Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
I find myself re-reading Austin's lecture notes as reconstructed by G. J Warnock. The result of a slow wet day and recent threads hereabouts.
The book is an extended and detailed remonstration against the view, so common as to be almost ubiquitous in these fora, that
Several ongoing threads advocate this view, in various denominations.
Austin, of course, has been the butt of many jokes, the quintessential irrelevant Oxford Don, putting the anal back into analytic, and so on. He's also a decorated war hero, and given the period in which he worked, a probable misogynist. A quick look at his book ngram shows continuous, perhaps even exponential, growth. Anecdotally there has been recent interest in sorting out Austin's own views from those of his student, John Searle
Anyway, it promises to be a wet week, and this thread might ease the tedium.
I wasn't able to find a free PDF. If you have access to one, you might link it here.
The book is an extended and detailed remonstration against the view, so common as to be almost ubiquitous in these fora, that
p.2:...we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense*), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.).
Several ongoing threads advocate this view, in various denominations.
Austin, of course, has been the butt of many jokes, the quintessential irrelevant Oxford Don, putting the anal back into analytic, and so on. He's also a decorated war hero, and given the period in which he worked, a probable misogynist. A quick look at his book ngram shows continuous, perhaps even exponential, growth. Anecdotally there has been recent interest in sorting out Austin's own views from those of his student, John Searle
Anyway, it promises to be a wet week, and this thread might ease the tedium.
I wasn't able to find a free PDF. If you have access to one, you might link it here.
Comments (808)
The first lecture is introductory, of course. Austin notes the tendency to back down on stronger versions of the doctrine - "Theres the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it back".
Austin calls the doctrine "Scholastic", ironic language coming from a man who obsessed over detail and dictionaries. But here we have the first of the critical tools of which he makes use; part of my plan for this thread is to draw explicit attention to these. Austin points out that philosophers are incline to consider only a limited number of cases in their musings, to "oversimplification, schematization, and constant obsessive repetition of jejune 'examples'. ...our ordinary words are much subtler in their uses, and mark many more distinctions, than philosophers have realized".
Yes, I am aware that I am guilty of this. The tool being advocated is the broad consideration of the full range of uses for the terms at hand. Ruminating on limited cases will lead to limited rumination...
Austin makes clear that his intent is not a defence of realism. In the terminology he uses, he is not advocating a preference for material things over sense-data; in the terminology used more recently, he is not defending realism against antirealism, but rejecting the very distinction between these two.
The reason is simple: "There is no one kind of thing that we perceive, but many different kinds" (p. 4, emphasis in original).
So there's the argument of the text in outline.
There's a copy of Ayer's Foundations at https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.46395/. In the section quoted Ayer is introducing the Argument from Illusion,
Some mirth has been found in Austin's use of "the ordinary man" - as if such as he would have any idea... But notice that the contrast between philosophers and ordinary folk is borrowed from Ayer. Austin uses it to draw out the idea of ordinary language which is central to his approach. I'll adopt "folk" by way of avoiding issues of gender.
The points against Ayer here are:
1. It's not the case that ordinary folk see themselves as always perceiving material objects they see shadows and rainbows and such, and understand that these are different to pens and cigarets; further, it is far form clear what a "material thing" might be, outside of a discussion of the sort being had here.
2. it is not true that not seeing a material thing is equivalent to being deceived by one's senses.
3. There's more than a hint that common folk are naïve in not being critical of the objects of their everyday perception.
4. That there is not a place for doubt here, or at the very least, that if there is to be a place for doubt, it is not obvious.
5. We don't attribute truth and falsity to what we see, but to what we make of what we see. Further, and importantly, talk of deception only makes sense against a background in which we understand what it is like not to be deceive.
All these come together to show that seeing things is a far more complicated and indeed complex process than is supposed in Ayer's text, and indeed in fairly simple accounts given elsewhere. Seeing a cup is not the same as seeing a rainbow or as seeing a shadow or a headless magician's assistant on stage.
The use of "directly" in "seeing directly" takes its meaning in contrast to the meaning of "indirectly" in each case. Do you see the ship directly or through a periscope? Do you see the door directly or via a mirror? This is a standard critical tool for Austin, used elsewhere and later to show philosophical abuse of "real".
In the spirit of taking on as wide a field of examples as possible, Austin draws attention to the examples being dominated by sight. What might it mean to hear something indirect? What sort of thing is an indirect smell? "For this reason alone there seems to be something badly wrong with the question, 'do we perceive things indirectly or not?'"(p. 17)
Other examples follow. In the other direction, are we to say that we saw the guns indirectly if we see the flash of their firing? The cloud chamber example is perhaps dated, a more recent equivalent might be to ask it we saw the Higgs boson, or did we see signs of it's passing? The cloud chamber is more direct... :wink:
Whatever our philosopher is doing in talking of "direct perception" is very different to what the rest of us might be doing. So much the worse when the philosopher is going to claim that the something could never be perceived directly.
To give myself a different challenge, I like to take on Austin's linguistic philosophy. More specifically, with an attack developed by Ernest Gellner. In his book, Word and Things, he defines the Four Pillars of Linguistic Philosophy as follows:
1. The Argument from the Paradigm case - This is the argument from the actual use of words to the answer to philosophical problems, or from the conflict between the actual use of words to the falsity of a philosophical theory.
2. The habit of inferring the answer to normative, evaluative problems from the actual use of words.
3. The contrast theory of meaning, to the effect that any term to be meaningful must allow at least for the possibility of something not being covered by it.
4. The doctrine I shall call Polymorphism. This doctrine stresses that there is very great variety in the kinds of use that words have, and that with regards to any given word, there can be great variety in its particular use.
To start, I would ask, would you characterize Austin's philiosophical approach as Gellner does?
If it's a challenge for you, you should provide the answer. I've set my own task here.
Interesting.
It reminds me of this: §9. Hallucination and Truth
Basically, Richard Fumerton argues that 'the possibility of hallucination' proves that naive realism is wrong, meaning that, 'we are never directly acquainted with the fact that a physical object exists'. Furthermore, we are still left without clear criteria to distinguish between veridical perception and hallucinatory perception. Note that when I say 'hallucination', I am referring to 'what we make of what we see', and how this can lead us to hallucinatory perceptions.
On the other hand, I think @Richard B raised a good point on whether we can see this subject from a linguistic view as well.
There are cases where the objects are not visible at all by bare eye sight. Consider a far away star too dim to be seen with bare eyes in the night sky.
But when you use a telescope (good quality), and see it, it becomes visible. There is a medium (a good quality telescope) between your eyes and the object (the faint star). So, we could say that we don't perceive things directly always?
And when one gets old, hearing gets poor. The folk would use a hearing aid. All the sounds the folk hears would come via the hearing aid. Does the folk then hear the sound directly or indirectly?
The idea of rejecting the distinction between direct and indirect perception interests me, but then again, I don't use "indirect perception" in such a limited fashion. For me, whether or not something is directly perceptible or not is partly determined by what it consists of. So, it's not just about a tool using perceiver. It's also about the elemental constituency of what's being perceived.
We sometimes indirectly perceive both causes and effects. Worldviews are efficacious. They cause certain things to happen. Worldviews cannot be directly perceived, but their inevitable affect/effect on the world can.
Worldviews are - in large part at least - adopted during common language acquisition. They are in that sense, an affect/effect of societal norms.
I am on whomevers side that denies this. We always directly perceive material objects. I do so not from a . deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking dichotomies ., but because it should never be an issue that I dont, insofar as every perception is direct, re: unmediated. I perceive a shadow as equally direct as B flat minor.
Nahhhh ..the tidy-looking dichotomies lay elsewhere, direct perception/sense data need add no more to them.
This talk of not directly perceiving objects makes me wonder, not for the first time, who Austin believed he was arguing against. Did he think that Idealism in general, or versions of Kantianism in particular, entailed such a view? I dont think thats a very charitable interpretation of what I take Kant and others to be saying.
Stuff like this, perhaps:
[quote=Russell, The Problems of Philosophy]
We are all in the habit of judging as to the real shapes of things, and we do this so unreflectingly that we come to think we actually see the real shapes. But, in fact, as we all have to learn if we try to draw, a given thing looks different in shape from every different point of view. If our table is really rectangular, it will look, from almost all points of view, as if it had two acute angles and two obtuse angles. If opposite sides are parallel, they will look as if they converged to a point away from the spectator; if they are of equal length, they will look as if the nearer side were longer. All these things are not commonly noticed in looking at a table, because experience has taught us to construct the real shape from the apparent shape, and the real shape is what interests us as practical men. But the real shape is not what we see; it is something inferred from what we see. And what we see is constantly changing in shape as we move about the room; so that here again the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the table.
Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known. Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise; namely, (1) Is there a real table at all? (2) If so, what sort of object can it be?
[/quote]
Probably Ayer as well.
(I agree with you about Kant. I think of him as a direct realist.)
Not who. What.
. What we have above all to do is, negatively, to rid ourselves of such illusions as 'the argument from illusion ., and assorted other linguistic vagaries.
And a caution, if I may: mention Kant at your own dialectical peril.
As for the Russell quote . . . I don't think he's being quite as villainous as Austin or some others might paint him. Most of what he says is unexceptionable, merely pointing out the difference between how an object may look to us, and what shape it may actually have. And it is certainly true that we construct the correct shape from a multiplicity of individual "takes." By the time Russell starts to make his point, "real" appears in quotes, meant to contrast with appearance, as in:
Again, I think this is uncontroversial. We may or may not see the "real" shape at any given moment, but Russell doesn't mean the object itself is somehow unreal, or that the object's true shape must permanently elude us. In Russell's sense of "real" -- a perception that corresponds fortuitously to an actual shape -- and in that sense alone, the object can be said to be "not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference...."
Notice, lastly, that this Russellian sense of "real" suggests the basis for distinguishing between veridical perceptions and familiar illusions.
Well, I've been composing a reply but now I realize I don't want to get into this topic at the moment.
My parting shot is just to say that I think the following bit from the Russell quotation is indeed stating what you've implied it is not, namely that we are "not directly perceiving objects":
If there are any directly perceived objects at all for Russell, they are sense data, not tables.
I think Austin is wrong to quibble about the terms direct and indirect, because both succinctly describe the relationship between perceiver and perceived as it pertains to the arguments for and against realism.
For example, we might contrast the man who saw the procession through a periscope with the man who didnt, and rightly call the one indirect and the other direct when describing the perceptual relationship between those particular men and that particular procession.
But in terms of realism, directly and indirectly describe the perceptual relationship between the man and everything he perceives, which includes the periscope, the air, the clouds, etc. It doesnt describe the relationship between the man and the procession, the tea cup, or whatever the relationship between the subject and the object of a sentence may be.
If we allow that, then I would be a bit concerned with a very likely possibility of the realist's claim that even illusions are real, because it is the object of their perception.
His target is the idea that we only ever see things indirectly. In giving a wide range of examples he shows that such a proposal would be problematic.
, yes, if someone were to maintain that we only ever see things indirectly, it cannot be in the sense that is being used in reference to telescopes, hearing aids and periscopes. The onus might be placed at their feet, to show the sense that they are using.
There is a further point, that in cases in which we correctly say someone sees something indirectly, there is an implicit contrast to cases of direct seeing. We understand that seeing the door in the mirror is indirect, compared with turning and seeing it directly; that hearing the music on a recording is indirect, compared with hearing it live. In each case, what it means to perceive indirectly is clear in virtue of our understanding of what it means to perceive directly.
And there remains the obscurity of smelling indirectly.
And yes, Ayer is very much Austin's mark here, but the arguments used have much broader application. , I linked above to the text that is Austin's target.
, I understand that historically Ayer's approach derived from Russell's, and so Logical Positivism was an attempt at reinvigorating Logical Atomism, a continuation of British Empiricism.
Ayer's reply to Austin is found in Has Austin Refuted Sense-data Theory, which I was unable to find free on line. (?) Needless to say, I don't think Ayer's rebuttal carries much weight.
Many thanks. I don't see Russell as arguing for the impossibility of direct perception, but maybe Ayer does; I'll read him and find out. Russell's "real" table is only the composite, and hopefully accurate, view we create after many sense impressions of the object. That table is not directly perceived, but that's not the table Austin or anyone else should be worried about. The key here is that "real" is a technical term Russell uses without defining it very clearly. Or so it seems to me.
A lame question, but I'm fairly new to the forum: How do I make those arrow+name graphics that mean "view original post"?
These?
Bottom of each post is a secret, invisible "??". Hover near the ellipsis.
This to me seems a big glaring missing part of any comprehensive metaphysics, eh? But as long as you can shrug it off with no qualms you can move on from there to less speculative things like that chair means chair.
I guess the idea that a word like "chair" could be ambiguous doesn't sit too well with you, but is it really so arcane or "speculative"? "Chair" can refer to any given perception of a chair -- which, as Russell points out, may or may not give us a good sense of the chair's true shape -- or "chair" can refer to the composite, hopefully correct, idea of the chair which we put together based on those individual perceptions. We could certainly debate whether this ambiguity is a good thing, and perhaps recommend that one or the other sense of "chair" be changed to a different term, but the distinction being made really isn't all that speculative, is it?
Thanks for the secret knowledge behind the ellipsis!
Attached is a PDF of the book Sense and Sensibilia.
Come on and get me Oxford. I got a sandwich and a gun.
"What we should figure out, is knowledge... well, we tried. Then virtue!... nope, not that either." Plato
"Let's start with the thing-in-itself; and then set it over here behind this wall." Kant
"I exist! Or, if that's okay with you God." Descartes
"I see it! No, wait, that's only its appearance." Hume
Quoting Banno
Quoting NOS4A2
Hes investigating how we see something directly by looking at the actual cases when we do, and then how we see something indirectly through different examples, to show that philosophy made up the problem of realism. I think the book might be interesting to you.
Quoting J
Wittgenstein will look further into why philosophy created a problem with sense perception, belief, appearance, subjectivity, etc., but Austin is taking down everybodys problematizing of the issues which led to metaphysics and justified true belief and Ayers Atomism and Positivism and qualia, etc. because they all have in common that they want everything to work one way that allows for absolute universal, generalized, proven, predictable, etc., knowledge. Theres a reason we get stuck on logical/emotive, true/false, knowledge/belief, etc. and that is because we are only looking at one version that is resolved one way, as, in the case of perception:
Quoting Banno
Austin - Sense and Sensibilia 1962; Wittgenstein - Philosophical Investigations 1958. They never met, but they should have. Wittgenstein will look at how we think a bunch of things work, like language, and rules, seeing, identifying color, etc., and decide there is not one way we judge how things work, but many different ways.
Quoting Banno
In A Plea for Excuses, he will label this The Importance of Negations and Opposites in a discussion of freewill based on looking at actionusing another tool of Austins, which is to look at how something works by looking at how it doesnt work, how it goes wrong; in the case of action, by looking at how we excuse it, qualify it, renounce it, etc.he actually looks at how voluntary and involuntary are so different it doesnt make sense to manufacture the issues as: was that done freely (voluntarily)? or was it determined (involuntarily)?
Quoting J (emphasis added by Nickles)
Quoting Jamal (emphasis added by Nickles)
I cant recommend reading this book more; Austin will have a lot to say about philosophys use of these words. Austin causes us to reconsider why philosophy creates a problem so it can solve it (@J why is the shape correct and actual, and not just roughly? - @jamal what does perception have to be immediate and direct in order to ensure? (spoiler!: its because we only want to answer one way, to one standard.)
Quoting Banno
Elsewhere he will say, basically, "intention" only makes sense (compared to imagining it as a cause) when someone does something "fishy" against a background in which we have ordinary, shared expectations. As in, "Did you intend to run that light?"
Quoting Banno
I just want to add that a common confusion is that Austin's method is pitting regular ol' common-sense people against esoteric philosophers, or as if ordinary was popularityjust taking a study, as if his philosophy was sociology. The common folk are all of us together who work within Wittgenstein's various criteria that are ordinary only compared to the single "prefabricated, metaphysical" criteria of certain, justified knowledge that philosophy uses.
I'm not angry or anything, but I really hate being misquoted. Shown below is how it went: a quotation from Russell followed by my summary of his view with regard to the directness of perception:
[quote=Russell]The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known.[/quote]
Quoting Jamal
Carry on :smile:
There goes my degree.
Quoting Jamal
OOHH.... that is entirely my bad. I was rushing and crammed your sentence in with Russell's, probably among other errors. Apologies. And if I ran roughshod over your point or concerns, I jumped the gun a bit on assessing them I'm sure. I'm just a little excited to have anyone talking about this book.
I was thinking @Banno that Ill just follow along in the book and ask when theres something I never got about this, and then we can all make the most sense out of what hes saying before we jump to judging the argument.
Cheers. I'm not claiming any expertise here, just an interest and an enjoyment of his style, even recognising its many flaws.
I already missed a few things, and may go back and edit what I've already said.
Anyway.
Here he outlines the argument from illusion, hinting at the shenanigans he sees in its structure. Austin will show how Ayer has oversimplified, even misdiagnosed, the case for these abnormal instances, why we should reject 'sense-data' as a solution, and then that generalising to all perceptions is absurd.
Austin's dissection is minute and thorough.
The three examples on the next page are central: A stick that appears bent in water because of refraction; A mirage; and a reflection in a mirror. I'll give a bit of background on each.
The physics of the stick is straight forward.
Quoting Discourse
The mirage example is a bit unclear.
Presumably the "thing" that is supposed not to exist is the body of water...
...in which the tree appears to be reflected, not the tree, which does exist. This image shows a possible result:
The ship, of course, exists. Ayer's example is not the best.
Mirror images are familiar, and well-understood.
Of course, the stuff in the mirror is "the wrong way around" - usually.
There's no mystery here, all accepted physics.
Moore might have said "If this is not a real hand then I don't know what is." So either this is a real hand, and we are good, or we have no idea what a real hand might be.
Sometimes there is reason to doubt what you're experiencing, say if they just gave you ketamine and you're now convinced you're a character in a video game, screaming "I'm not real! I'm not real!" That happened, btw.
But if no one is telling you that you're drugged and hallucinating, you probably would just take the whatever as real.
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I don't quite get your question. Could you say more? Do you mean that it would be more accurate to say "roughly correct" or "very good approximation of the actual shape"? If so, no problem.
Good point, I tried to share the same thought as you did previously when I attached a brief PDF of Richard A. Fumerton.
I think this author points out interesting views such as:
We sometimes see things incorrectly; therefore, we never see them correctly.
But it is obvious that some see this point as invalid...
Yet, again, it seems that you and me, are the ones who are interested in 'hallucination' regarding this topic, Frank.
I feel that Ayer's sense data theory is more reasonable. If everything you perceive is real, and that is it, it sounds too simple, and it has no ground to explicate what happens after your perception with the perceived content.
When you look at the perceived content as sense data, you could say that the sense data is stored in your memory, which you could retrieve and manipulate i.e. imagine, analyse, remember, synthesise etc throughout time and time after the perception.
Perception is far more than just to say, what I see is "real", and that is it. The aftermath of perception is more complex, deep, rich and meaningful in human perception.
Without some sort of repository place for the perceived content i.e. sense data, everything ends abruptly, there is no more to be said.
For the realists, there is no room to say anything more on the perception than a chair is chair - that is real, which is too simple. How do they further explain on remembering, imagining, and intuiting, and analysing ...etc? A chair was a char. But you cannot know anything afterwards. Blank.
I couldn't conclude that we never see things correctly due to the possibility of hallucination. Detecting an hallucination presupposes that at some point I determined what was real to some suitable level of certainty.
What the possibility of hallucination does is confirm that there certainly is very good reason to occasionally doubt what you're seeing. For instance, a 15 year old boy with new onset schizophrenia tells his parents that he's hearing voices telling him to do harm to the people around him. He is in a state of doubt. He's looking for guidance. If he finds himself in the 21st century, the people around him will tell him the voices aren't real. If it was the year 1410, he would be told that he is possessed. So the resolution of his doubt really comes down to the hinge propositions of his time. It does not come down to some absurd rule that there's never reason to doubt your senses.
But indirect realism isn't a matter of saying that we never see what's real. The indirect realist does believe she has access to the truth. She just thinks her access to truth is indirect by her definition of indirectness. You don't have to be a direct realist to be a realist. Obviously.
Basically, I think that reality does exist objectively. At least, there has to be something which exists at all. Because if we conclude that something doesn't exist, then it existed before, necessarily, because the latter precedes the second.
The debate goes on when Fumerton himself keeps denying realism because, according to him, it is difficult to reckon a physical object due to how the world is dependent upon our mental states.
What makes me wonder if it is possible to experience reality from an objective perspective.
Im saying that correct is made up as a part of the perception of actual because the real issue is the identification of the table, judging whether it is a table or a bench, and thus roughly a table is a rock with a board on it. But I jump ahead I think; Im going to read along.
If we read on, perception is used as a straw man for any problems in the aftermath of perception, but seeing a table is to identify something as a table, which is judging whether something is a table, or, say, a bench (that we somehow mis-identify as a table) and not a matter after perception, but Im getting ahead of the text. our senses are dumb [they] do not tell us anything, true or false.
There is a part in this (very small) lecture where he addresses real and reality.
Ill leave him out of it; only complicate things. One book at a time. But, come on
It is a matter of unpicking fallacies which leaves us, in a sense, just where we began. P. 5
we may learn a technique for dissolving philosophical worries Id.
I am a bit lost in discerning between 'real' and 'reality', but if I am not wrong, the core of the two concepts depends on truth. Objects are the subject of our knowledge, and their reality depends on our perspective of the world, although they are plainly 'real'. So, while reality is a concept of ours, real is ontological. Agree?
I did not know this was the origin of that quote. Excellent. :up:
We adopt, discover, and construct them. They are both causes and effects/affect. We perceive their effects/affects. That's tangential to the topic though.
I'm just curious about the approach to direct/indirect perception.
You need more than just identifying a table as a table in visual perception. What if the object you were seeing was a look-alike table, but actually it is a chair? Upon folding out the folded down back underneath the table, it works as a chair? Is it a chair or table?
In perception, there is far more going on than just identifying an object as an object i.e. reasoning, intuition, judgement and intentionality can get all involved, and for that they have to be sense data, which is the medium in the consciousness caused by the real object in the external world. Not the real objects themselves, because you cannot store the actual tables into your consciousness or memory. You would store the sense data of the table in your memory.
The realist's account on perception sounds too simple. Is there a point even asking what perception is?
I dont know what you are quoting; I was referring to Austins lecture, which is what we are reading. I thiink it would be getting ahead of ourselves to take into considerations other readings before we attempt our own or even have a clear view of what he is saying at way, as he is only collecting evidence and has not gotten to why the philosopher wants to have a generalized problem with everything we see all the time already, from the very beginning p. 8.
I know this thread is about Austin, but when you mentioned me saying: There is a part in this (very small) lecture where he addresses 'real' and 'reality', (here) I thought you had a look at what I shared about Fumerton because that is what I debated with Frank mainly. He and I had a brief exchange on hallucination and how it could be related to Austin. I beg your pardon if I confused you for taking into considerations other readings.
I think this is a good point. In the case of a table, and perhaps more clearly in the case of a pen or cigarette, what we see in not simply an object in passive perception, but something culturally and conceptually determined. In a culture without tables or pens or cigarettes what is seen is not a table or pen or cigarette. But neither is what is seen "sense data".
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I agree with Austin that what we see is not something immaterial, but I do not think it a matter of course that what we see is a church that looks like a barn. It is only when the camouflage is removed that what we see is a church. What it is and what we see are not the same. What we see is what it looks like to us.
First, a general question. Everybody seems to be confident that they understand direct vs. indirect perception. I can sort of understand what is meant by indirect perception and why it is thought to be the appropriate way of looking at perception, as here:-
Quoting Corvus
It would be reasonable to introduce a term like sense-data as a place-holder for whatever it is we decide we perceive directly. It's when you try to identify what the sense-data are that the trouble begins, for me, at least. The obvious candidates are either the signals sent to our brain by our nervous system or the events that trigger our nervous system to send a signal (light waves, sound waves, etc.) But those are nothing like what Russell or Ayer had in mind.
But my biggest puzzle is what would count as direct perception. Austin seems to me to begin to give an answer to that question by explaining what we mean by indirect perception. My only doubt about his argument is that perhaps it is unhelpful when we come to experimental psychology or neurology.
Ayer's supposition is that in each case what we see is not a "real" material thing; there is no bent stick, no body of water, no person standing in the mirror, and hence we "must" conclude that in each case what we see is something else - what philosophers call a "sense datum".
Some might now replace "sense datum" with "qualia". Not quite the same.
Austin points out that although we are supposedly looking at the Argument from Illusion, that there is a distinction between an illusion and a delusion, terms interchanged by Ayer, and that the examples given are not examples of illusions. "The argument trades on confusions at just this point" (p.22)
Here's the familiar Müller-Lyer Illusion:
The two lines appear different lengths, but are the same.
Amusingly, the page from which I borrowed the image has this to say:
Quoting Zach Olsen
Olsen's conclusion is not quite right, but not quite wrong, either. We are, after all, aware of the Müller-Lyer Illusion, and after a point no longer surprised by it - one might say it becomes a part of the way we think. The Müller-Lyer Illusion is part of the world around you and part of what you think. Olsen's conclusion, "the world around you is not the way you think it is", is imprecise, as are similar views expressed already in this thread.
Delusions differ from illusions mainly in their being something amiss with the person who is deluded - they have delusions of grandeur, of persecution. We suffer from delusions, not so much from illusions... (p.23) In an illusion, nothing need be "conjured up"; we see the lines before us quite clearly. In a delusion, the grandeur or paranoia are the product of the sufferer. Something is wrong with the person who has delusions. But there is nothing wrong with you when you look at the Müller-Lyer Illusion; indeed, now you are aware of the illusion, you can take steps to prevent yourself being deceived, and even use your understanding to create novel illusions.
Yep. I supose that what is salient here is that sometimes folk doubt what they are experiencing without good reason. Austin is slowly and carefully showing why this is problematic.
Quoting javi2541997
The invalidity of this is apparently not obvious to many. Stove's gem, the worst argument in the world, and so on.
Quoting Corvus
Austin is certainly not making any such claim. Sometimes we see things that are real. It does not follow that everything we see is real. Sometimes we see things that are not real. It does not follow that everything we see is not real. So your "For the realists, there is no room to say anything more on the perception than a chair is chair" is a mischaracterisation. Nor is memory a simple process of storage. I suggest the brush you are using here is too broad. If for you "the realist's account on perception sounds too simple", you might consider that you have not represented their view accurately.
, , "hallucination" is closer to "delusion" than to "illusion", in that something is conjured up in both an hallucination and a delusion, but not so much in an illusion. Should Ayer have called his the "Argument from Hallucination"? That doesn't carry the same rhetorical strength.
Quoting Antony Nickles
:up: Slowly...
Quoting Antony Nickles
To be clear, there's no need to leave Wittgenstein out, indeed there is much to be gained in keeping him in, but we need to take care, given the considerable overlap, as to who is claiming what.
:up:
Quoting Ludwig V
The danger here is the presumption that what we perceive is all of one sort, in such a way that we can apply the label "sense data" in all cases. Austin is showing that this is not a good idea.
So is a mirage an illusion or a delusion? Ayer would have us suppose that we have conjured into existence a thing, a "sense data", and hence that we are deluded, seeing the sense data where there is nothing. But it is clear from the explanations given above that what we see is a part of the sky, or a ship, appearing in an unexpected place. The problem, if there is one, is not within us, but in the way light is bent by layers of air at different temperatures. We don't need the delusion of sense data to explain mirages.
When you look at yourself in the mirror, are you looking at an illusion? That is an odd use of words. Those are your eyes, that zit is on your nose; they are not illusory, and certainly not delusions. The coin, seen edge on, looks elliptical - that's not an illusion, but just how a coin seen edge-on is supposed to look. The straight stick in water looks just how a straight stick in water should look - slightly bent. Just as in the Müller-Lyer Illusion we understand what is going on, our expectations are met.
Importantly, there are common cases where we miss-perceive, yet are neither illusions nor delusions. Austin gives the example of a proofreader who sees "casual" as "causal"; not a delusion or illusion, but a simple misreading.
Austin uses Price to show a common feature of Arguments from Illusion; that they suppose there is something extra that is what is seen in each of these cases, in addition to the mirage, reflection, stick and so on; the argument is taken as proving that this additional aspect of perception is needed. I hope it is plain from the explanations given hereabouts that this need not be so. The explanations of each do not require sense data. In such situations we are not deluded.
Oh no need to apologize. Its just I cant do two things at once.
Agreed, though I think qualia are problematic for Austin in one important respect: In the passage you just discussed, Austin sounds as if he believes theres only one correct way to see something. The straight stick in water looks just how a straight stick in water should look - slightly bent. But this is a sophisticated result, one which a child would probably not reach without some coaching. How something should look has to be grounded in, and educed from, what it does look like, at any given moment of perception, and this is arguably what quale refers to.
Later, Austin seems much more aware of this. Not to jump ahead, and I wont elaborate the point till we get there, but see pp. 100 102. For instance, this: When something is seen, there may not only be different ways of saying what is seen; it may also be seen in different ways, seen differently. (Austins itals.)
I think it needs to be reiterated that Austin is peeling away the logic of assuming mistakes about seeing things are evidence of a generalized problem with the faculty of our senses or something after that, as in when something is amiss (that his 'senses are deceiving him' and he is not 'perceiving material things') p 9
One of the problems he sees is that philosophy takes it that perceiving always works the same way as perceiving objects rather than all the ways we see, and thus the different ways we have trouble (other than just with our senses) seeing people, people's voices, rivers, mountains, flames, rain-bows, shadows, pictures on the screen at the cinema, pictures in books or hung on walls, vapours, gases-all of which people say that they see or (in some cases) hear or smell, i.e. 'perceive'. Are these all 'material things'? P. 8
Again, just because we have problems simply means in each case there is a separate logic of ordinary error. But the philosopher wants to group all the different errors into one problem (with perception) with one answer: flawed Perception compared to say reality. As Austin says, "...there is no neat and simple dichotomy between things going right and things going wrong; things may go wrong, as we really all know quite well, in lots of different ways-which don't have to be, and must not be assumed to be, classifiable in any general fashion." Such as something wrong with our ability to perceive anything at all (which we should also keep in mind is only one example of philosophies desire to create a problem as one kind of thing, as with: appearances, beliefs, subjective, morality, etc.)
Is that what he addresses in a somewhat racist fashion on p.26? I don't think he's saying that there is only one correct way, but that there is at least one correct way, that does not involve sense data. And that's all he need show in order to undermine Ayer's contention that we are obligated to invoke sense data. Ayer's argument is based on there being no alternative. Austin simply need show one alternative.
Yes, Austin is displaying the varieties of perceptual experience, and drawing conclusions therefrom. Contra , I supose.
I forgot to tag people in my above post, but I also wanted to bring attention to Sec. 3 on page 9 where Austin comments that philosophers like to point out that they are noticing something that ordinary people do not; that philosophy is more aware, smarter, etc. And, yes, philosophy's job is to reflect and reveal what we dont normally consider everyday. And Austin seems to breeze by this, at least for now. But I want to point out that, yes, there are problems, and mistakes, and falsehood, and ignorance, etc. and that philosophy is trying to record that fact. The only problem is that philosophy starts with simplifying the problem (to perception, appearance, etc.) and forcing a single answer (something "real", "objective"), rather than what Austin is doing here which is to examine how our failings are varied and thus have various ordinary ways in which we account for them.
Austins point of showing how indirect perception actually works is to show that in no instance is it the opposite of what we imagine direct perception would be the perfect case of. So if we set aside the problem of direct or indirect, we can look and identify the actual mistakes we make in seeing something, identifying something, or whatever else is supposed to fall under the imagined process of perceiving something (more than just simply vision). it seems that what we are to be said to perceive indirectly is neveris not the kind of thing which ever could beperceived directly. P. 19.
The sting, when it comes, is pithy and simple.
So the argument goes that the stick is straight, but appears bent.
And the answer here is simply that there is no problem with a straight stick that looks bent when partially immersed in water, not illusion, no delusion, nothing that needs explaining beyond the physics of optics mentioned earlier. And there certainly is no need to infer the existence of a novel entity to take on the part of being what we see when we look at a straight stick that appears bent when partially submerged, appart form and distinct from the stick.
And when you see yourself in a mirror, there is no need to invent a simulacrum to stand in for you. There is no illusion, no hallucination and no error. What you see is yourself, reflected in the mirror. Again, this is what mirrors do, and no further explanation is needed that replaces your reflection with anything immaterial.
And when you see a mirage, you need not infer the presence of a new thing, but understand instead that the light from things already there has been bent in odd ways. Of all the examples, this is the one Ayer deals with most poorly.
So there is no reason, let alone a necessity, to conclude that in these cases we need invoke sense data to explain what is going one.
Even less, then, to take the next step, and conclude with Ayer that in normal cases, what we see is sense data.
I personally think that it is invalid because it is simplistic, and it doesn't prove too much. But I don't want to get deeper in this specific premise because I agree with you.
Quoting Banno
Interesting. But do we see ourselves in the mirrors because this is what they do - reflecting - or because do we actually exist? OK, we can conclude that 'real' objects are phenomenal, as we ordinarily treat them; and the things - or ourselves - that appear are, most of the time, real. That is just the point. And, this point comes from a 'general coherence' of our experience. What the argument from the possibility of hallucinations gets us is a brief possibility to doubt on this coherence. Note please, that my aim is not to doubt everything and always, as I said previously, things must exist objectively, but they are 'interfered' by our senses. I understand that taken delusion with sufficient seriousness, it is an argument against the possibility of knowledge in general.
So, if I am capable of seeing myself in the mirror, it is thanks to the mirror itself and not me.
Agree? Or am I lost?
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes. :up:
Having finished Lecture III, I noticed that Austin continues to bring up normal cases. This is part of his method, but he only hints at it. At p. 31 though, he says that we must remember what sort of situation we are dealing with. (Emphasis added) Wittgenstein will insist on the importance to philosophy of command[ing] a clear view PI #122 and of the need for a particular p.188, wider #539 great variety of p. 181, or even imagined context and will remind us to Remember that #33, 88, 161, 167, 217, 269, p. 191, p. 207, or to remember actual cases ; #147 and #591, as In what sort of context does it occur? P. 188.
The situation we are to put these claims into, and what we are remembering about the context of those situations, are the public standard procedures p. 24 and normal occurrences or normal find[ings] with which we are familiar p. 26. I think he gets at why when he says we see exactly what we expect (emphasis added) because our common expectations are what we see, only to have them disappointed. It is philosophy that makes it a disappointment with (our) perception. (Do we bring the disappointment inside of us to have control? As then we might be able to make sure we dont fail again?).
As he showed in the case of deception, we only recognize the odd case against normal ones. P. 11. You are only able to be surprised by an illusion because you were normally expecting something else. Thus why it is important to put these claims into a situation and context to see what the normal procedures, standards, expectations, implications, and findings are for that kind of thing (delusion, mis-identification, deception, etc.). Wittgenstein will call these ordinary criteria.
One question could be: what about this method is important? (other than having someone set out an example and I actual say.. oh yeah, hes right), but the more interesting question is why philosophy wants to abstract from any context and our ordinary means of judgment? but that is not under discussion here.
Quoting javi2541997
Yes, it is simplistic. But what makes it invalid is that the conclusion does not follow from the premise. Quoting javi2541997
What is not ruled out here is the possibility that we sometimes see things incorrectly and at other times we see them correct. That is, the premise does not ruled out that we sometimes see things correctly.
Quoting javi2541997
This just does not follow.
Quoting javi2541997
That's a good question, with a long, but not so difficult, answer. I don't know your philosophical background. So I will go back a few steps. What follows is a potted history, and as such it is roughly correct in broad outline, but definitely wrong on the detail.
The approach to philosophical questions being used here is ordinary language philosophy, a part of analytic philosophy. It doesn't begin with doubting everything, or trying to find certainty, or looking for indubitable sources of knowledge, Instead it starts pretty well where we are, here and now. And it proceeds by looking with great care at the philosopher's main tools, their words.
So it doesn't here begin with what exists and what doesn't, or what "self" is, what it is to be this thing and not that thing, questions of individuation and essence, or other profound questions. But it could.
Some folk presume that because it doesn't start with such things, it doesn't address them That'd be quite wrong.
Here it has begun with an argument that in its day was quite influential, a cornerstone of what was called Logical Positivism. Logical positivism was a branch of analytic philosophy that tried to build certainty from observations. The argument presented by Austin is a large part of the demolition of that project.
So on one view, all Austin is doing is critiquing another analytic philosopher. However, in the process he is developing and using a range of philosophical tools, with much broader application than just the question at hand; and also providing at least in outline a coherent account of how we deal with perceptions by setting out in fine detail the many nuanced ways we use language in this area.
He is developing and showing us a different way to deal with philosophical issues.
So you asked, roughly, how our existence fits in to the account given here. The answer, roughly, is that it is taken as granted; not because it is assumed to be certain, but because it is not central to our concerns here. To be sure, if it became an issue, then we could consider it, again using the method of examining the way we use words around notions of existence and so on. There are such considerations elsewhere, mainly in areas relating to logic, quantification and equivalence. And the answer, roughly, might be not "...if I am capable of seeing myself in the mirror, it is thanks to the mirror itself and not me" so much as "... if I am capable of seeing myself in the mirror, it is thanks to there being both a mirror and me".
Cheers. :up:
My problem is that I can't imagine what direct perception would be. Isn't this part of what we need to recognize here? If nothing could count as direct perception, then the idea that perception is actually indirect doesn't make sense. The problem is the move from "some perception is indirect" to "all perception is indirect".
But I agree that setting this issue aside enables us to understand what is going on here better, even though I'm not entirely sure that the last word has been said here. (I have in mind Cavell's idea that the idea of a last word on scepticism is a mistake.)
Quoting Banno
I certainly agree with that. If there is anything more to be said about or with sense-data, it would be off-topic here, so I shall leave it alone.
Quoting Banno
I agree with this, whole-heartedly. But you referred earlier to some of the "critiques" of ordinary language philosophy here Quoting Banno and there's a mention of Gellner's book here:-Quoting Richard B
So I'm tempted to articulate more of a defence. But, again, that would perhaps be more appropriate elsewhere.
I'm afraid I'm a bit confused about whether we are working through the sections systematically or just reading the book at our own pace?
For my part my intent is to continue in the way I have been, reading a lecture or two ahead and then going back to re-read in more detail to make notes mostly for myself. Lecture IV will probably be very brief, then a bit more detail, or less, as we move into the later lectures, if I loose interest. If you want to move at a faster pace, go ahead, but I've found in the past that this leads to folk getting lost and needing to go over arguments again.
In a PM to @Richard B I said
I hope Im not just conflict-averse, but I really believe theres less here to dispute than might first appear. Do we agree that qualia refer to actual phenomenological experience, and that the word can be used in meaningful sentences that describe those experiences? If so, lets try out the idea that this is what Ayer, Austin, & Co. are arguing about whether there is a separate layer, or filter, or raw experience, that is not identical with the eventual object that we say, perhaps too breezily, that we see. Even for ordinary perception, a great deal of how to see has to be learned. I think the indirect perception advocates (and thats a terrible term, very misleading, but were stuck with it) are saying that theres a meaningful distinction to be made between the sensory information I receive at time T, and the identification of what Im seeing at time T+1.
Does such a position involve believing in sense-data? Perhaps, but what it doesnt entail is believing we see sense-data as opposed to the object in question. The sense-data are what permit the seeing, at least in almost all ordinary cases where weve learned to pick out relevant objects from the blooming, buzzing confusion of pure sensation (James).
Wasn't Austin a direct realist? His argument was against sense-data theory in perception, claiming that when you perceive an external world object, you are perceiving it directly without any medium in between the perceiver and the object.
I was trying to point out some problems with the direct realist's account that you can perceive external world objects directly, and sense-datum is not involved.
The contents you perceive definitely get stored in your mind, if not in memory where else could it be?
Another problem I used to think that naive realists and direct realists (not sure they are the same people, but sounds similar to me) have with their claims, is that what they perceive is the true account of the real world, which is problematic (from the argument of illusion). You cannot ground certainty of the external world solely on the basis of what you perceive due to the imperfect human sense organs, and possibility of illusion with perception due to the way the objects' nature and property are, or the fluxing environmental condition of the perception etc.
I agree with Russell's Representative Realism, because it says what we perceive is sense-data not the objects direct. In the case of sense-data, the whole process of perception process gets coherently explained and understood. Because it is sense-data, the data which could be accurate or inaccurate, can be stored and retrieved, it coheres with the whole human cognitive process and paradigms.
And still he wasn't denying the external world as illusion. The world out there exists even when we don't perceive it. But due to nature of the world, and our perceptual sense organs, what we perceive is sense-data, not the objects themselves.
Anyhow, this thread is a good opportunity to take out the old classics "Sense and Sensibilia" and "Foundations of Empirical Knowledge", read, think, refute (if need be), and learn. cheers.
The directness describes the relationship between perceiver and perceived. By direct one means there is no causal intermediary between the perceiver and the rest of the world, that we arent viewing sense-data, neurons, shadows on a cave wall, but the things themselves.
Yes, I would go with that.
Quoting Ludwig V
Hes not done yet, for sure. But the argument is that discussions about indirect perception make sense, but not as thought of in contrast to direct perception. Which means we dont need the idea of sense data at all. It would just be perceiving but I believe the next move is that we dont even understand what perception is (if we talk about sense perception, what is direct touch? direct smell? etc.)
Quoting J
The argument for sense perceptions, or data, and qualia (and appearances, and particulars) have in common that we are problematizing sensing in a particular wayby abstraction from any settingand creating one answer because we believe there is always a problem (and that we want to buffer ourselves from the possibility of any). However, Austin has just shown that the problems we have with sensing are ordinary and resolvable at the ground level, so both the abstraction from any case, and the generalization to all cases is unnecessary. There is more.
To be fair, as Austin intimates somewhere, all perception is direct. Its just a question of what it is we are perceiving. In my opinion there are only two likely candidates: ourselves or the world. So in my mind it also becomes a question of identity and selfhood.
I used to think every perception is indirect i.e. via sense-datum. But Banno says that Austin claims there are perceptions which are not indirect. So I presume he means that there are both direct and indirect perceptions depending on what they are. I look forward to hearing what they are, and verify if it is a true claim, or not.
But take for instance, I am looking at an object on the grass in my back garden. I am on the 2nd floor of my study room, and looking down at the grass through the window. It is not that far away, about 30 ft distance. The object looks grey and round in shape, and is unidentified at first. I was wondering what it could be, but cannot make out.
I was suspecting it would be either a leaf from the trees, or an empty plastic carton blown by the wind from the outside road, or it could even be the next door neighbour's cat droppings. I am not sure due to the fuzziness of the object and the distance.
I take out my old Pentax binoculars, and point to the object through the window, and focus for the object. It is blurry and fuzzy at first, but soon it gets clearer, and appears as a super sharp image. I can see the object now very well, and can tell it is a leaf possibly dropped from the trees in the garden.
The visual perception in this case was only possible via the aid of the binoculars. For that, I would claim that the binocular was part of my sense organ. The image was transferred to me via the lenses in the binoculars into my eyes and then into my brain somewhere in which was able to identify the image as a leaf, not an empty carton or the dreaded cat droppings.
In this case, if I say the whole perception was direct from the leaf on the grass to my cognition, I think I am not being fair or reasonable. Even my eyes are not the recognitive judgemental place for the perception. They were just a medium, which transferred the image in the binocular to my brain somewhere.
I am sure the final place where the perceptual judgement took place where I identified the object as a leaf was somewhere in my brain, and the categorical concepts which activated my judgement of the identification of the leaf as a leaf from the trees. My perception in this case was indirect in many folds for sure.
I still don't know what kind of leaf it is, or from which trees (birch, poplar or acer) in the garden. For that, I will need to go out to the garden and walk into the grass, and stand right above the object and have a close peek.
Hence, my perception was incomplete, although having identified what the object was ( a leaf), I am still not sure what it might be, therefore I have no complete access to the object in the world in epistemic sense even after having a concentrated perceptual operation with high quality visual aid. Of course I am not denying the existence of the object on the grass, or saying that it might be a figment of my imagination. What I am saying is that, I have perceived the object on the grass, and with the visual aid which assisted in clearing the blurriness of the image of the object, initial identification seems successful, however, the full knowledge of the nature of the object is still vague at this stage of perception.
Consequently perceptions cannot be direct, but must be resolutely indirect, because all perceputal activities take place via sense organs minimally, sense-datum mostly and many other peripheral factors. (I still keep open-minded admitting for the non-indirect perception case offered by Austin.)
So we don't seem to agree on the topic, but not all do, and that is pretty normal in all discussions.
It doesn't matter. Think of the loonies and colossi of affectation he savaged, so politely. Well, fairly politely.
Reading Sense and Sensibility resulted in a kind of epiphany, for me. The revelation of the profoundly errant views of the proponents of sense-data and such artifices was stunning. I felt as if I was Paul, but on the road to some kind of metaphysical Damascus, struck in the face by a cream pie and knocked off the high horse of philosophy as it became after Descartes.
[I've been wanting to do something with Paul being hit by a pie in the face for some time now. Best I can do for now].
Its not only the leaf, but also the binoculars, the window, the garden, the chemicals and particulates in the air that you are seeing. To the question what is it that is perceived, all of it must be included. The mistake, I think, is to consider the perceived as an isolated object, like a leaf or table. Moreover, everything witnessed in the entire sensual periphery must be considered as the perceived, including smells, sounds, and so on. If all of it included, as I think it must be, it is impossible to say perception is indirect because there is no intermediary there.
If the law of identity holds, I cannot consider the final place where the perceptual judgement took place as perceived, because the brain is a component of the perceiver. Does X perceive Y, or does X perceive X? At any rate, neither precludes any intermediary.
Austin is specifically tearing down philosophy's framing of the issue as both direct or indirect. As he says:
"It is essential, here as elsewhere, to abandon old habits of Gleichschaltung, the deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking dichotomies. I am not, then-and this is a point to be clear about from the beginning-going to maintain that we ought to be 'realists', to embrace, that is, the doctrine that we do perceive material things (or objects)." p.3
It might be best to simply follow along, as the book is attached to my post here.
Well we are not here for changing your views, but fair enough for your points. I have given out my views for your points.
He quibbles throughout, but then says that, according to the argument from illusion, sense-data is perceived directly.
So whether we are perceiving a table or sense-datum, both are perceived directly.
I was just responding to the other members queries on the points. You got to give out your points as clearly as possible, if you had one, when asked, don't you? :)
Thanks for the link, but I have nice hardback copies of both Austin (1962) and Ayer's (1940) books. I was reading both of them today. Must admit Austin's writing style is super clear, and utterly logical.
I am easily persuadable given good arguments, but indirect realism is lacking in that department. So thank you for at least sharing what you believe.
As you may agree, philosophical arguments are not about brawls, but just your points laid out in several premises and evidences followed by your conclusions. And pointing out why you do or don't agree with your opponents points. :)
Quoting NOS4A2
This is confusing, but if we break it down: they are trying (but fail) to persuade us that we only can "directly" perceive sense datum, because of the problems brought up in certain circumstances which they want to say creates a problem with perception. This is not an admission by Austin that we perceive things directly, but simply stating the argument they are making in creating the indirect/direct distinction.
I was not intending to suppress discussion. It just helps me to respond to the text and how we are interpreting that, which is what I am trying to focus on discussing--not "my" points, but Austin's--which I see as different than just expressing our views on this issue. But, feel free.
That would be one way of seeing it, but actually I was saying the opposite. Pure sensation or qualia or whatever term you prefer is what we call the unabstracted perception, the unconceptualized sensation specific to one setting and one time. We then go on to see X based on what weve learned about how to see. I think Austin considers this issue of seeing as . . . later in the book.
But I may not be understanding you. How does any of this problematize sensing? I was hoping to make the problem diminish or even disappear, working in parallel with Austin rather than against him.
The point about abstraction is a note on Austin's method. If we ignore all the uses of a term in all its various contexts (as Austin brings back), then we narrow our understanding of, say, "direct" and "material objects", etc. and our picture becomes unconnected from our lives.
Quoting J
The fact that we make mistakes, mis-identify, are tricked, and all the other things Austin explores, should point (as Austin does) to the ordinary ways by which we resolve those issues. Philosophy turns these instances into a intellectualized "problem" which underlies all cases, thus unconnected from our procedures and familiarity, because it can then have one solution, here "direct perception", or "qualia".
Very true. Of course not.
On re-reading, a few things stand out to me. Foremost is how often Austin explicitly pushes against many of the sorts of things of which he is now accused. Those accusations target a caricature, not the man. Next is the explicit misogyny and racism, which is perhaps more than just an indication of the times. And he's not as cruel as he is in my recollection, although the attack is searing, castigating each and every step in Ayer's book one after the other.
It's interesting to watch and attempting to fit the actual Austin in to the account that is so prevalent here, that indirect realism is about sensory apparatus, the way in which our eyes and brain process vision, and so direct realism must also be about sensory apparatus. Corvus in particular is finding that what Austin actually says does not match the common account of what an indirect realist should say. The hard part for them is going to be addressing the arguments Austin actually presents, and not re-dressing them so that they fit a preconfigured critique.Quoting Banno
This applies also to direct/indirect realism. The danger for this thread is that the discussion becomes just another rendition of that tedious "he said/she said".
Quoting Ludwig V
The point Austin makes quite early seems to me to cover this:
You didn't see it directly, you saw it through a telescope, or a mirror, or only its shadow; how we are to understand "direct" perception depends entirely on what it is contrasted with; so of course it is difficult to imagine what "direct perception" is, per se. It's a nonsense, an invention of the defenders of the sort of argument Ayer is presenting. You can find examples in every thread on perception*. Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes!
Quoting Corvus
Yep, Ciceronianus' Damascan cream pie in the face. A good philosophical account is compelling.
Quoting J
One of the prejudices I share with Austin is a dislike for specifically philosophical innovations. Talk of qualia mostly post dates Austin, but I suspect he would have spent some time pointing out that the term doesn't seem to achieve anything not already found in our ordinary talk of seeing and touching.
Quoting Banno
...that's from three years ago. I've had no reason to reconsider.
* See the ongoing discussion in https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14738/a-case-for-transcendental-idealism by way of example. It was in part bemusement at the dreadful standard of the discussion there that inspired my re-reading of Austin.
It's an example of what Dewey called The Philosophical Fallacy, now that I think of it--simply put, the disregard of context. Whatever is thought in philosophy to be true (or I would say untrue) under certain conditions may be claimed to be true (or untrue) under all conditions.
It would be so great to have a time machine and go to the future when the mind is more fully understood. :smile:
Having gotten through Lecture IV: this is an example of where Austin takes a deep-dive into the differences between ordinary "uses" of words that philosophy takes as terms for a special purpose, but I think Austin somethings buries the point of all this. ("uses" here are the different "ways in which 'looks like' may be meant and may be taken p.40)
I'm going to take a stab at putting the dots together, but I do think the way he talks about it (below) needs to be accounted for. I take him to be showing how different uses (of like or seems) each have different things that matter to us about them, different ways we judge them, including: whether they are analogous or divergent 36 whether evidence is used 37 that there are different kinds of evidence 39 sometimes only needing a "general impression" 39 what "complications are attributable" 39 what they "well might be mistaken for" 42
I take these various standards and features to show that there are many different means of judging, rather than only whether we see it (directly) or do not see it; which is the point at which philosophy adds something in-between, like "sense-data", because then the standard can be unqualified across instances, locations, and everything sensed. But just because we can make a mistake does not mean we have to interpret sensations as always open to explanation by faulty sensors, as errors can be corrected because there is "nothing in principle final, conclusive, irrefutable about anyone's statement" and that I can "retract my statement or at least amend." 43
There is also, again, that judging these cases is different in different contexts, or that there needs to be a correct context, such as: "particular" and "special circumstances" and "suitable contexts" 39 that we need to look at the "full circumstances of particular cases" 39 or that how it is used will "depend on further facts about the occasion of utterance;"
I also want to note that these means of judgment are "our normal interests" 38 in these things, because it opens the question of what philosophy's interests are in its one standard (directness) without regard to instance or context which I take as the desire to "rule out uncertainty altogether, or every possibility of being challenged and perhaps proved wrong."
And to internalize our possibility of failure makes it a problem with me ("my" perception), or with humanity (some faculty or process), but Austin is claiming that our standards and circumstances that frame how these issue play out means that "I am not disclosing a fact about myself" because "the way things look is, in general, just as much a fact about the world, just as open to public confirmation or challenge, as the way things are. p 43 (emphasis added). How can it be only your perception when what you see incorrectly can be pointed out by me?
A slightly shorter, but intense, lecture breaking apart various uses of "Look", "Appear" and "Seem". talks about the complexity of the issue, which comes down to Ayer apparently playing on words again - the straight stick looks bent; but what are we to conclude from that? We can agree that it looks bent while maintaining that it is in fact straight; but Ayer would have us deny this, or at the least call it into question. Ayer wants us to take "something looks bent" and conclude that, therefore, something is bent; it's only by our being duped in this way that we will again be convinced of the existence of sense data.
Further, as repeats, "descriptions of looks are neither 'incorrigible' nor 'subjective'... There is certainly nothing in principle final, conclusive, irrefutable about anyone's statement that so-and-so looks such-and-such"(p.42). How things look will not carry the weight Ayer would place on it.
Yes, this one was interesting and you raised a good question.
I will try to develop an answer and make an attempt to interpret what Austin wants to mean roughly.
I think perspective - subject and object - is based on two main categories: the external, which essentially treats all things as objects and ignores the subject (that's why inP. 61 he somehow agrees with other philosophers or thinkers such as Locke, Hume, Kant, etc. in the fact that there are 'physical occupants', thus the 'bodies'), and then internal, which treats the whole of experience and objective reality as a content, as representation, of the subject. This is why in P. 85 he states: [...] or if, being subject to an illusion of double vision, I say that I am perceiving two pieces of paper, I need not be implying that there really are two pieces of paper there)
Similarly, the content of the relation of perception between subject and object can be assigned by reflection indifferently to either object or subject. This is why what I see incorrectly, can be seen by you as well. The answer might not be who is right or wrong nor why we see it wrong, but both.
Agree?
Thanks very much for this. I don't want to move at a faster pace (except that I have skimmed through the book because I find it helpful to have something of an overview. But it'll be a lot easier to follow and contribute if I know where the focus is in the discussion. By now, I guess you'll be reading Lecture IV - and by the time I'm actually posting this, you have read it. I found Lecture IV quite difficult and am not confident that I've understood it.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes. I should have explained that I was asking the question because I didn't and don't think that "direct" perception makes any sense, except in the context of Austin's account of indirect perception. But various comments have clarified sense-data are (very like) qualia, and I'm content believe that I'm right to be puzzled.
I agree that these entities are developed in pursuit of Quoting J. The idea that we can, so to speak "peel off" the layers of interpretation to arrive at a purified, simple sensation seems to me a wild goose chase. That peeling off process is itself a process and the result will be another concept of the sensation which will be, paradoxically, itself a concept. There is no "before". (I wish I could construct the Austinian argument for this.)
Quoting NOS4A2 Yes - in the context of our mistakes. The argument from illusion, rightly seen, is not as persuasive as the more difficult cases. The more difficult problem is that, for example, Macbeth is behaving as if he sees a dagger, and not acting (pretending), so he believes that he sees a dagger. There's no (philosophical) problem until we remember that perceiving is always perceiving something. So we invent something to plug the apparent logical gap and create something that gives us philosophical certainty, and a morass of problems to go with it. That's my diagnosis of the conjuring trick, anyway.
Quoting NOS4A2
Quoting javi2541997
I don't really understand either of these models, but it is striking that Austin (so far, at least) doesn't directly consider them. I'm very suspicious of them. For a start, they are dominated by the sense of sight. But do they apply to all the senses? Perhaps to hearing, and even to smell, but touch and taste are different, and proprioception and balance different again. It's not obvious to me how helpful they are in those contexts.
We do not have to buy in to the argument that the tree falling in the forest when there is no-one to hear it does not make a sound. It depends what you choose to call a sound.
I think Austin roughly consider them, at least that is what I interpret on the page 61 when he states:
Quoting Austin
Quoting Ludwig V
Good point. What we have to take as granted is that the sound actually happened, but this one can be seen in two different perspectives, which each do not deny the sound itself.
Internal. Treats the whole of experience and objective reality. Thus, the tree fell and made the sound, doesn't matter whether we hear it or not.
External, the sound existed, but we verified its existence because we heard it eventually.
Here we must consider first that is not so much neither internal nor external but both that we are stuck with. This is why I attempted to understand Austin using these two perspectives, or at least looking for alternatives rather than denying them altogether, which is what Positivism does.
I was wanting to keep interacting from my own thoughts only on the topic, but perhaps I must read the Austin, and even Ayer too if the thread is about what Austin actually said in "Sense and Sensibilia", rather than what problems direct realists and indirect realist have in their accounts on perception.
Austin and Ayer were very last in my reading list, but they are brought to the current reading list due to this thread. My reading on them will be very slow due to my other readings going in tandem with them.
From my quick reading of Austin last night, I agree that @Banno was right in his point that Austin seems to think there is no significance in differentiating direct and indirect words in perception. He emphasises linguistic usage must be centred from ordinary people's usage, not philosophers' In that sense, words like "material stuff", "direct or indirect '' don't make sense, because no one really uses these terms in daily life unless one is a philosopher.
However, he seems to acknowledge the case when "indirect" perception makes sense such as seeing objects using telescopes, binoculars and spectacles, which I have been using as an example for the indirect perception process.
Indeed I feel, there is no much significance in delving into the differentiation of direct and indirect perception because from my point of view, all perceptions are somehow indirect from the minimal perspective that for any human perception, it will happen via proper and relevant sense organs i.e. the eye sights in visual perceptions, and ears for acoustic perceptions, and nose in case of smelling. No one would use their nose to see a tree in the field, and no one would use their eyes to smell wine. And without the relevant sense organs and their proper functions, that particular sense perception would be impaired, if not impossible.
But if we agree on the fact that these sense organs are not the final perception location in the process, then they have to be the medium passing the sensed contents into the final location i.e. the brain. Therefore all perceptions are indirect. And we are not even talking about sense-datum at this point.
I am still trying to understand the direct realist's account on perception. In what aspect perception is to be understood as direct and real? Are they saying that what they sense from the external objects directly arrives in their brain without any medium in between? Are they saying that what they sense and perceive from the external world are the true existence of the beings and the world with no possibility of being uncertain or inaccurate?
This point might not be the main topic of this thread as @Banno pointed out, so it could be ignored if that is the way the thread will proceed.
I will be reading the part where Austin discusses on "Delusion and Illusion".
