccer?
Truth is a word changed by its context. If I claimed that "X shop is selling doughnuts at Y price" and you asked, "Is that true?" I would fully appreciate that you wanted to verify the information was reliable. Conversely, if I said "The doughnuts from X shop are delicious", and you asked, "Is that true?", I would appreciate that you knew this is not a matter where my opinion was definitive. If you ate some and said they weren't that good, you wouldn't call me a liar, you'd just know it was a difference in taste/opinion.
I think the word works fine with context. I've only tried to point out that context is determinative of truth's qualities. One puts it together for themselves. Whether a truth claim is about "something real" or not.
Ok. And how is this relevant?
Quoting Judaka
One of the categories your mind uses to work.
Quoting Judaka
I don't see how that could be the case.
Quoting Judaka
I don't think it's useful to start fragmenting this into a million little questions if we can't even agree on the basics.
If I say "X is true" is that different from saying "I like X"? That is, is "truth" just an expression of my preferences or is there more to it?
Quoting Judaka
Yes, that is the claim you're making, I know.
Quoting Judaka
But taste and price are already different. There's no need for truth to be different as well. This example works just as well if we assume the term "truth" does exactly the same in both sentences and the difference lies entirely in the claim itself.
Quoting Echarmion
What sort of categories are you referring to?
Quoting Echarmion
Quoting Judaka
Quoting Judaka
Quoting Echarmion
You don't seem to understand my claim though. You seem to think I'm arguing that the "change" is a literal rewrite of the word's meaning and that's not the case at all. The "change" is:
Quoting Judaka
How truth functions isn't changed by context, the concept remains the same. If it's true that a doughnut is delicious or that a doughnut costs Y, in either case, it just means that indeed the doughnut is delicious or indeed the doughnut does cost Y. The statements were correct.
Truth, I would say, is a philosophical concept. As philosophers we pursue the truth, and science along with logic and reasoning is how we attempt to acquire it. The assumption is that if we can get our beliefs to correspond exactly with how reality is, then we have the truth. At least that is the correspondence theory of truth, which is probably the most prevalent and commonsense definition of what truth is. It doesn't take too much reflection to realize we can seldom if ever get our beliefs to correspond to exactly how reality actually is, or at least we have no way of verifying that. So, we have to be content striving for it, and always admitting the possibility of error.
This is just another quibble. When someone says, "Science pursues X," they are not claiming that science exists apart from scientists.
Quoting Judaka
The problem is that you are using false statements to support your claim that not all truth is scientific truth. You already admitted that the first sentence of the OP is false. Here is another:
Quoting Judaka
That's like saying, "Science isn't Y, but Y under Z, and Z is what we call 'science'." The sentence isn't even coherent. Science cannot simultaneously be "Y under Z" and "Z". I think your faulty theory of language is leading you to try to separate science from truth. Science really is "Y under Z" and not just "Z", so to speak. Y cannot be separated from science.
.Quoting Judaka
Oh, is that right? So you don't think that some truths are scientific truths and some truths are not? You're all tied up in knots. :wink:
The basic building blocks for thinking and experiencing. Like causality, basic logic operations, basic concepts that allow you to sort and make sense of sensory input.
Quoting Judaka
It seems like we're talking past each other and not getting our points across.
If you write that "context determines truth's [I]qualities[/I], then to me that sounds like "a literal rewrite of the word's meaning".
I understand "qualities" to mean the specific attributes that define something and make it distinct from other things.
I think you are looking for something that doesn't really exist. I don't think the mind consists of like substantive thoughts as objects which can be converted into words and back again.
Quoting Echarmion
It could have meant that, but it's part of a paragraph that goes on to explain those changes in qualities, which did not include any major changes to how truth functions. Using that context and my the context of my previous statements, I had hoped my meaning was made clear. Nonetheless, I clarified the misunderstanding, isn't this what I should've done?
Quoting Echarmion
You misunderstood my point, and I've been open about not yet understanding yours.
Quoting Echarmion
I agree that there is such thinking that doesn't rely on language.
So, what is the relationship you're proposing between these categories and the words used to refer to them?
Quoting Leontiskos
Isn't this your position? That not all truth is scientific truth? Otherwise, why bother using the term?
Quoting Leontiskos
Sure, if you want to be anal about it, others understood my meaning perfectly fine, and I suspect you do as well.