As I see it, in Metaphysics, the Indirect Realism of Ayer is the more sensible approach. In Linguistic Idealism, the Direct Realism of Austin is the more sensible approach. As Austin is speaking from a position of Linguistic Idealism, Sense and Sensibilia should be read bearing this in mind.
Could you explain what that is?
:up: however people will rebut that it is the whole body and not just the brain so its direct in that this is how the human brain body processes the world, and you cant get out of this as if from primary to secondary works of process integration. Thats just my guess.
To my understanding, as Austin's interest is in language, it is not surprising that he challenges the sense-data theory that we never directly perceive material objects, as this is not how language works. In language, we do directly talk about material objects.
Linguistic Idealism may be described as the position that puts the mind at the centre of reality and language at the centre of the mind, and language does not represent the physical world as is often claimed but is the world itself. (www.researchgate.net - Nonrepresentational Linguistic Idealism). Wittgenstein has sometimes been described as a Linguistic Idealist. GEM Anscombe considered the question whether Wittgenstein was a Linguistic Idealist in her paper The Question of Linguistic Idealism.
Basically, the sense-data theory of Ayer and the linguistics of Austin are different aspects of knowledge, as mathematics and ethics are different aspects of knowledge. That is not to say neither is not valid, but becomes problematic when mixed up together.
Ah. That's better, isn't it?
I see. So Austin doesn't want sense data because it interferes with the way he envisions the relationship between mind and world?
Thats a good guess. The indirect realist position presents itself with a problem of self-hood, among others. It implies the perceiver is like a little viewer who observes the neural circuitry of his sense organs as they dutifully present him with impulses that turn out to look like chairs, sound like horns, and smell like lavender.
Its a shame Austin doesnt wade into any of these problems given the title of his book (just another play on words, I guess), and is content to split-hairs on rather trivial matters, like an entire lecture on the word real.
Perhaps more the relationship of language to world. Don't you agree? Reference to sense-data is not generally used in ordinary language, as when he writes:
For reasons not very obscure, we always prefer in practice what might be called the cash-value expression to the 'indirect' metaphor. If I were to report that I see enemy ships indirectly, I should merely provoke the question what exactly I mean.' I mean that I can see these blips on the radar screen'-'Well, why didn't you say so then?'
Good point. We will see what the reading and discussions will reveal in due course.
Great point. :ok: But we are not asking who or what is responsible for perception, but how perception works.
You had said he puts mind at the center of reality, and language at the center of mind. That's why I thought the ultimate relationship would be mind to world. No?
Thanks for the quotation from Austin. It does help.
Quoting javi2541997
Austin's point is that we are not stuck with them. He doesn't analyse this particular duo, but if he did, he would seek to clarify exactly what they mean, and, IMO, conclude that they don't mean anything coherent.
Quoting Corvus
Austin's point here is that "direct" and "indirect" are a pair, linked by their opposition. Each derives it's meaning from the other, like "north" and "south", "up" and "down", "hot" and "cold". If you say that all perceptions are indirect, and imply that no perception is, or could be, direct, you deprive "direct" of any "meaning" and hence render "indirect" meaningless as well.
I don't accept that my eye is an intermediary, getting in the way of my perception. It would be simplistic to say that indirect perception is perception aided by something that is not (part of) me, but it is a start, and at least rules out the idea that my eye, which enables me to perceive at all, is somehow an intermediary in a process which could not happen without it.
Quoting Corvus
I am also trying to understand that, because unless I do understand that, I don't understand what "indirect" means.
Quoting RussellA
This is a new concept to me. As far as I know, neither Austin nor Wittgenstein recognize this classsification. Since they are both what one might call no-theory theorists, I'm inclined to think that this is a pigeon-hole attributed to them so that they can be more easily refuted. I haven't run across Anscombe's article before, so I need to look at that before forming an opinion.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I think that this is right, at least in the sense that I perceive things, not my eyes nor my brain. I'm dubious whether it really makes sense to say that my body perceives things either, since most physical objects are not sentient. But insofar as I am embodied, it may be helpful.
Quoting RussellA
Those metaphors "at the centre" are presumably shorthand for something and need a bit of explaining. It seems plainly absurd, however, to claim that language is the world, if you mean that cats and dogs are linguistic objects of some kind. (But I agree that language does not represent the world, though it certainly can be used to describe it.)
Quoting NOS4A2
You miss the point. If you are going to assert that the objects of perception are unreal or that tables and chairs are real, it is a good idea to know what the word means, including what it means to other people. Unless you offer your own definition of real, other people will assume that you mean by it what it means in ordinary language. But in ordinary language, the assertion that tables and chairs are real is extraordinarily pointless, and the assertion that rainbows and sunsets are unreal is completely puzzling.
Quoting Corvus
It is true that Austin does not ask this question. But then neither does Ayer. You are right to put the question that asks in that way.
But if you ask how a rainbow is made, the rainbow will not be part of the explanation. The sunlight, and the raindrops involved are not the rainbow, but the rainbow is not an entity distinct from them either. This should not be surprising. If the analysandum is part of the analysis, you have a circularity. So looking to find a process or event that is the perception inside one's head is a mistake.
How the human brain/body works is a good question but a question for physiology and psychology, from their different points of view. The only contribution that philosophy seems to make is to define the problem in such a way that it is insoluble and call it the "hard problem", which seems less than helpful. Perhaps they should tell philosophy to butt out and leave them to it. But then, traditional comfortable dualism would be threatened. From my point of view, that's not a problem.
Yes, it's an example of what I think of as the tyranny of the noun.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I also found Lecture IV less than exciting, because his target wasn't obvious and it wasn't easy to see how his exploration could be applied. Your summary was helpful, in particular Quoting Antony Nickles
However, I came out thinking, not that his approach was wrong, but that a slightly different approach would have been more illuminating. He says that he offers his examples so that we can get the feel of it, but I'm afraid I didn't. I was much more comfortable with Lecture V, because the idea that "real" is grammatically comparable to "good" gave me something to hold on to.
After scratching my head for a while, I came to the conclusion that, in spite of his saying that it is the differences are important, it is the similarities - overlaps - that are most prominent. Hence my confusion. Here are some examples of what I would have found more helpful. But I'm not sure the application to his targets is as clear as it is in what he wrote.
1) He doesn't mention that "appearance" (which is not best thought of as a noun, but as a verb) has one important use that is quite distinct from either "looks" or "seems", as in "When we reached the crest of the hill, the sea appeared, twinkling in the sunshine", or "the train appeared down the track" or "the magician appeared on the stage". There are no peculiar objects involved in these events.
2) "looks" have their home, not as peculiar properties of objects, but as something that I do. I look at things. "looks" in the senses explored in Austin's discussion, are, so to speak what I see when I look at things. As Austin points out, "looks" is part of a family of verbs, each of which is specific to one sense; there are nouns that go with each verb, as in "sounds" and "smells", etc.
3) "Seems" doesn't seem to have a noun attached - as he points out, there are no such things as "seemings". It is also the only one of the three that, to put it this way, has deception or at least the idea that what seems to be so is not the whole, or proper, story, built in to it.
It's not that Austin doesn't make the point he needs and I'm not sure that I'm not being presumptuous or just changing the subject in saying all this.
I don't wish to dissuade you, indeed there is no alternative, as you must begin where your thoughts are now. The material we are considering takes some digestion, especially as much of it is contrary to what is usually taken as granted in these fora. But from what you have written here you have been following Austin's account well, which is far more than can be said for others.
Again, the notion of a direct perception makes sense when we know what it is being contrasted with. So we understand the difference between seeing the ship indirectly through the periscope as oppose to popping the hatch and taking a look from the conning tower; we understand the difference between seeing the tree indirectly through the binoculars as opposed to walking over to it to see it directly. But the contention offered in the forums is much odder than these cases. It's that we never see the ship or the tree or anything else directly, but only through the intervention of our eyes. And here it is not at all clear what it would mean to see something without using one's eyes, or any other sense organ. So it's not clear what the direct/indirect distinction is doing in this case. Austin doesn't directly address such an argument, because no one, least of all Ayer, was so gormless as to present it.
It was addresses by David Stove, an Australian philosopher, who used the example of tasting oysters. Should oysters be eaten straight, or with a squeeze of lemon? Or the whole Kilpatrick treatment? Well, if you would know what oysters themselves taste like, it might be best to try them "natural". But the argument for indirect realism is as if someone were to suggest that one never tastes oysters except with one's tongue, and therefore one never tastes oysters in themselves.
I hope the absurdity is plain, and that you see the relevance of 's joke.
Quoting Corvus
I also hope that it will become clear that neither Austin nor I are making the claim that our perceptions are in some way always direct. Sometimes - periscopes and binoculars and mirrors - they are indirect, and in such situations we can understand what it would mean in contrast for them to be both direct and indirect.
So in those terms, there is nothing to understand. A so-called "direct realist" account of perception is the same as the standard account given by science. Quoting Corvus
No. But they might say that when you look at a cup, what you are seeing is the cup, and not some philosophical innovation such as sense data or qualia. That you are not a homunculus sitting inside a head, looking at the a screen projecting images of cups.
The reply to this will be that we understand from recent scientific developments that our brains actively construct a model of the cup. That's quite right. But it would be an error to think that what we see is this model - the homunculus again. Rather, constructing the model is our seeing the cup.
Yes!
I appreciate the facetious style - this is what such silly alternatives deserve.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yep. It would have been novel for Austin, too. Thank you for saving me from addressing this incongruity.
An excellent post.
Suppose there is a tribe that does not have cups. What do they see when shown or given a cup?
But 's question shows some of where these ideas might be taken, more so by Wittgenstein than by Austin. One wonders what direction Austin might have taken had he lived longer.
What I am getting at is that there is more to perception than passive reception. What we see when we see the cup is not something separate from or independent from what we call it and what we use it for.
That's what @RussellA said. It's linguistic idealism.
I figured you'd notice the joke and the irony. Perhaps others will now that you mentioned it.
Quoting Banno
The pie has hit your face when you recognize this to be the case. There's a kind of self-deception at work. or affectation, when we question whether or not we really see a cup.
I think it is more a matter of what we do than what we say, of what cups are made and used for. The role or function that cups or, to use two examples Austin does, cigarettes and pens play in our lives.
No doubt.
Is that consistent with me using a cup to trap a spider?
People surely have the ability to see ways of using things, in ways no one has before. So surely what we 'see' is more than just previously recognized linguistic and usage associations?
And it will come to the fore with Lecture V. There will be folk who are so enamoured with the delusion of sense data that they will reject the argument, which is curiously phenomenological in character. In a good way.
Quoting Fooloso4
Sure. There's much more detail that might be included, if it were deemed relevant.
How do you think this impacts on Austin or Ayer's arguments? Otherwise, this would for me be veering off towards Quinn and Davidson; Radical translation, Radical interpretation, Triangulation and so on. Interesting stuff, and happy to follow up on it, if it is germane.
But otherwise, you and I might agree that name calling - "linguistic idealism" - doesn't help. There's more to a cup than the word "cup". Some of the comments here are utterly off the path.
He makes the point clear enough. It is a fatal enterprise to use the word in the way Ayer does. If us ordinary people need our hand held in what the word real might mean, perhaps he should have reminded his readers that it isnt really fatal to use the word in such a manner.
I think so.
Quoting wonderer1
I agree.
I think a more general way of seeing use is in terms of state transitions. The way you use a cup is a special case since how I use a cup is a sequence of percptual states (and transitions between them): e.g. how I fill a cup with water, bring it to my mouth and drink. My knowledge of this use might be seen, broadly, in terms of predicting what the next states are (or what they plausibly could be) from any part of the sequence and knowing what came before (or what could have come before, plausibly).
But then state transitions also include things that seem a bit more basic and probably totally unconscious; for instance, predicting what I will see next if I twist the cup a certain way, or how the percept changes when I myself moves. Perhaps, predicting the type of sound when I tap it or the way it feels if I touch. That is quite implicit knowledge since no one is really explicitly predicting or paying attention to what they will see next as they twist a cup, or the sound it will make when they set it down on the table - yet we would all know very well if something unexpected happened in these contexts.
If you think about it, even though your using a cup to trap a spider (or some other trick) might be a totally novel use of the cup, it relies entirely on knowledge of such state transitions like I just mentioned - known regularities in cup-related percepts. I would not be able to use the cup to trap the spider if I could not predict / have knowledge of the next sensory percepts that would occur in trapping the spider. I probably must, at least implicitly, know the cup has certain predictable properties to even come up with the idea.
I disagree with that post though that this has anything to do with seeing in the conventional sense. I think what we see when we see the cup is just the specific, immediate, individually unique image / percept of whatever is infront of us, which in fact is probably rarely ever exactly the same between two moments and is almost inevitably in constant flux as we move in the world, and the world itself moves.
There are therefore just transitions to the next perceptual state and the next state after that, in real time. Much of these transitions might just be what we passively observe, but there is always some control we have in some sense, which requires knowledge of state transitions.
- for instance, the way I move my head changes the way the cup looks. I can move my hand to manipulate it directly. I can move my jaws and speak the word "cup" or perhaps utter a selection of words that evoke a response in someone else. Maybe the sounds of those words will just appear before me, disembodied (like internal monologue); disembodied images likewise. I can shift my eyes to an area of the visual field where the next cup-related event miraculously occurs (e.g. water pouring from a spout; such a coincidence I happen to look there: why did I do that?). Perhaps I have other changes in attention and even internal states (like maybe heartbeat) if that miraculous event were not to occur. Notice these controllable acts are all coupled to my knowledge of state transitions in the sense they are all re-actions or pre-actions to what could come next (or perhaps what could have happened in the past even - any type of cup-related association).
Totally passive observation of changes of perception in real time is meaningless because without any of these controllable actions / reactions, I cannot even express or enact my knowledge of those passive observation sequences (e.g. our eyes following around these passive observations, words uttering the next passive observation, the shock and heartbeat change when some unexpected passive observation happens, an imagine picture popping into my head). Without those controllable actions I am probably no different to a wall which a film is being projected onto - the wall is receiving the image without any reaction, no meaning for the wall, even though it has these images projected on to it!
Knowledge is nothing more than these controllable actions which themselves are still just special cases of state transitions in our perception in real time, but nonetheless characterize my expertise about things like cupness through raw, individually unique percepts that change over time with some regularity / pattern to those transitions. So there is no sense in seeing the use of a cup. The use or knowledge of a cup unfolds in real time as it is being used, as we are reacting to it, as some sequence of unique percepts over which we have varying amounts of control.
There is no explicitly stored catalogue of knowledge unless you perhaps think it is appropriate to use that term to refer to latent biochemical states in our neurons (I don't). What we know is generated and enacted on the fly in our controllable perceptual states in contextually sensitive ways, embodied in neuronal action potentials.
I think Austin is saying that language is a tool and speaking about the world is part of how this tool works.
I've looked for uses of "sense data" outside of philosophical contexts, but found precious little. I checked the main online physiology and medical resources, but found nothing; certainly nothing showing its use in these fields.
You have two kinds of neurons, sensory neurons and motor neurons. Sensory neurons do nothing but send electrical impulses into your central nervous system. I would think those impulses would qualify as sensory data. No?
Sensory data, sure. Our senses provide data. But "sense data" seems a term peculiar to philosophy, with the mentioned peculiarities.
From an earlier post:
Quoting Fooloso4
The sense data (indirect)/material object (direct) dichotomy, taking either one or the other or both together fails to encompass the problem of seeing.
To quote Wittgenstein:
I see.
Well, sometimes what we see is what there is...
I'm not seeing a difficulty for Austin, here - is there one? I had rather taken him as showing that seeing, touching, smelling and so on were much broader than Ayer's account supposed, in much the way you do here.
I wanted to point out that part of the confusion here is that we (and most everyone in philosophy in general) do not take what Austin is doing as revolutionary and radical as it is. He is not offering another theory to explain perceiving or something to replace it. He is claiming that the problem that everyone is arguing about how to solve is made up; that the whole picture that we somehow interpret or experience remotely (through something else--sense perception, language, etc.) or individually (each of us) is a false premise and forced framework.
It might appear that Austin is just being snobby about words or is only making a claim that language is the right filter for the world, etc. But his method (as with Wittgenstein) is to set out what we say and do about a topic as evidence of how that thing actually works. That is to say, he is learning about the world. For example, in examining what we say and do about looking, he is making a claim about how "looking" works, the mechanics of it. Seeing something is not biologicalwhich would simply be visionand neither is judging, identifying, categorizing, etc. (perception is a made up thing, never defined nor explained p. 47). . Austin is showing us that seeing is a learned, public process (of focus and identification). Do you see that? What, that dog? Thats not a dog, its a giant rabbit; see the ears.
So, again, he is not saying we experience the world directly or indirectly--he is throwing out the entire picture of us (here) and the world (there) that leads to that distinction. This, for some, is very hard to wrap their heads around because it means letting go of a fixed, certain world, even, as is the case here (and with Kant), when we cant or dont know it.
As examples:
"Its a shame Austin doesnt wade into any of these problems and is content to split-hairs on rather trivial matters, like an entire lecture on the word 'real'."
"there is not much significance in delving into the differentiation of direct and indirect perception because from my point of view, all perceptions are somehow indirect from the minimal perspective that for any human perception, it will happen via proper and relevant sense organs"
sense organs are not the final perception location in the process, then they have to be the medium passing the sensed contents into the final location i.e. the brain
I think perspective - subject and object - is based on two main categories: the external, which essentially treats all things as objects and ignores the subject
But creative problem solving and imaginative ways of using things are based on the fact that we have had practices like holding in cups, trapping things, pacifism, etc. and not a matter of seeing as if it were attached to vision. But, yes, our practices are not closed off from innovation.
Roughly, Ayer's argument is that
So far we have watched Austin carefully dismantle the first two steps. The first in Lecture II, the second in Lecture III and IV. Now we are moving on the finishing step.
Before looking at Austin, let's consider Zhuang Zhou. You will no doubt be familiar with the story. As a butterfly, he did not know he was Zhuang Zhou. When he was Zhuang Zhou, he wondered if he was a butterfly.
It's a stimulating story, throwing one's considerations off-centre, and I do not wish to detract from it, but to add to it, since I think it can give us some insight into the approach Austin takes in Lecture V. We do know the difference between dreaming and being awake. We understand the nature of dreams, that they occur during sleep, usually at night, and may involve various otherwise impossible things. We understand what it is to dream and what it is to be awake - we must do, because we have the language around dreaming. If we could really not tell our dreams from our more lucid states, we could have no such language. We could not even have the word "dream".
We know also that the story is told from the point of view of Zhuang Zhou, and not from the point of view of the butterfly. If we did have the story from the perspective of the butterfly, the world would be a very different place. But the symmetry on which the story depends must be broken in order for the story to be told.
Considerations such as these have a close parallel in the final writings of Wittgenstein on certainty. The story can only take place if the very things it brings into doubt are held firm. And the story, being constructed of words, has to take it's place in a community of human beings.
Here again is the self-deception that is needed to get a good story to come alive - as mentioned.
I hearty agree! While we are at it, let's also throw out that other bugaboo (should that be buggerboo?) subjective/objective, the notion of things having to be either "internal" or "external".
Well, it doesn't surprise me that Austin embraces empiricism roughly. I read from other users who took part in this thread that, if we want to try to understand the exhange between Austin and Ayer, we have to focus on Linguistics as well, because Austin states that 'Ayer's 'linguistic' doctrine really rests squarely on the old Berkeleian, Kantian ontology of the 'sensible manifold'(p. 60), and he also states: .' (I fully agree on this point)
So I wonder to what extent we should take into account this topic from a Philosophy of Language perspective, and not just metaphysics.
On the other hand, I think pages 59, 60 and 61 are key. It shows what this is about, in my humble opinion, and even when afterwards I read them I started to wonder why people believe that Austin wants to 'disagree' with Ayer. I don't think so, but just to improve his theories and arguments. Don't you think?
Interesting, because on page 61 Austin states that there is a sense of 'melancholia' related to Locke and Berkeley, and others who worked with empiricism. Nevertheless, Austin himself states:
When he says 'them' it is not clear to me if he refers to all of them altogether or just Kant and Berkeley.
Part of the difficulty is understanding the significance of what he says. It is too easy to trivialize "ordinary language". But I think that's is a reaction to the difficulty of seeing what one might do next in philosophy. So much is being dismantled that the landscape can seem to be a desert. Bringing the nonsense in philosophy to an end is one thing. But bringing philosophy to an end is something else. Whatever motivates philosophy has certainly not gone away.
One reflection on re-visiting this text after so long. I see it differently. What Austin does in dismantling Ayer's argument is just a careful, thorough, detailed analysis of the argument. It's classic. The core of the business is not the messing about with dictionaries, but the careful critical reading of the text. Completely conventional, completely orthodox. Or so it seems to me now.
The issues at this point are complicated, and I don't fully understand them. As a preliminary, it seems quite clear to me that Austin does disagree with Ayer. But he also wants to be as fair to Ayer as he possibly can. It would be easier to interpret Ayer uncharitably and produce an argument that, in the end, just attacks a straw man. But it is more convincing to refute what I have seen referred to as a steel man, i.e. an interpretation of the argument that is as strong as it can possibly be.
I'm not sure that Austin is entirely right about Berkeley. (I don't know Locke or Kant well enough to have an opinion about them.)
Berkeley is not entirely clear about whether the arguments he presents are just about language or not. If he is presented with possible counter-examples, such as the watch-maker, he shows that whatever the watchmaker believes, what he is doing can be represented in terms of "ideas" (which correspond, at least roughly to Hume's impressions and Ayer's sense-data). But his project is to refute any inference to anything beyond what can be perceived (ideas) - except minds, but set that aside for now. So it is clear that he does not think that it is just a question of language - how could the existence of God be just a question of language - except to an unbeliever?
But he gives permission several times for ordinary language to continue to be used in certain contexts and by certain people. True, there is always the proviso that users should accept his arguments. I read him as anxious to avoid the appearance of contradicting "vulgar opinion" - to the point where he allows that ordinary objects (or at least the ideas of them) continue to exist even when not perceived by anyone, since God continues to perceive them. (This is only clearly stated in the Dialogues). In short, I read Berkeley as suggesting exactly what Austin says he doesn't suggest. But I'm not at all sure that Berkeley's position on this is coherent. (If you want references to Berkeley's text, I can provide them.)
I think his melancholy is disappointment that Ayer has not really progressed from the classical doctrines, in spite of the claims that Logical Positivism is a revolution that overthrows the entire tradition of philosophy.
I also think that he is saying that he would side with the less liberal Kant and Berkeley.
The most interesting feature of this discussion is that it shows that Austin's view of language is more complicated than the dismissive interpretations of the linguistic turn suppose.
But this is all in Lecture VI, so perhaps we should park it for now and return to it later?
When Wittgenstein at the start of On Certainty discusses GE Moore and the statement "I know that here is a hand", perhaps one can say that Ayer's centre of interest is the relationship of mind to world and Austin's centre of interest is the relationship of language to world.
For Ayer, we know of the hand through our sense data independently of language. For Austin, we know of the hand through our language, independently of any world that may or may not exist independently of our mind.
In this sense, there are similarities between Austin and the later Wittgenstein, in that for both of them the main interest is in language. Their interest is not in Ayer's metaphysical considerations of the relationship between the hand that I know exists in my mind to a hand that may or may not exist in a world independently of my mind.
Using an analogy (allowed within ordinary language), an author may write an article comparing and contrasting Atheism and Christianity in order to evaluate their similarities and differences. However, a Christian author may also write an article evaluating Atheism, and would unsurprisingly find it wanting.
Similarly, an author may write an article comparing and contrasting sense-data theory and ordinary language in order to evaluate their similarities and differences. However, in my opinion, Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article Sense and Sensibilia evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting.
From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, it may well be the case that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant.
On the other hand, I beg your pardon if you think that my posts are not clear or difficult to follow on, because it is true. I am very interested in philosophy, but my knowledge of the matter is basic, and I just wanted to take part in this thread, but roughly. I am aware that I am not capable of providing more substantial answers.
Continuing to the main point...
Firstly, I thought the paper of Austin was a matter of linguistics rather than metaphysics. This is what I interpreted when I read: P. 15
And then in P. 59, he also states:
Nonetheless, if I am not wrong, the main direction in Austin's work is metaphysical. It makes me wonder whether Austin wants to disagree with Ayer for being 'idealistic linguistic' or if he actually considers that 'sense' and 'sensibilia' are a subject of Philosophy of Language. - or at least an approach to -
Finally, rereading what I posted previously, I think you are right. Austin agrees with Kant and Berkeley, and disagrees with Ayer. But it doesn't seem to me that he disagrees in everything about Ayer, but some points. At least, in an analytical perspective, Austin agrees with Ayer.
The fact that a philosopher may not attach a label to themselves does not mean a label cannot be attached to them.
As the IEP in its article John Langshaw Austin (19111960) writes:
Austin is best known for two major contributions to contemporary philosophy: first, his linguistic phenomenology, a peculiar method of philosophical analysis of the concepts and ways of expression of everyday language; and second, speech act theory, the idea that every use of language carries a performative dimension (in the well-known slogan, to say something is to do something).
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Quoting Ludwig V
Perhaps one should look at Dunmett, Sellars, Wittgenstein and Austin who are making this kind of claim.
Wittgenstein wrote in 5.62 of Tractatus "The World is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world."
Sellars is known for his Inferential Role Semantics. His most famous work is "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). In it, he criticizes the view that knowledge of what we perceive can be independent of the conceptual processes which result in perception. He named this "The Myth of the Given," attributing it to sense-data theories of knowledge. (Wikipedia - Wilfrid Sellars).
Dummett is known for his Semantic Antirealism, also known as Semantic Inferentialism, a position suggesting that truth cannot serve as the central notion in the theory of meaning and must be replaced by verifiability (Wikipedia - Michael Dummett).
Austin warns us to take care when removing words from their ordinary usage, giving numerous examples of how this can lead to error. He argues that all speech and all utterance is the doing of something with words and signs, challenging a metaphysics of language that would posit denotative, propositional assertion as the essence of language and meaning (Wikipedia - JL Austin).
Austin is promoting an ordinary language philosophy with the aim of removing what he argues are false distinctions made by classical philosophy, resulting from the misuse of words such as "direct" and "indirect". He proposes going back to the ordinary use of a word rather than its metaphorical use.
I was reading him as having a less dramatic point. I think he accepts that perception involves a fair amount of interpretation. I think he's targeting a specific argument wrt that interpretation, that is, that we don't perceive the world around us, but rather we only perceive sense data, which is unique to each individual, as the medium for communication with the world.
I think the sense data theory is fine as a first stab at hypothesizing about perception. It's the idea that the fundamentals of perception are little blobs of light and color along with borders and shapes. The problem I see is that this conception of the fundamentals contains all the elements of the supposed higher levels. If you see a blob of light, you've tuned your attention to exclude everything except that, and "blob" is an interpretation. It's not raw perception, in other words. So I agree with Austin that the sense data theory doesn't do what it's supposed to do. I don't see Austin as establishing any great insights beyond that, though.
Indirect and direct are just words, which are adjectives to describe the noun, how it works. Perceptions are not by definition or essence linked to Direct or Indirect.
Ayer and Austin could have picked up other words to describe perception, but they are the words they used to describe perception.
The terms direct and indirect only get attached to perception when one is asked "how perception works". Because obviously there are objects and the perceiver in this issue, and the point we are discussing to describe the perception process is, by looking at all entities in the chain and their involvements in perception. We are not asking who is perceiving the tree in the garden, and what perception is made of, but how perception works.
To say eyes are one of the mediums of visual perception is to point out that perceptions are indirect. It had been mentioned particularly, because it is the most obvious and unmistakable example of the medium in visual perception by anyone, due to the fact that some folks in this thread seem to have problems in understanding why perceptions are indirect.
Quoting Ludwig V
You can't understand what direct perception doesn't follow therefore indirect perception is not valid. It just proves perceptions are not direct, but they are indirect.
Quoting Ludwig V
Again, we are not asking what perception is made of, but how perception works.
When you are asked how a car works, could you explain the workings of cars without going into the explanations on how the engine, steering and gear works?
In the case of the camouflaged church what we see is not, as Austin claims, "a church that now looks like a barn". (30) What we see is a barn. If we didn't what would be the point of camouflaging it?
He continues:
While this is true, and is the reason why he cites this example, the distinction between what we see and what it looks like cannot be made unless we can see that what it is, a camouflaged church, is something other than what it looks like. If the camouflage is removed we might say that what we see is a church that now looks like a church, but if the camouflage was not there in the first place we would not say that what we see is a church that now looks like a church.
To say that what we see is "a church that now looks like a barn" is to admit that ideas and interpretation are parts of perception. That admission seems to be how he denies any sort of comprehensive indirect realism.
If we read him while focusing on what's happening with truth, he's saying we arrive at truth by various means, including reason. He's saying that Ayers was a truth skeptic. I don't know if he actually was. I've never read Ayers. :grin:
Quoting Corvus
The distinction between direct and indirect is stated on page 2:
Quoting Ludwig V
I tried to take a stab at this confusion above in saying Austin is not taking the views of the common person to address the concerns of philosophy (to say they conflict). He is employing a new (old) method that by looking at what we ordinarily say (in the course of business) shows (is evidence, but not empirical @javi2541997) that we have way more standards then philosophys singular standard (direct or not). It is not that our ordinary activities solve philosophys problems, but only show that philosophy turned our concerns into a problem it created only able to be solved by a particular (direct, objective, scientific) solution, however mysterious (and so Austin is deconstructing metaphysics @javi2541997).
Quoting Ludwig V
This method is to draw out our ways of judging (which we rarely examine), in the same way Socrates did, but without jumping to (starting with really) the standard that we must end up with a type of knowledge that fixes the precipitous conclusions that philosophy imagines (skepticism, relativism) because it does not take into account the ordinary ways we have of resolving our errors and conflicting cases. This doesnt finish philosophy but only shows that we can disagree on rational terms where philosophy did not think it was capable only because it set the standard for rationality up front.
Wittgenstein will echo that this method seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) #118 But he will focus on the outcome that we now have a clear view, that there is a value in the discovery. The work on morality, other minds, etc. are each different, and continue.
He's establishing that as well, to my satisfaction at least. The "pie in the face" moment as I like to call it is when you understand you've been on a wild goose chase all along. It's not an easy thing to acknowledge, as is being shown.
This kind of philosophy is well described as therapeutic, I think. It's directed to the treatment and (it's to be hoped) cure of a kind of disorder or disease which leads us to believe that we are, in effect, the homunculus Banno refers to, watching a movie screen or TV in our minds.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I think you see this in Deweyian pragmatism as well. Perceiving, thinking, doing is how we learn of and interact with the rest of the world. The tendency of philosophers has been to treat "the mind" as something different from the world in a sense, unconcerned with the mundane when appropriately engaged and thus capable of ascertaining what lies beyond the prejudices of the "common herd" regarding the nature and reality of things with which it deals every day, like cups.
I've never believed little blobs of color are fundamental to perception, so I missed out on the pie. I don't think any scientists believe that either, if any ever did.
Thanks for your quote. :pray: The fact that Austin starts with direct and indirect perception in his book implies that he took the issue not lightly? Just guessing.
Anyway, pointing out eyes as a medium for visual perception is not such a nonsensical statement. It could be actually a legitimate scientific statement. If one reminds oneself that it is also part of the claim from phenomenologists such as Merlou-Ponty, who takes the physical body as a base of perception.
All neurologist and psychologists will never leave out eyes as a medium and sense organ for their account of visual perception. Berkeley has written a book on Visual Perception which exclusively explains how eyes work with the distant and close object for visual perception.
Of course phenomenology would be off topic in this thread, so we won't go there deeper, but perception cannot be discussed without discussions of sense organs to some degree.
I don't recall mentioning "little blobs of color" or their relation to perception. Perhaps you're being deceived by your senses, yet again.
Per the SEP, that's what sense data is. That's what Austin is complaining about: little blobs of color.
Thanks for the clarification. The pie I got hit with was rather tasty, but I'm glad you avoided getting hit by one.
Was it coconut? :worry:
One problem I have with your obvious and unmistakeable example is routine biology. One usually uses her eyes to view mediums. So how does one view the medium of her own eyes, if not with her eyes?
Thanks mate. :)
Quoting Banno
The fact that Ayer and Austin both deal with the issues regarding direct and indirect perception implies, that they must have taken the distinction not lightly. Especially if you notice Austin starts his first and second page of the book with general account of indirect perception, which he notes has been the classic view on the perception how it works.
Some folks deny the distinctions and some say they don't understand what direct perception means. It is because perhaps all perceptions are indirect in nature, and they cannot find any examples of direct perception.
I myself, cannot quite understand how perception works directly, but I do understand how it works indirectly, i.e. via sense organs and sense-data.
When one says perception is direct, i.e. it is between him and the objects or the world, I cannot quite get the point. Because the question was not who is perceiving the object, or the world, or who is responsible for the perception of the objects and the world, but the question was, how perception works.
It is like saying, how does a car work?, the person says, I drive the car. It is between me and the car, nothing in between. It is an answer which is from someone who totally misunderstood what the question was about.
You mention bringing eyes as a visual perceptual organ is absurd, simple and gormless. I feel it is not a reasonable or fair claim either.
Eyes were pointed out as a visual perceptual sense organ as a medium of visual perception, because without your eyes, you will not have visual perception. Simple as that. Of course everyone knows that eyes are the visual sense organ, but they seem to totally forget that eyes are the medium for transferring the image of the external objects into the brain, which makes the visual perception possible in the brain.
The working of eyes for visual perception could be quite complex. It wouldn't be something so simple and definitely not irrelevant with the visual perception topic, so saying it is not worth even mentioning such a simple thing in the discussion of how visual perception works sounds wrong and indeed addlepated.
Of course neither Austin nor Ayer mentions anything about the workings of eyes in visual perception in all of their books. That does not mean that they thought it would be gormless to talk about the sense organs in the theory of perception, but maybe they didn't know anything about how eyes worked in a neurological and biological way to perceive images and transfers into the brain.
Quoting Banno
Neurologists and Psychologists would say it would be addlepated for anyone talking about visual perception without going through ins and outs of the workings on the eyes, but Austin and Ayer had been doing it linguistically and logically, hence there are bound to be some muddles on the way. Still it is a useful exercise in semantics at least, and finding out what the actual issues are in the topic.
Quoting Banno
This is wrong. Because in neurological research, human perception can never see the exact "NOW". There is time lapse of your seeing the cup, and your brain processing the object as a cognition of a cup of about 0.05ms, which means you never see the cup direct. What you are seeing is a memory of the cup of 0.05ms past even if you may be telling yourself that is the live real perception you are having of the cup. It is a processed and stored image you were seeing.
Terms such as 'realism' in all its variety of flavors confuse me. I try to avoid them. The fault may be entirely my own, but I have not been able to find any consistent usage that makes me confident that those who talk about such things have the same concerns and are arguing for or against the same things.
There are all kinds of realisms and anti-realisms, so I agree there's no consistent usage. For this essay, I think an indirect realist believes there really are cups. The cups exist independently of me, it's just that all I see is patches and blobs from which I infer(?) the existence of a cup.
Austin is pointing out flaws in some arguments for that scenario, particularly in the wording of the argument, which appears to be misusing common words.
These videos explain how eyes work in our visual perception.
I think the indirect realist gets it backwards. She sees the cup and based on a theory of perception infers that she sees patches and blobs.
Put her in a room that contains only patches and blobs my guess is she would see patches and blobs. But if some of those patches and blobs were arranged in a certain way, in dim light, and at enough of a distance she might see a cup or pen or chair. That is to say, there is, I think, a constructive element of seeing.
We need to get past the picture of a process called "perception". If nothing else, Austin has shown that this is a figment that is simply manufactured by philosophy.
Quoting Corvus (emphasis added)
"Perception" is just a catch-all for: seeing, looking, identifying, grouping, judging, etc. (as well as, elsewhere: thinking, understanding, intending, etc.) in order for philosophy to frame the issue as a specific type of singular problem. But all these other things are not internal processes, but are each separate activities (like actions) that are done by public mechanics (standards) that allow for rectifying errors and debate (see Sec. IV).
Quoting frank
He would say that we do not each have "our perception" and then we debate those, but that the things we interpret are publicly judged by standards that we share. And so "interpretation" is a public process of argument taking into consideration that we have to apply those standards. By Austin's method, we would understand "interpretation" by looking at the kinds of things we say about what we "interpret", as in commenting about a painting (which is a thing we are interpreting), or making explicit the implications of a text (which is a skill, again, involving some thing, say, like a rule, or a someone's hand gestures),
Quoting Corvus
Now to say we have brains and they allow us to have senses, like vision, smell, touch, and we can study those, is an entirely different matter than our public practices. In doing philosophy we are not doing science, although as much as science imagines a mysterious process of "perception" that it can know, it is taking a fantasy of philosophy and treating it like a biological conundrum.
But also, whatever science learns about the brain is not going to resolve the issues of philosophy like skepticism of our relation to the world and each other (which creates the need for something to solve that "problem", here, by "direct perception". Or, when finding philosophy can't have the immediate or certain "knowledge" it desired (as a prerequisite), it does not admit the whole framework was wrong, but makes it about an imagined failing of our nature and creates "indirect perception" (appearances, etc.).
Quoting Corvus
But, having taken all that down a peg, this is just to say that you are not me, and I am not the world (because the world is not in my head, however "indirect", causing yours to be a different world). I do have personal tastes, interests, desires, commitments, guilt, motivations, etc. These are not wrapped up in a single theoretical conceptualization of "my perception".
Quoting Corvus
Austin is explaining how looking, seeing, etc. work. If science wants to study what happens to the brain when these things are going on, then that is just a different interest, but these practices are not discrete functions or processes of the brain (though the brain does do other stuff).
I know how eyes work. The question is: how are you able to view the medium of your eyes?
Usually we use our eyes to view mediums, such as light for example. So one might say we perceive light. But youre saying the eyes are the medium. Eyes are no longer an aspect of the perceiver, but of the perceived. So it raises the question. If the eyes are the medium, and you believe that we perceive this medium, how are you perceiving them if not with eyes? Do you think the perceiver is the brain?
It is not a different interest. It was just part of the explanation why perceptions are indirect. Austin's first page of the book is about direct and indirect perceptions.
Yes, if you read the SEP article on sense data, it asks you to focus just on blobs of color. I can do that, and it does have some philosophical significance to me, but I agree that it was probably misguided to say primal perception is blobs. We know, for instance, that there's a big section of the brain that's devoted to picking faces out of the visual field, so you're likely to see a face before you see a blob. :razz:
Quoting Corvus
Philosophy created the idea of "perception" and the idea that they are "indirect" (as with Hume's appearance, Plato's shadows, etc.). That people imagine science can explain these particular phantasms is just where science is barking up the wrong tree in trying to solve the mistakes of philosophy. Again, that is not to say there are not things to learn about the brain, just not these things to solve a problem philosophy mistakenly created.
Austin is simply investigating Ayer's creation of the distinction in dismantling the whole framework of direct/indirect as well as "perception". I can go over any of the text you take to lead to that conclusion.
I think the main issue regarding Austin is his ambiguity arguing about Ayer's points. At least, what I interpret is that there is empirical evidence that Austin gives as granted, and he is surprised of why Ayer actually believes in the existence of such a disagreement with 'empirical facts'.
On the other hand, if you believe that Austin is deconstructing metaphysics, then how should we get involved with his theory? Or at least an approach to. I interpret the verb 'deconstructing' as padding backwards on what others wrote on 'perception', 'real', 'external', 'internal'. So, do you believe that Austin took a step back from metaphysics?
Furthermore, I think Austin sates a very interesting point in page 49:
I think Austin drives us here to Idealism, or more specifically, a new use of language or Philosophy of Language. I think it is Ayer the one who embraces positivism rejecting metaphysics altogether. I beg your pardon if I am not explaining myself accurately. I attempt to understand Austin from a Philosophy of Language view, basically.
I ask because nothing in biology shows that we are viewing our own eyes. Rather, eyes are included in the act of perceiving, as necessary components of the perceiver. And the contact with light on the retina is quite directlight hits the retina. This contact between perceiver and perceived suggests the directness of perception.
I find Austin and Ayer's account of the topic interesting and useful. But I still feel the classic account of indirect perception which has been around from the time of Plato is more reasonable, even if Austin tried to dismiss the distinction of direct and indirect perception altogether, and even if there are still many folks who claim that direct realists' view on perception is correct.
As said, brain and eyes are not the main topic in the thread, but were brought in to show that the perception process is not direct.
I would leave it at that, and move on to the next chapter of the book. I did read up on the delusion and illusion part in Austin last night, and also read the part where he discusses difference in usage of the words "looks" "seems" and "appears". It was more like English semantic chapter rather than Philosophy, but was very useful. I agreed with him on every point in the chapter.
I am going to prepare for pointing out some of the logical problems noticed in Austin's analysis on Delusion and Illusion in his book.
That's right. Austin was a classicist. He was drawn into philosophy by puzzlement at the things philosophers said. He brought his method over from Classics.
Should, or even could, we bring out every nuance of this story? What is the building over there? It is a church. It has been made to look like a barn. So we see a church that has been made to look like a barn, A church that now looks like a barn. That seems reasonable. I think this account is clear.
We might prefer to avoid saying "What we see is a barn and what we see is a church." And if pressed, I'd have to agree with Austin, that what we see is a church, albeit one that looks like a barn.
So with the barn and the church. What I see is a barn. Youd have to tell me about the church disguise before I could even loosely claim to see it, just as I need to be told about molecular structure before I could, loosely, claim to see it. And in both cases, it's a use of "seeing" divorced from ordinary perception.
I dont think theres a right or wrong way to talk about this, necessarily, but I do think a defender of the value of ordinary language is going pretty far out on a limb here.
These are not easy issues to work through. One thing that might help is remembering that sight is not the only sense, and that an account of how we perceive must wok as well for touch and smell as for vision.
So are you sure you understand how it works to touch something indirectly? To smell the coffee, indirectly?
I certainly don't.
Quoting Corvus
There's a homunculus lurking here.
Yes, but going on past experience on the fora, it won't happen. :wink:
A brief comment on the Butterfly Dream. The last two lines are important:
.
Distinctions are made between Zhuang Zhou and the butterfly and being awake and dreaming, but beyond the distinctions is the transformation of things. Throughout the Zhuangzi one thing becomes another. Often it is not simply a distinction between things, but from one thing to its opposite. Understanding comes through this transformation from the limited perspective of one thing to that of another. The story is told in Chapter Two: On Equalizing Things.
"I see a barn" is not wrong. One might usefully say we will meet at the barn, and be understood by those who know it to be a church. Isn't the point that "I see a barn" is not the whole story?
But "I see a barn and I see a church" is problematic, if they are the very same. One feels entitled to ask, "So, which is it? Church or barn?". One presumes that it is not both. Despite this, a church might be used as a barn, or a barn as a church.
Again, detail and context are needed. "I see a church that looks like a barn" gives us more than "I see a barn".
We should try to avoid the interminable discussions that so often proceed from such differences. I take it that we agree there is a church, and that it looks like a barn, and that "I see a church" is OK, and so is "I see a barn", but that their conjunction needs some additional information - the fact of the camouflage - to avoid contradiction.
If "a church were cunningly camouflaged so that it looked like a barn" why would you think that what you see is not a barn but a church? How would you respond when you saw it? Would you approach it with the intention of praying?
I'm not seeing(!) a point here, either in favour or against the arguments we are considering.
We don't just see cups, we pick them up, hold them, drink from them, wash them and store them in the cupboard.
The only cups I own are used for holding pencils and paint brushes. I drink tea out of a metal tumbler that comes with a lid.
Right. What would be the point of camouflaging it if not to fool those who do not know that it is a church?
Quoting Banno
The point is about what it is that we see. What is the basis for the distinction between what something looks like and what we see? It seems as though Austin is basing the distinction on a questionable assumption about objectivity, as if we don't see a barn because it is a church.
Quoting Corvus
Well I'll leave you to it, only to say that taking these points as a matter of "semantics" is due to underestimating that he is dismantling the "classic account of indirect perception" from Plato through Descartes and as it remains these days, with Ayer as only one proponent but with the same reasons and same means.
You filthy degenerate! :razz:
Sure. Touching someone indirectly is possible. Think of a dermatology doctor wearing thin surgical rubber gloves, and performing skin examination of a patient. His specially manufactured surgical gloves are made so thin, almost transparent and super sentient to the doctor's hands so he can feel the parts of the skin being touched just like with skin to skin, but there is a barrier between his hands and the patient's skin being touched and examined.
Indirect smelling? Well as Austin said, there are various types of smelling too. Forget coffees.
Think of your partner's underwear. You used to smell the body scent from the body directly, but you can smell the body scent from the underwear when it was taken off and left on the bedroom floor on one lazy Sunday morning. You are smelling the body scent indirectly via the underwear.
Quoting Banno
The research paper about the topic was in a Psychology and Neurology article. I remember reading it.
Sure. IS there a presumption that there is only one correct answer here? Those in on the joke see a church. The duped see a barn. The explanation is that the church has been made to look like a barn. I don't see a problem. Quoting Fooloso4
Exactly.
Quoting Fooloso4
The duped think they see a barn. They are mistaken. What they see is a church, made to look like a barn. I don't see a problem.
Quoting Fooloso4
But we don't see a barn, we see a church that looks like a barn. How does dressing that up in terms of objectivity change that? Did camouflaging the church transform it into a barn? I don't think so. It just made it look like a barn.
He is not presenting a different way of thinking (another answer or theory) about this (manufactured) problem of direct or indirect access (and all the related philosophical manifestations). He is showing us how things work to make it clear that the philosopher created this distinction (with pre-defined reasons for a certain answer). So, yes, he is dismantling, and not only the entire framework, but showing how errors in these related activities are normally resolved in different ways (showing that skepticism is not an issue for philosophy with just one face). He does also have important things to say, about: our variety of activities, the role of context, the different criteria for judgment of each thing, etc.
In other words, what something is, in terms of its deep structure or physical reduction, isn't necessarily perceptible at the phenomenological level. The church looks like a barn. My group-of-molecules looks like a bottle. Wouldn't Austin agree that this is just common sense? The confusion, if there is any, stems from the fact that we often fail to disambiguate perception-words like "see"; sometimes we want "see" to refer to the phenomenology, other times to the "simpler units" that create the phenomenology and, often, provide a reductive description. This latter use often gets combined with a view of how object X "really" is, scientifically.
If you were asked who was smelling the body scent from the underwear, of course, you could say "I ( ) was smelling it directly from the underwear."
But if you were asked how does the smelling work, then I would expect you to say (if want to be reasonable), smelling works indirectly via the nose as the sense organ which is the main medium, and there was 2nd medium in this case (you could have more than one medium on perception) which was the underwear (because the scent was not originated from the underwear but from the body). The body scent you smelt was of course a sense-data.
As I see it, the problem is only "manufactured" if we buy into the idea that there is only one correct way to think about it. Otherwise, you just have different ways of thinking and talking about perception.
Then we are in agreement.
We are also in agreement that they failed to correctly identify the building.
Quoting Banno
If by "we" you mean those who are not duped, then yes. But it may be that we would be among the duped, in which case we would see a barn.
I get that. But we are perceiving light, not electrical signals. We are our eyes, the signals, the brain, etc. We cannot be both perceivers and mediums.
Do you see something deeper here, that I'm missing?
Sec V: Im going to point out again the importance here to Austin of context and standards.
This is going to be confusing for some of you maybe as he is not using experience as something only we have (thus putting it in quotes, as if Ayer would say this is some process of the mind), but these are two different situations (the "context" is different), and that we would judge them separately based on the different associated standards, and not simply by direct or not. Philosophy wants to treat everything the same without regard for the surroundings, or, as Austin puts it, the extraneous and attendant concomitants (accompaniments).
Next Ayer and Price try to argue that, if we are deluded, two things must be indistinguishable (that we have no way of judging between direct or indirect, thus why they claim we can only see sense data). But this is to ignore that we might not be using, or aware of, criteria to differentiate, as with tea experts, art critics, or eloquence.
And so philosophy is jumping to conclusions without even investigating our various standards and not taking into account any kind of context. [The] conclusion [we always see sense-datum] is practically assumed from the very first sentence of the statement of the argument itself. p.47 [We are asked to] concede the essential point [perceptions are always present] from the beginning. Id.
Why would philosophy want an answer that only fits two standards and is abstracted from any context? Why would it want "perception" and "sense data" to come between us and the world? (These are rhetorical questions.)
Yes, and then there is the broader methodological point that this failing leads to broad philosophical theories - such as Ayer's logical positivism - built on misunderstandings of language.
And this is to my eye what is absent from, say, Ernest Gellner's supposed rebuttal. When i read his book, I don't see him addressing the Austin or the Wittgenstein I understand. It strikes me as an instance of Banno's rule: It's easier to critique someone if you begin by misunderstanding them.
I'm saying, along with Austin, that there is no correct way to consider "perception" because philosophy did not think about it, as in look into how it would work and whether anything else was actually resolving those issues. Philosophy created a boogyman to slide in the only kind of answer it would accept, certain knowledge. The book is attached above in one of my posts if you care to discuss.
If asked how does smelling works, I would refer to the standard scientific account - I'm doing philosophy, so I don't know anything those scientists don't also know. But those accounts do not talk of direct and indirect smelling, except when they adopt a philosophical stance.
I was the one who found the PDF for Banno. However, I don't have time to read and discuss the book at the moment.
My point was that, in thinking about perception in different ways, using different criteria for what would count as 'direct' and 'indirect', perception can be considered to be either direct or indirect.So my question is, given there is no fact of the matter regarding which is the case. what is the problem?
I think Corvus was just pointing out that science shows that perception involves representation and interpretation. It's just weird to insist that that's direct (as someone in the thread was doing).
The argument from illusion has two parts. In the first, already addressed, it is argued that in certain abnormal situations we must admit that what we see is not a material thing, but a sense datum. We've already seen how this is wrong. In the second part this false contention is supposed to be extended to all cases, such that all we ever see is sense data.
Ayer claims that there is "no intrinsic difference in kind between those of our perceptions that are veridical in their presentation of material things and those that are delusive" (p.44). The objections follow.
1. A bogus Dichotomy. There's a certain question-begging in the use of "perceptions", which are already in the place of sense data, and so presume them from the very start.
2. An exaggerated frequency. The implicit, unjustified presumption is that perceptions are all either veridical or delusive.
3. An exaggerated similarity. It is just not true that veridical and delusive perceptions are 'qualitatively indistinguishable". We do understand the difference between dreaming and being awake; seeing stars at night and seeing stars after a concussion; seeing an after-image and seeing a colour patch; seeing a blue wall and a white wall through blue glasses; seeing pink rats and suffering dementia tremens. "In all these cases we may say the same things ('It looks blue', 'It looks bent', &c.), but this is no reason at all for denying the obvious fact that the 'experiences' are different"(p.49-50)
4. An erroneous suggestion. Why should we expect, when we see two different things, that they should appear different? Why shouldn't two different things appear much the same?
5. If one fails to make a distinction, it does not follow that there is no distinction to be made. If we fail to make a distinction between delusive and veridical perceptions, it does not follow that there is no such distinction to be made. We are fallible.
6. What, exactly, a "perception" consists in remains obscure. This allows the goals to be moved - "Inevitably, if you rule out the respects in which A and B differ, you may expect to be left with respects in which they are alike" (p.54).
I guess that's right. @Isaac and I had some lengthy chats about what "representation" consists in, in a neural network. What we did agree on is that in so far as there are such representations, it is clear that they are not symbolic, but found in the weightings of various connections.
It makes more sense to me to think that there are a great many facts of the matter, only some of which we know, but some of those facts can be fairly well understood.
Corvus was directing attention to what we know about the eye, which is that an image is transduced to electrical signals, which the brain subsequently does something with.
When pressed, Isaac would admit that his "weighting" scenario is merely theory. We don't actually know how having a brain allows for the cohesive experience of perception.
Philosophers... always finding problems where there are none.
In his time, it was not at all uncommon, so I assumed he was. Perhaps that's why I feel so at home with him. It's curious, though, to see how much more complicated his reliance on ordinary language is than it seemed to be at the time.
Quoting Banno
The camouflaged church is more complicated that Austin presents it, and the discussion above was an excellent dissection of it, particularly since it avoided the trap of thinking that the look of the church was something distinct from the building which could be peeled off it in the way that the camouflage could be peeled off it.
However, I think that does not take account of what is sometimes called the success logic of "see" (and "perceive"). So, for me, it is perfectly clear that no-one sees a barn, even though some people think they see a barn. Everybody sees a church, but some people do not realize that it is a church. However, in the context of this discussion, I don't have a conclusive argument for objecting to the idea that we see whatever we think we see, even though, for my money, that gives far too much to sense-data.
But what is neglected here is the context in which people may wish to communicate with each other about it - say, for the purpose of organizing a service, or even for the purpose of storing stuff. Call the people who see a church group A and the people who see a barn group B. One might say "Turn left into Hoe Lane and you will see the church half a mile down on the right". This would not work for those in group A who do not know about the camouflage and it would hopelessly mislead group B.
So I need to add "It looks like a barn." for the church-goers. But even if the aim is to find a barn to store stuff, I still need to explain to avoid large quantities of inappropriate stuff turning up at the church. In other words, "I see a church" and "I see a barn" are both inadequate (but not false) because of what they omit. (It's a sort of suppressio veri) So I would say that neither is OK. Only "I see a church camouflaged as a barn" is true.
Side-note. I'm fascinated to find this example in this context. I'm sure other people are aware that it has
a prominent place in discussions of the Gettier problem. I was aware that philosophical examples circulate in the literature, but not usually as widely as this.
Quoting NOS4A2
:up:
I realize that is the usual way of describing certain phenomena of perception. But both "representation" and "interpretation" are usually applied in very different circumstances - when the original is also available to us. But in perception, the original is not available to us. So we end up bewailing the veil of perception which cuts us off from the world. But the point of the senses is to give us information about the world, and they do this quite successfully, on the whole. So these models are a trap.
While I agree with Austin's complaint that the delusive/veridical argument is a gross over-simplification of perception, I think that he is does not quite identify the source of the "problem". Indeed, it could be argued that he shares an important mistake with his opponents. Consider this:-
"Again, it is simply not true to say that seeing a bright green after-image against a white wall is exactly like seeing a bright green patch actually on the wall; or that seeing a white wall through blue spectacles is exactly like seeing a blue wall; or that seeing pink rats in D.T.s is exactly like really seeing pink rats; or (once again) that seeing a stick refracted in water is exactly like seeing a bent stick. In all these cases we may say the same things ('It looks blue', 'It looks bent', &c.), but this is no reason at all for denying the obvious fact that the 'experiences' are different. (p. 49)
He is here making a move that he makes earlier, in the context of the argument from illusion:-
"The straight part of the stick, the bit not under water, is presumably part of a material thing; don't we see
that? And what about the bit under water ? - we can see that too. We can see, come to that, the water itself. In fact what we see is a stick partly immersed in water." (p.30)
The problem is simply this, "experience" is not a count noun, but more like a mass term. There's no criterion for individual experiences, barring such informal criteria as we apply in context when we discuss them. (I suspect that all the empricists assume an atomic account of experience, which is simply a misunderstanding.) Austin's move is simply to widen the scope of "experience" to include the various ways we distinguish veridical from delusive. The argument gets its force from the narrow focus that is silently adopted, and a wider context allows Austin to rebut the claims.
Austin's argument is not best framed as an objection to wrongly describing a given experience. The problem is that Ayer and Price are selectively ignoring inconvenient circumstances by focusing on a narrow version of certain experiences. As Austin says:- "Inevitably, if you rule out the respects in which A and B differ, you may expect to be left with respects in which they are alike" (p.54). So Austin is right to insist that attention to a wider context will (often) correct such mistakes. But framing this as a disagreement about what the experience is is not helpful.
This is typical of what you find when you go looking for secondary information on Austin's overall agenda:
Quoting Krista Lawlor
So there's no single view of him that represents a consensus.
I agree with Austin that using veridical vs. illusory as way into the question isnt promising. The insight from James that I quoted earlier seems much more on target. There are phenomenal experiences lets call them perceptions and these same experiences can refer to, or be of, objects in the world which have names and, often, are constituted in interesting ways by smaller, more fundamental components.
James wants to say that neither names nor fundamental components are perceived, in the sense given above. So its a handy and reasonable distinction to make: We can give the term perception a job to do by letting it refer to the phenomenological experiences, but not the names or the components. If we want to refer to them, its easy: The direct object in the sentence I see the red patch on Jupiter is the red patch on Jupiter, a name which clarifies our perceptual experience of I see red, but isnt synonymous with it. The direct object in I see red is the color red. Since we dont see names, the distinction must be a valid one. And surely it conforms with our ordinary talk about these things? We know the difference between I see a tree and I see a tree which I also happen to know is called an elm. Indeed, James would say that we could take it all the way back, and say, "I see 3-dimensional colored object of a certain shape which I happen to know is called a tree."
My understanding was that "directly" was used to emphasise the fact that we don't perceive material things "directly", but perceive indirectly via sense-datum in Austin's book page 2. Austin gives out the classic general account of indirect perception, and says the issue is not trivial matter, and some people find it even "disturbing" on the account.
I was understanding that Austin dismisses the distinction between direct and indirect perception as not
meaningful, because he thinks perceptions are direct, although some perceptions are indirect such as when using binoculars or telescopes in visual perception. I might have misunderstood the point. If so, please correct me, and confirm what is the case.
From my view, direct perception does not exist. All perception is indirect via sense data and sense-organ which carries the sensed information into the brain via sense organs. Indirect or direct are just linguistic terms to mean that activities or motions are one to one link without any medium or stop off place between the subject and object, or there are ( in case of indirect processes). Direct and indirect are not some essential properties of existence or entities as some folks seem to think. We could easily have used "mediated" or "medium-less" instead of direct or indirect.
If I speak to you via phone, then I am speaking to you indirectly via phone. If I speak to you face to face over a table, then I am speaking to you directly. But we wouldn't even talk that way unless someone asked you "was your conversation direct or indirect i.e. via phone or video link?" No one would ask that type of questions in ordinary daily life of course. :)
Plane from London to Sydney is a direct flight, if it flies without stopping anywhere during flight, takes off from London and lands in Sydney then it is a direct flight. If it stops in some other airports such as Dubai or Singapore, then it would be an indirect flight.
Quoting Banno
Scientists would definitely start with the sense organ Nose for their account of how smelling works. I am not sure if they would be interested in talking about direct or indirect smelling. I only gave my ideas on indirect smelling, because you asked for it. And that was just out of my impromptu reasoning on the indirect smelling case.
Smelling is different from visual perception, and it is more vague to think in terms of direct or indirect smelling.
But it tells you that smelling is definitely indirect perception because the object is the body, and what you are perceiving is the body scent. The body is a physical existence with mass and weight in space. The scent is a property emanated from the body with no physical properties at all. Your nose is inhaling the air mixed with the sense data of the body scent. If the perception was direct, then you couldn't smell it from the underwear on the floor, when you picked it up and sniffed it off, as the body was either in the shower or making breakfast in the kitchen.
Yes, that's to be expected. Paradoxically, that's also why it pays to read the original text. There's room for a large discussion there. I'm not sure that the range of different reactions is greater in his case than in others.
Does that mean there's something wrong with my finding a flaw in what he says, even though I'm very much in sympathy with the project? Aren't we supposed to think these things through for ourselves - with the help of the commentators?
Quoting J
That sounds interesting. But I don't want to adjourn to another thread to pursue it right now. I wouldn't want to dismiss James out of hand, but for now I would like to stick to Austin. Your summary bristles with ideas that need further explanation and articulation.
Quoting Corvus
Doesn't this imply that perception of sense data or perhaps "the sensed information" is direct perception?
Quoting Corvus
That's intuitively correct. But doesn't that just mean that direct and indirect are not properties, but relations (or perhaps properties of relations)?
Quoting Corvus
I think that, together with the idea of "raw" or "unabstracted" and "certain", that is exactly what proponents of sense-data mean by direct. Whether those ideas make sense is another question.
Quoting Corvus
Yes. The meaning of "direct" and "indirect" is determined by the context. The sense-datum theorist is like someone who insists that what we call the direct flight is actually indirect because it follows a route on the journey. That's a problem.
It implies that it is indirect.
Quoting Ludwig V
Direct and indirect are just words i.e. adjectives and adverbs describing how perception worked. One can say, I can see it directly, indirectly, clearly, dimly, sharply, indubitably, lucidly, positively, distinctly, manifestly, conspicuously, translucently, unmistakably, evidently, or precisely, .... etc etc.
I had the same thought regarding Gettier, and supposed there were some connection. Austin was probably aware of Russell's stuck clock, an early Gettier problem. Doubtless Gettier had read Austin.
I agree there are many facts about perception, including scientific observations about how it works, but that wasn't my point: the point was that whether it is 'direct' or 'indirect' is a matter of looking at it from different perspectives, using different definitions of 'direct' and 'indirect'. Perhaps the terms 'mediate' and 'immediate' would be better alternatives. Phenomenologically speaking our perceptions certainly seem immediate. On the other hand. scientific analysis show perceptions to be highly mediated processes. Which is right? Well, they both are in their own ways.
I think it's more a matter of philosophers finding new and novel ways to imagine things; the "problem" only arises when the demand that there be just one "correct" way of viewing things is made.
I'm not sure where this leaves us.
I don't think the bit I bolded is right. Indeed, Austin is at pains to make the point that our perceptions are sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case. And this is one of his arguments against the sense data view that all our perceptions are indirect.
Again, it now seems to me that you have missed a rather important part of the argument against sense data.
In Sec. VI Austin is full of so much vitriol and sarcasm its hard to gather what the argument is. I had to go back to Ayer, who says "having described the [ empirical ] nature of the evidence that is ordinarily thought to be sufficient to establish [mirrors, bent sticks, and mirages]... I wish to consider what would be the position of one who, though he acknowledged the particular facts about our experiences that constitute this evidence, still chose to deny the propositions about material things that these facts are supposed to prove." (Ayer p. 17 emphasis added) And here I can imagine is where Austin goes ballistic, and rightly so. Why would anyone imagine someone who ignores evidence?
Nevertheless, Ayer postulates someone (I'll call them the philosopher) who says that, although there are facts they do not dispute, say, that we are seeing the same coin, that that "does not prove that he really is seeing the same object" (Id. Emphasis added) One reason why the philosopher might say they "really" don't see the same object is because they want to claim that each of us has our own "perception", as in: "Where we say that two observers are seeing the same material thing, he prefers to say that they are seeing different things which have, however, some structural properties in common." Even worse, Ayer here does not even try to reconcile the two positions, but simply chalks them up to "a choice of language". (Ayer p. 18) Instead of attributing that the philosopher is wrong, Ayer chooses that "it is to be inferred that he is assigning to the words a different meaning from that which we have given them." Id. This is why Austin keeps saying that Ayers philosopher can agree to the facts, but then say "whatever [they] like" Austin p. 59
I finally realized what is going on. This is Platos (projected straw-man) problem with the Sophists; he thought they believed there was nothing like knowledge except persuasion by rhetoric (of beliefs, as he framed it). Here it is the fear of that skeptical moral world transferred to our best case scenario, a physical object. Our failure even to come up with a standard for (all of) the physical world leads to the assumption that the resolution must be metaphysical, like sense-data (and not that our desire for one standard and one context is wrong). From Ayer we could say one reason is that we would like to maintain our own perspective as a fixed, given of human nature (that you and I (always) see our each coin, even though we agree they are the same). Ayer resigns himself to only be able to be sure of facts about sense-data (to thus be certain by one, fixed standard because only one type of object, without the need of any talk of context).
"Direct" and "indirect" are antonyms. The Cambridge dictionary defines "antonym" as "a word that means the opposite of another word" and provides, by way of example "two antonyms of "light" are "dark" and "heavy". The opposite of "antonym" is "synonym".
Quoting Banno Well, yes. But then, they could equally well agree to meet at the church. Always subject to the proviso there is a the context of a mutual understanding of where to meet. But in the context of a church-barn or barn-church, that understanding is harder to presuppose.
Quoting Banno I would like to think so. Though the Stanford Encyclopedia cites Alvin Goldman as the source, in 1976. But he might easily have read Austin as well.
Quoting Janus
I think that's right. It could be argued that we cannot expect "ordinary language" to be adapted to cater for this (relatively) new kind of knowledge - yet. This does seemm to open up the possibility of a technical account. However, talk of "perceptions" could easily encourage us to think of our perceptions as the end stage of a process. But they aren't pictures - or at least anything like an internal picture or model leads immediately to the question how we perceive that, and an infinite regress.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I'm inclined to attribute Ayer's approach to Cartesian scepticism, rather than to any ethical question. However that may be, it is interesting that Ayer seems to back off the radical implications of his theory by denying them; Berkeley does exactly the same thing, in his rather different way. Surely that must show some sort of unease about the theory. (I didn't find the same thing in Hume.)
I would suggest that the reason Austin goes ballistic at this point is because any possibility of successfully refuting the theory is closed if each of us can say whatever we like and deny that we were asserting the consequences. I can sympathize with that. More soberly, it at least trivializes the theory.
Quoting Janus
It is possible that more than one way of thinking about things is valid, in one way or another. But surely some sort of selection will be needed sooner or later.
As I read him, James isnt saying that the simples -- of whatever level of simplicity -- are objects of perception at all. Certainly its a question for physiologists to decide at what point something is in fact perceivable, but James (and Flanagan, who has updated a lot of James in his own accounts of consciousness) is concerned with something a bit different. His point is that a constitutive or foundational or quiddity-ish description of object X is unlikely to coincide with what we can perceive. Mind you, this is using perceive in the way I suggested, as a term for phenomenal experience. There are certainly ways you could use it that would allow for perceiving atoms, I guess, but thats hardly common. What J & F & I find interesting here is the disconnect between what is X understood as an ontological question, and what is X understood as a question about what Im perceiving. Just for funsies, I ran this by a physicist friend of mine. He didnt understand how there could even be a debate here. The fundamental entities of existence don't look anything like what we perceive with our senses, was the gist of his reaction. I think thats what James meant.
As for the question about Jupiter: We dont do either of the things youre asking about, it seems to me. We cant build up Jupiter as such, unless we know its name. What we can build up is a description of what we see, and perhaps get to an object with characteristics A, B, C... but a name isnt perceivable. Upon being told that our object is called Jupiter, we can add that info to our knowledge, and refer to it by name, but no one thinks we can see Jupiter in the same way we see a color. Otherwise, we would have known the name from the beginning. Jupiter isnt a raw feel, an element of (sorry) sense data. The analysis is the same working in the other direction, from Jupiter to the bands and patches.
Not to be repetitive, but this all seems to hinge on disambiguation of what we mean when we say things like I see Jupiter. Are we naming a sensible object, or the using the name of a sensible object? Funnily enough, in a way that Austin might well appreciate, the common man has no trouble making this distinction whenever its needed; we philosophers seem to get in a muddle about it and insist that theres only one right way to speak.
The question arises, as it invariably does: what mediates perceptions?
So pushy. :wink:
I'll get to it, soon.
I'm inclined to see, thinking of things from a variety of perspectves as a matter of ongoing epistemic necessity. I couldn't do my job, without frequently changing the conceptual framework I am using to consider things. Why would some sort of selection be necessary?
Makes sense. Thanks for elaborating.
Just want to clear this up (if I can). The method of "Ordinary Language" Philosophy is not to reduce philosophy to ordinary words (Wittgenstein uses "ordinary" words as his own technical terms all the time: criteria, grammar, sense, use, etc.). It is also not to reduce philosophy to the understanding of the person-on-the-street. Like Socrates, what Austin and Wittgenstein do (which I tried to set out once here) is to look at what people say (sort of like, the phrases they use) in certain situations, like when we say, "I know..." This evidence, or data, allows for a number of things. One is that we see that there are multiple different things going on ("knowing" is not only one thing--Wittgenstein calls these senses, or uses), and in different situations (paying attention to context, and how we expand context to clarify sometimes), but we also see how we judge differently (by criteria that show what matters about it to us), and also depending on the situation. What they sometimes do (Wittgenstein more than Austin) is take a philosophical statement and imagine one or more (even fantasy) situations to reveal what standard philosophy is using for judgment (compared to which, the criteria of their examples are termed "ordinary"--which is not really: ordinary, like the reasons we might use), and what context (if any) could the philosophical statements be placed in for them to be more intelligible (or less, as Austin is more prone to).
@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus
To attempt to clear up the direct/indirect issue, Austin's method, as I said previously, is to look at the opposite part of a dichotomy because how something fails shows us more about how it works (On Excuses is actually about action, and through that, morality.) So when he takes up "indirectly" he is looking at examples of what we say in a situation (his method), here, involving "indirect perception" (though these are not claims nor proposed alternate explanations). Those examples show that any opposite of indirectly does not have the implications (sense) or criteria (rules of judgment) that Ayer wants his "directly" to have, which are that we perceive infallibly, indisputably. Since we do not "directly" perceive, we cannot "not directly" (or "indirectly") perceive in a way that would be opposite to Ayer's fantasy of perceiving directly, say, always personal or flimsy, so ever needing justification, argument, or mutual agreement. This of course is to overlook that perception is not a thing (thus, as shown in Sec. VI that "my perception" is not a thing). True, false, right, wrong, correct, mistake, me, us, do not work this way.
Quoting Ludwig V
Austin does not dwell on or spell out the implications as much as Wittgenstein, so Austin is not very well understood because he is assuming he is talking to people who have read philosophy and will see the connections and understand the magnitude of what he is taking on (with Ayers as just a good example), which is basically every philosophy that has addressed skepticism (mind/body, moral, object) and come up with an answer (or accepted it), like metaphysics, or Kant, or positivism, etc. He is not for or against it, but is taking the whole thing apart (Wittgenstein will go to a deeper place).
Quoting Ludwig V
Now this I either have not gotten to (I am at Sec VI) or don't understand.
Nice thread. Good stuff.
Quoting Ludwig V
Hi Ludwig. Aside from this post, I'll likely not add much more. I am not attempting to disagree with anything you've said here. I just wanted to add a bit to what you wrote in response to the sentiment you're addressing above.
It does not follow from the fact that there is more than one notion of perception that all the different ones are on equal footing. It's also worth pointing out that a position, notion, or conception can be both, perfectly valid and false. Seems to me that in cases like this, we can further discriminate between the notions. As Banno and others have hinted at, the notion of perception is in dire need of being precisely put.
However, this thread is about Austin's answer to Ayer's and thus it is about that notion of perception. That would be the correct one in this situation. "Correct" in the sense that that is the one under consideration, so the others are irrelevant here.
After a little contemplation, I remember where I got this sense that something is just not right with this passage. From another linguistic philosopher, Norman Malcolm, in is book Dreaming, Chapter 18 "Do I know I am Awake", he says the following:
"'There are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking (how otherwise should we know how to use and to contrast the words?)...'(Austin, p133, "Other Minds") I thing Austin says this, not because he knows of any 'recognized ways', but because he assumes he can know he is awake and so must have some way of doing it. His question, 'How otherwise should we know how to use and to contrast the words?', assumes we do know how. This is partly right and partly wrong: we know how to use the words 'I am awake' but not the words 'I am dreaming'. To speak more exactly, we know that 'I am dream' is the first person singular present indicative of the verb 'dream', and that dreaming and waking are logical contraries, and therefore the 'I am dreaming' and 'I am awake' are logical contraries. In this sense we know how to use the sentence 'I am dreaming'. On the other hand, considerations previous mentioned bring home to us that is can never be a correct use of language to say (even to oneself) 'I am dreaming'. In this sense we do not know how to use those words."
In the book, Malcolm shows that saying something like "I am dreaming" or "I am not awake" while asleep is an absurdity because the one who utters such a sentence is demonstrating that they are not asleep. (Note: Malcolm is not saying such sentences as "Am I dreaming" or "I must be dreaming" do not have actual uses, for example, to express surprises, or question whether something is as it seems). He goes on to say that nothing counts for or against the truth of such a sentence, so nothing counts for the truth of a sentence like "I am awake". "If one cannot observe or have evidence that one is not awake, one cannot observe or have evidence that one is awake." What about observation? Could you know by observation? Well is this not a contingent fact, so if by observation you should know if you are awake or not awake. But you cannot observe yourself "not awake" because if you did, you are "not awake". Malcolm goes on to explore the possible of saying "I am awake" could correctly identify my state at the time of uttering the sentence. He says, "there are various states of oneself, each having a name. "Awake" is the name of one of them, 'fear' of another, 'drowsy' of another, and so on. When I apply 'awake' to myself I pick out one state from others having different names. In order to pick it out I must take note of it, I must see it. I think we go wrong in supposing that, when I answer 'I'm awake', I apply the word 'awake' correctly to my state at the time-although that sounds unexceptionable. For what would it mean to apply that word incorrectly to my state at the time? When we say 'I'm awake' we are not distinguishing between states. It is not a matter of 'picking out' anything. When you say 'I'm awake' you are not reporting or describing your condition. You are showing someone that you are awake. There are countless other way of doing this (one way would be to exclaim "I'm not awake'); but the conventionally correct way of doing it with words is to say 'I am awake'.
So for Malcolm, the force of the perplexity from the question 'How can I tell whether I am awake or dreaming?' get it power from two errors:
1. That dreaming and waking might be exact counterpart (qualitatively the same) comes from the confusion of "historical and dream-telling senses of first person singular psychological sentences in the past tense."
2. The idea that one must be able to know, to see, that one is awake.
Austin thinks we must be able to know how to make this determination because we are able to make this distinction in our everyday language. But Malcom tries to show that this has nothing to do with knowledge if one looks at how we use and learn these words.
Does this show that Austin drifted from the pure faith of linguistic philosophy? Or, that he may have other philosophical presuppositions hidden in his closet?
I agree, and what a good phrase. I think what you typed is very intelligent. Philosophy allows us to keep going beyond the limits of our knowledge, and it is one of the main disciplines of humankind. Yet, there will be big debates amongst all the philosophers and their theories to discern who is more right than the other. But, how could it be the nature of philosophy if we don't disagree at all? And I think this is the beautiful debate of this thread and what Austin tried to refute to Ayer humbly.
I agree. I felt the same when I read it. Furthermore, the fact that Austin seems ambiguous to me usually.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I think it is not about ignoring 'evidence', he just plays sarcastically. On page 59 he states: 'If there is here to be any question of truth or falsehood, there must be some disagreement about the nature of the empirical facts.' And the he also says: 'How could anything be a question of truth or falsehood, if anyone can always say whatever he likes? But here, of course, Ayer answers that, sometimes at least, there is real 'disagreement about the nature of the empirical facts'. But what kind of disagreement can this be?'
Ha! I think Austin is throwing a bone to Ayer, and this 'bone' consists on persuading Ayer to pick up a position: Metaphysics or Linguistics?
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yeah, and I think this is why Austin states that:'so long as we persist in regarding the issue as one concerning a matter of fact, it is impossible for us to refute him. We cannot refute him, because, as far as the facts are concerned, there is really no dispute between us...'
Yep, ambiguity kicking in again.
I actually second the notion that it is important to understand Ayers idea of perception and not bring a preconceived notion to our reading, which is a good practice with any terms (or even various senses of words, like believe). Even if, as here, when we have been given no definitions or direct explanation, there is its place in the argument, what role the term plays in relation to others, and the criteria that might be used in making judgments on its identity, application, and mechanics. We can use our imagination to create rational inferences, even with a placeholder, like here, with perception. Of course, there needs to be evidence under the scrutiny of judgment. I mean, its not like we can just make up anything.
Austin's claim seems to be devoid of good evidence or reasoning apart from the fact that it is revealing some aspect of perception from the perspective of the linguistic usages at the time when Austin was alive. I don't think the claim is a strong argument to say that Sense-Data theory is untenable. The claim seems not even relevant in opposing Sense-data theory.
Times have moved on more than a half century since "Sense and Sensibilia", and you must be aware that linguistic usage of so-called "ordinary people" changes considerably along with time.
You still have not answered the question on whether Austin was a direct realist or not. You must also realise that language is not perception. They are related, but one is not the other, and vice versa.
I don't disagree with this. But then he seems to me someone who thinks he has found firm ground to stand on, but actually has positioned himself on a marsh. That is, the idea of direct, immediate experience doesn't do what he thinks it does.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I wouldn't disagree with this either. But I'm finding that his project is more complicated than I realized. However, if we pursue those issues here, we may well find that we never get back to the main point.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I'm thinking that there is an argument in the background that is confusing people. It relates to Corvus' question Quoting Corvus
The question has a presupposition, which is in question. So it can't be answered. It's comparable to the traditional "Have you stopped beating your wife?" In this case, whether I answer yes or no, I commit to accepting that direct realism is a coherent possibility. But that's what's in question. If you accept Austin's ordinary language definition of direct and indirect perception, then he does accept that some perceptions are direct and others are not. But the meaning of "direct realism" in Ayer's text is different from that.
Ayer's official position is that all perception is indirect and dubiously realistic. The understanding of Ayer's position that I've come to in this discussion is that there is such a thing as direct perception - perception of sense-data - and the objects of this kind of perception are always real, in the sense that they are what they seem to be, but always unreal in that they are not what we would like to think they are - perceptions of "external" "objective" reality. Austin rejects that idea, not on the ground that it is false, but on the ground that it is incoherent.
Quoting Antony Nickles
"Evidence" needs to be interpreted here. It is not a matter of evidence of the kind that's appropriate to deciding whether unicorns exist or the prisoner is guilty. It is a question of the kind of evidence that is appropriate to deciding whether unicorns are possible or whether what the prisoner has done amounts to a crime.
Quoting Janus
You make us sound like SF writers. You can't mean that. But perhaps you mean new and novel ways to think (conceptualize) things. Well, some philosophers certainly do that and it can often be a good idea to break away from orthodox, traditional ways of thought. That's what Austin is trying to do here. Curiously enough, Ayer wrote (Language, Truth and Logic as exactly that. But that doesn't mean anything goes, does it?
Quoting Janus
Well, it's not a question of the (empirical) fact of the matter. That's what makes this a philosophical discussion. I have time for Quoting Janus
This does pose the question what we are to make of, how we are to understand, what we are beginning to learn from physiology and psychology about perception. I think that is a real question. But it still treats perceptions as if they were objects and as if those processes produced a final result, thus allowing Dennett to claim that consciousness is an illusion. What if perception is an activity? What if perceptions are no more objects than a magnetic field or a rainbow or an orbit or heat? BTW, none of those things are events, either.
Your statement is based on a fallacy of false dichotomy. Surely there are more perceptual theories than just the two. The question didn't presuppose anything. It could be the case that Austin had no idea on perception theories at all coming from a linguistic background.
I had the same feeling about this. Malcolm's take on dreaming has not been popular. Indeed, it has largely met the ultimate rejection - being ignored.
I would be delighted to indulge in a conversation about this, but I'm not inclined to think that he's not quite right about these cases shows that his overall argument is wrong. So I think it is off-topic.
Quoting Richard B
Coming back to it now, I'm not sure how pure the faith of linguistic philosophy ever was.
Well, at the time, sense-datum theory was a staple of philosophy and was taught to and discussed by almost all analytic philosophers. In a sense, since Austin is rejecting the terms of the question, the third alternative would involve neither rejecting not accepting them
But still, if you know of another philosophical theory of perception, perhaps you could identify it?
If Austin was not a direct realist, then it would disappoint me. Because then it implies that he didn't even have his own belief in perceptual theory, but was just after attacking Sense-data theory on the basis of shallow linguistic perspective.
That accurately sums up this thread. I would say that it is going nowhere, slowly.
If philosophers would respect the fact that there is always a medium between the thing sensed (sometimes called external), and the sensation of the individual (sometimes called internal), most of these silly problems could be avoided.
First, we could understand very clearly how there is no direct, or even indirect cause/effect relation between the thing sensed and the sensation, due to the intermediary activity of the medium. Further, we could apprehend the fact that most of the intermediary activity is the activity of a living organism, as an agent, and is therefore causal in the sense of purposeful actions. Then we could simply dismiss all these misguided problems of direct vs. indirect, and apprehend the living being as a biological agent which creates its own sensations. This would provide a much better starting point for wannabe philosophers.
Interesting. I haven't seen it in that way, but it reminds me of you a phrase on page 47, when Austin states: In that sentence Ayer uses, not indeed for the first time, the term 'perceptions' (which incidentally has never been defined or explained).
When I read it, I thought Austin was arguing that Ayer lacks of clarity on what 'perceptions' actually are, not that maybe he is missing a comprehensive concept or definition. And this also reminds me of the problem of universals and the nature of meaning. I have been reading your post carefully, and I guess - If I am not terribly lost - we both agree on the fact that Austin criticise 'direct' and 'indirect' due to the lack of sufficient linguistic background.
Did I make a good try?
Ludwig V says that Austin might not have had any idea on Perception. In that case, I am wondering on what Philosophical ground Austin was opposing Sense-data theory apart from some ordinary people's linguistic uses of 1930-1950s in England.
According to what you are saying, if Austin had any theory of perception of his own, it would have been called "sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case"-ism. It sounds too mouthful, and is empty in content.
I feel what Austin was forgetting was that perception is a subject process. Perception happens in one's mind which has no access by other minds. But he keeps stating problems on Ayer's account on Sense-data, Delusion and Illusion from 3rd point of view.
Something is only Delusion and Illusion when you know that why the perceived object is either delusion or illusion from 3rd party point of view. To the perceiver who doesn't know why the object appears as it does, but appears as it does, it is how an object appears in his mind, and that is the perception. What is described by 3rd party mind as delusion or illusion is not the perception, but explanation of why it is not real perception. In other words, to Austin the bent straw was an illusion, but someone who doesn't know why it appears as bent, the bent straw is a legitimate perception until he knows why it appears as bent, but straight when taken out from the water.
When one finds out, that what he was perceiving was an illusion or delusion, then he would know that it was an illusion, but before that it was a perception. Therefore perception is not just seeing something, identifying an object as something, and the end. But it goes on to further mental certification and judgement process of confirmation, correction and reconfirmation.
Yes, it is very interesting, indeed. I agree with your post entirely, and it is well written and explained. In addition to your point, I feel that analysis on Delusion and Illusion by Austin has not been appreciated in the debate of this thread, because the core seems to be whether this author embraces realism or not, or why 'direct' and 'indirect' debate is too twisted amongst the philosophers themselves. Also, the confrontation of 'perceive' and the 'perceiver', etc.
Austin is not talking about the words awake, and dreaming: what their explanations or definitions are, how to use them in a sentence (or gather the science of sleep). Austin is pointing out that we, our society, have ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking (and, lets presume, being awake). They come with their own means of judgmenttheir criteria, that are reflected in what we say at those times (in examples of the type of things we say when we are trying to differentiate between the two).
He is not saying that our judgment in this leads to the same level of knowledgewith foundation and certaintyas Descartes wants for the self. However, we do distinguish between the two, say, when we experience something surprising and someone comes in the room and, when told, they ask were you dreaming? Or, when I go to tell someone about a surprising thing and they tell me I was just asleep and must have dreamt it, and I say, But it was sooo real!. One insight is that we only report dreams past tense, afterwards (most of us). These are evidence (examples) only of the rational ways these cases (events) can be decidedyou are the judge of them yourself: are these rational criteria for the use of distinguishing between dreaming and being awake in these particular situations? No? well if you wanted you could probably come up with some expressions that might satisfy your reservations, which would prove their rationality, and maybe teach me something important about the world (the rationality of say, seeing, or thinking). The fact that ways to distinguish are possible is proof of Austins claim. Descartes was trying to pull the same stunt in setting the goal before investigating the field. In Other Minds, here, it is that whether something is real or not, always has to have a suspicion it is a phony, abnormal.
It is a fantasy-world question, dreamed up by Ayers desire to have fixed, certain (direct) access to the world, even if he has to make up the terms, like sense-data, so something can be real (which is the singular standard which sets up this whole kind of answer from the startold as Plato).
Quoting Ludwig V
He is not talking about perception, he is discussing indirect and direct (here as they relate to seeing, reflecting, etc.); he accepts none of that. I must be a terrible writer.
Quoting Ludwig V
We want so desperately to have something certain (objective) that we even set it off the table (in that they are not what we would like to think) but go through somersaults to keep it as the standard. (Kant anyone?) I havent seen anything that would make me think Austin would concede that it was not false. His use of it should be qualified with Im just using this term to try to figure out what Ayer might mean by it. No luck so far.
Quoting Ludwig V
The point is that there is not one kind of evidence (direct or not; real or not). There are different kinds of evidence for each thing, for what counts as evidence of dreaming, or being awake, or seeing something. Now it is true that these will be different kinds of evidence, but just depending on the thing. Evidence does not need to be shoe-horned into the standard of objective too. Part of what Ayers has done is imagine the world as unintelligible, a scene of competing wills, with nothing true, because of his prerequisite.
What is the medium?
I'm afraid it is me that is the terrible writer. I should not have allowed myself to use that term, though I meant by it no more than seeing/hearing/....
Quoting Antony Nickles
Certainly. I should have put the point in a different way to make that plain.
Quoting Antony Nickles
There's another tricky word. I'm only gesturing at the point that what's in question is not "ordinary", contingent falsity, but something more radical, in that Ayer uses "direct" and "indirect" in an incoherent way.
Quoting Corvus
I'm glad you found a way of understanding what I was trying to say. Quoting Corvus is indeed a mouthful. I would still resist calling that a theory and I would have included the proviso "if you accept his use (I don't say definition) of "direct" and "indirect"." Part of the issue is whether Ayer's use of those terms is coherent.
Not sure about James, but I think Dewey would say that context is all important, and the tendency to ignore it, which is to say to treat perception as a philosophical issue, is at the bottom of most of the so-called problems of the external world, other minds, mind body dualism, appearance versus reality, etc.
In fact, in most cases we don't bother to think about what we see or sense generally, simply because questions don't arise that can't be addressed adequately by "common sense" as it were, except in special circumstances. Very few are unable to distinguish between dreaming and what takes place when we're awake, for example. Nobody would think a stick in a glass of water is "bent." It doesn't occur to us even to focus on the cup we use to drink let alone wonder if we see it or something else.
What philosophers have done is, in a sense, unnatural, by which I mean disregarding how we actually live and treating our experience as made up of isolated instances to be subjected to analysis as if they are separate, but then, perversely as it were, extrapolating from them general conclusions to apply in all cases.
There, I said it. Philosophy is unnatural and perverse. Must do a thread on that.
I agree here, but the radical nature of it is not that Ayer is incoherent; he was chosen because of his putting the case as well as one can. Austin is going after the desire for classic analytical philosophy to need a certain standard or certain knowledge, without context. The wish for that is a fear of any chance of error, instead of seeing that our practices are rational and any errors have means of resolution, even when that is only rational disagreement (in the moral or political realm). Our fears and desires are isolating us as the only way to maintain something certain (by pulling back from the world); but we dont need everything to meet the criteria of certainty.
That people have made up their mind, or had made it up before we began), without even understanding what Austin is saying, much less why he is saying it, is proof of the point he is trying to make. Ayer (Plato) makes it look like he is investigating our relation to the world, but before starting had a standard already decided for the answer, thus the need for the wacky picture.
Is anyone going to do a reading of VII? Or are we not done with VI.
This looks very plausible. It also looks to me that you might have been reading Cavell?
Quoting Antony Nickles
As a final flourish, I would like to point out that this have been the point where Austin makes good on his comment that we are told to take it easy "really it's just what we've all believed all along. (There's the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it back.)" (Lecture 1 page 2) This makes it much harder to understand what the doctrine amounts to.
VII looks most interesting. I'm looking forward to what people make of it.
Indeed.
In order to fully understand any position, the student must first grant some of it, at least. "The mark of an educated mind" and all that. Does Austin target Ayer's notion of "perception"? Did Ayer reply?
Hard to talk about something if there is nothing in the mind of the speaker. Before we began using terms like "perception", in order to pick stuff out of the world to the exclusion of all else, there was something to be named. Anything else is a complete fabrication of the mind.
Not all perception uses tools. If it is the case that all perception is indirect, and it is also the case that not all perception uses tools(Ayer knew this too!) then Ayer's notion of "perception" remains undisturbed by the comparison to optical tools such as telescopes/microscopes. That counts as indirect as well.
He means something different. He's drawing correlations between something other than optical tools.
I find that criticism toothless.
Understanding what one possibly means, what they're talking about, or what they're picking out to the exclusion of all else when they utter "direct perception" or "indirect perception" is just a matter of looking at definitions and/or the way their using the words. With that much I'll readily agree.
But...
Whether "it" is direct or not is to question whether all perception is direct or not.
If it began happening long before we began thinking about it, then we're attempting to take account of something that existed in its entirety prior to our noticing it. If our notion of perception cannot admit this or dovetail with it, then it is wrong.
If all perception includes our thinking about it, then it would follow that only creatures capable of thinking about their own perception are capable of perceptions. We use language to acquire knowledge of that which preceded it. Such metacognitive endeavors emerge via language use replete with naming and descriptive practices. We have ancestors that were once in the cat's stage...
Cats perceive mice despite having no idea what the term "mice" is. No notion of "perception" necessary for that to happen either. Our acquiring knowledge of that much is another matter altogether.
Not all notions of perception are on equal footing.
Sorry for the interruption folks. :yikes:
Quoting creativesoul
I agree. But the following example is needed to take into account: Quoting creativesoul
Well, cats don't know the term 'mice' because this is a human concept of our vocabulary. Cats express themselves using the sound: 'Meow' and maybe when a cat goes with that sound, it is referring to mice as well. And, I do not understand why you claim that no notion of 'perception' is required when the animal kingdom is partially based on this. A cat goes to catch a mouse because it was perceived, they do not act randomly. So, I guess that a cat is aware of what 'mice' means in its animal mind.
Thanks, but the bit you replied to ought not be further expounded or explicated. It's far too tangent.
Oh yeah thats probably a straight ripoff. I wouldnt normally bring in these kinds of larger implications/conclusions except I dont seem to be getting any headway in understanding by keeping my cards covered as Austin does (to the point people only think it matters to words).
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yep.
The point concerning direct and indirect has been made by others, myself included. Some ground is infertile. Ideas will not grow there. Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes, there may have been too much presumption on our part that folk had an idea of what Logical Positivism entailed. Ideas of sense data and maybe also of emotivism are perhaps engrained in the thinking of our engineers, without their realising whence they came. But in addition there seems to be a dislike of critique generally. I don't find Austin's style sarcastic so much as droll.
Anyway, nice to see a bit of discussion being kicked up by the thread. It's already much longer than I expected it to be.
Austin's English and writing style is very clear, so there is little possibility for misunderstanding what he was saying. And all the points we have been discussing in the threads are also clear. I have given out my arguments against yours. You just need to give out yours.
Cavell's idea is very interesting and it would be nice to see how it could be developed into a real part of philosophy - digging deeper into the reasons why scepticism or sense-data seem to be able to recover from refutation and sprout afresh. Rejoining philosophy after being out of touch for so long, it does seem plausible to suppose that some ideas arise from enduring tendencies in human thought, which are not based on the arguments. I didn't find his gestures towards Phenomenology convincing - and it seems that phenomenologists didn't either.
The reason you propose in this case makes sense to me. But I don't think it applies to, for example, Berkeley.
I have not read Malcolm's book, but have heard of it. From what I understand his emphasis was on the observation that our discussions of dreaming are post-hoc; they take place after the fact, while we are awake; and that this led him to supose that dreams are not experiences at all. If that is the case he can hardly be cited as arguing that there is no qualitative difference between dreaming and lucidity. If anything it seems he doubles down on Austin's approach.
Quoting Richard B
But "I am dreaming" has a use for those who have lucid dreams. The central critique aimed at Malcolm's account is, as I understand it, that he insists that dreams occur (at least in their quintessential form) when one is soundly asleep, a definition not accepted by others, especially dream researchers.
What is most interesting here might be the potential for a distinction between Malcolm, a student of Wittgenstein, and Austin, that might shed light on their relative differences. Good topic.
What you say confuses me, because it doesn't seem to fit at all with what I understood Malcolm to be arguing. Malcolm's thesis is regarded as outrageous because he denies that people have experiences while they are asleep. The core of the argument is that to be asleep is to be unconscious, but to experience something is to be conscious, so the common sense of dreaming is self-contradictory.
The only facts of the matter are 1) that young children sometimes wake up convinced of impossibilities and have to be taught that they were dreams and 2) that people often wake up telling stories that seem to them (at the time they are telling the stories) to have happened to them while they were asleep. That impression - that things happened to them while they were asleep - is not evidence that anything did happen to them while they were asleep. On the contrary, the evidence is that nothing happened to them while they were asleep.
I wouldn't want to opine on the opinions of dream researchers. But I am under the impression that much of their data is gathered by observing people while they are asleep (and not talking) and, from time to time, waking them up to see whether they have anything to tell. Which is not evidence that they are experiencing anything while asleep - even though they may think it is.
I think this argument is good. It's weakness is the identification of sleep with unconsciousness. I don't think it is obvious even to common sense that sleep is the same thing as unconsciousness. There is a good deal of common sense observation which suggests that a sleeper can be, to some extent, conscious while asleep - and sleep research has a good deal to say about this. That opens up the possibility of reconciling, to some extent at least, common sense with this argument.
Yes, Ayer wants to use it as a basis for certainty on questions empirical, and it simply will not bear that weight.
Thanks for bringing in some more background on Ayer. I've misplaced my copy of Metaphysical Animals, but recall a discussion in there about how Ayer was popular amongst the young men of the mid thirties, who were fond of saying to the dons that they "didn't understand" them - a product of Language, Truth, and Logic. The pendulum, set in motion by Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, had swung too far with the Vienna Circle and its consequences. The forties brought a deep re-thinking of the way philosophy was being done, that superficially looked like an overemphasis on language.
Yes, I agree that this is his account - forgive my previous poor phrasing.
Quoting Ludwig V
There is, as you point out, also REM and other evidence that show a great deal of activity during sleep. It looks as if something is happening. That seems to be why Malcolm's ideas are discounted.
Consciousness is ubiquitously taken as granted, much too little attention being paid to what we mean in using the term. Malcolm's contribution here is to be applauded.
All processes are mediated or mediate. Perception can be validly understood as a process.
Quoting Ludwig V
Different ways of thinking may be selected as valid depending on context.
Quoting javi2541997
The problem I see is that there is no clear wsy of determining which philosphical theory is more right.
Quoting Ludwig V
Anything that has no intelectual appeal to virtually anyone will not "go" to be sure. I don't see the 'sense data' theory of perception as being in that category. So I see it as being misleading to say, for example, that Austin has definitively refuted the afore-mentioned theory.
Quoting Ludwig V
I agree that perception is not an object, but it can be understood as a process or, phenomenologically, as an immediate presencing.
Magnetic fields, rainbows etc., can be understood as phenomena if not as objects, as processes if not events.
Perception could also be thought of as an activity, but is that not just another word for 'process' with perhaps an implication of agency thrown in?
Anyway, happy for others to move on, if you want to do VII. Small steps, and my notes are mainly for me.
Generally speaking, the nervous system.
I dont mind someone else taking the lead either, as I tire of beating my head against the wall and talking to myself.
That's the natural state of those with our inclinations.
Im not so sure. I cannot see the difference between the body and a bodily process. When I point to either, or both, I am pointing at the same thing. I dont know how to distinguish between the thing that moves and the movements it makes, as if I was distinguishing between the morning and the evening star.
The nervous system is not a medium, though, because it is a part of that which sensesthe perceivernot that which the perceiver senses. I guess my next question is: where does the perceiver begin and end? I doubt appealing to biology can furnish an answer in favor of the indirectness of perception. Sound waves, for example, where the medium is air, contacts the sensitive biology of the ear directly, not indirectly.
Your question is made irrelevant by the conditions I described. The two described conditions are things perceived, and the perceptions. The perceiver therefore is the medium. There is no need to discuss a beginning and end to the perceiver unless we make the medium, i.e. the perceiver, our subject. But if the medium, perceiver, is made to be the subject of our inquiry, then the thing perceived and the perception are incidental to the inquiry, and the silliness of this thread is avoided.
I dont think it can be established that a perceiver is both perceiver and perceived. I suspect that, given the indirectness theory, that you would say we perceive our nervous systems, and not the sound waves in air. Is this so?
This is a bridging lecture. Up until now Austin has been addressing the argument from illusion. After this lecture Austin moves on to discussing "real" and realism. This is the bit in between, consisting of a bit of summation and a bit of anticipation.
It's I think no more scathing than the previous chapters, in which Ayer's argument is subject to a close vivisection. Austin invokes, again, Ayer's framing of the issue, the presumption that we must either perceive material objects or we perceive sense data, puzzling over Ayer's motivation, and concluding that Ayer began with the view that we only ever see "sense data", the "sensible manifold". On this account the argument from illusion is secondary, a post-hoc justification.
That's all.
So you don't think that people can perceive themselves - be self-aware?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see how one can separate three things, perceiver, perceived and perception. They are clearly interdependent, by definition.
Quoting NOS4A2
Yes, I think this is the way that your analysis has to go. But I don't think that it encourages us to believe that this approach is useful.
Quoting Janus
That doesn't mean that there is no way of determining which theory is more right, or less wrong.
Quoting Janus
You have put your finger on the way to determine which theory is more right or less wrong. Now, how does one establish whether a theory has any intellectual appeal? By argument, perhaps?
Quoting Banno
In conversations, I found a reluctance to take scientific research on board. The problem here is partly that being a scientist does not make one immune from philosophical mistakes. What makes it even more difficult is that the distinction between ordinary language and science is distinctly permeable. REM is in some ways a technical, theoretical concept, but in others is a common sense observation.
But I don't see that the research can prove that the subject is experiencing something (in the required sense of experience) without also proving that the subject is also conscious. So we need to stop thinking of consciousness as binary. This is not contrary to common sense - half-asleep, half awake.
Research evidence does show a great deal of activity during sleep, and, by the same token, shows that sleepers are not in a normal state of consciousness.
Dreams do not fall foul of the Private Language Argument, since they are reported in ordinary language. But they make no sense unless sleep is not the same as unconsciousness.
There's room for an interesting speculation about why so many philosophers have been so resistant to even considering the philosophical implications of dreaming that they ignore these arguments.
Quoting Banno
I have no problem with that and I think that Malcolm (and the very few sympathizers) are wrong to assume/suggest that nothing is going on. But that just emphasizes the question what is going on in dreaming?
But still, something is going on in sleeping bodies. Why not say they are dreaming?
VII
@Corvus Fortunately, Austin comes back to hallucination and this chapter is worth reading and enjoying.
In this chapter, Austin wants to dive into the word 'real' more deeply, and according to him, we can set the word'real' in two categories: A normal or basic word used by ordinary people that is already established in our communicative behaviour - this is why he states: Certainly, when we have discovered how a word is in fact used, that may not be the end of the matter; there is certainly no reason why, in general, things should be left exactly as we find them;
And then, an extraordinary word, whose sense is often used by philosophers. It is interesting to highlight that Austin describes the word 'real' as 'substantive-hungry'. Thus, a word that is needed for substantives, to have a definite sense, to get any foothold.
On the other hand, it is important to notice that Austin admits that a question like 'what is real or not' not always comes up. He states that we only question this when the things may be not what they seem. I agree with this. Don't you, folks?
Keeping on the track, Austin says that 'real' 'nor does it have a large number of different meanings-it is not ambiguous. ' I just don't understand why he says this. Now, he is the one who is ambiguous here. These folks... Always with the same complex philosophical arguments...
------------------------------
Austin also states that 'real' is a trouser-word. That is, a definite sense attaches to the assertion that something is real, a real such-and-such, only in the light of a specific way in which it might be, or might have been, not real. 'A real duck' differs from the simple 'a duck' only in that it is used to exclude various ways of being not a real duck-but a dummy, a toy, a picture, a decoy, etc.
I agree, and I don't have anything against his statement.
'Real' is also a dimension-word (like 'good' Austin affirms). It is an easily comprehensive term in a whole group of words of the same kind. Austin claims that 'real' is more understandable among the people than 'proper' 'genuine', 'true' 'authentic', etc. He also states in a linguistic point of view that: how does the distinction between real cream and synthetic cream differ from the distinction between pure cream and adulterated cream? Is it just that adulterated cream still is, after all, cream?
A lot of questions like these arise, and Austin claims that he shall not go into.
Lastly, 'real' is an adjuster-word. Austin says that it is adjusted to meet 'innumerable' demands of language. He also accepts that vocabulary is finite and we - sometimes - face new things that are unknown to us. An adjust-word helps us to fit the 'new' idea in the vocabulary we have already known. Austin uses a good example: We have the word 'pig', for instance, and a pretty clear idea which animals, among those that we fairly commonly encounter, are and are not to be so called. But one day we come across a new kind of animal, which looks and behaves very much as pigs do, but not quite as pigs do; it is somehow different. But what we could do, and probably would do first of all, is to say, 'It's like a pig. ' ('Like' is the great adjuster-word)
But it is not a 'real' pig... So what is it then? Well, I think Austin claims an eclectic point of view and says: We have, after all, other flexibility-devices. For instance, I might say that animals of this new species are 'piggish'; I might perhaps call them 'quasi-pigs', or describe them (in the style of vendors of peculiar wines) as 'pig-type' creatures.
Again, these 'dilemmas' don't usually come up in our ordinary language. Then, Austin concludes that is not very worthy to make a distinction between 'real X' and 'not real X', and we are not even able to draw it...
Cheers. I hope I made a good effort after all.
I guess you would like the following quote from Austin:
Great points. Thanks for your effort. :up: :cool:
Yes, I think when Austin goes on explaining about the usage of word "Real", even he was aware that our perception was not 100% immune from infallibility. There could be cases of illusion, hallucination, delusion, and confronting with the bogus objects which look like certain objects, but found out to be bogus, lookalikes, mistaken identities etc. Hence the contents of perception require further judgements of its "authenticity" to have assurance as legitimate knowledge. The word "Real" is a qualifier to mean that what was perceived is fit for authentic knowledge of our perception among the other uses of the word.
I didn't say that. I said that the perceiver (in general) is the medium between the perception and the perceived.
Quoting NOS4A2
No, I would not say that. The nervous system, as medium is neither the perception nor the perceived.
Quoting Ludwig V
I think a thorough analysis would show that the three are not properly "interdependent". A "perceiver" is necessarily prior to, as logically required for, both "perceived" and "perception", but it is not necessary that a perceiver is actively engaged in that act which involves a perception and a perceived. This puts "perceiver" into a different category, and independent from both those two. "Perceiver" does not necessarily imply the existence of a "perception" or a "perceived", as the perceiver is not necessarily engaged in that activity referred to by the name. This point is very important to Aristotle's biology, as it is the reason why all the capacities, or powers, of living beings are described as potentials, potencies, rather than as actualities. The reality of this fact implies that we must turn to terms other than "perceived" and "perception" to understand "perceiver".
It is neither the perceived, nor the perception, or even a combination of both, which can provide the defining features of the perceiver because the perceiver exists independently of these. As "perceived" and "perception" become incidental to the perceiver in this way, and not necessary to "perceiver", we must turn in another direction, toward what "perceiver" is dependent upon in order to understand the perceiver.
That's why i said threads like this which focus on the question of a direct or indirect relation between perceived and perception are fundamentally misguided. The relation cannot be understood without first developing an adequate understanding of the perceiver, and this requires turning away from the act of perceiving, towards whatever it is which provides the power or capacity for that act.
So, if we start with a proposition which states the nature of the perceiver, then the relation between perceived and perception will follow from this necessarily, as implied by that proposition, without question. And, as explained above, if we want to understand the nature of the perceiver we must turn to principles other than the relation between perceived and perception. Therefore discussions about the relation between perceived and perception are completely unnecessary, leading nowhere, and they will go on endlessly when this is the subject of discussion rather than the nature of the perceiver.
You certainly did, and a very welcome one, too. Thank you.
But could I add that his little disquisition about ordinary language philosophy deserves some attention too. However, I would like to put this issue into the context of Aristotle's method. Since he had a strong background in Ancient Greek (and, no doubt, Latin), Austin must have been familiar with Aristotle. Aristotle was a great respecter (especially in the context of ethics) of his tradition, often under the label of "what people say". He uses that as a reference point, not a referee, so he is happy to amend and adjust that as appropriate in what he is discovering by his attention to how the world actually is - a sort of empiricism, in marked contrast to Plato.
Since I'm lazy, here a quotation from pp. 62 - 64:-
" 'Real' is an absolutely normal word, with nothing new-fangled or technical or highly specialized about it. It is, that is to say, already firmly established in, and very frequently used in, the ordinary language we all use every day. Thus in this sense it is a word which has a fixed meaning, and so can't, any more than can any other word which is firmly established, be fooled around with ad lib. Philosophers often seem to think that they can just 'assign' any meaning whatever to any word; and so no doubt, in an absolutely trivial sense, they can (like Humpty-Dumpty).
Certainly, when we have discovered how a word is in fact used, that may not be the end of the matter; there is certainly no reason why, in general, things should be left exactly as we find them; we may wish to tidy the situation up a bit, revise the map here and there, draw the boundaries and distinctions rather differently. But still, it is advisable always to bear in mind
(a) that the distinctions embodied in our vast and, for the most part, relatively ancient stock of ordinary words are neither few nor always very obvious, and almost never just arbitrary;
(b) that in any case, before indulging in any tampering on our own account, we need to find out what it is that we have to deal with; and
(c) that tampering with words in what we take to be one little corner of the field is always liable to have unforeseen repercussions in the adjoining territory. Tampering, in fact, is not so easy as is often supposed, is not justified or needed so often as is often supposed, and is often thought to be necessary just because what we've got already has been misrepresented."
The reference to Humpty-Dumpty is presumably a swipe at Ayer & co.
I wouldn't be surprised if he (or they) got the idea from Aristotle. At least, far from being a revolution, it seems that it has a reasonably respectable ancestry. But, of course, a revolution is so much more dramatic than a tradition..
Quoting javi2541997
You could say that it has a different meaning for each substantive it gets attached to. But what Austin is emphasizing is that it does the same job, i.e. has the same use, when attached to the substantives it gets attached to. One could quarrel with that, but there's no clear principle of individuation attached to either meanings or uses, so we can allow different applications of those terms.
Quoting javi2541997
If that's what he means to say, it is indeed hard to understand. I think he is not saying that but saying that "real" is an umbrella or basket for all those other terms. Perhaps more like the head of the family.
I don't think we are very far apart, though I need to enter a caveat that "perceive" covers a range of activities. After this discussion, we have to be a little cautious using that term.
I was using "interdependent" as a flexible term to cover the different relationships between those elements. So, yes, a perceiver is not just a perceiver but has an independent existence as, say, a creature with the capacity to perceive, not just a particular perception, but a whole range of different perceptions. But surely, the perceiver is only a perceiver as capable of exercising that capacity, just as parents are only parents in relation to their children, even though they are many other things that do not require any such relationship. If they don't have children, they are not parents.
And, yes, to understand that capacity we have to understand that creature, not only when perceiving this perception, but many different perceptions but also as capable of, and performing, many other actions as well. But surely, understanding the capacity requires also understanding the exercise of it?
Thank you for your kind words. I appreciate it.
Quoting Ludwig V
I agree.
Quoting Ludwig V
I fully agree with you in this sense, and it reminds me of Steven Pinker and his book: 'Words and Rules. The ingredients of Language'. For example, when children learn basic 'stuff' or knowledge, they do not mimic sentences or words like parrots. First, they try to make sense of what they perceive, and this is thanks to language. It is not arbitrary, as you said.
Quoting Ludwig V
Ah, OK. Now I can see more clear what Austin holds in his theory.
Quoting Ludwig V
I think he actually meant that 'real' is a concept which fits better in the understanding of people rather than others, which shares the same 'substantive-hungry' claim. I don't think it is an umbrella or basket for the rest of the words with the same 'root', but the one we tend to pick before the others. That's why he named it as 'dimension-word' because 'real' - as a term - can fill up our demands better than 'proper' or 'true'. Nevertheless, although this point of Austin is very interesting, he decided not to go deeply into it...
Thanks, mate. :up:
Quoting Corvus
Exactly. But it is interesting to point out that, according to Austin, this matter doesn't usually come up in our ordinary daily life, but only when things may not be what they seem to be. Thus, I think he refers to that most of us already give for granted many truths (or real facts, like the example of the 'pig'), and only when we debate - like we are doing right now - those questions flourish.
I suggest that Austin does not allow himself to be seduced by the cartesian sceptical argument into pursuing some perfectly assured certainty, which in the end destroys so much, but to notice that when things go wrong, there are ways of coping. Somewhat as, when you drive down a road, you have no assurance that the unexpected will not happen. But you are confident that you can deal with such incidents as and when they occur. That's particularly clear in his fourth point, that real is an adjuster word.
You also said that the nervous system was the medium. So if both perceiver and nervous systems (in general) is the medium, then Im left to assume nervous systems are perceivers in your view. They perceive and are also mediums. But I just dont know how that can be possible, because much more than a nervous system is required for the act of perceiving.
Humans and other animals perceive, and are therefor perceivers. This is what I mean when I use the term perceiver: a thing that perceives. It can be said these things perceive. The same cannot be said of nervous systems.
As for your positioning of perceiver, perceptions, and mediums, its too odd for me to think about because it implies the perception (whatever that is) is somewhere outside or behind the perceiver.
For Ayers, the hallmark of indirect realism is divergence between the world as experienced by a human, and the world as it is. If there's a difference, it's indirect realism. Ayers says that since one's experience is a representation from a certain point of view, requiring interpretation for usefulness, there is divergence.
For Austin, if human experience lines up correctly with what one would expect from a certain POV, and therefore requiring interpretation, then directness and indirectness are valueless descriptions.
I think Ayers' view works, although he doesn't really prove anything. He starts out assuming indirect realism and concludes indirect realism. Austin's view might be valuable for someone who thinks all indirect realism requires a homunculus.
What do you mean here that it can be said for animals but not nervous systems?
It cannot be said that a nervous system can perceive because perception involves more than nervous systems. For instance, in humans, lungs, a heart, bones, muscles, skin etc. are involved in the act.
I see. I think I understand what you mean. It seems rather arbitrary though: where does the extension end? At the actual physical objects we perceive?
I think these details are important because no one mentions these components of perception, as far as I know. Which extension do you mean?
This is an argument I have made use of many times. I have several times used this quote from Austin's Other minds:
An example of it's use, in a conversation with @T Clark
Quoting Banno
And here again, from three years ago:
Quoting Banno
So in outline, Ayer was looking for certainty, and in the process misused and muddled the terms and concepts he was working with. Austin's approach, along with others involved in the "linguistic turn", is to look for clarity over certainty.
The arguments in Lecture VII contrast these difference in approaches.
In addition to what has said, I'd like to emphasises the method that Austin explicates on p. 63.
Words already have uses. Elsewhere Austin says
There's an evolutionary point here, that the natural language we use is the result of adaptation over a very long period of time, with the result that it is particularly well suited to doing the sorts of things we do with words.
Notice also that Austin is explicitly not saying that we ought only use words as they are used in everyday contexts (a common criticism from those who have not read Austin). By all means, adapt and invent for new contexts, but do this with care, and with an eye to the existing distinctions and nuance.
Austin also makes the point that changes in the way words are used in one area may have unexpected repercussions in another. Hence it is best to consider widely the context in which they are embedded.
Oh, and for subsequent use, it is worth noting the last point in the lecture, that it is worth making a distinction only if there is a way of telling the difference between what has been distinguished.
I was alluding to something along the lines of the extended mind idea.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_mind_thesis
Quoting Banno
Interesting. A worth reading, and I didn't know about that work of Austin's, which looks more 'metaphysical' than 'sense and sensibilia.'
Quoting Banno
Yes. When I read chapter VII I came to this conclusion as well, and this is why - I guess - he states that some words such as 'real' or 'good' are adjusted-words because they respond to innumerable needs from people on ordinary days. I mean, I agree with him that we tend to use 'real' with more confidence (the glass on the table is real! Instead of using 'proper' or 'reliable') and 'good' (the conversation in this thread is good. I think nobody would use 'sublime' here, for instance)
Quoting Banno
And he also states that 'a distinction which we are not in fact able to draw... is not worth making.' It seems to me that he didn't want to dive in the pure distinction between real and not real.
I would oppose any such view, personally.
Thanks very much for these posts. They were very helpful to me.
A good text, or a good writer, always has more than you think. It's curious how at one level, we understand what the metaphor is getting at (roughly). But on a second look, doubts creep in - and then doubts about the doubts. Perhaps we have to understand what he means by seeing what his practice is. Is this faute de mieux or what really counts?
Quoting Banno
Yes, I think Hume identifies the same problem in relation to the argument from design. Only he calls it "augmentation". I think it's a very important point. I must try to find the reference.
Quoting Banno
Yes. That is clear enough in this context. I agree also that the detail of the pursuit of clarity becomes more complicated when we push beyond the outline. Ayer surely has views about clarity and certainty.
(I don't want to be obstructive here. I think Austin achieves his goal. I just want to be wary of "augmentation".)
I didn't know about this. I'll have to look at it carefully. It addresses some important considerations. However, I'm a bit suspicious of any attempt to locate "the mind" at all. It would be absurd not to acknowledge that I am located in space and time. But It is not obvious that the mind, as such, can be located in the same way, any more than numbers can.
Quoting frank
This would be one way of understanding the debate between them. But you are giving too much to Ayer and so missing the point of Austin's argument.
To put it this way, the phenomena here are more complicated that the straightforward distinction between experience and reality can deal with.
Let me try to come at it this way.
1. When Macbeth sees a dagger (i.e. there is a actual, real dagger that he sees), Austin would say that he sees the dagger directly.
2. But that only makes sense if we think of indirect ways in which he might see that dagger, such as via a mirror. In those cases, it makes sense to explain that what he sees (directly) is an image of the dagger and so, in a sense, is inferring that the dagger is there or is interpreting the image as an image of a dagger. Note that the relationship between an image of a dagger is quite hard to describe, but is not at all like the relationship between one dagger and another or the relationship between a dagger and its scabbard.
3. But in the play, there is no dagger, and no image of a dagger. We need to say that he does not see a dagger at all. And yet, he is behaving as if he sees a dagger, and he clearly believes he is seeing a dagger. What are we to say? Well, there is a word that covers this situation - "hallucination". But a hallucination of a dagger is not a real dagger and not a (real) image of a dagger. What, exactly, is a hallucination?
Ayer wants to say that Macbeth sees a dagger-like sense-datum and then wants to argue that what Macbeth actually sees (directly sees) in all three cases is a dagger-like sense-datum. He wants to sweep away the differences between these three cases into the same formula. I think he could justify saying the sense-datum is always what we see "directly". But then, he is extending "direct" and "indirect" and using them in a new context, so he has changed their meanings.
So you could say that they are talking past each other.
Ayer suggests is that to talk of sense-data is just an alternative way of representing the facts. Austin wants to argue is that this amounts to "anything goes" and compares Ayer to Humpty-Dumpty. He also suggests that Ayer doesn't really believe that the choice between the two ways of talking is indifferent.
I would say that the problem is that Ayer's way of talking buries the real differences between the cases.
For the record, to say that someone is hallucinating a dagger is to say that they are behaving as if there is a dagger and believes that there is a dagger when there is no dagger. No more than that. You can call that seeing a dagger or an image of a dagger, if you like, but I think that's just confusing. When people draw the conclusion that we never really see or know reality or that reality is nothing like what we think it is, it becomes absurd.
The two or not quite analogous. Perception is a capacity, as you say, the perceiver is "capable of exercising that capacity". So it is a special type of activity which may be produced. The ability to perform that special activity is what defines "the perceiver". This does not logically require that the perceiver has actually carried out that specific activity yet, as is required with "parent".
The difference, may not seem important at this point, and you will find some philosophers pushing in the other direction, like Wittgenstein, who would define having the ability to 'follow a rule' as someone who has been observed to have followed a specified rule, rather than as someone who has the capacity to follow that rule. But you will see that this sort of mistake (misdirection, or misguided way of looking at such activities) leads to a very serious problem. He then has the problem of trying to figure out at what point the ability to follow the rule comes into existence. Is it after demonstrating the correct action once, twice, or whatever? Furthermore, since the capacity which is understood by 'following a rule' must, from this perspective, come into existence at some point in time, Wittgenstein is faced with the question of what type of capacity exists prior to this. Then each such capacity would be defined by having demonstrated a fulfillment of the required actions, and there would always be a further capacity prior to each action, leading to an infinite regress of capacities prior to the first action, which could not be described as the capacity to perform that observed action.
So Aristotle neatly avoided this problem of infinite regress of potential by defining the potential, or capacity for a specific type of activity as being prior to the activity, in a more absolute sense. From this perspective, the capacity to perceive, what we are calling "the perceiver", must necessarily preexist the act which is implied here by the name, as the act of perception. We must therefore forfeit our empirically based principles to make the understanding of capacities possible. Empiricism infiltrates our thoughts in an attempt to simplify, but it really corrupts our capacity to understand. This corruption of the capacity inclines us to assume that the existence of a "perceiver" requires that an act of perception has already occurred, and such an epistemology leads us to an infinite regress of capacities, rendering these capacities as unintelligible to us. Instead, we must accept the obvious, much more highly, and truly intuitive principle, that the capacity to perceive, which defines "the perceiver" must be prior in time to any act of perception. From here we have a much more realistic way of understanding the relation between the perceived and the perception.