Quoting Leontiskos
This is why I think your view of language is counterproductive. While humouring you, I made it clear that I agreed with your meaning/point when you separated scientific truth from other types. You should've cared more about that. But instead, you take this very anal view of language, and interpret my words without caring about what you know about me, what I've said or the context. To suggest what? That I completely dispute your point, which I've twice agreed to?
Quoting Leontiskos
This is the exact same shit the OP says. If I wrote "Science is not a pursuit of truth, but scientific truth", it'd have the exact same meaning. That should mean you agree with me, and yet, you're taking a combative stance and tearing my view apart. It makes no sense to me. Even I won't agree with my own statements if they're taken completely out of context.
Since humans are capable of entertaining counterfactuals and also of dealing with probabilities and necessary elements, I'd say that there needs to be some faculty for sorting things into possibility/necessity/actuality.
We'd then expect to have language that corresponds to these. So "truth" would correspond to actuality. If it's true that there's a tiger in the bush, I must act immediately. If it's merely a possibility, or a story, the proper reaction would be different.
Quoting Judaka
Well, my problem is that I can't really tell what your point is.
Based on your OP I got the impression that you were arguing for multiple truths. That is truth has multiple distinct meanings, or perhaps we could say functions. For example scientific truth, which is for empirical questions. And perhaps as a counterexample aesthetic truth, which applies for feelings of beauty or taste.
My response to this idea is that I do think truth has the same core meaning, or function, across different contexts. Specifically, truth does always seem concerned with establishing a reliable and reasoned basis for further decisions or debates.
This of course does not mean that any sentence that contains the term "truth" means the same thing. Context matters for language. And also it is obvious to me that a less precise claim, even if it's true, might not strictly imply any further conclusions, while a more precise claim, if true, might then imply very specific consequences.
But the above caveats, to me, are simply about all language in general and have as much to do with "truth" specifically as they have with any other term.
So maybe we actually agree and are just framing the issue differently.
Quoting Echarmion
Quoting Echarmion
Are you saying possibility/necessity etc are concepts that exist without language, and language merely corresponds to these (mental) concepts?
Quoting Echarmion
Right, but it's only true that there's a tiger in the bush if it's "correct to say" that there's a tiger in the bush. It's only correct to say that there's a tiger in the bush if there really is a tiger in the bush. Even if "truth" is "correct reference" or "correct answer", it would have served the function you wanted in the example you gave.
I'll again reiterate that I am confident that you do not use the word truth to refer to actuality, you use it as "correct reference" or "correct answer". To answer if it's true that "There's a tiger in the bush", one must understand the concepts "is", "tiger", "in" and "bush". If the tiger is behind the bush or in front of it, or if it's a lion and not a tiger, or if it was in the bush, but already left, then "There is a tiger in the bush" is false. I could say "There is a predator in the bush" or "There is something in the bush" and these could be true as well as "There is a tiger in the bush". It's clear that "truth" corresponds to the "correctness" of the statement, which is based on the applicability of the language used.
Quoting Echarmion
Why must it do that?
Quoting Echarmion
I thought we were close to agreeing earlier on, but then suddenly the discussion took an unexpected turn.
Quoting Echarmion
Your understanding of the OP wasn't my intention, and I agree with you that truth has the same core function across different contexts.
Where we seem to disagree is on the core function itself.
The point of the OP doesn't make any sense using your understanding of truth's core function as referring to "actuality", and that's maybe why you didn't get it. If you try thinking about it from how I explained "truth" then probably you will.
Maybe I should not have used the word "actuality", as it seems to have caused more confusion than it solved. I just meant it as what is actually the case as opposed to what's possible.
But if we both agree that the core function of truth is the same across different contexts, we probably don't disagree all that much.
I tend to stay away from technical discussions about what truth [I] is [/I] exactly, since they never seem terribly productive. I like the somewhat playful phrase that truth is that which asserts itself regardless of your wishes.
Quoting Judaka
Yes, though I would not claim it must be these specifically. Or that it's as simple as language using something that's there. It's probably a more messy kind of feedback loop.
But basically it seems to me there needs to be some common mental framework language can use, otherwise I don't see how we can, for example, decipher ancient languages noone speaks anymore.
Quoting Judaka
I don't understand this, specifically I don't understand why actuality and "correct reference" aren't one and the same here.
Quoting Judaka
So truth always signals the applicability of the language used in the claim to the situation? I mean that sounds vaguely like what I believe, but I'm not sure I really understand.
Quoting Judaka
I don't know if it must, it just seems plausible to me.