Quoting Ludwig V
So, as outlined above, I would answer "no" to this question. The capacity preexists the exercising of it, therefore analysis of the exercising of it will not provide an adequate understanding. The implied infinite regress will produce infinite discussion, like in this thread. But, as Aristotle showed, any capacity relies on a prior actuality. So understanding the capacity requires understanding the prior actuality which the capacity is based in. This is due to the nature of existence and the passing of time. "Capacity" implies a number of possibilities, while exercising the capacity produces one actuality. The act, which produces one from many, which is exercising the capacity, is not a necessary act, as understood by the concept of free will. It is an act of selecting from possibilities. So the specific act, a specified capacity, must be understood as part of a more general capacity, not by understanding the specific act itself.
Quoting NOS4A2
Correct, that's why I was careful to begin my discussion of the medium with the qualification "in general". We could start with the eye, or the nose, as the medium for those specific senses. Then we would say that nervous system is the medium for all the senses, "in general". But then you start talking about "the perceiver", and we move to an even more general sense of "the medium" because we see the need to include all the aspects of the living being which support the nervous system, as also required, and therefore part of "the medium".
Quoting NOS4A2
If my way of speaking is foreign to you, making it too difficult to understand, we can drop the discussion, that's fine. But why do you need to imagine a spatial relation between perceiver and perception? It is better to imagine a temporal perspective, as outlined above in my reply to Ludwig. The perceiver is prior to the perception, as necessary to cause it. Therefore the "behind" you refer to is temporal, as after.
When Austin keeps analysing the Delusion and Illusion case, he appears to be acknowledging the fact that perception has cases where it gives wrong perception rather than the real perception, which lacks certainty. Of course he is not talking about Cartesian certainty here.
I am not sure if Austin's extensive arguments on Delusion and Illusion were meaningful in his voracious attempt opposing Ayer's Sense-Datum concept. He could just have said that perceptions can lack certainty in certain cases.
I feel that perception doesn't end there, but it activates the other mental activities in the mind such as reasoning, judgement and imagination for the assured certainty on the perceived content, as well as being stored in the memory for later retrieval in the mind for the other mental activities such as analytic, synthetic and creative uses, or the motivation for actions.
And when the perceivers doesn't believe the perceived content has certainty, they will keep on trying to verify on the validity of the perception until reasonable certainty is available to them.
If not, they will be concluded as mistaken identity or illusion, or else conclude or be opened minded the perceived object as unknown or mysterious perception. In case of Delusion, perhaps the perceiver will never find out or acknowledge, if what the perceiver was seeing was delusion.
Thanks for making it more clear. I was just trying to picture it, the haphazard result of dividing what I believe is one entity into two. A perception to me is just the perceiver considered abstractly, and not worthy enough to be given position, spacial or temporal. But in a way it does come after, insofar as it is a post hoc state, an afterthought, as in between this time and that time I was perceiving such and such. So for me it speaks little of the directness or indirectness of perception and doing so leads me into wild territory.
Likewise the action is just the actor considered abstractly? Except one actor can do a wide range of actions, so you can't narrow it down to just one action. One actor is a set of actions? So one perceiver is a set of perceptions?
Yes. One can abstract out a specific action from another by considering it on its own as a state, by placing limits on its duration, naming it, and presenting it as a singular movement, and so on. The actor is the action, or rather, the actor acts.
Do you see how there's a numerical problem here? One actor, Jim, performs three different actions:
1. Picking up the garden hose
2. Whacking the baseball
3. Talking to his neighbor
So if there's equivalency between actor and action, then:
A. There are three different Jims, one for each action, or
B. Jim is equivalent to a set of actions (1,2,3).
See?
I dont see a problem. Jim remains the same throughout while what he performs does not.
Right, so Jim is a set of actions. Not one action.
Jim is Jim. Jim acts. Hes not a set of anything. We tend to abstract Jim into states of Jim. We name the states we have abstracted, make of them a set, and so on. It is at this point we have stopped considering Jim and now consider our own abstractions, ourselves.
I agree. The outcome is: the actor is not the action.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Forgive me, but if I understand you rightly, you are using "following a rule" as an example, but intend what you say to apply to all actions. I don't want to get involved in what W might have meant or not meant in his argument about this. So, if I may, I shall talk in terms of another example.
I choose "walking across the room" as my example. I think that you intend what you say to apply to that as well. I asked myself whether you intend what you say to non-actions, to what are called dispositions. These are somewhat different in that the disposition of a stone to resist impact from other bodies is not acquired by the stone but is built in, so to speak, when the rock is formed. So there can be no disposition before the disposition, so your argument doesn't apply. So I'll assume that a capacity is a disposition that is acquired, as tempering changes the properties of iron (and so we call it steel).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is a fake puzzle, based on the fact that we tend to use "capacity" in an ambiguous way. We say of an infant that cannot yet walk, or of someone that has not yet learnt to drive that they cannot walk or drive, but that they have to capacity to learn to walk, or drive and in that sense, can walk or drive. The capacity to learn or otherwise acquire, as skill is distinct from the exercise of that skill. Your infinite regress, I'm afraid, is little more than a pun.
Except that we acquire many skills by practice. The infant learns to walk by trying and failing and gradually getting better at it. We learn to drive by sitting in the driving seat and trying to drive and gradually getting better at it. This learning process is built on what we already can do, but which we have not learnt to do. Infants can do various things from birth and even before birth. These are the result of the physical development of the body, and can be compared to the tendency of the stone to resist pressure - that is, they are dispositions, not capacities.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As I explained above, the capacity to learn to see is indeed "prior to" the capacity to see, but is not the same capacity as the capacity to see.
Quoting Corvus
But that is exactly what he does say. He makes a big fuss about it because Ayer argues for a conception of perception that eliminates the possibility of uncertainty at the cost of depriving us of the ability to see anything except what is in our own heads. That's the issue.
Quoting Corvus
That's perfectly true. But those activities are not perception, so I'm not quite sure what your point is.
The point is whether seeing an object in your mind, not in the external world should be included in perception. When you are not seeing the cup in the external world anymore, (having returned to your study room from the kitchen where the cup was), you could remember, think, imagine bringing the cup to your study room etc. You visualise the cup in your mind, and are seeing the mental images of the cup.
Quoting Corvus
I'm afraid I have a mild form of aphantasia. You can speak for yourself, but not for me.
See Wikipedia - aphantasia
I'm quite capable of thinking, remembering, imagining without seeing images. I'm glad of that. It enables me to drive to the shops, which involves remembering them, without seeing images that might interfere with driving safely. How do you manage?
The outline of how I think about this is here Quoting Ludwig V. There, I do consider the case of an actual image. My discussion of hallucinations deals with one form of mental images. I didn't consider this case. I'm reluctant to deny that people see something when they see mental images, because it seems that some people find them useful in, for example, problem-solving. However, in line with the empirical evidence, I do deny that people always see an actual image when they think about, remember, or imagine a cup.
I don't have a good understanding of the phenomenon. On the other hand, I have no problem saying that what one might call verbal thinking is just suppressed speech, as is reading silently to oneself.
Im very curious: you say you dont experience visual remembrances. I take it that, then, for example, you cannot recall what a childhood pet dog (in case you had one) looks likebut can instead only recognize the pets visual appearance if you were to see a photograph of the former pet? Also, I take it that you are not able to manipulate a geometric object, such as a square, within your mind? (Imagination can be a very ambiguous term at times--due to its etymology not being representative of all the terms often seeks to convey.)
Does the aphantasia you experience by any chance extend to any other sense of perception: sound, touch, taste, smell, and so forth? For instance, can you experience any such thing as an internal voice while thinking?
The issue is besides the threads topic, but Id welcome your response.
Quoting Ludwig V
Taking your question at face value: speaking for myself, I view it as an ability that can be used or not used. As one additional tool in the toolbox of cognition. It in no way interferes with any day-to-day cognitive process.
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Since Im posting on this thread, my own position is that all perception of the external world is directly real when addressed from any first-person point-of-view. When addressed from a third-person perspective, however, perceptions of the external world are known to differ; sometimes mildly, such as with the various types of color blindness among humans, sometimes starkly, as can be found in the sometimes starkly different perceptual senses of different species of life (e.g., we dont perceive the magnetic fields the way homing pigeons, for example, do and always havecf. magnetoreception); thereby implying indirect realism in terms of individuals perceptions of what the external world factually consists of. Because of this, to me, both direct and indirect realism are valid, but occur in different layers of reality as a whole. (Said this to contribute, but Im not much inclined to read along with the literature of Austin and Ayers, though Ive been reading parts of this thread.)
Austin returns to Ayer's text armed with the contents of the previous lecture. Ayer has attempted to explain perception, making a distinction between those that are "qualitatively delusional" and "existentially delusional". Austin's objection is that this gives the impression of their being only two cases to consider. He gives examples that break this proposed dichotomy. Ayer missed those cases where something is taken to be something that it isn't, entirely missing what is perhaps the most common delusion.
Austin goes on to criticise the notion that there are preferred conditions for observations in which we can see the "real" qualities of some object. Again, by way of a series of examples he shows that it is not possible to make this approach coherent.
The key problem according to Austin is trying to give one account where there are multiple, quite different cases. The result is a gross oversimplification that cannot capture or explain what is going on without gross misrepresentation.
Amusingly, on reading the posts in this very thread concerning actors and actions, one can see the very same problem being repeated.
The philosopher's pride here allows him to supose that he can first make the box and then squeeze the examples in. It's surprising how often it is those who advocate some form of empiricism who, for whatever reason, drop their love of observation so readily when they turn to their use of words, instead joining with Humpty Dumpty. It's a worthy quip.
Why should it?
There is a very clear distinction to be made between imagining a cup and pouring tea into it. And a long historical agreement that perception concerns the sense, and the objects in the world around us, and so is best contrasted, rather than confused, with imagination.
But even if you are inclined to hesitate at that distinction, it would be best to keep clear as to the difference between what is imagined and what isn't, lest one spill the tea.
I tend to see mental images all the time, when I am remembering or imagining, even when I think of something, I can see images of the object I am thinking of.
Even when I do gardening, before even starting the work, I would first imagine how it should look after the work, and commence the work as the images seen in my mind, and try to match the reality to the image, and it works better.
Maybe some people cannot see mental images as you said. Do your reasoning, thinking and linguistics overrides the mental images that you try to see? I am not sure. I cannot imagine it. I am not sure what should be a normativity in this regard.
But I was wondering, Austin and Ayer, talk about perceptions in terms of delusions, illusions, hallucinations, and just ordinary visual perceptions, and they all occur in the realm of so called perception. But why don't they include mental images we see during our remembering, imagining, thinking, and intuiting? That was my question.
You seem to have misunderstood me. I was not saying that seeing and imagining is the same thing.
I was saying that if delusions, illusions are regarded as a type of perception, then why shouldn't seeing mental images in memories, imaginations, thinking and intuitions be thought of as a type of perception too. It was a suggestion, not a claim.
I interpret the QM claim that nothing is real as meaning something like 'nothing is really as it seems'. Not saying I agree with this as such. but it might be said that in the context, and from the point of view of what QM tells us about the microphysical constitution of ordinary objects, what they are is not what they appear to be.
So you don't see the route to the shops when you remember it? That's good. It could be confusing to see the route as you remember it and as it actually is at the same time. It is simpler and clearer to say that when driving the route, remembering it does not require any images, only correct actions as you go along. (It could also show as correctly telling someone else what to do.)
I'm less sure of what to say given the research about aphantasia. If I take it at face value, some people see something they call an image under circumstances I don't - or so they say. Other people don't - or so they say. Rather than rushing in, it seems best to pause for thought.
His demolition of that classic idea is an excellent piece of philosophical work.
Quoting Corvus
Well, you may see them. But I don't think you can assume that everybody sees them.
Quoting Corvus
My best answer is that imagining something is not like my cases 1 (the real dagger) or 2 (the reflected dagger), both of which clearly count as perceiving something. It most resembles 3, (the hallucination, except that, of course, you are not fooled, deluded) in that there is no dagger nor image of a dagger involved. Isn't that good enough reason to say they are not perceptions?
There are even discussions in the Scientific theory symposiums where the scientists discuss how can you tell the Scientific knowledge is what the world really is, not the one imagines the world might be when all the Scientific researches, studies and experiments are based on the fallible human sense observations of the world.
Anyhow, what about the case of illusion where a folk sees an Oasis in the desert when there isn't one? The case of illusion when a folk sees a ghost, when there isn't one? Is there always clear distinction between delusion and illusion? How could you tell which perception is delusion, which one is illusion and which one was the real perception from the first order perspective?
I suppose we should wonder how fatal it is. Certainly he doesnt mean one will die if the philosopher never lists the correct amount of contexts, or uses less accounts than Austin or Banno finds appropriate. Sure, Ayers limited account does not help us at all with real pearls, real ducks, real cream, real watches, real novels, but what about the topic at hand? It seems the worst thing to come of it is that some word-concerned philosopher, who never raises his head from the text, might have to quibble about it.
Ok, so what do you think Austin might have to say here?
Well, for a start, the word "real" in "nothing is really as it seems" should bring on some hesitancy. What's it doing there? We might take it out, and see what happens. Consider "nothing is as it seems". Well, that doesn't seem right. It seems I am writing this, and you are now reading it, to the extent that one could not make sense of "It seems I am not writing this, and you are not reading it".
Also, there isn't anything special about QM in this regard. Pop physics has long told us that the ground beneath your feet is mostly space - "Not really solid, as it seems". But of course the ground is both solid and mostly space, and a good deal of decent physics and chemistry has gone in to showing how these can both be true.
It seems to me (Banno, not Austin) that "QM claims nothing is really as it seems" is a rhetorical attempt to give preeminence to one sort of view over others. But while QM is fine for physics class and designing computers, it's not much use in arranging flowers or deciding what to have for dinner.
So it seems to be an example of the sort of thing Austin was addressing, where the intricacies of the world are overly simplified.
I thought that was a little jab at me. It was a good one, by the way. But I think my question still stands. How many contexts would be necessary to appease someone like Austin?
Why is that the question?
Why not "What grounds do you have for doubt?"
Have you not read Ludwig's post? I was asking against his points.
Quoting Ludwig V
Quoting Banno
Would it not be just the same question in different wording?
Well, pretty much all of them. It's not too hard, with the aid of a tool such as the OED, to pick out the main instances. Even easier now, with online tools. Austin occasionally envisioned a team of scholars doing such research for each philosophically dubious term. But the main methodological point is the order of proceedings: look at how the word is used before deciding what it means.
It's in line with Wittgenstein, of course:
No.
Could you explain the difference in the meanings between the two sentences in detail? Bearing in mind he never mentioned your 'ground for doubt'.
My favourite graffiti:
Anyhow if it were a mere observation, it loses validity, objectivity and factuality until it had been fully analysed, reasoned and verified.
I like the way you put that. Im sold.
Ok.
It's again a methodological point. One of the departures for Ordinary Language Philosophy from other forms of analytic philosophy is that it does not start with an attempt to achieve certainty. Ayer shares an analytic background with Austin, coming from a (mis)reading of works such as Wittgenstein's Tractatus. He thinks he can fill out a theory of perceptions in such a way as to provide a firm basis for scientific knowledge, while at the same time showing the poverty of other supposed ways of knowing. In the process of firming up such a theory he leads himself, and a great many others, astray. As Austin points out, pp 59-61, there is historical precedent. Perception will not bear the epistemological weight philosophers put on its shoulders. it needs help.
Why, thanks. It is odd that the point needs to be made, really. How many threads start by defining the terms to be used instead of examining them?
But it's so much easier to start with a definition. You don't have to think, or read.
OK, now do you agree that a person must have the capacity to walk across the room prior to actually walking across the room? And, this is not the capacity to learn how to walk, because the person has already learned that. Despite the fact that we might not be able to judge that this person had the capacity to walk across the room, until after the person actually demonstrates this ability by walking across the room, it is also a simple fact that the person must have had the capacity to do it, before carrying out the act.
Quoting Ludwig V
No, I consider "dispositions" to be something completely different. A disposition is an arrangement of parts. And, if a specific arrangement of parts inclines a person to act in a specific way, then the disposition plays the role of a restriction on a capacity. A capacity, and the restrictions on a capacity are very distinct. So for example, a habit may be a sort of disposition. The habit inclines the person with the potential, or capacity, to actualize it in a specific way, the habit of walking across the room for example. This disposition restricts the capacity, which could act in many different ways, walk to many different places for example, inclining the person to act in the one specific way, out of the many possible ways. So a disposition is somewhat opposite to a capacity, the latter being a freedom, the former being a restriction.
Quoting Ludwig V
Here you demonstrate misunderstanding. The ability to walk across the room, which necessarily preexists the physical act of walking across the room, (as the skill to do it), is very specific, by those terms. The more general "capacity to learn to walk" is completely different. Being more general, as a capacity to learn something, the same capacity is also the capacity to learn all sorts of different things. So it is not properly called the capacity to learn to walk, because that unnecessarily restricts it to learning to walk, when it actually could manifest in the learning of many different things. When a person learns to walk, that capacity to learn many different things, is restricted in a specific way, as a sort of dispositioning, so that a more specific capacity results, the capacity to walk. And, the even more specific, the capacity to walk across the room.
Quoting Ludwig V
Now you are simply avoiding the issue by leaving out the logically necessary intermediary between the capacity to learn a skill, and the exercising of that skill once it is learned. The intermediary which you neglect, is having the skill without actually exercising it. I have learned how to walk, I have the capacity to walk across the room, but I am not currently exercising this capacity. This capacity, which we might call the skill itself, comes after learning the skill, but it must always exist prior to exercising the skill.
I do not know how you can describe an infinite regress as a pun. That makes no sense, but I think you must see it that way due to the misunderstanding which you demonstrate.
Quoting Ludwig V
This attempt to reduce capacities to dispositions does not address the issue at all. It just demonstrates a basic misunderstanding, or possibly an intentional effort to avoid the issue. The issue is that the capacity to walk, drive, or whatever specific skill you will name, which. as actually having the skill, is necessarily posterior in time to learning the skill, is also necessarily prior in time to carrying out the specified activity. It cannot be reduced to learning the activity, as you seem to propose, because it only exists after the skill is learned. And, it cannot be described in terms of carrying out the specified activity because it is necessarily prior in time to carrying out the activity.
Quoting Ludwig V
The issue is that the capacity to see, which is temporally posterior to learning how to see, is necessarily prior in time, to the physical act of seeing. Therefore the capacity to see cannot be reduced to the capacity to learn how to see, nor can it be reduced to the physical activity of seeing.
That's the point I was making. When we properly look at the issue, the question of "directness or indirectness" becomes incidental and insignificant. That question is misguided, most likely as an ill-advised attempt to avoid the "wild territory", which is reality.
I think you could say the same thing about Austin. His arguments have been largely ignored because the philosophical community continues to talk about qualia, what-it's-like-ness experiences, or the ontological subjective.
My main point in this post is to show how two linguistic philosophers supposedly analyzing the same ordinary language we all use, seemingly coming up with some fundamentally different conclusions.
Austin seems to be saying that we somehow know the dream experience is "qualitatively" different than the waking experience, because as he says "How otherwise should we know how to use and contrast the words. He further inserted a footnote saying "This is part, no doubt only part, of the absurdity in Descartes' toying with the notion that the whole of our experiences might be a dream." But Malcolm is saying that this idea that dreaming is an experience where we question, reason, perceive, imagine is an incoherent one, so there is no sense to say we are comparing experiences to determine they are qualitatively similar or not.
In "Dreaming" Malcolm does not ignore scientific considerations regarding dreams. He says the following:
"The interest in a physiological criterion of dreaming is due, I believe, to an error that philosophers, psychologists, physiologists, and everyone who reflects on the nature of dreaming tends to commit, namely, of supposing that a dream must have a definite location and duration in physical time. (this is an excellent example of what Wittgenstein calls a 'prejudice' produced by 'grammatical illusions') It might be replied that a dream is surely an event and that event must have a definite date and duration in physical time. But this gets one nowhere, for what justifies the claim that a dream is an event in that sense?"
But Malcolm takes this one step further, and suggests that maybe scientists are just proposing a new concept of "dreaming". What would be the consequences of this stipulation, that REM means that a human was dreaming. One, "...if someone were to tell a dream it could turn out that his impression that he dreamt was mistaken-and not in the sense that the incidents he related had really occurred and so his impression was not of a dream but of reality. The new concept would allow him to be mistaken in saying he had a dream even if his impression that he had seen and done various things were false. Another consequence is that it would be possible to discover that a man's assertion that he had slept a dreamless sleep was in error; and here one would have to choose between saying either that he forgot his dreams or that he had not been aware of them when he dreamt them. People would have to be informed on waking up that they had dreamt or not-instead of their informing us, as it now is."
He ends his chapter in a rather un-antithetical view of science when he says, "Physiological phenomena, such as rapid eye movements or muscular action currents, may be found to stand in interesting empirical correlations with dreaming, but the possibility of these discoveries presupposes that these phenomena are not used as the criterion of dreaming."
I understand folk like to say Malcolm is denying that we have experiences such as dreams, but I think we one needs to understand he is studying how we understand the concept of "dreaming" and what we can and cannot say about such a concept.
Lecture VII is not a theory about what the word real means. Its showing how the actual world works compared to the imagined idea of Reality itself, the theory of an objective world. In this case, compared to the picture that we do or do not perceive Reality, something immutable, infallible, and generalized to every object and abstracted from any circumstance and any responsibility we might have.
However, despite this need forlets call it a pure knowledge (as Wittgenstein does) or perfect knowledge (as Descartes does)everything but math is not objective in the way philosophy imposes on Reality. But instead of looking, as Austin does, at how we actually manage our uncertain world, Ayer internalizes the worlds failings by making it our failing: that we can only perceive a world that is real, which forces us to only be able to ask confused questions like: do we perceive reality directly? Or is our perception of reality indirect/mediated? Maybe through some real process of the (perfect) brain? or because it is my perception of Reality? (and you have yoursinstead of just our varying personal interests).
The dismissal of Austin is done for many reasons, but it boils down to an inability to accept anything but an answer to the worlds uncertainty (like a perfect knowledge) or nothing at all (falling back only on a mediated perception), and not taking seriously that the ordinary ways we handle problems in each case are sufficient and our only recourse. Austin is (as is Wittgenstein) only seen either as setting out just a different answer to these cobwebs of misunderstandingsthat he is some version of a realistor that the mechanics he uncovers about the world are trivial in response to these issues (hes just relying on words or common sense).
Lecture VII: Once again, Austin is not talking about words (explaining words), he is looking at the words we say when we do something to illuminate our practices. That words are used in a particular way is a fact (p.62) because our lives have been firmly established (Id.) There is a correct way (as in, appropriate) to address a subject, its mechanics, which is how you can be wrong p. 63. This is not being nit-picky and pedantic about word usagebecause it is our lives that are normative (influence the conformity of our acts). Note here when Austin says: Real or not? cant always be raised. We raise this question only when suspicion assails us (p.69) (emphasis added)
In saying that the distinctions [are] embodied (Id.), Austin is saying we live them, in them, by them. Distinctions are how we judge, and, in judging along those lines, we reinvest ourselves in the criteria for that practice. There is nothing arbitrary (p.63) about the way our practices work. They have import because they reflect our interests in our lives.
So Reality is a prefabricated (a priori) standard of judgment measuring everything against perfection. (P.64) What philosophy did is take the ordinary question: is that a real duck? (or a decoy?) and turn real into a quality of everything. However, there are many different ways (criteria for how) things count as real, and one of the most important being because there is an antecedent (expected) alternative, like: fake, a variant context, deception, artifice, etc. So, it is untenable for everything to be real (or not), unless you remove the question and abstract the (unnatural) quality onto the whole worldta da: Reality!
Im not sure were Austin put forward this idea of what we do in dreams. I was trying to show that there actually are, as he says, recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking. Why does this have to mean: while we are dreaming? It seems perhaps Malcolm is creating his own opponent, but I dont think it is Austin.
Yes, Austin explains pretty well the ordinary vocabulary of our language, and that's why he states that the use of some words depends on the 'adaptation' of our daily life.
But he goes beyond all of that. I disagree when you say that words are dependent upon how we do something, because there are some words which their functionality is more than just a 'tool'. This is why he uses 'real' - the word 'good', too - as an example. He establishes some theories on the nature of this word, expressing that it is a 'substantive-hungry', trouser-word, dimension-word, and dimension-word. These characteristics help us in our demanding, and it is obvious that 'real' tends to be more used amongst people than 'proper' - as he states - I think this about Philosophy of Language, and I don't think he attempts to say that it depends on the way we do things. It is the opposite. Thanks to these complex words, we are able to have a better understanding.
Yes. The search for certainty. Nothing can bear the weight of that.
Quoting Banno
Just occasionally, I find I have to take issue with something that W says. The idea that it is just a matter of just looking, or collecting data, is far too simple. Wittgenstein gets us to look at things differently, to break out of the tyranny of philosophical knots. Austin gets us to see distinctions and differences that we overlook unless we are very careful. Both provide cases (examples) that are effective. They are not random. They are selected and constructed.
What is also true, though, is that their work is only to persuade us to do our work.
Quoting Corvus
Fair enough, and I can see why it might make sense. My reason for not accepting it is that perception (seeing, hearing, etc.) is always perception of something - hence the tendency to think about subject and object. That's how we get led astray. In the case of imagining something, there is no object - I mean that unicorns don't exist and that it is misleading to suppose that when we imagine unicorns we necessarily see something unicorn-like. (When we imagine or remember visiting the Parthenon, we are not visiting the Parthenon).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But it seems to me that, just as one swallow doesn't make a summer, one action doesn't make a disposition, habit, tendency or addiction, and that I acquire the capacity or skill required to do many things by doing them or trying to do them. Your infinite regress suggests that I cannot acquire any capacity, and I don't believe that.
Quoting Richard B
Thank you for your posts about this. But I had the impression that he does deploy an argument about this, that experiencing something is incompatible with being unconscious and that being asleep is being unconscious.
Quoting Richard B
Yes. I put it down partly to the conventional approach to philosophical education as initiation into traditional ways of thinking with the intention of inoculating students against infection. It doesn't seem to work very well, partly because breaking through, or out, of them is not a once-for-all job. But that pushes us back to Cavell's idea that the roots of philosophy lie deeper than was recognized at the time.
Quoting Richard B
Yes, and I think he is wrong about that. At least, he is wrong if he thinks that by inspecting the dream experience, we can reliably sort out whether we are awake or not. There's no reliable clue inherent in the experience that allows us to identify it as a dream - if there were, we would be dreaming it, so it wouldn't be reliable. That's why we insist, in the morning that these things did actually (seem to) happen. We tell the difference because the dream story doesn't fit with our waking life in the ways that our memories of yesterday fit with what happens in the morning.
Austin doesn't pay attention to the fact that children have to be taught to recognize that the wolves they dreamt of are dreams - that there are no wolves around one's house and one cannot really jump over tall buildings. Nor does he take into account that many societies do not believe that dreams are just false; they develop ideas that posit them as realities (gods, other worlds, altered states of consciousness) or develop interpretations that posit a kind of truth to them.
Quoting Richard B
Yes. That's why I didn't attribute the resistance to him. It was an informal conversation, no more. But the question what we are to make of them stands, and the issue that the scientists, for the most part, as far as I have seen, seem to accept that we have experiences while we are asleep. But the issue remains that we are dependent on the dreamer's reports about what they are; dream stories are not independently verifiable. The scientific data here ought to be the reports, not the experiences reported.
OK, that's fair enough. :) But Austin shouldn't be afraid, or shy away from facing the contemporary criticisms and analyses on the points laid out in his works, if they are to be confirmed as having good grounds to stand on as a legitimate constructive philosophical methodology which must be a non-dogmatic and non nitpicking linguistic-quibble.
But doesn't it exist in your mind as a mental image? Oh you said you don't get mental images. I find it hard to accept. I mean how do you dream? Do you deny the existence of mental objects?
Surely you must see the mental images in your dream? OK, you say you only have linguistic and reasoning objects only, in your mind. But how do you dream linguistically?
What justifies putting math in a different category? If math is just a different way of using language, how does it possibly obtain this status of "objective"? All instances of language use provide for different degrees of certitude, but what provides the principles for putting math in a completely different category from other ways of using language, in respect to certitude?
Quoting Ludwig V
This is representative of the faulty way of looking at things, which I am trying to get you to recognize. No matter how you look at any specific action itself, or how many times you look at the recurrence of a similar action, this will never provide for you an understanding of the capacity for that specified action, nor will it provide an understanding of that disposition which produces the similarity of repetition. This is because the nature of "a capacity", as a potential, involving a multitude of possibilities, is such that there is no necessary relation between the potential, capacity, and what actually occurs.
So, we cannot proceed from an observation of what actually occurs, to produce an adequate understanding of the capacity which provided the potential for that actual occurrence, because we are missing an essential ingredient, required for that understanding. This required element is the agent which chooses from the multitude of possibilities, to produce the specific activity. In the case of intention actions we know this agent as the "free will". The agent which makes the choice, apprehends the possibilities in its own unique and peculiar way, therefore understanding the reason why one specific sort of action is caused, rather than one of the multitude of other possibilities, requires knowing the agent's perspective.
Quoting Ludwig V
You misunderstood the infinite regress. The infinite regress demonstrates the failure of your way of looking at things, that the existence of a capacity can be understood through learning, doing, trying. It arises from trying to explain the capacity for a living activity through reference only to the activity produced from the capacity. This is what you do when you refer to learning, you refer to various forms of a similar activity, as a being develops its disposition toward the capacity it holds. Your suggestion that a stone's disposition is similar, is not supported by common knowledge because we do not understand the stone to choose from possibilities, like we understand living beings to.
So, take your example of the capacity to walk across the room for example. We can only say that this capacity exists after we observe the being walking across the room. However, we know that the capacity must preexist the action, to enable it. Then, we might say that the being demonstrated this capacity when it walked halfway across the room. But still, the capacity to walk halfway is the same sort of capacity as the capacity to walk all the way, and this must have preexisted the walking of halfway. Therefore we must look at the capacity to walk a quarter of the way. Prior to this, we have an eighth of the way, etc., and this would produce an infinite regress, like a Zeno paradox.
You might think that such an infinite regress is silly, but it's really just a short cut to getting to the real problem. If you say that prior to the capacity to walk, came the capacity to stand up, replacing one specified capacity (to walk), with another prior capacity (to stand up), we face the same type of infinite regress, only replacing the development of one specified capacity (to walk) with an infinite series of similar capacities (to walk, to stand up, to crawl, etc.). The infinite regress is only avoided by stopping, which renders the capacity as still not understood, because we do not get to the bottom of it
The fact is that if we try to understand the reality of the type of capacity which living beings possess, solely through reference to the activities produced by the capacities, we face an infinite regress which renders the capacity as unintelligible. This is due to the nature of the relationship between the capacity and the activity produced from it; the fact that there is no logical necessity to this relationship. The lack of a logical relation produces the need to impose boundary conditions on the activity, which results in an infinite regress when the boundary is approached.
Quoting Ludwig V
What I said was that I don't always get mental images. Sometimes I do and sometimes I don't. Sometimes I call them up (especially when remembering) and sometimes I don't. I sometimes seem to recall images when I wake up in the morning; I have no way of knowing whether my report is accurate. BTW, there's no problem about dreaming "in language"; it's just telling a story (improvised); for me that usually happens when I'm awake, so it is called day-dreaming.
What I'm protesting against is the idea that necessarily one "sees" an image when imagining things, remembering things, etc and that "seeing" an image is always the same thing. The images I "see" when I remember something are not like the images I see on a screen or in a mirror and even less like the images I see in pictures, and when someone remarked, on seeing me and my brother together for the first time "Oh, there are two of you. You are the image of each other." (We are not twins and neither of us was impressed by this remark.) All these examples are different from the image of the monarch that appears on stamps, coins and notes in the UK.
I don't deny that we think, remember, judge, imagine, etc. etc. How could I? I'm not sure that I know what mental objects are supposed to be.
Here is the link for mental objects from Wiki.
Account of Mental Objects / Representation from SEP.
Mental images are the mental objects which happen to be images in your mind, be it imagined, intuited, perceived or remembered.
Account for mental imagery in SEP.
Account for mental image in Wiki
The life of philosophy is debate, which requires a puzzle or a question. Solutions and answers end debate. Paradoxically, being right leaves nothing to say. So it becomes necessary to renew the puzzle.
Wittgenstein did not appreciate this, which is why he had to give up philosophy when he had written the Tractatus.
Quoting Richard B
As usual, what was supposed to be a final authority becomes a subject of debate. No-one really likes a final authority. In some people, the prospect of a final authority triggers a desire to overthrow it.
I don't think this is cynicism. I think it represents some understanding of philosophy as a way of life.
Thanks for these links. I'll have a look at them.
If you do math, and I do math (competently), we come up with the same answer. It doesnt matter who does it. It is universal, rule-driven, predictable, repeatable, logical, a fact, etc. (thats all I mean be certain). Imagine everything Socrates wanted for knowledge; thats why he used math as the ultimate example in the Theatetus.
I think linguistic philosophy tends to be less about debate and more of this:
Show this use, and this use, and this use, and this use, etc now give up all your talk of sense datum. No? look at how we learned these words now give up all your talk of sense datum No? see these words have no contrast now give up all your talk of sense datum No, dont you find your philosophical worries dissolve away?
If the linguistic philosopher gets lucky, their analysis goes places where they make final proclamations such as this is nonsense or this is incoherent.
also, i think Austin's point stands, in the face of what Malcolm has to say. That is, that we do differentiate between the various forms of dreaming and waking indicates that we have a fairly clear understanding that there is a difference. That's not the whole of an argument against Descartes, but it is a good start.
Thanks for your posts.
But the question is, how does this relate to "Reality". How does the fact that you and I agree that the answer to 2+2 is 4 say anything about reality. It's clearly not everything Socrates wanted for knowledge because it doesn't tell us anything about the world we live in. That we agree on rules for using symbols doesn't constitute knowledge. And when we get down to actually applying those rules in the real world, people round things off, and cut corners in their own idiosyncratic ways.
So yes, we agree that 2+2 equals 4, and this is "universal, rule-driven, predictable, repeatable, logical, a fact, etc.", but it's not knowledge because it's not applied to anything real. And when we go to apply it, we need to decide, does a husband and wife qualify as 2, or would it be better off to count then as 1 family. And this depends on the purpose, what are you counting, individual people, or families. Then we must define terms and apply the math accordingly. So the math does not provide us with any higher degree of certainty about the world than other language forms, because it is applied according to principles stated in other forms of language anyway.
Check out these Ngrams, just out of interest.
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=J.+L.+Austin%2C+Norman+Malcolm&year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=en-2019&smoothing=3
Neat stats, if it was just reverse maybe we would have had less talk of Qualia.
I think that's about right.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yep. Another case of making the box then trying to squeeze stuff in.
Just to clarify what Malcolm actually examines and says in his book, "Dreaming". One, he is mostly examining the use of "I am asleep" or "I am dreaming". He spends less time considering "I am unconscious", and views this sentence as different than the aforementioned sentences. He says, "Here there is a similarity between 'I am asleep' and 'I am unconscious': neither sentence has a use that is homogeneous with the normal use of the corresponding third person sentence. It would not occur to anyone to conclude that a man is asleep from his saying "I am asleep' any more than to conclude that he is unconscious from his saying 'I am unconscious', or to conclude that he is dead from his saying 'I am dead'." Two, he does provide some further clarification of the relationship between dreaming and a conscious experience. He says, "I was inclined at one time to think of this result as amounting to a proof that dreaming is not a mental activity or mental phenomenon or a conscious experience. But now I reject that inclination. For one thing, the phases 'mental activity', 'mental phenomenon', 'conscious experience', are so vague that I should not have known what I was asserting." He goes on further to explain, "If a philosopher uses the phrase 'mental phenomenon', say, in such a way that dreams are mental phenomena by definition, then obviously no argument is going to prove to him that they are not. I avoid this way of stating the matter. What I say instead is that if anyone holds that dreams are identical with, or composed of, thoughts, impressions, feelings, images, and so on (here one may supply whatever other mental nouns one likes, except 'dreams'), occurring in sleep, then his view is false." And lastly, "And someone may have as his grounds for classifying dreams as 'conscious experiences' the fact that we speak of 'remembering' dreams, or the fact that in telling dreams we say that we 'saw' and 'heard' various things. There is nothing wrong with these decisions, if they do not cause one to be mislead in other respects."
While Malcolm gives a little here, there is not much left over to compare whether a conscious experience of a dream is "qualitatively" similar or different to a conscious experience of being awake.
Yes, math doesnt tell us about the world. But it has qualities similar to the standard by which philosophy wishes it could judge the world, and, when it finds that doesnt work, instead of seeing the ordinary criteria that already exist, it projects its standard onto the qualities of an imagined Reality.
I think maybe I worded something about math that triggered your response; I dont claim anything in particular about it other than as an example of the standard, which Plato in the Theatetus and Descartes set out better than me.
As this is important to Austin as wellthough I dont know exactly what you are referring to when you say that it is just a matterWittgenstein keeps insisting we look not because he cant speak about something (as some carry over from the Tractatus). Its that ordinary criteria have no power of argument (logical, necessity). So what they are doing is drawing out examples of when you would say such-and-such about something. All they can do is create those examples (show you them); you have to accept for yourself the validity of the implications on what matters to a thing being that thing, how distinctions are made, what judgments, etc. They make claims about the mechanics of that thing (the grammar Wittgenstein says; Austin will point out salient features on p.68) but you must come to it on your ownprove it to yourself (or provide another description, expand the context to incorporate other considerations, etc.) And then we can debate the impact those have on philosophical issues.
P.s. - this is why Wittgenstein is so enigmatic, why he leaves us with so many questions; because, as you say, we have to do the work for ourselves. I believe this to be in part because they are asking you to take a totally different perspective on an old philosophical issue. That its not a new opinion, but a new way of seeing, a changed self.
:grin: Good stuff. Very droll! Hope others are enjoying these jokes.
Quoting Richard B
See 's comments regarding representation and mental imagery. There's a lot of variety int he way these ideas are used in philosophical discussion. I'm not at all surprised to find some disparity even amongst those that share basic philosophical methods.
Add that to recent studies showing that folk have very different styles of cognition - not just aphantasia, but a much larger variation, to the extent that it has been suggested that no two minds need quite be the same in how much of their cognition is visual, how much linguistic, and exactly what these both mean.
After all, why should we think that what goes on in everyone's minds is much the same? Why shouldn;t folk give vastly different accounts of their own cogitations?
And hence why should we expect any agreement on "mental Phenomena"?
But what linguistic philosophers, or adept psychologists, might be able to do here is to outline some sort of common ground or some general features, perhaps a "grammar" on which there is more agreement than disagreement.
I'm dubious that any such grammar might include stuff that could clearly be called "qualitative".
This is all very speculative, mere hand waving. The point is to indicate that we might not have good reason to expect much agreement here. Why should we expect there to be one universal account of consciousness, dreaming, cogitation and such?
See The last great mystery of the mind: meet the people who have unusual or non-existent inner voices
and Most of us have an inner voice, but if you're part of the minority who doesn't, this could be why
and mostly Cognition: do we all think in the same way?
I was just guessing there would be, but I don't have any in particular. From my own view, I am not sure if Ordinary Language Philosophy can grasp and understand the world in full, because
1. Language is for expressing, describing and communicating thoughts and the contents of perception.
2. Language never have access to the world direct.
3. Language is the last activity in the chain of the mental events i.e. you perceive, think, then speak in that order, never the other way around.
Look, if you need to have a go at Austin, there is already plenty of material out there you can use.
If you want to understand where things went after Austin, read up on Peter Strawson and Paul Grice. Strawson and Austin clashed over the analysis of truth, while Grice inserted a very fine blade between use and meaning, forcing the two apart again. The result was a turn away from natural language in favour of formal languages, especially the work of Kripke and Davidson.
This would be very interesting material for follow up on, perhaps in another thread, or after the material that is at hand here.
I was wondering if rejecting all other points being raised with Austin's methodology and the points of his book, but keep on insisting to be recalcitrant for staying in the only one book of Austin, in that one book only, and regurgitating what he said repeatedly would be a good approach in understanding Austin. Because at the end of the day, it is a topic of Linguistic Philosophy as well as Perception.
And if you find the topic repetitive, go do something else. You don't have to be here.
But equally, I'm not obligated to reply to your posts.
I never asked or expect anyone to reply to me. It is totally up to you whether you reply or not. I have been keeping responding to the questions to me, and where I feel related and appropriate, asking back and expressing my own point of view.
Though I haven't had time to read the book, I've very much appreciated the discussion.
Quoting wonderer1
Yeah, it's attracted some fine, intelligent comment, and gone in a few unexpected directions. Most pleasing.
That's what I disagreed with, that math is regarded by philosophers as the ultimate paradigm, "the standard" for knowledge. Perhaps Descartes characterizes it like that, but definitely not Plato in his later work, nor Wittgenstein in his later work. Even Russel found problems with math, as evidenced by the paradox he pointed to.
For these philosophers the search for certainty in knowledge leads them to mathematics, but upon analysis math becomes very problematic and disillusionment follows. In the Theaetetus for example, Plato may have presented math as if it was supposed to be the standard, but then exposed problems with that presupposition, and in the Parmenides, he demonstrates problems with math's basic foundational concept, "one", or "unity".
Yeah, feel free. No pressure. Although I had some criticisms on the methodology and the subject itself, I also must admit that I have learnt a lot during the readings of "Sense and Sensibilia".
I'm not all that surprised that there is a variety of first person accounts of various mental phenomena. I'm sure that we all tend to fall victim to the assumption that everyone else is just like me. It's more dangerous when that assumption becomes the idea that everyone else ought to be like me or that there is something wrong when other people turn out to be different from me. (There's an overtone in the very terms "aphantasia" and "hyperphantasia" that I think is very dangerous. They are not necessarily pathologies.)
These are first person accounts, not objective reports. The fact that people give such accounts is important, but should not be taken to suggest that they are true, or at least it needs to be taken into account that they are unverifiable (not therefore meaningless). Compare the ways that the medical profession treats "I am in pain". Compare also the trouble that we have (should have) with dreams.
Quoting Corvus
I'm afraid this triggers one of my hobby-horses. Language is also for expressing emotions, giving orders, consoling people, deceiving people, inspiring the troops, shaming wrong-doers and many other things. Focusing on one, admittedly important, use of language narrows the vision of philosophy and distorts the understanding of people living in the world.
There is, I believe, even an argument that the origins of language, assuming they lie in animal communication systems are severely practical things like expressing peaceful or aggressive intentions, making demands, expressing anger, fear, pleasure and pain and such.
The theoretical uses of language are not the core, but a derivative, and arguably still marginal, use of language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, this way of looking at an infinite regress has occurred to me. One issue is that once you have taken the first step, you need a reason for not taking the second step.... Or, you need a reason for stopping. The standard view of this, as I'm sure you are aware, is that the infinity of the regress is real, so that, for example, Achilles can never catch the tortoise or we can never acquire a disposition. Wittgenstein takes issue with this, but it is still regarded as a problem.
But we can probably agree that there is a feeling that simply to analyse a disposition (potential, capacity, ability, skill, tendency, liability, habit, custom) as a counter-factual that x would happen if... is not enough. But I notice that you never specify what would count as the bottom of it. But we do look for, and often find, a basis for the disposition. Petrol is flammable because its' molecular structure is such that it easily reacts with the oxygen in the air and so forth. Most ice floats because its molecular structure makes it less dense and therefore lighter, than water. But these are empirical discoveries. So the most that we can say is that a disposition includes the idea that there is a causal basis for the counter-factual, but no more than that. In the end, it's just an application of the principle of sufficient reason.
I know that's not very well argued, but I hope it is enough to suggest at least that there is an alternative view to yours.
My problem with your view is that, so far as I can see, your view of capacity and potential are wide open to the objection that Berkeley rightly levels against the scholastic idea of matter as pure potential and Locke's view that substance is something unknown - that it is empty.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, mathematics applied to the world is subject to the same caveats and limitations as any other empirical knowledge. The idea of mathematics as something different is about pure mathematics and purely mathematical objects, like numbers.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Thanks for this. But isn't it also true that the Theory of Forms presents an idea that seems to be a generalization of mathematics and provide a basis for his view that the things of this world are but shadows of reality? I would have thought that Plato was quite able to hold a view and recognize difficulties with it at the same time.
Quoting Richard B
Well, I would not say that there is never a give-away within the experience, so to speak. On the contrary, the fact that I seem to be flying might be regarded as a clue. But somehow, such clues seldom, if ever, get picked up. So it is not really the experience that doesn't give away the truth, but the experiencer who doesn't pick up the clues - until they wake up the following morning. But this doesn't amount to a dream-like quality that tells the dreamer what is going on.
Quoting Antony NicklesThe quotation from Austin is:- "I may have the experience (dubbed 'delusive' presumably) of dreaming that I am being presented to the Pope. Could it be seriously suggested that having this dream is 'qualitatively indistinguishable' from actually being presented to the Pope? Quite obviously not. After all, we have the phrase 'a dream-like quality'; some waking experiences are said to have this dream-like quality, and some artists and writers occasionally try to impart it, usually with scant success, to their works." pp. 48, 49.
It's the last sentence I take issue with.
As an additional note on Lecture VII: Part of philosophys problem (exemplified by Ayer) is that the desire for a perfect knowledge, and the subsequent resignation to an imperfect knowledge, both only allow for a fixed outcome (of knowledge, or a perception, or appearance, or mental process, or meaning). In this lecture about reality Austin is also explaining how our relationship with the world is more than just information, such as would correspond to (equate with) an objective world.
As I discussed earlier, one point is that you cant fool around (p.62) with words because of the way they workthe distinctions they make, what they count as doing or being somethingis taken from how the world works (their criteria are: what has mattered to our society, what is really important (p.77))I mean, you can fool around, but you look like a madman, or a poet.
Another point, again, is that the situation that we find ourselves in matters, so it is always a discussion of an event (as Ricouer would call it)a moment in time with a past and you and another with things a certain way, even expectations, etc. To call this just a context though might miss the fact that it also has a future. We do not just see something and either get it (really know it) or do not (as an immediate perception, just indirect now). We make mistakes, but we correct ourselves; we jump to conclusions, but we can dig deeper and learn more; we apologize, make excuses; but we carry on--despite not having perfect knowledge--without cutting ourselves off from the world.
Another difference with fixed knowledge is that it does not do well with ambiguity, and when we dont know how to "proceed" (Wittgenstein discusses this as "being able to continue", e.g. a series). As Austin says, there may not be any right answer (p.66) and, that, in certain cases, there is no right answer no rules according to which, no procedure by which, answers are to be determined. (P.67) These are the kinds of situations that create the fear of radical skepticism, which philosophy believes can only be resolved by definite knowledge (but then it cant get it). Austin shows that, despite our not knowing what is right, or having a rule or a procedure or determined answer, we still manage to move forward in situations where there is no tidy, straightforward style (p.72). His example is that like allows us to adjust (p.73) our language to adapt to something new, not simple. And being able to account for outliers is not a strong suit for objective criteria; for example, when pig has a meaning that is a universal amongst particulars. Austin is pointing out that in not demanding a universal pig, or a new world (i.e. reality), but in having "flexibility" (p. 74), we are actually "more precise" (Id.) and can better handle the "unforeseen" (p.75), which is to say, we proceed with the ability to readdress the situation; we can live through it without figuring it all out ahead of time (deontologically, teleologically (what is right? A rule, a value?) Thus Austin says, the criteria we employ at a given time cant be taken as "final, not liable to change. (p. 76) And that openendedness allows our understandings to adapt as our lives change.
Well, its not the answer that matters, its the desire for an answer: something universal, generalized, predetermined, predictable, perfectly logical, etc., e.g., God, the forms, the thing-in-itself, consciousness, reality, sense data, qualia, etc. Austin is saying the whole enterprise is wrong from the get-go.
You keep reminding me of Dewey. That's a good thing for me, but perhaps not for others. See his The Quest for Certainty. Analytic and OLP philosophers weren't the only ones seeking to cure philosophy of its various ills.
Thanks for that excellent summary.
A foot-note. There is an additional aspect to this desire for certainty. It is the tendency to universalize. Admittedly not everything is certain (sometimes our sense deceive us), but equally not everything is uncertain (sometimes our senses do not deceive us).
I do think it is important at some point (once we have the complete reading under our belt) to differentiate Austin from Dewey from Wittgenstein, etc. Preliminarily, I think Dewey and Austin don't take into consideration the continuing fear of skepticism (given the powerlessness of our ordinary criteria) in the same way as Wittgenstein, who sympathizes with, and tries to understand, the skeptic's desire (as he fell into that trap with the Tractatus), rather than the, say, condescension that Austin gives off, or Dewey's belief in procedure (or something like that).
Quoting Ludwig V
Absolutely. Reacting to the fact that we can't know ahead of time when and how we will make mistakes, be deceived, be judged for not doing the right thing, come to an impasse with others, etc. pushes us towards the vision that we only see "our perception" or only "particular" parts of a chair, i.e., that our relation to the world is always mitigated. The desire for "purity" as Wittgenstein puts it, or "certainty" as Cavell terms it, results in the abstraction from individual cases, turning the state of our situation into an intellectual "problem" which we want to solve universally (beforehand), for any case, so we will never be wrong again, not have to be responsible for our errors and moral duty.
This is why Austin is giving us an overview** of the case-specific actions we can take to reconcile (after the fact) the issues that skepticism takes as simply a failure of knowledge, to show that the individual case is not a weakness, but a strength, as the mechanics work better given the details of the particular, rather than the abstraction to a universal.
**Wittgenstein also investigates examples of the universalization of philosophical issues (rules, others, mental processes, etc.) by showing us a "clear view" of specific "intermediate cases" (see quote below) so we might see how our ordinary criteria are sufficient, precise, etc. despite our disappointment that they can't keep us out of trouble. "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. PI, #122.
I don't think there are much in the way of metaphysical implications from Austin, do you? He's just pointing out the way we speak.
This is a common misconception. I don't think Austin does himself any favors by saying he is just examining "sense perception" and not directly explaining the implications of what he is doing, and then just jumping into examples. For one, his critique of Ayer is an example of a larger philosophical issue, which includes metaphysics. "The case of 'universal' and 'particular', or 'individual', is similar in some respects though of course not in all." (p.4 fn1) And, also, Austin is denying there is "reality" (directly addressing the metaphysical), which Ayer is arguing we just don't have direct access to (p. 3 and Lec. VII -- I discuss that here).
I address the underestimation of Austin, as just "pointing out the way we speak", here above, but the gist of it is that the things we say (or could say) in situations reflect the criteria we use in judging a thing, and the mechanics of how the world actually works. What we say when talking about "real" are an expression of what matters to us about it, what we count as applicable, how mistakes are corrected, etc.
Method, more specifically, I think (the method of "inquiry").
Quoting Ciceronianus
My Dewey is rusty; "method" rings a bell now. I leave it to you to draw those distinctions at some point.
So if everyone says "God created the world in six days", would that reflect the mechanics of how the world actually works?
Quite agree. This seems to be coming to the fore - that there is no single way in which to be conscious.
Quoting Ludwig V
For me the key here was Davidson's A nice derangement of epitaphs. Any account can be actively undermined and falsified by another account. Also, formally, an account can be consistent, but only if it is incomplete; or it can be complete, but only if it is inconsistent. Perhaps this is why "not everything is certain, but equally not everything is uncertain".
I don't think any of 's three points are cogent. To a large extent that is what this thread is about.
Where Wittgenstein is enigmatic and full of questions, I think Austin takes too much for granted that we will see the implications of what he is doing, and so I do think part of the effort has to be making explicit why he is pointing out what he does (apart from just eviscerating Ayer's position). I find the offhand comments to be the most important almost.
My hope was not to bring Cavell's interests and conclusions into this reading of Austin, but I have let myself be goaded (with all this dismissive talk of "just language" and "quibbling") into expanding on the reasons why philosophy wants something like Ayer's "solution", which is how Cavell sees Wittgenstein going further than what seems like Austin simply refuting Ayer.
I should resolve myself to just doing my reading and responding to those doing the same, but I always hope there is some possibility of getting through to people if I could just say the right thing. But how do you help with this, where the whole picture and every word in it is either confused or wrong. It makes me think Austin is even more of a genius because he can make sense of Ayer.
The way I understand it, the movements of the body are not separate from the body, but are just aspects of it; so, I don't know how not to distinguish between the two.
Quoting Ludwig V
I know how to determine which philosophical theories seem more or less right and wrong to me, but not how they seem to other. I can't but think that we all have our own methods and criteria for determining that, and that those methods and criteria are based on our most fundamental presuppositions..
Quoting Ludwig V
I know which theories have intellectual appeal to me, and I have to go on what others tell me about what seems to be most appealing to them. By argument or discussion, I might find out what others are convinced by, and i may or may not agree with them. There is a possibility that I or others may change their mind if a convincing counterargument is presented, but my experience on these forums leads me to think that that is relatively rare.
I just disagree that there are metaphysical truths we can pull out of the way we speak. It's frequently difficult to even pin point how our speech refers, much less discover great truths in grammar.
You're thinking of "the world" as not including origin stories, mythology, religious belief, etc. That there is, for example, nothing meaningful to anyone about having the world be created. This is an example of judgment by one standard, e.g. what is "real".
The aspects of the body are the body, at least when I look. What distinguishes them beyond the words used to describe it?
I read this and found "All along the watchtower" playing in my head - the Hendrix version...
There are folk hereabouts who have come to philosophy from elsewhere, usually science or engineering, seeking some sort of validation for the work they have done.
Others have long, perhaps always, had the niggle that leads them to puzzle over these questions.
The main driver for this thread was 's OP, not so much because of it's specific content, as that the approach was simply taken as granted for much of that thread. "How do you help with this, where the whole picture and every word in it is either confused or wrong". Engaging directly in the discussion is of no help. Folk have to work through it themselves. Perhaps reading Austin will proved a few folk with the tools one needs to see the error in such threads.
Even without words I see the aspects, movements or activities of the body not as the whole body. I suppose you could say that the totality of all the aspects, movements and activities of the body just is the body, but I never see any totality of aspects, whereas I do see bodies.
That said it is also true that I don't see the totality of any body. but when I look at a body from the front, back or side I still think I am looking at the body. and not necessarily focusing on any specific aspects of it.
I'm not sure what you're saying. Do you mean if everyone believed in God, that would make him real?
Maybe you are not taking seriously Austin's "cannot" and "wrong" and "facts" and the distinctions he points out. He comes off as arrogant, but he is providing evidence of how the world works, so, unless you can argue with his examples (by saying, "no that's not the way it works"), I don't see how, reasonably, you can categorically "just disagree" with his conclusions--this isn't about opinions. One "metaphysical truth" or implication from Austin's examples is that our speech does not "refer", in the same way there is nothing "direct" for us to "perceive" or not. But I'll leave you to feel however you'd like.
I really didn't see him as doing that at all. Interesting how differently two people can read the same paragraphs, huh?
I'm not sure you've read Sec. VII, where Austin claims that we only ask "Real or not?" in the case of something in particular (p. 68-69). So the question "Is God real?" would be framed "Is that a real god?", and then we would apply the criteria for gods, such as, perhaps, do people believe in its power, its truth, or is it just an idol. Another way to come at it would be to question, when we ask "Is God real?", what criteria do we apply? what would be the basis for our judgment? in what situation are we asking this question? (to a priest? to ourselves?) Obviously you are thinking of specific criteria without considering, also, if "real" in this case is a different sense, and thus subject to different criteria.
I was just trying to figure out what you were saying.
Quoting frank
Quoting Antony Nickles
Quoting Antony Nickles
I think there is an elephant in the room. People do seem to have picked up the puzzle about why, if Austin wants to deny reality, he doesn't just come out with it. He seems to dance around the question with marginal and trivial comments on how the word "real" is used, and so forth. I think someone should at least try to explain why.
Metaphysical claims, if true, are necessarily true, which means that their contradictions are necessarily false; Epistemological claims are a priori true and hence a priori false. This undermines any idea that one can simply assert or deny such claims. True claims, whether they are necessary or a priori, exclude nothing and hence are trivial and empty; false claims could not possibly be true and hence are meaningless. So one cannot simply deny the claim that "the moon is made of green cheese" or "that 'twas brillig and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe" or that "John is a married bachelor". Denying those claims requires that they be possibly true; but a metaphysical truth, if it is true, is logically true and there is no possibility that it is false, and vice versa. All you can do with any of those three examples is point out that they are meaningless. Similarly, if someone asserts that all we ever perceive is directly is sense-data all we can do is point out what "direct" and "indirect" mean in this context.
Philosophy is extremely difficult because it needs to establish common ground where there appears to be none. But for some reason one keeps on trying.
The way I see it the word "real" is just for emphasis. If QM is taken to show us something about the fundamental nature of things, then from that perspective things are not as they seem; that is not solid and static with well-defined boundaries.
Yes, good point. You seem to agree that language cannot grasp or understand the world in full. Because it cannot perceive or think about the objects. It can express, describe, criticise and diagnose on the objects and world according to the mental events and judgments.
I was expecting to come back with his own points or arguments against my points. But I was disappointed at his response saying that my points on the Philosophy of Language are too general to give any replies. I didn't feel that was a fair and right response from him, which was also anti-philosophical. Because Philosophy is all about brining one's own arguments against the others' trying to either agree or disagree on the points, but never dismissing the other interlocutor's points on the basis of the non-philosophical reasons.
My points were not general as makes out, and was never out of blue, because I was particularly responding to his own points on few of his previous posts where he suggests that Linguistic Philosophy can understand the world in full.
The problem with language is that, no matter what one says, and how one says on something, if it were about abstract objects, then it will just be a statement about the abstract objects in one's mind.
If the sayings were about external objects, but it didn't cohere with the external object one was talking about, then it will be judged as false, or meaningless statements.
You'd have to give me some reason how this is not claiming evidence of how things are or are not done, or when they can be.
What metaphysical truth do you see in that?
Thanks. I'll add it to my reading list.
None whatever. That's the point. What Ayer wants to do, can't be done. He wants to ask the question about anything that we see (in the normal sense of "see") whether it is real. Can't be done.
If someone tried to escape a check-mate by making a knight's move with the king, you don't make a counter-move, you protest that what he wants to cannot be done.
You can't ask if your cell phone is real?
Quoting Ludwig V
I did try to explain here and here why Austin and Wittgenstein do not overtly argue for a certain case. What it comes down to is that the authority of their claims, about these examples, is only as much as you are willing to grant in seeing for yourself (finding your own reasons perhaps), say, about what Austin is claiming about how "real" works (and thus how "reality" does not**). This shift in perspective is so radical that it is possible to fight someone "too close in" where you are engaging on their terms, instead of continually leaving the door open that they might see the bigger picture, despite that we are "inclined" to just give up (PI, #217). What it takes to see the point is not adopting an opinion, understanding an argument, but changing your "attitude" (perspective, as position with respect to) or the "aspect" you see Wittgenstein will say, perhaps by even seeing what you thought you wanted in a new light (your "real need") and, in a sense, changing who you are.
One point, however, is that we all want to get at the truth, find (explicate) something illuminating about ourselves and the world. So we can say that a claim does not make sense; that we can't (yet, hopefully) figure out what sense it has, but to say it is "meaningless" is to imply that it shouldn't be meaningful to those who propose it (though I understand your point is logical Ludwig), which not only could be taken that we are dismissing "them", but that we are refusing to understand their reasons for making the argument they do (which I am guilty of). Austin crosses this line more cruelly than Wittgenstein, who is actually investigating why he wanted the kind of answers he sought in the Tractatus.
Quoting Ludwig V
Again, we are trivializing the import of these claims in mistaking that they are about how "words" are "used". He is making claims about how we actually (in the world) judge whether things are real or not; he is using these examples to draw out the criteria for it and the mechanics of it. I'm not sure how I can explain this another way unless someone explains what there is not to understand. (Not turning spade... not turning spade...)
p.s.** Austin does not get into the cases of when we do want to address "reality", as in something someone is avoiding, what you encounter in being naive, in insulting someone's hope as just a fantasy, etc.
I was responding to what seemed like your dismissal that Austin:
"is providing evidence of how the world works, Antony Nickles
I really didn't see him as doing that at all..."
Does it make sense now?
@Banno @Ludwig V (Below, I'm trying to capture that there is something to the sense that metaphysics (and skepticism) seem to follow the criteria that Austin sets out for real or not.)
Nevertheless, the truth about metaphysics is that it comes from philosophy's desire to generalize the question "Real or not?" onto everything, thus making "real" a quality of the entire world, as opposed to mediated; or objective as opposed to subjective, or appearance as opposed to universal, etc. In Austin's words, metaphysics was manufactured to answer the question whether the entire world "may not be what it seems", "raised" out of our fear ("suspicion", skepticism) that it is true. The remaining criteria (a must) of Austin's is "there is a way, or ways, in which things [the whole world] may be not what they seem [it seems]." p. 69 I'm not sure how that plays out.
Quoting Corvus
His first reaction might have been to point out that this is some of what language can do, but certainly not all. In How to do things with words he goes into this in more detail, but as points out we also command, question, doubt, and so on. With these words, we don't just percieve the world, we change it.
He might then point out that we don't only "express", we also hide, conceal and camouflage; we don't only "describe", we misdescribe, mislead, misdirect; we don't only "communicate", we deceive, mislead and beguile. Where we do one thing with words, we also do the opposite.
You'll be thinking "Yeah, but each of those is just more expressing and describing" - thereby forcing language in to the boxes you already built for it. But one should avoid the temptation to first decide what language does and then look at the how. A first step might best be to look at the variety of ways in which we do things with words and build a picture of what language does from that. Look, first.
He might puzzle as to why you give such primacy to perception. Again this might be the result of preconceived philosophical views entering in to your considerations. Giving primacy to perception is indicative of the misplaced need for certainty discussed in many of the posts here, were perception is considered, against the evidence, to be veritable. Again, perception will not bear the epistemological weight philosophers put on its shoulders.
And if Austin were writing this, there would be a thread running through the text that shows how the very approach you have taken presumes wrongly that a complete answer can be given, an account of language in its entirety, as if the whole of language dwelt within itself.
So there, against my better judgement, is a beginning of what might be said about just your first point. As Anthony says, the whole picture and every word in it is either confused or wrong.
This post might seem cruel, but you were insistent. It very much seems that although you are commendably struggling with this material, you haven't yet seen how it undermines much that you take as granted.
And yet for frank, "(Austin is) just pointing out the way we speak".
:100: :up:
I don't think it's a dismissal of Austin to fail to see anything of metaphysical import. I didn't think that was his goal. He can point out features of the way we speak, but that doesn't cash out as anything metaphysical.
I agree, but we don't learn that from analyzing speech.
I agree. I was responding to the view of the folks here on this thread. They think Austin's analysis of speech provides some foundation for something metaphysical. I don't think it does.
Has anybody here actually read any Ayers?
Why do you ask?
How would you characterize his metaphysics?
I do, but--and this is Cavell reading Wittgenstein, so I'll keep it short--there is knowledge, and then there is our relation to that knowledge, to our criteria. You may know the right thing to do, but not do it, but then you are responsible for doing so. We may have confidence in our criteria, but we still have to live our lives by them, or not. Pure (only) knowledge is the attempt to remove any doubt, thus the possibility of human failing, remove the need for "our bond".
Ok. :smile:
We're getting off the rails. I thought you were dismissing my claim that Austin "is providing evidence of how the world works." Thus my bolded quote where he is making claims about how the world works. As far as metaphysics goes, I'm not sure what you mean by that term. He's dismantling metaphysics (in all its hydra-head of forms), not trying to substitute an answer to the same skepticism.
Yeah, there's a need to go back to the text.
Malcolm is not creating his own opponent, but is addressing an assortment of historical figures, for example:
Descartes, "all the same thoughts and conceptions which we have while awake may also come to us in sleep"
Aristotle, "'the soul' makes 'assertions' in sleep, giving in the way of example a dream that 'some object approaching is a man or house' or that 'the object is white or beautiful'"
Kant, "In deepest sleep perhaps the greatest perfection of the mind might be exercised in rational thought. For we have no reason for asserting the opposite except that we do not remember the idea when awake. This reason, however, proves nothing."
Moore, "We cease to perform them only while we are asleep, without dreaming; and even in sleep, so long as we dream, we are performing acts of consciousness"
Russell, " What, in dreams, we see and hear, we do in fact see and hear, though, owning to the unusual context, what we see and hear gives rise to false beliefs."
All of these quotes are from his book Dreaming.
So, should we count Austin amongst this very esteem group? Let's take a look at another quote about dreams from Sense and Sensibilia, pg 42
"And we might add here that descriptions of dreams, for example, plainly can't be taken to have exactly the same force and implications as the same words would have, if used in the description of ordinary waking experiences. In fact, it is just because we all know that dreams are throughout unlike waking experiences that we can safely use ordinary expressions in the narration of them; the peculiarity of the dream-context is sufficiently well known for nobody to be misled by the fact that we speak in ordinary terms."
In this paragraph, he states the we "know" dreams are unlike waking experience, and we know "the dream-context" sufficiently to not be confused. As stated before, in "Other Minds", he states, "There are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking..." But the problem here is that he does not specify these "recognized ways". This has not gone unnoticed by a Barry Stroud, in his book, The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism, "Austin does not say much about what he thinks the 'procedures' or 'recognized ways' of telling that one is not dreaming actually are. He seems content with the idea that there must be a procedure or else we would not be able to use and to contrast the words 'dreaming' and 'waking' as we do".
What could be these 'procedures' or 'ways'? I think it would be useful to understand how we come to learn such a concept as 'dreaming'. Malcom describes it as such, "If after waking from a sleep a child tells us that he saw and did and thought various things, none of which could be true, and if his relation of these incidents has spontaneity and no appearance of invention, then we may say to him 'It was a dream'. We do not question whether he really had a dream or if it merely seems to him that he did." and "That this question is not raised is not a mere matter of fact but essential to our concept of dreaming."
I believe Austin may be thinking that we know the concept of dreaming from 'one's own case'. From 'one own case' we know, somehow, that this case cannot be the case of a waking experience. However, Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigation attack this notion that one learns what thinking, remembering, mental images, sensations, and so on, are from 'one's own case'. Malcolm says the following:
"One may think to overcome these difficulties by allowing that the descriptions that people give of their private states provides a determination of what those states are and whether they are the same. But if one takes this line (which is correct) one cannot then permit a question to be raised as to whether those descriptions are in error or not-for this would be to fall back into the original difficulty. One must treat the description as the criterion of what the inner occurrence are. 'An "inner process" stands in need of the outward criteria' (Wittgenstein, PI 580)."
However, could Austin believe that the 'recognized way' of knowing comes from remembering how we learned "dreaming' in the first place. That we wake up with the impression of having done certain things, and understanding that they are not true. But is anything really being compared here? Are we contrasting the dream experience with an awake experience, or are we simply applying the concept of dreaming in the way we learned it?
Did you see this reply?
I take him in the current work only to be pointing out that words can have different import given a context of expectations and shared understandings, rather than assumed to be interchangeable wherever they are until proven otherwise.
Quoting Richard B
It doesnt sound like anything Ive read of his. Even in Other Minds he is debunking Moores argument from analogy (I would like to know the page of your quote, as I could not find it). I would say that the recognized ways of distinguishing (not knowing) dreaming from waking are the criteria for differentiation of the two, one of which I claimed would be that we only remember dreams; another would be we dont have control over the events of our regular life in the same way. I also think it bears pointing out that recognized is meant: by society, and is not a conscious acknowledgement or reasoned application of criteria. Our lives ordinarily happen as a matter of course and our criteria are only applied when there is something unexpected, phishy, phoney as Austin says. I believe I gave some examples of those circumstances above as well.
The quote by Wittgenstein is very easy to take in multiple ways. But, if our descriptions are the outward criteria, then there doesnt need to be anything inner in the sense of something I know. Wittgenstein calls them expressions because I am in no better position to describe (or know) something than you are (I may be blind to myself, or say something that reveals more about me than I realize). This may be, of course, off the topic of Austin, other than he is also discussing criteria, and it does have a fallout for what processes are inner.
Of course you can ask that. But you are asking whether your cell phone as real. Maybe it's a dummy or a toy. But you can't ask if everything you see is real.
The classic case is produced by Ryle. You can ask of each coin in your pocket, whether it is a forgery. ;But you can't ask if all coins are forgeries. Because no coin can be a forgery unless there is a definition of what it is to be not forged. Actually, and more relevantly, you can't ask in general whether all x's are imitations, because what an imitation is, is defined by defining what is not an imitation.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I'm sorry. Things go so fast here that I sometimes don't check as carefully as I should.
Quoting Antony Nickles
You make a good point in this paragraph.
Quoting frank Good question. I've read various things that he wrote, but not this specific text. Now I know where to get hold of it. I will certainly read it - and I expect to change my views somewhat.
Quoting frank
Actually, that is a more difficult question than you might have thought. His first book, Language, Truth and Logic introduced Logical Positivism to the UK. That was already a movement that rejected traditional metaphysics and proposed logical analysis as the new method for philosophy, so Ayer would himself have claimed that his theory is not metaphysical. Nor was he the first to do so. Both Berkeley and Descartes made the same claim.
PS. On reflection, I think there is something important in the observation that Ayer also rejected (traditional) metaphysics. That means that we should look more carefully at Austin's critique of Ayer's "two languages" theory. I don't have time to do this now, but it seems to me now that his suggestion that Ayer assumes that the sense-datum language is more fundamental, more accurate, preferable to what he calls "material object language". He sees it as a version of traditional (i.e. metaphysical) views and references Berkeley. But Berkeley was against (traditional, for him) metaphysics and arguably also has a "two language" version of his theory. I don't have time to work this out right now, but it is more complicated that I had recognized. (Hume, so far as I recall, doesn't have a "two language" account of his system.)
The contents of your post doesn't seem to have any points against the fact that language is a tool to describe, express, criticise and diagnose the objects and world.
In other words, adding and listing all your points to the already stated fact, that language is a communication tool, does not change anything of the point.
Read your post again. It is filled with illogical and emotional conjectures - "you will be doing this, you would be doing that ..." It doesn't state any objective fact either on perception, or language.
See your imaginative conjectures? Who are "we"? Do we always change the world? With language?
Can you change the tree on the road with your words?
There it is!
But I'm running Norton's Anti-virus software. It warns me that connections to this site are not secure. Can you re-assure me that nothing disastrous will happen if I follow the link anyway?
I'm sorry, but I'm risk-averse, especially in the environment of the internet.
Thanks.
All these activities you listed are just part of the communication, description, expression and criticisms ... so on and so forth. You just listed these items to fill in the space. I could have done that, but what is the point? Everyone knows that they are part of the communication and interaction.
Quoting Banno
Misunderstanding and getting mixed up is evident here. "what language does from that."? Language doesn't do anything. It is a tool. Humans do things. Language just gets used to communicate and interact their thoughts, feelings and intentions.
Quoting Banno
You deny and criticise giving Prima Facie on perception leaning on Austin's shoulder, as if perception doesn't count. But here you seem to be acknowledging that you must perceive first before you can speak. Wouldn't it be a case of self-contradiction?
First of all, I think you should learn to think and speak for yourself, not hiding behind Austin or whoever when expressing your points in Philosophy. But more importantly, I think you seem to be wrong again on that point. What is the point trying to create a well with just Austin's linguistic analysis on Ayer? Wouldn't the water in the well go stale soon with the prejudice and narrow mindedness rejecting all the relating issues, analysis and criticisms?
Should we not try to look wider? OK we cannot grasp the whole world or universe, let's presume, but should we not try to look at the issue at least from the perspective of Language in general? From my perspective, it would be more constructive to do so, otherwise you cannot comment on anything which is buried and hiding in the artificially dug-up wells.
Quoting Banno
Here, one cannot fail to notice the impression that the whole motivation seems to prove the opposing interlocutors views are either confused or wrong, rather than trying to see the issue from a fair, reasonable and constructive point of view.
Well, the answer to your last question must be No. If you define the problem as the connection between words and the world, you have built that answer in to the question.
But what is at stake is not merely words and things, but how we think of things, and how that affects how we live. The concept of "the lived world" or, better, "the world as we live in it" is helpful here.
I suggest that we can recognize that the distinction between words and things may be useful and appropriate in certain contexts (A rose by any other name would smell as sweet) and that a generalization to everything in every context is extremely dubious, not to say puzzling.
Words are not separate from the world, but part of it; they are also things in the world. In any case, the focus on the relationship between words and (other) things is not always helpful. Not all words, to put it as constructively as I can, stand in the same relationship to things. How do you apply this idea to "and", "if", "not"? Anyway things are not the only things in the world (events, states, processes, etc. etc.). Are mental objects things in the world? Numbers? (No, they are not just words. Different languages use different words to refer to the same numbers.)
I note here that Austin also refers to "non-verbal" reality. In one way this is perfectly natural, and is provided for in natural (ordinary) language. In another way, it is very puzzling, because it can be taken as suggesting that no language can "fully describe" or "fully capture" the whole of reality. I'm sure Austin is fully aware of all that, so I assume that he intends to take advantage of what is provided for in natural language without saying anything about the generalization. I don't have an answer here and suspect that there can't be one. My preferred solution is that this is a false dilemma, but I don't know how to prove it.
You are right to point out that words don't do things. People do. But communication can only take place because they use words in the same way. Humpty Dumpty was partly right (think of that rose again) but also partly wrong. Communication would break down if you decided to use "platypus" in the way the rest of us use "rose" (without telling us) - and so on. Call it objective or inter-subjective, it is meaningful to talk about what "rose" and "platypus" mean.
The revolutions of Copernicus and Newton were not simply discoveries. They involved thinking about things in a different way. The effect on how (Western European) people thought of themselves in the world was dramatic. The revolutions of QM and Relativity also involved changing how we think of things and also profoundly affect how we think of ourselves in the world. Nor is it just a question of science. Religious and cultural movements can also bring about profound change and change the world that we live in. Luther's Reformation. Paine's defence of the common man. Capitalism. Marxism. That's where philosophy comes in.
Quoting Corvus
I think that is a bit unfair. Austin undoubtedly thinks that he is treating Ayer's view in a fair and reasonable way. "Constructive" is a bit more complicated. If someone claims to have devised a perpetual motion machine, what is the constructive way to treat their idea? (BTW, I think that Austin goes to impressive lengths to consider Ayer's views carefully, but, for the most part, is also right to criticize them.)
Therefore you cannot change the world or objects in the world with your words.
Quoting Ludwig V
For Austin, maybe it was. But that was the impression being created and propagated by his blinded followers.
If you're contemplating the possibility that you're in the Matrix, you can. It's just a matter of imagination. There's nothing illogical about it. Descartes leads us through a list of possibilities for it.
I think the argument you're thinking of won't allow global skepticism, that is, you can't wonder if everything is unreal, because the meaning of real will breakdown if you do. Questioning everything you see is not global skepticism, though. You can allow the reality of something you aren't seeing.
It was who claimed that you perceive the world, then change it with words. I was just asking a question expressing doubts on his claim.
By the way, there is no connection between words and the world. There is connection between words and mental events and activities.
Hey! There is something we agree on. So can we also agree that how we think about (conceptualize) our world changes us and therefore it? Or are we not part of the world?
Quoting Corvus
OK. I have no brief to speak for his followers. Either we deal with them separately, or we ignore them.
Quoting Corvus
.. and mental events are not part of the world?
Quoting frank
If I'm contemplating the possibility that I'm in the Matrix, I'm also contemplating the possibility that the Matrix doesn't work. In fact, all those clever scientists have already informed me that the world is very different from what I think it is, so I know it doesn't work. But then, the whole business gets upset because I'm already in a brain in a vat.
I am running Safari on an iPad 6 and nothing seems to have gone wrong, but, and heres a question, how would one know they are hacked when the point is for the hacker not to reveal they are hacking someone?
Well you could assert it is part of the world. I won't challenge you on that.
I, personally see my mental events / state totally separate from the world. When I go to sleep, the world disappears into non-existence.
There is no logical ground for me to believe the world exists during my sleep, because I no longer perceive the world until waking up to consciousness. Therefore perception is prior to language. Language only operates when the mind is in gear, and able to see the world, as a communicating and interacting tool with other minds.
Yes, it is a tool, like I would use a wrench to pull out the nails from the broken door. Language is a tool to transfer my contents of thought to you to mean "This is what I think on the issue. What do you say to that eh? alright mate?". Nothing more or less.
Whatever Banno says to the tree in the field he sees, the tree will not change. It will just keep growing at his own pace ignoring him totally.
Suppose, we have no language at all. The world will keep going on albeit with no or limited communications between all the living beings. We might have to wave hands to each other to mean Yes or No, or use our fingers to count the apples in the market, but the world will remain silent, and just keep going about with its business like it has done for millions of years.
Well, if you are asleep, I would have thought that you are not in a position to believe (or disbelieve) anything.
Well, what about dreams, you say? If dreams prove anything, they prove that if you do believe anything in your sleep, you would be well advised to review it when you wake up.
"because I no longer perceive the world until waking up to consciousness." You'll enjoy Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human knowledge or Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. You'll be disappointed in the end, though. The thing is, given that you cannot prove that things exist when you do not perceive them, you cannot prove that they don't, either.
I don't say that there are no cases where things cease to exist when I no longer perceive them. But I do say that there are some things that continue to exist when I no longer perceive them. On your account, you have decided that "exists" and "perceive" mean the same thing. I accept what I understand to be normal usage. We use the words in different ways. Why does it matter?
Quoting Corvus
Sorry, I don't understand this. Typo somewhere?
I think the back of my head exists when I don't perceive it - which is most of the time. I think the other side of the coin I'm holding exists even though I don't perceive it. Will that do?
See I have noticed the linguists always go on at "use the words in different ways. Why does it matter?" But it is just matter of habits, customs and choices of the different groups of people or individual. It is not something a priori problem.
So, let me ask you first what is the logical ground that things exists when you don't perceive them?
A p.s. to the reference to ways of distinguishing between dreaming and awaking in Other Minds. I found the quote (p. 87). Based on the surrounding text, I take it that Austin feels that the situation is one that philosophy has removed from the attendant contexts of the two things.
Quoting Austin, Other Minds, p.87 (emphasis in bold added) this is a link to the text
The fallout here is that asking the question "Am I awake or dreaming?" assumes that we are asking how we "know" if our experience is "real" in situations where we are able to distinguish between the two solely on the difference in the situations (their separate contexts)--Austin puts it rather arrogantly that I am not "entitled" to ask, but he just means it would never come to whether dreaming was a phoney version of being awake. Now, how the situations are different is a matter we could discuss, as I think I have, but that can be elaborated as ordinary, recognized distinctions of the surrounding circumstances.
Lecture VIII: I first realized here that Austin is very bent out of shape that someone can just "prefer to say" things one way or another, depending on their "preferences" (p.78); which made me look back at words being "invented ad hoc" (p.75), or "fooled around with" (p.62), and his guard against distinctions seeming "arbitrary" (p. 63), and particularly his insistence that some things can be "wrong" (p. 63), leading to:
Which makes me consider that one of Austin's motivations, that I grant appear hidden, is to find (or defend) a truth between metaphysical certainty and radical skepticism (which would make his concerns less than trivial). This may come later.
What he does say is that Ayer is fixated on the case where we think something is there but nothing is, which sounds like when philosophy thought that ethics was possible, but determined there was nowhere from which to judge right and wrong (the way it wanted). Leaving that be, Austin counters with the case where we see something where something else really is. (Id.) This sounds similar to a case where one thing is limiting our ability to pick out another, say, seeing the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika (PI, #420). Austin also points out cases where something is or might be taken to be what it isnt really. (P.80) This error comes from the possibility to focus/judge on parts of a thing ("aspects" Wittgenstein will say) for which there are criteria (thought of by philosophy as "particulars", or, here, "my perception"), and thus, as he points our here, the possibility to be fooled sometimes in the process. The fact there are certain public possibilities, is why seeing is not a mental process but is simply recognizing or identifying (taking says Austin) something as something, say, seeing a wing as a way for a bird to retain body heat, rather than seeing it as a means of flight. (One could almost say we perceive it that way, but this makes it sound like only we can, or know we have.) Ill leave my thoughts on general accounts and predictive value for another time.
Somehow I think that Austin has not quite got his act together. I take it that he is concerned about, for example, the difference between appearance and reality, where there is a claim that nothing is real except appearances and the distinction between between the real and the unreal has been (in our view) over-generalized. He wants (needs to) rule that distinction out, (i.e. show that the question "How do you mean?" cannot be answered in this context). But he doesn't quite get that far.
Whatever you may say about brain in vat, it's not illogical, and neither is indirect realism.
I am a brain in a vat. How could it be illogical?
I know I'm breaking the rules.
But we've retreated to dogma and playing games. However, the orthodox "brain in a vat" thought experiment is just a game as well, only it has a pompous name. That's my point. It works if, and only if, you follow the rules. But the rules are deliberately designed to force you to a conclusion. So it is not argument, as such. An argument proceeds from agreed premises to a conclusion, not from an assumed conclusion through a set of rules designed to enforce it.
Quoting Antony Nickles
That's a very interesting way of putting it. Austin has to be familiar with the doctrines. But it has to be part of a more complicated version of the official programme. That's not an objection.
notice that the following is phrased in the first person plural"
The argument is not that I know dreams are unlike waking experiences, it's that we know. If he were basing this on his own case, wouldn't that be "..it is just because I know that dreams are throughout unlike waking experiences that I can safely use ordinary expressions in the narration of them".
Not a knock-down case, but Austin, of course, was writing without the benefit of access to Wittgenstein's work, so it is no surprise that he doesn't place much emphasis on distinguishing one's own case from the communal case. It probably did not occur to him that folk might read it as you have.
So the test does not support your assertion, at least here.
:grin: As I said:
Quoting Banno
I can only set the argument before you. If you can't see it, that's down to you.
There's a curious myopia amongst those who see language as only "communication" or "information exchange", such that they have a great deal of difficulty seeing how words are actually used by people to build the world. Property, ownership, money, exchange, promises, hierarchies, the everyday paraphernalia of life is constructed by language.
Austin's student, John Searle, followed through on these ideas. I outlined his approach in Institutional Facts: John R. Searle.
I suppose this presents an argument for a follow-on thread examining How To Do Things With Words.
Such stuff is basic philosophical literacy.
:lol: Not in your world, perhaps.
Yep. Quoting Ludwig V
Nope. Worked for me, but like Antony I am using Safari.
Not bad. However, I am not convinced of your or my argument. There is a nice youtube video titled John Searle on Austin and Wittgenstein. One rather humorous story Searle recollects was when he discussed the private language argument with Austin. From Searle's point of view Austin did not understand Wittgensteins point when the beetle in the box was brought up. Austins response was something like, see the beetle is a something and a nothing, a clear contradiction. It is a short video but funny and shows how very different these two philosophers were as people.
:lol:
Given this, there is no way that you will be able to understand Austin. You've just got the perception stuff far too embedded in your thinking. It's a bit sad that you have been so mislead, but them's the breaks.
You do know that the world continues while you sleep. Right up until you try to do philosophy. But if you insist that your words do not connect to the world and that you cannot tell if you are awake or asleep and that the world ceases to exist when you sleep, then there is little common ground on which we might move forward.
So I might leave this conversation there.
You spoke it to someone with a chainsaw, not to the tree. You still cannot distinguish words and actions.
There is a difference between having no logical ground of believing in the existence of X, and the actual existence of X. Please think about it carefully again. Leaving is fine. It just confirms you ran out of the ideas for the arguments. What can anyone do about it?
You say that as if the order can't change things. And yet it does.
Quoting Banno
Another confusion between words and things. :roll: You still seem to be hiding in Austin' well, and cannot see the world out there just staring at the well wall.
But you don't see the fact it was the action which changed the tree not your word.
Words are actions. We do things by speaking and writing. Your view of language is far too passive.
Hmmm I don't agree with you at all. You are still confusing the tools with the broken door. :(
Well, that's a question. My antivirus does notify me about trackers, though. And ransomware needs to draw attention to itself.
Thanks for this.
Nothing's perfect. I find it reassuring that someone else has used the site and not come to visible harm. There's no guarantee that the anti-virus software is always right, either.
Thanks for the reassurance.
I will download the book.
Obviously. It probably has not been pointed out to you before that we do things with words. A Big Learning for you.
Quoting Banno
Austin's writing is very clear, and his points are logical. Anyone reading Austin will have no problem understanding him. For some reason you seem to think, no one can understand Austin.
No. I think most folk here understand Austin. You are an exception.
Yeah I gave you the reason why I don't agree with your points. I would have thought you would admit the problems in your statements which are full of confusions and contradictions.
I never claimed I understand Austin in full.
And the repairing tools are not the broken doors to be repaired. Saying they are the same sounds illogical.
I don't know what the standard would be to "rule... out" the distinction, but I don't think he wants to say our questions about the world cannot be addressed, and so does not need to show that the position has no meaning. The problem of our skepticism of the world and others is not going away here; Austin is only pointing out our sufficient ordinary criteria in order to normalize how we address these situations (rather than solving it for every case, forever).
What I take him to be doing in Lec VIII is showing there are other types of cases involved in the issue in order to break apart the forced dichotomy of appearance vs. reality, which dictates their definition and mechanics. This widening of cases allows for discussion of appearing and appearance, and reality and what's real, only with the requirements of a context and the ordinary criteria we use in those situations.
That's interesting. But it is curious that Austin's reaction would suit Wittgenstein fine. The idea of private experiences makes them a something and a nothing, which is a contradiction. Ergo, the idea of private experience is self-contradictory. QED.
Quoting Corvus
I think the problem here is that you do not believe in the existence of unperceived objects and need an argument to prove them. I believe in the existence of unperceived objects and expect you to give me a reason not to. It's not a promising start for an argument, is it?
Berkeley doesn't do much better, either.
I think I'll wait and see what happens in VIII ff.
Speech Acts
(The end of that article has some critique of Austin for you).
Just assume that terrible things are going to happen at any time, and then when they do happen you won't be surprised. Does that help?
Good stuff. "This was Austin's most important idea: All utterances are the performance of speech acts"
It's not illogical. If you think it is, could you show how?
The conversation above with @Corvus has me wondering how much this topic depends on an understanding that language is not purely descriptive. I hadn't considered "How to do things with words" a prerequisite, but perhaps it should have been...?
Ayer adopts a descriptivist theory of language, of course. Is Austin anywhere arguing against descriptivism in these lectures?
Quoting Banno
I think this essay addresses the issue in its own way, though perhaps less directly. I think it is important to note that acts that perform something are merely an example of a way that something has the import ("value") to us that we want of truth (judgment, necessity, implications, etc.), without their being judged on the criteria we have for true or false, and so "speech acts" are not replacing that standard (answering the same need), nor are a generalized explanation of meaning.
Quoting Banno
In this essay, he is also giving examples, but of how we address "real" without turning it into a metaphysical quality everything has (that we don't "perceive"). As I put this above, Austin is pointing out our sufficient ordinary criteria in order to normalize how we address the situations involving "real" vs. "appearance"; in the instance of the other essay, rather than addressing everything as subject to the question: true or false?
You can't cut down a tree, or influence it in any way, with words. You can of course influence other language users with words, you can induce them to cut down the tree. So, it is of course true that we are influenced by our own words and the words of others, that is we are influenced by our understandings of the meanings of those words, and not by the words themselves as mere physical phemomena, whether they come in the form of visual symbols or sounds.
Quoting Banno
Who doesn't understand that words are not merely descriptive? Someone who has not given the matter any thought would likely not even explicitly think of words as descriptive, let alone as merely descriptive. This seems like a simplistic strawman to me.
Once you've read it, here's a link to my take so far. I haven't written up my notes past page 80.
Thanks for your concern.
I'll just make sure that my back-ups are up to date and then get on with it.
As you don't quite say, bad things happen - and not only on the internet. Get Plan B in place and then get on with it.
You've been watching too much Amy Schumer.
I'm not sure what "it" refers to here. I thought my question suggested that I thought that my view that I am a brain in a vat is not illogical. That was intentional.
However, perhaps I haven't understood what you mean by "illogical". ?
Or perhaps you think that I think that the concept of a brain in a vat is illogical. I don't. It is a very odd description, somewhat like describing music on a violin as the sound of catgut vibrating. The overtones are clear - and no doubt deliberate.
I've never even heard of her. Who is she? Is she a suitable life model for a ancient retired male WASP philosopher?
Quoting Ludwig V
Oh good. :up:
Actually, if you are saying that perhaps in this context "real" and "unreal" are more important than "true" or "false", I think you may have a point. After all, part of the problem is that it seems that everything we want to describe can be equally well described in sense-datum language and in ordinary (natural) language. So truth/falsity is arguably not the issue.
Careful, now. I also think that the idea that I'm living in a Matrix situation is an implausible fantasy. In particular, I know that the truth of the matter is far stranger than Matrix proposes
.
Yes. It's just that illogical doesn't mean unlikely, or even false. It looked to me that ordinary language was failing us in an ordinary language thread. Good to know that didn't happen. :grin:
In these lectures the target has a very odd view, that all we have at hand is the perception, and never the thing perceived. I supose such a one could never cut down a tree, but only a perception-of-tree...
Speech Act Theory seems to have problems. It confuses word utterances from actions just like you have done. Now I know where your confusion is coming from.
If you asked Searle "Who cut the tree?", he would say "You ordered me to cut the tree, so it must be the words in the order sir."
Yeah, you can. I put in the order, Trees-are-us came and implemented it. Who cut down the tree? If they find out it was over twelve metres tall, it is I and not Trees-are-us who get fined. I didn't touch the saw, but I cut the tree down by giving an order.
And all I need demonstrate here is that this is the sort of thing we do say, setting out a way that we do act. That's enough.
There is a difference between an order and a saw. They do different things. But that is not pertinent. I cut the tree down by giving an order.
Cheers, Corvus. You win.
Confucius taught this. They call it "social magic." It starts with rituals, but there is also the performance. Confucius taught that you should learn the rituals, and then perfect the performance by breathing life into your interactions with other people. So it's not just the words. They're basically part of the ritual. It's by the performance that you are responsible for the death of the tree.
You would say, "The tree was cut down by the tree surgeon."
That seems nonsensical to me; words do not cut downs trees, people do. You influenced someone by words to cut down the tree, you did not cut down the tree, even though, by convention, you may be held responsible for the other's act of cutting down the tree.
Disregard entirely.
The point, way back, is that we do things with our utterances.
The context was the erroneous description of language given here:
Quoting Corvus
I'll leave you to agree, or not, with this. I hope to get back to the main text.
(I'd erroneously supposed that Corvus' muddle might segue into Lecture IX, one of the particulars therein being that a word's having a different use need not mean it has a different sense.)
Quoting frank
Yep.
Searle goes in to the background conditions and such in detail, while Strawson moves sideways to intent. It's a big area. Even bigger, if we now include Confucius.
In the sense that we may act on other people (and some animals) with our utterances, such as to cause, or at least influence, them to do things, I agree.
Vats don't have toes that can be smashed.
Quoting Ludwig V
What I was trying to say is that Austin's goal here, as elsewhere, is to show that there are more considerations (criteria) and situations than philosophy takes into account. However, as he hints at earlier, which I mention here, I do think he is (or will be) concerned here also with truth, what Ayer refers to as "veridical", and, though I might grant we can describe things within the picture of sense-datum and on our ordinary terms (these are not a matter of "language"), I think Austin's point will be that there is a right and wrong, perhaps based on what doing those "well" consists of, or that we are not aware of, or do not get, "everything we want". This remains to be seen of course.
Sounds dubious.
Just to be sure, the notion of predictive value is from Ayer, pp 267-268. It's Ayer who would privilege certain sense-data because of a mooted "predictive value"...
There's also this gem...
Ayer only knows he's not dreaming because reality is repetitive. Not much of an argument.
Almost pragmatic.
You are not at all paying attention to the difference between capacity, or potential, and a disposition, which I explained. They are opposing terms in the sense that capacity is the freedom to act in a multitude of different way, while a disposition is a restriction to that capacity, resulting in one specific type of action. That is why explaining potential, capacity, skill, liability habit, custom, etc., in terms of dispositions can never be sufficient.
It's very clear to me, that we do not ever get to the bottom of a disposition, because the singularity of the disposition becomes unintelligible when we try to make it consistent with the underlying multitude of possibilities. Molecular structure is not "the bottom" . We must look at the structure of atoms and electron shells to understand the underlying potential which gets tied up in the disposition you call "molecular structure". Then we get faced with the reality of quantum particles being described as possibilities. Ultimately the question of why specific possibilities are selected to be actualized (wave function collapse) cannot be answered. The tendency, in the modern mindset is to ignore the necessity of the act of selection, therefore deny the logical requirement of an agent which selects, and simply assume that the underlying potential restricts or limits itself (self-organization) in an habitual way, resulting in the describable disposition.
Quoting Ludwig V
These arguments both, can only remove the potential of the underlying matter or substance, by replacing it with something actual. This is the actuality of God. The problem though, is that the reality of potential cannot simply be replaced by the actuality of God, because this produces determinism, which is inconsistent with our experience. Therefore to maintain the reality of free will we must maintain the reality of potential. However, since the concept of free will in human beings cannot account for the agent involved in the selection from the possibilities which underly the natural dispositions you refer to, such as molecular structures, we do not avoid the need for the Will of God.
Quoting Ludwig V
The problems with the Theory of Forms, are more complex than you might think. It became evident to Plato that there was a need for "the good", as that which makes the Forms, as intelligible objects, intelligible, in the same way that the sun makes visible objects visible. Then he started to outline his understanding of the requirement of a medium between the Forms and the things of the sensible world. This medium was Plato's solution to the interaction problem often attributed to dualism.
Quoting Banno
Quoting frank
I've read enough of A.J. Ayer to know that the way to show his metaphysics as misconceived is through his moral philosophy. He seems to misinterpret the classical (Aristotelian) distinction between the apparent good, and the real good, such that he cannot find any principles which might distinguish these two. I think Copleston provides a good approach.
The well is Austin's criticism of Ayer's position. The conversation is based upon that. In the conversation, relevant replies dip from exactly that well. Germane points and subsequent conversation are not creating the well. They're using it; drawing it up from the depths... examining its contents.
Valid objection/criticism of Austin's critique of Ayer's position is perfectly fine. If the criticism is broad, and it somehow applies locally to this particular thread topic, then that connection ought be set out in as clear and concise language as possible.
Quoting Corvus
The last claim above does not follow from the bit that precedes it.
Think of when you've watched another sleep. People sleep. We watch. We're part of the world. The world exists while they sleep. If you agree, but still doubt your own experience, then you're working from double standards. Special pleading for your case.
Quoting Corvus
We cannot change the tree on the road with our words alone. It does not follow from that that we cannot change the world with our words. Strictly speaking we do always change the world with our language, if for no other reason than we've added more examples of language use to it.
The point is that we do sometimes use language to do exactly what you said, but... and this is the important part...
We do other stuff with it too.
https://ia804706.us.archive.org/19/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.46395/2015.46395.Foundations-Of-Empirical-Knowledge_text.pdf
And things still seem to be working OK.
Quoting Janus
Quoting Banno
Quoting Janus
Interesting exchanges, both of you.
It reminds me of Austin's arguments in chapter VII, the one that I tried to summarise last week. It is obvious that we cannot cut a tree with just words, but we can't cut it if we don't understand the act of 'cutting' either.
This is why some words - according to Austin - are considered as 'dimension words', the ones which tend to be more suitable for the needs and demands of people. For example: Banno could have said to me: 'Rip out the leaves of the tree'. I would probably not understand him, so I would not be able to do this action.
But, using dimension words such as 'cut' - or 'good' or the controversial 'real' - my basic knowledge would influence me to do what Banno is asking for.
Then, they depend on each other. Linguistic understanding and metaphysical possibility.
Continuing from p.80 in Lecture VIII, Ayer admits that the criteria he values most is that of prediction. I have here and elsewhere asserted that the claim to objectivity or universality or purity or Ayers directness is based on the desire to have a reliable, predetermined, complete, independent standard, like math, that allows us to have outcomes that are predictable (thus the clamor for something like science, the facts of which are based on repeatability). For example, we want a moral rule or goal so that we dont have to be good, we can just do what has been determined is good, and thus we are absolved because we can just claim, I followed the rule!
The desire to anticipate the implications of our actions is also a motivation for a general explanation. If there is anything Austin is good at, it is showing that abstraction is the death of truth. It seems clever to find one criteria to judge everything by (true or false? Real or not?) because it doesnt change, which makes for predictable outcomes. But a general account also flattens out distinctions, which are exactly what will inform us of what might happen in a particular instance.
I think that what needs to be said about the tree is 1) you can't cut down a tree (in one sense of "cut down") with 1) words, 2) a fishing net, 3) a screwdriver ... More generally, there are things we cannot do with words, and there are things we can do with words. The problem then arises with the philosophical division between words and things. That's the bit that creates unnecessary problems. But words are also part of the world and words are also things in the world. The distinction between the two may have uses for certain purposes, but if misapplied, just generates false puzzles.
It wasn't about other people sleeping. It was about the question, do I believe the world exists, when I am asleep? The point is not about the existence of the world. It is about the logical ground for believing in something when not perceiving. There is a clear difference.
Quoting creativesoul
X cannot do Y. That doesn't mean X cannot do Y? Is this not a contradiction? This is exactly the confusion I have been telling he has been insisting on. :)
Quoting creativesoul
Literally you could say anything. But that alone doesn't change anything in the real world. You need action to change the world. I take it that you have never cut your grass by yourself in your life for sure. :rofl: How nice it would be if you can change the world by your words alone. :roll:
You could say your words caused the action to happen. But you forgot the words were just expression (a communicating tool) of your thoughts, emotions and intentions. Not the actions. I hope that you are more reasonable than Banno in understanding and accepting this point. If not, it is OK. I gave my opinion for the points, as you asked for it.
You seem to have missed the point.
When we sleep, we are not perceiving the world.
Now apply the example I offered. It is of a case where someone we're watching is sleeping, and the world still exists even though they are not perceiving the world. The same holds true of the world and you while you sleep.
You're mistaken here. "change the tree on the road with our words alone" is not equivalent to "change the world with our words". In other words, you've assigned the same variable "Y" to two different things and then treated them as the same thing. They're not.
See that word "alone"?
Words do not cut down trees. Words can instruct another to cut down trees... using language to do so.
Yes.
As I previously said in this long thread: Philosophers... always finding problems where there are none. :wink:
Quoting Ludwig V
I agree. Very well explained, Ludwig. I also think that Austin wants to argue about this in some paragraphs. Especially, when he explains the extension of the application and uses on words such as 'real' and 'good'.
The point is that we are talking about a logical ground to believe in the world when not perceiving the world. Please ask yourself, what is your logical ground for believing in the world when not perceiving the world. Please don't say the world exists even when you are not perceiving it, because it is not what we are talking about here. We are talking about the basis for scepticim regarding the external world.
Quoting creativesoul
But did words cut the tree itself? What tools did the words use for cutting down the tree?
OK, you say now you gave instruction to cut down the tree. Did the tree surgeon cut down the tree without any payments for it? If you gave the instruction to cut the tree, but haven't paid for the work, would he have cut the tree?
What if the tree surgeon refused to cut the tree, because the tree is not allowed to be cut due to the local conservation laws. What if he misunderstood your instruction, and cut the tree in next door neighbour's garden instead? But more importantly, did you give the instruction to cut the tree out of blue with no thoughts why the tree needs cut?
Again you could insist on saying that your words in the instruction caused the tree to be cut, but with all the above possibilities with the situation, are you actually justified to claim that it was your instruction which cut down the tree? Some people in ordinary daily life might say that, but you must be aware of the fact that here we are talking about rigid philosophical analysis on the change of the world, not daily life conversations.
The bottom line here is whether logically, if a hammer is the broken door. You used a hammer to repair the door. But the hammer is not the door. If you said that they are the same, I don't see any more point honestly.
Anyhow, I have gone over this same stuff with Banno all along, and I don't see any point of doing so again with yourself. My points are clear.
1. We don't have a logical ground to believe in the world while not perceiving it.
2. Words are not actions.
3. Words are not things.
4. Language is a communicating tool.
Have a nice day.
Cool, thanks!
While in general support of your arguments, I think your #1 is suspect.
Its nonetheless quite obvious, if youre doing continental metaphysics and everyone else is doing meta-linguistics, the chances for agreeing on much of anything is vanishingly small.
The logical ground for me to believe the tree exists across the road is that, I have perceived its existence. There is no other ground for me to believe in the tree to exist apart from the perception.
But when I don't perceive it, I don't have that ground to believe it still exists. It might well be existing, but with no perception of it, there is no ground for believing it anymore.
Normally people still believe the tree to exist when not seeing it, because that's what they do.
But as I don't have a ground to believe in its existence, I can choose not to believe in its existence.
Now which belief is more rational? I would say my belief is more rational than the ordinary peoples' belief, because their belief has no ground, but I chose not to believe in its existence when I don't have a logical and epistemic ground to believe in it.
So the whole point of argument was about the logical ground for belief in the world, rather than the existence of the world itself.
You might believe the tree exists because a trusted friend told you so, and on the other hand, your perception might be delivering false information to you if, for instance, you have taken a hallucinogenic drug. So, though it's true that if you perceive a tree, it's rational to believe there's a tree, it's probably not the only grounding for such a belief, right?
hmmm being a sceptic, I am afraid I don't base on any of above case as the logical infallible ground for the existence of the tree apart from my own perception. Maybe some other folks might. Not me. :)
I don't think your perception is infallible. LSD is not a "true" hallucinogenic, which means you know at the time that what you're seeing isn't real. For instance, I had an incident where I observed that the moon was following me around. I knew that wasn't real, though.
Sure, I don't claim my perception is infallible. As a sceptic, in fact I even doubt my own perception. But it is the most reliable source of knowledge for me.
And the 2nd reason that I don't believe in the objects in the world is that there is a possibility that my perception was mistaken, it could have been an illusion, the tree I thought existed was cut down by someone while not being perceived by me, and not there anymore, or it could have been hit by lightening, and burnt down to ashes (and I am certain that it wasn't someone's words or shoutings that caused the burnt down - no, no. That would be an irrational belief or claim, if not insane ) ... etc. I am open minded about all the possibilities that existence can succumb to at anytime. I think it is a rational belief to have.
Right. I don't think Austin is arguing with that, although it may seem that some posters in this thread are. He was taking issue with a theory of perception transmitted by Ayers, which says your knowledge of external entities is built up from smaller units of perception called "sense data."
The idea is that what you directly perceive are these units, and the larger things like trees are constructed from the smaller ones. I think Ayers would have been interested to learn that this doesn't mesh with what we now know about perception, which is that the brain appears to be "wired" to anticipate objects, which is kind of what Kant believed @Mww, although I don't think he would have thought of it as the brain doing it.
Austin's objections have to do with the way we talk about perception, that we say we've perceived a tree, we don't say we've perceived sense data, so he's saying that Ayers' supporters are misusing English. I think they could have answered that by saying they would make up their own jargon, which is very common and acceptable. Otherwise, Austin puts forward arguments that are ancient philosophical issues.
I agree you have the logical ground for the existence of a thing, as you say, while not perceiving it, iff youve already had the experience of that thing, under sufficiently congruent conditions. Your #1 asserts you have no logical ground for believing while not perceiving, which is precisely the time in which that ground is all you have.
Quoting Corvus
Actually, there is no other ground for knowing the tree exists, with apodeitic certainty, apart from the perception of it. You can still think whatever you please.
Quoting Corvus
Agreed, which makes explicit the vast dissimilarities between mere belief conditioned by logic and empirical knowledge conditioned by perception.
Oh, he was quite aware the brain does everything, but we as human dont consciously operate in accordance with the scientific mode of brain mechanics. And, of course, we dont give a damn how we operate un- or sub-consciously, insofar we are not sufficiently equipped to know of it, so not much point in constructing a speculative methodological system grounded in something we know precious little about.
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Yeah, well, Im still on your side, though were both technically outside the boundaries of the discussion.
I am not sure if perception or indeed any mental events could be reduced to the brain from Epistemology and Metaphysical perspectives. It cannot be denied that the brain is where all the mental events happen, but from that boundary we are entering the physiological and neurological land, which are the foreign territories.
There are lots of issues that can be talked about at the conceptual level on mental activities since ancient times, and that is what we have been doing, and I don't see much changes in the near future for that trend to change as far as speculative Philosophy is concerned, and I am happy with that.
For sense data theory of perception, I feel that it is more reasonable than any other theories of perception. When I see an object in the world, many times I am not sure what it is at first, when they are some distance away. All I get is the extension and colour of the object.
The extension is in the space and time, but the colour is a property from my consciousness, so there is some synthesis going on in perception. At this stage of the perception the object is nothing more than data i.e. I know the shape, colour and the location of the object (i.e. on the grass of the garden). I can further go and look close into the object and try to find out what it is looking for more data on the object.
But even if it was found out to be a tree leaf, if I keep asking questions on it, there are more facts I don't know about the leaf i.e. which tree did it fall from? Was it indeed from the trees in the garden? or Was it blown into the location? How long was it there? So, I never get absolute full information about the leaf, and in that sense, it still remains as data. Data is also, by definition, information that can be stored and retrieved for further manipulation, which is coherent with perceived data, because we remember, imagine and reason with the perceived data after the perception.
This is the case even when I pick up a cup with my hand and look into it. Of course it is a cup, but at asking where it is made. what it is made of, who made it, or which factory made it, what is the diameter?, the weight? ... etc. Of course some information will be available if I go and measure the diameter with the ruler, and weigh it on the scale, but many information still remains unanswered. It is a data. For some naive direct realist, it is a cup, and that's the end of story for them. For me, there is a lot more I don't know about the cup. It is a data needing more investigation if need be, and possible to find out more information on the data in due course. Because a cup is a cup, not just because it looks like a cup, but because it has the extensive properties (some are in the form of essential properties and some are informational properties) attached to it for being a cup.
Anyway, I feel in that sense, Austin's endeavour trying to criticise or deny Ayer's Sense Data theory had been in vain. Asking how we talk about perception is interesting, but it wouldn't make our perception have more certainty in perceiving.
It would have been more meaningful if Austin came up with his own definition and theory of perception before criticising Ayer, but it doesn't appear to be the case.
Yes, appreciatively.
This, and the last lecture, are twice the length of the other lectures. Austin is broadening his account here, becoming more explicit as to his method. In this lecture he is also sorting out some of the motivation he ascribes to Ayer. Austin has argued that Ayer makes use of the Argument from Illusion, but that a closer reading shows Ayer does not actually believe the argument. That is, Ayer does not reach the conclusion, that what we directly perceive are sense data, as a consequence of consideration of the Argument from Illusion. Rather, Ayer has other reasons for his view, and uses the Argument for Illusion only rhetorically, as a post hoc justification.
This lecture, then, examines Ayer's actual motivation.
But before pursuing Austin's argument, it would be worth looking in a bit more detail at the broader context in which Ayer was writing. What follows is my own potted history.
Since Hume, the great problem for empiricism has been moving beyond observation. How is it that we can move from what is here, before us, now, to a general principle or a prediction as to what will occur next? How do we get from the observation of a white swan to the principle that all swans are white?
There are at least three aspects to this problem - it's really a series of problems. First is the problem overtly addressed in the present essay: how is it that we can move from the evidence of our senses, on which empiricism is supposedly grounded, to making true statements about the world? Second is the problem of induction, how we can move from a series of such observations to a general principle, a "law". The third problem is to do with when we might correctly say that one even causes another.
Ayer was addressing these problems. The two main rival accounts were that of Karl Popper and of fellow logical positivist Rudolf Carnap.
Roughly, Carnap tried to quantify confirmation - the more observations, the better. This was not very convincing. Popper took on the impossibility of indubitable confirmation, and proposed instead that science was based on proving our conjectures wrong.
For a long while Popper's falsification was the winner, at least in terms of popularity, although Bayesian analysis owes much to Carnap, and the arguments are far from finished. I'd surmise that Ayer thought of himself as addressing these rivals, and that Austin's quite different account came out of left field for him.
A bit more about Ayer, perhaps, since it's arguable that Austin is addressing a caricature, rather than the real McCoy.
The SEP article on Sense Data starts its account by listing things generally agreed:
Consider the last of these. There are some who supose that our sense data provide information about the things in the world; while others will claim that we there are issues if we move beyond the sense data to make claims about the state of the world that is supposed to bring them about. Ayer has a compromise. So some will say, of a coin viewed obliquely, that the sense data is oval in shape, while the coin remains circular; others would say that the coin viewed obliquely changes shape from circular to oval. Ayer, to his credit, argues that the difference between these two accounts is linguistic, that this is not a difference in ontology but in semantics.
For Ayer, statements about objects just are statements about sense data.
(For my part, that this discussion should take place at all shows something of the poverty of the sense data theory).
You might try increasing the dosage. You cannot dismiss all that you see while you're on acid as not real, because you must see some real things or else you\d be completely lost in a completely unfamiliar surrounding. So some of what you see must be real.
The problem of course is how do you distinguish between what is real and what is not real. And if you cannot make the distinction you cannot know that what you are seeing isn't real, at any given time, nor that what you are seeing is real at any given time.
This is true, but it is also true that we don't need language in order to understand the act of cutting. Think beavers, for example, or leaf-cutter ants.
Yes, that's true. We can understand the act of 'cutting' by mimicking it with gestures too, for instance. If I am not wrong, I think Austin argues about this in other books. How to do things with words, I guess.
Lecture IX: The smack-down that Austin gives Ayer here seems almost uncanny (@Banno even feels Ayer might be misrepresented). And so how is Austin able to claim this kind of logical necessity? Take Ayers example when I see a stick which looks crooked. (P.87) Ayer wants to make this a special kind of seeing, but Austin says that what this shows us is that what looks crooked may not really be crooked. almost as if it were a rule (P.88). He says this is something we all know, but then who are we? and what do we know? Isnt it everyone who knows how looks works, in its sense of seems? Is there anyone who would deny the implication? Though perhaps there is a moment where it hasnt yet dawned on you, but then you realize it (maybe with a slap to the head, as it seems obvious now), maybe if it were emphasized I see a stick which looks crooked, and then it is a given to accept the unspoken implication, as if it were simply a continuation of the sentence, [but I dont know that it is crooked or just seems that way] and there might be other implications that we could acknowledge apply here, as [until I get more evidence, look at it closer, differently]. So then ask yourself, say @Corvus, how these just words have now become, undeniable?
I agree that scepticism is a fundamental starting-point for this debate. But there's a question of the burden of proof. Your challenge to me is to provide a reason for believing that the cup that holds your coffee exists when you don't perceive it. Do you accept that if you were to turn and look at it, you would see it? Is that not a reason for believing that it still exists?
You either don't accept the counterfactual or don't accept that the counterfactual implies that the cup exists when you don't perceive it.
Remember the part about how words don't affect the world? If you think that the cup exists when you perceive it and doesn't exist when you don't, you believe that your perceiving affects the world. Most people, I think, believe that it does not - at least in paradigm cases like your cup of coffee.
I think the counter-factual is a reason for believing that your cup of coffee exists whether you perceive it or not. So I think that the burden of proof is on you. So I ask you what reason you have for not believing that the cup exists whether you perceive it or not?
You might also like to look up Berkeley's argument for believing that he does not perceive himself when he perceives the cup and yet believes in his own existence, and then for believing that his perceptions must have a cause, that he is not the cause and hence that God exists even though he does not perceive God. (You don't have to be a theist here. You could just believe in external objects as the cause of your perceptions instead of God.)
Quoting Banno
Exactly. But it depends on the linguistic version of the issue. The question is, whether the two versions are equivalent. However, sense-datum language implies a general scepticism about external objects. Ordinary language does not. So can we not conclude that the two versions are not equivalent and hence not inter-translatable?
Quoting Corvus
You have put you finger on what gets left out of the debate. I think that even Austin accepts the dissection of perception out of our lives and to a large extent overlooks the huge contribution that our actions in the world modify how we perceive it. Our perceptions are not like images on a screen. There is a feed-back between perception and action. Ayer nearly gets there when he says that prediction is crucial, but misses the point that predictions are not only based on sense-data but on the results of actions.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes. But I think that abstraction and generalization (which, despite Berkeley, I do not think are the same thing) are also sources of truth. So let's not over-generalize about it. Pragmatism is probably the best policy here.
Why would I want to remove the potential of the underlying matter or substance? All I want to do is to explain it, by giving a fuller account of what happens when one billiard ball strikes another. My suggested explanation doesn't even eliminate the counterfactual phenomenon; it simply provides a fully explanation of the causes that produce it.
There's nothing wrong with determinism. It is the idea that free will is inconsistent with it that is problematic.
I don't see any need for the Will of God. What, exactly, do we need it for?
I mean we have no ground, warrant or reason to believe in the world, when we are not perceiving it.
The ground, warrant or reason for believing in the world is the perception of the world. But when you are not perceiving it, there is no more the ground, warrant or reason to believe it. That is from a logical reasoning.
But people keep believing in the world when they are not perceiving the world. They are believing it without the ground, warrant and reason for believing it.
So what is more rational? I would say stopping believing in something when there is no ground, warrant and reason to believe it would be definitely more rational than keeping believing in something when there is no ground in believing it.
This was what Hume was propounding in his Treatise, and that point of Hume was what Kant described as "a truth which awakened him from dogmatic slumber." I cannot be sure on the accuracy of this point now without checking it again. But I am assuming that was what Kant said. Please correct me if I am wrong here.
"Scepticism is what keeps Theory of Perception ticking", as said by Barry Stroud (a late Canadian Philosopher), and I think he is right.
This is true. What it shows is that in order to live, you have to be irrational.
Somehow people do regularly distinguish real from unreal, for all practical purposes anyway. It's not merely a logical thing, it's more at the level of innate capability.
We know, for instance, that if a person is blind from birth, but then gains sight, they won't be able to distinguish a picture of an apple from a real apple. That's not a logical issue. It's something about perception.
It shows that the sceptics have been scorned for their rationality by the naive folks. :chin: :roll:
And yet both you are Hume write for an unperceived public.
How long must the lights stay out before this form of skepticism takes over? Do you doubt the existence of the world each time you blink?
Blinks don't take long time enough to make the world to totally disappear. Does yours?
We are talking about what is called Academic Scepticism allegedly practiced by both Hume and Kant, which I am trying to learn more (waiting for the book to arrive).
It is about the warrant of belief, not the existence itself. This is an Epistemological issue, not ordinary life issue.
A rather famous quote on this problem:
The biggest knock against Popper's theory I can think of is that it has been invoked so many times to call areas of scientific development that later yielded huge breakthroughs "unfalsifiable pseudoscience." Mach, writing before Popper, famously thought atoms were pseudo-science. Popper was invoked to deny quarks a hearing in physics. We see the same sort of attack leveled at quantum foundations to this day, even though research there does indeed progress and touch other areas of the field.
It seems to me that:
A. Scientific theoreticians cannot avoid doing metaphysics.
B. The anti-metaphysical, empiricist-positivist view dominant until fairly recently does get rid of metaphysics, it just enshrines a certain type of metaphysics dogmatically. After all, saying it is "meaningless" to even talk of certain things is, in an important way, to make a metaphysical claim about them.
It's also a strong form of reductionism in a way, even though it is often advanced by people who have nothing good to say about "reductionism" in general. It says that experience cannot be fundamentally about the whole of a relationship between some object of experience and some experiencing subject. Rather, the only way to understand the phenomena is by reducing it to phenomena "within the subject."
This seems to cut against a lot of the theorizing in embodied cognition, which I tend to find fairly convincing, while also tending to suggest a view of "sense datum as discrete things," instead of the more plausible view (IMHO) of "sensation as continuous process."
Part of this, IMO, is that Kantian dualism often ends up "baked in" to theories in cognitive science from the get-go. That is, the reduction of experience to a process that only involves the discrete object of study (generally the brain) all but ensures that the same problems that show up in Kant will show up here, because they are presumed from the outset.
A larger issue is that we've generally dumped potentiality, essence, substance, natures, and even form (to a lesser extent) from natural philosophy because they are unobservable. But then we work them back in via less obvious forms because we need them. E.g., thermodynamic entropy, information entropy, the heat carrying capacities of metals, etc. all involve a sort of "potentiality." So, metaphysics still lurks around, it just is less well examined.
Since appeals to Hume and Kant and academic skepticism will take us too far from the topic of this thread I won't pursue it here, but I would be interested to read what you have to say if you start a thread on Hume and Kant and their connection to Academic Skepticism, and more specifically your claim that:
Quoting Corvus
But to do so, it would seem, would be to involve you in a performative contradiction when you go on to council us unperceived beings:
Quoting Corvus
It strikes me as being unreasonably reasonable.
Sure. This is not the main topic in this thread. So I will bow out, and let them carry on. I have been only responding to the questions and posts directed to me.
I will read the book when it arrives, and will open a new thread on it, if there are interesting points on the subject. Thank you for your post.