Quoting Echarmion
"Correct reference" refers to the correct use of language, and "actuality" refers to "that which really is". What constitutes as "correct use" of language is a very complicated subject, as I'm sure you appreciate. It involves a wide variety of context-dependant linguistic and cultural factors that are entirely manmade. Social conventions and laws, political or artistic concepts and a litany of other concepts are all part of "correct reference".
A basic example is ownership/private property. "It's true that I own the computer I'm using" is true by "correct reference". It's true according to the social conventions of the society that I live in, since I bought this computer, and it resides in my dwelling and I use it. If you want to treat concepts as though they're above language and manmade rules, and "truth" as beyond such things, then there's zero basis for believing that the concept of "ownership" is real. Or look at a card game like Yu-gi-oh or Pokémon, "It's true that Pikachu is a Pokémon", you'd probably agree, even though it's complete fiction.
Quoting Echarmion
Yep, that's right.
Though "truth" can also be used to directly refer to a hypothetical "correct reference", using the logic contained within words. Such as "hypothetical" applicability, something that could be correctly said, even if it wasn't said. For instance, it's true that I wrote this comment, because it'd be correct to say that I wrote this comment, it's true regardless of whether anybody actually makes the claim that I did.
Another example is how people say things like "True courage is X", possibly to suggest that it's incorrect to reference Y as courage, because only X is correct to refer to as courage. I could say "I want to find out what true compassion is", "true compassion" is equal to "that which can be correctly referred to as compassion". In summary, your description is correct in this context, but we can manipulate that concept in these ways that you're undoubtedly familiar with.
Quoting Echarmion
It's based on the "shared human experience", we could agree on that. It's also based on practicality, we want similar functions from our languages.
Quoting Echarmion
As in, the word "truth" doesn't refer to actuality, but confirms a possibility as a certainty? I'd agree it can sometimes have that effect.
Quoting Echarmion
Conceptually that's true, but not in practice, as I tried to demonstrate here.
Quoting Judaka
Technically, truth does not respond to one's wishes, but it does respond to one's desires, values, logic and intended meaning.
Quoting Echarmion
Hmm, well, feel free to wrap this discussion up when it no longer interests you.
Interesting. So, is this a "it's turtles all the way down" situation, where language references only language with no other reference point / correspondence?
Quoting Judaka
Of course social constructs like property and fictional entities are ultimately self-referential, and so your argument works here.
But what about rules that don't seem mutable by human though or action? What we call the laws of physics can be expressed in infinite ways linguistically, but the rules remain the same. Gravity will not reverse and pull you into the clouds if you define up as down.
Quoting Judaka
Aren't you making the claim by writing it? This is slightly confusing to me.
Quoting Judaka
But isn't what people are concerned in this scenario the negation of a value judgement? That is they're not concerned with what the word means in the sense of a dictionary definition. Rather the goal is to exclude a certain behaviour from the positive value judgement that's emotionally connected to the language.
Quoting Judaka
But could it not also be a priori?
Quoting Judaka
Well it's sometimes true in practice. But of course in practice one is almost always wrong in some way.
Quoting Judaka
I think that's the core of our disagreement. From the perspective of some theoretical Maxwell's demon, everyone is wrong and their truths contingent on their beliefs, circumstances etc. But from the perspective of the people doing the talking and thinking, their truth is the truth.
Quoting Echarmion
I'm having a hard time understanding this question. Could you reword it?
Quoting Echarmion
I'm not sure I understand, the words "rules" and "mutable" are throwing me off. Also, I'm not sure what problem you're asking me to address.
Quoting Echarmion
Indeed. And water won't kill me if I call it poison.
However, I'm still not sure that I understand the issue you want me to address.
Quoting Echarmion
It was just an example of hypothetical applicability. "Truth" is something we can use as part of our decision-making and thinking. "If it's true that I need to pay my rent today, then I should pay it", type of thing. I'd need you to go into more detail about what was confusing for me to clarify further.
Quoting Echarmion
The speaker would indeed be unconcerned with the dictionary definition, this is a matter of word applicability, which is related to interpretation. A certain behaviour could be "True courage" or not depending on how we interpret/understand it. Though, this is very tangential to the point I was making.
Quoting Echarmion
From my perspective truth requires language, I don't see how there could be any priori without language.
Quoting Echarmion
"The core of our disagreement" is how we understand the concept of truth. So, it can be difficult to follow when you contrast our views like this, am I to read the word "truth" using my understanding or yours?
For my part, some claims are influenced by one's beliefs, and some aren't. so it depends. This "perspective" you outlined seems to neither reflect your views nor mine.