Of course there are legitimate cases where applications of generalization are more useful than specificity. This comes from the sense applied to multiple objects: classification, inferences from particular observations, etc., which is what Austin is doing. But here I am talking about generalization from a single case or two (in the sense of without objects). Abstraction is a harder practice to justify. Not taking into consideration multiple examples (the practice in multiple situations, contexts), as it were, of how things "are" (as Dewey might say I believe), is to intellectually theorize separate from actual cases (an event with attendant circumstances). So I would need an example (or two) of when abstraction is actually a good or useful process.
What I think differentiates these practices in philosophy is that they come from the desire for absolute certainty or universal truth as Austin discusses in Lec. X. (p. 104). In order to be universal, we necessarily must abstract from the particulars. In order to have a standard of certainty like direct perception, we must generalize our perception of every object from a case which works that way (direct perception of at least sense-data).
You're saying that to someone who I strongly suspect may not understand what a performative contradiction is. Indeed, that poster is being grilled by a few different people here for the absurdity of claiming to not believe in anything anytime unless that something is being perceived at the time. That sort of radical skepticism leads to a reductio in more ways than one could count quickly.
If I were as cruel as I once was, I would've grilled him(I suspect) myself, but this thread topic interests me too much and I just don't find that sort of 'discussion' appealing.
In defense of @Corvus, he says he has on order Catalina González Quintero's
"Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics".
I do not know this work or what he will get from it. Perhaps after reading it he will modify his claims or give us reason to rethink some of our own. In any case, even if we disagree with what he will say or Catalina González Quintero says, it demonstrates an attempt to become better informed about such things.
Quite so. That's the essence of what the "analytic" philosophers believed, and explains why they spent their time talking about language.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Does Sebastian Rödl consider the possibility that I might walk round the apple and discover that there is an apple?
You repeat your claim three times but don't answer my questions. Quoting Ludwig V. I take that as meaning that you think there is something wrong with the question. Could you explain?
I am not sure if there is any point to trying defend anything against someone who didn't understand what self-contradiction statements are, but claim to understand performance contradiction. I was under impression that he was going to go through all the arguments that I went through with Banno AGAIN with the whole load of self-contradicting questions, and was wondering what the point was.
Quoting Fooloso4
I am not sure either. But I thought it would be interesting to read somebody whom I have never come across as Kant commentary scholars before. I was presuming maybe there might some new interesting insight in the book. Will be able to tell more once I finish the book. Who knows.
I am not claiming that I am an academic sceptic. Most of my ideas comes from my own reasoning and little amount of casual readings on the textbook and commentaries.
Of course, I see the cup when I turn and look at the cup. The perception is coming in vividly.
But do you not see the difference that there is now the firm ground for believing in the existence of the cup, instead of not having the warrant that the cup's existence when not seeing it?
Oh, I never intended to imply that generalization from a single case or two was not extremely rash (to put it mildly).
As to abstraction, I intended an "ordinary language" sense of the word, not a view of the debate about nominalism. The Cambridge Dictionary definition is "existing as an idea, feeling, or quality, not as a material object". This, to me, fits with, for example, Austin's insistence that not everything is a material object. Numbers would be an prime example. The Cambridge Dictionary gives, truth, beauty, happiness, faith and confidence as examples of abstractions. I have always understood properties like colour and shape to be abstractions, but perhaps I'm wrong. I noticed that you said that it was a "harder practice to justify" rather than
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes, quite so. And theory without application to cases is empty. But theory with application is not. So it's not an issue about theory in itself.
You still don't answer the question. So you still believe that you would have to accept the counterfactual if you did and that you would then have to admit that it is a ground for believing it exists when you don't perceive it.
The next question is whether you accept that you exist when you are perceiving an object and whether you perceive yourself when you are perceiving an object.
Ayer says
So if not because of problems with illusions, what are Ayer's reason for holding to sense data?
I've over-read the texts here, and now find it difficult to see what Ayer is arguing. He really does seem to think that the only two possibilities are that we see material objects or we see sense data; that there is no nuance and no alternative. that's the only way in which I can see his argument reaching the conclusion it does.
So his argument is that we can only perceive either material objects or sense data; that we cannot perceive material objects; and that hence we must perceive sense data.
Two premises; both just wrong. The argument is so poor it's almost gormless.
So here's a question for anyone who cares to delve deeper. That seems to me to be the argument in Foundations, found on pp 24-25. If not that argument, then which?
And if that argument, then Austin.
Well that and trying to turn language into sense data by claiming that: "the meaning of a sentence is the empirical data that would verify (or falsify it)." This view is runs into a host of problems, not least of all that it is a statement that it does not seem possible to verify based on sense data.
Yes, that's sort of the point. You can see the whole apple by moving around it, but you cannot see it all at once. Now what grounds do you have for saying: "before I could see the back side of the apple, now I can see the front. Since this remains the same individual apple I looked at earlier, I am justified in positing that I am looking at a whole apple that has a back that I cannot see?"
Common sense tells us that we can justify this with recourse to the idea of the apple being an "object" that can be seen from many different directions. But common sense isn't "sense data." Common sense includes "metaphysical" concepts like "objects." Any solution also seems to require a consideration of time and temporal logic, which is part of Rödl's argument. But also consider that any apparent apple could just be a crafty hologram as well.
Rödl's point might seem fairly silly from a common sense point of view, but he rebutting fairly technical attempts to show how knowledge could possibly be reduced to merely sense data. These attempts also had to "leave common sense behind," like most philosophy, since it turns out a lot of unchallenged assumptions are packed into common sense.
The problems for a sort of "arch-empiricism," only gets worse if you assume that any reference to metaphysical terms like "object" means only the very sense data that might verify the truth of a statement involving them. I tend to lean very empiricist, but I think the positivists just took this in a bad direction.
Plus, it seems to me that mathematicians talk about infinities and continuums all the time, and theologians and atheists debate about God all the time, while having meaningful discussions, despite the fact that anything infinite or infinitesimal cannot be verified through sense data.
I would go with Hume. There is no reason to believe in anything when I don't perceive, be it the world or myself. That doesn't mean that I don't believe in the world or myself. I keep asking you to know the difference between the two cases.
So let me ask you this time. I have asked you this question many times, but you have never answered for it yet.
What is your reason to believe in the existence of the world, when you don't perceive it?
Strangely enough, he's doing an argument from ordinary language use. Pared down, he's saying there are two senses of "see."
1. John sees a star.
2. John sees a speck no bigger than a six-pence.
If there's confusion about the second sentence regarding the sense of the verb, further explanation would insert "what appears to be" after the verb. But Ayers says we usually don't need that extra phrase because we can discern the different senses by context of utterance.
Because these two senses exist in language, we can generalize this case.
Now we forget about John and his star and go back to cases of mistaken perception. I thought I saw two pieces of paper, but there was only one. Again, there are these two senses of "see"
1. I saw two pieces of paper.
2. I saw one piece of paper.
In the first case, what I saw does not exist as a material object. Therefore, it's a sense datum. Here, Ayers is reporting on the sense data theory, he's not presenting this as his own ideas. He says he accepts it, though, with the caution that what the sense-data theorist ends up doing is offering new jargon to explain a hypothesis which can be empirically verified or refuted.
In other words, he's saying that the sense data theorists isn't offering us any needed revisions to everyday speech, but rather offering jargon that's helpful for special purposes.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Well, yesterday I thought the argument so bad that I must be missing Ayer's point. Today I still think the argument extraordinarily poor, but still can't see an alternative. Ayer is presenting a very poor argument.
He's deluded by the overwhelming need for certainly, as Austin continues in Chapter X.
Quoting Antony Nickles
This was Philippa Foot's criticism, wasn't it? The boys want certainty, so they can avoid responsibly. The War overarches all of these considerations - it's hard for young folk to understand the way in which it provides the foundation for this whole exercise. All of these men served with distinction, and all had to find some way to come to terms with what they had to do. What's true of Hare is true of Austin and Ayer and Wittgenstein. They fundamentally need to understand why they set aside personal responsibility ot the greater cause. It's an unfair question - addressed in The Cain Mutiny.
Quoting Ludwig V
I think the conclusion, after Austin, is that this whole framing of the issue is muddled. However if we do take the framing as granted, then "statements about objects just are statements about sense data" is not an observation or conclusion but a piece of what is variously called metaphysics, or definition, or invoking a rule. That is, statements about object just count as statements about sense data. In those terms it cannot be false, or even wrong, but is rather misplaced.
So a translation (interpretation) would have the form :
A rough example, the ubiquitous cup...
Now I hope it is plain both that this is the consequence of Ayer's position, and that it is absurd. A cup is not equivalent to a collection of sense data. And it's not just that it is entirely possible to have the sense data and not the cup, or the cup and not the sense data, but that the supposed equivalence is between entirely different things. The analogy is not like the mistake in saying chalk is a type of wood, but like saying chalk is a type of democracy. Material objects are not sense data.
This is why one cannot answer the questions @Corvus is so insistent on. They are not coherent enough to have an answer; or if you prefer, the answer is Sense and Sensibilia.
Quoting frank
I think it clear from Austin that there are not here two differing senses of "see". But I take it you are setting out what Ayer is claiming, rather than evaluating it?
Quoting frank
Yes, that seems to be his argument. It's dreadful.
Quoting frank
Ok.
As Hume showed in relation to inductive reasoning, there is no purely logical justification for believing that any of the observed natural regularities will continue to hold. That is because it is not logically contradictory that they may not hold.
However, we have good inductive (not deductive, mind) reason to believe they will hold, since they have never reliably been observed to fail. Hume might say this is merely thinking based on habit, but nonetheless we have good pragmatic reasons to believe that the plethora of observed natural invariances will not suddenly cease to exist. This belief is consistent with the whole coherent and consistent body of scientific knowledge and everyday experience and observations.
The same goes for the belief that things persist when unperceived: that they do persist is merely the inference to the best explanation for why things generally will be found where they were last seen, absent them having been moved in the interim.
Of course, it is not logically contradictory that things should cease to exist and then come back into existence again, but considered against the whole body of science and everyday observations it is highly implausible.
Good argument, but Lakatos' research projects or Watkins' "Confirmable and influential Metaphysics" had the potential to overcome this problem. The real knock-out blow was Feyerabend's careful historical falsification, for philosophers, and Structure of Scientific Revolutions for everyone else.
What progressed was a spurning of attempts to found science on a "formal" system that ensured or at least explained it's capacity to produce truth, or truthiness, or some such, in favour of a "sociological" approach, explaining success in terms of such things as open discourse, reproducibility and honesty.
And that, interestingly enough, corresponds nicely with Lecture X of the book at hand.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The biographic accounts I have read put this approach, at least in Oxford, firmly on Ayer. Before the war the Dons were apparently beset and confounded by earnest young men clutching Language, Truth and Logic, interrupting their lectures on Kant and Hegel with "But I do not understand what you mean by...".
I share your preference for embodied cognition, but unfortunately I will have to echo the young men here, since I do not have a clear way to unpack what you have said in the remainder of your post.
Yes. I think Ayers would say that whether there are two senses or not should be decided empirically. I like that.
Perhaps this comes from such folk confusing reason with deduction?
Far and away the simplest supposition is that when you are asleep, the world continues on without you. This accounts for both the overwhelming continuity and small changes that have take place when one wakes, and agrees with the accounts of what occurred, as given by those who stayed awake...
But to rationalise in this way is also preposterous. It's not as if such a justification could be better grounded than what it is supposed to be justifying!
Realising that the world continues in your absence is a key step in developmental psychology, one that it seems folk here have either skipped or unlearned. But I'm confident these folk will demonstrate their understanding of object permanence outside of the Philosophy Forum, and that this is the sort of aberration suitable for @Ciceronianus' latest thread.
That is, I call bullshit.
Although I recall Hume had problem with induction for being circular or question-begging type of reasoning.
From my point of view, if someone had a bad memory or have had little or not enough experience of the observations, induction doesn't work for him. In these cases, inductive reasoning cannot be a good ground for believing in something. If there is a possibility of even one failing, then it cannot be a law or principle.
Hume seems to be in the position that inductive reason (because it is based on habit and customs) can only offer us probable knowledge of the world, hence it cannot be a good ground for believing in the world.
Quoting Janus
There are many sceptical discussions even on the whole body of scientific knowledge for their validity, because all scientific knowledge is obtained from the phenomenon i.e. sensibility via observations. Obviously there are problems in the certainty and accuracy of the scientific knowledge too. Even Science cannot escape from Scepticism. This is a totally separate topic. Maybe you could start a new topic with this issue.
I have to differ. He is saying that the difference is purely linguistic - his so-called "two languages" theory.
I had thought that was what you meant by Quoting frank
Basically, what I was pointing to is how cognitive science, neuroscience, etc. look at "explaining experience" on a basic level. Consider the experience of seeing a tree. We start with a person in front of a tree
Well, our current sciences that try to explain experience say "how the light bounces off the tree, how it ends up entering the eye, that's not our business. That's physics. We don't need to care about that. Our explanation starts with action potentials firing down the optic nerve."
The problem is that there, off the bat, we've already removed the possibility of an explanation of sensation that is going to include the object of experience in any direct way.
My point would be that people don't see trees in a vacuum. A human body in a vacuum becomes a corpse, and corpses don't appear to do any experiencing.
It seems to me that an accurate view of experience can't start and end at the boundaries of an individual body. If it does, then of course you're going to end up with concerns about "how experiences can be [I]about[/I] objects." You end up having to talk about "representations of trees," because you've already chopped the tree out of your explanation at the outset.
But physics would seem to suggest no such hard line between discrete systems. The causal chain of light waves, tree, retina, and brain all flow seemlessly into each other, and that's the process that generates the experience of "seeing a tree." It's a system that includes tree and person, a relationship between person and tree (not person and "representation.")
This isn't a flaw in the science, but more how it gets used in metaphysical discussions.
It does seem to make it hard to explain how something could ever wake one up, that's for sure.
He meant that the two senses of "see" are already in the rules of language, and that this is supposed to support talk of sense-data. "Sense data" is the new jargon.
But I invite you to take a look at the titular book for this thread.
??
Quoting Banno
That seems to be what Ayer has in mind, and it doesn't work.
Not sure how to understand this, but it's probably worth pointing out that not all analytic philosophers think metaphysical claims are meaningless. While it was roughly true of logical positivists, and is often (somewhat erroneously) taken to be true of the early Wittgenstein, it's not true of Russell and Moore, nor of the Oxford Realists or Popper's intellectual children, and Quine naturalised metaphysics but would not call it that.
Analytic philosophy is a broad church...
A large part of the focus on language should be seen as working out the varieties of metaphysical statements so as to choose between them.
Yea, I see what you're saying.
That seemed to be the objection you were raising, that Berkeley's and Locke's arguments removed the need for potential, as matter.
Quoting Ludwig V
I explained, the explanation you provided was far from a full explanation. When you come to grips with that we might be able to continue the discussion.
Quoting frank
But the example was when a person was under the influence of LSD. It is in this situation that the real parts of the experience are not so easily distinguishable from the unreal. We could say the same about someone suffering mental illness like schizophrenia.
Quoting frank
I don't see how you draw the conclusion that if it's something about perception, it's not a logical problem.
However, this distinction between the real and apparent good, needs to be understood through the Platonic principles from which it was derived. Proper understanding reveals that "the real good" is the good apprehended by the individual, as one's goal or objective. Because the individual's apprehended goal or objective is "the good" which actually motivates the individual to act, it must be known as "the real good". This leaves any proposed independent good, supposedly supported by a divine unity, or God, as the "apparent good". Inverting this, and trying to understand "the real good" as some sort of independent, objective good, supported by God, leaves "the real good" as completely incoherent, as demonstrated in Plato\s Euthyphro, and this incoherency is what confronts Ayer.
Ayer had proposed two different senses of perception words, one in which we infer the thing "seen" exists, and the other in which no such presumption is made. Austin shows the weakness of this account by again exposing it to a barrage of counter examples. Then oddly,
The actual argument is that philosophers have invented a way of using "see" and similar words such that what is seen must really exist. They then "discover" that material things are inadequate to the task of being the things that really exist; so they invent a new thing, and put this in the role
You can hear the glee in Austin's voice as he points out that this argument doesn't use either the argument from illusion or the two languages argument.
So what is it all about? It's about certainty. All this frippery hides Ayer's actual interest, which is to find (or invent) firm grounds for our statements about the way things are.
And so to Lecture X.
1. 1340 Bad or depraved beyond correction or reform: of persons, their habits, etc.
2.15411804 Of something faulty or defective: That cannot be improved or set right. Of disease: Incurable.
and the third, the one used by Austin...
3. 1611 Not liable or open to correction; so good that it cannot be improved. Also, not verifiable; that cannot be proved false.
And the source for this third? Well, the earliest listed, from 1611, is "The Reader being well instructed..may, without any further labour, make a good and incorrigible peece of worke" - R. Peake
And the second, from 1956? Why, "Experiential statements are not incorrigible in the sense that once they have been discovered to be true they cannot subsequently be denied", from our very own A. J. Ayer, Problem of Knowledge, p 55.
It's not Austin's word, it's Ayer's.
Another of Austin's jokes? I like to think so. He loved his OED.
Well, we could play a little at ordinary language philosophy and see if there are any actual distinctions but dont we see here at least a related problem because of the use of material object as a contrast, when that term is the unattainable maguffin that has left us with appearance and indirect perception?
I would take an idea as an abstraction solely because it is, or can be, removed as my expression Hey, that was my idea! This is tied perhaps to a sense of problem-solving.
Im not sure a feeling counts. This sounds suspiciously like it is in contrast to reason, as emotive to the positivists; somehow turned into a value.
Again, quality makes me nervous of its philosophical sense (as real was to be a quality), but quality is of course a measure of attainment, and so the goal (refined metal) or standard (of a specimen of horse) is abstracted in order to be standardized, though metal has science, and husbandry has breeding.
Numbers are the ultimate example. If math and science werent so successful, philosophy would never have gotten dragged off course so much trying to be like it. So, of course, the most important thing missing from math is us.
Truth and beauty are measured by standards; Im pretty sure we dont measure happiness (except in being petty). I want to say faith is more like resolve than opinion so I dont think that counts, along with confidence, which is more like knowing a skill, though I imagine it could affect ones general demeanor (or head size).
I know too much to want to get into color and shape here (I take it back, can we call them qualities and be done with it?)
I also know too much to want to argue with you. I had in mind only the cautious idea that "abstract" might have its uses. As so often, we ought always to consider the meaning of "abstract" in a particular context and in the light of what counts as "concrete" in that context.
As Austin might say:- "This discussion of appearance and reality is too abstract. We need to consider some concrete examples".
The use of "quality" as a classification of "colour", "shape", etc. is arguably a philosophical invention (Aristotle?), which survives only by it's contrast with whatever "part" of an "object" is not a quality. "Relation" is a similar term. "Object" here could mean "substance" or "essence" or, in more recent times, as whatever is named when a name is bestowed or referred to when a referring expression is used. (The point is, of course that "quality" in this use, as in all the other uses you identify, is part of a language-game, only not a natural or ordinary language game - context again.)
Yes. I'm afraid I over-generalized.
Quoting Banno
I found it very hard to get to grips with IX, but I think I've finally got my head more or less round it. I was not entirely happy with the discussion of " see as", especially in the context of "The speck is a star" (and is the star a speck - I suppose so.) Austin cites Wittgenstein here, but W is not as comprehensive here (at least in the PI as he so often is. This links to the point that Austin also makes, that the "same" object can be described in more than one way (as in the example of kicking the door and kicking some painted wood.) I was also reminded of Kripke's discussion of Hesperus, Phosphorus and Venus.
There's a lot more to be said here and I'm not sure that Austin totally excludes the possibility that the idea of sense-data, or something quite like them may not have a place.
Calling seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck (or a rabbit) an interpretation is not quite right, but captures the point that the same object can be seen in two ways. We know it is the same object because we have the third description as a mediator - actually, there are two mediating descriptions. One is the duck-rabbit. The other is the description of the marks on the paper. But these, I think, are yet more interpretations. In fact, it isn't clear that there is any description that is truly neutral. In the "ordinary" practice of interpretation, there is something that counts as the original, which is what is to be interpreted.
In most ordinary life, we can sort out how to proceed. But when our access is so limited as it is in astronomy, I'm not sure that things are so easy. It's very tempting to interpret the specks we see, from which we deduce the reality that lies behind the appearances, as data. I suppose we can classify these cases as exceptional, but still, we've given Ayer his first move. However, there is, so to speak, a real speck that we see, so this is not the incorrigible data that Ayer was looking for.
Still - on to X and incorrigibility. It was interesting to see a solid argument that the philosophical use of the term is technical, or specialized.
Camouflaged to look like a barn (?).
I don't know what makes this understanding "proper". It is defensible as a view. But people often do things that they think are in their interests, but actually bring them harm. Moreover, it clearly wasn't Plato's view. (Only philosophers can understand what the real good is)
The passage you quoted from me Quoting Ludwig V has a typo. It should have read "My suggested explanation doesn't even eliminate the counterfactual phenomenon; it simply provides a FULLER explanation of the causes that produce it". So I'm not arguing that the kind of explanation I'm citing explains potential away.
Quoting Corvus
I didn't realize that your question to me was in the context of Hume. You did drop a hint, but I didn't pick it up. My fault. That does change things. However, your sketch above is an abbreviation of his argument, which does not reflect what he thought he was doing.
Hume was happy to employ sceptical arguments against the idea of "hidden causes" or "hidden powers", as he refers to them. But he was scathing about what he calls "pyrrhonist" (radical sceptical) arguments. Not that he thought that they could be refuted; he just thought they should be ignored. His argument about association of ideas, habit and custom was intended to provide, not a refutation, but a basis for ignoring such arguments. He relies on past experience, for example, as a "full and complete proof" when he argues that a naturalistic explanation of a supposed miracle will always be more plausible than the supernatural one. As Austin says in Sense and Sensibilia "There's the bit where you say it, and the bit where you take it back".
So I agree that there's no deductive argument for positing that things you don't perceive continue to exist (A). But there is a considerable weight of (reasonable) evidence against it. In my opinion, it is at least enough to put the burden of proof on the your idea that things cease to exist when not perceived - the contradictory of A. Curiously enough, there's no deductive argument for that, either. Stalemate. In another discussion, we could ask each other what's next, but perhaps that will do for now.
I guess if you take so much you have a psychotic break. I don't know. Datura apparently does take away the ability to distinguish real from unreal. It's said to be extremely traumatic.
We could just refer to color and shape as a things color and shape (thus the reticence to abstract from them to anything else as unnecessary); our interest in them (what we judge them for) is how we identify, count, compare, etc., and so we could investigate the mechanics and criteria of those practices in various contexts. However, no thanks.
Well, you are right that he does try to make it a linguistic issue because [ordinary language] is not so good an instrument as the sense-datum language for our special purposes Foundations p. 25 (emphasis added) And so the purpose forces the argument, thus it is useful [in looking at how our experiences relate to what we say about things to] refer to the contents of our experiences independently of the material things that they are taken to present. P.26 So the purpose here is to remove our statements to be independent from judgment to particular cases. Having removed ourselves from the empirical propositional and only relying on different methods of descriptions, we cannot properly claim that it is either true or false. I think this is why Austin characterizes it as being able to say anything you want, but what I take Ayer to be doing is abstracting the discussion from a factual one so we are always correct, despite it only being about our description, with the actual goal that we are never wrong about what we see (sense-data).
It's just that there can be more than one true statement for any given fact. Did you kick the door or the painted wood?
This needs to be pointed out because Logical Positivism speaks as if there were only one. That's probably a consequence of it being an adaptation of the Tractatus; it's assuming a form of logical atomism as its foundation.
So logical positivism starts at perception and supposedly builds material objects from there, then natural laws from material objects.
Now "I kicked the wooden door" might well be logically equivalent to "I kicked the painted piece of wood". But it is harder to say "I see a rabbit" is equivalent to "I see a duck".
Austin shows how logical positivism grossly oversimplifies the things we do with words, and so also the way we understand what is going on around us.
...the core Austinian argument against qualia...
:smile:
The "broad church" metaphor was used by formed Prime Minister John Howard to describe his Liberal Party - an amalgam of progressive liberals, libertarians and conservatives, unwieldy and incompetent. It's as if the 'mercan Democrats and Republicans were one party, ranged against a socialist Labor Party and the Greens...
"Analytic Philosophy" is similarly an uncomfortable adjunction of very different ideas.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I took this as a sideways swipe at Carnap, another logical positivist. Carnap does think that we can say anything we want - his "protocol statements" need only be consistent with each other, not needing any formal "correspondence" to the world. Ayer and Carnap clashed on this issue.
So Carnap might well have taken
to heart, thinking that all that was needed was for elementary propositions to be consistent; while Ayer took his elementary propositions to be something like "I see a red square".
Is the offer you are declining the project Quoting Antony Nickles. I confess I don't feel tremendously enthused at the prospect in the abstract.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Quoting Antony Nickles
Do you mean that Ayer represents the question as which "language" to use so that he can choose between the options on the grounds that sense-datum language cannot be wrong and for that reason is more "clear and convenient" for the special purposes of philosophy? That makes sense. But I think the two languages are not equivalent precisely because one is true or false and the other is incorrigible.
Quoting Banno In some sense of "logically equivalent" that's probably true. But the different descriptions might make a serious difference. "I shot the target" and "I shot the heir to the crown" are not by any means criminally equivalent. But it would be odd, wouldn't it, to say that "the wooden door" and "the painted piece of wood" are interpretations of anything.
Quoting Banno The point here is that the two descriptions are logically not equivalent and yet both duck and rabbit are valid interpretations, so both "I see a rabbit" and "I see a duck" can be said when what I see is a single picture. Rorschach images are a different kind of case with some of the same features.
So in the end, I think that Austin hasn't thought these examples through. I can see the general relevance to perception, but the exact points are not clear.
Quoting Banno
Yes, he certainly does that. The pity of it is that no-one seems to follow his example. Philosophy still loves its classifications and its doctrines.
These are quite fun and I'm guessing they show something about their work through the decades. But I don't know (and don't understand the Wikipedia article) about Ngrams. Is there a layperson's explanation anywhere? One axis is years, so that's clear. The other is a percentage, but percentage of what?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Ngram_Viewer
http://storage.googleapis.com/books/ngrams/books/datasetsv2.html
Of course.
Yet Ayer has to maintain some sort of equivalence in truth value between sense data language and material object language if he is going to maintain that the difference between them is no more than linguistic. If the truth value changed with a change in wording, then how could the two be saying the very same thing?
Quoting Ludwig V
"You kicked the door" IFF "You kicked the painted piece of wood"
If the door is the very same as the painted piece of wood, this has to be so.
Quoting Ludwig V
I think the point you are making is much the same as the one Austin is making. Austin treats such stuff in more detail in A Plea For Excuses, a prime candidate for a follow on thread. HE talks about shooting donkeys rather than targets or the heir to the crown.
@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul
Just to loop back to Lec. VIII where Austin countered Ayer in saying an illusion was a case where we see something where something else is, in Lec. IX Austin directly addresses that we can choose which way to say what we see (p. 99), which doesnt depend on my perception but on what needs to be pointed out given the situationour interest in this aspect or that of the total situation (p. 100). This differs from philosophys fixation that there must be a universal chair for all particulars, rather than at times that we have different interests in how we judge a chair to be a chair. And so, there will sometimes be no one right way of saying what is seen , not a surface or a sense-data. Or, as @Ludvig puts it: it isn't clear that there is any description that is truly neutral perhaps forgetting that there is always a context for a case. I will only point out that at other times there will be a right way of saying what is seen.
I also find it fascinating that Austin recognizes Wittgensteins work on seeing an aspect of something, see as as Austin says, though only allowing it for special cases. Not as empathetic as Wittgenstein I think, for whom seeing an aspect is part of treating a person as if they have a soul (PI, p.178), or seeing (acknowledging) the aspect of them as a person writhing in pain p.223.
On the two languages issue, Austin reports Ayer as saying that "..they find it 'convenient' to extend this usage (sc. that what is experienced in delusive cases is a sense-datum) to all cases', on the old, familiar ground that 'delusive and veridical perceptions' don't differ in 'quality' and that he is disposed to accept the recommendation with the comment "'it does not in itself add to our knowledge of empirical facts, or even make it possible for us to express anything that we could not have expressed without it. At the best it enables us only to refer to familiar facts in a clearer and more convenient way.' (P 87 Sense and Sensibilia. This is hardly a ringing endorsement. One wonders why he is so cautious.
Translating "I see a table" into sense-datum language (a patch of colour of this shape here and a patch of another colour of that shape there) would be extremely cumbersome and the only advantage that I can see would be to maybe remove the possibility of being wrong. I don't rule out the possibility that such a representation might be useful in some circumstances. But clarity and convenience are hard to discern.
Quoting Banno
Yes, of course. I'm only saying that having the same truth value isn't the end of the story and so isn't the same as equivalence for all purposes. A Plea for Excuses does indeed take the point further.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes, I agree with both points.
May I gently point out that there seems to be a typo here. There is a member called "LUDVIG" on this site, but that isn't me, but you were quoting me. I wouldn't want to miss something.
Quoting Banno
Thanks. That makes sense.
It is odd, though, that "J. L. Austin" is apparently mentioned in 1900, when he was born in 1911. I know - it's someone else with the same name. But since, so far as I can see, the same is happening for both the others, it seems that even full names are much more common that one might have thought.
The old "illusion" of a chequerboard with a shadow cast across it such that dark square A is 'surprisingly' shown to be "the same exact shade" as light square B ...
... seems to me to demonstrate that we precisely do not see the sense data, (patches of identical grey) but the interpretation thereof. We read the difference into the same data and see the result. One reads the flat screen as if it were representing the world. Just as one does not see the black worms all over the screen, but the meaning of the writing.
Likewise, I am told that the eye vibrates, and this produces a 'flicker' at the edges of objects that aids edge detection. One does not experience the vibration or the flicker, but the edges of objects.
Likewise a spear fisherman learns to see round the corner of the water's surface to where the fish really is so that when his spear bends as it enters the water, it will hit the fish. And the architect, the artist and the fashion designer all use 'trompe l'oeil' with equal proficiency. Only philosophers actually look for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.
Hume's scepticism is the scepticism of the power of pure reason. His fight is with a rationalism that tries to prove what cannot be proved but must be discovered. Reason cannot get an ought from an is, or a will-be from a has-been, or a world from experience. This is because it is limited to words and talk and can only keep language in order at best.
This is the sense in which it cannot affect the world. And the sense in which it certainly can affect the world is that when one orders coffee the waiter tends to bring one coffee. The tree is not listening, but the lumberjack is. Now if one cannot allow that both these senses are perfectly valid, then it is rationality that has a problem, because the world accommodates both with no trouble at all.
Thus Hume is rejecting rationalism in favour of empiricism, and it looks like Austin is doing the same, while Ayer and co are trying to rehabilitate a form of rationalism
If the person acts on it, it must be a "real" good, because it caused the person to act. Whether it is later judged as being a mistaken act is irrelevant to whether or not the good which is acted on is "real". It is necessary that this "good" the one which is acted on, is real in order that it may be said to cause action.
This is a very important point in understanding Plato because it brings actuality, "act" into the idealist realm of intelligible objects, resolving the so-called interaction problem which is intrinsic to the prior theory of participation. Now the objects of the intellect may be understood as real and actual. Through the medium of "the good" intelligible objects can be known as prior to, and cause of all artificial material objects which are like shadows or reflections of the intelligible objects, making the intelligible as higher in priority. "The good" is said to illuminate intelligible objects in a way which is analogous to the way that the sun illuminates visible objects (Republic Bk.6), the will to know. It provides the basis for Aristotle's conception of "final cause". I say it is the "proper" understanding because it is the only way to make "real good" intelligible, rather than the incoherent mess which Ayer presents us with.
Well, that's one way of putting it. But I can't see that it is Plato's way. Surely, for him, there is only one real good, i.e. the Form of the Good? The good things of this world may participate in the Form, but they are "shadows" of the Good and so not real (really) good. I accept that the addict who pursues their addiction believes that it is a good thing. But for the rest of us, before and after the action(s), it isn't. This is the problem of akrasia. I don't see why you insist that alcohol is a good thing for an alcoholic, just because the alcoholic believes that it is - though that could be said if one had a thoroughly subjectivist view of what good is. But that would be incompatible with any Platonic view, so I don't suppose it will appeal to you.
I agree that the alcohol can be regarded as a cause of the alcoholic's actions (in some sense of "cause"). But nothing follows as to whether it is a good thing for the alcoholic or not.
I can see that you are trying to develop a solution to a key problem with the theory of Forms. But your concept of cause is very different from modern usage, though it may fit with the Greek concept of aitia. However, there are other problems with the theory of Forms that make it hard for me to see much benefit in "solving" this one.
I'm inclined to think that this discussion, interesting though it may be, does not fit well with the main topic of this thread. So perhaps we should leave this there, until another opportunity arises.
I tried to tag everyone doing the reading when I wrote up my notes on a section; you have been spared all that. Not them.
Distribution lists are tricky. I usually leave someone off and get rebuked.
It's so close to meaning as use, that what we say is so much more contextual than had been previously supposed - and is still supposed by many today, it seems, amongst those who think language is just "communication" or "information", as if that were any clearer, or as if that might account for everything we do with words.
The zeitgeist was primed for ordinary language to come to the fore. Anscombe would not have been the only one moving between Oxford and Cambridge. Anscombe would have been at lectures presented by Austin. She seems to have preferred the mysticism of Wittgenstein to Austin's dry pragmatics. "She believed that attending Wittgensteins lectures freed her from the trap of phenomenalism that had so plagued her". Many hereabouts remain trapped in phenomenalism.
I agree entirely that one major theme running through these pages is that the issues here need not have one solution, or even any solution. The plot twist in this story, as we find in Lecture X, is that - spoiler alert - Ayer's Logical Positivism derives not from the argument from illusion and not the two languages or anything other than his desire for "incorrigible" proposition - for there to be only one solution.
That is why Ayer invents sense data, and it is what Austin shows to be misguided.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yep, but it is perhaps a minimum achievement for an interpretation or translation of a statement in one language into another.
Have you looked at the Ngram for your own name? Mine peaks in 1987, but is first mentioned in 1865. My nom de plum dates to the 1600's.
I'll agree, perhaps with some reservations about "interpretation".
There was a recent, very odd discussion in the Case for Transcendental Idealism thread - , and apparently insisting that they see only in two dimensions, only imagining the third... I couldn't make sense of it.
But the reason I drove her home was that I promised - an ought from an is, in a manner of speaking, that at least superficially contradicts your "Reason cannot get an ought from an is...". There's more here.
Which raises the question, who is actually doing the reading?
I suggest you read Plato more closely. The "Form of the Good" is unknowable, even to the philosopher. So what Plato talks about is "the good", and the good is particular to the circumstances. Whether or not a particular good participates in the Form of Good can never be known, because the Form of Good cannot be known. Are you familiar with Plato's Euthyphro? This is where such an independent "Form of Good", which the goods of this world would participate in, is shown to be an incoherent idea. This is the start to Plato's refutation of the theory of participation. Look at The Republic, there is no such thing as the Form of Justice, which all instances of "the just" would participate in, there is only individual ideas as to what "just" means.
Quoting Ludwig V
Consider precisely what "good" means in the context of Plato's philosophy. It is what motivates a person to act, what Aristotle called "the end", 'that for the sake of which', and what we call the goal or objective. As such, the "real" good must be what motivates a person to act. If the desire for alcohol has motivated an alcoholic to act, then we must say that it was the real good. If you want to make a further judgement about whether alcohol is "a good thing" for the alcoholic, then you are going to need a completely different sense, a different meaning, of "good".
This different meaning of "good" is based in some moral principles or some other standards. But these standards suffer the problem pointed out in the Euthyphro. We cannot say that this meaning of "good" is anything real or independent, because it is only supported by a code of ethics or something like that, and the attempt to make it something "real" produces incoherency. Therefore we can only say it is an apparent good not a real good.
So when you judge whether the alcohol is a good thing, or not a good thing for the alcoholic, this judgement is only as it appears to you. There cannot be any real truth or falsity to this judgement because it is only based in appearance, how things appear to you through the application of some standards. However, when we see that the desire for alcohol motivates the alcoholic to act, as an end, or a goal, what Plato called "the good", and Aristotle called "final cause", we can definitely say that the alcohol is a "real" good, because it has caused real activity, in the real world.
Quoting Ludwig V
Perhaps our discussion is a little off topic, but it points to the fundamental problem being discussed in the thread, concerning the difference between the philosophical use of words, and the ordinary use of words, and how this difference starts to significantly mislead us when it comes to discussing the meaning of words like "real".
See, ordinary language would have us believe that "good" refers to some judgement based in a code of ethics. However, if we try to make this ordinary language sense of "good" into something "real" we end up with incoherency which would incline us toward a fundamentally incoherent definition of "real" in order to make this sense of "good" the real good. And this demonstrates why, when doing philosophy, we must adhere to rigorous philosophical meanings of the terms, and not be corrupted by ordinary language, because this corruption leads us into incoherent metaphysics.
It applies well enough to the kicked wood/door. But it might be more complicated to apply to the duck-rabbit. It is satisfied in an objective sense, but not everyone always sees both interpretations straight off, so you would have to phrase it carefully.
Quoting Banno
Perhaps they are not aware that our ears deliver spatial information about the source of the sound "directly"; however, the information is deduced from the difference between the information from one ear and the other. That's why the sound from earphones often sounds as if it were located in your own head. Binocular vision delivers spatial information in the same way as an old-fashioned range-finder; however,, that method only works at limited distance. Further away, we use internal clues.
However, I'm sure that we learn about space and that action in space is critical to understanding it. But ideas about what is perceived are also important, so I wouldn't be surprised if someone who was convinced by the arguments "saw" in two dimensions; but it is an interpretation, just as seeing in three dimensions is an interpretation.
That's not a coherent view, I know.
Quoting Banno
That sounds like an interesting discussion.
Quoting Banno
We'll never know.
Perhaps there can be specialized philosophical terms. But they can only amount to a dialect of English. So ordinary language is inescapable.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
An interesting line of argument. But I can't engage with it without reading or re-reading the texts and I'm afraid I simply don't have the time to do that. Sorry.
As Oscar Wide said:"There is only one thing in life worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about.
It depends what you mean by "see".
According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, two possible meanings of "see" are i) to perceive by the eye and ii) to imagine as a possibility.
Therefore, both the following statements are true: "I can only see in two dimensions" and "I can also see in three dimensions", dependent on whether the word "see" is being used literally or metaphorically.
Metaphors are a legitimate part of language. In What Metaphors Mean, Donald Davidson wrote:"Metaphor is a legitimate device not only in literature but in science, philosophy, and the law; it is effective in praise and abuse, prayer and promotion, description and prescription."
Yes, as Davidson points out, language is full of inherent ambiguities, when he wrote: "Another brand of ambiguity may appear to offer a better suggestion. Sometimes a word will, in a single context, bear two meanings where we are meant to remember and to use both."
Which use is literal and which is metaphorical?
Quoting RussellA
I don't think there's any doubt of that, though "metaphor" is a somewhat slippery term. I'll put the book on my wish-list.
But how does this help us understand this topic?
it's a good read, showing that understanding a metaphor involves understanding its literal meaning.
But yes, what this has to do with seeing in two or three dimensions remains obscure.
It is a good reading. Thank you for sharing the paper.
.
This reminds me of Austin's arguments on chapter VII, when he states: Consider the expressions 'cricket ball', 'cricket bat', 'cricket pavilion', 'cricket weather'. If someone did not know about cricket and were obsessed with the use of such 'normal' words as 'yellow', he might gaze at the ball, the bat, the building, the weather, trying to detect the 'common quality' which (he assumes) is attributed to these things by the prefix 'cricket'. But no such quality meets his eye; and so perhaps he concludes that 'cricket' must designate a non-natural quality, a quality to be detected not in any ordinary way but by intuition.
The point though is that ordinary language misleads us when we discuss the nature of reality, therefore the philosopher must be very wary about this. Take the example of "see" discussed by . It appears like the ordinary use of "see", being the activity that the specific sense, the eye is involved in, is the "literal" use of the term. But just like in my example of "good", ordinary language is based in what "appears" to us, and it often has no consideration for what is "real", i.e. reality, as in what is really the case. This misdirection from ordinary language inclines us to alter our definition of "real", such that it fits with what is apparent to us through the senses, rather than adhering to rigorous logic in determining what is "real". That is the problem which Plato's cave allegory exposed. The vulgar are looking at the appearance of shadows as if they are the real things, because that's how the vernacular leads them.
However, the philosopher sees beyond this. What really happens in the act of seeing is that the brain produces an image, and it is not the eyes which are producing the image, nor is it the eyes which are "seeing". The eyes are the medium, a tool used in the act of seeing. Then the real, more literal sense of "see" is the one based in the imagination of the mind, rather than the one based in the sense. And that this must be "the real meaning" of the term is evident because it refers to what is really occurring in both situations, seeing with the eyes, and imagining, rather than simply referring to what appears to be occurring. This is demonstrated more clearly with my example of "good", and it is the reason why the common, vulgar or naive people, who will not resist the restraints imposed by common language, will remain in Plato's cave, refusing to follow the philosopher's ascent.
Clearly, the first is meant literally and the second metaphorically.
If "see" means literally "to perceive by the eye", when standing in front of an object such as an apple I can only see the front of it. If "see" means metaphorically "to imagine a possibility", when standing in front of an object such as an apple, I can also see the back of it.
Is there anyone who thinks that we can literally "see the future", "see into her mind", "see the solution", "see what you mean", "see the end of time", "see the other side of the Universe", "see atoms", "see evolution happening", "see Caesar's dilemma" or "see gravitational waves".
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm not here to help you understand Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, I'm here to specifically respond to @Banno by pointing out that different meanings of the word" see" shouldn't be conflated.
Though, as an aside, as a Christian author could write an article evaluating Atheism and unsurprisingly find it wanting, Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting. From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, I may well agree that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant.
Davidson is certainly not amongst the natural language philosophers. He is among the next generation who returned to examining language in formal terms. He was certainly influenced by Wittgenstein; I'm not sure how much Austin was present in his thinking, although the separation of literal and pragmatic meaning can be traced to How to do things with words.
And despite all that, it is far from clear what any of this has to do with the contention that we only see in 2 dimensions, which is just plain wrong.
Perhaps this should all be in a different thread, since it runs the chance of leading us off topic. but I'll drop it here to see what transpires.
Words can be strung together into sentences. Those sentences are of various sorts - statements, questions, commands, and so on. These can to a large extent be marked by differences in the sequence of words: "The door is shut", "Is the door shut?", "Shut the door!" and so on.
Philosophers have a tendency to give priority to statements, mostly because it is these that are either true or false, and that are constitutive of beliefs.
Sentences can be used in "utterances", somewhat of a term of art for philosophers, since it includes verbal and written texts. An utterance is a particular use of a sentence to perform some act - make a statement, ask a question, issue a command. It's of course not necessary for the sentence to match the utterance - one can ask a rhetorical question, which can be to use the sentence form of questioning in order to utter a statement.
Our utterances are of course actions. There is a further step where we do things using an utterance. "I name this ship the Queen Mary" in the appropriate circumstances names the ship. "I now pronounce you husband and wife" marries the couple. These are not only the act of saying something, but are an additional act performed by or in saying something.
Austin's contribution was to carefully seperate out these elements, to elucidate where they might on occasion go astray - infelicities of misfire and abuse - and to begin a classification. His student Searle ran with the classifications, turning it into a career. Austin attempted to explain language in terms of convention, but this was later found inadequate without also including intent.
I'm not suggesting that this is the only, or even the correct, way to understand how words work, just that it is implicit, and sometimes explicit, in Sense and Sensibilia and so ought be understood. Nor was Austin the only one suggesting ideas along these lines.
I promise I had similar thinking after reading the paper, but I wasn't confident enough to express that the work of Davidson was influenced - or reminds me of - Wittgenstein, so I am happy to know that you have the same thought. Yet I mentioned Austin because it is the principal subject of this thread, but it is true that 'literal and pragmatic' belong to 'How to do things with words'. Well, fair enough with that interesting paper you shared previously, I don't want to get off-topic and disturb your - and the rest of the folks - analysis on 'Sense and Sensibilia'.
There's a intricate issue here. There's no doubt that the meaning of "cricket" is being extended but I don't think it is being transformed in quite the way that a metaphorical use would extend it. "Cricket" is defined as a noun and we understand how it is constituted. But "cricket" in Austin's example is being used as an adjective, in a different category. This change, or stretching, is different from a metaphorical use.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Whether ordinary language misleads us is precisely the question. Though there's no doubt that language can mislead - as it is clearly misleading Plato when he concludes that all we see is shadows.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm afraid I don't agree that the brain produces an image. If it did, there would be a question how we perceive the image that the brain produces.
Quoting RussellA
Quoting RussellA
If you know that there's another side to the apple, you know that you are looking at a three-dimensional object, so you are not seeing in two dimensions. Seeing in two dimensions occurs when you see a picture of an apple. You do not confuse the image of the apple with an apple; you do not confuse the back of the picture with the back of the apple, (except when you are deceived and do not know which you are seeing). Hence seeing in two dimensions is the metaphor, not the reality.
Quoting RussellA
I'm sorry if I misunderstood. I thought that helping each other to understand Austin's text was the point of the thread.
Forgive my pedantry, but "utter" in this sense seems to me to be a revival of the classic and original use of "utter", which survives in the law. When one uses a forged £5 note, in law, one "utters" it. When one presents a forged passport, one "utters" it. And so on. Creating the forgery is distinct from using it and the creator does not necessarily use it. So the distinction matters.
When one utters "I name this ship" in the right circumstances, one uses the words. We're not used to it, but it isn't a philosophical invention.
The point Austin makes against Ayer can be made against those who suppose that we only see in two dimensions - that the evidence is to the contrary! To think otherwise one must have somewhat extreme and external motives... an ideology.
The cave allegory is explicitly presented as a metaphor, that's why it's known as an "allegory". Plato does not conclude that all we see is shadows, he presents that as a symbolic representation to elucidate how the average person is wrong in one's assumptions about the nature of reality. And as I explained, it is the common way of using language which misleads us in this way.
Lecture X: skipping seven pages in, past the Ayer/Carnap muck, we finally get to the truth. @Banno or others will be better at telling this story, but, traditionally, I would assert something (The tree is green) and the assertion is true if the fact is correct, thus all the worry about whether we can be sure that the tree is really green, that we see it (perceive it) correctly. Also, some will claim that only a certain type of sentence can be true or false, thus the assertion (or proposition).
Austin will claim that it is neither the form of the sentence that makes it capable of being true or false nor on what it is even claiming (its meaning) because the truth will turn on the circumstances in which it is uttered.(p.111) If you and I are looking at a tree, and you say The tree is green, I could say No [thats false], Aspens are green, thats a Maple, its brown. But, if you say, I meant the leaves. I would admit Okay, sure [that assertion is true (however banal).] But now when you say It just seemed too cold for leaves not to have turned yellow. I might see what you describe, and say Huh [thats true]. And that is not a true fact, but an acknowledgement of the remark, and based only on a vague calculation of fall.
Lecture X: I was amused to see Austin describe philosophys desire for certainty in a few lines (it takes Wittgenstein half his book). Descartes starts his Meditations with Some years ago I was struck by how many false things I had believed . Austin characterizes this as the regret that in claiming some truths, we stick our necks out further. (P.112) The point being that philosophy hasnt wanted to know the truth, or knowledge, but just to never get egg on its face (especially in the shadow of science). Austin uses the example of generalizing the case we make (retreating from claiming to know the name of the star, to only knowing that it is a star) to show that Philosophy wants to find a place from which it can take no chance at all, my commitment is absolutely minimal; so that in principal nothing could show that I had made a mistake, and my remark would be incorrigible. (Id. Bold added)
The generalization of Austins example is one way that philosophy has tried to not be wrong. It struggles with moral loggerheads, but it only takes up the best case for knowledge (the easiest to prove) in: seeing an object (it uses pain as an example of the other because it is unavoidable, constant, etc. as well), and then it wants to universalize its findings back to ethics (and wonders why it has nothing to say).
Also, you will notice that I emphasized that Austin is aware that when we make a claim, we are making a commitment; we are committing ourselves to what we have said, to be responsible for amending the meaning, to be subject to the implications of how it is judged (or retract it)(p.112). In wanting to be incorrigible (as Banno has pointed out) philosophy not only wants something foundational for knowledge, but to rule out even the possibility of being corrected, which means forsaking the part we play in making a claim (or making it poorly, as to magenta on p. 113), which it does by assuming that the words alone can be discussed not only by neglecting the circumstances in which things are said (p.118) but apart from a person having said it (expressed it Wittgenstein will record this as).
Quoting Antony Nickles
I laughed out loud. He's certainly succinct. In truth, I'm somewhat surprised, and very pleased, at how opposed to philosophy Austin is. He shares the antiphilosophy usually attributed to Wittgenstein. I don't recall being aware of this in previous readings.
I'll get to the point of attempting a summary. Still mulling stuff over. By all means, please go ahead with further comments. I'm waiting for your overview; I'm sure you have some critique of Austin waiting in the wings.
I haven't paid much attention to Carnap, his approach just didn't seem to me to get off the ground; but I'm told Chalmers makes use of Carnap's approach, so it may have some present relevance.
Honestly, I think Austin is not using 'cricket' as an adjective, but a prefix. According to him, this noun is 'always-the-same' meaning. If someone did not know the significance of 'cricket', he/she couldn't match it with other words such as 'ball', 'bat', 'pavilion', etc. This is why he states that the person might gaze at those words trying to find out a common factor.
...
The factor here is the prefix cricket.
It is similar to a metaphorical use. This is why Donald Davidson states: Thus, when Melville writes that "Christ was a chronometer," the effect of metaphor is produced by our taking "chronometer" first in its ordinary sense and then in some extraordinary or metaphorical sense.
'Christ' is always-the-same meaning, while chronometer is a word whose significance can vary. It can work as a noun or in a metaphorical sense.
Yes, he is cautious about it presentation of it. He's no fool. But that caution is eerily reminiscent of Austin's remark "There's the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it away". Only Plato gets the bit where you take it away in before he says it.
Perhaps it is a symbolic representation. If so, it is a representation like the Escher staircases.
Surely Plato does differentiate between the Forms and the ordinary world? The traditional view, as I understand it, is that he believes that the Forms are in some sense superior to the ordinary world. How would you describe that difference?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm afraid the question is whether it is us or Plato who is being misled.
The shift from worrying about true or false to commitment and retraction is definitely helpful. One would have to how this works in the context of incorrigible first person statements of experience. The assumption that the language is being used in standard, or at least shared, ways would be one point. The possibility of self-correction is another. (Austin mentions both of these.)
Isn't there a doctrine - it is present in my memory, but I've lost any sense of where it can be found - that logical truths are true in all circumstances and consequently empty and trivial. In other words, I'm not sure that this idea is distinctively Austinian. I believe that Wittgenstein relies on a similar point in his argument about "I am in pain". It is not only first person statements that are incorrigible.
Much discussion of this seems to rely on a clear distinction between statements that are true or false and statements that are neither. I doubt if either Austin or Wittgenstein would really want to defend the usual binary (simplistic, context-independent) position. Certainly, it seems to me that "I am in pain" has similarities to both. On the one hand, it is like "Ouch" (an expression) and on the other, it is like "He is in pain" (true/false). Wouldn't a similar point apply to "I see a turquoise patch"? There are differences, of course. For example, I don't know what the equivalent of "Ouch" would be for "I see a turquoise patch". Not sure where this goes.
Quoting Antony Nickles
That is certainly the outcome of philosophical practice at least since Descartes. But I'm not sure it is fair to put it in that way. I would rather say that philosophers have become so focussed on avoiding error and so fascinated with a particular truth-game, that they have lost perspective and tried to deny the truths that they cannot pack into their box.
Quoting Banno
I was inclined to think that Carnap is not actually particularly interested in Ayer's problem, but focused on the practices that we call science. What he says makes sense in that context, but it is true that in Ayer's (and Austin's) context, it falls apart.
Yes. I think that's right.
Quoting javi2541997
I agree with that. But what you say implies also that this use is also different from the paradigm cases that are usually offered to explain what they word means. "Metaphor" is a slippery word, so I don't think there is any future in arguing about whether it is correct or not to classify this use as a metaphor or not. We seem to have a pretty much common understanding of what it going on here.
In what sense are you using the word "see".
From the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word "see" can have several meanings, including "to perceive by the eye" and "to imagine a possibility".
You say that because you know that you are looking at a three-dimensional object then you are not seeing in two-dimensions.
By this, do you mean either i) you are perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form or ii) you are imagining a three-dimensional form?
The problem with Austin
The problem with Austin is that he is taking his Ordinary Language philosophy too far, even further than the Ordinary Man would take it.
For example, in the expression "I see an apple", Austin's approach is to ignore any possible metaphorical meaning for its so-called "ordinary" usage, thereby turning a blind eye to the range of possible meanings as laid out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary.
As he wrote: For reasons not very obscure, we always prefer in practice what might be called the cash-value expression to the 'indirect' metaphor. If I were to report that I see enemy ships indirectly, I should merely provoke the question what exactly I mean.' I mean that I can see these blips on the radar screen'-'Well, why didn't you say so then?'
For Austin, "I see an apple" is all one needs to know. However, for Ayer, it is an important metaphysical question when looking at an apple whether I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form or I am imagining the possibility of a three-dimensional form.
Quoting Ludwig V
That's why I included my understanding of Austin's position regarding sense-data in page 5 of this thread, which has neither been supported nor opposed.
Though, as an aside, as a Christian author could write an article evaluating Atheism and unsurprisingly find it wanting, Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting. From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, I may well agree that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant.
Quoting RussellA
Ordinary Language Philosophy has nothing to do with common sense or with the ordinary man, as I tried to explain here (and elsewhere as referenced in that post), it is a philosophical method, not a position.
Also, nothing could be produced that would show that I made a mistake (p.114) about Thats a pig, because the circumstances are such (p.115), not because of some belief in isolated sentences.
Ayer's word, "incorrigible', can be taken as either "so good that it cannot be improved" or as "that cannot be proved false." As mentioned earlier it is the latter for which Ayer is cited in the OED.
This is to be contrasted with Certainty: "Established as a truth or fact to be absolutely received, depended, or relied upon; not to be doubted, disputed, or called in question; indubitable, sure."
Being incorrigible is not so demanding of some proposition as being certain.
So to his credit, and Austin seems to grant this, Ayer is not looking for certainty, as Descartes and others did. He will settle for the best he can get, or at least avoiding being proven false. Ayer is after knowledge, rather than truth.
The following is worth quoting in full:
This lecture is about why this is a misguided approach.
The first sense and I mean that I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form - except when I am looking at a two-dimensional picture.
Quoting RussellA
I wouldn't say he ignores metaphorical meanings for "apple". He explicitly draws attention to one kind of relevant metaphor in the passage you quote. He also draws attention to the difference between that metaphorical use and the literal use. That is not mentioned in the Merriam Webster definition.
Quoting RussellA
As it happens, in the example you cite, "I" am perceiving by the eye (in future, I will write "see" instead of this cumbersome form) two dimensional forms which I know give me information about the three-dimensional world. I can't see any important metaphysical questions from this.
Quoting RussellA
Yes, it is common to dismiss the arguments of people who believe in God because they arrive at the conclusion they started from. But actually, that's a lazy mistake. It is perfectly possible for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the existence of God that deserves to be taken seriously. Some of them do beg the question. But that's not the same thing. For example, if you say I got the most votes because I won the election, your premise (I won the election) relies on the conclusion (I got the most votes) rather than providing evidence for it. Nothing to do with what you or I believe.
Quoting RussellA
That's not the same thing as begging the question. Ordinary Language Philosophy is a method of evaluation and he is using it to evaluate Ayer's argument and he comes to the conclusion that the argument is invalid. It would be up to a supporter of Ayer to show that the mistakes and confusions that Austin has identified are not mistakes and not confused. This argument would invalidate any criticism or evaluation of any argument - it would, as they say, - prove too much.
Quoting RussellA
I think there's a typo in the sentence, isn't there? You seem to be saying that the sense-data theory is irrelevant. I would agree with that.
The irony here is that those who rely on what you go on to call the "traditional view" are chasing shadows. The shadows are the opinions that influence how and what we see, including what we see when we read Plato through the lens of the opinions of this tradition.
Quoting Ludwig V
The distinction is between what is and what things seem to be for us. The ordinary world is the world of our opinions. Ontology determined by epistemology, or, as the problem has been articulated at least since Parmenides, the problem of thinking and being. Although the term 'ontology' is a modern neologism, its etymology points not to what is, but to what we say and think about what is. The Forms are hypothetical:
(Phaedo 99d-100a)
See also the discussion of dialectic in the Republic:
(Republic 511b)
We are, however, never free from hypotheses. We remain in the realm of opinion. We never attain knowledge of the beginning (arche) of the whole. It is not that Plato is misled by language. Quite the opposite. He recognizes the limits of what can be said. The Forms are philosophical poiesis, images of the truth and knowledge that those who desire wisdom strive for.
Quoting Ludwig V
Just to tweak this a bit, Austin is not shifting from true and false to commitment (abandoning truth), but only adding that a claim (even to truth) is made in a circumstance, and I am only underlining his recognition that one of the pieces of the circumstance is that it is made by a person subject to the future (responsible to it, to further intelligibilityhis amending or retracting as only examples) rather than philosophys desire to try to solve for the future, avoid the possibility of error entirely (be incorrigible, abstractly, universallythus, also removing our part).
Quoting Ludwig V
Again, Austins claim is not that statements are ordinarily (not metaphysically) incorrigible because they are made by me (first-person), but because of the circumstances that make, say, I am in pain intelligible, for example, that I am informing you so that you might help me, even if I am not in pain, which is not a matter of it being wrong, but of me lying (p. 113, 118), which is always a possibility in that case (without recourse). My understanding is that neither Austin nor Wittgenstein claim that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me. However, in the sense above, it is important that it is me that is making this claim (with respect to my responsibility to it).
Also, saying that Austin is relying on standard, or at least shared, ways overlooks the fact that we might not find a right answer (p.66), that he leaves the whole matter of judgment open to new circumstances (though I cant find that part again, maybe p. 74), and, in any event, any discussion is only brought up when it is under suspicion or is questioned, as if there is never any dilemma or surprise, the question [of doubt, thus criteria] simply doesn't come up (p.76). This is not a general foundation, but, again, pointing out that a question only comes up in a specific situation. Wittgenstein is read as claiming a foundation based on much the same thing, but he also ultimately finds an end to all that (rules, my mental processes, language games, etc.) and looks at much the same circumstances when investigating continuing a series, among other things.
The fundamental point is that what matters is the fact that claims are made in a situation. The conclusion is the same for first-person statements as with identification of a pig, or a color. And not only do they have different criteria (which is more Wittgensteins focus), but the application of those criteria still depends on the circumstance (what the use or sense is of something in that instance Wittgenstein would say).
Quoting Ludwig V
The whole point here for Austin is that the more stringent our presumed standard (incorrigibility), the less cases that actually meet that requirement. Again, this is why philosophy reduces itself to the best-case of objects (or first-person claims). In fact, no case actually meets that requirement for certainty (not as a lack, but categorically/mechanicallythus philosophy makes up something, e.g., sense-data). As I stated above, Austin addresses this, among other places, in discussing the desire for, and outcome of, generalization (p.112), but also that it is less likely to cover novel situations (p. 130). Emerson refers (in Experience) to this as everything slipping through our fingers the harder we try to grasp (which Heidegger alludes to in What is Called Thinking?).
I'm going to venture into uncertain territory here. His dismantling of Ayer's approach is convincing, as always. I'm convinced, but not satisfied and I think this raises difficult questions.
On p.121 he says "We learn the word 'pig', as we learn the vast majority of words for ordinary things, ostensively-by being told, in the presence of the animal, 'That is a pig'; and thus, though certainly we
learn what sort of thing it is to which the word 'pig' can and can't be properly applied, we don't go through any kind of intermediate stage of relating the word 'pig' to a lot of statements about the way things look, or sound, or smell. The word is just not introduced into our vocabulary in this way."
This is all very well, and relevant. But formal definition and various kinds of entailment do have a place, whether inside or outside ordinary language. So, though it may be unfair, I'm inclined to think that Austin has over-generalized here.
In the footnote on that page he says "Another way of showing that 'entailment' is out of place in such contexts: Suppose that tits, all the tits we've ever come across, are bearded, so that we are happy to say 'Tits are bearded.' Does this entail that what isn't bearded isn't a tit? Not really. For if beardless specimens are discovered in some newly explored territory, well, of course we weren't talking about them when we said that tits were bearded; we now have to think again, and recognize perhaps this new species of glabrous tits. Similarly, what we say nowadays about tits just doesn't refer at all to the prehistoric eo-tit, or to remote future tits, defeathered perhaps through some change of atmosphere."
Rather than try to find a place of impregnable safety, adapt to the unforeseen when it occurs. Very helpful when dealing with philosophical certainty.
But there's another concern. If we were to take Newtonian mechanics and argue that the terms of that theory were nonsense from the point of view of ordinary language - (and even from the point of view of some non-ordinary language, since the law of gravity violates the prohibition of action at a distance) - we would meet a battery or arguments that our criterion was in appropriate and that the theory had did make sense and had various other virtues. Of course, that isn't a philosophical theory. But how do we distinguish philosophical theories which can be debunked by appeal to ordinary language from other theories, physical, psychological - without begging the question?
I think where I'm going with this is something like - ordinary language is not a distinct philosophical method, it is embedded at least as a starting-point in all philosophy and in all theory. A clean sheet of paper is simply not available.
Quoting Antony Nickles
More tweaking. I think Wittgenstein's point is that "I am in pain" is not simply passing on information, but is an expression that elicits a response ("Ouch!"). Actually one could use "I am in pain" in the same way as one might use "he is in pain" - to give information. Which use I'm making of it will depend on circumstances.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I don't quite understand this. What else would they be based on?
Quoting Antony Nickles
That is a really important point.
The term ordinary language philosophy is confusing and made up. First, ordinary is only in contrast to metaphysical, here, sense-data. And it isnt about language, it is about the everyday criteria and cases shown in contrast to the singular criteria of certainty (incorrigibility) and an abstract generalized case. And it is not an appeal, as if ordinary criteria are in competition with or replacing metaphysics (nor is the use of ordinary language the goal). It is a method of doing philosophy by examining specific cases and what we say when in order to draw conclusions about the way things work (and dont).
Austin mentions that we learn criteria when he says certainly we learn what sort of thing it is to which the word 'pig' can and can't be properly applied (p. 121 my bold). What I think he is pointing out is that we do not define a pig, nor do we need to check off a list of entailments (as in prerequisites), but that criteria are just the bounds of distinctions (categories), for example, between a donkey and a horse, which only come up when necessary. And so not that it cant be a pig unless it checks all the (entailed) boxes, because we dont know which, if any, criteria to apply until there is a situation, which may be novel, and thus require stretching or changing or ignoring our ordinary criteria.
So, has metaphysics seeped into scientific theories? Im not going to answer that because I dont want to go down the road of saying most neuroscience is operating under a number of misconceptions (whoops, now Ive done it). But, of course, science is not searching for philosophical certainty; it has its own: if I apply its method, I come up with the same answer (so does everyone).
Quoting Ludwig V
Which is what I was trying to say, only said better. Of course we need not only be doing one thing either, and so this is to give information as well (and why we shouldnt be said to use language), though, yes, the circumstances would need fleshing out. You would need to be unaware I was in pain, and also be someone who would be expected to do something about it, say, the host at a party, or a doctor. If you just walk up to me and say it, I am likely to respond, for lack of a better way to read it, Yeah, were all getting old.
Well, based on is a distracting word hereof course the only one capable of expressing myself may be me (though others can read me). But, obviously (ordinarily), we can be lying, and even lying to ourselves (Im angry as an expression of sadness). More to the point here, what about not being wrong about statements about me is necessary? Ive been shot! Wait, no. Perhaps we are afraid we wont or dont know ourselves, but this is a legitimate possibility. Or maybe I dont have authority in the eyes of others to report on myself (a child, or a captive). This is to say, first-person statements might not be incorrigible at all, and, even if they are, the fact I am making them is not of the only importance.
The Forms are prior to what you call "the ordinary world", and it is this priority which makes them more real. The "priority" in this sense, is the sense of a temporal priority, such that the Forms are causal. Being the cause of the things of the ordinary world is what makes them as you say "superior". The "ordinary world" would mean how we perceive things to be, through sensation.
So the people in the cave see the world of artificial, ordinary things. 'Ordinary things' we can describe as temporal things, coming into existence and going out of existence in time having a temporal beginning and end. The people in the cave do not understand that these artificial ordinary (temporal) things are just a copy, representation, or "shadow" of the idea or form from which they are created. An ordinary bed is made as a copy of an idea of what a bed is. "The good" is the purpose for which the thing is created, and in the allegory it is the source of light, the fire. The good, along with the idea, cause the existence of artificial, temporal things. Once a philosopher comes to understand how this is the cause of existence of these temporal things, one can go beyond the existence of artificial things (leave the cave) and understand that the cause of all natural temporal things must be a similar causal process.
Quoting Ludwig V
That is a good question, and with some effort of philosophical inquiry it can be answered. First, we'd have to address the scenario in the cave. Is it true that the idea, or form, of an artificial thing is prior to, and along with the purpose, is in some way a cause of existence of the material thing in the ordinary world.
If we decide that Plato is correct in this representation, i.e. not being misled, or misleading us, then we proceed to the second step, as Aristotle did in his Metaphysics. This is the question of in what ways is the coming into being of natural things similar to that of artificial things. And this is a much more difficult question which requires education in metaphysical principles.
So are we prepared to accept that:
Now it seems to me that the first thing philosophy will want to do is qualify this, as: not incorrigible in the same way, or not truth, or not a fact. And we must grant that we are not talking about true in all occasions and for all time, and thus not always the case (a fact set in stone), even given similar circumstances. But all of this perfection has been shown to be a fantasy based on fear and desire; the satisfaction of conclusive verification is not a foundation, but only what is demanded in this situation (our real need Wittgenstein will say). So, yes, the truth Austin is proposing is qualified in that the circumstances must allow for it, and may not sustain it, but, nevertheless, we have something true, and not, as may also be claimed, that it is only good enough for everyday or practical or ordinary purposes. P.119
That being said, and without yet having read the final chapter, I will only convey what I know of what Cavell claims are limitations of his old teacher (this @Banno is perhaps the only shoe I have to drop, having been pleasantly surprised that Austin addresses more than I had before considered, if only peripherally). I think we can agree that Austin says that we only know how to (or need to) address a concern if there is reason for asking, and that we have everyday ways of distinguishing and identifying, etc., though they may not always answer the question. Cavell (through Wittgenstein) takes the skeptics generic claims more seriously (where Austin is more condescending?), though not on their terms either (towards certainty). Austins examples of objects and identification, etc., work to his advantage, where Wittgenstein is pulling back another layer in discussing pointing, rule-following, continuing a series, understanding, doubting, etc. The difference in these examples is that our not finding an answer reveals not our ordinary means of resolving cases, but that the mechanics of our lives reveal more than just about knowing how to answer questions. This, of course, is for another dayperhaps Other Minds?
Meta is notable for apparently not having even mentioned Austin on a thread about Austin.
In the end, I dont think people take Austin seriously enough, to be as impactful as he should be, so thanks for taking him up. What I appreciate most is that he makes me realize that what you say matters, and that the truth can matter more than we realize, more than our cynicism, laziness, narcism, self-absorption, delusion, aggrandizement, and on and on. In honor of that, his best from the last Lecture:
It all runs quite smoothly, there's positively no deception: and yet in the end that baby has somehow been spirited down the waste-pipe.
He gets off to rather a bad start, however, which reveals him as already at least half-way to perdition.
You've got to get something on your plate before you can start messing it around.
I'm afraid that I'm partly responsible for that. I was curious about his take on Plato (which seemed to be based on some serious reading and thought). But it was also because Plato seems to me to be an early progenitor of the mistakes we are talking about, because he believes that ordinary perceptions are all false and develops something that is close to sense-datum theory in the "cave" metaphor. But he takes the central point (that ordinary perceptions are deceptive) and runs off in an entirely different direction with it, because he has an alternative concept of what is really real. But that's of interest itself. My understanding of Kant is that he also takes the central idea to show that there is a "reality" "behind" the phenomena), rather than believing that the phenomena are the only reality (cf. Berkeley).
True, that's partly based on the accident of my biography, that I've always been involved with Plato, though not at a serious (research) level. The later dialogues were simply beyond me. I couldn't take them seriously enough to get my head round them.
There is an interesting and, so far as I know, unusual, idea there. Quoting Fooloso4
I think this is a much better way of putting what's going on. Perhaps it is helpful to reflect that lawyers arguing a point in case law are in a similar position. The practice of the courts, rather than legislation needs to be examined in order to arrive at justice. It strikes me that Austin's examples can be treated as simply (counter-) examples. The ordinariness of the language is beside the point
But there is the suspicion of technical or specialized concepts. Here's the rub. It is impossible for someone who does not accept the term "quale" or "qualia" as being capable of coherent use to join in the discussion. The only possible strategy is to demonstrate the incoherence of the proposed usage.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Exactly. The ordinariness of the language is beside the point.
Quoting Antony Nickles
.. and it may well be helpful in such situations to articulate and formalize our habits in order to be better able to focus arguments and settle those difficult cases.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I'm probably unusual in that I'm rather suspect that there is really no such a thing as a or the scientific method. Blame Feyerabend. (I know he's persona non grate for two good reasons, but if he's right, he's right. I can accept that without approving or excusing some of the things he's probably done). I prefer the idea that science is simply organized common sense.
Quoting Antony Nickles
.. and you elaborated further and I agree with all of that.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Quite so. That's a consequence of the private language argument. But then, there's the issue whether psychosomatic pains and illnesses are "real" or not. I'm in the camp that says they are not deceptions or illusions, even though the usual causal pathways are not involved.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes. Austin thinks that sense-datum theory can be disposed of or dissolved. Cavell, writing some time later, is taking seriously 1) the survival of scepticism (and sense-data) post Wittgenstein, and 2) Wittgensteins remark about "our real needs" being at the heart of the issues. But his phenomenological turn, though plausible, is not, I think, particularly illuminating. On the other hand, I'm not sure where else to go. However, our discussion of the pursuit of certainty is helpful.
Before I can comment, it depends what you mean.
Do you mean either i) at one moment in time when looking at an object I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form or ii) at several moments in time when walking around an object I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form.
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Quoting Ludwig V
When looking at a radar screen the technician would ordinarily say "I see the enemy ships", inferring that they see the enemy ships directly rather than indirectly. This suggests that the expression "I see the enemy ships" is not to be taken literally but metaphorically.
However, there is more to it than that, in that within Austin's Ordinary Language Philosophy the words within the metaphor are to be taken literally rather than figuratively. This is in the same way as described by Donald Davidson in his article What Metaphors Mean.
In Ordinary Language Philosophy, the expression "I see the enemy ships", although classified as a metaphor, is intended to be taken literally, in the same way that a Direct Realist when saying "I see a red postbox" means not only that they see a red postbox but that the postbox is literally red.
This leads into the debate between Direct Realists who argue they directly see an object in the world and the indirect Realist who argue that they directly see the sense-data from an object in the world.
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Quoting Ludwig V
The relevance is linguistic, in that the word "see" has several meanings, including "to perceive by the eye" and "to imagine a possibility".
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Quoting Ludwig V
True, but it would be more difficult for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the non-existence of God.
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Quoting Ludwig V
An Ordinary Language Philosophy as a philosophical methodology would be agnostic about Ayer's metaphysical sense-data theory, but Austin's Sense and Sensibilia is clearly more than a philosophical methodology as it concludes that Ayer's metaphysical sense-data theory is wrong.
Austin and Ayer hold two independent positions. Austin, as the name Ordinary Language Philosophy suggests, that of linguistics, and Ayer that of metaphysics. The problems of linguistics are different to and independent of the problems of metaphysics.
Ordinary Language Philosophy is about the meaning of an expression such as " I see an object in the world", whereas sense-data theory is about whether we see an object in the world directly or do we see the sense-data from that object directly. These are two very different things and shouldn't be conflated.
I believe that sense-data are metaphysically true, and I also believe that sense-data is irrelevant to linguistics. For linguistics to try to prove or disprove the metaphysical theory of sense-data is like asking a person to describe something they don't know about.
Linguistics and metaphysics are two independent fields of study, and the existence of one neither proves not disproves the existence of the other.
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Quoting Ludwig V
I agree that from Austin's Ordinary Language point of view the sense-data theory is irrelevant.
That's one of the questions. The difficulty is that arguments about metaphysics have to be expressed in language. If the (attempts to express) metaphysical argument result in self-contradiction or absurdity, they cannot be correct. No?
Quoting RussellA
I don't know. I don't believe in God, yet I can tell you what the arguments for and against are. What's the problem?
True, the argument for sense-data theory can only be expressed in language.
However, if the argument results in self-contradiction or absurdity, it is possible that it is the argument that is self-contradictory or absurd, not the topic of the argument.
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Quoting Ludwig V
Your arguments for the existence of God haven't persuaded you of the existence of God, so they cannot be very persuasive.
It is not at all close to a sense-datum theory.
This is what Socrates says, the image of the cave is:
(Republic 514a)
The images whose shadows we see are not sense-data, they are:
(514c)
Yes, but we see the shadows, never the statues, which are also not what they seem to be, i.e. not men and other animals. So you're right. There are two levels of unreality involved. But Plato is claiming that we never see reality, and that's the central issue in sense-datum theory.
OK. But the argument in question here is the argument that we never perceive reality, only sense-data.
What Plato is claiming is that we do not have knowledge of those things that are of central concern to the Republic, that is, of the just, the beautiful, and the good. We have opinions about such things not knowledge.
He acknowledges that the craftsmen, physicians, ship captains, and others have knowledge. They see the "reality" of those things they have knowledge of.
The cave has been discussed in other threads and, of course, a new thread can be started.
Ayers doesn't present that view. There may be advocates of sense data who do believe that, but Ayers agrees with the view that what we see is real, whether it's sense data that we see, or material objects.
Linguistics and metaphysics are two very different fields of enquiry.
Austin's Sense and Sensibilia is written from the viewpoint of an Ordinary Language Philosopher.
I can understand Austin, as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, making the point that sense-data is not a necessary part of linguistics, which I agree with.
However, I don't agree that he then continues to argue, still as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, that sense-data is not a valid metaphysical position.
The metaphysics of sense-data, which is outside of language, cannot be critiqued by an Ordinary Language Philosopher from a position that reality is established by language.
That's true. But it depends on the argument. If my argument is that democracy is bound to fail (as Plato argues), that argument may be absurd, but that doesn't show that democracy is absurd. But if the argument is that God exists and that argument is absurd, until there is another argument, there is no basis for asserting that God exists. No?
Quoting Fooloso4
We would have to get into the texts to settle that. But I pretty clear that he does not think that such people have philosophical knowledge, which is knowledge of the true and the real. They have something lesser; his word is sometimes translated "Knack".
Quoting Fooloso4
So I think we should leave the topic there.
Quoting frank
Well, his position is more complicated than my remark allowed. That is true. If you prefer, he says that it is only sense-data that we see directly, and that "material objects" are "constructions" out of sense-data. So material objects, according to Ayer are not what we think they are.
So you believe both positions and that no argument can settle the issue? Basically on the grounds that any argument must be from one position or another and that it cannot therefore address the issue. H'm. That would need some explaining.
But I think we all know that observers who are looking at the same object each see a different scene. Each one could draw out what they see and we could compare, and note differences. No one concludes from this that the observers aren't seeing a material object. I think Ayers was fully up to speed on how this is playing out in language.
I think Austin's criticisms aren't toward Ayers. They're toward a version of sense-data theory that does say we don't see the world around us.
I would have thought that Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) is associated with GE Moore's common sense and the later Wittgenstein's ordinary language of the ordinary person-in-the-street.
OLP doesn't reduce philosophy to ordinary words, but proposes that philosophy can better be undertaken using ordinary words. OLP does not reduce philosophy to the person-in-the-street, but suggests that philosophy should be understood by the person-in-the-street. OLP looks at the ordinary use of words, what words mean within the context they are being used in.
OLP looks at words such as direct and indirect and points out it is not possible to make the simple statement that direct and indirect have opposite meanings. Not only does direct have several different meanings dependent upon context but also indirect has several different meanings dependent upon context.
OLP points out that problems arise when ordinary words having commonly agreed meanings are given unusual new meanings by philosophers in their attempt to solve philosophical problems, thereby creating more philosophical problems than they solve
Because of the nature of language, in that the meaning of a word depends on its context within the whole, and between words are family resemblances, OLP tend to be anti-essentialist, meaning that their philosophy is more about relationships between truth and reality rather than based on an absolute truth or reality.
However, Ernest Gellner in Words and Things 1959 made the valid point that as language derives from the communities within which we live, as these communities are ever-changing and unstable, philosophical ideas expressed within our language will also inevitably be ever-changing and unstable.
(Wikipedia - Ordinary Language Philosophy)
True, in the absence of a good argument that God exists people fall back on faith.
Quoting Ludwig V
Exactly my problem with Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, in that from the position of linguistics he does take a position on the metaphysics of sense-data.
Incorrigible! I thought you'd never notice. I happen to have a strong aversion to certain words, and some names can be even worse for me.
Youre not wrong about Moore. He was simply trying to satisfy the desire of metaphysics for certainty with basically, as you say, common sense (Austin responds to him in Other Minds). However, Wittgenstein is using the method of investigating what is said in particular situations, but the lessons from these examples are not a substitute for the foundation that metaphysics wants (I say this to clarify Austin in contrast, but I have no desire to debate this claim here.)
Quoting RussellA
OLP is examining what anyone would say in a particular situation, in order to find unbiased philosophical data, not as proof of a position. And it makes use only of what anyone would agree is true (though this can be hard for people reading Wittgenstein to see, or agree to; Austin is more understandably insightful, but then without the depth of Wittgenstein). Thus the importance of trying to make the most sense possible of anothers position. Accordingly, here, Austin is also looking at the metaphysical use of words (attempting to give them as much sense as he canWittgenstein will actually make up situations that might make sense for them, as he has more sympathy, having been in their position, literally).
And I wouldnt phrase it that the object is what words mean, but the implications that go along with them in different situations, the criteria we use to judge, the distinctions that are made, etc. We could say these are the ways they are meaningful to us. Austin is more concerned with showing that we have the means at hand to address the skeptics concerns with errors, illusion, mistakes, etc., where Wittgenstein takes the skeptics claims as illuminating the limitations of knowledge of others, expression, understanding, i.e., examples of our relation to ourselves, others, ad the world in general. Austin here only addresses seeing (perceiving) but he does elsewhere look at knowing.
Quoting RussellA
Ill grant that OLP makes it clear that absolute anything is an empty pursuit. But Austin also shows how reality, as conceived as a standard for truth or knowledge, is a manufactured idea. Nevertheless, OLP does not abandon the essence of the world. I would argue that Austin is reclaiming the myriad ways in which we are interested in things. (I see this as another of Austins hidden lessons @Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997.) Wittgenstein points out that Essence is expressed by grammar. PI, #371 This is not to say that the mechanics of our practices serve the same purpose as metaphysical essence. Grammar is not equal to essence; the standards or criteria we judge by reflect what matters to us about a practice, what is essential to us about the world.
Quoting RussellA
Just to follow through here from my response above, OLP is not arguing that reality is established by language. Language is not its term. Its a method that only draws out the things anyone would say in a given situation in order to shed light on the way we look at philosophical issues. It is not about linguistics; its about what we do, how we ordinarily judge our practices, compared to how philosophy has traditionally created a standard for knowledge.
So Austin is not trying to replace metaphysics. And he is not arguing just that sense-data is not valid; hes showing that metaphysics itself is not a valid position at all. He reveals that it is argued for the purpose of its own predetermined manufactured fantasy: certain, foundational, universal, abstract, complete, independent knowledge.
I wouldnt draw that conclusion about terms from OLP necessarily. Austins terms of criticism look like ordinary comments, but circumstance, mistake, say anything they want, etc. are in need of unpacking just as he has done with real and perception, etc. I always feel like the penetration of his insight overwhelms seeing the fact that every philosopher is less aware of themselves than their adversary. Wittgenstein unfortunately used specialty terms to the doom of his being understood, but even pushed words like grammar, criteria, aspect, etc. into terms of art.
I do agree that Austin will seem to be just picking apart others termsand both he and Wittgenstein do talk a lot about nonsense or not making sensebut one of their skills is actually giving others terms and arguments as much sense (and circumstance) as they can (both have their limits). I think Austin is asking What distinction is being made here?; not to say it is incoherent, but to reveal how it is being used, what purpose it is playing, what is important about it to them. What is hard to wrap my head around is that this can be different than what they say, what they want it to do, or the import they wish it hadthat they can only mean X. Ill look back for some examples, but it is not outright dismissal.
Quoting Ludwig V
But if weve learned anything from Austin shouldnt we ask: not whether it is real (meets some standard we impose), but what matters to us about pain? What is the distinction we want to impose, and what is the actual criteria and mechanics we judge by. We can try to determine (know) causes. But we, as you said, respond to someone in pain (or ignore them). Could we be fooled? Sure. And theres our excuse to skip over the other and look inside them instead; to treat the disease rather than the patient (as a human) as is commonly warned against.
Quoting Ludwig V
Well no one in this forum has accurately summarized Cavell before, but are you referring to Wittgenstein above? This is obviously for another time, in bulk, but I dont understand what would be a phenomenological turn for either of them.
The next part, pp. 106..., concerns the two languages theory, which according to Austin is supported only disingenuously by Ayer. Now I had previously understood Ayer as suggesting something along the lines of
But it seems I've jumped the gun. I'd been misled by such things as
...supposing that at a minimum the two languages must have some equivalence of truth value. But there is to be no such symmetry. "The material-object language must somehow be reducible to the sense-datum language".
(an incomplete post... an unfinished thought.)
True, but they are a foundation for what Ordinary Language Philosophy wants
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Quoting Antony Nickles
OLP as any method cannot avoid but being biased
OLP is a method, and as with any method, is only able to discover those things that it is structurally capable of discovering. By that I mean, if given a problem, whether scientific or philosophical, the method I choose in order to solve that problem determines any solution that I may discover. For example, I may want to discover the nature of reality, and my chosen method is visual observation. However, the reality I discover will be only be that part of reality accessible to vision. I will be missing that part of reality only accessible to touch, hearing, etc .
As no method is unbiased, using OLP as a method to investigate the philosophical nature of reality will inevitably come up with a biased answer, an answer biased by the very method being used. OLP is one method amongst many, including Analytic, Logical Positivism, Phenomenology, Scepticism, Common Sense, Verifications, Continental, Aristotelianism, etc, where each will give a different answer biased by the inherent nature of the method itself.
OLP by its very nature of having a specific method can only result in biased conclusions. It is inevitable.
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Quoting Antony Nickles
I would think that the metaphysical use of words is a logical impossibility.
Words can be used to describe Ayer's metaphysical problem with sense-data. For example, I can say: "when looking at a red postbox, for the Direct Realist the postbox is literally red and for the Indirect Realist the postbox appears red, not that the postbox is literally red".
Ayer's metaphysical problem with sense-data is independent of language and would still happen in a world without language, in that language is not an aspect of the metaphysical situation. When a person looks at a red postbox, is the postbox literally red, or does the person have a private mental sensation of the colour red?
On the one hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data is independent of language, yet on the other hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data can be discussed within language. Wittgenstein gave a solution to this conundrum in Philosophical Investigations 293 using the beetle in the box analogy, where we can talk about pain yet cannot describe pain. The private sensation of pain, the beetle in the box, drops out of consideration within the language game. The word "pain" in language is not describing an unknown cause, pain, but is describing the known effect of an unknown cause, ie, pain behaviour.
Similarly, Austin might talk about "the metaphysics of do we directly see sense-data or directly see the object", but this expression is not describing an unknown cause, whether sense-data or an object, but is describing the known effect of an unknown cause, ie, seeing something.
I find Austin a refreshing example of how to productively do philosophy, no matter what the conclusions he comes to; the method is satisfyingthe possibility of it (for common ground) is heartening. But when Austin says Ayer & Co provide the best available expositions of the approved reasons for holding [this position: of the world as, say, hidden] more full, coherent, and terminologically exact, I feel like this is a little cagey. He proceeds to tear to pieces what seem clearly strange arguments pieced together like toothpick scaffolding. The only thing I can think is that Austin realized that Ayer throws himself into every part of the position unreservedly, and is detailed and deliberate at every step, however confused. So Austin uses him as a great example of every misstep that metaphysics makes. Its not that Ayer is a worthy opponent, but that he explicitly hits every touchstone of errors that manifest from the desire for something incorrigible.
If the equivalence I set up were so, then statements about sense data would entail statements about material objects.
Now I set up this equivalence as a way of understanding the minimum requirement for there being two languages.
Austin shows that
The symmetry is broken; and with it the two language theory.
OLP proposes to try to reach an unbiased take on each example (not, somehow, generally, entirely), subject to acceptance by you, so also subject to correction, refinement, further cases, additional attention to the circumstances. This focus is to strip away any bias as in a hidden agenda or prerequisite, like having a standard or goal ahead of time (like incorrigibility) which is thought only needs to be explained, proven. Instead it examines the lay of the land of what we would agree we would say in a particular circumstance to understand the criteria we use, the implications, the distinctions, etc., in that case, and only then using that data to make any philosophical claims.
Quoting RussellA
I am not talking about the metaphysical problem (whether it exists in or out of language, or can or can not be discussed), but the metaphysicians use of words (knowledge, intent, real, direct, etc.) in comparison to our ordinary use of those words, which reveals how and why metaphysics wants to remove context and generalize only one type of case.
Keep in mind that it was Apple who invented this keyboard command. It's Windows that has the command wrong.
Window-brain on a Mac at home: thus my shame.
OLP cannot be unbiased about sense-data as the Christian cannot be unbiased about Atheism
OLP is a movement that believes philosophy must lose its grand metaphysical aspirations in asking such questions "what is truth" and "what is essence" in favour of a philosophy based on ordinary language used by competent speakers of that language. Philosophers should instead ask what does it mean to say that "is it true that it is raining in Paris" and "this perfume has a fine essence".
Any movement that believes that philosophy must lose its grand metaphysical aspirations is obviously biased against philosophers who have grand metaphysical aspirations.
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Quoting Antony Nickles
The metaphysician interested in the sense-data problem removes linguistic context because the metaphysical question "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object" is independent of language
Yes, OLP believed that philosophy should lose its grand metaphysical aspirations and stop trying to understand words in terms of the universal and abstract, such as "what is truth", but concentrate on understanding words as they are used in ordinary language by any competent speaker, such as "is it true that it is raining in Paris".
This approach follows from Frege's Context Principle, In his book The Foundations of Arithmetic he changed the metaphysical question "what are numbers" into the linguistic question what does it mean to say "the number of horses is four"
The Indirect Realist is asking the metaphysical question "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object". Metaphysical because such a question cannot be answered by the sensations alone but only from reasoning about the sensations.
It is true that the metaphysician interested in sense-data wants to remove context, as such a metaphysical question is independent of language, and context is an inherent part of language.
It is not true that the metaphysician interested in sense-data is wanting to generalize only one type of case. They are interested in the specific and particular case "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object".
(Wikipedia - The Foundations of Arithmetic)
Austin on Ayer, p, 119
I agree the above doesnt track, but what I thought was interesting was that Austin does again hint at the fact there are expectations (p.119) in a situation (involving anything), and so rather than what Ayers classifies as statements that I would (or must) make, or that must be the necessary fallout (not sure on this exactly), we are subject to the implications of what type of thing is said or done, qualified non-systematically by the particular circumstances. So, we need not meet a predetermined standard of evidence, nor is there a level and nature to what is entailed, but entailment and implication appear to be in the same ballpark (which may satisfy @Ludwig Vs interest in continuing what entailment stands for or does).
I'm confident that Austin thought in such strategic terms. Well spotted.
Aspects of logical positivism seem to have taken root elsewhere, as is apparent in the rise to defend versions of emotivism elsewhere in the fora.
Quoting Banno
This is how I take Austins How to Do Things With Words. Of course, with him, he is not so much defending emotivism as showing how judging only by the criteria of true or false of only statements excludes all the other various criteria we have that matter to us with similar importance and consequence, depending on each different practices (and their attendant circumstances), including ethics and aesthetics which positivism explicitly ruled out from being able to be rationally addressed at all (thus emotions, or moral intuition, or some other mysterious process).
I agree, though I dont think it is absent entirely. Part of what I take Austin to be doing is to defend the practice of philosophy, thus, not what we should conclude, but the way we should conduct ourselves. Thus his bristling at the paucity of examples, the manufactured dichotomies, the inattention to detail, the exclusion of our ongoing responsibility, etc. And, although he does not directly alude to this, the import is that, without fixed standards or preset goals, everyone could benefit from such diligence.
Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, its a method, but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on the essence of things, as I argued in the last paragraph here.
The particular method used to obtain an object will pre-determine any object discovered
According to the IEP article Ordinary Language Philosophy -
Ordinary Language philosophy, sometimes referred to as Oxford philosophy, is a kind of linguistic philosophy. Linguistic philosophy may be characterized as the view that a focus on language is key to both the content and method proper to the discipline of philosophy as a whole (and so is distinct from the Philosophy of Language).
According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, "method" can typically mean a procedure or process for attaining an object: such as a way, technique, or process of or for doing something.
OLP is clearly not a just a method of philosophy, as its chosen method of focusing on language will inevitable pre-determine any conclusions it reaches.
OLP is the belief-system that philosophical enquiry must focus on language.
A method of philosophy that focuses on language will necessarily come to different conclusions to a method of philosophy that doesn't focus on language.
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Quoting Antony Nickles
As you said "because the truth will turn on the circumstances in which it is uttered.(p.111)"
True. If I said to someone "you are truly hot", this would have several possible meanings dependent upon context. Some literal and some figurative.
As you said "But Austin also shows how reality...............is a manufactured idea".
True. The concept of "reality" is manufactured within language.
The following is my understanding, but am ready to be persuaded otherwise.
Is Austin really an OLP?
I see a bent stick and know that my perception could have been caused by either i) seeing a bent stick or ii) seeing a straight stick in water. I see an ellipse and know that my perception could have been caused by either i) seeing an ellipse head on or ii) seeing a circle at an angle.
The Merriam Webster dictionary definition of the word "see" includes i) to perceive by the eye and ii) to imagine the possibility.
Ayer, as an Indirect Realist, is using the word "see" in both ways. He is seeing as in perceiving by the eye a bent stick and is also seeing as in imagining the possible cause as either i) a straight stick in water or ii) a bent stick.
In Ayer's terms, seeing as in perceiving by the eye an effect can be called sense-data and seeing as in imagining the possibility can be called the material object.
But Austin in Sense and Sensibilia is saying that Ayer is wrong, in that we don't see sense-data but do see the material object.
My only conclusion from this is that Austin is saying that using the word "see" as to perceive by the eye is invalid and using the word "see" to imagine the possibility is valid. But this position is against the meaning of the word "see" as set out in the Merriam Webster dictionary as ordinarily used by competent speakers of the language .
As OLP is the position that philosophy should be carried out using words as ordinarily used by competent speakers of the language, and Austin appears not to be following the tenets of OLP, as shown by the Merriam Webster Dictionary example, this suggests that in fact he cannot be described as an OLP.
Quoting Banno
Yes. But there's an additional step, which I think is the killer move. It occurs in the discussion of Warnock - XI pp. 141,142. "Warnock's picture of the situation gets it upside-down as well as distorted. His statements of 'immediate perception', so far from being that from which we advance to more ordinary statements, are actually arrived at, and are so arrived at in his own account, by retreating from more ordinary statements, by progressive hedging. (There's a tiger-there seems to be a tiger-it seems to me that there's a tiger-it seems to me now that there's a tiger-it seems to me now as if there were a tiger.) It seems extraordinarily perverse to represent as that on which ordinary statements are based a form of words which, starting from and moreover incorporating an ordinary statement, qualifies and hedges it in various ways. You've got to get something on your plate before you can start messing it around. It is not, as Warnock's language suggests, that we can stop hedging if there is a good case for coming right out with it; the fact is that we don't begin to hedge unless there is some special reason for doing so, something a bit strange and off-colour about the particular situation."
The two "languages" are not equal. One is "derived" from the other, as Ayer supposes. But object-language is not derived from sense-data language. It's the other way round. (I'm hedging about "entailment", of course.)
There is also a puzzle about exactly what Ayer means by saying that objects are constructions. What are they constructed out of? Experiences? Patches of colour? Actually, I'm pretty sure he means "logical constructions", but that needs a good deal of explaining, and certainly doesn't include any non-verbal reality.
Quoting RussellA
... and the point about that particular case is that no clear meaning has been assigned to "direct". One might well reply that I see both directly, or that directly has different meanings in the application to objects and to sense-data. If I see sense-data directly, I see objects indirectly. If I see objects directly, I don't see sense-data at all. So the question can only be answered if I have already made up my mind about the answer.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I'm beginning to think that "ordinary language philosophy" is a misnomer. It's a lot closer to philosophy than it seems to be if one reads the programmatic description. Perhaps the project would be better understood if one talked about "natural language". Logicians seem to have a generally accepted concept, which seems at least close to ordinary language.
Quoting RussellA
Quite so. That's why careful attention to language is so important. But there is a very tricky problem attached to that. Language - at least ordinary language - clearly "points to" a non-verbal reality, and Austin himself uses the phrase at least once in these lectures. But if we try to understand that non-verbal reality we find ourselves unable to do so. Hence much philosophy and many doctrines. None of which succeed. I don't have a solution, but wouldn't it be reasonable to explore ordinary language carefully to understand what this "pointing to" amounts to? It doesn't seem reasonable to attach a label ("metaphysics") to this phenomenon of ordinary language and then use it as if we understood the phenomenon, thought that's exactly what happens all too often.
Quoting RussellA
Quite so. So Ayer's method pre-determines what he will discover. Stalemate. What next?
You could urge us to accept both Austin and Ayer, but that's a position that needs some explanation. Few people think that they do not disagree, and most think that both cannot be right including the two participants.
Actually, I think you over-state the case. It would be more accurate to say that the particular method applied will pre-determine what kind of object can be discovered. A microscope will discover many things, but never a star. For that, of course, you need a telescope, which will never discover a bacterium. And you need a different kind of instrument to measure volts and amps.
Though the Merriam Webster dictionary does narrow down the definition of "direct" when used as an adverb to:
a) from point to point without deviation, by the shortest way - flew direct to Miami
b) from the source without interruption or diversion - the writer must take his material direct from life
c) without an intervening agency - buy direct from the manufacturer
When I look into the night sky and see the planet Mars, I am able to see Mars because of the photons of light entering my eye. These photons had previously travelled the 380m km through empty space after leaving the planet.
So when I say "I directly see Mars", as there is no information within these photons that their source was Mars, I am using the word "directly" in a figurative rather than literal sense.
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Quoting Ludwig V
Until whilst walking through a town someone driving in a car runs over my foot.
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Quoting Ludwig V
Yes, stalemate. Ayer's method pre-determines what he will discover and Austin's method pre-determines what he will discover.
This is perhaps why on the Forum for a Thread to come to an agreed conclusion is probably as rare as hen's teeth.
As Austin wrote:
In these lectures I am going to discuss some current doctrines (perhaps, by now, not so current as they once were) about sense-perception. We shall not, I fear, get so far as to decide about the truth or falsity of these doctrines; but in fact that is a question that really can't be decided, since it turns out that they all bite off more than they can chew.
Perhaps the moral is that one doctrine cannot criticise another doctrine based on its own particular foundational beliefs.
As the sense-data theory cannot show that OLP is invalid, OLP cannot show that the sense-data theory is invalid.
It absolutely is not named by them. It isnt about language (although Wittgenstein looks at meaning as an example to investigate); its getting at the criteria and mechanics of, here, seeing (perceiving), by looking at examples of what we say (judge, identify, imply, expect, etc.) in particular situations. Some of these are fantasies (with Wittgenstein). Again, it isnt an argument to say we should use ordinary language, nor is it trying to be normative about how we practice seeing; even dry old Austin is inevitably making claims about truth, metaphysics, etc. I did try to explain it here though its almost like you have to read the whole huge conversations, as I get somethings wrong and misstated at least initially.
Quite so. Perhaps this is where philosophy should begin. But it never does.
Quoting RussellA
It depends what you mean by "understand".
Quoting RussellA
So far as I know, no-one suggests that photons are the sense-data for the eyes. That would be an entirely different matter. For example, it would be very strange to say that what we see is photons.
Quoting RussellA
Yes. Now we need to work out what it means to buy something indirectly. If one buys from a shop, does one buy indirectly from the manufacturer? If so, I'm not sure that one can buy directly from anyone else. A nice puzzle.
So how does this work in the case of "directly see the car that ran over my foot"?
I don't deny that there's an issue about understanding modern research into vision. If one models the brain as a computer, one would have to classify something as data and something else as output. Both are tricky, but "experiences", "sense-data", "ideas", "impressions", "qualia" are not helpful concepts; they are simply waving one's arms about and worrying (or purporting to worry) about the "hard problem"; but this is simply defining the problem as insoluble, which may be a satisfactory outcome, depending on the point of view you started from. (See my first comment in this post.)
OLP is not about definitions. In trying to understand seeing (perceiving) the method is to find examples of the kinds of things we would say in a particular situation.
The point is to draw out from there the implications, expectations, and how we judge, how mistakes are made, distinctions drawn, corrections, i.e., how seeing works. This isnt an argument that we should use language a certain way, or for one type of language (ordinary) against another.
Quoting RussellA
So its not that philosophy should use ordinary usage. It looks at ordinary usages in individual cases to inform philosophical claims because what we are interested in about a subject, its essence, is reflected in how we judge it, which is captured in the kinds of things we say about it in particular cases.
Quoting RussellA
Austin is specifically not claiming we see directly or indirectly (bottom of p. 3), but that the whole thing is made up, including the picture of material objects, metaphysics reality, etc.
I followed your link. That will take some digesting. But I will read it.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I assume you mean the whole of the book. I'm afraid I have indeed read lecture XI and couldn't wait to share what I think is a jewel.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I had taken a rather different direction, thinking about the "ordinary" in philosophy. Descartes starts his meditation from ordinary life. Perhaps that's just a pedagogical device, starting from where his audience is. Berkeley makes great play of his respect for "vulgar opinion" and "what is agreed on all hands", yet rejects "universal assent". Hume's view of the divide between ordinary life and philosophy is well enough known. And Ayer, as Austin points out, starts from the "ordinary" man (who, admittedly turns out to be a stalking-horse, to be slaughtered before the philosophical work can begin) and insists that both his senses of "perception" are ordinary (see p. 93)
Quoting Antony Nickles
I would like to add, however, that it is at its best when it actually analyses the uses. His discussion of "real" is really illuminating, because, I suggest, it goes beyond "looking" and gives me what Wittgenstein might have called an "oversight" (in a non-standard sense) of the use of the word. In contrast, his dissection of "vague" and "precise" is effective enough, but doesn't take that step. Maybe I'm not being reasonable, but I think that extra step is important.
I meant the whole discussion, but there are a few essays in Must We Mean What We Say by. Cavell that set it out better than I can.
Quoting Ludwig V
Descartes, Socrates, Hume, etc., they all start from ordinary examples
But when they see the possibility of error they just jump to the conclusion that we must not be able to know the way they want and then they project the skeptical/metaphysical picture from there. Here, Descartes takes it that we do not have ordinary criteria for identification, and, out of his desire for unassailable knowledge to solve everything, does not see that we also judge a person as a person (see them as a person, or not), which is a different matter then just information and conclusion. So Descartes falls back on the picture that judgment must be a process of the mind that is mysterious and thus without the foundation he presets which drives the whole picture. As Wittgenstein and Austin say, the first step is the killer.
Quoting Ludwig V
Cavell, in Problems in Modern Aesthetics, points out that Kant (in his critique of judgment) says that we make aesthetic claims, like OLPs descriptions of its examples, in a universal voice, which is to say Do you see what I see? for yourself, coming to it on your own. Thus why Austin sounds so arrogant, and Wittgenstein is always leaving things unfinished, asking questions you have to change your perspective in order to answer. We, of course, may not agree, and agreement is only to the case, to the circumstances imagined.
Quoting Ludwig V
Most people take it that the examples are the point, as if they are to argue within the same old classic philosophical framework for the same end. But drawing out the examples are evidence or data from which they do make claims about philosophical issues (truth, reality, the other, knowledge, ethics, essence, etc.) and, of course, critique the practice of philosophy.
Quoting Ludwig V
Clearing up how those work is not only to take one more chink out of Ayer, but to show, as his diversity of other examples are meant to elsewhere, that our ordinary ways of judging things, etc., can be precise and clear and thorough and explicit and sufficient and of import to philosophy just not foundational, universal, ensured of agreement, etc., which is not to say they are just claiming it is good enough (simply practical).
So Austin is not an ordinary language philosopher.
Thank you for that, Russell, since it shows so clearly that you are not paying attention, but making shite up.
What the dictionary says is not (to coin a phrase) definitive. In other words, the definitions in dictionaries have been developed by human beings are not exempt from criticism and revision. They are intended to capture the use of the word by ordinary speaker
You quoted two of the meanings in Merriam Webster. The full list has 9 main meanings with two or three variants for most of them. The two most important ones, in my book are "to perceive by the eye: to perceive the meaning or importance of". I think the latter is metaphorical. The use of "see" to cover "suppose" and "visualize" cited in Merriam Webster is, in my view, marginal and metaphorical. The Cambridge Dictionary has 9 meanings. Dictionary.com has 21 meanings.
Ayer maintains that "see" has two meanings, both of which are covered by "perceive by the eye". So he and Austin disagree about what the ordinary use is. Many people have agreed with Austin. I don't know that any philosopher has directly argued with Austin about his conclusion. Whether you are convinced by Austin's examples that Ayer is wrong is up to you.
Yes, I understand that. My point is only that if one remembers the roots of philosophy in ordinary language, it might seem less of an extraordinary aberration to those who don't see the point.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes, I can see the point. So long as that voice is hopeful rather than dogmatic.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes. I read somewhere that he was brought up with a practice, not of having heart to heart chats with people when he was going off the rails, but leaving a book by his bedside. I don't know if it's true, but it fits with his practice. It's risky, though.
The accusation of arrogance, in both cases, is the response of those who don't recognize the voice or don't find the expected lesson in the book.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes, and I think its also good to point out that the goal is not to negate everything that Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hume, metaphysical philosophers, did (or are doing) because the search for truth, the tendency to doubt and the desire for certainty are clearly part of the human condition, and the work they did obviously has merit. And I mean not in as a theory or summary (knowledge, to tell), but the example they set and the reward in reading those texts.
Quoting Ludwig V
I like to think of it as provisional, speculative. Unfortunately, people always just want something to take away, so any hint that they are generalizing something and we take that as all the value they have, rather than to show us a practice which we continue with our own interests and examples. Austin used performatives utterances as just one example of how not everything is true or false, and now he is forever just the performative guy as if that was meant as an entire theory of language.
My supervisor often used to say that being wrong in interesting ways was nearly as good as being right.
I've quoted this before on this forum, but I'm old enough to believe that some things are worth repeating.
Right or wrong, the best thing is to leave or create a path to continuing the discussion (just as a scientific theory needs to do more than just be "true". It needs to open avenues for further research.). I'm afraid the "no theory" theory, if anyone has ever seriously held it, doesn't do that.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Well, I was remarking that I like Austin's "analysis" of "real" because it gives me an "oversight" of the yse of the word. So there's that to consider.
The idea of practice is important. When I was a student, it was often emphasized that examples are not marginal, but often critically important to any argument. It's not as easy as Austin makes it look.
On the one hand, I would start by looking at the Merriam Webster definition of "understand"
On the other hand, an animal such as a dog has a non-verbal instinctive understanding not to put their paw into an open fire
IE sentient beings can have both a verbal understanding of the word "understanding" and a non-verbal understanding of the concept understanding.
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Quoting Ludwig V
Figures of speech are inherently strange
I agree, it is a very strange thing for the Indirect Realist to say what we see is sense-data. But then it is also a very strange thing for the Direct Realist to say that what we see are material objects.
But such is the strange nature of a language that is fundamentally metaphorical, where the figure of speech is foundational to language. For example, as discussed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their book Metaphors We Live By.
As an Indirect Realist, I can say "I see sense-data" meaning "I perceive by the eye sense-data" and I can say "I see a material object" meaning "I imagine the possibility of a material object".
However, the figure of speech is foundational to language, meaning that the expressions "I perceive by the eye", "sense-data", "I imagine the possibility" and "material object" are all figures of speech and therefore not to be taken literally.
As "I see your inner pain" is a figure of speech, "I see sense-data" is also a figure of speech, and neither are intended literally.
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Quoting Ludwig V
How about:
I bought the table directly from the manufacturer through their outlet shop.
I bought the table indirectly from the manufacturer through their internet site
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Quoting Ludwig V
How about:
I directly saw the car that ran over my foot.
I indirectly saw the car that ran over my foot through a reflection in a shop window
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Quoting Antony Nickles
OLP couldn't exist without definitions
A definition is foundational to OLP.
We hear a scream outdoors and our dog enters the room. Consider a fourth possible expression "he x guilty". We have to decide which of the four words "looks", "appears", "seems" or "x" is the most appropriate within the given context. Our task is impossible if we don't know what "x" means, and to discover what "x" means we have to go to the dictionary for a definition.
Without the words "looks", "appears", "seems" or "x" having previously been defined, it would be impossible for us to determine which was the correct word to use in the given context.
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Quoting Antony Nickles
The expression "Ordinary Language Philosopher" is ambiguous.
Austin thought that the best way to analyse philosophical problems was by analysing language. He thought that most philosophical problems are caused by the ambiguous use of language, and many philosophical problems would disappear if language was used more rigorously.
I agree that Austin's first step in undertaking philosophy was to analyse language as it is ordinary used by the competent speaker.
However, the expression "Ordinary Language Philosopher" is ambiguous.
Does it mean either 1) the OLP uses ordinary language when analysing ordinary language or 2) the OLP analyses ordinary language but doesn't use ordinary language?
Austin is conflating sense and reference
Austin is inferring that both the Indirect Realist who argues that there is a difference between sense-data and material object and the Direct Realist who argues there are is no sense-data but only material object hold positions that are spurious:
I am not, then-and this is a point to be clear about from the beginning-going to maintain that we ought to be 'realists', to embrace, that is, the doctrine that we do perceive material things (or objects). This doctrine would be no less scholastic and erroneous than its antithesis. The question, do we perceive material things or sense-data, no doubt looks very simple-too simple-but is entirely misleading ( cp. Thales' similarly vast and oversimple question, what the world is made of). One of the most important points to grasp is that these two terms, 'sense-data' and 'material things', live by taking in each other's washing-what is spurious is not one term of the pair, but the antithesis itself. There is no one kind of thing that we 'perceive' but many different kinds.
Austin describes Ayer's position, which is as an Indirect Realist:
The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.).
Consider the dichotomies i) far and near and ii) sense-data and material objects.
Expressions such as "far and near" have a sense and a reference. As regards reference, far could refer to something at a distance 100m and near could refer to something at a distance of 1m. As the distances 100m and 1m are not opposites, as a reference, far and near are neither mutually exclusive nor contradictory. However, as regards sense, far and near are mutually exclusive and contradictory.
Similarly, the expression "sense-data and material object" also has a sense and a reference. As regards sense, they are mutually exclusive and contradictory. As regards reference, sense-data could refer to an effect such as photons entering the eye, and material object could refer to a cause, such as photons being emitted by a material object, and as a reference are not mutually exclusive nor contradictory.
The Indirect Realist is considering the pair sense-data and material object in two distinct ways. In one way as sense, which is a linguistic dichotomy, and in another way as reference, which is not a metaphysical dichotomy.
However, Austin's argument is flawed, as he infers that because there is no metaphysical dichotomy, then there cannot be a linguistic dichotomy, which is an invalid argument.
Yes, as Barbossa said about the Pirate's Code, they are more guidelines than actual rules. But in the absence of rules, guidelines are better than nothing.
Quoting Ludwig V
Perhaps "to perceive by the eye" is also metaphorical, in that is it the eye that is doing the perceiving or the person who is using their eye.
Quoting Ludwig V
Is this likely? There were dictionaries during his lifetime.
I don't need playground bullying, so I'm leaving the Thread.
Ill grant you that, but it does not rest on definitions; Austin is drawing out how we judge their use, distinctions, application, possibilities, the circumstances they come up in, etc., so that we understand the variety and logic of more than one case or dichotomy.
Quoting RussellA
Num 2, except its technically what we say when, like the different kind of things we say on instances of, in this case: seeing something, but, also, hes not just imagining instances of what we say in ordinary use, but also trying to flesh out the criteria and circumstances for philosophical use as well.
Quoting Antony Nickles
It may help to clarify "definition" here. If it means a written set of criteria or list of synonyms that can be entered in a dictionary, rule-book or law, it will be important to remember that we manage to learn to use words correctly without them. That doesn't mean that the words we use don't have a definition; it just means that they don't have a formal definition.
Formal definitions are a useful supplement, but not necessary, except in certain formal situations. (Austin makes this point, correctly, in my view - and he adds, also correctly that we learn very many words by ostensive "definition). In addition, the information given in a dictionary will be useless to anyone who does not know how to use the words, that is, how to apply the definition and use the word in sentences that are at least sufficiently grammatical to convey meaning. (Grammar was developed and used long before it was articulated and written down in Alexandria in the 3rd/4th century BCE. (It was developed to help people teaching or learning a language as adults - clearly written grammatical rules cannot be used by someone learning their first language))
Quoting RussellA
Quite so. But non-verbal understandings and beliefs - and perceptions - are different issue.
Quoting RussellA
Well, yes. Austin questions (I think, dismantles) Ayer's use of "material objects" as well as his use of "sense-data". He thinks that neither term is useful or coherently usable. But he would be quite content to say that he sees tables and chairs - and rainbows and rain.
Quoting RussellA
This question emphasizes to me that the description "ordinary language philosophy" is not very helpful. The more I consider it, the less I understand what it means. If one reflects that, however many technicalities are used, the fundamental structure of the language is kept, because it is foundational to any use of the language. In a sense, there is no alternative to ordinary language, even though it can be modified and added to in all sorts of ways. (I except mathematical language which uses neither ordinary grammar nor ordinary vocabulary (though even there, there are some ordinary terms that do crop up - "number", for example.)
In a sense, anyone who speaks/writes relies on ordinary language, however much it may be added to or modified.
Quoting RussellA
Yes, you can. It doesn't half help, though, if you make it clear that you are an indirect realist. I know how to interpret what you say.
However, by the same token, a Direct Realist can say "I see a table" meaning "perceive by the eye a table" (though it's a terrible phrase and almost incomprehensible if one takes it seriously) and, if there's an argument going on with an Indirect Realist "I imagine the possibility of sense-data" (because sense-datum language is derived from "material object" language)
But then the disagreement between them seems just a quarrel about words, hardly worth spending any time or effort on. What's at stake here? Nothing.
Quoting RussellA
Well you could say that any use of a word that isn't a name for a unique object could be described as metaphorical. When I describe a car as red and then describe a coat as red, I am carrying the word over to another case. In other words, you are applying "metaphor" so widely that I can no longer grasp what it means for you. What you be an example of a literal use of, for example "imagine"?
I'm afraid I haven't read Metaphors We Live By, so I can't engage with what they say. But I understand "metaphor" as defined as a non-literal use of a word, and if that's right, not everything can be metaphorical. Mind you, I can just about get my head round the idea that the literal use of a word is also a figure of speech.
Quoting RussellA
Do you mean that "sense-datum" and "material object" are both referring expressions. That depends on us agreeing what they refer to. I can understand that "material object" refers to things like tables and chair, but probably not to rainbows or colours. But I don't understand what "sense-datum" refers to. That's the issue.
Quoting RussellA
That's odd. I interpret him as arguing the other way round, that because there is no (valid) linguistic dichotomy, there can be no metaphysical dichotomy.
I appreciate your considered replies, and because of them have learnt a lot about the philosophy of Austin over the past few weeks, but am leaving the Thread for the reason I gave in response to @Banno.
I'm glad our dialogue was constructive and sorry about your decision to leave.
The only conclusion is that you have not read Sense and Sensibilia, but have instead made up your own version both of what Austin said and what Ordinary Language Philosophy is.
I'm glad you appreciate the efforts of @Antony Nickles and @Ludwig V, but our previous experience tells me that they are attempting to sow on barren ground.
Of course, you might improve. There can be no substitute a detailed, comprehensive engagement with the material.
Read the damn book. Or bugger off.
I supose Ayer might reply that there is good reason - the lack of incorrigibility...
Quoting Ludwig V
For now, I'm going to go with Ayer as arguing that language about material objects is entailed (for some unspecified notion of entailment...) by sense-data, and that sense data are a hedge on our ordinary talk about objects. Then Austin's reply is that there is no reason for such a hedge, especially since the unspecified nature of the entailment does not provide the sort-after incorrigibility.
Quoting Banno
I didn't, perhaps specify clearly enough that my problem with Ayer is that he thinks of material objects are "constructions". He might have meant "logical constructions", I suppose. Either way, this needs explanation. (Perhaps the might be some more detail in his book.) I have a clearer idea of "hedging" means, though it's connection with any version of "entailment" is a bit obscure.
I don't think they are incompatible.
I have a feeling that there's no reason not to proceed to lecture XI, and was thinking of producing a summary. Would that be helpful?
Please do.
Something has to be said about Carnap and Ayer, as seen by Austin. Carnap had the idea that it didn't much matter which sentences were held to be true, so long as they were consistent with each other.
Quoting SEP:Carnap
So one could have a linguistic pluralism in which one person spoke of rabbits being leporidae, and another a system in which gavagai are, maybe gavaidea... and the two schemes would in the end say much the same thing. For Carnap the touchstone was consistency, not correspondence. Ayer and Austin on the other hand opted for correspondence.
The emphasis on correspondence was a large part of the criticism of Austin by Strawson.
But the main criticism Austin levels against Ayer here is to reject the idea that there are a particular class of sentences which are apt to verification. For Ayer these are sentences about sense data. Austin, again by numerous examples, shows that this is not so, that is anything what is verifiable and what not is dependent on the circumstances - on what needs hedging.
Does the project of "logical positivism" or "empiricism" in general rest solely on Ayer's idea of sense data? Can you explain why Ayer insists that sentences about sense data are the only ones apt for verification? For example, when we determine the chemical makeup of a substance, scientists use an electron spectrometer. There are several tricky things here.. The spectrometer takes all sorts of data that is translated back as chemical compounds. There are detectors in there, providing data that is spit back in real human language. No one need rely on their sense data here for the "verification" of the compounds being detected here. Why is "verification" so narrowly defined as sense data? What kind of data would it be that the spectrometer is outputting? It is data based on known measurements of photoemissions hitting a field, etc. It is mathematical, it is information, it is...
Check out the SEP article.
For the rest, yes, all good questions, which add to the puzzle of why Ayer limited his verification only to sense data. Austin's observation, that this is far too limited, is supported by your comment.
Two quotations from SEP - Vienna Circle
"The Vienna Circle was a group of scientifically trained philosophers and philosophically interested scientists who met under the (nominal) leadership of Moritz Schlick for often weekly discussions of problems in the philosophy of science during academic terms in the years from 1924 to 1936."
"While the Vienna Circles early form of logical empiricism (or logical positivism or neopositivism: these labels will be used interchangeably here) no longer represents an active research program"
And one from SEP - A J Ayer
"Ryle was also instrumental in getting Ayer to go to Vienna in 1933 to study with Moritz Schlick, then leader of the influential Vienna Circle of philosophers, scientists and other intellectuals, joining W. V. O. Quine in being one of only two visitors to be members of the Vienna Circle. His philosophical experience in Vienna was somewhat limited by his uncertain knowledge of German, but he knew enough to pick up the basic tenets of logical positivism."
Quoting schopenhauer1
I don't think working scientists ever give a moment's thought to sense-data. But for what it's worth a defence of the idea would go something like this. The spectrometer is a material object like any other, so the usual "translation" could be made. It would be even more complicated that the normal examples of tables or trees, but there's no reason in principle why it could not be made. Reading the information is not specially complicated. The rest is up to interpretation via the various theories. Compare an astronomer observing starts through a telescope. There's no knock-down argument here.
Berekeley considers a watchmaker as a potential counter-example and has no difficulty arguing that, complex as it is, all our knowledge as well as the watchmaker's is easily translatable into collections of ideas. The real argument is in the actions of the watchmaker in building the watch - or so it seems to me. Action in the world establishes that I am embodied - a three-dimensional object among other three-dimensional objects.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Because Ayer is seeking to find the foundations of knowledge. Sense-data provide the incorrigible and self-evident starting-points of the the chains of evidence that underpin our knowledge. Perhaps, most of the time, we don't actually articulate the chains all the way back to the beginning. But we can, if we need to.
Quoting Banno
The difficulty of consistency/coherence theories is that language itself has a place for non-verbal reality. So I'm with Austin and Ayer here. As you say, Strawson disagreed. However, I don't really know how to articulate words vs world. One of the many topics about which I could do with some revision/refreshment.
Cool.
Quoting Ludwig V
What do you mean by "translation" here? The spectrometer is spitting out data that signifies levels of known compounds. It would be trivially true, that the person "reading out" the data and "translating it" is using their "sense-data" to indeed confirm the machine's output. If Ayer is trying to say something here, it is that the determination of synthetic truth is sense-data verification. But the determination here was a machine.
If anything, it leads to a much broader discussion to what an observation is composed of. I get logical positivists wanting to keep statements about meaning to be in some way grounded in observation (especially conforming with the other academic disciplines and keeping up with the "Joneses" at the turn of the century if you will..) but why sense-data in particular? Rather, observation can be had by any number of methods, many of them inferential. It's a weird hill to die on, unless you really contort the cause-effect relationship back to "sense-data" to prove your point that it all goes back to that.
To be charitable, you can say that sense-data must be involved in the human way of interpreting the world, but that is pretty charitable. If anything, the whole discussion leads to a sort of Platonic notion of information as agnostic to sense-data and just "existing" in some sense, whatever the interpreter is.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yeah, this is the part that seems dubitable to me. As I said, information seems to be agnostic to sense-data. What if a computer was reading and analyzing the results of another computer, and deemed it correct. What "sense-data" was needed for this observation?
Quoting Banno
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes, in a way. You are using "observation" in a common sense way, and I'm on board with that. But Ayer's argument is that all observations other than sense-data are inferences from sense-data.
Quoting schopenhauer1
To my mind, the effectiveness of the argument about sense-data depends on the appeal of this argument. Dissecting that is a complicated business. But it is difficult to imagine a different way of interpreting the world which was completely incomprehensible to human beings - we couldn't even identify it as an interpretation of the world. (That's a vey brief gesture towards how the argument might go.)
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes. and I find the idea of information as something that couldn't ever inform anyone somewhat puzzling. The relationship with the idea of sense-data is not clear to me. If one interpreted sense-data as light, sound, etc. (i.e. as physical effects of "the world" on our sense-organs), then they make some sense. But that's not what is intended by Ayer. He has in mind "experiences" or what Berkeley called "ideas" and Hume called "impressions" and Kant and Husserl called "phenomena"
Here, for what it's worth is my summary of lecture XI. I've set it up as a dialogue.
This lecture is about Warnock on Berkeley a restatement or revision of Our own ideas are what is immediately perceived i.e. what makes no assumptions, takes nothing for granted.
Warnock Making assumptions is not necessarily speaking loosely (as Berkeley thinks). Eradicating assumptions is a matter of paying attention to what we are entitled to say. The case of the witness being asked to report only what he actually saw results in the witness being more cautious.(p.133)
Austin But this doesnt justify sense-data. sometimes I may supposedly see, or take it that I see, more than I actually see, but sometimes less. (p.134)
Warnock Immediately perceive has no ordinary meaning so Berkeley can decide how it is to be used.
Austin This is an over-statement. In any case, both Berkeley and Warnock do trade on the ordinary uses of immediately and perceive. (p.135)
Warnock The patch of red that we immediately perceive might or might not be a book, so what we immediately perceive is something different from the book.
Austin This is a confusion, since that patch of red is the book. (p.136)
Warnock rejects Berkeleys view that there are entities of some sort which are what we immediately perceive. He looks for the kind of sentence which expresses a judgement of immediate perception. (p.136)
Austin Possible wrong assumptions are not a matter of propositions/sentences (i.e forms of words) but of forms of words in the circumstances of their use, i.e.statements.
Warnocks discussion of Hearing a car assumes there is nothing else to go on.
Austin But what if there is something else to go on? (p. 137)
Warnock Material object does not mean the same as collections of ideas. They are related as verdicts to evidence. (p.140)
Austin This model only applies to second-hand judgements. It excludes the possibility of being in the best position to make a judgement. It leaves out the position of the eye-witness. (p.140)
Austin Sense-data are the result of the demand to find the minimally adventurous form of words. Warnocks approach is a matter of hedging from statements about material objects, not building up to them. (p. 141) But we dont hedge unless theres some reason for doing so. The best policy is not to ask the question. (p.142)
I think this is very good, and it is an important aspect of the "sense-data" perspective. We need to look at all acts of sensing as acts of interpreting. The tendency is to think that all human beings sense things in the same way, due to similar physical constitution. But just like we each interpret the same proposition in a unique, slightly different way from others, so we also interpret sense-data in a unique way. The difference becomes evident and very significant when one undergoes certain illnesses, toxins, hallucinogens, etc.. But simple experiments can demonstrate the magnitude of the fundamental differences unique to each being. For example, line up a group of people facing a particular direction, tell them to take mental note of what they see, then have them turn around and write it down.
Quoting Ludwig V
I would say that such a thing is not difficult at all. Consider the human being's temporal perspective, one's "present" in time. The average person's "present" is said by psychologists to be about two to three seconds. This time period, the temporal frame of reference, grounds what we know as the present state, "what is", the base for interpretation of the world. Now imagine if one's temporal frame of reference was a couple billion years, or just a couple nanoseconds. Each of these would give us a completely different grounding for "what is", at the present time. The extremely long frame of reference would have billions of years of celestial motions all blurred into one "now", while the extremely short frame of reference would show precise positioning of tiny fundamental particles. To me, when the temporal frame of reference is considered, it is not at all difficult to imagine that there would be ways of interpreting the world which would be completely incomprehensible to human beings.
Different interpretations of a picture presuppose a picture that is the original and mediates between interpretations. Ditto different interpretations of a law or other text. So if all acts of seeing are acts of interpretation, what is the original of what is being interpreted?
To be sure, we give different descriptions of what we see which are, or amount to, different interpretations of what we see. I would be happy to describe "what we see" as sense-data. However, I interpret that in the ordinary sense of see, not the sense required by sense-datum theory. Whether the sense of "see" required by sense-datum theory is coherent or not is one of the key questions.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not clear whether those differences result from differences in what is seen (unlikely, but possible) or differences in what they notice or attend to, or perhaps in what they remember or even in differences in what they think I want to hear.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm afraid I can't imagine that. However, I can consider the possibility that someone's temporal frame of reference is different from mine. Indeed, while it is unlikely that any actual beings are as so radically different from mine, it is more than likely that other living beings have different temporal frames of reference. Quite how that would play out, is harder to work out, so I'm not much further forward. While I grant that it's possible, I have no idea how one might come to know that it differs or by how much. However, even considering the possibility presupposes a) that I can identify them as conscious, therefore alive and b) that their subjective time would relate to mine in some way, such that I could explain differences by the difference in temporal frame of reference.
I understand what speculation means in ordinary life, but in cases like this, I lose my bearings. How do you manage?
So from here sense-data are the immediate "impressions" upon the senses. I actually don't see how that's much different than Hume's "impressions" as that is a very good name for this notion. I understand how Hume's Ideas (combinations of impressions into abstractions and such), but impressions seems pretty equivalent to sense-datum, unless there is some weird technicality I am not understanding.
From all this it is clear that it is the phenomenal experiences that the mind is having. The part that is in contention here with Austin is that Austin wants to add "From all this it is clear that it is the phenomenal experiences that the mind is having with the world."
Ayer can be accused of an extreme solipsism and this kind of epistemology might rub people the wrong way if they want to maintain the external world and the veracity of the human mind. Ayer is ever closing the human off to only phenomenal and not "the world". The two shall never meet, so to say. This is ripe then for being taken to more speculative extremes and uncertainty in general whereby Kantianism and Idealism, more generally might save the day. The middle ground is a kind of "indirect realism" which some might still find distasteful as "Kantianism in drag". That is to say, the "real world" is never known, just represented, and now this creates the division of mind/body that many philosophers want to get away from as it again, brings in the "specter" of the ghostly mind, which is to be eradicated and replaced. Thus this whole argument needs to go away to preserve realism.
There's a good deal of familiar ground in this. But there are differences of detail and elaboration that are of interest. The only thing that seems to materially add is the concluding section on hedging, which I've already drawn attention to.
One other point struck me:- "Warnock says that a witness being asked to report only what he actually saw results in the witness being more cautious. Austin's reply is that "I might begin, for instance, by saying that I saw a little silvery speck, and go on to say that what I actually saw was a star. I might say in evidence that I saw a man firing a gun, and say afterwards, 'I actually saw him committing the murder!' That is (to put it shortly and roughly), sometimes I may supposedly see, or take it that I see, more than I actually see, but sometimes less." (p. 134)
It occurs to me that the quest for certainty has missed something. There are two ways of being wrong. One is to state more than I really saw. The other way is to state less. In other words, falsehood is not just suggestio falsi (saying what is false), but also suppressio veri (not saying what is true). Exaggeration is not true, but neither is understatement.
Quoting schopenhauer1
You, I and Austin can all agree on that conclusion - depending on what you mean by realism. The trouble is, it hasn't. (See qualia).
Forgive me, I have to go now. I can't respond to this in detail.
Well, I don't necessarily believe that, but I am just positing a hypothetical view for why this whole debate might be important in the debates surrounding epistemology.
Besides the broader implication (no real world fits in here, oh no!), the idea itself as we discussed just seems odd one if it is the point for which verification is to be obtained. That is to say, verification happens at broader observational levels, not immediate impressions upon the body. Verification is a judgement. The computer makes a judgement. Even if the judgement is based on experience, that doesn't mean necessarily, "sense impressions" but various judgements and inferences derived from those sense impressions. Thus, one can jettison the "sense impressions" if there is a sufficient tool for the "judgements and inferences" part. So that is why I am not computing Ayer very well here. Perhaps I am not being charitable in the right way with his view.
You are dead right about that. Berkeley used "idea" a bit more widely but clearly included the same idea(!) in its scope. Kant's "phenomena" is also very similar. "Sense data" is an update to the idea designed to suit the 20th century.
Quoting schopenhauer1
To be fair to him, he doesn't deny the external world and doesn't deny that we know things about it.
However he would agree with you that Quoting schopenhauer1
It's the idea that all knowledge of the external world is based on evidence from the senses. This is useful because it closes the infinite regress of evidence - (sense-data, for Ayer, are incorrigible, so immune from sceptical doubt). So part of what is at issue here is whether all knowledge of the external world is an inference. Austin spends a good deal of time dismantling (or trying to dismantle) that model. The lesson from Austin (and I'm pretty sure he intended this) is that incorrigiblity is a philosophical dream inspired for the search for absolute certainty.
There is a complication here, that Ayer says that physical objects are "constructed" from sense-data. I think he means "logically constructed", so this isn't a straightforward metaphysical claim, but exactly what it means is not clear.
My version of this is that life is not really about avoiding error, but coping with it when it crops up.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I have an issue with this. First of all, if the "real world" is never known, you have changed the standard meaning of "know" for a distortion created by the idea that "certainty" means immunity from error (see above) and if "representing" means nothing unless what is represented is also known. Comparing representation with original is how you know it is a representation - think picture vs original. How do you know what the picture is a picture of if there is no way of, at least sometimes, comparing them?
Quoting schopenhauer1
That is exactly what is at stake in the broader context. I'm sure you know that the modern idea of "qualia" is a (not unsuccessful) attempt to preserve the ghost.
Right, this would be the wishy-washy (from accusers I mean) "indirect realism". He mine well be a Kantian! Might be the (exaggerated) pearl clutching on this accusation.
Quoting Ludwig V
Well, I think he means it in the Humean way of "impressions" and "ideas". Ideas are built up from impressions. And here we get the seeds for the difference between straight up epistemological empiricism (tabula rasa), and Kantian cognitivism (there are innate mental faculties which shape the impressions). That debate is rather archaic now, but it does show up in various modern forms in terms of just how it is our minds construct the world from experience.
Quoting Ludwig V
I think this is possibly where language breaks down and word-games begins. The external object exists and creates the same events because it holds some primary property. This is the "real". No one usually doubts this. However, the word-games come in as to "what" counts as representation. Is a photon hitting the pupil and electro-chemical nerve firings being equivalent to or causing a mental perception and conception a "representation"? Some say yes some say no. Some might say, the sensory parts of the brain are "direct" and the higher ones are "indirect". But how is that the case? Is it the "whole body" is involved and thus, one cannot separate it? If that's the case, how does one avoid panpsychism? There are things like object-oriented ontologies where all objects have some sort of qualitative aspect, for example. Then there is process philosophy etc. But no respectable empiricist/positivist is going to go down that route.
Quoting Ludwig V
Is it an "attempt" or is it simply a more just what "seems to be the case". It "seems" that there are sensory qualities. Many people consider this secondary properties as the qualities themselves are only apparent to an observer, not "there" in some non-observational sense, other than the physical substrata from which the qualities become realized. And now we are back to the Philosophy of Mind.
You're missing the point. You are assuming "a picture". But if some of the different interpretations of the supposed "same thing", do include "a picture", there is nothing to suppose as the original except the assumption of "the same thing". But if the interpretations are different, where's the logic in assuming that they are interpretations of the same thing in the first place?
Quoting Ludwig V
This is the problem, "seeing" requires noticing and attending to. This mental activity constitutes a basic part of seeing, such that there is no seeing without it. Therefore, premising that the difference is due to a difference in attention does not imply that the difference is not also a difference in what is seen, because attention plays an active role in determining what is seen.
Quoting Ludwig V
I have no problem with this, it seems to come naturally for me. See, you and I have very distinct modes of interpretation. Can you imagine that a plant might produce interpretations of its world? We can go far beyond "consciousness", in our speculations about interpretations. What about a non-conscious machine, an AI or something, couldn't that thing being doing some sort of interpretations?
I agree that's what's in the background. (There was a great revival of Hume amongst analytic philosophers, at least in the UK, at the time.) But Hume posits "relations between ideas" and rejects "reason" (or some sense or other of it). So Ayer is riffing off Hume, rather than reproducing him.
Quoting schopenhauer1
If photons can count as sense data, then I say yes. But the idea is that we aware of them, so then I say know. So I just say I don't know what they are (supposed to be.)
Quoting schopenhauer1
Well, the idea that the mind is the brain is clearly physiologically inaccurate and since action is embedded in perception, I go for the whole person. But I don't see panpsychism as a problem - just a mistake, generated by the philosophical fondness for exaggerated generlization.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It depends on what you mean by "object". If "to be is to be the value of a variable" is true, then clearly that's false.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I'm coming round to the idea that accepting Locke's argument is a mistake. After all, in ordinary language (for what it is worth), there is no doubt that it is the stop-light that is red and that there is nothing red in my head. Moreover, Berkley's argument that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities won't stand up seems a good one.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Perhaps we should never have been anywhere else.
Well, sometimes they are, and sometimes they're not. What's the criterion for saying that two interpretations are interpretations of the same thing or that they are interpretations of different things?Without that, interpretations objects in their own right, with no connection to anything else. Strictly speaking, to speak of an interpretation without saying what it is an interpretation of, and indeed we often add "as". So Freud's theory was an interpretation of dream as the outcome of unconscious hopes and fears.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Good point. So now I ask whether "those differences result from differences in what is seen, or perhaps in what they remember or even in differences in what they think I want to hear."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If a plant produced interpretations of its world, it would be conscious. If an AI produced some sort of interpretation, it would have some sort of consciousness.
A longer reply might (possibly) be more helpful. It depends on circumstances in which you would interpret something as an interpretation. That's why I can't answer the questions. They seem to me idle playing with words. There's nothing to argue about here, because there's nothing to agree or disagree with. All I can do is ask you to elaborate your fantasy. I'm certainly not going to draw any conclusions from it.
Certainly, there are plenty of stories about conscious AIs. But they are writing stories about rather peculiar human beings and then inserting "AI" where they are thinking "person". Don't get me wrong - I enjoy some of them, but they don't face up to the philosophical question about when an AI would be conscious. That's not a criticism. Art is not supposed to be science.
It makes no sense to ask that question. Memories and anticipations inhere within, and are necessary to, the act of seeing. Therefore differences in what is remembered or anticipated manifest as differences in what is seen. The distinction you ask for cannot be made.
Quoting Ludwig V
All you are doing is unnecessarily restricting the meaning of "interpretation" in a way so that only consciousness can perform the act which produces an interpretation. The problem is that I do not see the reason for this restriction. I see very little in any conventional definition, or use of the word, to support your requested restriction.
The word is generally used to signify an act which presents the meaning of something, and "an interpretation" would be an instance of what is produced by this act. There is nothing to indicate to me that this type of act could only be carried out by a consciousness. There is however, an implication of "understanding" in some usage, but this is somewhat problematic. Nothing necessitates that the interpretation consists of understanding rather than misunderstanding. Since the interpretation might equally be misunderstanding as well as understanding, we cannot say that "understanding" is implied by "interpretation", so the link between consciousness and interpretation may be denied in that way.
But that is only my, very subjective, interpretation of "interpretation". And of course, I admit that it may be a misunderstanding. But this leaves me with no principles to distinguish understanding from misunderstanding, correct from incorrect. Therefore the principles which distinguish understanding from misunderstanding, correct from incorrect, or in general, good from bad, cannot be derived from sense-data, which would require interpretation. A judgement of this kind must be prior to, and active in the production of the interpretation. That makes the perspective of "sense-data" ontologically problematic because our innate sense of good and bad must be derived in some means other than through the senses, because it must have an active role in the process of interpretation.
Yes, but the sense-datum is supposed to be what is left when all assumptions are set aside.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Would the Cambridge dictionary definition be evidence of what the conventional definition is:-
interpretation - an explanation or opinion of what something means.
The dispute is based on two widely differing interpretations of the law.
It is difficult for many people to accept a literal interpretation of the Bible.
We were disappointed that they insisted on such a rigid interpretation of the rules.
interpretation - a particular way of performing a piece of music, a part in a play, etc.:
Her interpretation of Juliet was one of the best performances I have ever seen.
An interpretation by actors or musicians is the expression by their performance of their understanding of the part or parts they are playing:
Masurs interpretation of the Brahms symphony was masterful.
This does seem to be the best interpretation of their observations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Really? So the chair you are sitting on might understand what you are saying, and your dustbin might understand that to-day is the day it gets emptied?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not quite. Something that is not conscious cannot understand or misunderstand, so your argument does not "break the link".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would put it this way. We are innately inclined to remember feed-back on what we do. In the case of seeing, that's how we get feed-back. So we learn pretty quickly what works and what doesn't. That's the basis for how we see something. Interpretation can play a role sometimes, but I'm not sure it's meaningful to suppose that it always plays a role.
:up:
I kind of like the idea of a 18th century Hume being more (the age of Enlightenment) cynical than the 20th century Ayer in regards to human "reason". Hume's biting critiques really are unmatched, and it seems like everyone after has tried, but failed or has simply copied his critiques with new vocabulary...
Quoting Ludwig V
Well, my point was photons hitting the pupil is not sense data. That is simply the physical events we correlate with the sense data. That's the whole problem we are trying to solve... that all of these arguments go back to.. We can try to quibble about what a specific author said in a text in a chapter, in a passage, but let's get to what the subtext is, it's this (the hard problem.. )
Quoting Ludwig V
You'd REALLY have to elaborate on that because right there is a huge generalization and handwave itself. But assuming by "whole person" we mean the theory "embedded cognition", I don't see how it really solves the problem any differently to recognize that indeed it's about the whole body's embeddedness in its environment.
Quoting Ludwig V
It's basically that objects interact with the world through vicarious properties but retain a sort of hidden property that makes the object itself and not just a composite of properties. Actually, it is sort of like the idea of "whole body" but spread out to objects, not just humans/animals. Specifically the theory is about not undermining objects (to just its vicarious properties), or overmining objects (to every relation it can ever possibly be a part of). There is something that makes an object that object, without dissolving it, but also recognizes that object has properties that allow it to interact with other objects, etc.
Quoting Ludwig V
And here again is the crux of the argument. What does it mean that the stop-light IS red, rather than the stop-light has properties which if an observer were there would instantiate as the quale "red"? That is to say, what is red in and of itself? If you start talking wavelengths and rods/cones we are back to a dualism so that doesn't help your case much for "directly" perceiving the object. And then you can say why is it photons, rods, cones, and EM spectrum frequencies ARE the quale of red?
This goes to a deeper question I have I was going to start a thread on. What would it mean for something to have the "property" of a sensation? So the sensation of red/sound/touch/taste/smell, what if that is a "property" then what does that mean?
The generic answer would be that as long as X, Y, Z events are in place, property 1 obtains. This gets into the problem of emergentism. So 1 is emergent from the background of X, Y, Z. But whence "emergence"? It seems like a sort of pseudo-answer, like a Homunculus Fallacy by another name. It is the "magic" that can be conjured as an end to all inquiries.
Again I'm noticing how much this presages Wittgenstein. This time the discussion of doubt in On Certainty, with "hedging" taking on the role of doubting.
The irony is, of course, that he didn't think he was a sceptic, and, given that he believed in the Christian story on faith, despite his own demonstration that there is no reason to believe it, he certainly doesn't seem particularly cynical.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I'm afraid I find it helpful to focus on a specific text. However, since I don't properly understand how the problem arises (though I've seen a lot of arm-waving), I don't yet have a basis for discussing solutions. (I find it very liberating not to have to pretend to know all about everything now that I'm retired.)
Quoting schopenhauer1
Quoting schopenhauer1
Those theories look attractive, though the range of what's on offer is a bit confusing. But when I say "whole person" I meant the context of human life and practices, not cognition, embedded or not. I don't have allegiance anywhere yet, though who knows what may happen next.
Quoting schopenhauer1
You are like someone who takes delivery of a flat-pack bookcase, unpacks all the bits and the instructions and wonders where the actual bookcase is. It's a paradox of analysis - the subject of the analysis seems to disappear.
Quoting schopenhauer1
You are beginning with a mistake. If there was something that makes an object that object, it would be just another component. It's the problem that Aristotle tried to solve with his idea of "essence" (literally, in the Greek "the what it is to be"), the scholastics with "quiddity" and Locke with his idea of substance ("something, I know not what"). Not even chasing wild geese, but unicorns.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I grasp the idea that sensation is an activity or an event or partly both; there is a standard verb for it. But "property" is not so clear; I don't know what the adjective would be for it.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes. I have the impression that the idea was proposed as a project, and that various ideas have been proposed. As one would expect, there are several candidates, none particularly appealing. The sunlight and the rain interact and a rainbow is the result. Would it be fair to say the rainbow emerges? I suppose so, but I don't find it particularly enlightening, compared to the pedestrian scientific explanation.
Thanks. I hoped it would work, but wasn't sure. The text just seemed to fall into that format.
Quoting Banno
I don't want to be picky, but Philosophical Investigations was published in 1953 and Sense and Sensibilia in 1962 (both posthumously - I guess that must be just a coincidence), So any presaging must be the other way round. However, the relationship between the two is intriguingly mysterious. It would be wonderful if there was something from him about Wittgenstein. Isn't there an unflattering (to Wittgenstein) anecdote about a comment by Austin on the private language argument?
Well, Searle and others have made the claim that Austin only took a passing interest in Wittgenstein, and the stuff about doubt is mostly in On Certainty, which I think came out in 1969. But yes, it is a point of contention.
Searle seemed to think Austin had not understood Private Language.
I know, and that's why it's incoherent to say that the sense-datum is what is seen, because seeing necessarily involves what you call "assumptions". What is seen includes "assumptions".
Quoting Ludwig V
You are citing specifics again, and that is a problem. If the chair is capable of making an interpretation, this does not imply that the chair is capable of understanding what I am saying. What the chair is interpreting might be something that we have no idea of. The dustbin example suffers the same problem.
That's the complexity of "interpretation". I am not necessarily capable of interpreting the same thing with meaning that you are capable of interpreting. And, I might not even recognize as meaningful, something which you are capable of interpreting the meaning of. Furthermore, all these difficulties make it so that we cannot even understand exactly what the act of interpreting actually consists of, so we can't even say for sure whether a chair is interpreting or not. We'll say that the chair does not interpret in the way that human beings do, but since other animals interpret in other ways which we really cannot relate to, we can't rule out the possibility that plants and even inanimate objects might themselves have different modes of interpretation.
Quoting Ludwig V
The argument holds, because neither understanding nor misunderstanding can be implied by "interpretation" itself. These are judgements made as to correct or incorrect interpretation. Therefore understanding and misunderstanding are not things intrinsic to the interpretation, but are determinations attributed to the interpretations post hoc, often by a third party. The interpreter does not necessarily assume to understand, nor to misunderstand, in the act of interpretation. Nor does the interpreter necessarily believe that the interpretation must be one or the other of these two. What is done is merely interpretation, a judgement of meaning. So the non-conscious cannot be excluded from interpretation through the requirement of understanding or misunderstanding. However, there is necessarily some underlying inclination toward a good, or intention, purpose, which drives the act as an act of judgement. But acting with purpose, intention, is not restricted to consciousness.
Quoting Ludwig V
"What works and what doesn't" implies purpose, and purpose implies intention. And any act with intention has meaning, as what was meant. So I do not think you can disassociate interpretation from seeing in this way. If learning to see is a matter of learning "what works and what doesn't", then it is directed by intention and judgements of value and meaning are involved, therefore interpretation is involved.
Yes, it is very much hearkening back to that. Here is the gist of it...
It is placed in the camp of "Speculative Realism" which according to Wiki is:
Quoting Wiki
His inspiration was:
And basically the theory is:
Being that this is "speculative" realism, I am sure you will find this all quite distasteful :D. Unlike logical positivism and the analytics who only interact via sense-datum (or broadly human experience) to world, and/or propositions of language/logic-to-world, this is trying to understand "world", even if using human conventions to portray it. Not sure how well the project can hold up for "Speculative Realism". But just wanted to share a new idea for you if you were unfamiliar.
Quoting Ludwig V
Sensing? Yes, what is this "sensing"? It is an event, sure, but many people want to posit that a "property" to mental events. So, the property of liquid, solid, gas, or the property of magnetism, or mass or pressure, is supposed to be likened to a property of some mental event. Mentality is thus deemed an EMERGENET property of X, Y, Z events taking place. Whenever XYZ is there, the mental property must be present. It was not there previously or after its arrangement, but that particular arrangement will cause the emergence of that property. And indeed, if this sounds like a Homunculus Fallacy, it is!
Quoting Ludwig V
It's not only not enlightening, it's not the same in kind, in my estimation, to that of a mental event. That is to say, the emergence of all other things are understood by way of our observations. That is to say, properties cohere in a sufficient observer. But how does the observer itself emerge onto ITSELF?
What I remember about that anecdote fits with that. But then, he's not alone, neither in his time, nor now.
Quoting Banno
OK. And it certainly isn't clear what he thought.
Quoting Ludwig V
I feel this might be misunderstood if we dont make clear that the circumstances are of greater importance than any form of words. Yes, there are expressions that take a particular form, like a statement (or empirical proposition), but it is the attendant circumstances which make stating a fact important; whether that it is true, or hurtful, or both. More than that, there are also expressions that do not take a form of words at all, because they are simply a threatening gesture, but also because we dont judge by the words (or the words use; or my use of them) but by the place the expression (or practice) holds in the circumstances, i.e., its sense or use (which is here what Wittgenstein is referring to) e.g., a plea, an overture, an apology, pointing, seeing, mocking, etc. To some expressions, the form (or practice) is crucial, like a knock-knock joke, to others, it is the deviance from any form that makes the expression what it is, like modern art, or its singularity, say, the cry of pain from me.
Quoting Ludwig V
This harkens back to Lecture X (p.112), when Austin pointed out that Ayer was pulling back behind precise sense-data to allow us to be uncommitted to our expressions. Here hedging our claims about the world qualifies our relation in order to mitigate our liability as well. Austin is claiming that our ordinary expressions do not inherently need to be hedged, unless there is something strange or a bit off-colour about the particular situation. (P.142) But Austin is not championing the status quo, as if it was more entitled or that it naturally has more solidity. We can unreasonably question another, but in doing so we put ourselves out (too familiar perhaps), or put them out (opening ourselves to calls of libel). In any case, we subject ourselves to judgment, and it is that responsibility Austin wants to be certain we understand.
I agree with that. So I conclude that the concept of sense-data, as adopted by some philosophers, is incoherent.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If the specifics don't conform to the generalization, it's a problem for the generalization, not for the specific.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How do you know that? Surely, if we can know that their perceptions of the world are different from ours, we can "relate" to them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So we formulate a judgement, which is not an interpretation, and then promote it to an interpretation and then decide whether it is correct or not? At first sight, it would resolve my problem. But what is this promotion process?
To put the point another way, surely to make a judgement is normally to evaluate it as correct? If one doesn't judge that a proposition is correct, one can make a range of different judgements, that it is false, or possible and so on. All of which involve evaluating that these different judgements are correct.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Some interpretations seem to be based on a process that we are not subjectively aware of. The usual term for that is unconscious, which is distinct from non-conscious. Non-conscious beings neither have nor lack an unconscious.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree with the first sentence, and we should, perhaps, take more account of it in our analysis of perception. But philosophy is interested in theory, which is supposed to be driven only by the pursuit of truth. I would agree that this stance can lead philosophers into mistakes.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not trying to disassociate it. I'm trying to understand it. I'm arguing that there is a problem with the standard model of interpretation.
Quoting Wiki
Since to know something is precisely "to correlate thought and being", if there is anything "outside" (whatever that may mean) that correlation, it stands to reason that it is unknowable; one might speculate that it will also be impossible to know whether there is or is not anything in that situation. If the Heidegerrian line of thought you go on to explain works, it, by the same token, correlates thought and those beings. But there are some points that might mean something.
I've come across readiness-to-hand before and I can see Heidegger's point and in a sense would endorse it. The various things that we take an interest in are not merely theoretical objects, but things that we interact with (and which interact with us).
There is that temptation to consider any description of an object and to feel that there is more to be said, as if something had escaped us. I think we've agreed on that.
I grant you that there is more to rocks and rain that their interaction; many other things can happen to both.
I'll set aside my objections to the use of "real" in the philosophical sense that treats is as a property like colour or shape. From my benighted point of view, the point of the senses is that they (mostly) inform us about real objects; positing sensual objects as an additional category of existence is precisely the key mistake of sense-datum theory.
Quoting schopenhauer1
You misunderstand me. Certainly a rainbow is not a mental event. My point is that the explanation of a rainbow "reduces" it, to use the jargon word, and so seems to assert that it does not exist. But the rainbow is not merely caused by, but is the refraction of light through drops of water. A physical, physiological, account of seeing the rainbow is not a normal causal account, where cause and effect are two distinct entities, but an analysis of what seeing the rainbow is.
Quoting schopenhauer1
This is just mystification. There is a theoretical construct which is implied in most pictures; it is known as the "point of view". In addition, we perceive ourselves as three-dimensional objects in the world, partly through various self-monitoring parts of our nervous system and partly from acting (and being acted upon) in the world.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I can accept that as a rough draft of the kind of thing we expect to find. But I'm sure it will be a lot more complicated than that.
It seems to me that a form of words always suggests a context, no matter how tiny the thumbnail sketch. So philosophers who think they are just considering a form of words are mistaken. Context isn't everything, but it isn't an optional extra. (I get really annoyed about the examples one sees that are tiny thumbnails, which are treated as the whole story, when it is clear that a wider context would reveal complexities that are ignored.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I'm sorry. I don't see quite what you are getting at. The complaint that OLP is in some way inherently conservative ignores the fact that their project was a philosophical revolution, even if it was not a political or social revolution.
Given the accusation of a conservatism so strong that it refused to engage at all with politics, this is a point that it might be worth following up on.
A sympathetic question - can this stance be justified from the text?
And more generally - how might Austin answer the question of relevance here:
Especially the last few seconds.
:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:
Wow, that somehow encapsulates how I picture it in my head. Great sketch! Pedantic. Stuffy. Self-important. Self-referential. Greatest hits!
Quoting Ciceronianus
You still don't get it.
They would say that, wouldn't they :razz:. Keeping the joke going! I like a funny guy.
I just saw that quote.. If you are saying that Austin was in on the joke, then I'm not contesting that.
The fact that taking into consideration further or wider circumstances (and even responses) can change what is meaningful about an expression shows that the expression itself is just kind of ya know what I mean? and whether you do is based on so much more that came before it and is happening around it and what happens after, if necessary. There are times when the actual words matter, but much of the time they are as if a cue in a particular direction of what can already be expected in that situation. Thus why our words seem to move right past each other when we dont take into consideration we might be standing in different worlds (of interest, implication, anticipation).
Quoting Ludwig V
And I agree but would double the bet. Words not only suggest a context, they require it. If I am going to say Im sorry and there is no harm done, the expression itself here can only move along the attendant earmarks of an apology; so that we all know what the next thing is that will be said in this instance, as if it were requiredas if it must be said. Its not the words here that have the power, which seems even to overwhelm our free will in only being able to respond Sorry for what?. So maybe we could say the context isnt always everything, but we definitely do not have certainty in what we perceive nor control over what is said in what we express.
Yes. I didn't mean "suggest" in the sense of something that one might ignore or refuse - "How about some crisps with that?" something more like "Love and marriage go together like..." One might supply "meat and potatoes" or "horse and carriage" or "heaven and hell". Hence misunderstandings.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I'll go with that.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes. But many jokes as well.
I don't disagree. A question. Is this a critique of the people, or of the ideas? What conservatism are we talking about? Not philosophical, presumably. Political? Social? Cultural? Linguistic? Are we talking about what was conservative then, or what is conservative now?
It is true that Ayer and Austin were career academics. But I don't think their biographies, particularly in the period 1940 - 1945, support the idea they were "ivory tower" academics. Wittgenstein had a more complicated career, but didn't conform to that stereotype either.
There's a slogan associated with AI Wei Wei. "Everything is art. Everything is politics." He's in a good position to know. Of course, he should have added that "Everything is philosophy". But then, one may begin to feel that this is a matter of point of view rather than domain. Everything can be seen as art, philosophy, politics, etc. because those are aspects of everything. That doesn't mean that everyone should become either artist, or philosopher, or politician.
I really enjoyed the sketch. The parodies of philosophical arguments are very pointed. Like a politician who is anxious to be satirized, one could see it is as a back-handed compliment. But it isn't a criticism specifically on grounds of conservatism.
In favour of the criticism, there is the by now familiar point, less widely acknowledged at the time, that ordinary language can express undesirable, offensive and damaging stereotypes. A great deal of work has gone into exposing them. The good news is that ordinary language (well, a lot of it) has changed in response. (Which is not to say that there is no more to do.)
On the other hand, Austin does not claim that ordinary language may not need reform (p. 63), though admittedly his description of the process, especially the phrase "tidy up", could be described as an understatement and does largely ignore the practicalities of making the changes he is contemplating.
Curiously enough, at the time, OLP seemed to be very much on the side of the democratizing angels. True, in fact, it was not ordinary language but Received Pronunciation that was being promoted. But even Received Pronunciation was a relatively new invention (on the back of the BBC, which was less than thirty years old at the time), developed to facilitate nation-wide communication through speech, rather than writing. Whether OLP contributed to the changes in lexicography that have happened since, I could not say; but it was certainly an aspect of that wider movement.
But the issue of OLP is tangled up with at least two other issues. One is the very idea of the academy and its tendency to separate itself from the world, drawing in its skirts as it goes on its way. Well, specialization is not a bad thing, is it? Anyway, many academics are anxious to engage with the world as well as pursuing their academic work - some even do their academic work in the world and others aim to spread academic ideas outside the academy.
The other is the socio-cultural dominance and consequent exclusivity of Oxbridge (and, now, some other universities). That has little to do with academia as such and a great deal to do with socio-cultural issues at least in the UK, if not more widely. On this issue, I can only applaud and wish there was more of such criticism now. In fact, much of the second half of the 20th century continued that battle, with some success. (Even Oxbridge has moved on. adjusting to the times, as it has no doubt done so often before) Sadly, this century has seen much (but not all) of that progress eroded.
Just some random points.
This is not true. The issue is the way that the specific is related to the generalization, and whether the relationship assumed is logical or illogical. Your example assumed a relation between the specific and the generalization which was not implied by the generalization. This fallacious or illogical relation produced a claim that there is a problem with the generalization, when the real problem was with misapplication of the generalization.. Andt since this supposed problem with the generalization is only produced through the means of an illogical relation with the specific, the claim that it indicates a problem with the generalization is not justified.
Here's an example which is analogous to the mistake you made. Suppose I make the proposition that we see electromagnetic waves as colour. Then you mention some specific wavelengths like ultraviolet, and infrared, which are outside the visible range, claiming that this is evidence that my proposition is false. The specifics do not conform therefore there is a problem with the generalization. But my proposition does not state that we see "all" electromagnetic waves, so the relation which that claim relies on is not justified by logic, it is illogical. What would really be the case in this instance is that you misunderstood, and therefore misapplied the generalization.
That is the same sort of illogical relation between the specific and the generalization, which your other argument relied on. I make the proposition that a chair produces interpretations. You say that a chair does not interpret what I say, therefore a chair does not produce interpretations.
Quoting Ludwig V
This is a common epistemological problem. It is commonly represented in the form of 'We can know causes from their effects, without establishing a direct relation with the cause itself'. We do this through the means of generalization, principally inductive reasoning. But inductive reasoning does not have precise rules and therefore does not provide the level of certainty which some epistemologists require for "knowledge" so they expose problems like Hume did.
The issue you point to here is ambiguity in the use of the term "relate". There is a vast multitude of different ways which "relations" may be made, implying a multitude of types of "relations". Sometimes we do not properly distinguish between different types of relations, and ignore the fact that certain types produce a much higher degree of certainty than other types.
So you are correct to say that if we can know that other animals have perceptions, we can "relate" to these perceptions, but what happens with this type of reasoning is that the former, "animals have perceptions" is a generalization, while the latter "we can relate to these perceptions" expresses a proposition about some specifics. The relationship with the mentioned specifics, "perceptions" is established through the means of the generalization which is naturally lacking in certainty. The relation is not direct between the subject and the particular. This type of relation inverts the true order of necessity, so it is a completely different type of relation, i.e. it lacks in necessity due to the inversion.
Here's an example "all grass is green" is a generalization. We can say that this proposition provides a relation to individual blades of grass, that each one must be green, but it's really just a pretend relation to individual blades of grass. And because it's just a pretense, despite the fact that you may call it a relation, the knowledge derived here is only as reliable as the inductive reasoning which created the generalization in the first place. So if I tell you that I have a blade of grass in my hand, and you think that the generalization provides you with a relation to that blade of grass, you'll conclude that the blade of grass in my hand is green. But it might actually be brown, or some other colour, because the generalization is faulty. And that's why I say that this type of relation. though it is correct to call it a relation, is a sort of pretend relation, because it's not direct, it goes through the intermediary of a generalization and therefore is only as reliable as the generalization. Further analysis shows that the relation is not with actual individuals, but possible individuals.
I would say that this is the case with the generalizations I provided, first that other animals have perceptions, and second, that they are different from ours. These generalizations are to some extent unreliable as produced from a sort of inductive reasoning. Now you say that if we know that the perceptions are different from ours, then obviously we relate to them, but this is what I called a pretend relation, through the intermediary of the generalizations. My principle was that different people have different perceptions, and I extrapolated to other animals having different perceptions.
So if I talk about a person on the other side of the world, whom I know has different perceptions from me, through that generalization, this does not mean that I have established a relation with the perceptions of a person on the other side of the world. It's purely fictional, just a pretense, created by the generalization, but the generalization creates the illusion that I am actually saying something real about a real person's perceptions, and I actually have a relation with those perceptions.
Quoting Ludwig V
No, I think what I said is the inverse of that. We form an interpretation, but the interpretation is not a judgement at all. Then afterwards the interpretation is judged as correct or not. I might have confused you though, because I then said that the interpretation is itself is purposeful, intentional, and therefore aimed or directed by some form of good. So I would not characterize the interpretation itself as a judgement, but an action which is the product of this more base form of intention, which may be called a form of judgement. Interpretation is more like a tool of intentionality which lies between two distinct forms of judgement, the judgement which directs its production, and the judgement which judges the correctness of it, afterwards. The judgement which is prior to the interpretation is a judgement of what is needed, the interpretation itself is the act deemed as required to fulfil the need, and the posterior judgement determines successfulness. The process of trial and error can be understood in this way. Far too often though, the judgement made prior to the trial and error action is represented as non-intentional, to avoid an infinite regress of intentional acts.
Quoting Ludwig V
I think we really need to recognize two very distinct forms of judgement, the prior and the posterior, in relation to the act. The prior judgement, as a judgement of what is needed, the act required, or means to the end, cannot really be characterized as a judgement of correctness. It can sometimes be seen as a judgement of "the correct act" but most often it cannot. If we start to characterize the prior judgement as a judgement of correctness, we start to portray all intentional act as a matter of following rules. The act would be determined by a rule, and this rule would produce a judgement of the correct act for the circumstances. But this is not how we think and act in real situations. The need to act is influenced by emotions and all sorts of subconscious things which cannot be described as judgements of correctness.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes, this is the point. If interpretation is a form of action, then the judgement which is prior to the action, which brings the action into existence, must be subconscious (I don't understand the distinction between unconscious and non-conscious which you point to). This produces the need to consider distinct forms of judgement, the prior and posterior, as explained above.
Quoting Ludwig V
I don't believe there is a standard model of interpretation.
So am I entitled to conclude from your last sentence that "all swans are white" is only as reliable as the induction that created it in the first place? Fair enough. So "Swan A is white" and "Swan B is white" etc are the premises of the induction? Fair enough. So now I reason that "all swans are white" Then I discover that Swan Z is black. So my generalization and the preceding induction is not reliable. So I need to do one of three things: a) abandon the generalization b) modify the generalization ("swans are white, except in Australia") c) change my definition of a swan ("A swan may be black or which" or the quantifier ("Most swans are white".) True, the new generalization is also subject to the same hazards. But what am I supposed to do - abandon all generalizations? I don't think so. There's no pretence involved at any stage.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If my chair does not interpret ("produce interpretations") what I say, there are two possibilities: a) that it produces interpretations of some other thing(s) or (b) causes me to produce interpretations. I deduce that you meant the latter. My mistake. But that does not give any ground for supposing that the chair has a mind or is conscious.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You do represent the prior judgement as intentional, so how do you avoid the infinite regress?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are missing the cognitive element in most? all? emotions. If I am afraid of snakes, I have made a judgement about snakes and that judgement is an important part of the judgement about what is needed. Prejudices may be erroneous or ill-founded, but they are nevertheless judgements about what is appropriate in various circumstances - even if I am not aware of them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, unconscious and subconscious are a bit tricky. But non-conscious, for me at least, means "not capable of consciousness or unconsciousness" or "the distinction between conscious and unconscious does not apply".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
1. Something before the interpretation, a text, a picture - something that means something. Call it the original. "Interpretation of...."
2. The interpretation. "Interpretation of .... as ...."
The third stage is not normally necessary when there is only one interpretation available.
3, Evaluation or justification of the interpretation.
I've been thinking about other cases in which we know the socio-political tendencies of philosophers. Locke, Berkeley, Hegel, Sartre, Heidegger, Adorno, Russell all spring to mind. Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and Kierkegaard have pretty clear religious affiliations. (There's no point in going further back than that in this context.) I don't think that philosophers pay much attention to them in their philosophical readings of them, do they? How seriously should we take the possible conservatism of OLP?
It might be more relevant to ponder why their work has been so widely disregarded. Likely, it would be speculative to suggest reasons, but here goes, anyway.
There's a theoretical issue. Many philosophers have thought to refute their predecessors. Few of them have thought to bring philosophy as such to an end. Mind you, the twentieth century differs from earlier times in that a successor appeared to be waiting in the wings, to take over all the interesting questions - and, to a considerable extent, it has. (Science, of course.) (I'm reminded of the problem for conventional painting when photography developed. The artists worked out a way forward pretty quickly, Philosophy is still trying.) So, perhaps OLP was too successful. It convinced its adherents, who either spread out to pass on the word or gave up philosophy. Not a recipe for a thriving tradition. (It is possible, however, that the same problem afflicts analytic philosophy in general - there seems to be an under-current of concern nowadays that it is not going anywhere and has nowhere to go.)
There is a practical issue. Simply, that the style of argument that Ryle, Austin and Wittgenstein deploy is much, much harder than it looks.
Far too often though, the judgement made prior to the trial and error action is represented as non-intentional, to avoid an infinite regress of intentional acts.
Metaphysician Undercover
an example of how thinkers of the day dealt with the issue of describing a reverse ability between determined and undetermined presentations of facts, as noted , unsupported above by using the same argument.
I can't offer much more. Ayer was more politically active, supporting the Labor movement and advocating decriminalisation of Homosexuality. Biographers note that Austin was more interested in teaching than writing, and I think his influence is there in the Four Women, who were all political an attended his sessions, although none were in his circle. There'd be a PhD in arguing that case.
I don't think OLP disappeared. OLP provided philosophers with a new toolbox, and while the details changed as philosophy became both more formal and more about cognition, I think there is another PhD in showing that the tools did not disappear but instead became ubiquitous. Analytic philosophy takes the sort of conceptual analysis pioneered by the OLP philosophers as granted.
There a technique in history called "prosopography". That's what we need here. But it is very labour-intensive. Wikipedia - Prosopography
Quoting Banno
It's true that I keep seeing traces or reminders of OLP in discussions that seem far removed and it's true that when something is taken for granted, the need to give explicit references is less important.
Quoting Ludwig V
Wittgenstein refers to this as well, but what I take it to mean is that sometimes OLPs method does not work because the things we say in a particular situation distort the mechanics of that practice, rather than reflect the criteria we ordinarily judge it by (which is OLPs means of insight). So, when they talk of tidying up or rearranging (PI #92), they are not talking about word politics, but simply using the means of OLP, say in substituting one form of expression for another (#90). Sometimes this just means simply drawing out multiple examples to see a wider view of how it is that a practice works despite first impressions given only one way of speaking about it. Other times weve taken one way of speaking and created metaphysics.
Quoting Ludwig V
On the face of it, OLP seems to be pitting what we usually say against what philosophy says. The interpretation that OLP is conservative (usually taken from Moore) is that it is just common sense refuting skepticism. Austin will appear conservative because of his snobbishness about how language is just being used clumsily, lazily, haphazardly, etc. In both cases there is the underlying condescension that skepticism is folly or abnormal. Wittgenstein shows us how our fear is warranted (that we cannot know the other, know for certain what is right). In all, I take the suggestion that we look around at the variety of the world to be license to explore our own interests, and that it is democratic to think anyone can reflect and learn.
Quoting Ludwig V
I dont take OLP as wanting to end philosophy (nor refute skepticism). I think Austin thought he had finally found a way to get started (though in his mind this was just going to be a kind of cataloguing). Wittgenstein took on the same nemesis, however, seeing that the skeptic was part of himself, he realized the desire for certainty is a reoccurring part of all of us, thus, the battle was not to kill the hydra, but only cut of (charm?) each snake as it comes up. And in the face of our fundamental fear and desire, to merely offer as alternative the vast complex flawed variety of the world, is rather like saying eat your veg and exercise to someone who just wants a pill.
Quoting Ludwig V
Austin and Wittgenstein both make what they are doing look obvious, so people take the point as simple, or trivial.
As Horace observed long, long ago "The "true/real) skill is hiding your skill". (Ars est celare artem)
But then it looks easy and people think it is easy. Perhaps then, there is a role for rhetoric in philosophy - making it look portentous helps to persuade people to take it seriously.
On which note, has anybody else noticed Austin's rhetoric in Sense and Sensibilia? He gives the impression of someone at the end of his patience rather than a dispassionate analyst. Yet he is also very fair to Ayer. Puzzling, and complicated.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes, if you look more closely, that is what they (all, I think) had in mind. But people (especially conventional/traditional philosophers, perhaps) focused on the initial phase and the second phase got overlooked. It reminds me of the reputation of Descartes, Berkeley and Hume; their constructive phases seem to get swallowed up in the first phase.
Quoting Antony Nickles
It certainly seemed democratic at the time, in comparison to the condescension of their predecessors - analytic and other wise.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes, I cited those example (with some trepidation) in order to show that the technique was capable of being usefully applied where live social and cultural issues are at stake. Inevitably, politics gets involved and sometimes people get things out of proportion.
Another possibility you have not considered, the black thing you saw is not a swan. This is a real possibility, and it is the bigger problem with "seeing" things according to essential properties produced from induction. If swans are known as necessarily white, then your eyes may be closed to many other properties when judging things as a swan. When you see a black thing you would not see it as a swan. And so, if someone suggests that it is a swan, this proposal must be justified by reference to something else, other than colour. That is a real problem with "essential properties".
The swan example is very simple, and so it might not elucidate the principle I'm trying to express, about how the way we see things, is greatly influenced by the way that we learn to see essential properties. We might find better examples in the way that science looks at dividing things into parts, each part having essential properties which make it the part which it is, and that guides us in the way that we divide the thing into parts. The thing must be divided so that the parts have the essential properties which we've expressed as necessary. So for example, an electron is negative and a proton is positive, and we cannot divide the atom in any other way because we've created these categories of essential properties of the parts. However, adhering to these principles produces the need to assume "anti-matter". This should indicate a problem with the restrictions we have dictated.
Quoting Ludwig V
You don't seem to have grasped the "pretense" I referred to. Let me try to explain in a different way. The pretense is in the claim that the generalization has provided us a relation with the particular thing. The generalization guides the acting, thinking human being, in one's relation to the particular. So the human being who applies the generalization, as a tool, is really between the generalization and the particular. The relation with the particular, is between the person and the particular, and the generalization is something outside this relation, created for the purpose of enhancing this relation.
Look critically at the way you presented your swan example please. First, you produced the inductive premise, "all swans are white". Then, you proposed "swan Z is black". Surely you see that the proposition of a black swan is contradictory to your inductive premise. What does this indicate? It indicates that you have allowed a relation to the particulars of the world which is distinct from, and not controlled by, nor dependent on those universals, those inductive generalizations. This relationship with the world which you have, allows you to say "Z is a swan" regardless of what the generalizations (rules and regulations) dictate. Therefore we ought to consider that the person's real relationship with the particulars of the world is direct, and the universal, or generalization, is a sort of tool which the individual can use or not use, as one wills.
That is why I said that this idea, that the person relates to the particulars of the world through the generalizations is just a pretense. But that's an ambiguous and finnicky kind of statement because we actually do relate to the particulars through the means of the universals. However, the universals can be looked at as tools, and they are not essential to that relationship, as the direct relationship is prior to, and precedes the existence of the tool, which is created by the desire to enhance or augment the relationship. It is the idea that the universal is prior to, and fundamental to the relationship (as in Platonic idealism), as the medium between the individual person and the particular, which is the pretense.
Quoting Ludwig V
No, I meant a). Even if we can produce conclusive evidence that your chair does not interpret the words that you say, we cannot exclude the possibility that it is interpreting some other things. We really do not know many aspects of the world, like at the quantum level. So we cannot claim to know exactly what the chair is doing in the basic activity it is engaged in, especially in relation to "interpretation" which is not a clearly defined term with clearly expressed essential properties.
Quoting Ludwig V
The infinite regress is avoided in the way outlined by Plato, by assuming the reality of "the good". As explained by Plato, "the good" as the fundamental base for action, activity, or actuality, is unknowable to us human beings, though it is in its essence highly intelligible. That it is essentially intelligible indicates that there is no infinite regress. The appearance of infinite regress is produced by a misrepresentation of what is unknowable to human beings as unknowable in general, or absolutely, like infinite regress.
Quoting Ludwig V
I am not "missing the cognitive element" within the cause of action, I am downplaying it as inessential. This is evident in involuntary acts, reflex, etc.. It is simply not true that you must have made a cognitive judgement to be afraid of snakes. Creatures are born with many such innate fears, prior to the capacity of making cognitive judgements.
Quoting Ludwig V
What I am talking about as prior to the interpretation is the condition of the interpreter, before the interpretation. The individual must be capable of interpreting, attentive, and motivated, as interpretation is an act carried out by the thing which interprets. How can you have a "standard model of interpretation" without a representation of what constitutes an interpreter? It is only by properly modeling "the interpreter" that we might exclude the chair as an interpreter.
Metaphysician Undercover
That is correct. However it appears to reinforce the idea of reversibility of the essential idea from a intensive sentiment, that always appears as a tentative presentation, never able to catch its faith Ians confidence of running out of air up ahead.
The mouse may simply be afraid of small spaces, as unable to fathom that essentially up ahead the largesse of quantum objects are relative to the time it might take to see in the darkness, and indeed it has been shown that the vampire bat is not too far away from a mouse, and such gross distinctions are extremely difficult to make, as an analogous comparison between dusk and dawn, that is uncertain at that juncture.
So reversibility is essentially a necessary pretense prior to its cinceotiin
I was alluding to that possibility when I said I could change the definition of a swan. I was a bit abbreviated when I wrote "Swan Z is black". On the other hand, if the object I see is not at all like a swan, then I won't be tempted to modify my generalization, so it isn't problematic.
I don't think definitions are necessarily about "essential properties" in the metaphysical sense. That is, they are only essential so long as we treat them as essential.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, it's a bit more complicated than that. Generalizations are indeed like a rule, and every application is a new decision. But they are subject to inter-subjective agreement. So, if I want to communicate with others, in unusual circumstances, I need to carry their agreement with me.
Your representation of the relationship between me, the rule and the case is a bit odd, but I'm not a Platonist so it is not worth arguing about.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think I'll just skip this issue. You are clearly speaking a language different from mine, so there's not prospect of mutual understanding.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You implied that you are not a Platonist. Now you adopt his idea of the good. ???
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have a point. But then, you don't want to exclude the chair as an interpreter, so I don't know what's going on.
Regarding how our perceptions provided by the senses occur, I am very close to Kant. There is no pure and passive receptivity. For Kant, such a thing would be undifferentiated chaos. For example, taking the case of the snake mentioned above: One does not simply have a glance, but there is recognition of the thing lasting, having a duration and a location in space, which will allow us to carry out the action. (let's say an act of evasion).
Let's take the case according to the assumption that our perceptual apparatus is a kind of film camera: The snake is not shown simply as a frame but as a series of frames. How can we say that it is the same snake that appears through different frames? In this case there is a sitensis, a non-passive activity of consciousness and sensitivity, although this is not voluntary. The activity is the work of a "something in general" that enables something like a recognition of the snake through duration and through upcoming events. That is, there is an act of transcendence applied to sensitivity, in the sense of inscribing something in the conscious system in order to be repeated under similar conditions [thus The memory functions as a trace register. And the trace is abstract enough as a written sign] This is where something like "the snake" appears, which is repeated for all the others, the concept, one can say.
The tentative pretense as it approaches the sense of sensibility, conduits the repetitive progression of variable, relative uncertainty , as far as that sensibility concerns the overall generally accumulated impression of its self through both systems of aporehension, is indeed such a process best described as gnostic.
Welcome to the Forum.
I've been unable to make sense of your posts.
Interesting, Yes, something like that, tracing the influence Austin had on his students by examining what they did and said.
Quoting Antony Nickles
:grin:
This is evident in the present series of threads on moral antirealism, started by @Bob Ross. The attempts at conceptual clarification are rejected because they do not directly solve the Grand Problem Of What To Do.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Especially in a forum such as this, where dilettante abound. The sight seems to disproportionately attract retired or unemployed lab assistants and engineers. Some pay attention to the details. Others come already supplied with the answers to all our philosophical quandaries, ready to explain where we have gone wrong. This might be amusing: A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesnt exist. Heres why hes mistaken
Anyway, I wanted to thank you both for making this thread far more interesting, informative and certainly longer than I expected.
I was thinking of examples, an then
Quoting hypericin
The article uses Austin's approach, even talking of misfires.
:up:
For what it is worth, I couldn't agree with you more on the free will debate article you shared: most scientists just assume there's no free will because the world is determined.
Sorry Bella, I just can't make out the principle of reversibility which you are proposing.
Quoting Ludwig V
It cannot be true that it isn't problematic because you've already labeled it as "swan Z". So you are clearly seeing it as a swan, despite it being the wrong colour. If you did not see something about it which made it look like a swan, despite being the wrong colour, you would never have called it "swan Z". Then that black thing would be irrelevant, and you would not even have the example you gave me, because the naming it as a swan was essential to the example.
Quoting Ludwig V
The way that I represented generalizations as tools, used in our lives of relating to particulars, makes the fact that they are subject to intersubjective agreement irrelevant. What is important is that the individual's relation with particulars is direct. That the generalizations require intersubjective agreement only reinforces the idea that they are secondary, or posterior to that primary relation (the individuals of the intersubjective relations are themselves particulars).
Quoting Ludwig V
What I think is that "Platonism" in its modern form, what is understood by, and referred to by, that term, is not a good representation of the actual philosophy of Plato. So I disagree with "Platonism" in its modern representation, but I find within the philosophy of Plato, the ways and means to get beyond the problems associated with what is known today as Platonism. The modern conception of Platonism, if intended to represent the philosophy of Plato, is a straw man.
Quoting Ludwig V
It's not that I don't want to exclude the chair as an interpreter, intuition strongly tells me that I ought not believe that the chair does any type of interpreting at all. However, I do not see the principles required to exclude the chair, and that is why I argued that we cannot exclude the chair. That would not make sound logic, to simply adopt the propositions which you desire.
The problem is, as I explained, that we do not have a clear and accurate understanding of what it means to interpret. So, despite the fact that you provided the principles of what you called a standard model of interpretation, that model I found to be extremely deficient because it provided no description of the interpreter. Since interpretation is the act of an interpreter, I do not see how one could ever claim to have a model of interpretation which has no reference to the interpreter. So until we know what an "interpreter" is, we cannot exclude the chair as a possible interpreter.
Well, for me, it is a hen-and-egg relationship and I don't see what is important to you, or what you mean by "direct" here. So we'll have to agree to disagree.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Oh, I'm sure one can find all sorts of things in Plato if one looks hard enough. But it's not something I'm into at the moment. It would help if you specified, when you mention Plato, whether you mean the modern Plato or the ancient one.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, the unproblematic black thing is not a problem for the issue at hand. The problematic black thing is the problem, and therefore the relevant case. I didn't go into the intricacies because I thought they were obvious - and indeed it is clear that you understood the situation. So what's the problem?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
An interpreter is a person, normally a human being, a person. (I do not rule out the possibility of non-paradigmatic cases). A chair is not a human being, a person, and not even sentient. That's background understanding in normal circumstances. If you want to consider that a chair might be an interpreter, I don't know where to begin. I'm not really interested in a long dissection of the idea of a person vs an insentient object. To make a discussion of this, you need to give me a problem. Simply announcing your question is not enough.
I have to read this. In context, this use of misfires speaks volumes. Isn't language wonderful?
Quoting Banno
It was a surprise to find the thread and a great pleasure to participate, and I'm very grateful to you and . And I learnt some things into the bargain.
Quoting Bob Ross
Well, they are free to assume whatever they want, aren't they?